



Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences

School of Political Science

Department of Political Science and History

**INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS, MIGRATION AND
THE PRIVATE SECTOR: THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL
COMMITTEE FOR EUROPEAN MIGRATION, 1951-1980**

Ioannis Limnios Sekeris

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We need to work together to ensure that migration benefits everyone: countries of origin, transit, and destination and, of course, the migrants themselves.

William Lacy Swing, Director General of the International Organization for Migration (2008-2018).

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Acknowledgements

When I was first asked why I chose to research the history of migrant transport through international organisations, I slowly realised that all the pillars of my research were integral to my life, even before I was born. I grew up in Nea Alikarnassos, a suburb of Heraklion city on the island of Crete in Greece. Nea Alikarnassos (New Alikarnassos) is a refugee city, built in 1925 to host Greek refugees leaving Alikarnassos city (today's Bodrum) on the southern coast of Asia Minor after the end of Greco-Turkish War (1919-1922) and the exchange of population between Greece and Turkey. Herodotus (484–425 B.C.), the father of history, also originated from Alikarnassos and was an omnipresent figure in the new city, constituting the emblem of Nea Alikarnassos. My great-grandparents and grandparents also moved from Alikarnassos after 1922. Discussions about refuge, of a former homeland, of what was left behind, and of the difficulties of a new beginning were some of the first memories I built, and living in-between two cultures was a reality experienced throughout my life.

Nea Alikarnassos is located between the Heraklion port and the Heraklion airport. Sounds of ship horns and aeroplane take-offs permeate the city's atmosphere. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, two Cretan passenger liner shipping companies operated in the domestic sea routes from Heraklion port: Minoan Lines and ANEK Lines. Periodically, ship launchings occurred at the port, and the locals were invited to visit the ships before their inaugural voyage. My father and I always visited the new vessels, and, as a young boy, I was fascinated by the dimensions and the dynamics of the vessels. Similarly, the Hellenic Air Force opened their premises every November to celebrate Patron Saint Archangel Michael where one could board military aircraft, learn about their capabilities, and buy aeroplane models; together with my father, we never missed such an opportunity.

Many more members of my family experienced migration. Part of my mother's family migrated in the early 1950s to Argentina and the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, while a great part of my father's family had migrated to Australia. Both sides of my family migrated with the assistance of the *Intergovernmental Committee of European Migration*, which I discovered decades later as a history researcher. The increase of intra-European migration, especially in the 1960s, also affected parts of my extended family, who migrated to Western

Germany. Family reunions were always a special event for all of us. At dinner, family members from abroad would tell stories, share experiences, and describe ‘different’ ways of life. They also brought ‘exotic’ gifts such as koala and kangaroo toys or German chocolates. Hence, many aspects of refuge, migration, ships, and aeroplanes were always part of my life; they shaped me as a person and a researcher, and I am thankful to my nuclear and extended family for all the incentives provided to me, even unintentionally. These incentives eventually guided me to the subject of this dissertation.

Writing a doctoral thesis is a very creative period—a period of academic fulfilment. Equally, it is a period of significant isolation and deprivation. Thankfully, plenty of people were next to me, making this voyage easier and to them, I owe my acknowledgements.

Above all, I am deeply grateful to the Academic Consultative Committee of my dissertation. I met my supervisor, Professor Lina Venturas (Panteion University), while I was concluding my Master thesis. She was not a member of my Consultative Committee, but, as an expert in migration, I felt the need to contact her. I mustered my courage and emailed her, and, without knowing me, she responded within a few hours and offered to meet me, sharing valuable insights for my research as well as reading parts of my MA thesis. This academic relationship was built over the years with participations in research programmes, workshops, and conferences, among many more. Professor Venturas taught me the values of academic research at a high level: to think analytically and how to understand historical changes outside the national borders. Working with Professor Venturas, she lent me her unreserved and unconditional support, and her assistance shaped my research interests and my work as a historian. Thus, I will always be indebted to her assistance.

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Parts of this doctoral thesis were presented in international conferences, were published in collective volumes, and competed in academic competitions such as the *John Scholes Transport History Research Essay Competition* in 2020 organised by SAGE Publications and the *Journal of Transport History*. An article deriving from this dissertation won the prize, which is annually awarded to a writer of a publishable paper based on original research in the history of transport and mobility. The support, comments, and insights of all my Consultative Committee members throughout all these endeavours was more than crucial and I would like to thank them wholeheartedly.

For this dissertation, several trips for research purposes were necessary. It was also an opportunity to meet new people who generously offered their support to this project. First, I would like to thank Kerstin Lau, the librarian of the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) in Geneva, Switzerland. Kerstin welcomed me from the first moment. She shared my excitement in archival research, facilitated me in the collection of books and articles of my interests; she was always there to support me academically, but also to remind me that taking breaks is important, too. Along with Christina Vasala, the legal officer in IOM, they introduced me to Geneva life, and I am indebted to their support in my prolonged stay in the IOM Headquarters in Geneva.

In Greece, I would like to thank the then Chief of IOM Mission in Athens, Daniel Esdras, who opened the archives of his Mission to my research and visited me at my little desk, asking me what interesting stories I had explored each day. At the History Archive of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Giorgos Polidorakis' support allowed me to examine historical records not yet available to the public, thus enriching my research. Regarding the journal of *Naftika Chronika*, its editor Ilias Bisias and Panagiotis Kapetanakis from his team, stood as friends, providing me each day with dozens of volumes of said journal to examine. I need to thank Ilias Bisias, also, for introducing me to interviewees from the shipping sector: former officers of a

very active liner shipping company operating between Greece and Australia since the 1960s.

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For this research, many personal interviews took place with officials of liner shipping companies, of international or non-governmental organisations, travel agencies, as well as with migrants. Not all these interviews were utilised in this dissertation, but I owe an acknowledgement to all the interviewees who were willing to meet me at workplaces and public cafes or welcome me in their apartments and wholeheartedly respond to my questions, sharing their valuable life experiences. Lastly, I would also like to thank Atha and Helen Limnios who hosted me in their apartment in Athens for several months, allowing me to proceed with my research without worries regarding accommodation.

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List of Abbreviations

AJDC	American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee
AJWS	Australian Jewish Welfare Society
APMBP	Accordo Passeggeri Mediterraneo – Brasile/Plata
APV	Accordo Passageri Venezuela
ARA	American Relief Administration
ARC	American Red Cross
ASTA	American Society of Travel Agents
DIMC	Department for Immigration, Canberra
DPs	Displaced Persons
EAPS	Europe Australian Passenger Service
ECA	Economic Cooperation Administration
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EEC	European Economic Community
ELMES	Hellenic Mediterranean Line
EMICO	European Migrations Committee
ERP	European Recovery Programme
FANU	Flota Argentina de Navegacion de Ultramar
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation
FTL	Flying Tiger Line
GAL	Greek-Australian Line
GATT	General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs
GDR	Greek Drachmas
GOETO	Grand Order of European Tour Operators
HAL	Holland-America Line
HAPAG	Hamburg American Line
HIAS	Hebrew Sheltering and Immigrant Aid Society
IATA	International Air Transport Association
ICEM	Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration
ICM	Intergovernmental Committee for Migration
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IGCR	Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IMCO	Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organisation
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IMM	International Mercantile Marine Co
iNGOs	International Non-governmental organisations
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
IOs	International organisations
IRI	Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale (Institute for Industrial Reconstruction)
IRO	International Refugee Organisation

JAI	Jewish Agency for Israel
JDC	Joint Distribution Committee
LD	Law Degree
MSTS	Military Sea Transportation Service
NAC	North Atlantic Conference
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NHAL	National Hellenic American Line
NDL	Norddeutscher Lloyd
OEE	Ο Έξω Ελληνισμός (Greeks Abroad - newspaper)
OEEC	Organisation for European Economic Cooperation
PANAM	Pan-American Airlines
PICMME	Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe
POWs	Prisoners of war
P&O	Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company
SCCT	Sub-Committee on the Coordination of Transport
SITMAR	Societa Italiana Trasporti Marittimi Line
TV	Transamerica Airline
TWA	Trans-World Airlines
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDHR	United Nations Declaration of Human Rights
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNRRA	United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration
US/USA	United States of America
USEP	United States Escapee Programme
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WCC	World Council of Churches
WHO	World Health Organisation
WWI	World War One
WWII	World War Two

Introduction

2015 was a year of financial rescue for the shipping companies operating in the northern Aegean, thanks to the transfer, from the islands to Attica and northern Greece, of hundreds of thousands of refugees and migrants who landed on the opposite coasts of Asia Minor. Many millions of Euros accumulated in the coffers of these companies from charter contracts for transport with the state and also with the tickets that immigrants and refugees paid for their transport with both chartered ships and liner ships.¹

Scope & Methodology of the Thesis

In any crisis, the parties involved endure different experiences. This is what the above excerpt clearly demonstrates in the case of the Mediterranean Refugee Crisis in 2015 when more than 856,000 migrants and refugees crossed the sea borders mainly between Turkey and Greece and, in their vast majority, landed in the Northern Aegean islands.² With the refugees and migrants destined primarily for the Northern European countries, the only way to continue their trip was by moving to the Greek mainland. The cheapest way to do so was by sea. This humanitarian crisis was proved as an opportunity for the liner shipping companies operating within Greece to increase their profits. Considering that the general passenger traffic they served was diminishing (tourists and passengers) due to the refugee and financial crises, the increasing migrant/refugee passenger traffic guaranteed their profitability. Therefore, new shipping companies started their operation on the islands, along with those already in operation, and experienced a period of unexpected profitability, which resulted in the creation of a new *migration business* in this sector.

This aspect of migration generated the subject of this dissertation, which studies the international organisations and the transport enterprises facilitating migration after the end of the Second World War. The core idea is that, through the migration process, the production of revenue is achieved for those involved in its facilitation. The means

¹ «Αυξημένη επιβατική κίνηση στη γραμμή Πειραιάς-Χίος-Μυτιλήνη λόγω προσφύγων», capital.gr, 01.08.2016, see www.capital.gr/epikairota/3145204/auximeni-epibatiki-kinisi-sti-grammi-peiraias-xios-mutilini-logo-prosfugon, retrieved 11.06.2022.

² “The Refugee Crisis through Statistics: A compilation for politicians, journalists and other concerned citizens”, European Stability Institute, 30.01.2017, www.esiweb.org/pdf/ESI%20-%20The%20refugee%20crisis%20through%20statistics%20-%2030%20Jan%202017.pdf, retrieved 11.06.2022.

for this revenue are the living, namely the migrants or the ‘human cargo’,³ as the transport sector uses to term the individuals it transports. Thus, human mobility will be examined as commerce, migrants as a ‘living-good’, and the participation of state or private companies will be put in the foreground of this examination. This approach aims at illuminating the way the organisation and the mechanisms under which the migrants’ expressed will to migrate was handled by those facilitating the migratory process; this approach was not under humanitarian terms, but business and commercial ones.⁴ Four axes are driving this dissertation: migration, international organisations, and the states and the private sector; the interrelation and interlink between them is highlighted throughout the thesis.

The driving force for this dissertation emerged from my earlier research regarding the European and, more particularly, the Greek emigration to Australia during the first post-WWII decades. A shortage of historical studies on the entrepreneurial aspect of migration and, more specifically, on the role of the shipping and airline companies of the period in the management of migration flows and of their involvement and profit out of their operation was noticed. The political and social aspects of migration as well as the financial consequences on an individual, family, and state level have already been sufficiently examined. However, the role of the private sector is absent from the examination, an area which has become the focus of this thesis. In addition, after the end of the Second World War, the involvement of international organisations in the management of human mobility from Europe, which subsidised their migration in a Cold War context, added another factor in the management of migration on an international and intergovernmental level. The contemporary Mediterranean refugee crisis highlighted aspects of migration management that involved a spectrum of stakeholders.

The main goal of this dissertation is to attempt to fill the gaps identified in the historiography by examining the post-WWII transportation of migrants and refugees through the most active international organisation of the period in the field of

³ David M. Williams, “Bulk Passenger Shipping, 1750-1870”, in Lewis R. Fischer and Helge W. Nordvik (eds), *Shipping and Trade, 1750-1950: Essays in International Maritime Economic History*, Yorkshire, 1990, pp. 44-45.

⁴ On a criticism of the approach of migrants as products, David Spener, “Some Critical Reflections on the Migration Industry Concept”, Trinity University, <http://faculty.trinity.edu/dspener/clandestinecrossings/related%20articles/migration%20industry.pdf>, retrieved, 13.01.2020, pp. 11-12.

migration—the *Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration* (ICEM). Simultaneously, the geographical scope of the examination will be widened on an international (Western Bloc) level without concentrating on one pair of sending and receiving countries. This thesis attempts the re-conceptualisation of post-WWII migration by including the discussion of the private financial sector, mainly the transport enterprises, as well as the international intergovernmental organisations specialised in migration issues, along with the emigration and immigration countries. The companies of the private sector involved in the migration process are not approached in this dissertation as stimulators for the furtherance of migration, considering that their traffic load was provided through the direct mediation of ICEM. Therefore, the transport companies cooperating with ICEM were not trying to influence the decision of potential migrants to emigrate; they were only profiting from the traffic managed and organised by ICEM. In this context, they are examined as a remunerating link in the migration chain. ICEM is recognised as an agency endowed by its founders with the task to apply business solutions to the post-WWII migration problem of the West. The *Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration* functioned as a business institution with a social character. This characteristic is examined in the Organisation's relation with its member-states, the private sector enterprises—more specifically, the transport companies—and lastly, in the relations developed between its business partners. Hence, the dissertation opens the dialogue between migration history, history of international organisations, maritime history, aviation history, and business history; a bridge is constituted between all these fields, which, heretofore, has not been discussed in a scholarly capacity.

The timeframe of the thesis starts in 1951, when the *Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration* was established. However, the history and the work of the international organisations involved in human mobility preceding ICEM are also examined, especially those established after the end of the Second World War. The examination ends in 1980, a year marked by a myriad of changes: ICEM's Constitution widened the territorial areas of its intervention; there was an increase in the development and provision of migration services, apart from transport services, by the Organisation; the European overseas migration decreased; finally, it was a year when considerable changes in the transport sector occurred with the abolition, to a large extent, of the passenger shipping companies from the transport programme of ICEM,

as well as from passenger traffic overall, which resulted in the total domination of the airline companies.

Theorising the Relation between Migration, International Organisations, and the Private Sector: a historiographical overview

An initial distinction of the migratory movements can be made between the legitimate versus the irregular/undocumented movements. In the first case, human mobility is regulated based on the legal system of the countries of origin, transit, and of destination. The irregular/undocumented movements are governed by the illegitimate mechanisms managing human mobility (e.g. human smugglers and traffickers). Irregular movements are noticed in every period and are not noticed only in the contemporary period; in many cases, a complex mechanism is put in force, showing great flexibility and adaptability in the changing regulations established to inhibit irregular migration. However, in the context of this dissertation, we will focus only on the legitimate aspects and mechanisms of migration.⁵

Regarding legitimate movements, one of the structural elements for the implementation of a migratory movement is the desire or need of the quasi-migrants to move or the existence of one or more reasons that forces them to move internally or externally of national borders. People migrate for various reasons: financial (geographical differences/disparities in income and employment opportunities between countries of origin and destination, for instance), social (education, marriage, family reunification), environmental (desertification, deforestation, pollution),⁶ and others are

⁵ For aspects of illegitimate mechanisms of migration, as well as the state-mechanisms for the deportation of foreigners from the receiving states to their countries of origin or to other states, see Catherine Dauvergne, *Making People Illegal. What Globalization Means for Migration and Law*, Cambridge, New York, 2008; Ruben Andersson, *Illegality, Inc.: Clandestine Migration and the Business of Bordering Europe*, Oakland, 2014 and Sidney Jones, *Making Money off Migrants: The Indonesian Exodus to Malaysia*, Hong Kong, NSW, 2000.

⁶ Several theories have been developed in researching the decision of people to migrate. Some of them are the push and pull factors between the countries of origin and destination that drives people to migrate; the cost-benefit calculations, namely the ability of individuals or group of people in making rational decisions weighing up the pros and cons of a migratory movement, or, among many more theories, the importance of migrant networks that connect migrants, non-migrants and former migrants in webs of kinship, friendship and shared origin. The reasons that drive people to migrate is not included among the goals of this dissertation, but for an overview of the relative theories, see Stephen Castle, Hein De Haas, Mark J. Miller, *The Age of Migration. International Population Movements in the Modern World*, London, ⁵2014, pp. 25-53; Russel King, *Theories and Typologies of Migration: an overview and a primer*, Willy Brandt Series of Papers in International Migration and Ethnic Relations 3/12, Malmö, 2012, pp. 12-23; Ewa Morawska, *International Migration: Its Various Mechanisms and Different*

forced to displace or flee because of war conflicts, political, racial, gender, and religious-based oppression or persecution, amongst other reasons, and they seek refuge in a third safe-country, or they move to safe regions within their state.

The political aspect of migration entails a very strong economic aspect, both for the migrating individuals as well as for the states, companies, and entrepreneurs involved in the facilitation of the migration process. Financial profits for all the aforementioned ones are expected through or from migration. For migrants themselves, their relocation is accompanied by expectations for an increase in their income along with improvement of other aspects of their lives; the states (migrant sending/receiving) foresee the improvement of employment rates, the increase in development, production, consumption, amongst others; the companies and entrepreneurs involved aim for the growth of their business cycle and, thereafter, for the increase of revenue with the enlargement of the pool of potential customers.

The theory of *migration infrastructure* is used in combination with the theory of *migration business/industry* to deconstruct the organisational stages of the migration process and its economic aspect. It is understood that migration entails several stages, before and after its fulfilment, in whichever period it took place. Thus, the complex process of migration requires an infrastructure that manages the migrant flows. The concept of *infrastructure* was recently adopted for migration studies, creating the theory of *migration infrastructure*, which sees migration as a process requiring the mediation of various actors and mechanisms before its implementation.⁷ It sees migration as the result of larger forces, apart from individual ones, thus entailing the role of the labour market, the international division of labour, and the transport sector, among others. This research approach aims to understand the structures and the operational stages of the migratory process, rather than the behavioural attitude of migrants or concentrating on migrant flows. Therefore, through this dissertation, the research questions are

Theories That Try to Explain it, Willy Brandt Series of Working Papers in International Migration and Ethnic Relations, Malmö, 2007, pp. 2-28; Christiane Harzig, Dirk Hoerder with Donna Gabaccia, *What is Migration History?*, Cambridge, 2009, pp. 53-83; Lina Venturas, *Μετανάστευση και Έθνος: Μετασχηματισμοί στις συλλογικότητες και τις κοινωνικές θέσεις*, Athens, 1994, pp. 10-47. For an overview of the emergence and development of ‘migration’ and ‘migration history’ as research discipline, see Dirk Hoerder, “History”, in Christine Inglis (ed.), with Wei Li and Binod Khadria, *The SAGE Handbook of International Migration*, London, 2020, pp. 124-139.

⁷ Biao Xiang, Johan Lindquist, “Migration Infrastructure”, *International Migration Review*, 48:S1 (2014), pp. S122–S148. For the notion of *infrastructure* see Brian Larkin, “The Politics and Poetics of Infrastructure”, *Annual Review of Anthropology*, 42 (2013), pp. 327-343.

dominated by the mechanisms of migration, focusing on “how’s” rather than “why’s”, namely, ‘how the migrants moved’ and not ‘why they moved’.

Migration, as a multi-structural process entailing the work and involvement of various entities before or after its fulfilment, cannot be examined only from the side of migrants, the reasons for their emigration or the way of their settlement. A great number of factors are interrelated and interlinked. This is also the belief that drives this dissertation, which has migration as its research-core and examines the migration relationship with three main pillars a) international organisations, b) the states and c) the private sector.

Human mobility requires the existence as well as the functioning of a supportive mechanism in order to be fulfilled. This mechanism extends to local, national, bilateral, and international levels. These levels are interdependent and interact between them in order for the machinery to work and for the migrants to be moved.

At the *local* level, the economic conditions interplaying with informal social networks developed by the migrants prevail over the formal networks that recruit workforce for companies and distribute them locally and internationally, especially in contemporary times. The informal social networks inform, prepare, and even discourage the potential migrants for their migratory movement. The experiences of the emigrants and returnees or the information from those who stayed behind act as information hubs for those thinking about or planning their migration. Furthermore, the state services at the local/community level, as well as the micro-businesses such as the migration or travel/tourist offices, prepare the migrants for the initial stages of their migration based on the policy lines as drafted by the central state.

At the *state* level, the organisation of the migration machinery involves the national economy and laws, which determine the context of the legal inflow and outflow. These laws set the operational context of the responsible state services, the terms of national non-governmental entities and private agencies’ participation and operation in the migratory process, and, in conjunction with others, the control measures for implementing the laws.

The *bilateral* level concerns the migration agreements between states. Through these agreements, the parameters of migration are organised: for example, the characteristics of the inflow towards an immigration country (age, employment and other criteria), the duration of the agreement, and the obligations of the countries to

support the migratory procedure. Furthermore, the terms of operation of the private businesses between the countries are also regulated.

Lastly, the *international* level concerns the international laws and conventions adopted for the rights of refugees and migrants and the human rights in general that the governments have co-signed and agreed to respect and protect.⁸ It also concerns the international division of labour and the economy, as well as the functioning of international intergovernmental or non-governmental organisations, which facilitate the management of the migratory flows. These organisations reduce the cost of management for the national governments—occasionally also for the migrants themselves—and contribute to solving common problems. Furthermore, the international businesses, which link emigration, transit, and immigration countries, also participate at the international level.⁹

Throughout modern history, the link between migration and the private sector was, and still is, inextricable. Potential migrants used the services of travel or migration agents in order to seek information on the prospects offered in immigration countries, prepare their documentation, receive the entry permit and search for employers in the receiving countries, and among others, pay for their tickets. Those coming from cities or villages away from the ports took trains or other means of transport to reach ports, stayed at hotels a few days before their embarkation, and used food and other services around the ports;¹⁰ all these enterprises flourished during periods of high migration flows. In addition, migrant transfer to the receiving countries was implemented mainly by private transport companies, whereas on their arrival, in many cases, their accommodation or the search for employment was managed by agencies of the private

⁸ The most prominent ones are the *Universal Declaration on Human Rights* of 1948; the *Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees* of 1951 and the *1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees*. The most recent *International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families* of 1990 and *New York for Refugees and Migrants* of 2016. For more conventions and treaties on migration, see Khalid Koser, “Refugees and Migration”, Thomas G. Weiss and Rorden Wilkinson (eds), *International Organisation and Global Governance*, London and New York, 2014, pp. 670-674.

⁹ The aforementioned categorisation refers to the legal migrant movements, which have concluded all the formalities required for the exit from the emigration and entry to the immigration country in advance. A parallel movement is the irregular migration, namely the migration of people without completing the regular formalities needed. On irregular migration we can find similar segmentations and organisation on levels, but this is not within the interests of this dissertation.

¹⁰ For an illustration of the commerce and the businesses participating and benefitted from the migration flows around the ports (porters, lodging housekeepers, emigrant agents, Chandler shops, clothing shops, prostitutes, pickpockets), see Kevin Brown, *Passage to the World. The Emigrant Experience 1807-1940*, Barnsley, 2013, pp. 26-30.

sector. Likewise, technological innovations promoted and adopted by the private sector changed the route of world migration. The transition from sailing-ships to steamships and diesel-powered ships, and later to aeroplanes, along with the progressively technological improvements incorporated, among other things, resulted in the enlargement of migration and the transformation of the demographic, financial, social, and labour market systems of entire states, among many more.

One of the first historians to study the involvement of actors from the private sector in migrations was R. Harney in 1977,¹¹ who introduced the term “commerce of migration”. Harney researched the involvement of ‘intermediaries’ or ‘go-betweens’, as he coined the transportation and money brokers and others that offered numerous services to Italians migrating in the 19th and early 20th centuries. These intermediaries profited from this commerce.

Harney’s research interests attracted more scholars since the 1990s, when further studies on relative topics emerged. The common characteristic of the studies that followed is that they have mainly been conducted by social scientists (anthropologists, sociologists, international studies researchers, among others) rather than historians. Furthermore, apart from their interest in aspects of the migration industry at present, they are more concentrated, with few exemptions, in irregular/undocumented migration rather than forms of migration industry supporting regular/legal migration.

More particularly, in 1992, J. Hollifield studied the relationship between immigrants, markets, and states.¹² A few years later, J. Salt and J. Stein saw “migration as business” and proposed the treating of international migration as a global business. They defined *migration business* as “a system of institutionalized networks with complex profit and loss accounts, including a set of institutions, agents and individuals each of which stands to make a commercial gain”.¹³ Robin Cohen, in 1997, discussed the *migration industry*, which he recognised to be composed of lawyers, travel agents,

¹¹ R. F. Harney, “The Commerce of Migration”, *Canadian Ethnic Studies*, 9 (1977), pp. 42-53.

¹² James F. Hollifield, *Immigrants, Markets, and States: The Political Economy of Postwar Europe*, Cambridge, Mass., 1992.

¹³ John Salt, Jeremy Stein, “Migration as a Business: The Case of Trafficking”, *International Migration*, 35:4 (1997), p. 467. In the approach of migration as a business some academics acknowledged that other non-monetary incentives in migration, mainly the activation of personal and family networks, were not considered. For a critic on Salt & Stein’s approach, see Emma Herman, “Migration as a Family Business: The Role of Personal Networks in the Mobility Phase of Migration”, *International Migration*, 44:4 (2006), pp. 191-219.

and recruiters, among others, who maintain links with countries of origin and destination and are attracted by the cash network.¹⁴

During the next millennium, the occupation of academics with aspects of the *migration industry* acquired a more systematic and wide range. The work of Rubén Hernández-León is the first analytical academic approach to the migration industry. Hernández-León, from a sociological scope, approached the migration industry through the example of the migration of Mexicans to the United States and identified migration industry as the “ensemble of entrepreneurs who, motivated by the pursuit of financial gain, provide a variety of services facilitating human mobility across international borders”. In addition, he acknowledged that the *migration industry* “greases” the engines of international human mobility, providing and articulating the expertise and infrastructural resources that facilitate such mobility, and proposed its study as a distinct actor in the social process of international migration.¹⁵

After Hernández-León’s work, more studies followed suit.¹⁶ The most prominent was the collective volume edited by Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen and Ninna Nyberg Sørensen,¹⁷ which attempted to research aspects of the migration industry under three perspectives: the types of actors involved in the migration industry, the kinds of roles that the migration industry acquires regarding the migrants, governments, and migration flows, and, lastly, the relationship between political economic and social structures within the migration industry.

During the last twenty years, the research of migration business/industry has attracted a handful of young historians who studied human mobility, in conjunction with aspects of the private sector, mainly passenger shipping companies, during the 19th century and up to the early 20th century.¹⁸ More specifically, Drew Keeling, who started

¹⁴ Robin Cohen, *Παγκόσμια Διασπορά*, transl. Τίνα Πλυτά, Athens, 2003, p. 289.

¹⁵ Rubén Hernández-León, *Metropolitan Migrants: The Migration of Urban Mexicans to the United States*, Berkley, 2008, pp. 154-155.

¹⁶ Indicatively, Michal P. Garapich, “The Migration Industry and Civil Society: Polish Immigrants in the United Kingdom Before and After EU Enlargement”, *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 34:7 (2008), pp. 735-752; Johan Lindquist, “Labour Recruitment, Circuits of Capital and Gendered Mobility: Reconceptualizing the Indonesian Migration Industry”, *Pacific Affairs*, 83:1 (2010), pp. 115-132; R. Andersson, *Illegality, Inc. Clandestine Migration and the Business of Bordering Europe*, California, 2014.

¹⁷ For more, Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen and Ninna Nyberg Sørensen (eds), *The Migration Industry and the Commercialization of International Migration*, London and New York, 2013.

¹⁸ Studies for the research of the migratory voyage are traced also during the 1970s and 1980s, but these scholarships are based either on why the migrants were moved, rather on regulating how they moved, or they do not examine the operation of the shipping companies with a broader international framework, as Torsten Feys mentions on his critical approach of the studies of this early period on “Transoceanic

his research in 1999,¹⁹ was interested in developments in the transport sector in the transatlantic migrant journey in the early 20th century up to the beginning of the First World War. He was one of the first to examine this migratory passage through the lens of the passenger shipping companies, contributing to enriching the knowledge in migration and economic history fields of research. His access to the archives of four main shipping lines operating between Europe and the United States revealed new archival records from the business sector, a development that assisted in the examination of the migrant business through the lens of the shipping companies. Thus, Keeling opened the discussion on the profitability of the transatlantic journey for the companies. He also highlighted the competition between the shipping companies and the Shipping Conferences, a competition which took the form of a “fare war” between the operating shipping lines: the migration policies affecting passenger transport companies as well as the relationship of state migration policy with the shipping companies. Keeling perceived the shipping companies as facilitators in the migratory movements, acting in line with the economic policies, the social dynamics of chain migration, and state and international policies. Previous studies examined only a segment of the market, while their archival material was coming from sources other than the shipping companies. More importantly, Keeling conducted archival research on both points of the migratory voyage, namely in Europe and in the United States; thus, the transnational approach added value to his research.²⁰ As far as I am aware, it is the first study conducted in the 21st century that examines such aspects from a historic perspective. The research path that Keeling laid with his work continued and developed over the following years.

Torsten Feys, in his research, examined the relationship between migration policy and the steamship companies operating in the Atlantic Ocean between 1830 and the outbreak of WWI. Feys approached transatlantic migration through migration

Shipping, Mass Migration, and the Rise of Modern-Day International Border Controls: A Historiographical Appraisal”, *Mobility in History*, 7 (2016), pp. 152-155. Other studies examine specific aspects of the voyage, towards a certain destination, as for example Helen R. Woolcock, *Rights of Passage. Emigration to Australia in the Nineteenth Century*, London, New York, 1986, who is interested in the 19th migrant trip to Queensland and in maritime health care of passengers.

¹⁹ Drew Keeling, “Transatlantic Shipping Cartels and Migration Between Europe and America, 1880-1914”, *Research in Economic History*, 19 (1999), pp. 195-213.

²⁰ Drew Keeling, *The Business of Transatlantic Migration between Europe and the United States, 1900-1914*, Zurich, 2012. This book derives from Keeling’s PhD dissertation, completed in the University of Berkley, California in 2005; T. Feys “Transoceanic Shipping, Mass Migration, and the Rise of Modern-Day International Border Controls, pp. 155-156.

history and maritime history and examined the role of ports in Western Europe in trying to attract the migration business to their territories. He emphasised how ‘migration fever’ was a reason enough for the establishment of new steamship lines and, next to that, the power assigned to the shipping lobbies, which intervened in the formation of governmental policies affecting their businesses in relation to migration traffic. Feys’ access to the historical archives of the *Holland-America Line*, a private shipping company operating between the Netherlands and the United States, drove his research in the study of the company’s relationship and competition with other shipping lines operating on the same routes, as well as in highlighting the agents’ network built for the support of the company’s profitability. Feys attributed the role of stimulator of the migratory movement to the passenger shipping companies, recognising that they were not only facilitators in the transatlantic migrations, but, more importantly, one of the reasons for the production of new migrations. His study also highlighted the adaptation by the shipping companies, or, more clearly, the bypassing of the progressive migration restrictions in the United States, revealing a parallel system of migration facilitating the entry of migrants likely to be rejected from entry.²¹

Per Kristian Sebak remained in the same research area of the transatlantic voyage at the end of the 19th century and widened the chronological examination up to the outbreak of the economic crisis of the Interwar period. Sebak is concentrated in the transatlantic migration from Scandinavian countries and, more specifically, in transmigration traffic developed through migrants from neighbouring countries to Scandinavia. Thus, Sebak examined the employment of Scandinavian steamship companies of the period in that business, the development of their transnational network, and the steamship companies’ connection with inland means of transport. His research was occupied by the examination of three Scandinavian shipping companies, and he analysed the dynamics and mechanisms driving their relationship as well as their relationship with the state, the dominant market players, the migrants, and transmigrants, mainly from Russia, leaving to the United States by Scandinavian transatlantic passenger shipping companies.²²

²¹ Torsten Feys, *The battle for the migrants: the introduction of steamshipping on the North Atlantic and its impact on the European exodus*, St. John’s, 2012. Feys’ book derives from his PhD dissertation, completed in the European University Institute, Florence, in 2008.

²² Per Kristian Sebak, “A Transatlantic Migratory Bypass: Scandinavian Shipping Companies and Transmigration through Scandinavia, 1898-1929”, unpublished PhD thesis, University of Bergen, Norway, 2012.

The aforementioned three researchers initiated the historic examination of mass migration as a business that creates profits, employment, and opportunities for many; at some point, their work was also an inspiration for this dissertation. All of these three researchers are in an internal academic discussion between them.²³

Yvette Santos examined the late-19th and early-20th century establishment and the unsuccessful long-term operation of a national passenger shipping company for the emigration traffic between Portugal and Brazil and the progressive enhancement of Portuguese law for emigrants' protection until the 1920s.²⁴ Santos' research transited the research interest from the United States' sea routes to South American ones, and she highlighted how the transformation and the shifting of policies for the transport sector in the emigrant traffic commenced after the migration restrictions were imposed in the United States in the 1920s. The consequent engagement of Portuguese shipping companies in emigrant traffic is also examined, as well as the interplay with the Portuguese state for the granting of concessions over the foreign competition.²⁵ Santo's PhD thesis is maybe the first historic study examining the competition between shipping and airline companies in the migrant traffic between Portugal and Brazil until 1970. However, the writing of the thesis in Portuguese makes it inaccessible to many researchers.²⁶

Panagiota Tourgeli, who also writes in her native language, Greek, even if she did not focus her research solely on migration industry issues, devoted a large part of her dissertation to the examination of the participation of national ports, shipping companies, shipping and migrant agents in the 19th-century transatlantic migration from Greece. Tourgeli discussed the commerce developed around ports as well as the competition emerging between the interested business parties. Her research was concentrated in a medium-size port city in Greece—Patras. Tourgeli supported that the migration industry network developed through the ocean-liners in Greek ports was a

²³ For other recent studies on various subjects on transport migration see, T. Feys, "Transoceanic Shipping, Mass Migration, and the Rise of Modern-Day International Border Controls", pp. 157-161.

²⁴ Yvette Santos, "Portuguese emigration, shipping companies and the state: The business of migrant transport after the Belle Époque", *International Journal of Maritime History*, 30:1 (2018), pp. 74-88.

²⁵ Yvette Santos, "Portuguese Emigrant Transport to Brazil: Conditions and Factors of Vulnerability in Portugal's Operation of this Business During the Military Dictatorship", *e-Journal of Portuguese History*, 16:1 (2018), pp. 43-55.

²⁶ Ivet Sobral dos Santos, "A Junta Nacional de Emigração e a Política de Emigração no Estado Novo", unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Lisbon, 2014.

self-sustaining and ever-expanding economic subsystem with local characteristics, depending on national and international economic, political, and social institutions.²⁷

Lastly, other historians researched aspects of the migration industry, thus widening the spectrum of forms this industry takes, but in less extended research. Such an example is the article of Ivan Light in 2013, where he examined immigrants' access in immigrant banking institutions, to sex services as employees and customers, as well as their access in ethnic saloons at the turn of the 19th century in the United States. Light believes that the aforementioned services constitute the second tier of the migration industry, which supported the continuing immigration from Europe. Their existence was dependent upon immigration's continuation, and they improved immigrants' quality of life in the United States.²⁸

On the side of the study of international organisations, the academic community started researching their work in the second half of the 1960s and the early 1970s, when political scientists offered the first surveys and case studies under the scope of international relations theory. Historians were not so interested in the history of international organisations at the same time. The reason is the state-centric focus of the research of that period, which examined aspects of the political, diplomatic, military, and economic history of states. The few early historic studies conceived international organisations as means for the achievement of the national interests of states rather than as instruments of international policy and globalisation, among others. The few people of this early period who were interested in the history of international organisations were officers and employees of the organisations they were examining,²⁹ not scholars.

An exception to the historians of this initial period is Louise W. Holborn, who was systematically occupied with the research of international organisations related to human mobility. She had also worked for most of the organisations she historically

²⁷ Panagiota Tourgeli, «Ελληνες της Αμερικής, εμβάσματα και μετασχηματισμός τοπικών κοινοτήτων στην Παλαιά Ελλάδα (1890-1940)», Ph.D. dissertation, University of Peloponnese, Corinth, 2019.

²⁸ Ivan Light, "The migration industry in the United States, 1882-1924", *Migration Studies*, 1:3 (2013), pp. 258-275.

²⁹ A. Iriye, *Global community. The role of international organizations in the making of the contemporary world*, California, 2002, pp. 4-5; Davide Rodogno, Shalom Gauthier, Francesca Piana, "What does transnational history tell us about a world with international organizations? The historians' point of view", in Bob Reinalda (ed.), *Routledge Handbook of International Organization*, New York, 2013, p. 95.

examined. Holborn wrote extensively about the organisations before and after WWII, laying the foundations where the work of later historians was based.³⁰

Historians were more interested in international organisations from the 1990s onwards and the use of a variety of archival records was noted.³¹ Among the subjects occupied was the role of international organisations dealing with displaced persons, refugees, and migrants.³² The historians thus enriched the knowledge on the organisations' policies and work on a national and international level and on the participation of particular member-states, among other topics.³³ The works of Gerard Daniel Cohen, *In War's Wake: Europe's Displaced Persons in the Postwar Order*, and the edited volume by Lina Venturas, *International "Migration Management" in the Early Cold War. The Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration*, are two good examples of the involvement of historians in the examination of the policies behind the establishment of international organisations related to human mobility, the balances sought with the formation of the membership of these organisations the political aspects of their work, and the results of the movements under their auspices, amongst many others.³⁴

From the side of the history of maritime migration, which is another field this dissertation is based on, was largely a result of the work of migration historians, as the maritime historians were mainly occupied with freight transport and not passenger transport. To highlight this absence of academic dialogue between the two disciplines, as cited by T. Feys, Michael Miller noted "migration historians and maritime historians have often written about transoceanic crossings like two ships passing".³⁵ From the side of aviation history, academic studies do not focus on the use of aeroplanes for

³⁰ Examples of Holborn's work: Louise W. Holborn, *The International Refugee Organization, a specialized agency of the United Nations: its history and work, 1946-1952*, London, N. York, 1956; Louise W. Holborn, "International Organizations for Migration of European Nationals and Refugees", *International Journal*, 20:3 (1965), pp. 331-349; Louise W. Holborn, with the assistance of Philip and Rita Chartrand, *Refugees: A Problem of our time. The work of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 1951-1972*, 2 vols., Cambridge, Mass. 1975.

³¹ Davide Rodogno, et.al., "What does transnational history tell us", pp. 95-97.

³² Extensive discussion follows on Chapter 2. Examples of IOs dealing with human mobility, *League of Nations, Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees, United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, International Refugee Organisation* and the *Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration*.

³³ Examples of such recent studies, Jessica Reinisch, "Internationalism in Relief: The Birth (and Death) of UNRRA", *Past and Present*, Supplement 6 (2011), pp. 258-289.

³⁴ Gerard Daniel Cohen, *In War's Wake: Europe's Displaced Persons in the Postwar Order*, New York, 2012; Lina Venturas (ed.), *International "Migration Management" in the Early Cold War. The Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration*, Corinth, 2015.

³⁵ For the citation of M. Miller see T. Feys, "Transoceanic Shipping Mass Migration", p. 155.

migration, considering that the use of these means of transport was also disproportionate in relation to the general passenger and tourist traffic they handled. Transport historians were occupied with aviation history matters in researching the politics behind the establishment of initially state-owned airline companies, their technological development, the competition with liner shipping companies, and its relation with the tourist traffic.³⁶

The contribution of this dissertation lies in the interdisciplinary approach to the examination of the management of post-WWII migrant transport by combining migration history, history of international organisations, transport history (maritime history & aviation history), and business history. It attempts to re-conceptualise the post-WWII migration through the examination of migration with a business approach, by widening the chronological spectrum until the 1970s, and highlighting the developments taking place in all the aforementioned fields.

The transnational approach adopted also assists in the widening of the geographical research of post-WWII migration, which, to date, is mainly interested in the transatlantic journey and in the migrant receiving countries. Thus, the examination includes the European emigration countries of the Western Bloc, as well as the majority of the immigration overseas countries of the Western Bloc, like Australia, Canada, the United States, Latin American countries, South Africa, and New Zealand.

As it will be supported, the *Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration* (ICEM) was an intergovernmental agency established in 1951, amidst the Cold War, after the initiative of the United States—a product of the West. ICEM's role was the management of part of the so-called 'overpopulation' problem in Europe created after the end of WWII and to support the redistribution of this population and workforce between allies, with a view of achieving political balances and fostering development in the West. ICEM had a structural relationship with the private sector, mainly the transport businesses, since passenger vessels and aircraft were the transport means used for the actual transfer of the migrant/refugee population under the auspices of ICEM.

Including the sector of the international organisations in the mass transportation of migrants and refugees in this dissertation assists in the examination of the politics of the post-WWII period, which was a period of gradual globalisation with a progressive

³⁶ For example, Marc Dierikx, *Clipping the Clouds. How Air Travel Changed the World*, Westport, 2008.

integration of the Western world into international agencies amidst the Cold War. The involvement of an international organisation with the private economic sector is an aspect that has not yet been approached by historic research,³⁷ albeit international organisations before ICEM, such as the *League of Nations*, had extensive relations with the private transport sector in the transfer of Russian refugees by trains and naval ships. Furthermore, after WWII, the number of migrants increased in conjunction with the number of emigration, immigration, and transit countries involved; consequently, the role of the international organisations and their interaction and businesses with the private sector also increased.

More specifically, the political and economic climate in the aftermath of the Second World War can be described as follows: a struggle existed for political balances between the two superpowers that emerged after the War (the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics); the labour force fragmented and imbalances emerged between countries with excess and deficient workforce; technological advances in transportation progressed; and trade and migration promoted growing tendencies for globalisation. The establishment of transnational enterprises and intergovernmental organisations facilitated and accelerated these procedures. All these factors were visible in the work of ICEM, which is at the core of the examination of this dissertation.

One of the main contributions of this dissertation is that the establishment and early work of ICEM is approached as a quasi-continuation of the Marshall Plan by foreseeing the active cooperation and partnership between the public and private sectors; this target also resided within the goals of the New Deal policies on which Marshall Plan was based, and it was also a target of the Keynesian economic policies dominating in Western-European governmental planning until the 1970s. As the Marshall Plan did, ICEM also endeavoured to act as a tool for the achievement of political balances within the Western Bloc through the redistribution of European population overseas, the adoption of development policies, and the employment of the state/private owned transport companies. During the 1950s, it largely constituted an agency for the revitalisation of the shipping sector, as well as of international trade, since new trade routes were established and developed by the means of transport used

³⁷ Political scientists have touched such subjects for synchrony; an example is Catia Gregoratti, “UN-Business Partnerships”, in Thomas G. Weiss, Rorden Wilkinson (eds), *International Organization and Global Governance*, New York, 2014, pp. 309-321.

by ICEM for the movement of its migrants. In addition, the migrants transported were a potential workforce and consumers in the countries of reception and remittance-senders to the countries of origin. These aspects of the ICEM's work are supported in the respective chapters of this dissertation.

ICEM is understood in this study as a business institution with a social character, attempting to enforce economically profitable business solutions in the management of the post-WWII migration problem in the West. As a product of the capitalist system, ICEM adopted the financial and business practices it incorporated; these practices were followed foremost by the private financial sector. Therefore, ICEM instigated competition between its business partners, as well as against the travel agents; it targeted cost reduction and profit maximisation for the funds it managed and for the transport companies with which it cooperated while it strove to prove its efficiency and necessity of its existence to its member-states.

In this direction, this dissertation attributes a role of, now termed, *humanitarian entrepreneur* to the operation of ICEM. The theory of *humanitarian entrepreneurialism* was recently developed by academics in political science and in anthropology.³⁸ It derives from the theory of *organisational entrepreneurialism* and largely from the *organisational theory of change*. It emphasises “the role of entrepreneurial actors in identifying innovative institutional solutions and their ability to forge supportive political coalitions for their adoption”. It supports that international organisations are likely to propose initiatives and new services, as they have “epistemic capacity for initiative”, and they work between “intergovernmental mandates, policy imperatives, [...] transnational actors and private regulations”. Such initiatives trigger global partnerships assisting in institutional change, which require “leadership coalitions between international agencies, like-minded states, and external actors”.³⁹

The operating model of ICEM was based on “profit for purpose” with the aiding in the transportation of migrants and refugees overseas as its core responsibility; thus, by achieving social welfare, it was also focusing on making profit for others and its

³⁸ Megan Bradley, *The International Organization for Migration. Challenges, Commitments, Complexities*, London, New York, 2020, pp. 49-50.

³⁹ Lilian B. Andonova, *Governance Entrepreneurs: International Organizations and the Rise of Global Public-Private Partnership*, Cambridge, 2017, pp. 34-36.

own survival.⁴⁰ Contemporary *humanitarian entrepreneurs* claim that it is “possible to ‘do well and do good’ by developing goods and services that directly address the world’s most intractable problems”, seeking to save life while simultaneously generating profit.⁴¹ ICEM identified gaps in the international migration system, which it tried to fill by developing services for its member-states.

ICEM’s *humanitarian entrepreneurialism* is identified in its eagerness to develop additional inspection services, which, apart from securing the interests and welfare of the migrants while on board a ship, it would execute the inspections for the passenger vessels of the shipping companies it used, thus initiating a new service for its member-states. As it will be analysed in more detail, such a service was additional to the national inspection systems, in most cases, in line with the regulations adopted by United Nations specialised maritime agency, the *Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organisation* (IMCO). Another example of its intervention in a humanitarian mode was with the forthcoming Australian withdrawal from membership in ICEM, when Australia endeavoured to manage, on a bilateral basis, the migration from certain European countries that, concomitantly, were member-states of ICEM. The ICEM Administration proposed to mediate by seeking to develop additional services for its emigration member-states and protecting the financial and migration interests of its poorer emigration states. In this way, it did not only secure the interests of the migrants and of its member-states, but it also worked for its survival and necessity for the continuing existence of ICEM. These were also the elements on which the ICEM Administration’s successful entrepreneurialism was laid.

ICEM’s vast archival records and my access to these files make our enlightenment possible by deepening into three main aspects:

- a) The relationship between ICEM and member-states and the relationship of member-states with their transport companies (state/private-owned passenger shipping and airline companies)
- b) The relationship between ICEM and the private sector enterprises (mainly transport companies and secondarily with travel agents)
- c) The relationship between the transport companies doing business with ICEM.

⁴⁰ Swati Agrawal, Ritika Gugnani, “Creating successful business model: lessons for social entrepreneurship”, *International Journal of Entrepreneurship and Innovation Management*, 18:5/6 (2014), pp. 438-439.

⁴¹ Jamie Cross, Alice Street, “To Fail at Scale! Minimalism and Maximalism in Humanitarian Entrepreneurship”, *Social Anthropology/Antropologie Sociale*, 30:2 (2022), pp. 101-103.

The Sources

The research was based on primary written sources of the period. Thus, extensive archival research was undertaken on archival records from four countries: Switzerland, Greece, the United States, and Australia.

Considering that the dissertation is based on the work of the *Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration*, extensive archival research took place at the Headquarters of the *International Organization for Migration* (IOM) in Geneva. The archive is very rich; it consists of correspondence of the ICEM Headquarters and of its various Departments with governments member-states of the Organisation; correspondence with shipping and airline companies and other actors of the private sector; intra-organizational correspondence on Headquarters' level; correspondence with ICEM Missions located in the countries of its member-states; correspondence with other international organisations, as well as reports and minutes from meetings and Sessions of ICEM or with the participation of ICEM officials. The IOM archival records in Geneva (IOM-SW) are very rich and, to their largest extent, unused by the research community so far, but this dissertation will bring them to light. The archival records are separated between Registry Records and General Records. This distinction is indicated in the sub-notes, but it is simply an indication of the location where the archives are maintained and not of their importance or subject. The dissertation is based on the IOM archives collected in Switzerland, and more than 580 files and 50,600 documents have been examined for the needs of this dissertation.

Apart from the archival material examined, IOM maintains an updated Library (IOM-SW/Library) in Geneva where technical reports, policy documents, and, more importantly, published records from the ICEM Plenary Council and of the various Sub-Committees are maintained. In these venues, the representatives of the ICEM member-states and of the ICEM Administration participated, each part demonstrated its opinion, ideas and policies, and discussions also occurred. This material was thereafter shared by the ICEM Administration with its member-states and to external agencies (international governmental and non-governmental organisations) and represents the formal display of ICEM's work. This material was examined from 1951 to 1981. It was particularly useful in the examination of the public image of the Organisation. Its contrast with the archival collections of ICEM and of the national archives examined

highlights the discrepancies between the public discourse of ICEM with its member states and of their private discussions.

In Greece, two archival collections were examined: the archive of the Mission of the International Organization for Migration in Athens (IOM-GR) and the Archive of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Athens (AGMFA). The IOM-GR maintains a vast archival collection that has not been organised and indexed to date; it contains correspondence between the ICEM Mission in Athens and its Headquarters, as well as other ICEM Missions in emigration and immigration countries, with various Ministries of the Greek government, with shipping and airline companies, and with travel agents, amongst many others. The use of this archive, the greatest part of which is used for the first time by a researcher, acted as a means to trace how the central policies of ICEM were channelled in the field (a country Mission), the organisation and management of migration on a national level, and the balances of power between the Greek government, the transport sector, and the ICEM Mission in Athens.

The Archive of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Athens (AGMFA) highlighted aspects of the policy preparation stages from a state member of an international organisation and its representation in its Council institutions, its goals through its participation in ICEM, and the means for achievement. Aspects of collaboration with other member-states for the achievement of mutual goals were revealed through the use of this archive, as well as the balances between the optimal management of migration and business interests. The access to this archive, though, presents several difficulties, the main difficulty being the prohibition of photographing the archives and the need for handwritten notes, as well as the imposition of a ceiling on the requested files per day, thus hindering the examination of the material needed. In addition, the very nature of the archive as diplomatic causes the AGMFA Administration to not prioritise the taxonomy of archival records with migration subjects. Therefore, an internship was required for the organisation and the indexing of part of the archival records related to ICEM, which, to reiterate, are being used by a researcher for the first time.

The archival records from the United States (National Archives and Records Administration, NARA), from Australia (National Archives of Australia, NAA), and from the International Refugee Organisation from Paris (IRO-FR) were collected and availed to me, thanks to a research project under the scientific coordination of Lina Venturas, and entitled *Migration Management and International Organizations: A*

history of the establishment of the International Organization for Migration, in 2012-2015. NARA proved useful in the examination of the first decade of the operation of ICEM, especially from the perspective of the United States, the country after which initiative the ICEM was established and the country which was behind any main decision of the Organisation. The National Archives of Australia, as in the case of AGMFA, uncovered aspects of Australia's participation in ICEM, especially from the side of the most important migrant-receiving country within the Organisation. Lastly, the IRO-FR archive was only partially used in relation to the period preceding ICEM's establishment.

However, what is missing from this dissertation are the archival records from shipping and airline companies. Request for access to the archives of Greek shipping companies cooperating with ICEM in the period under examination was denied, as well as access to personal archival collections of officers in such shipping companies or of ICEM officials. Therefore, the actual profitability of the ICEM migrant transport programme for the transport companies was one of the crucial questions of this dissertation which was answered indirectly. It was attempted to overcome this gap through the use of the maritime, migrant, daily and international Press, the national archives, and through accessible online primary sources particularly regarding the case of the Australian transport companies.

Lastly, several personal interviews were conducted in the context of this thesis with officers of a Greek passenger liner shipping company in operation between Greece and Australia, travel agents, ICEM officials, and migrants travelling under the ICEM auspices. Only a few were sufficiently useful for the scope of this dissertation, however they contributed to reveal aspects of the migration industry created through ICEM that were not detected through the archival records.

Chapter Outline

The dissertation is organised thematically into eight chapters, while the last chapter could be considered a case-study for the participation of Greek transport companies in the ICEM migrant transport programme.

In the first chapter, the migration business before the Second World War is discussed. Starting from the migration policies, along with the technological innovations of the 19th century in the area of transportation, we will examine how they

affected human mobility, particularly the transatlantic migration movement. What the government support towards the transport companies entailed and how business interests shaped state migration policies are some of the questions that will occupy the interest of the first chapter of the dissertation. In addition, the networking of the shipping companies for the expansion of their activities will be examined, as well as the formation of oligopolies in the shipping sector and the work of religious agencies that were the first to assist and manage overseas migration in an intercontinental level.

The Second World War created a completely new reality with the division of the world between West and East, with each part adopting different political, economic, and social systems and practices. Greater tendencies toward globalisation and the will or, in some cases, “compulsion” of the national governments to work on an international level for the solving of common problems resulted in the establishment of several international agencies. The second chapter is devoted to the examination of the international organisations created between 1938 and 1951, which were specialised in the management of human mobility, and the history of ICEM from the 1950s to 1980. The chapter shows how the post-WWII political climate shaped the assistance offered by the established organisations and how the tensions in the Cold War formed the policies followed by these organisations. A considerable part of the chapter is dedicated to the creation of the *Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration* (ICEM), the organisation which, as was mentioned, will set the core of this dissertation. ICEM’s mandate, administration, membership, structure, policy, and relation with the private sector are discussed, and an overview of the operations of the organisation during its first thirty years is offered. It will also be supported that ICEM acted as a quasi-continuation of the Marshall Plan, which ended in 1951, the establishing year of ICEM.

To better understand the results of the work of any organisation, we first need to know the processes and mechanisms under which its policy was formed and executed. This will be the role of the third chapter, which will first examine the dominant role of transport within ICEM, as well as its organisational infrastructure and the way its machinery functions. ICEM was a body under constant development together with the migration field and the transport sector in the first post-WWII decades. Thus, changes in ICEM’s Departments occurred in regular time intervals with repercussions in the consistency of its transport policy. In this chapter, we will discuss the organisational formation and function of ICEM, the bodies for execution and control of its transport policy. Special attention will be paid to the transport policy itself in the

fourth chapter. Under which procedures the business partners of ICEM were selected and a description of its policy regarding the surface and aerial means of transport are a few of the questions that will be answered in this chapter.

Each member-state had an agenda and goals that it wanted to accomplish through its membership in ICEM. The means to achieve these goals will be elaborated on in the fifth chapter. We should remember, though, that the success of the political agenda of each member-state was based also on the negotiation power it had within ICEM. Therefore, the creation of coalitions between member-states was far from rare. The most important groupings were between the maritime countries and those interested in aerial means of transport. Conflicts occurred between the aforementioned groups of countries, as well as with the ICEM Administration. How these conflicts emerged, to what extent they reached, and how they were solved will be examined. Thus, the fifth chapter will focus on the relationship between ICEM and its member-states and between the member-states with their transport companies. The conclusion of special agreements between ICEM and some of its important member-states will be examined, as well as the adoption of protective measures by countries for the transport companies under their flag. Reference to the profits earned by each flag through the ICEM migrant traffic will be made in straight correlation with the political and economic realities of the period.

The relationship between ICEM and the private sector is the subject of the sixth chapter of this dissertation. The most important business partners of ICEM were the transport companies, namely the liner shipping companies and the airline companies. An important part of the chapter will concentrate on the relationship of the ICEM Administration with the shipping and airline companies and their representative bodies, Shipping Conferences, and IATA, amongst others, in the three main geographical areas where ICEM operated– the North Atlantic, South Atlantic, and Oceania. The quality of their cooperation will be traced and the dynamic and profitability of the ICEM migrant transport programme for the shipping and airline companies will be attempted to be identified.

The seventh chapter traces the delicate relationship developed between ICEM and its business partners, as well as the development of business opportunities emerging out of ICEM's operations. The chapter focuses on the competition between the migrant and the tourist traffic in a period when tourism was growing. Did the ICEM traffic maintain its attractiveness for the transport companies throughout the period

researched? The changes in the attitude of the shipping and airline companies are examined. Considering that migrant transport was a competitive arena, what were the practices and strategies adopted by the participating transport companies to minimise competition? Companies were struggling to increase their business cycle through ICEM in order to earn a larger piece of business from the migrant traffic. This resulted in conflicts between various maritime companies or between companies of different modes of transport. What form these conflicts took place and how they resulted in mergers and further cooperation between other lines will be discussed in this chapter. Our examination will not miss the contribution of migration traffic to the increase in world trade. Reaching other business areas of the private sector as well, we will examine the relationship of ICEM with travel agents from which ICEM constituted a competitor and a source restricting the work of the travel agents. How the relationship between ICEM and travel/migrant agents was formed in various countries will be discussed in this chapter and indications for the relationship of ICEM with other non-transport enterprises will be examined.

The eighth chapter is a case-study focusing on the migrant business developed in Greece through the ICEM migrant transport programme. The role of the Greek shipping and airline companies employed in the North Atlantic and Australasian sea and air routes, the stance of the Greek state in the support of the transport sector, and their confrontation with ICEM are the main subjects that occupy the chapter. The case study assists in the transit from macro to a micro-level of analysis and assists in testing the adopted practices noticed in the transport market of other ICEM destinations in the case of Greece. Examples of collaboration, subversion, and indirect pressure are highlighted, as well as the relationship between Greek business interests and the wider governmental economic policies and endeavours through the migrant transport under ICEM.

Chapter 1:

Migration Policies and Migration Business before the Second World War

The aim of this chapter is to provide an insight into the migration complex and migration management of the 19th and the first half of the 20th centuries. The link between politics, economy and technology is highlighted, all of which were factors that affected the relationship between migration, transport, state and private interests. Thus, three main structural elements governing migration are identified a) technology, b) relation of governments with shipping liner companies and c) participation of non-governmental/private agencies (religious/voluntary) in migration management. These elements were formed during this period and largely directed the post-WWII migration.

One of the best researched migration movements during the 19th and early 20th centuries is the transatlantic passage between Europe and the United States. This development is not surprising, since between 1820 and 1924,¹ the United States received about 36 million immigrants from European, Asian and other American countries and 18 million more until 1987, making a total of 54 million people. In a worldwide perspective, the United States received over 65 percent of the transatlantic migration between 1846 and 1940, followed by Canada, Argentina and Brazil.²

Other parts of the world were steadily receiving immigrants, but in significantly fewer numbers in comparison with the United States. For instance, between 1851 and 1939, Canada numbered about 6.2 million immigrant intakes.³ After 1870, the Latin American countries experienced increased political stability and had adopted policies favouring mass immigration and welcomed more than 13 million immigrants until 1930. In Argentina in particular, between 1881 and 1930, more than 5.8 million transoceanic immigrants arrived. Between 1880 and 1930, Brazil received four million immigrants while the rest of the immigrants were directed mainly to Uruguay and Cuba and, to a lesser extent, to other Latin American countries.⁴ On the

¹ 1820 is the year when the first records on immigrant arrivals became available and 1924 when entry restrictions nearly put a halt on US immigration.

² Adam McKeown, "Global Migration 1846-1940", *Journal of World History*, 15:2 (2004), pp. 156-157.

³ Barry Edmonston, "Canada's immigration trends and patterns", *Canadian Studies in Population*, 43:1-2 (2016), p. 116.

⁴ Blanca Sánchez Alonso, "The Other Europeans: Immigration into Latin America and the International Labour Market (1870-1930)", *Journal of Iberian and Latin American Economic History*, 3 (2007), pp. 397-399; Maria Damilakou, *Έλληνες μετανάστες στην Αργεντινή (1900-1970). Διαδικασίες συγκρότησης*

other side of the southern hemisphere, Australia, during part of its colonial period between 1830 and 1900, received about 1.7 million immigrants. From 1901, when Australia constituted a Federation, and up to 1939, the country's immigrant intakes counted less than a million.⁵

Even in the early 19th century an organised system was required to support the population willing or forced to migrate. The involvement of the private sector, mainly the shipping liner companies, was vital for the population of the overseas countries, as well as an area for great entrepreneurial profits. Therefore, this chapter looks into the example of the European free migration trade to the United States and secondarily to the Latin American countries and Australia for the period before the Second World War as well as the migration business developed around this trade.

The first section refers to the technological developments of the period (railways, telegraph and steamships) and understands them as facilitators in the increase of population mobility, and thus contributors in the shaping of the migration volume. Overseas migration in the 19th century is identified also as a technologically driven travel business, which increased regional and international trade rates and transformed cities, societies and ports; a first step towards globalisation and an integrated economy. In this context the role of the shipping liner companies is examined along with the relations developed and interlinks with the governments on matters of finance, profit accumulation, legislation and law enforcement. The transport companies are recognised as an influential component in the formation and implementation of the migration policy.

The second section examines the infrastructure and network developed for the successful function of the migration business of the time. The agent system is analysed and its contribution to the successful loading of the vessels is highlighted, along with the formation of the Shipping Conferences for the regulation of the shipping liner companies' competition; an innovation of the 19th century which marked the maritime business. Lastly, the role of the religious and non-governmental/private agencies is discussed. Their involvement is recognised as an early unintentional attempt for migration management in an intercontinental level

και μετασχηματισμοί μιας μεταναστευτικής κοινότητας, Athens, 2004, pp. 32-33; St. Castle et. al., *The Age of Migration...*, p. 126.

⁵ Brian Murphy, *The Other Australia. Experiences of Migration*, Cambridge, New York, 2008 p. 26; Eric Richards, *Destination Australia. Migration to Australia Since 1901*, Sydney, New South Wales, 2008, pp. 45, 97, 127, 386.

through the establishment of extended networks in the immigration and emigration countries in addition to building working relations with the shipping liner companies. Thus, another pool of migrants was created and their activation subsequently enhanced and instigated emigration.

From Sail to Steam and the impact on migration

The 19th century, among others, was a century that was marked by a series of technological innovations that assisted in the connection and communication of people, products and ideas between distant places of the world. As a result, the 19th century, and more specifically its second half, is considered by many researchers as the first phase of the globalisation process. These innovations assisted in the “time-space compression”. More specifically, and first of all, the development and expansion of railway lines all over Europe, Asia and the Americas from the early 1830s on, assisted in the connection between cities and hinterlands, along with the organisation of Post Offices throughout the countries. In the second half of the 19th century these links were augmented on an international basis and by 1910 a rail-trip from Lisbon to Beijing was feasible. Railway lines assisted in the interconnection of distant regions, transformed societies and cities, and increased the economic activity between them, as well as the mobility of peoples (labourers, migrants, tourists). Researchers of this period refer to a “world economy”, which integrated the national economies to a global economy. Moreover, in the aspect of ideas and information, the innovation of telegraph brought the world in direct communication within a few minutes instead of days. The United States could communicate directly with Western Europe in 1866 with the completion of the transatlantic laying of telegraph cables. In addition within twenty years later, by 1886, all the large cities from India to Australia, South America and Africa had joined in this technology and could communicate with each other since underwater cable had been installed. Before the end of 1902, most of the regions of the globe could communicate and conduct business with each other.⁶

The aforementioned technological innovations of the 19th century were perfectly combined with the progressive transition from sail to steam power in the

⁶ Andrea Colli (ed.), *44 Cats. A Global History of Globalization*, Milan, 2018, pp. 22-24; Jürgen Osterhammel, *The Transformation of the World: A Global History of the Nineteenth Century*, Patrick Camiller (translation), Princeton and Oxford, 2014, pp. 37-38, 510-511, 715-717, 719-721; Torsten Feys, “Riding the rails of removal: The impact of railways on border controls and expulsion practices”, *Journal of Transport History*, 0:0 (2019), pp. 1-2, 8-9, 18-19.

case of ships. This stimulating development in transportation began for the transatlantic journey in the 1850s and concluded in the 1870s; for the Australasian trade it concluded a decade later, in 1885. Steamships enabled greater consistency with timetables, increased the vessels' speed, space and passenger-carrying capacity, improved the accommodation and living standards on board; consequently, reduced the mortality rate during the journey and strengthened the ships' seaworthiness.⁷ Thus, in the 19th century we have a tripartite innovative and an interlinked scheme, where steamships connected distant countries divided by sea in comparatively less time, trains penetrated in the hinterlands and the telegraph instantly spread information from one side of the globe to the other. These three innovations worked concurrently and from their respective systems each paid their merit in the increase of global migration.

As far as steamships are concerned, despite an initial increase in the cost of passage,⁸ migrants were positively affected from this technological advancement. The transatlantic trip became more accessible to migrants out of Northern Europe, where this overseas journey mainly began. Tickets became widely obtainable and migrants arrived at their destination within a specific time; shorter passage duration made immigration less permanent and re-emigration possible,⁹ which was a noteworthy change in the character of migration due to the technological changes in shipping. However, the domination of steamships did not instantly occur but, rather, progressively, and it was a period when both means of power on ships co-existed. In 1856, the proportion of migrants arriving in New World by steam was one in twenty-eight, while in 1860 the respective ratio was one in three—¹⁰ a considerable change of transport patterns within four years.

⁷ Günter Moltmann, "Steamship Transport of Emigrants from Europe to the United States, 1850-1914: social, commercial and legislative aspects", in Klaus Friedland (ed.), *Maritime Aspects of Migration*, Köln, Böhlau, 1989, pp. 311-312; Frank Broeze, "'Our Home is Girt by Sea' The Passenger Trade of Australia and New Zealand 1788-1914", in Klaus Friedland (ed.), *Maritime Aspects of Migration*, Köln, Böhlau, 1989, pp. 459-460.

⁸ At first, a transatlantic voyage in steerage by steamship cost eight times more than on a sailing ship, K. Brown, *Passage to the World*, p. 57. However, in due time, the reduction of voyage duration, along with the technological advancement of the steamship, among other reasons, resulted in rationalisation of the voyage cost.

⁹ Raymond L. Cohn, "The Transition from Sail to Steam in Immigration to the United States", *Journal of Economic History*, 65:2 (2005), pp. 470, 473. For the return and remigration from the USA to Southern Europe and vice-versa, see Ulf Brunnbauer, *Globalizing Southeastern Europe: Emigrants, America, and the State Since the Late Nineteenth Century*, Maryland, 2016, p. 110-117.

¹⁰ T. Feys, *The battle for the migrants*, p. 51. For the transition from sail to steam and the adaptation of the shipping lines engaged in migrant traffic, see James Boyd, "Mechanising migration: Transnational relationships, business structure and diffusing steam on the Atlantic", *International Journal of*

Transport companies benefited heavily from migration. Initially, the migration trade was based on the existing trade routes. Thus, the trade of products (grain, sugar, tobacco, timber, cotton and meat) from North Atlantic or Oceania to Europe was made viable through migration. The westbound trip from some regions up to the 1820s-1830s was mainly realised in ballast due to the lack of substantial number of commodities to be transported back. This was until the time when migrants became “the commodity” around which the shipping liner industry developed. Migration filled this gap and a new profitable business emerged. It should not be forgotten, as N. Canny argues, that “no major migration movement takes place until it becomes profitable for the owners of the carriers of human cargo to make the connection between supply and demand”.¹¹ The success of the migrant traffic was despite the fact that the majority of the migrants would use the services of steamships once or twice in their lives. However, the effect of *chain migration* of relatives and friends ascertained the continuity of the flow, therefore of the profits and of the interests of the steamshipping companies. Transporting migrants was a lucrative business for the shipowners also before WWII;¹² a business which was driven from market-laws and targeted the profit.

Many governments supported the steam investment on ships, as well as the expansion of the shipping liner companies under their flag in order to compete with sailing-ships and foreign transport companies. The components of this support consisted of a) *preferences*, b) *postal subventions* and c) *direct subsidies*. The *preferences* referred to the adoption of discriminatory policies to halt competition. More specifically, preferential railway rates were offered to producers/traders for the traffic taking place through ships under their flag, increased fares when they chose foreign companies, or difficulties were raised to shipping liner companies in obtaining a licence to perform emigration traffic within a country’s territory. These measures, along with others, were adopted by governments to make trade more attractive for the shipping liner companies operating under their flag, as well as to monopolise the overseas voyages in those companies’ favour. The *postal subventions*, on the other

Maritime History, 32:1 (2020), pp. 3-22. Regarding the voyage to Australia, and in particular, to Queensland, 68.3 percent of the direct passenger voyages were through sailing ships between 1860 and 1900. In the 1880s though, around 75 percent of the passengers travelled to Queensland by steamships, and in the 1890s almost 99 percent, for more H. R. Woolcock, *Rights of Passage*, pp. 50-51.

¹¹ Feys, *The battle for the migrants*, pp.11, 17; for the quotation of N. Canny, *ibid.*, p. 12; F. Broeze, ““Our Home is Girt by Sea”, pp. 456-457.

¹² U. Brunnbauer, *Globalizing Southeastern Europe*, p. 76.

hand, were the most common assistance offered in Europe in the 19th century; a practice that was initiated by British shipping and later followed by all the main maritime countries of the period. Apart from the actual transfer of mails of particular countries with which they traded for free, the steamship liner companies also enjoyed tax exemptions within these countries. These subventions had the role of a financial supplement in the acquisition of modern technology and in making steamships more competitive due to their initial higher cost compared to sailing ships. Lastly, the *direct subsidies* took the form of financial assistance for the renewal or expansion of the companies' fleet by new shipbuilding and transition from sail to steam. Nevertheless, it should not be considered that subsidies were a 19th century practice. Governmental subsidies and other forms of support became vital for the migrant transport, as well as for the entire operation of the passenger shipping companies throughout the 20th century. This is seen especially during the Interwar years when a sense of national consciousness was more intense; the governments favoured diverse forms of financial or legislative assistance for the mercantile marine in order to assist the expansion of their national flag throughout the seas.¹³

An evident example occurred in Hungary in 1903. In an effort to direct emigration through the then Hungarian port of Fiume over the neighbouring ports of Bremerhaven, Hamburg, Rotterdam and Antwerp—the preferred ports for Hungarian emigrants—, Hungary licensed the British *Cunard* steamship line for ten years, thus creating a monopoly in the service of a direct line from Fiume to New York. The Hungarian government guaranteed a minimum of 30,000 emigrants per year to Cunard. If this number was not achieved, 100 crowns for each lacking emigrant were deposited to the steamship company by the Government. Cunard, from its side, would purchase the supplies for its vessels from Fiume, even if the prices were ten percent above the market prices. In order for the Government to force emigration through Fiume, passports were issued by the local authorities only if emigration took place through Fiume. In addition, discounted train tickets to Fiume city were offered to potential migrants and in 1906, a hostel for emigrants was constructed wherein the living conditions were supervised by state officials and physicians. The results were

¹³ S. G. Sturmey, *British Shipping and World Competition*, Research in Maritime History no. 42, St. John's, Newfoundland, 2010, pp. 22-28, 83; Gelina Harlaftis, "Shipping", in Teresa da Silva Lopes, Christina Lubinski and Heid J.S. Tworek (eds), *The Routledge Companion to the Makers of Global Business*, New York, 2020, p. 442. For *preference* measures adopted through legislation from German port-cities, the Austro-Hungarian empire, and Italy, see K. Brown, *Passage to the World*, pp. 33-37.

not as expected,¹⁴ but the Hungarian policy and the practices put in action are revealing of the value of migration business.

It needs to be clarified that subsidies, under any form, were not guaranteed in the operation of the shipping liner companies or throughout their entire business-life. Many countries did not subsidise the shipping liner companies under their flag; a lack of sponsorship obliged shipowners to rely on their strengths and find ways to increase their competitiveness and draw revenue from a variety of sources.

Migration, being the main form of passenger traffic in the 19th century, was a considerable factor influencing the growth of merchant fleets and their technological improvement. As Roland Hope mentions, the emigrant trade practically ensured the cost coverage of a ship. The profits from the first and second-class passengers were considered as “a bonus” by the shipowners operating in the North Atlantic.¹⁵ More specifically, Drew Keeling supports that in the early 20th century, the passenger traffic in the North Atlantic was constituted by approximately 90 percent from migrants, while 50 percent of total profits of the companies were produced from the migrant traffic.¹⁶ In any case, this conclusion should only be linked with steamships, not with sailing-ships through which emigration trade was far from easy or highly profitable. Steamships redefined the emigration trade, as well as its organisation and the profitability of the traffic.¹⁷ Therefore, the governments supported financially the adoption of new technology in the field of transport. As it has been argued, transatlantic migration in the 19th century was also a “technologically-driven travel business”.¹⁸

The growth of the volume of migration resulted in an increased interest from the central governments’ side in regulating the migration process. Specialised legislations were established to regulate the emigration or immigration of population, as well as the involvement of the private sector (migration agents and shipping companies) and the conditions of the voyage.

¹⁴ Brunnbauer, *op.cit.*, pp. 157-159. For the corresponding attempts of Austria to promote emigration through Trieste port, see *ibid.*, pp. 159-160.

¹⁵ Ronald Hope, *A New History of British Shipping*, London, 1990, p. 333.

¹⁶ D. Keeling, *The Business of Transatlantic Migration*, p. 44 and footnote 35, p. 44.

¹⁷ Francis E. Hyde, *Cunard and the North Atlantic 1840-1973: A History of Shipping and Financial Management*, London, Basingstoke, 1975, pp. 59-60.

¹⁸ Drew Keeling, “The Transportation Revolution and Transatlantic Migration, 1850-1914”, *Research in Economic History*, 19 (1999), p. 55.

In the early 19th century, the main concern of the European governments involved in the North Atlantic migration was not based on the qualitative characteristics of migrants, but rather on the means of migration, namely, the ports and the shipping companies used. Britain was the first European country to enact, through its Passenger Acts, legislation on the seaworthiness, standards of ventilation, and sanitation of the emigrant ships in 1803. The relative legislative corps of other European emigration countries appeared at least thirty years later, with Bremen establishing its passenger laws in 1832, the Netherlands in 1837, Belgium and Norway in 1843 and Hamburg in 1845. However, in said laws, emigrant safety standards were set to the bare minimum for fear that increased travel costs would result in financial repercussions and an uncompetitive edge to the shipping liner companies under the countries' flag. Abuses from the side of the shipping liner industry were also frequent, including the passenger overloading.¹⁹

The United States governments, as a migrant-receiving country, endeavoured to regulate the migrant flows, but the severity of the measures was being perpetuated by the maritime lobbies and the European ports' competition.²⁰ The first US Act on the migrant ships was introduced in 1819; albeit delayed, it was a legislative response to the loss of migrant lives on board that took place in 1817-1818. The Act enforced sanctions for passenger overloading, determined the conditions required on board in relation to the passengers' sustenance, and demanded the delivering of a detailed passenger list to the US Authorities upon a ship's arrival.²¹ This Act was the first attempt by the United States to connect a type of maritime trade (passenger traffic) with migration policy and migrant transport policy. It is also indicative of the commercial approach to migration adopted by the Authorities: their primary concern

¹⁹ Maldwyn A. Jones, "Aspects of North Atlantic Migration: Steerage Conditions and American Law, 1818-1909", in Klaus Friedland (ed.), *Maritime Aspects of Migration*, Köln, Böhlau, 1989, p. 323. Regarding the defective seaworthiness of the vessels, it is indicative that only in 1875-1883, 26,188 British sailors died in accidents on and sinking of British registered ships. Death aboard a ship was six-time more frequent than working in British coal mines. The introduction of steam decreased the death rate while onboard a ship. For more see Jonathan Hyslop, "'Ghostlike' seafarers and sailing ship nostalgia: the figure of the steamship lascar in the British imagination, c. 1880-1960", *Journal for Maritime Research*, 16:2 (2014), pp. 215-216.

²⁰ Feys, *The battle for the migrants*, p. 65.

²¹ M. Jones, "Aspects of North Atlantic Migration", pp. 321-322; Chap. XLVI, *An Act regulating passenger ships and vessels*, Statute II, 02.03.1819, 15th Congress, Sess. II. Ch. 45, 46. 1819, <https://aadha.binghamton.edu/items/show/203#?c=0&m=0&s=0&cv=0>, retrieved 28.02.2022. The same legislative pattern was followed in Australia. Queensland legislated the standards for emigrant trade after heavy emigrant death tolls while on board. For a review of the bills enacted, Woolcock, *op.cit.*, pp. 63-70.

was the regulation of the transport of migrants followed by the formalities of the movement of population in and out of the United States.

The 1819 Act was subsequently revised and replaced by a series of Passenger Acts (1847, 1855 and 1882, to mention a few),²² most of them resulted after heavy migrant loss of lives during the trip. The new Passenger Acts provided the terms under which the passenger traffic, migration traffic included, should take place in response to an era of prolific migration flows towards the North Atlantic.²³

The growing interest of the US governments to intervene in the migrant transport alerted the shipping liner industry, which mostly benefitted from traffic enroute to the United States. As T. Feys has explained, until the first half of the 19th century the shipping liner companies were able to prevent the Authorities' interference on their businesses on migration traffic, marking a period when migration and entrance to the United States was unregulated. When the United States government set a legislative framework on immigration and centralised its policy, the shipping liner companies increased their presence in Washington, the main decision-making centre of the country. In the early 20th century, the shipping liner companies had set strong links with the Authorities and constituted a 'consultative' and influential political body with regards to their business; this entity had strong leverage when politicians were called to vote on matters relating to migration. Delays on the voting of bills, rising of public awareness on restrictive measures on migration, or amendments on forthcoming bills to ease the impact on migration and on the shipping liner companies' business were the result of their lobbying. The shipping companies bribed congressmen, financed election campaigns of their political supporters, offered dinners, and provided these politicians with their first-class services. As E. Blue points out, "shippers had long been accustomed to privileged treatment when federal legislation was being drafted".²⁴

It should not be forgotten that over time, and especially during the 19th century, the power and influence of shipowners in port-cities around the world was

²² For the 1847 Law, see <http://library.uwb.edu/Static/USImmigration/9%20stat%20127.pdf>, retrieved 25.06.2019; for the 1855 Law, see <http://legisworks.org/congress/33/session-2/chap-213.pdf>, retrieved 25.06.2019; for the 1882 Law, see <http://legisworks.org/congress/47/session-1/chap-374.pdf>, retrieved 25.06.2019.

²³ For a review and appraisal of the aforementioned Acts, see Jones, op.cit., pp. 323-331.

²⁴ Feys, *The battle for the migrants*, pp. 250-251, 321; Ethan Blue, "Finding Margins on Borders: Shipping Firms and Immigration Control Across Settler Space", *Occasion: Interdisciplinary Studies in the Humanities*, 5 (2013), p. 9.

more than noticeable. Along with other entrepreneurs (bankers, merchants), shipping liner companies formed small oligarchies in order to protect and retain the pace of their trade and to prevent government intervention. These oligarchies were crucial decision-making entities in the governance of the cities, institutionalising this power under the formation of chambers of commerce, through which they were fighting for their exclusiveness.²⁵ In Denmark, during the late 19th and early 20th century, for example, the success of the private-owned shipping liner company called the *Det Forenede Dampskibs-Selskab* was based on the link between the Danish shipping industry and the private banking institutions of the country, resulting in minimal state intervention.²⁶ In the case of Australia –which, before 1901, was governed by the British Empire and locally by colonial British governments– the shipowners, merchants and passenger agents for a certain period of time were responsible for selecting the migrants who would be financially assisted by the state and be able to migrate to Australia.²⁷

The lobbying of the shipping liner companies can be noticed as having influenced several measures for the control or restriction of immigration to the United States. The establishment of the “literacy test” towards the end of the 19th century, as a means to exclude migrants from entrance to the United States without the basic reading and writing knowledge of their native language, is a good example to highlight the involvement of the shipping liner industry and their lobbies in the migration policy of the country. The bills including the establishment of the literacy test reached the US Congress seventeen times between 1896 and 1917,²⁸ all unsuccessfully. This remarkable postponement of more than two decades is the result of the lobbying of the shipping liner companies in Washington’s political circles. It is also an indication of the power held in the private sector in terms of interfering and intermingling in matters related to governmental jurisdiction, namely the legislative procedure. Since their interests were at stake, the shipping liner companies initially organised campaigns to influence the United States public by raising awareness and by heavily supporting the national and ethnic Press, which reproduced and enforced the pro-immigration views of the shipping liner companies. *New York Herald* is a

²⁵ J. Osterhammel, *The Transformation of the World*, pp. 282-283.

²⁶ Per Kristian Sebak, “Constraints and possibilities: Scandinavian shipping companies and transmigration, 1898–1914”, *International Journal of Maritime History*, 27:4 (2015), pp. 758-759.

²⁷ Broeze, op.cit., pp. 448-449.

²⁸ Torsten Feys “The visible hand of shipping interests in American migration policies 1815-1914”, *Tijdschrift Voor Sociale en Economische Geschiedenis* 7:1 (2010), p. 38.

clear paradigm of such a national Press siding with the shipping liner companies; the latter deposited large sums to the immigrant-owners of the newspaper in the form of advertisements. Additionally, the focus and mobilisation of the old and new immigrants, who had also acquired voting-rights, was an appreciable pressure-lever on the politicians making decisions on migration restrictions. On another level, the shipping liner companies financed and supported the institutionalisation of their pro-immigration agenda by forming Committees as a counterweight to institutions promoting the elimination of immigration. Coalitions with several entities (politicians, academia, capitalists, employers, labour unions, transport experts, railway enterprises) were formed through Committees and institutions in order to influence the legislative procedures.²⁹

Undeniably, the power of the shipping lobbies and companies correlated with the wider political and economic climate prevailing in each period. In the 1920s, the notorious US immigration quotas were established. The quotas set a percentage for the annually permitted immigrants in the United States, based on the number of each nationality residing in the country published by the national census of specific years. At the same time, the issuance of visa authorisation for entry in the United States was set as a prerequisite and thus, the state increased its intervention in the field of migration.³⁰ During this period, the clientele of the shipping liner companies serving the Europe-US route drastically reduced. Meanwhile, Italy, one of the main emigration countries, restricted emigration in 1927³¹ and reduced the pool of potential passengers for the transport companies even further. Researchers of this period have not yet discussed the reaction of the shipping liner industry to the aforementioned measures, but these companies were undoubtedly adjusting to a new reality. With the implementation of new monthly quotas, steamships raced overnight into New York's harbour in order to join the entrance line before quotas were exhausted and visa issuance was exceeded.³² Furthermore, we know that the shipping liner companies

²⁹ Feys, *The battle for the migrants*, pp. 260-263, 276-283; Drew Keeling, "Costs, Risks and Migration Networks between Europe and the United States, 1900-1914", in Torsten Feys et. al. eds., *Maritime Transport and Migration: The Connections between Maritime and Migration Networks*, Research in Maritime History No. 33, St. John's Newfoundland, 2007, pp. 150-154.

³⁰ P. K. Sebak, "A Transatlantic Migratory Bypass", pp. 258-261. For the progressive restrictions on the US immigration system and their impact in the late 19th century up to the 1920s see, Brunnbauer, *op.cit.*, pp. 124-130.

³¹ McKeown, "Global Migration 1846-1940", p. 172.

³² John C. Torpey, *The Invention of the Passport. Surveillance, Citizenship and the State*, 2nd Edition, Cambridge, New York, 2018², pp. 147-148.

sought other markets for the employment of their vessels. During the 1920s, Brazil, Argentina, Canada and Australia emerged as alternative destinations for migrants and shipping liner companies.³³ These destinations prevailed for a time until the economic implications of the Great Depression of the 1930s and the hostilities of WWII rapidly decreased the number of immigrant intakes. The competitiveness and lure of the United States heavily affected the potentials of other immigrant destinations. The aforementioned countries took advantage of quality characteristics of past decades, such as the decreased cost and a shorter duration of migrant voyage from Europe to Latin American; however they could not capitalise substantially on these advantages that they could not capitalise substantially so far.³⁴

Considering the implementation of the migration policy, the United States governments involved the shipping liner industry in many enacted bills; this was a form of political and institutional assignment of migration policy to the private sector. More specifically, during the 19th and the early 20th centuries, the main concern of the United States Authorities was that the foreign population arriving at the country's ports did not become public charges due to lack of means and acquaintances for support while in the United States. Among the list of 'excludables' were those with health diseases and those not sufficiently white, among others. Therefore, the shipping liner companies were asked to screen migrants during embarkation and to not permit boarding in such cases. Otherwise, imprisonment and fines to the captain and the shipping liner company were imposed. Moreover, the shipping liner companies were obliged to bear the detention and deportation costs of the 'excludable' migrants. Thus,

³³ P. K. Sebak, op.cit., pp. 261-263, 313-315. Brazil's migrant intakes increased considerably after 1920. Between 1916-1920 Brazil received 186,400 emigrants and in 1921-1925 this amount almost doubled reaching 386,600 souls; this tendency continued in 1926-1930 when 453,600 emigrants arrived for the first time in the country. The same applies to Argentina, which in 1916-1920 received 2,400 immigrants and 510,200 in 1921-1925. The corresponding amounts for Uruguay were 53,100 and 70,000, while for Chile 14,800 and 34,300 respectively. For the Latin American migration statistics see, Silke Hensel, "Latin American Perspectives on Migration in the Atlantic World", in Donna R. Gabaccia and Dirk Hoerder (eds), *Connecting Seas and Connected Ocean Rims: Indian, Atlantic and Pacific Oceans and China Seas Migrations from the 1830s to the 1930s*, Leiden, Boston, 2011, Tables 15 and 16, pp. 290-291. Canada, despite an initial drop in its migrant intakes from 1920 (138,800) to 1921-1922 (91,700 and 64,200), increased in 1923 to 133,700 and continued rising (excepting 1925) up to 1929, culminating this rise in 1928 with 166,800 arrivals. For more see, <https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/11-630-x/11-630-x2016006-eng.htm>, retrieved 21.12.2019. Australia's migrant intake presented a noticeable increase after 1921 when the first US quota was imposed and set at 3 percent. In 1921 Australia received 17,525 immigrants and the following year 40,157. In 1924 when the US quota was restricted to 2 percent, Australia's immigrant intake increased further to 46,069 and reached 51,580 in 1927. For more on Australian annual immigrant intakes see, E. Richards, *Destination Australia*, table 1 pp. 386-387.

³⁴ B. S. Alonso, "The Other Europeans", pp. 401, 422.

the shipping liner companies were set financially liable towards the state for the “human cargo” carried and undertook “sheriff’s” duties, as noted by J. Torpey, in the regulation of migrant movement at the “behest of states”.³⁵

Inevitably, the restrictive measures on migration were reducing the potential clientele of the shipping liner companies. Hence, several companies and their agents developed various measures to retain the level of their business. Initially, they tried to grind the restrictions of the laws by training the migrants who were likely to be rejected from entrance to the United States. They checked and corrected, where appropriate, the manifest of the migrants before depositing it to the US Authorities, in order to track down reasons for their entry rejection. Companies offered to prepare immigrants on the answers they had to respond to the inquiries of the interrogators at Ellis Island. In case immigrants did not possess the ‘landing-money’ required by the Authorities, the shipping liner companies, or their agents, could lend it. The companies were also in contact with their families and philanthropic organisations to facilitate the successful disembarkation of those likely to be detained. Furthermore, some shipping liner companies hired doctors to cure those suffering from skin and eye infections before the trip. Another alternative for those with increased possibilities to be rejected was being transferred to the United States through Canada, Mexico or other US ports where the entrance controls were not as rigorous compared to Ellis Island.³⁶ In this way, the shipping liner companies gained the fares for the transfer, the migrants successfully migrated, and no fines or other expenses were imposed to the shipping liner companies.

It is understood that the relation between the states and the private sector in the case of migration was of high importance. The shipping liner industry can be characterised as a very critical sector, equal to its influence with the industrialists, in the formation and implementation of the state migration policy before the Second World War. On the one hand, through their lobbying, the shipping liner companies shaped the political climate as well as the legislations to be voted in their favour, and through their business activity they contributed to the formation of the population

³⁵ E. Blue, “Finding Margins on Borders”, pp. 7-8; J. C. Torpey, *The Invention of the Passport*, pp. 12, 116.

³⁶ Feys, *The battle for the migrants*, pp. 74, 225, 264-267, 274, 322; Blue, *op.cit.*, p. 8; Brown, *op.cit.*, p. 38. Similar practices were developed also in other migrants routes, for the practices of the agents in the case of Portuguese emigration to Brazil, the United States, and France, see Yvette Santos, “The Political Police and the Emigration Industry in Portugal During the 1930s”, *Journal of Migration History*, 5 (2019), pp. 481-485.

composition of countries. On the other hand, the central governments were late in setting up the working context of the shipping liner companies regarding the passengers/migrants' protection and when they eventually did so, the implementation of the enacted measures was lacking in view of the protection of the companies' business interests.

Entrepreneurial and Ethnic Networks & those involved in Migration Business

The field of migrant transportation was a highly competitive area for the shipping liner companies operating in the North Atlantic and Oceania before WWII and remained as such towards every migrant route after 1945. Therefore, the organisation of the infrastructure of the shipping liner companies was of vital importance for their maintenance and success in the business. Governments lent support and assisted companies in establishing their network and in widening their business circle in and out of territorial waters. These objectives were firstly attempted through the diplomatic corps in various countries. The consuls built a network informing the shipping liner companies in advance on policies of their competitors or the governmental policies in the countries where they operated, they intervened in the conclusion of trade agreements for the companies' benefit, and assisted in the increase of their trade-volume by advertising them.³⁷ It is therefore understood that the governmental diplomatic services were at the disposal of the shipping liner industry. The governments, by assisting the companies in the competition for a bigger slice of the market, anticipated greater revenue generated in the state cashiers—a mutually beneficial solution.

On another level, the success of each shipping liner company was based on the expansion and extent of their network for the selling of overseas tickets. Therefore, they collaborated with *migrant brokers* through whom their agents' network managed the selling of tickets to potential passengers and migrants. The *agents*, on the other side, were assigned by the *brokers* with the task of increasing their business and ultimately of establishing offices in key locations for migration. The *agents* sold tickets to the migrants, and through their *sub-agents* they expanded their selling areas also to the hinterland. The *agents* and the *sub-agents* were in direct contact with the

³⁷ Feys, *The battle for the migrants*, pp. 65, 212.

migrants, and along with the *migrant brokers* they were the key-persons to the successful loading and, to a considerable extent, the profitable running of a ship. To gain more from the migration business, the *agents* also assisted in the preparation of the migrants (selling of inland tickets, providing medical examinations and banking services, and issuing travel documents when it was a prerequisite for emigration); meanwhile, cases of migrant exploitation were far from rare. Governments attempted to regulate the agent-industry by setting laws preventing the speculation over migrants. Nevertheless, the agents' inventiveness and zeal for making money frequently caught the Authorities unprepared.³⁸

Regarding the sharing of the migrant transport market, even from the early 20th century, a concentration of a few companies that dominated the traffic in the North Atlantic and Indian Ocean has been noticed. As D. Keeling states, this traffic “was carried out by a privately-owned but government-regulated and supported oligopoly”. It is indicative that between 1900 and 1914 two-thirds of the migrants travelling between Europe and the United States were transferred by the four largest companies, and a total of 90 percent of migrants travelled by the ten largest shipping liner companies.³⁹ These companies were also geographically concentrated; mostly originating from Britain and Germany and, to a much lower extent, from France, Italy and other countries.

The process of the formation of oligopolies was not a novelty of the passenger/migrant traffic. It constituted a general development of the shipping market that continued in the Interwar period in a variety of maritime traffics. In 1939, five companies in the United Kingdom controlled over one-third of all UK tonnage, as opposed to one-quarter by the end of WWI.⁴⁰ The centralisation of the business within groups of companies was developed through mergers and amalgamations of

³⁸ Feys, *The battle for the migrants*, pp. 65, 77-80, 83-88; Brunnbauer, *op.cit.*, pp. 78-79, 176-184. See also as a case study for the network built from the agents of Austro-American Line at Patras in Greece, as well as for the exploitation of potential migrants, P. Tourgeli, «Ελληνες της Αμερικής», pp. 98-117.

³⁹ The ten largest groups were *White Star Line* 20 percent, *North German Lloyd* (NDL) 19 percent, *Cunard Line* 15 percent, *Hamburg American Line* (HAPAG) 13 percent, *Compagnie Générale Transatlantique* 7 percent, *Navigazione Generale Italiana* 7 percent, *Holland America Line* (HAL) 4 percent, *Fabre Lines* 3 percent, *Austro-Americana Line* 3 percent and *Scandinavian American Line* 2 percent, Keeling, “Costs, Risks and Migration Networks”, p. 122, footnote number 25. Of the companies above the British ones held 35 percent, the German 32 percent, French 10 percent and Italian 7 percent among others.

⁴⁰ The 1939 ‘Big Five’ companies were the *P&O*, *Furness Withy*, *Ellerman*, *Cunard*, and *Ocean Steamship*, for more see, Hope, *op.cit.*, p. 363.

companies during this period⁴¹ as well as in the late 19th century and contributed much to the oligopolistic market of the shipping liner companies; this characteristic remained after 1945.

The oligopolies were also strengthened by the formation of business unions, the so-called Conferences, amongst several shipping liner companies which faced the severe competition on the market as early as the second half of the 19th century. Shipping conferences were simply cartels at sea. Under these alliances, each company sought a “guaranteed” and sizable slice of the migrant trade. These unions were a way to cut down the competition and to stabilise prices by agreeing on common fares, the numbers of the trips executed by each member-company, and by following a common policy.⁴²

The shipping conferences as a 19th century innovation emerged considerably in the 20th century. Despite the limitation of the autonomous shipping liner companies’ free-from-Conference membership and obligations, the competition between them did not relax. Their main competition was over the migration traffic on the North Atlantic route, and it was of such magnitude that, in 1904, a rate war broke out amongst them. More specifically, in 1903, the shipping liner company Cunard Line secured a long-term subvention from the British government. Cunard had just withdrawn from the *North Atlantic Conference*, since it was facing competition by the *International Mercantile Marine Co. (IMM)* and German shipping liner companies (HAPAG and NDL) and, simultaneously, the consequences of the decrease of migrant traffic. In addition, Cunard reached an agreement with the Hungarian government in order to assist in the country’s emigration by initiating a new service between the Adriatic and New York. Boosted by these factors, Cunard considerably lowered its migrant fares. German shipping liner companies responded immediately by supporting the establishment of rival shipping liner companies from Austria and Scandinavia in order to foster Cunard’s renegotiation. Cunard defended its positions, and the ‘rate war’ became reality, leading the migrant fares for all the interested

⁴¹ Harlaftis, “Shipping”, p. 446. One of the main mergers of the period is the trust formed by J. P. Morgan with the establishment of the *International Mercantile Marine Co. (IMM)*, under which the *American Line*, the *Red Star Line*, the *Atlantic Transport Line*, the *White Star Line*, the *Leyland Line* and the *Dominion Line* were amalgamated, and monopolised the shipping trade. IMM also had concluded trade agreements with HAPAG and HAL. For more on IMM see, Feys, *The battle for the migrants*, pp. 163-210. For the coalescence and mergers in the shipping sector in the Australian and New Zealand run, see Broeze, op.cit., pp. 461-463.

⁴² Martin Stopford, *Maritime Economics: third edition*, London, New York, 2008³, pp. 556-557.

counterparts to record-low levels. Facing the consequences of this ‘war’, all the respective parties (Cunard, IMM, HAPAG and NDL) were driven into an agreement which concluded in ‘peace preservation’ at the end of 1904 and the increase of fares for the following year.⁴³ This incidence is indicative of the financial significance of the migrant traffic for the shipping liner companies in this period. The intercompany alliance prevailed in the preservation of their areas of business as well as in the persistence of the shipping liner companies to find new outlets to conduct business, even with the adoption of a fighting character.

Colonisation by European Empires created a whole business system in which the foundations were economic, aside the demographic ones. The British were among the first to endeavour the colonisation of overseas territories in the name of the British Empire, by transferring settlers in North America, Australia, New Zealand and India. Another major colonising empire were the Spaniards, who colonised parts of Central and South America; amongst other colonisers in the 18th and 19th centuries. Forced migration of convicts was one of the first practices to be implemented by the British. The target was the relocation of a workforce to initially inhospitable territories far away from Europe with a view of increasing production, the creation of domestic and imperial trade markets, and in the transferring of know-how to the indigenous population.⁴⁴

Hence, apart from the shipping liner companies, which organised and implemented the migrants’ transfer to the North American continent, there were also other agencies and entities working on these shipping liner companies. The colonisation and populating of the territories of the southern hemisphere activated organised efforts for the mass transfer of migrants, mainly from Europe. In Australia and New Zealand in particular, especially in the first half of the 19th century, colonisation companies selected migrants and, through the networks they had built up with emigration agents, managed the transfer of the new settlers to the Antipodes. The colonisation companies were actually working for the sake of business interests in the new workforce. At the same time, some of the directors and associates of these colonisation companies were also shipowners. Thus, they were favoured by gaining priority in the selection of their vessels and consequently in the vast acquisition of

⁴³ For a detailed analysis of the 1904 rate war see Keeling, *The Business of Transatlantic Migration*, pp. 107-141.

⁴⁴ Osterhammel, *op.cit.*, pp. 370-374.

revenue from their affiliation with the British government for the transfer of new settlers in its southern-hemisphere colonies. They also gained considerable power, which made some shipowners “walk about [...] ‘like dictator[s]’”.⁴⁵

A similar pattern of settlement was implemented by Brazil. In search of a workforce for the coffee-plantations, the Brazilian state of São Paulo was contracted with shipping liner companies in 1894. Free transport passage from Europe was provided, as well as inland transportation within Brazil for the migrants interested in working in coffee plantations. This system operated until 1927, and, apart from the transport assistance, the migrants were additionally benefitted from free rent and food, securing thus a minimum annual income.⁴⁶ In other Brazilian states, like Rio Grande do Sul, colonisation companies sought to attract European immigrants under a scheme supervised by the Brazilian imperial government offering transportation, money, tools, animals, and lenient payment deadlines for debts and for the issuance of land ownership.⁴⁷ These systems were a way for Brazil to overcome its disadvantages with respect to other migrant-attractive destination countries, foremost the United States, as well as for the coffee-planters to increase their production with low-waged workers.

As it is known, the period before WWII was far from peaceful.⁴⁸ Ethnic groups were persecuted and expelled from their residence or forced to flee. Therefore, as it will be extensively discussed in Chapter 2, important refugee flows were generated during the Interwar Period (1918-1939), which international organisations were mandated to manage and facilitate. Amongst the refugees fleeing their homes were also the Jews of Eastern and Central Europe. To assist the Jews, their American coreligionists established various religious agencies, such as the *Joint Distribution Committee* (JDC) in 1914 that was eventually renamed to *American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee* (AJDC) in March 1931. Through fundraising in the United States, JDC collected money which was transmitted to its partners in Europe in order to provide relief assistance to the Jewish victims of war and persecution.⁴⁹

⁴⁵ Broeze, op.cit., pp. 448-449.

⁴⁶ S. Hensel, “Latin American Perspectives”, p. 288; Alonso, op.cit., pp. 405-406.

⁴⁷ Patricia Bosenbecker, “Private Companies of Colonisation and Immigrant Entrepreneurs in Brazil”, *Journal of Migration History*, 3 (2017), pp. 162-165.

⁴⁸ Among the war atrocities in this period were the Balkan Wars, World War I, the Russian Revolution, and the rise of Fascism and Nazism in Italy and Germany respectively.

⁴⁹ Chiara Tessaris, “The war relief work of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee in Poland and Lithuania, 1915-18”, *East European Jewish Affairs*, 40:2 (2010), p. 127; Zosa Szajkowski, ““Reconstruction” vs. “Palliative Relief” in American Jewish Overseas Work (1919-1939)”, *Jewish Social Studies*, 32:1 (1970), pp. 14-15, 40.

JDC's mandate regarding the Jewish migration was the provision of assistance to European refugees in becoming self-supported in their place of residence or to assist their "repatriation". The "Repatriation of refugees" or "repatriation of US citizens" in the United States was a carefully selected term capable of bypassing the rigid anti-immigration climate and legislation in the United States of 1922-1923 which forbade assisted immigration. Therefore, the 'repatriation' declared the return of the individuals to the United States and not their first settlement. Thus, JDC a) facilitated the communication between Jews in Europe with their families and relatives in the United States, b) mediated in the transfer of remittances for the payment of transatlantic tickets from relatives in the United States to their family members in Europe, c) subsidised the ticket issuance in rare cases, while the full amount was repaid upon arrival in the United States in instalments, and finally d) assisted in the issuance of travel documents and visa authorisation.⁵⁰

Between October 1914 and August 1925, JDC had spent over \$1.5 million on refugee work out of about \$58 millions spent on overseas relief.⁵¹ By April 1923, JDC had assisted 300,000 total refugees and returnees in Poland and Lithuania.⁵² However, the geographical expansion of JDC's work took place in 1938 and 1939 with Hitler's invasion in Austria and Czechoslovakia, respectively. At that point, the provision of emigration assistance became its priority. JDC secured the necessary visas and accommodation for many of those fleeing the occupied zones and funded their travel expenses and landing fees. Between 1933 and 1939, the system operated by JDC had assisted about 110,000 Jews to flee Germany, 30,000 of them only in 1939, while from 1939 to 1944, the total number of the Jews emigrating through JDC were more than 81,000.⁵³

Another Jewish organisation which facilitated the emigration of European Jews with family ties to the United States was the *Hebrew Sheltering and Immigrant Aid Society* (HIAS). Setting Poland as its initial geographical area of operations, the shipping liner companies HAL and NDL recognised the business prospect of this

⁵⁰ Zosa Szajkowski, "Private and Organized American Jewish Overseas Relief and Immigration", *American Jewish Historical Quarterly*, 57:2 (1967), pp. 192-193, 218, 222-226.

⁵¹ Zosa Szajkowski, "Private and Organized", p. 228.

⁵² www.yivoencyclopedia.org/article.aspx/American_Jewish_Joint_Distribution_Committee, retrieved 21.12.2019.

⁵³ Zhava Litvac Glaser, "Refugees and Relief: The American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee and European Jews in Cuba and Shanghai, 1938-1943", unpublished PhD dissertation, City University of New York, 2015, pp. 11-12.

traffic and established a joint office in Warsaw to ease the selling of tickets. Like JDC, HIAS acted as mediator between the American and European Jews in the distribution of remittances for the purchasing of tickets to the United States. To best handle the remittances sent from the United States and to finance this movement, HIAS established its own bank in 1923—the *HIAS Immigrant Bank*.⁵⁴ At the edge of breaking the United States immigration law, HIAS offered free loans to US relatives of potential migrants, and in 1940, HIAS assisted 4,025 emigrants to reach the United States. Out of a total \$843,350 transportation cost, only \$271,570 was paid by the emigrants and their relatives, and the rest from HIAS and its partners.⁵⁵ Eventually, seeing a common ground of operations, the transport funds of JDC and HIAS-JCA merged after the outbreak of WWII.⁵⁶

In Australia, a similar venture took place by the local Jewish population, which, in view of their co-religionist persecutions in Nazi-stricken parts of Europe, formed the *Australian Jewish Welfare Society (AJWS)* in 1937. Apart from political pressure for the admission of an increasing number of Jewish refugees, AJWS undertook the task of coordinating the application admissions of Jewish refugees, their reception, and integration. AJWS received direct financial assistance from AJDC and HIAS, among others, and adopted the same practices with its American “sister-organisations”. Through fundraising, the organisations covered the fares of Jewish refugees, provided them with the required landing money and supported their settlement; the operational cost for AJWS was at least £3000 per year. AJWS joined forces with other Jewish organisations,⁵⁷ but, with the accession of Australia in WWII, their activities were restricted.

At an early stage, the Jewish community presented an organisational structure and provided transport assistance for its coreligionists. Other religious or ethnic groups did not experience the same level of organisation and activity in the provision of transportation of refugees and migrants prior to WWII. It should be stressed that the aforementioned Jewish organisations were not the only ones operating in this

⁵⁴ Szajkowski, “Private and Organized American”, pp. 193, 195-197, 205-207, 214.

⁵⁵ Szajkowski, “The Attitude of American Jews to Refugees from Germany in the 1930’s”, *American Jewish Historical Quarterly*, 61:2 (1971), pp. 116-117.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 135.

⁵⁷ Suzanne D. Rutland, *The Jews in Australia*, Cambridge, New York, 2005, pp. 56-57, 62-63; Suzanne D. Rutland, “Australian responses to Jewish refugee migration before and after World War II”, *Australian Journal of Politics & History*, 31:1 (1985), pp. 31, 34-36.

context before WWII, but rather the most prominent ones.⁵⁸ JDC and HIAS were in close relation with the shipping liner industry. HIAS in particular came in contact with a shipping liner company in order to arrange the movement of a thousand people on a weekly basis to the United States; this was an outlaw action in the US anti-immigration climate that prohibited the promotion of immigration. HIAS's actions also caused the reaction of other transatlantic competing shipping liner companies.⁵⁹ In addition, the governments involved in the Jewish emigration adopted measures for the protection of their shipping liner companies. Poland, for instance, refused the issuance of exit-visas to ticket holders of non-Polish shipping liner companies or to those sailing from foreign ports, in an effort to support the emigration exodus through its ports and transport companies; these practices were also adopted by also by Hungary and Belgium.⁶⁰

During the 19th and the first half of 20th century, the first structural elements of migration are formed—a pattern which largely governed the post-WWII migration:

- a) Technology
- b) Relation of governments with shipping liner companies
- c) Organisation of the private economic sector into cartels for the support of their business interests and for the enhancement of their influence towards governmental decisions.
- d) Participation of non-governmental/private agencies (religious/voluntary) in migration management.

Firstly, it is recognised that the technological developments of the period (railways, telegraph, steamships) facilitated the increase of human mobility, and thus contributed to shaping the size of migration. Overseas migration in the 19th century was also a technologically driven travel business. Along with these two components (technology and migration), regional and international trade increased and whole cities and ports transformed due to the technological innovations and the enlargement

⁵⁸ Other Jewish organisations operating before WWII were NCC-NRS, and HICEM, see Szajkowski, "The Attitude", pp. 118-122, 128-129.

⁵⁹ Szajkowski, "Private and Organized", pp. 199-200, footnote n. 19 p. 203

⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 198

of trade of commodities and migration; this is seen as a first step towards globalisation and an integrated economy.

Most of the governments were more than receptive in supporting the shipping liner companies under their flag: by providing financial assistance in the adoption of technological advancements, by adjusting the state legislation for the companies' business interests at the expense of migrants' interests, and by availing the governmental services to the shipping liner companies for the increase of their business-cycle. It could be demonstrated that the governmental migrant transport policies were part of the business approach of migration from the side of the governments, along with the labour policies favouring cost reduction. Apart from the political balances sought to be achieved through migration, migration was approached through a business lens by the governments rather than 'humanitarian' or simply demographical.

The transport companies participated and, with the negotiation-power acquired, influenced the formation of the state migration policy to a significant extent, especially in the United States, which was the main migrant-receiving country in the Western world of the period. They constituted a crucial policy and decision-making body. On the level of commerce, the integration and unification of the shipping sector also takes place during this time period. Mergers of shipping liner companies into large conglomerates,⁶¹ as well as the formation of Conferences, unified and centralised the trade. In the 19th and early 20th centuries, passenger shipping towards the Americas and Oceania was in direct relation and dependence from migration routes—a trend which mainly originated from Europe.

The religious and non-governmental/private agencies, apart from the assistance offered to their target-population, unintentionally constituted an early attempt for migration management in an intercontinental level; at a time when the promotion and assisted immigration were prohibited by the then main receiving country, the United States. Disregarding these restrictions, the religious agencies established their networks in the immigration and emigration countries. They met the shipping liner companies, built working relations, massively provided passengers, supplemented the passenger-loading capacity per ship and contributed to the shipping liner company's profitability; this was already in conjunction with the private

⁶¹ Harlaftis, "Shipping", p. 446.

immigration that the shipping liner companies independently served. Thus, religious and non-governmental/private agencies formed another pool of migrants and, through their activation, enhanced and instigated emigration.

The *migration business* was not a European, neither transatlantic, nor even a Western phenomenon. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, migrant workers in Southeast Asia travelled from India and China to Malaya, Burma and Singapore areas with increased demand for labour. Private labour recruiters, intermediaries, employers, shipping companies and state actors were involved to facilitate migration and created a whole migration business in close resemblance to the Western examples. Specifically, in the case of South Indian migration to Southeast Asian countries, some shipping companies had also undertaken the role of labour recruiter and in Singapore, the “transactions in human beings” from China was considered as the “most valuable cargoes” and an important resource for Singapore’s economy. Under the various names it took per region, a migration system was organised wherein the emigrants who could not pay their passage were borrowed either by money-lenders or the recruiting agent. The cost of the ticket was repaid through the assignment to a specific employer and working and living conditions that could not change before the end of the debt;⁶² this became an indentured labour migration system, as it is known in the case of the West.⁶³ Intra-Asian migration was of an important magnitude as well. In 1912, migration to Southeast and North Asia was about 1.1 million, while in 1927, a few years after the US immigration restrictions, 1.25 million Asian migrants were destined to Southeast Asia and 1.5 million to North Asia in 1929.⁶⁴

After WWII, the ground for migration services changed. A widening partition of the world into the West versus the Soviet Bloc produced new realities at a time when globalisation processes were intensified. New technologies made migration even easier, but, institutionally, migration encountered greater restrictions. The global division of labour and the need for balances between West and East set the pattern

⁶² *Coolie trade in China, maistry in Sound India, kangani in Malaya*. Amarjit Kaur, “Indian Ocean Crossings: Indian Labor Migration and Settlement in Southeast Asia, 1870 to 1940”, in Donna R. Gabaccia and Dirk Hoerder, *Connecting Seas and Connecting Ocean Rims: Indian, Atlantic, and Pacific Oceans and China Seas Migrations from the 1830s to the 1930s*, Leiden, Boston, 2011, pp. 136-137, 140, 150, 157; Carl A. Trocki, “Singapore as a Nineteenth Century Migration Node”, in Donna R. Gabaccia and Dirk Hoerder, *op.cit.*, pp. 207-208.

⁶³ For more on the indenture system, see Chapter 7.

⁶⁴ Adam McKeown, “A World Made Many: Integration and Segregation in Global Migration, 1840-1940”, in D. R. Gabaccia and D. Hoerder, *op.cit.*, pp. 45-46.

that migration followed at a time when migration flows throughout the world were considerably enlarged. Establishment of international and intergovernmental organisations added a new factor in the migration management, with which the transport sector was called and sought to cooperate. In which way and how successfully these developments took place will occupy the chapters to follow.

Chapter 2:

International Organisations Managing Human Mobility: Politics and economy in global and regional perspective

After the end of the Second World War, human mobility was progressively reaching its pre-WWII rates. The establishment and operation of a series of international and intergovernmental organisations added a new dimension to the management of human mobility, which thereon was also regulated on an international level. Political divisions and economic policies were crucial components in the formation of the new set of migration management, which was taking shape after 1945.

The objective of this chapter is to prove that the *Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration* (ICEM) was a quasi-continuation of the *European Recovery Programme* (ERP, “Marshall Plan”), which, in 1951, was approaching its conclusion as a significant element of US Cold War development policies. Apart from the funding provided from the successor of ERP for the establishment of ICEM (the *Mutual Security Administration*), the values of the Marshall Plan as drafted by the policy of the United States under the Truman Administration were also incorporated into the work of ICEM. This policy included the collaboration between the public and private sector, economic stability, free international trade, development, and abundance of consumption. In a post-WWII and Cold War era of multilateral integration, ICEM is perceived as a tool for the integration of the Western world in matters of migration and its management and the provision of the assistance to its member-states as part of the diplomatic repertoire of the United States.

The chapter is divided in two sections. The first section examines the operation of international organisations involved in human mobility before 1951. Starting with the League of Nations, the examination continues with UNRRA, the United Nations, IRO, and UNHCR, among others. It is endeavoured to highlight that the provision of ‘humanitarian’ assistance was never clear-cut humanitarianism; financial, commercial and political objectives were anticipated by the governments as a consequence of funding each international organisation. The role of the United States and of the Marshall Plan for Western Europe is discussed, along with the political and economic conditions and the problem of “surplus population” that drove the establishment of ICEM.

The second section is devoted to the examination of the role and operations of ICEM from 1951 to 1980. It is deduced that the founding member-states of ICEM

acknowledged migration as an *engine* for economic development that drove the operations of ICEM throughout the period examined. The ICEM structure and the services developed for migrants and refugees are analysed, along with the Organisation's structural goal—the provision of transport. In this context, ERP's endeavours in the development of transport means and of transport infrastructures during the first post-WWII decades are linked to ICEM's enhanced cooperation with the transport sector.

International Management of Human Mobility: the period 1938-1951

The management of human mobility is not a post-WWII idea. For a long time, migrant-sending countries had adopted policies to control the outflow of their citizens or subjects in order to retain their workforce and/or military-force and the level of sum from tax-collection, among others. In addition, migrant-receiving states controlled the inflow of foreigners by prohibiting or restricting the entrance of specific persons lacking the prerequisites required for their admission; for instance, the United States, Canada and Australia restricted the entrance of Chinese migrants for a great part of the 19th century and until the first decades of the second half of the 20th century. The terms of exit and entrance from/to a country were defined through bilateral agreements between the sending and receiving countries as an established practice for the management of transnational migration.

However, the international management of human mobility has a different starting point. Several initiatives for its regulation had emerged since the second half of the 19th century and more prominently with the establishment of the *League of Nations* after the end of the First World War. The League of Nations, even without a mandate on international aid or refugee protection, was called in 1920 to its first refugee-related operation. More specifically, the League supported the return of prisoners-of-war (POWs) from Russia to their countries. It also assisted the Russian refugees fleeing into neighbouring countries due to the Civil War and the economic crisis prevailing in the country. The League centralised its refugee activities in 1921 under the office of the *High Commissioner for Russian Refugees*, which, in 1925-1929, was incorporated into the *International Labour Organisation* (ILO). In 1930, it was reconstituted as the *Nansen International Office for Refugees* when the population in need of care started to increase. In its first transport operation, the League, under the leadership of Fridtjof Nansen, organised a transport scheme which

included the transport of prisoners-of-war within Russia by trains until Estonia, wherefrom transferred them to Germany by the four German passenger ships the League employed. Progressively, the transfer points increased (including Finland and Latvia), and, until September 1922, the League had managed to safely transport 427,886 prisoners-of-war from 26 different national groups at an average cost of less than £1 per prisoner-of-war.¹

After assisting prisoners-of-war in Russia and the refugees fleeing Russia, Nansen's organisation became involved in the incidents following the expulsion of populations between Greece and Turkey before and after the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, and assisted, among others, a considerable number of Armenians fleeing Turkey; it even projected the resettlement of refugees to South American countries, starting with Paraguay. The Nansen International Office for Refugees, as well as its predecessor, the High Commissioner, were steadily underfunded and had been allocated with a budget for refugee-related operations of about one percent of the League's total budget. Nansen's Office concluded its refugee operations at the end of 1938. The League retained the legal and political protection of refugees and the discussions for the founding of a new agency started.²

The importance of the League's operations lies in the fact that it was the first attempt from an international organisation to transfer large numbers of people by transcending important logistic difficulties, achieving an interstate and international cooperation of the involving parties, and by employing various means of transport (trains and ships) and conducting the whole operation at a minimum cost. The League, along with its specialised agencies, institutionalised the safe interstate transport of refugees and prisoners-of-war that became a 'legacy' for future endeavours of the international community.

¹ L. W. Holborn, "The League of Nations and the Refugee Problem", *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 203 (1939), pp. 124-125, 128, 131-132; Martyn Housden, *The League of Nations and the organisation of peace*, New York, 2014, pp. 60-63, 66; Evan Elise Easton-Calabria, "From Bottom-Up to Top-Down: The 'Pre-History' of Refugee Livelihoods Assistance from 1919 to 1979", *Journal of Refugee Studies*, 28:3 (2015), pp. 417, 419. For more on the organisations up to the outbreak of WWII see, Dimitris Parsanoglou, Konstantinos Tsitselikis, "The Emergency of the International Regulation of Human Mobility", in Lina Venturas (ed.), *International "Migration Management" in the Early Cold War. The Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration*, pp. 13-32. For recent discourses on migration management, see Antoine Pécoud, "Pitfalls, ambivalences and contestations of 'migration management'", in Emma Carmel, Katherina Lenner, Regine Paul (eds.), *Handbook on the Governance and Politics of Migration*, Cheltenham, Northampton, 2021, pp. 206-215.

² M. Housden, *The League of Nations*, pp. 67, 70-73; E. E. Easton-Calabria, "From Bottom-Up to Top-Down", pp. 417-418, 421.

In 1938, with the initiative of the United States, the establishment of the *Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees* (IGCR) in Evian marked the first coordinated response of the West in response to the refugee problem followed by the Nazi expansion. IGCR, which was formed only a few months before the outbreak of WWII, was a specialised, short-term organisation outside the formal framework of the League of Nations. IGCR's main goal was to secure "an orderly system of migration" for the people forced to flee from the German occupied areas. The greater part of IGCR's expenditures was shared between the United States of America (USA) and the United Kingdom (UK), but IGCR's funding remained problematic until it stopped its operations in 1939 due to the outbreak of WWII.³

During the Second World War, the ongoing situation required IGCR to adjust both its role and functions. A conference in Bermuda took place in April 1943 in order to revive and re-organise the Committee. The revision of IGCR's mandate was recommended in order to a) include all political and religious refugees and those persecuted due to their "racial origin" who had escaped from war-stricken areas in Europe, b) expand the membership of IGCR, c) increase the share of the administrative expenses of the Committee for all the member-states, and d) make all member-states contribute to the cost of maintaining and transporting refugees.⁴ With its success limited, the Committee concluded its functions in 1947.

The management of human mobility and, to a larger extent, the provision of 'humanitarian' assistance was not a clear-cut assistance offered. The United States policy, especially from the First World War onwards and with a considerable increase during Roosevelt's Administration (1933-1945), used 'humanitarian' assistance as a vehicle for achieving diplomatic and foreign trade interests. It largely constituted an instrument of the country's foreign policy – the means for the "second American intervention", as US President Herbert Hoover (1929-1933) has characteristically termed it. More specifically, the American entrance to WWI in 1917 turned the *American Red Cross* (ARC) into a coordinating body for the distribution of the US government humanitarian assistance offered abroad; with the presidential decision, the aid organisations working outside the United States had hereafter to act under the umbrella and leadership of ARC, thus transforming ARC into a quasi-state agency. In this context, ARC, apart from the successful fund-raising activities conducted,

³ Parsanoglou, Tsitselikis, op.cit., pp. 30-31; NAA/A446, 1962/67352, J. Horgan, 'Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees', 23.09.1943.

⁴ NAA/A446, 1962/67352, J. Horgan, 'Bermuda Conference Relating to Refugee Problems', 18.05.1943.

assisted millions of displaced persons by providing them with food, medical care, accommodation, and employment. ARC was used as a diplomatic tool by the United States government to enhance America's humanitarian and general image abroad.⁵

Such practices did not stop at this point; on the contrary, they were strengthened in 1919 with the establishment by the US Congress of the *American Relief Administration* (ARA). ARA was mandated and heavily funded by the State Department in order to feed and materially support post-WWI Europe, notably the victims of the Russian famine of 1921-1922, a significant number of whom had become displaced. Other private organisations contributed to this work, ARC and AJDC included, among others. Apart from its actual cause to feed Europe, ARA acted as an instrument for the establishment of political and trade relations with Europe. This agency attempted to fight the rising Bolshevism in Europe by assisting in the immediate needs of countries, which, in turn, would improve political and social stabilisation; a lack of elements like food and shelter was considered to make countries more vulnerable to Bolshevism. It also aimed at inaugurating trade roads for the channelling of American surpluses of the primary sector and to assist the American industrialists in opening businesses in Europe.⁶ State and private humanitarian aid constituted a concrete part of diplomatic policy.

The economic prosperity of the 1920s in the United States and parts of Europe was followed by the economic crisis of the 1930s and the inauguration of Second World War hostilities at the end of the decade. The war lasted up until 1945, and, after its conclusion, the international climate changed dramatically. WWII had a destructive impact in many ways; the great loss of human lives⁷ and the devastation of entire cities ensued along with the fall of the international and state political *status quo* as known prior to the war. With WWII approaching to an end, new realities were formed in the international arena. From 1945 to 1947, the Cold War gradually prevailed and two opposing parties emerged: the United States on one side and the Soviet Union (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics - USSR) on the other. The Cold War was an ideological conflict between the two superpowers that emerged after

⁵ Daniel Roger Maul, "The Rise of a Humanitarian Superpower: American NGOs and International Relief, 1917-1945", in Miguel Bandeira Jerónimo, José Pedro Monteiro (eds), *Internationalism, Imperialism and the Formation of the Contemporary World: The Pasts of the Present*, e-book 2018, pp. 130-133; Peter Gatrell, "Western NGOs and Refugee Policy in the Twentieth Century", *Journal of Migration History*, 5 (2019), pp. 391, 394.

⁶ D. R. Maul, "The Rise of a Humanitarian Superpower", pp. 132-134; P. Gatrell, "Western NGOs and Refugee Policy in the Twentieth Century", p. 393.

⁷ It is estimated that 70 to 85 million people perished either due to hostilities or war-related famine and diseases.

1945, both of which initially competed on the prevalence of their economic and social system to the European countries and progressively to the rest of the world. The United States promoted the values of the capacity of the market, private ownership, and entrepreneurial control, while the Soviet Union promoted public ownership and centralisation. The geographical expansion of their circle of influence constituted priority for both superpowers and the key-means for such a cause were economic production and technological advancement.⁸

Europe, a main centre of WWII, encountered several great difficulties after the end of the War. The devastation of entire cities had resulted in an increase of homeless people; in the USSR they numbered about 25 million and in Germany 20 million, consequently, a crisis on housing stock emerged. As it will be discussed in more detail further below, the displaced persons, refugees and prisoners of war constituted an additional number along with the local population of many European cities requiring state assistance for immediate care (feeding, housing, clothing, medical treatment, and surveillance). Transportation means (railway lines, roads, bridges, canals, merchant fleet, ports, and airport basis) were partially or completely destroyed in many countries. Thus, even if production in some industrial sectors had not completely disrupted, the products could not be transferred. The European mercantile marine after WWII had decreased by 61 percent of the pre-WWII fleet. The city of Vienna in Austria, for example, could not be supplied with coal, even if European coal extraction was operational in 1945. Paris, as well, with the demolition of the bridges across the Seine, was blocked to a significant extent. Moreover, Europe's productive sources had diminished. In many countries, food shortages were experienced that resulted in the shrinking or stagnation of the national economies and the unavoidable demand for American goods. However, with the eruption of European commerce in conjunction with the rest of the world—more importantly, with the United States—Europe lacked hard currency and could not import the raw materials and the machinery needed to boost its own production. Hence, the dollar crisis became more than critical.⁹

⁸ David C. Engerman, "Ideology and the origins of the Cold War, 1917-1962", in Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (eds), *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, Vol. I, *Origins*, Cambridge, New York, 2010, pp. 33-34; Charles S. Maier, "The world economy and the Cold War in the middle of the twentieth century", in M. P. Leffler and O. A. Westad (eds), *op.cit.*, p. 46.

⁹ Tony Judt, *Postwar. A History of Europe Since 1945*, New York, 2005, pp. 15-17, 82-83, 86-87; Derek H. Aldcroft (with the assistance of Steven Morewood), *The European Economy 1914-2000*, London, New York, 2002⁴, pp. 107-111; Barry Eichengreen, *The European Coordinated Economy: Capitalism Since and Beyond 1945*, Princeton, Oxford, 2008, pp. 52-56.

Nevertheless, not all countries were affected in the same way by the War. Germany, for example, had lost only 20 percent of its industrial plants by May 1945, which was a rather small percentage considering the extent of the country's involvement in WWII. The engineering industries producing machine tools remained almost intact in Germany, the UK, the USSR and France, among others.¹⁰ However, their economies and parts of their infrastructure were heavily affected.

The United States, on the other hand, was one of the most financially robust countries by the end of the War. During WWII, the country's gross national product increased by 60 percent and its total earnings by 50 percent. In the aftermath of the War, the United States owned two-thirds of the world's gold reserves, three-fourths of world's invested capital, and half of the world's shipping vessels and manufacturing capacity. The British financial and political inability to retain its status as the main power in Europe following the country's economic crisis of February 1947 resulted in the United States securing its supremacy in Europe. The Harry Truman Administration wanted to export the American model of organising economy, society, and way of life; under these circumstances, countries would grow and thrive under the American wings and influence. Truman's axes for such a cause were free trade, the access to raw materials, nonaggression, and intergovernmental cooperation through international organisations. The establishment of the *United Nations Organisation* in 1945 was the milestone for a period of successive founding of international and intergovernmental organisations with the assistance of the United States. The beginning of such an extended financial and political American involvement in Europe lies in 1947 when Britain could not continue supporting Greece and Turkey. Thus, in March of the same year, in an effort to retain parts of Europe under the Western influence, the Truman Doctrine was announced, which drafted the United States policy foreseeing the provision of assistance of free peoples to preserve "their free institutions and their national integrity", according to President H. Truman. Congress, subsequently, increased the American overseas budget by \$400 million.¹¹ The Truman Doctrine gave direct assistance to Greece and Turkey; Greece was immersed in civil conflict and, as the United States feared, Turkey was vulnerable to a likely Soviet aggression.

¹⁰ T. Judt, *Postwar*, p. 83; D. H. Aldcroft, *The European Economy 1914-2000*, p. 108; B. Eichengreen, *The European Coordinated Economy*, pp. 55-56.

¹¹ Melvyn P. Leffler, "The emergence of an American grand strategy, 1945-1952", in Leffler and Westad (eds), *op.cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 67-68, 71, 76; Judt, *op.cit.*, pp. 104-105, 107, 127; William I. Hitchcock, "The Marshall Plan and the creation of the West", in Leffler and Westad (eds), *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 155-156.

The United States equated international peace and European economic recovery with their own-security and long-term interests, thus paving the way for an extended European recovery plan. Even before this, the United States had provided European countries with extended loans and grants to cover emergencies aroused after 1945 such as essential supplies and repairs. In particular, the UK had been granted \$4.4 billion between 1945 and 1947, France with \$1.9 billion, Italy with \$513 million until mid-1947, among many other countries. These sums, however, were not directed for reconstruction purposes or long-term investments and did not resolve the structural problems of Europe. Therefore, soon enough, in April 1948, the *European Recovery Programme* (ERP), or the “Marshall Plan” as it is more widely known, was announced, and its implementation was undertaken by the *Economic Cooperation Administration* (ECA); this independent agency adopted a business-like approach of the Programme and was staffed from the business and private sector. The ERP intended to restore the major trading partner of the United States and to reset the balance of power in Europe and “refashion” the European countries, having the United States pattern as exemplar. Through the Marshall Plan, the conception of which was based on the New Deal policies of the 1930s, the United States wanted to assist in the economic revival of the sixteen participating European countries to improve their trade relationships and payment deficits with the United States and to restart the European economic growth with the establishment of sound economic conditions: the expansion of external trade, the elimination of trade barriers, the enhancement of economic cooperation, and the establishment and maintenance of equitable rates. As T. Judt notes, ERP was “an economic barrier to Soviet expansion”, and, between 1948 and 1951, it offered approximately \$12.3 billion in aid to European countries.¹²

Under ERP, each participating country was requested to draft a four-year plan based on which it was provided with goods free of charge on an annual basis. These goods arrived in the European countries in American-owned ships, and, when sold to the participating European countries, generated “counterpart funds” in the national currencies which were used—as bilaterally agreed—between each national government and the United States. The participating countries undertook certain commitments

¹² W. I. Hitchcock, “The Marshall Plan”, pp. 154-160; Judt, *op.cit.*, pp. 90-92, 94; Michael J. Hogan, *The Marshall Plan, America, Britain, and the reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952*, Cambridge, 2005 (1987¹), pp. 19, 26, 89-91, 105, 108, 136, 208. The participating countries in ERP were Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the US-UK bizon of Germany.

directed in the stabilisation of national currencies, the adjustment of exchange rates, and the liberalisation and development of trade on a bilateral or multilateral basis not only with the United States, but also with other European countries; all the aforementioned elements were required for the unification of Europe and the reestablishment of the free world trading system as perpetuated by the American agenda. Collaboration between the public and private sector was set as a prerequisite and it was strengthened and promoted as the key to a successful European economic recovery—a critical component of the Marshall Plan. ECA constituted the hub through which the public-private power was shared and tried to build a public-private partnership in view of greater productivity.¹³

In the case of Italy, which, from the onset of the post-WWII period, adopted a policy favouring emigration, and ERP also financed projects facilitating the emigration of Italians overseas. Specifically, in 1949-1950, ERP provided \$11.5 million, out of the \$29.5 million initially requested by Italy, for exploration missions and investments in Latin American countries and, to a lesser extent, Canada; ERP funding also facilitated the agricultural settlement of Italian migrants as well as for the transportation of emigrants to Australia.¹⁴

Sovereignty rights were transcended through the Marshall Plan, in the sense that it built a super-national authority with the right to dictate economic and development policies in the countries assisting. What the administrators of ERP wanted to achieve was to establish “a democratic neo-capitalism” similar to the one flourishing in the United States, as Hogan has pointed out.¹⁵ The ERP financial assistance was the price paid by the United States in order to establish an international monetary system based on the dollar and for the European countries to consent to the American economic hegemony, i.e., a “dollar diplomacy”; William Howard Taft, a former US president (1909-1913), had characterised the policy of American investments and export of capital towards countries under development with the goal of increasing the United States’ influence abroad.¹⁶

In this context, the establishment of several economic and financial organisations took place during this period to ease regional and international

¹³ M. J. Hogan, *The Marshall Plan*, pp. 93, 101, 136, 205; Judt, *op.cit.*, pp. 93-94.

¹⁴ Donatella Strangio, “‘Assisted’ Migration and the Marshall Plan: the Italian Case”, *Journal of Migration History*, 6 (2020), pp. 305, 323-324.

¹⁵ Hogan, *op.cit.*, pp. 109, 415.

¹⁶ Thanasis D. Sfikas, «Η Αμερικανική Εθνική Ιδεολογία και ο «Ιπτάμενος Δίσκος» του Σχεδίου Μάρσαλ», in Thanasis D. Sfikas (ed.), *Το Σχέδιο Μάρσαλ: Ανασυγκρότηση και διαίρεση της Ευρώπης*, Athens, 2011, pp. 61-62, 89-90.

economic integration. Firstly, the *International Monetary Fund* (IMF) was established in 1945, which, along with the *World Bank*, were set up after the Bretton Woods exchange agreement in 1944 and functioned as an international bank maintaining the fixed exchange rate, securing their convertibility, and facilitating the expansion and growth of international trade. The IMF was established mainly with American initiative and funds. The *General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs* (GATT) in 1947 followed with the purpose to promote international trade and eliminate tariffs and quotas which were understood as barriers to trade expansion. The *Organisation for European Economic Cooperation* (OEEC) in 1948, on the other hand, was established to channel the funds from Marshall Plan, but also to facilitate freer trade, the European interstate integration, and international collaboration.¹⁷

The restoration of the pre-WWII ‘normality’ through bilateral and international cooperation was set as priority for the victorious allies. Integration was key for the post-WWII period on a global and regional level. Said integration was sought not only on an economic level, as discussed above, but also in the political sector, beginning with the establishment of the *United Nations* (UN) in 1945 and its numerous specialised agencies, the *European Coal and Steel Community* (ECSC) in 1951, and the *European Economic Community* (EEC) in 1957, among many more agencies. In the military sector, the *North Atlantic Treaty Organisation* (NATO) was established in 1948. Following suit, a considerable number of international and intergovernmental organisations were established and aimed at economic, political, and military integration, predominantly of the Western world. More specifically, between 1940 and 1950, the number of international organisations (IOs) increased from 38 to 81, and the international nongovernmental organisations (iNGOs) increased from 477 to 795; this trend continued unabated in the following decades.¹⁸

Within the political and economic climate as described earlier, Europe also had to cope with unprecedented population redistributions at the end of the Second World War. Europe, along with Asia and the Middle East, numbered 175 million

¹⁷Amongst the financial agencies established with US assistance was also the *European Payments Union* (EPU) in 1949, which in an effort to ease European trade worked as a “clearing-house for debits and credits in European currencies”. For more see, Judt, *op.cit.*, pp. 93-94, 107-108; Eichengreen, *op.cit.*, 79-80.

¹⁸ The years between the end of the war, 1945, and 1950 saw the greatest trends for international cooperation through the establishment of new IOs and iNGOs. In the following decades this increase continued and between 1960 and 1970 the IOs nearly doubled, from 154 to 280, and in 1984 was 1530, while the iNGOs from 1268 reached 2795 in 1970 and 12,686 in 1984, for more see A. Iriye, *Global community...*, pp. 55, 98, 129. For the development of iNGOs see also, Marlou Schrover, Teuntje Vosters, Irial Glynn, “NGOs and West European Migration Governance (1860s until Present): Introduction to a Special Issue”, *Journal of Migration History*, 5 (2019), pp. 189-217.

displaced persons within their territories.¹⁹ In Europe, in particular, the Nazis and USSR regimes displaced, deported, and transferred about 30 million people from the territories they occupied or were under their control between 1939 and 1943. Nazis not only settled Germans in newly occupied territories of Eastern Europe by removing Slavs, but, as it is known, they also forcibly transferred populations to Germany to work in factories or to be imprisoned in concentration camps. With the liberation of Europe, these populations, along with the Axis soldiers and the non-German collaborators of Nazis, escaped out of fear of anticipating Soviet retributions, while the few Jewish survivors in Poland left because they did not feel safe in Eastern Europe. Many found themselves outside their original place of residence while hundreds of thousands of Displaced Persons (DPs) left Germany, Austria, Poland and other regions to return to their countries of origin. Furthermore, population exchanges took place between several countries after 1945. For example, in 1946, Czechoslovakia and Hungary exchanged about 120,000 Slovaks in Hungary for about 120,000 Hungarians in Slovakia; other exchanges occurred between Poland and Lithuania, Czechoslovakia and the USSR, and others. Meanwhile, in the summer of 1945 in Potsdam, Germany, the “Big Three” consisting of the United States, Britain, and the USSR agreed to transfer German populations living in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary back to Germany; this resulted in some thirteen million Germans settling into West Germany, while many of them died on their way back home.²⁰

The plans of some of the newly founded international organisations included the maintenance and, ultimately, the orderly transfer of population. The remaining population, as well as those comparatively few displaced persons who returned to Germany, required the immediate response of the Allied-occupying forces of Germany in matters of food provision, clothing, and medical care. Refugees and displaced persons were placed in camps and their care relied upon the *United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration* (UNRRA), which had been established as a temporary organisation two years before the end of WWII in November 1943 and eventually adhered to the UN in 1945. The UNRRA’s mandate included the rehabilitation of the liberated countries and the maintenance and repatriation of the millions of DPs under Allied control, mainly in Germany, Austria, Italy, Poland,

¹⁹ Ruth Ellen Wasem, “At the Nexus of Refugee and Labour Migration: US Refugee Policy Formulation after the Second World War”, *Journal of Migration History*, 6 (2020), p. 332.

²⁰ Mark Mazower, *Dark Continent: Europe’s Twentieth Century*, London, 1998, pp. 217-218, 221; Judt, *op.cit.*, pp. 22-26.

Czechoslovakia, and France. UNRRA was under the control of the United States, even if the Soviets were still members, and its aim was to cover IGCR's operational gap and to manage the transition from war to peace.²¹

Between July 1945 and June 1947, UNRRA had spent \$10 billion, the vast majority of which had been contributed by the United States, Canada and the UK. By the end of 1945, UNRRA's workload included the operation of 227 camps and relief centres for refugees and DPs in Germany, 25 in Austria, and more in France and other countries; by June 1947, the organisation was presiding over a total of 762 such centres and camps in Western Europe. UNRRA had also repatriated nearly seven million displaced persons by the end of 1946.²²

However, with UNRRA's mandate approaching to an end, repatriation was not an option for many DPs who did not want to return to their, by then, communist ruled countries; by 1947 and the start of the Cold War, the forced repatriations stopped. This population was mainly nationals of the Soviet bloc (Poles, Hungarians, Bulgarians, Romanians, Yugoslavs, Balts and Jews), who the West then perceived as political refugees. Apart from that, the denial of the United States and other Western countries to receive more DPs and the unwillingness of the Soviet Union to accept the "free movement" principal for the DPs—by equating with Nazi-collaborators those who refused returning to the Soviet Union after spending time in West—imposed the need for another political solution for the remaining unsettled populations. Moreover, the mandate of UNRRA did not foresee the resettlement of DPs, and thus, the need for a new organisation with a wider mandate soon emerged.²³

Apart from UNRRA's actual work, what is important to bear in mind from the agency's history is that its establishment marks the first coordinated attempt for the institutionalisation of an international 'humanitarian' system led by the United States,

²¹Rieko Karatani, "How History Separated Refugee and Migrant Regimes: In Search of Their Institutional Origins", *International Journal of Refugee Law*, 17:3, (2005), pp. 527-528; Jessica Reinisch, "'We Shall Rebuild Anew a Powerful Nation': UNRRA, Internationalism and National Reconstruction in Poland", *Journal of Contemporary History*, 43:3, (2008), p. 451. The work of UNRRA in relation to DPs was: "assistance in repatriation, return to homes, and previously settled residence; provision of supplies and services required before and during return; provision of a reasonable measure of assistance to displaced persons after return upon the request of the government or appropriate authority of the country to which displaced persons are returned", NAA/A1838, 861/1 PART 1, "Standing Technical Committee on Displaced Persons of U.N.R.R.A.", s.a.

²²Judt, *op.cit.*, pp. 28-29; Lina Venturas, Dimitra Groutsis, «Ο Ψυχρός Πόλεμος και η Ρύθμιση των διεθνών μετακινήσεων: Η δημιουργία της «Διακυβερνητικής Επιτροπής Μεταναστεύσεως εξ Ευρώπης», *Μνήμων* 32 (2011-2012), p. 205; Anthony T. Bouscaren, *International Migrations Since 1945*, New York, 1963, p. 12.

²³Yannis Papadopoulos, Dimitris Parsanoglou, "Operationalizing the Regulation of Human Mobility in the 1940s", in Lina Venturas (ed.), *op.cit.*, pp. 35-36; Daniel Cohen, *In War's Wake*, pp. 5, 10, 18; Judt, *op. cit.*, pp. 30-31.

not only organisationally and structurally, but also politically;²⁴ this development is seen also in the establishment of organisations following UNRRA's dissolution.

The member states of IGCR and UNRRA, along with the newly established United Nations, decided to replace both organisations and centralise their powers into a new one. In December 1946, the establishment of the *International Refugee Organisation* (IRO) became a reality. IRO became the new specialised short-term agency to succeed UNRRA and IGCR, and it was mandated to assist the one million of refugees and displaced persons still in refugee camps of Europe through repatriation, resettlement, and/or integration into the country of their residence. IRO encountered the resettlement of the DPs as a “safety-valve for overpopulation pressure” currently experienced in Europe.²⁵ Thus, IRO directed its actions to this solution.

The Soviet Union and the other Eastern European countries did not become members, since they considered it an instrument for the promotion of Western interests.²⁶ On the other hand, in the context of its Cold War policy, the United States directed IRO to adopt a definition of the term “refugee” linked to people experiencing specific categories of persecutions for reasons “of race, religion, nationality or political opinion”. In this way, the United States, as the main funder of the Organisation (46 percent of the budget was provided by US in 1946 and 60 percent in 1949), excluded the communist countries from membership in the newly established agency. In addition, the operational decisions of the Organisation were not subject to review by the United Nations, despite the fact that IRO was directly linked with the UN.²⁷ At this point it would be useful to remember that, in 1947, the onset of the Cold War was assuredly a reality, as a repercussion of years of tension between the opposing Blocs. Hence, a political division of the “eligible” member-states for IRO does not come as a surprise.

The uniqueness and importance of this Organisation lies in the fact that IRO established the infrastructure for the management of mass international human mobility. People migrating under the auspices of IRO had to sign a two-year contract and were placed in jobs selected by the immigration countries. Job selection was not based on their skills, but rather on the needs of the economies of the receiving

²⁴ D. R. Maul, “The Rise of a Humanitarian Superpower”, pp. 139-140.

²⁵ D. Cohen, *In War's Wake*, pp. 30, 103. IRO, among other agencies, received part of UNRRA's remaining assets and personnel, after its dissolution, see J. Reinisch, “Internationalism in Relief”, p. 285.

²⁶ Y. Papadopoulos, D. Parsanoglou, “Operationalizing”, p. 37.

²⁷ Karatani, *op.cit.* 528-529; Judt, *op.cit.*, p. 29.

countries.²⁸ In case workers did not remain for the contracted period in the allotted jobs, the immigration countries would deport them. Australia, for instance, initially recruited refugees capable of manual labour, and did not prefer professionals or intellectuals. In addition, IRO was the first organisation to own a fleet of passenger vessels for the transportation of its beneficiaries and subsidised part of the shipping costs, while the rest were covered by the interested immigration country.²⁹ This was particularly important, especially during a period of great shortage in shipping.

By July 1947, the Organisation had transported or helped resettle over one million displaced persons in some forty-eight countries and had repatriated 73,000 more.³⁰ Its mission concluded in December 1951, however, 400,000 people still remained unsettled,³¹ and the catalysts that caused people to migrate or seek refuge did not cease.

Within the two first years of the 1950s, and in view of the imminent dissolution of IRO, an international debate was generated about the succession state in the handling of European refugees, DPs, as well as migration problems in a financially viable manner, since IRO proved to be an expensive agency. Furthermore, the continuing operation of the IRO fleet remained a vital issue. By 1950, the problem of refugees and displaced persons had not been solved by IRO, and it was foreseen that it would not be solved before the Organisation's conclusion of operations.

In December 1950, the *United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees* (UNHCR) was founded, also on a temporary basis, to handle the international legal protection towards refugees and displaced persons and provide diplomatic support.³² However, UNHCR's role was rather restricted by the definition of 'refugee' under the

²⁸ NAA/A1838, 932/1/1, Heyes to DEAC, 162, 06.04.1951; *ibid.* "Background to the Contract", s.a.

²⁹ Alexandra Dellios, "Displaced Persons, Family Separation and the Work Contract in Postwar Australia", *Journal of Australian Studies*, 40:4 (2016), pp. 416, 428-429; NAA/A3300, 461, To Howland Sagreant-Department of State, Washington, 20.10.1947; *ibid.* "Memorandum for Colonel Austin", 20.10.1947. Passenger ships were made available to IRO from the United States for the transfer of DPs from Europe. However, the IRO passenger vessels did not solve the high shipping shortage of the period.

³⁰ Cohen, *op.cit.*, p. 101; E. Marks, "Internationally Assisted Migration: ICEM Rounds Out Five Years of Resettlement", *International Organization*, 11:3 (1957), p. 482.

³¹ Louise W. Holborn, "Intergovernmental Partnership for Planned Migration", *Migration*, 1:2 (1961), p. 6.

³² Gil Loescher, Alexander Betts, James Milner, *The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The politics and practice of refugee protection into the twenty-first century*, London, 2008, pp. 1-2, 13-14. In 1950, one year before the establishment of UNHCR, the *United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East* started operations, after its establishment in 1948; as a dedicated agency for the provision of support to Palestinian refugees. Also, in 1950 the *United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency* (UNKRA) was established, mandated also for relief support provision to Korean refugees, Gilad Ben-Nun, "From *Ad Hoc* to Universal: The International Refugee Regime from Fragmentation to Unity 1922-1954", *Refugee Survey Quarterly*, 34:23-24 (2015), pp. 27-28.

United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees—signed in Geneva in 1951—which narrowed the refugee status only to those affected by the events “occurring in Europe before 1 January 1951”.³³ Therefore, UNHCR undertook the role of a consultative agency for refugees, and it did not acquire operational responsibilities. Consequently, the rest of the activities of the under-dissolution IRO remained outside of the mandate of the then international organisations.

Despite the “absorption” of some DPs in the mines of Belgium and in manual works in construction and the agricultural sector in France and Britain,³⁴ the high unemployment and underemployment percentages in Europe hindered its stabilisation in the first post-WWII years. Concurrently, the organisation of post-war life in the West within the capitalist system and the efforts for the economic integration resulted in the increase of consumption, production and in the need for additional workforce in industrially advanced Western countries. The United States, in holding a hegemonic position in Europe’s politics, also recognized the high numbers of inactive population as a potential threat for the spread of communism in the impoverished and war-stricken Europe.

In the meantime, an international discourse for the so-called “excess” or “surplus” population emerged in the Western world, since the rehabilitation of refugees proved to be increasingly difficult. Efforts for the establishment of a *European Migrations Committee* (EMICO) in 1948 to deal with matters of workforce did not prove long-standing or successful,³⁵ neither the attempts on a national level for the management of overseas migration from Europe with ERP funding. This was also the case of Italy, as mentioned earlier, where accusations for lack of transparency and frauds in the management of ERP funds were noted.³⁶

³³ For the 1951 *UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees*, see Articles 1A and 1B at www.unhcr.org/4d934f5f9.pdf, retrieved 18.06.2022. These geographical and temporal restrictions were overcome with the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees in 1967. For the Protocol, see https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/1967/10/19671004%2007-06%20AM/Ch_V_5p.pdf, retrieved 18.06.2022. Due to the 1951 restrictions, UNHCR was not able to respond to many appeals in support of the refugee population, as the 14 million refugees generated after the 1947 partition of India and the establishment of the state of Pakistan. For more Rosemary Foot, “The Cold War and human rights”, in Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (eds), *The Cambridge Cold War*, Vol. III, *Endings*, Cambridge, New York, 2010, p. 449.

³⁴ 22,000 in Belgium between 1946-1947, 38,000 in France, and 86,000 in Britain, Judt, *op.cit.*, p. 31. For a case study of immigration to Belgium, see Lina Venturas, *Έλληνες Μετανάστες στο Βέλγιο*, Athens, 1999.

³⁵ Roberto Ventresca, “Italian migration policies at the beginning of European integration process: fruitless attempts?”, in Elena Calandri, Simeone Paoli, Antonio Varsori (eds), *Journal of European Integration History*, Special Issue, *Peoples and Borders, Seventy Years of Migration in Europe, from Europe to Europe* (2017), p. 64. The EMICO met the opposition of the main migrant-receiving countries and the Committee concluded its operations in 1949.

³⁶ Strangio, “‘Assisted’ Migration and the Marshall Plan: the Italian Case”, pp. 324-325.

In May 1951, in particular, the ministers of foreign affairs of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France met in London. Among others, they highlighted the “difficulties and disequilibrium” created out of the “excess of population” in some Western European countries, which contributed to the high unemployment and social risks of the societies. They noticed that the cure for the problem of high unemployment and social risks involved was the need for “systematic exploration of opportunities for greater population mobility”, and they promoted the establishment of an agency to handle this task.³⁷ In the rationale of this statement, the incentives that drove the establishment of the *Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration* can be found, as it will extensively be discussed further below.

On the other hand, the *International Labour Organisation* (ILO), even since the Interwar years, wanted to cover the migration-agency gap created, and, in 1951, proposed its own plan. ILO had experience in refugee-related issues in 1925-1929 when it managed the refugee bureau of the League of Nations, and consequently sought, throughout the Interwar period and more intensively after 1945, to gain a foothold in migration matters at an international level by organising conferences concerning migration matters (1938, 1948 and 1949) and by attempting to expand and take the lead in the “discussion on the international coordination of migration,” as Rieko Karatani states. ILO’s efforts culminated in October 1951 when the Organisation presented a plan for the management of European emigration in replacement of IRO. A conference in Naples took place with twenty-five countries, the United Nations, and five international organisations—totaling over 200 participants.³⁸

ILO’s project foresaw the establishment of an ILO Migration Administration to facilitate migration within and from Europe, financed by a fund to which the member states would contribute.³⁹ As IRO would cease its operations, ILO wanted to expand its functions to all types of migrants, including refugees. ILO’s intention was

³⁷ Emilio Renondo Carrero, “World War II Refugees and the Origin of the International Organization for Migration”, in Fernando Puell de la Villa and David Garcia Hernan (eds), *War and Population Displacement: Lessons of History*, Brighton, 2018, p. 164.

³⁸ Karatani, op.cit., pp. 523-525, 532; Marianne Ducasse-Rogier, *The International Organization for Migration 1951-2001*, Geneva, p. 15; Dimitris Parsanoglou, Yannis Papadopoulos, “Regulating Human Mobility through Networking and Outsourcing: ICEM, IOs and NGOs during the 1950s”, *Journal of Migration History*, 5 (2019), pp. 340-341. For more on ILO’s involvement in the migration field in 1921-1935 see, Linda Guerry, “Dividing international work on social protection of migrants. The International Labour Office and private organisations (1921-1935)”, in Fabio Giomi, Célia Keren, Morgane Labbé, *Public and Private Welfare in Modern Europe. Productive Entanglements*, London and New York, 2022, pp. 159-175.

³⁹NAA/A446, 1962/66432, Cable, DEAC to High Commissioner’s Office in London, 5153, Immediate, Restricted, 05.09.1951.

to help no less than 1,700,000 people from Europe in need of international assistance to migrate to overseas countries over a five-year period. 200,000 people would migrate during the first year of its operation, at a cost of \$100-\$130 million.⁴⁰

Meanwhile, the United States, which was never very fond of ILO,⁴¹ expressed strong reservations about ILO's plan and considered it "unrealistic" based on the number of annual transfers projected. Furthermore, according to George Warren, the refugee-policy adviser of the US State Department, the United States rejected the idea of membership of countries from Eastern Europe and Asia to join a new agency tasked with handling the European "surplus" population. It was strongly preferred that membership consisted only of countries belonging to the Western Bloc. The United States counter-proposed an alternative to ILO's plan in order to respond to the European "overpopulation" problem. Their plan foresaw the establishment of a new intergovernmental agency, with membership allowed only to friendly immigration-emigration countries or interested in the population problems of Europe.⁴² At the same time, the US Mutual Security Act, establishing the *Mutual Security Administration* that superseded ECA, provided \$7.5 billion for the rebuilding of Europe, \$10 million of which was allocated for the transport of European migration. Said \$10 million could also support the United States plan for the establishment of an intergovernmental agency of a temporary nature. However, the Bill forbade the money to be used by any migration agency with communist participant countries.⁴³ Hence, the member-states had to come solely from the Western world.

Therefore, the ILO plan was not feasible mainly because of the United States' reluctance to participate and finance the ILO proposal. The United States preferred an independent operational agency to handle the migration issue under logistic terms in line with the interests of the organisation's member-states by respecting their national sovereignty. They did not want the establishment of an agency with a protection mandate, as ILO did regarding the migrant workers' rights, or UNHCR regarding refugees' rights; both were UN specialised agencies and duly bound by the UN Charter and Conventions. Furthermore, the United States wanted to prevent the

⁴⁰ Karatani, op.cit., p. 533; Cohen, op.cit. p. 123; Richard Perruchoud, "From the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration to the International Organization for Migration", *International Journal of Refugee Law*, 1:4 (1989), p. 503; Carrero, op.cit., p. 166.

⁴¹ Donna R. Gabaccia, *Foreign Relations: American Immigration in Global Perspective*, Princeton and Oxford, 2012, p. 216. The United States joined ILO only in 1934, fifteen years after its establishment (1919), and withdrew in 1977 as a protest against the attitude of Soviet-bloc countries' trade unions. In 1980 rejoined ILO, but did not adopt all the ILO protocols on the fair treatment and rights of workers.

⁴² NAA/A446, 1962/66432, P. Shaw to DEAC, 6/10/1, 159, 18.07.1951.

⁴³ Bouscaren, op.cit., pp. 32-33; Karatani, op.cit., p. 535 and Carrero, op.cit., p. 167.

communist influence, which was an unattainable goal in the event that the new agency was established under the UN framework.⁴⁴

At this point it would be worthwhile to clarify that the Mutual Security Administration aimed at strengthening the partnership between the United States and European countries through economic recovery and, as its title also indicates, through military assistance.⁴⁵ Therefore, its funds were directed in both a military/security scope as well as developmental purposes.

The United States' plan soon thereafter took 'flesh and blood' after a Conference in Brussels in December 1951 organised the *Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe* (PICMME), which was later named as the *Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration* (ICEM). The new agency did not have an organic connection to any other organisation, the United Nations included, and consisted of emigration and immigration countries as well as 'sympathising countries' interested in migration out of political, economic, or other incentives. The membership was open only to countries respecting the principle of "free movement" of persons; thus, once again, communist member-states were excluded and the new organisation was politically unified with democratic member-governments, at least initially. PICMME/ICEM inherited the twelve passenger vessels belonging to IRO and was endowed with \$10 million in US funds. According to Warren's plan, the new agency would assist the emigration of about 115,000 people from Europe to overseas countries each year at an annual cost of \$30 million. Initially, the lifetime of the agency was to be twelve months, but there was a provision for its extension if needed.⁴⁶

PICMME/ICEM benefited from the organisations preceding its establishment, both in operational knowledge, experienced staff,⁴⁷ and in political management of decisions made by its member-states. The exclusion of communist members was not an invention, but a reality also experienced in IRO. Furthermore, the autonomy of

⁴⁴ Antoine Pécoud, "Introduction: The International Organization for Migration as the New 'UN Migration Agency'", in Martin Geiger, Antoine Pécoud (eds), *The International Organization for Migration The New 'UN Migration Agency' in Critical Perspective*, 2020, <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-32976-1>, pp. 5-6, 12.

⁴⁵ Hogan, *op.cit.*, pp. 391-392.

⁴⁶ Archive of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs (hereafter GMFA)/Central Service, folder 1952/72/4/1, Migration Conference – Brussels (26 November – 5 December 1951), "Resolution to establish a Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe (Adopted at the 13th Meeting, 5 December 1951)" Annex I, PIC/22.

⁴⁷ Many members of the PICMME/ICEM staff had also been employed in IRO and other organisations. An example is Pierre Jacobsen who was elected as the first Deputy Director of the organisation and was a former Assistant Director General of IRO.

PICMME/ICEM, outside the UN framework, provided the opportunity for the member-states to protect their sovereignty foremost as well as, in many cases, to adopt and implement policies favouring themselves and not the migrants. Thus, the establishment of an intergovernmental organisation with a specific agenda on migration management was an effort from the member-states to legitimise their policies and for the United States to further institutionalise its power after the end of WWII and during the Cold War, with the creation of another international agency after American initiative,⁴⁸ and under its leadership.

PICMME/ICEM, as it will be seen, adopted a business-minded view of the migration problem. Meanwhile, the United States, the country behind any main-decision of the Organisation, endeavoured, through the management of migration and PICMME/ICEM, to empower its allies in economic terms, solidify their cooperation, retain them under the American influence, and furnish them with the labour-force needed for their development. As the first post-WWII years were an era for a multi-sectoral 'integration', ICEM can be viewed also as an attempt for the integration of the Western world in matters of migration and its management. The American assistance channelled through ICEM to its Allies was part of the diplomatic repertoire of the United States. This empowerment cannot be viewed outside the context of the Cold War and the rivalry between the so-called Western and Eastern Blocs. This dissertation proposes ICEM's establishment and operation in the 1950s to be seen as a quasi-continuation of the Marshall Plan, which was approaching its conclusion in 1951. The Marshall Plan/ERP, fused with the New Deal's policies as discussed, aimed at the economic and political reconstitution of Western Europe; these goals were conceivably achievable through the abundance of consumption, economic stability, free international trade, development, and the close collaboration of public and private sectors.

This perspective of the establishing role of ICEM is also combined with the confirmed if we consider the Keynesian economic theory that dominated in the Western economic policies between the end of WWII and the 1970s, under which the economy was to be balanced through government intervention aiming for full employment and price stability. Therefore, the adoption of a mixed economy guided mainly by the private sector and partly operated by the government was the economic model that prevailed after 1945, while full employment could be secured through

⁴⁸ Tamar Gutner, *International Organizations in World Politics*, USA, 2017, pp. 8, 24.

flexibility in the wage demands.⁴⁹ Therefore, along with the Cold War development policies of the United States, post-WWII development would be achieved by importing migrants who, through their labour in the private sector, would foster development rates by securing economies of scale for the states and the private sector.

The lack of these principles imposed security issues for the Western world and the United States in particular, and, as a result, funds through the Mutual Security Act were allocated for the establishment of PICMME/ICEM. In the following pages, it is discussed how these values were embodied in PICMME/ICEM's mandate and operational system.

⁴⁹ Sarwat Jahan, Ahmed Saber Mahmud, Chris Papageorgiou, "What is Keynesian Economics?", *Finance & Development*, (2014), pp. 53-54.

*The Governments adopting this resolution Recognize that there exists a problem of surplus population and refugees in certain countries of Europe, while certain overseas countries offer opportunities for the orderly absorption of additional population; that the problem is of such magnitude as to present a serious obstacle to economic viability and co-operation in Europe; that, whereas a general improvement in economic conditions and increased production would provide increased possibilities for employment and settlement in Europe and, by facilitating intra-European migration, would offer a very important contribution to the solution of the problem, an increase in European emigration to countries overseas nevertheless remains another necessary element; that a close relationship exists between economic development and immigration; that international financing of European emigration should contribute not only to solving the problem of population in Europe, but also stimulate the creation of new economic opportunities in countries lacking manpower...*⁵⁰

The relationship between economic development and immigration is indisputable according to the authors of the aforementioned extract. This relationship is based on the following reasoning: the migration of certain European populations would naturally reduce the pressure on the labour sector in countries with high numbers of unemployed or underemployed persons and the need of the governments and societies to care for this “inactive” population. On the other side, overseas countries in need of workers would incorporate said “inactive” populations and, consequently, increase productivity and potentially consumption. As a result, both European and overseas countries would support their economic development and the level of trade between them would increase. Moreover, through migrant remittances to the countries of origin, consumption and production in Europe would follow suit. The United States presented their scheme as a solution where everyone benefits, and this leads us to the establishment of an agency to organise the redistribution of certain European “surplus population” to overseas countries.

The agency to assume this task was the *Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe* (PICMME). The extract presented above was PICMME’s establishing resolution, where the economic incentives in its establishment are dominant. This migration-development nexus followed the then policy-line development of the United States, which was

⁵⁰ AGMFA/Central Service/1952/72/4/1, Migration Conference, Brussels (26 November – 5 December 1951), “Resolution to establish a Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe (Adopted at the 13th Meeting, 5 December 1951)” Annex I, PIC/22.

inaugurated after the end of the Second World War and filtered in the context of Cold War policies.⁵¹ Thus, migration can be viewed as an *engine* for economic development; with the movement of migrants from less advanced countries to more developed ones, the movement of money, consumer goods, and skills would follow⁵²—not including the political stability in the Western Bloc sought through the work of PICMME/ICEM. This was also the reasoning of the western development economists in the 1950s and 1960s who examined labour migration as an integral positive part of modernization.⁵³ Participation in PICMME/ICEM was one of the policies adopted by many governments for the promotion of their development.

The new migration agency was established by sixteen governments from overseas and European countries,⁵⁴ with its Headquarters settled in Geneva, Switzerland. PICMME commenced its operation in February 1952, only two months after its establishing Conference in Brussels. The organisation was soon thereafter renamed the *Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration* (ICEM) in October 1952, abolishing its temporary designation, while its members remained the desire to be a non-permanent agency. One year later, in October 1953, the Constitution of ICEM was adopted, and it was entered into force in November 1954.⁵⁵

According to the Constitution, ICEM was called to a) *make arrangements for the transport of migrants, for whom existing facilities [were] inadequate and who could not otherwise be moved [...]* and b) *to promote the increase of the volume of migration from Europe by providing [...] services in the processing, reception, first placement and settlement of migrants [...]*. However, it was foreseen that ICEM in the implementation of its programmes would not intervene in the emigration or immigration policies of its members, but that it would conform itself to them.⁵⁶

⁵¹ For more on the development notion and its incarnation on international organisations see, Mark Mazower, *Governing the World. The History of an Idea*, pp. 273-304. On the concept of development and its connection with the Cold War, see Maria Damilakou and Lina Venturas, “Discourses on Latin America: The Migration-Development Nexus”, on Lina Venturas (ed.), *op.cit.*, pp. 295-298. For a theoretical analysis of the relation between migration and development, see Hein de Haas, “Migration and Development: A Theoretical Perspective”, *International Migration Review*, 44:1 (2010), pp. 227-264.

⁵² Ninna Nyberg Sørensen, “Revisiting the Migration-Development Nexus: From Social Networks and Remittances to Markets for Migration Control”, *International Migration*, 50:3 (2012), pp. 64-65.

⁵³ S. Castel, H. De Haas, M. J. Miller, *The Age of Migration...*, pp. 70, 78.

⁵⁴ The founding members of PICMME/ICEM were Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United States of America, see ICEM, *ICEM Handbook*, 1962.

⁵⁵ Perruchoud, *op.cit.*, p. 505.

⁵⁶ NARA/6th Session of the ICEM, Venice, October 12-21, 1953, ICEM Geneva, “Constitution”, MC/55, November 1953, Article 1, p. 3.

The Organisation was administered by a Director and a Deputy Director. Both were elected by a two-thirds majority vote by the PICMME/ICEM member-states. Hugh Gibson, a diplomat from the United States, and Pierre Jacobsen from France were chosen as the first Director and Deputy Director, respectively. This administrative precedent, namely the election of a US Director and of a Deputy Director of European origin, was followed throughout the period under examination, with only one exception.⁵⁷ This was a way for the United States to ensure that their policy would be implemented, as the US was the most influential funding member and political supporter of the Organisation.

The Constitution provided the establishment of the Council and of the Executive Committee of the Organisation. Regarding the Council, all member states had one seat and one vote in its sessions that took place twice a year. The Council's functions included: the determination of ICEM policies, the review of reports and the direction of the activities of the Executive Committee and of the Director's, as well as the review and direction of the budget and expenditures of the Organisation. Finally, it had been authorised with the furtherance of the functions of ICEM.⁵⁸

The Executive Committee was composed of nine annually elected member-government representatives—each member had one representative and one vote. The Executive Committee convened before the sessions of the Council, since among its functions was also the preparation and study of the annual reports of the Director, the financial and budgetary matters, and other specific questions referred to it by the Council. Thereafter, it recommended solutions to the Council. Lastly, the Executive Committee acted also as a consulting body to the Director, if so requested.⁵⁹

Special sub-committees with expertise on finance and transport matters were also established. These sub-committees included the *Sub-Committee for the Coordination of Transport*—for which extended discussion will follow in Chapter 3—

⁵⁷ The Directors between 1951 and 1980 were: Hugh Gibson (10.06.1952-12.12.1954, US); Harold Tittman (27.04.1955-13.05.1958, US); Marcus Daly (14.05.1958-03.10.1961, US); Bastiaan W. Haveman (27.10.1961-08.02.1969, Dutch); John F. Thomas (14.02.1969-28.02.1979, US); James L. Carlin (01.03.1979-30.09.1988, US). The Deputy Directors in charge: Pierre Jacobsen (09.12.1951-01.07.1957, French); Barthelemy G. Epinat (14.05.1958-30.09.1962, French); Joseph B. McFadden (01.09.1962-31.08.1964, US); Walter M. Besterman (01.09.1964-30.09.1970, Polish with close relations with the US); Giacinto Maselli (01.10.1970-31.12.1988, Italian). The only exception was the period of directorship of B.W. Haveman, who was Dutch and was chosen because, at that time, there was no US citizen fully accepted for this position. Thus, as a counterweight the Deputy Director was chosen from US candidates, J.B. McFadden, followed by W.M. Besterman.

⁵⁸ NARA/6th Session of the ICEM, Venice, October 12-21, 1953, ICEM Geneva, "Constitution", MC/55, November 1953, Articles 5-10, pp. 4-6.

⁵⁹ NARA/6th Session of the ICEM, Venice, October 12-21, 1953, ICEM Geneva, "Constitution", MC/55, November 1953, Articles 11-14, pp. 6-7.

and the *Sub-Committee on Budget and Finance*. Both bodies were of consultative nature to the Council. The Sub-Committee for the Coordination of Transport was created in the first stages of the establishment of PICMME in 1951 and was thereafter reorganised. The Sub-Committee on Budget and Finance was established in 1960.⁶⁰

The funding for ICEM came from the contributions of its member-states. According to the Constitution, every member had to participate in the administrative expenditures of the Organisation, while contributions to its operational budget were voluntary.⁶¹ The distinction between fixed and voluntary contributions on ICEM budgets made its policies and expenditures largely determined by state priorities, as Alexis Franghiadis states.⁶²

In the first decade of PICMME/ICEM existence, the United States covered 31 percent of the administration expenditures and 50 percent of its operational budget.⁶³ This was a scheme of unequally apportioned financial assistance offered by the United States and the participating countries, as adopted also in the previous organisations (UNRRA, IRO). Nevertheless, this funding was a lower percentage for the United States in comparison with the direct financial assistance offered through ERP; this can be attributed to the United States facing increasing difficulties and expenditures during the Korean War (1950-1953) and, thus, devoted progressively fewer sums for the financial support of other countries. However, the aim of the United States, with its relatively high contribution to the ICEM in comparison with other countries, was to continue supporting its Allies, including the ICEM member-states most prone to communist influence.

Who and where did ICEM transport? The emigration countries consisted of Austria, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, and, later, Spain and Portugal. The emigrants from the aforementioned countries were immigrating to Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Israel, New Zealand, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, the Union of South Africa, the United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, and other Latin American countries. The transfer of migrants from/to the above countries

⁶⁰ For more see Parsanoglou, "Organizing an International Machinery: The Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration", in L. Venturas (ed.), *op.cit.*, pp. 70-72.

⁶¹ NARA/6th Session of the ICEM, Venice, October 12-21, 1953, ICEM Geneva, "Constitution", MC/55, November 1953.

⁶² Alexis Franghiadis, "Who Pays: Financing and Budget of the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (1952-1960)", in Lina Venturas (ed.), *op.cit.*, p. 98.

⁶³ Franghiadis, *op.cit.*, table 3 and chart 2, pp. 101-102, table 6 and chart 3, pp. 105-106.

did not commence simultaneously, as many joined or withdrew from ICEM in different time-stages.⁶⁴

One of the main tasks of ICEM and its Constitutional obligation was the provision of *transport*. According to the Organisation's Constitution, *the movement of migrants should as far as possible be effected by the normal shipping and air transport services*. Thus, ICEM operated within the framework of the existing agreements signed between its member-states, and the migrants were moved on regularly scheduled sea and air means of transport.⁶⁵ However—as it will be discussed in Chapters 4 and 5—where deemed necessary, ICEM chartered passenger vessels or aircraft for the exclusive overseas transportation of its migrants.

The enhancement of the transport sector through ICEM can be explained in the context of the wider US policy during the Harry Truman Administration, whose firm orientation was the fostering of “private ownership and operation of merchant marine”.⁶⁶ The United States government adopted a liberal attitude to shipping targeting the furthering of world trade and recognised shipping as an important factor for the European reconstruction and balance of payments.⁶⁷

In this line, under the Marshall Plan, Italy assisted in new ship-buildings and purchase of American war-built vessels.⁶⁸ Furthermore, the United States, solely in 1949, funded the German shipping companies with \$42 million, while three years later they provided large amounts of loans for new shipbuilding with extremely low rates.⁶⁹ In addition, the main Greek port of Piraeus was rebuilt through ERP funds, as a few years earlier, in 1946, the Greek shipowners had purchased 100 war-built Liberties and seven tankers with advantageous terms from the United States and the

⁶⁴ On the year of admission and withdrawal of the member-states from ICEM see here, Table 4, Annex.

⁶⁵ NARA/6th Session of the ICEM, Venice, October 12-21, 1953, ICEM Geneva, “Constitution”, MC/55, November 1953; M. Ducasse-Rogier, *op.cit.*, p. 28.

⁶⁶ IOM Switzerland (hereafter IOM-SW)/General Archives/OPS-20-012, Transport Risks and Liabilities 1957: Harry Truman, The White House to James Forrestal, Secretary of Defence, Washington DC, 24.02.1949. The long-term policy of the US was the private, as opposed to public, operation of the merchant marine, for more see Andrew Gibson, Arthur Donovan, *The Abandoned Ocean: A History of United States Maritime Policy*, Columbia, 2000, pp. 191-121, 135, 169.

⁶⁷ Alan W. Cafruny, “The Political Economy of International Shipping: Europe versus America”, *International Organization*, 39:1 (1985), pp. 89, 96.

⁶⁸ S. G. Sturme, *British Shipping and World Competition*, p. 159; Roberto Guilianelli, “Ship financing in Italy in the first half of the twentieth century”, *International Journal of Maritime History*, 28:2 (2016), pp. 348-349. The purchase of US ships initially employed for military purposes did not progress as the governments of the United States and Italy wished, due to the reluctance of the Italian shipowners to proceed out of fear of American interference in the Italian ship market, see R. Ventresca, “Italian migration policies”, pp. 65, 67-69.

⁶⁹ R. Hope, *A New History of British Shipping*, pp. 397-398.

guarantee of the Greek government.⁷⁰ The American interest for the reconstruction of transport and trade did not exclude the nascent aviation industry. In this context, *Air France*, the French national airline company, received long-term loans through ERP funds in 1948.⁷¹ In 1949-1950, the Italian national airline company, *Alitalia*, was loaned for the purchase of American aircraft by the *Export Import Bank of the United States*, which was a federal organ involved in Europe's and Western Allies' post-WWII reconstitution.⁷²

In addition, as foreseen by the Keynesian economic policies and according to the case in ERP, the ICEM operations in the public (governments) and private sector (the transport sector mainly) were blended in a partnership for the transfer of migrants. ICEM employment of transportation can also be seen as an alternative form of funding of the merchant marine at a time when state shipping subsidies were progressively diminishing.⁷³

Apart from transportation, ICEM established an extended set of migration services, supplementary, but also supportive, to its transport programme. First was the *selection and processing* of migrants wherein migrants were pre-selected and registered based on the needs of its member-governments. On a later stage, ICEM presented the choices to the immigration authorities of the prospective country of destination for final selection, and ensured the right documentation and medical examination for potential migrants to ascertain that they were capable of working in the countries of settlement. Furthermore, ICEM organised information and cultural orientation sessions about the living conditions in the receiving countries in order to prepare the migrants for a smooth settlement.⁷⁴

⁷⁰ Dimitris A. Sotiropoulos, "International Aid to Southern Europe in the Early Postwar Period: The Cases of Greece and Italy", *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 656:22 (2014), p. 36. For the Liberties, see G. Harlaftis, *A History of Greek-Owned Shipping. The Making of an International Tramp Fleet, 1830 to the Present Day*, New York, 1996, pp. 252-258.

⁷¹ Nicolas Neiertz, "Air France: An Elephant in an Evening Suit?", in Hans-Liudger Dienel and Peter Lyth (eds), *Flying the Flag. European Commercial Air Transport since 1945*, New York, 1998, p. 33.

⁷² Amilcare Mantegazza, "Alitalia and Commercial Aviation in Italy", in H.-L. Dienel and P. Lyth (eds), *Flying the Flag*, p. 167. In the context of general support of aviation, the South American countries were supported with important American financial and technical assistance for the development of their aviation industry, for more M. Dierikx, *Clipping the Clouds...*, pp. 46-47; Melina Piglia, "'Carry our colours and defend our interests under the skies of other Continents'". Argentinian Commercial aviation policy in the Peronista decade (1945-55)", *Journal of Transport History*, 40:1 (2019), pp. 50-56. For an overview of the development of aviation in South American countries, see Dan Hagedorn, *Conquistadors of the Sky: A History of Aviation in Latin America*, USA, 2008.

⁷³ Hogan, *op.cit.*, p. 261.

⁷⁴ For a detailed analysis of the processing steps before the migrant trip, see Mogens Cordt Møller, "The Successive Stages of Migrants' Processing Prior to Embarkation", *Social Compass*, 3:5-6 (1956), pp. 121-124.

Over the years, and in view of the decreasing need for unskilled workforce in many immigration countries mainly in Latin America, ICEM organised training programmes in order to increase the qualifications of the potential migrants and respond to the needs of the immigration countries. Therefore, Vocational Training Centres were established in Greece and Italy and *vocational training programmes* also took place in Spain, wherein migrants trained for a short-term period, before their departure, on jobs in demand in the countries of destination; men going to Latin American countries trained as carpenters and turners, among others, and women immigrating to Australia, Canada and New Zealand trained as housekeepers or staff for hotels and other institutions.⁷⁵

The lack of language-skills depending on the countries of destination reduced job opportunities as well as possibilities for smooth integration in the receiving societies. Therefore, ICEM implemented short-term English, Spanish, and Portuguese *language training programmes* for migrants from Greece, Italy, and Spain immigrating to Australia, Canada, New Zealand and to the Latin American countries. The lessons were also continued on board ship during the trip to the new homeland of the migrants.

Every country offered a variety of opportunities for migrants' settlement based on the economic model it followed and the needs of its economy. In addition to the training of specific workers, ICEM offered the migration of agricultural workers as an alternative, who were supplied with land for their settlement and agricultural tools for the initial stages of production. The *Land Settlement* programmes took place mainly in Latin American countries and, to a lesser extent, in Australia and Southern Rhodesia. In general, though, land settlement schemes were not very successful and were limited within the first decade of ICEM's lifetime.⁷⁶

The immigration countries, with their participation in ICEM, anticipated that the population received through the Organisation would be settled permanently. Therefore, ICEM implemented schemes for *family reunification* in order to secure populations in their new countries and to speed up their integration into local societies. These schemes were co-subsidized by ICEM and the family member(s)

⁷⁵ ICEM, *ICEM Handbook*, 1962; Ducasse-Rogier, *op.cit.*, p. 30; Ioannis Limnios-Sekeris, "Australia and the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration: Racial Exclusion and Ethnic Discrimination in an Era of Universal Human Rights", in Lina Venturas (ed.), *op.cit.*, pp. 207-209.

⁷⁶ Ducasse-Rogier, *op.cit.*, pp. 33-34. For more on land settlement schemes and their evolution, see Yannis G.S. Papadopoulos, Dimitris Parsanoglou, "European land settlement and development in Latin America: The evolution of an idea from Interwar to the early Post-WWII years", *Dialogos Latinoamericanos*, 30 (2021), pp. 1-12.

already in the immigration country. Progressively, these schemes were implemented in all the countries of emigration and immigration and, for certain periods, proved to be the most attractive migration schemes of ICEM.⁷⁷

Apart from the emigration of nationals, ICEM was also active in the migration of refugee populations. It is true that the first group to be assisted by ICEM were the European refugees who had been displaced to the Far East due to the civil war in Russia or due to the Nazis expansion. In the Far East, mainly in China, IRO initially assisted refugees of European descent fleeing the region, but IRO was not able to move all of the refugees by its dissolution. Thus, ICEM assumed the role of moving the remaining refugees in the Far East. In cooperation with UNHCR, ICEM established an office in Hong Kong and tried to resettle said European refugees from the Far East to overseas countries. Another operation initiated by IRO, and finally inherited by PICMME/ICEM, was the resettlement of refugees in Trieste, mainly of Yugoslav nationals, who fled to Trieste after the expulsion campaign of the Yugoslav authorities in 1949 following the Tito-Stalin split.⁷⁸ Other refugee-related operations of ICEM involved the implementation of the *United States Escapee Program* (USEP), which assisted refugees fleeing “Communist-dominated or Communist-occupied countries” and were finally resettled to the United States.⁷⁹

The main operation in the 1950s that also renewed the commitment of the member states to ICEM was its response to the Hungarian refugee crisis in November 1956. The crisis originated from demonstrations against the communist government of the Hungarian People’s Republic, which led to an invasion of the Soviet Union in Hungary. This invasion resulted in the uprooting of 157,000 Hungarians who fled to Austria by the end of December 1956 and about 20,000 more to Yugoslavia. ICEM, at the request of the Austrian government and with the financial support of its member states, managed to transport 800 persons per day by the end of November 1956 and it also assisted in the resettlement of Hungarian refugees from other European countries of second asylum. By 31 December 1959, ICEM had been involved in the transfer of 144,182 persons out of Austria.⁸⁰ The Hungarian refugee crisis proved ICEM as a

⁷⁷ On how these schemes were implemented in the case of Australia, see I. Limnios-Sekeris, “Australia and the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration”, pp. 209-211.

⁷⁸ ICEM, *ICEM Handbook*, 1962; J. Ellie, *op.cit.*, p. 354; Ducasse-Rogier, *op.cit.*, pp. 27, 35.

⁷⁹ For more on USEP, see Bouscaren, *op. cit.*, pp. 15-17.

⁸⁰ Emmanuel Comte, *The History of European Migration Regime: Germany’s Strategic Hegemony*, London and New York, 2018, pp. 71-72; Ducasse-Rogier, *op.cit.*, pp.36-40; James L. Carlin, “Significant Refugee Crises since World War II and the Response of the International Community”, *Michigan Journal of International Law*, 3:1 (1982), pp. 9-10. For more on the incidents in Hungary, see Judt, *op.cit.*, pp. 313-323.

justifiable international organisation by effectively and timely organising the operation. Amidst the Cold War, its operation assisted also in the rendering of symbolic dimensions in favour of the West, as the refugees were fleeing the so-called ‘depressive’ communist regime for the Western nations.

All the services discussed above were established with the cooperation or prior consultation of ICEM with other specialised organisations of the United Nations system or voluntary agencies/non-governmental organisations (NGOs). For example, the *World Health Organisation* (WHO) and the ILO assisted ICEM in establishing the medical criteria for the selection of migrants; ILO, in addition, assisted in the vocational training programmes. The *United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation* (UNESCO) was involved in the setting up of the language teaching for migrants. The *Food and Agriculture Organisation* (FAO) assisted in land settlement schemes. UNHCR and USEP cooperated with ICEM in relation to refugee issues.⁸¹ In addition, ICEM followed the practice of IRO and cooperated very closely with voluntary agencies/NGOs mainly of religious or ethnic background. ICEM institutionalised their functions by signing agreements regulating their working relationship and funded their operations with millions of dollars annually. Among other functions, the voluntary agencies were entrusted with the allocation of loans in the countries of origin to prospective migrants and the loan collection in the countries of destination from migrants, as well as with the immigrants’ reception and integration. Some of the closest voluntary agencies collaborating with ICEM were the *World Council of Churches* (WCC), the *National Catholic Welfare Conference*, and the *Hebrew Aid Society*.⁸² Thus, ICEM, even as an organisation established outside the UN framework, maintained a cooperative relationship with many UN specialised agencies and worked side-by-side with non-governmental organisations, facilitating in the international cooperation and multilateralism on migration management.

The 1960s have been characterised as the “age of affluence”. It was the period when, especially in Western Europe, economic growth, prosperity, consumption, and industrialisation accelerated, governmental budgets and expenditures increased, and the private and public investments reached unprecedented levels. Consequently, the incentives for migration from Western European countries diminished, especially when an abundance of employment opportunities were offered; opportunities for

⁸¹ ICEM, *ICEM Handbook*, 1962.

⁸² D. Parsanoglou, Y. Papadopoulos, “Regulating Human Mobility through Networking and Outsourcing”, pp. 344-351; Gatrell, *op.cit.*, p. 399.

women-workforce grew, the tertiary-sector of production developed, and an improved quality of living with increased social care benefits for its citizens were noticed. Meanwhile, Southern Europe did not share the same level of success. An unparalleled intra-European immigration was realised from Southern to Western European countries.⁸³ The post-WWII “baby-boomers” sought employment and other way-outs within the European borders as well as in overseas countries, the latter experienced continued uninterrupted migration. At the same time, migration from former colonies towards Western Europe increased similarly.

During the same decade, the distinction between “developed” and “underdeveloped” countries, according to the terminology used at the time, was further consolidated. It was thought that the underdeveloped countries needed to be empowered by a skilled workforce in order to foster their possibilities for self-supported prosperity. In this context, the United Nations, in 1961, called the 1960s as the “decade of development”, underlying the obligation of the more advanced countries to assist the countries that were trying to be transformed;⁸⁴ even from 1949, President H. Truman had engaged the US in the developmental process, announcing a “development age”, and promised his country’s intervention and assistance in the transition to “a new era that nourished minds and bodies”.⁸⁵

Under these circumstances, ICEM completed its migration infrastructure along with its establishing role within the 1950s. With the return of Europe to prosperity, ICEM tried to find its role within new migration challenges facing the Western world and to adopt its services alike, in order to remain as a necessary agency to its member-states. Thus, at the turn of the 1950s, ICEM “was in urgent need of a radical transformation”. In this context, ICEM focused on the economic and social developmental needs of immigration countries and more specifically of the Latin American countries,⁸⁶ which were still considered as underdeveloped.

Therefore, ICEM, from its side, made efforts to improve the vocational training programmes and its placement services related to immigration to Latin American countries. In addition, ICEM inaugurated training seminars for immigration officials of Latin American countries in order to strengthen their migration practices out of the experience gained by longstanding immigration nations like Canada and

⁸³ Judt, *op.cit.*, pp. 324-327, 329-341, 361.

⁸⁴ A. Iriye, *op.cit.*, pp. 82, 103.

⁸⁵ Michael Barnett, *Empire of Humanity. A History of Humanitarianism*, Ithaca, London, 2011, p. 101.

⁸⁶ Emilio Redondo Carrero, “Migration and Institutional Inertia: Restructuring the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration, 1958-1961”, *Journal of Migration History*, 8 (2022), pp. 78-79.

Australia. Furthermore, the so-called *Migration for Development programmes* were inaugurated in order to empower the development processes of the Latin American countries. Thus, in 1964, ICEM launched the *Selective Migration Schemes* for Latin American countries that identified their labour shortages and matched them with the available and appropriately qualified workforce in European countries. The desirable categories of workers for Selective Migration schemes were migrants of a certain expertise, namely professionals with graduate degrees (university professors, instructors, engineers), technicians (technical engineers, planners, draughtsmen), and high skilled labourers (farmers, fishers and textile, leather, metal, electrical, or wood workers). In the second half of the 1960s, university professors and teachers were added to the desirable professions for migration to Latin America in order to recruit their educational and vocational institutions. Through the Selective Migration Scheme, a total of 16,681 professionals had migrated to Latin American countries between 1964 and 1975, mainly in Chile and Colombia.⁸⁷ Concurrently, the land settlement programmes continued and were reinforced under the Selective Migration schemes mainly by the support for agricultural training centres and the training of migrant farmers in modern techniques of farming.⁸⁸

ICEM's focus on Latin America during the 1960s can also be examined in line with the wider policy of the Kennedy Administration, which launched a ten-year plan called *Alliance for Progress*—another policy in the context of US Cold War development economics and in the footprints of the Marshall Plan. In the face of the resurgence of Communism in the so-called Third World, specifically in Latin America especially after the Cuban Revolution (1953-1959) and the arrival of F. Castro's forces in Havana in January 1959, the *Alliance for Progress* encouraged economic reforms in Latin American countries aiming at increasing the legitimacy of the governments of the region. The ultimate goal was the prevention of the expansion of Communism from Cuba to the nearby countries. Thus, through the promise of \$20 billion within a decade from US state and private funds, economic cooperation between the United States and the Latin American countries was sought by assisting the latter to increase their per capita income in exchange for reforms for the developing of institutional democratisation, the wider social sectors (health care

⁸⁷ Mary Anne C. Murdock, "An Analysis of the Intergovernmental Committee for Migration", unpublished MA Thesis, Princeton University, New Jersey, 1983, pp. 64-65; Ducasse-Rogier, *op.cit.*, pp. 45-51; Susana Torrado, "International Migration Policies in Latin America", *International Migration Review*, 13:3 (1979), pp. 432-434.

⁸⁸ Ducasse-Rogier, *op.cit.*, pp. 51-52.

system, education, housing), and their economic and social planning.⁸⁹ This ‘conjunction’ of Alliance for Progress and ICEM’s focus on Latin America’s development certainly does not surprise us. Rather, it is indicative of the fact that ICEM was largely a ‘mechanism’ to express and implement the policies as dictated by the United States.

The factors ‘creating’ refugee flows did not end in the 1950s. In the following decade, ICEM was involved in refugee crises by providing resettlement assistance in cooperation with UNHCR. In 1968, the Prague Spring reforms for the decentralisation of the economy and the democratisation of the communist regime in Czechoslovakia evoked the invasion and re-occupation of the country by the Soviet Army. This military intervention resulted in a refugee influx mainly to Austria, but also to other European countries. ICEM responded to the new refugee outflow and, by 1971, had resettled about 20,000 Czechoslovaks.⁹⁰

Other refugee movements in the 1960s involved the exodus of Jews from Poland in 1967, where ICEM assisted in the resettlement of 6,400 Jews in 1968-1969. Meanwhile, the ICEM-UNCHR office in Hong Kong continued operating and resettling Europeans from the Far East to various European and overseas countries.⁹¹ Apart from the refugee movement, ICEM continued assisting the national migration of Europeans and, in the 1960s, transferred its millionth migrant.

The 1970s was in many ways a decade of destabilisation experienced in various sectors. Firstly, the upgrading and reconstruction of the German and Japanese economies led to fierce competition with US manufacturers and consequently, the US economy experienced important implications. At the same time, the American failures, and final defeat, in the Vietnam War increased the political pressure in the United States as well as the national economy. The result was the abandonment of the fixed exchange rates system in 1971 from the side of the United States, as opposed to the gold-dollar exchange standard, and caused dollar devaluations and the adaptation of a floating-rate exchange system. Inflation became an obvious result in world economies, currencies fell, and the cost of imports rose dramatically in Europe. With the combination of the oil crises in 1973 and 1979, the affluence experienced in

⁸⁹ Michael E. Latham, “The Cold War in the Third World, 1963-1975”, in Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (eds), *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, Vol. II, *Crises and Détente*, Cambridge, New York, 2010, p. 263; Luis Eduardo Fajardo, “From the Alliance for Progress to the Plan Colombia: a retrospective look at U.S. aid to Colombia”, *Crisis States Programme, Development Research Centre*, Working paper no. 28, 2003, pp. 2-4.

⁹⁰ Carlin, *op.cit.*, p. 11; Ducasse-Rogier, *op.cit.*, pp. 55-56.

⁹¹ Ducasse-Rogier, *op.cit.*, pp. 56-57.

Western Europe during the 1960s was bygone, while unemployment, return migration, and economic crisis⁹² (as well as war and humanitarian crisis⁹³) became the new reality.

In this context, during the 1970s, the involvement of ICEM in refugee resettlement was even greater, reaching territories and populations not assisted before, thus paving the way for ICEM's greater involvement in migration from non-European countries and of non-European populations—a development that was recognised in 1980 with the change of the Organisation's role. More tellingly, in 1974, approximately 90 percent of the total population assisted by ICEM were refugees.⁹⁴ Specifically, ICEM's involvement with refugees in this decade began as soon as from 1971 when it assisted in the exodus of Jews from the Soviet Union and their resettlement mainly to Israel. Between 1972 and 1973, more than 64,500 Soviet Jews were resettled by ICEM. Also in 1972, when President Amin of Uganda ordered the expulsion of all Asians from the country, ICEM in cooperation with UNHCR, resettled about 4,600 stateless Asians from Uganda to European and overseas countries for permanent or temporary settlement.⁹⁵

Another large group of refugees assisted by ICEM in the 1960s and the 1970s were the Cuban refugees who fled their country on two occasions. They initially fled to Spain following the assumption of power by Fidel Castro in 1959 and, in 1980, many sought asylum in the Peruvian Embassy in Havana. ICEM assisted more than 70,000 Cuban refugees between 1961 and 1979 and more than 51,000 in 1981 by resettling them mainly to the United States and a minority to Latin America, Canada, and Australia.⁹⁶

⁹² Giovanni Arrighi, "The world economy and the Cold War, 1970-1990", in Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (eds), *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, Vol. III, *Endings*, Cambridge, New York, 2010, pp. 23, 25-31; Judt, *op.cit.*, pp. 453-454, 457-458.

⁹³ To name a few: 1955-1975 Vietnam War; 1968-1989 Communist insurgency in Malaysia; 1969-on civil conflict in the Philippines and insurgency of the communist party of the Philippines; 1971 Indo-Pakistani War; 1972 invasion of Uganda; 1972-1975 Bangladesh insurgency; 1973 Yom Kippur War between Israel and Egypt and Syria; 1975-1989 Cambodia-Vietnamese War, amongst many more.

⁹⁴ M. Bradley, *The International Organization for Migration...*, p. 5.

⁹⁵ ICEM, *Review of Achievements 1972*, pp. 9-12; ICEM, *Review of Achievements 1973*, pp. 8-9; IOM-SW/Library, ICEM Council, "Report of the Director on the Work of the Committee for the Year 1973, 38th Session, MC/1087, 16.04.1974; Carlin, *op.cit.*, pp. 12, 16.

⁹⁶ ICEM, *Review of Achievements 1973*, pp. 7-8; Carlin, *op.cit.*, pp. 19-20; Ducasse-Rogier, *op.cit.*, p. 58; R. E. Wasem, "At the Nexus of Refugee and Labour Migration", pp. 349-350; IOM-SW/Library, ICEM Executive Committee, "Emergency Migration Programme from Cuba", 57th (Special) Session, MC/EX/INF/42, 27.05.1980; IOM-SW/Library, ICEM Council, "Addendum to Report of the Director on the Work of ICM for the Year 1980. Report on Transport", 47th Session, MC/1334/Add.1, 01.04.1981.

After the Pinochet coup in 1973, Chile, a long-standing ICEM member, authorised ICEM with the arranging of the departure of refugees in Chile. ICEM, in cooperation with UNHCR and the *International Committee of the Red Cross* (ICRC), organised the movement of more than 20,000 Chilean refugees to a variety of countries.⁹⁷

ICEM's activities during the 1970s also reached other unexplored territories such as Bangladesh, Pakistan, India, Nepal and "Indochina".⁹⁸ For example, in Indochina, ICEM initiated a resettlement programme in 1975 for Indo-Chinese refugees and displaced persons who fled from Cambodia, Vietnam and Lao People's Democratic Republic. ICEM, in cooperation with UNCHR and ICRC, founded operation centres in Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan, Korea and Hong Kong and assisted the refugees with medical services and resettlement services, among others. The assistance to Indochinese refugees lasted more than two decades, until the 1990s. Between 1975 and 1979, it had resettled about 280,000 Indochinese.⁹⁹

Nevertheless, it must be noted that the refugee movements were also an income-earning activity for ICEM, since the Organisation was paid for its non-normal activities, with a per capita service charge from the countries involved in the refugee transports.¹⁰⁰ Hence, ICEM's budget, as well as the United States funding for ICEM, were not burdened with additional charges, while the operations of ICEM enlarged.

In the 1970s, ICEM continued assisting in the migration of nationals, the family reunification programmes, and the programmes for language training. More specifically, in 1973, ICEM transported its 2nd millionth migrant, while between February 1952 and December 1980, ICEM had transported 1,000,538 migrants and 1,899,996 refugees, totalling 2,900,534 souls (Tables 2.1. 2.2 and 2.3).

If we want to examine the contribution of ICEM in the total migration movements to and from its member-states, we will end up with diverging results. For example, countries like Australia and Israel were greatly assisted in growing their

⁹⁷ ICEM, *Review of Achievements 1973*, pp. 9-10; Carlin, *op.cit.*, p. 16-17. Some of the Chilean refugees who fled in 1973, return back to their country between 1974 and 1976, with an ICEM programme endeavouring the *Return of Talents* in Latin America. This programme had limited success and tried to halt the brain drain from Latin American countries. 70 percent of the 463 Latin Americans who joined this ICEM scheme were Chileans returning to Chile after the political change at the end of 1973, see S. Torrado, "International Migration Policies in Latin America", p. 436.

⁹⁸ For more Ducasse-Rogier *op.cit.*, pp. 59-60; Carlin, *op.cit.*, pp. 17-18. Indochina is the term used by ICEM, as well as its member-states to refer to South-East Asian countries, including Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, Vietnam, and Malaysia.

⁹⁹ Murdock, *op.cit.*, p. 56; Ducasse-Rogier, *op.cit.*, pp. 60-62; Carlin, *op.cit.*, pp. 18-19. Between 1975 and 1996 over 1.5 million of Indochinese were resettled with the support of ICEM/ICM in about 70 countries.

¹⁰⁰ Murdock, *op.cit.* p. 57.

population through the existence of ICEM, and Argentina benefitted by facilitating the most-wanted ‘absorption’ and ‘diversification’ of its labour-force. More specifically, Australia received 24.6 percent of all its migrant/refugee intakes from Europe through ICEM for the period 1951-1980;¹⁰¹ about one in four arrivals from Europe to Australia were assisted by ICEM. Israel presents more impressive statistics, wherein 39.1 percent of the migrant/refugee intakes of the country were handled by ICEM.¹⁰² Latin American countries were experiencing increased return migration rates and Argentina alone received 355,172 European migrants in 1952-1959 -a period when reliable statistics are available.¹⁰³ Out of these 355,172 European migrants, 102,297 of them were transported to Argentina by ICEM, namely around 29 percent.¹⁰⁴ Thus, in the 1950s, ICEM supported the population of Argentina, which was in line with the targets of the Argentinian immigration policy in force until 1955. From 1956 on, and especially in the 1960s, Argentina and the rest of Latin American countries were greatly assisted through ICEM in the attraction of skilled migrants, as this was an important immigration goal.¹⁰⁵

On the other hand, ICEM’s contribution towards the “demographic transformation” of other member-states was not of the same magnitude, either for emigration countries¹⁰⁶ or immigrant-receiving ones. However, we must take into consideration the different incentives of each member-state in its participation at

¹⁰¹ From 1951-1980 Australia received 2,522,879 migrants and refugees from Europe out of a total of 3,317,029 migrants and refugees received from all the rest of migrant/refugee-sending countries. Personal elaboration based on Historical Migration Statistics, <https://data.gov.au/data/dataset/historical-migration-statistics/resource/e6e527cf-7827-4000-b1d9-0046e575b6ef>, retrieved 20.05.2020. According to Table 2.1 here, 637,040 of them were assisted by ICEM.

¹⁰² Total intakes of Israel for 1952-1980 were 1,012,974 migrants and refugees, out of them 396,016 through ICEM. Personal elaboration based on, www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/total-immigration-to-israel-by-year, retrieved 23.05.2020.

¹⁰³ Maria Damilakou and Yannis S.G. Papadopoulos, “Ambitious plans with modest results: Greek migration flows to Brazil and Argentina in the 1950s and 1960s”, in Maria Damilakou and Yannis S.G. Papadopoulos (eds), *Migration and Development in Southern Europe and South America*, London, New York, 2022, table 10.1 p. 150, personal elaboration. From 1950-1974 Argentina received around 1,118,000 migrants from all its immigration outlets. For more see Alfredo E. Lattes, “An Overview of International Migration in Argentina”, in Alfredo E. Lattes, Enrique Oteiza, with the collaboration of Jorge Graciarena, “The Dynamics of Argentine Migration (1955-1984): Democracy and the Return of Expatriates”, UNSS, CENEP, 1987, Table 1 p.8, Table 2 p.12.

¹⁰⁴ Personal elaboration based on, NARA/12th Session of Council, ICEM, “Progress Report of the Director 1 January - 29 February 1960”, 20th Session, MC/386, 24.03.1960.

¹⁰⁵ Y. Papadopoulos, D. Parsanoglou, “European land settlement and development in Latin America”, pp. 11-12.

¹⁰⁶ Between 1950 and 1975, emigration from Italy numbered 6,442,700 people, from Greece 1,197,300, from Spain 1,833,000 and from Portugal 1,810,600. Emigration from the said countries through ICEM can be compared with Table 2.3 sums, but we should keep in mind that Spain was an ICEM member-state from 1956-1977 and Portugal from 1975 on. Personal elaboration based on, Alessandra Venturini, *Postwar Migration in Southern Europe, 1950-2000: An Economic Analysis*, Cambridge, New York, 2004, p. 16.

ICEM (demographic, economic, political, among many others) as well as the varying membership duration of each member-government in the *Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration*.¹⁰⁷

The United States, in particular, received 10,330,470 immigrants and refugees in 1951-1980.¹⁰⁸ We understand that migration through ICEM had a considerable low impact in its intakes with only 790,881 migrants and refugees (Table 2.1). The role of the participation of the United States was not to strengthen its economy through the importation of additional workforce of migrants and refugees. Its role was governed by Cold War politics and the strategy against Communism and its effort to reach balances within and outside of the Western Bloc.

For this reason, the United States lagged behind on imports of migrants and refugees through ICEM from other important immigration countries. An example can be seen in Australia and Israel: the stabilisation of these countries, for different reasons, constituted a priority for the United States. In the case of Australia, its geographical position close to communist China constituted it an important strategic pillar for the United States in the region. However, its distance from Europe and the long and expensive trip required to reach it made the country less attractive than other destinations in North America for the settlement of European populations, which could act as “guard” against Communist ideology. Accordingly, with the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, the United States acquired an important ally in the Middle East. Therefore, populating Israel with the scattered Jewish refugees across Europe was highly promoted and assisted.

Of a considerably small importance was also ICEM involvement in the population of Canada. Between 1956 and 1980, Canada received around 2,275,000 immigrants from all its migration outlets. Out of this total, 966,274 immigrants arrived between 1956 and 1962, the latter being the last year of Canada’s full membership in ICEM.¹⁰⁹ Despite Canada’s withdrawal from ICEM in 1962, it continued its cooperation with the Organisation and sporadically requested ICEM’s assistance in transporting specific groups of refugees and migrants until the end of the period of our concern. Thus, Canada, in 1952-1980, received 262,402 migrants and

¹⁰⁷ For ICEM membership of each member-state, see here Table 4, Annex.

¹⁰⁸ For US immigration statistics, see Andrés Solimano, “Globalization, History and International Migration: A View from Latin America” (2004), available at SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=908241>, p. 18.

¹⁰⁹ Personal elaboration based on V. Satzewich, “Rethinking Post-1945 Migration to Canada: Towards a Political Economy of Labour Migration”, *International Migration*, 28:3 (1990), Table 2 p. 336.

refugees with ICEM's assistance (Table 2.1), making a percentage of only 11.5 out of the total arrivals in the country.

As it was mentioned earlier, the initial establishing role of ICEM was the distribution of the so-called European "surplus population" as well as the assistance towards refugees and displaced persons. This task was completed to a great extent within the first decade of ICEM's lifetime. From the 1960s onwards, with the improvement of living standards in Europe and the increase of intra-European migration,¹¹⁰ ICEM extended its scope, first with the development of programmes for Latin America and then with its involvement in the resettlement of non-European origin refugee populations. Furthermore, in the 1970s, ICEM initiated a *Forum for International Migration Issues* with the intention to support the exchange of experiences amongst governments and other organisations on migration issues. Thus, ICEM was progressively turning into a global agency. Evidence of this tendency was the deletion of the geographical determination in ICEM's name in 1980 and was renamed the *Intergovernmental Committee for Migration* (ICM). In the 1980s, the Organisation, along with the gradual de-escalation of the Cold War and the operation needs, extended its programmes also to Asia and Africa, further enlarging its scope.

This change in the Organisation's aims or the perception that it had fulfilled its establishing role resulted in the withdrawal of funding and important member-states in the 1960s and 1970s. Other reasons for the withdrawal were of economic nature or the changes in migration needs of the countries themselves. With these reasons accumulating, the following countries withdrew from ICEM: Canada in 1962, France in 1966, New Zealand in 1967, the United Kingdom and Venezuela in 1968, Australia in 1973, Spain in 1977, and Brazil in 1980, among others.¹¹¹

The next decade, the 1980s, met the Organisation on a different migratory field of work with greater challenges to face. The end of the Cold War also resulted in the widening of the Organisation's scope and membership, the change of its Constitution, and the change of its name for the last time in 1989 to its current *International Organisation for Migration* (IOM).

These thirty years of PICMME/ICEM/ICM operation meant the establishment of a constantly expanding migratory agency, which created an international machinery and

¹¹⁰ For more, see E. Comte, *The History of European Migration Regime*, *op.cit.*.

¹¹¹ See here, Table 4, Annex; Ducasse-Rogier, *op.cit.*, p. 68; Perruchoud, *op.cit.*, p. 507.

infrastructure to respond to the needs of its members as well as to situations of crisis in an increasingly expanding geographical area, thus continuously meeting new operational challenges and opportunities. The existence of the *Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration* facilitated its member-states in their endeavour to control their workforce and demographic composition, either by the emigration of part of their population or by the addition of populations with specific characteristics. Both had an important impact on the national economies. ICEM was a product of its time; it was embodied with Keynesian economic models for the collaboration of the states and the private sector, the Cold War development policies, and the Marshall Plan ideals. ICEM epitomised these policies and ideologies and, through its operation, enhanced the cooperation between the state and private sectors. In addition, ICEM's operation was largely beneficial to most of the population moved under its auspices. Many established a new life abroad and were provided with opportunities not available in their countries of origin and others were able to escape from regions of crises. Simultaneously, the existence and operation of ICEM created opportunities both for state and private entities, such as the transport business which was involved in and profited financially from the migrant movement. The geographical expansion of ICEM's operations and the increase of its workload resulted in the enlargement of the pool of its business partners as well as of accessible revenue, among others. These aspects of ICEM's work will occupy us in the chapters to follow.

Table 2.1: Individuals Moved under the Auspices of ICEM, 1 February 1952 - 31 December 1980 – non-South American destinations														
Emigration Countries	Immigration Countries													
	Australia		Canada		Israel		New Zealand		USA		Other Overseas		Europe	
	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
Austria	92748	14.6	49098	18.7	179367	45.3	1651	7.4	76299	9.6	11895	13.7	34379	18.0
Migrants	22096	5.1	5974	5.7	204	13.8	361	2.2	1133	3.0	6617	9.7	0	0.0
Refugees	70652	34.3	43124	27.2	179163	45.4	1290	22.0	75166	10.0	5278	28.4	34379	18.0
Belgium	4088	0.6	3535	1.3	917	0.2	52	0.2	9507	1.2	4502	5.2	8	0.0
Migrants	3414	0.8	134	0.1	14	0.9	36	0.2	138	0.4	4328	6.3	0	0.0
Refugees	674	0.3	3401	2.1	903	0.2	16	0.3	9369	1.2	174	0.9	8	0.0
France	3546	0.6	9751	3.7	57667	14.6	31	0.1	23227	2.9	67	0.1	268	0.1
Refugees	3546	1.7	9751	6.2	57667	14.6	31	0.5	23227	3.1	67	0.4	268	0.1
Germany	103997	16.3	61380	23.4	520	0.1	530	2.4	99513	12.6	16927	19.4	1927	1.0
Migrants	68682	15.9	35306	33.9	148	10.0	223	1.4	6726	17.9	11836	17.3	0	0.0
Refugees	35315	17.1	26074	16.5	372	0.1	307	5.2	92787	12.3	5091	27.4	1927	1.0
Greece	119064	18.7	8230	3.1	20261	5.1	871	3.9	16819	2.1	10797	12.4	1800	0.9
Migrants	114418	26.5	5816	5.6	166	11.3	630	3.8	2799	7.5	9950	14.5	0	0.0
Refugees	4646	2.3	2414	1.5	20095	5.1	241	4.1	14020	1.9	847	4.6	1800	0.9
Italy	130077	20.4	52846	20.1	98571	24.9	736	3.3	138956	17.6	19300	22.2	12556	6.6
Migrants	62047	14.4	31616	30.4	462	31.3	15	0.1	3066	8.2	18757	27.4	0	0.0
Refugees	68030	33.0	21230	13.4	98109	24.9	721	12.3	135890	18.0	543	2.9	12556	6.6
Malta	51499	8.1	4910	1.9	0	0.0	72	0.3	2158	0.3	0	0.0	0	0.0
Migrants	51499	11.9	4910	4.7	0	0.0	72	0.4	2158	5.7	0	0.0	0	0.0
Portugal	1729	0.3	2932	1.1	0	0.0	0	0.0	2629	0.3	2560	2.9	227	0.1
Migrants	1724	0.4	2932	2.8	0	0.0	0	0.0	2629	7.0	764	1.1	225	97.8
Refugees	5	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	1796	9.7	2	0.0
Spain	12362	1.9	1370	0.5	25	0.0	6	0.0	73746	9.3	311	0.4	17	0.0
Migrants	12060	2.8	1150	1.1	11	0.7	6	0.0	336	0.9	290	0.4	0	0.0
Refugees	302	0.1	220	0.1	14	0.0	0	0.0	73410	9.7	21	0.1	17	0.0
Others	99467	15.6	26144	10.0	33691	8.5	15185	68.3	29130	3.7	16492	18.9	5704	3.0
Migrants	95125	22.1	16171	15.5	469	31.8	15036	91.8	18560	49.4	15934	23.3	5	2.2
Refugees	4342	2.1	9973	6.3	33222	8.4	149	2.5	10570	1.4	558	3.0	5699	3.0
Areas Outside Europe	6748	1.1	5047	1.9	4271	1.1	81	0.4	14790	1.9	1287	1.5	7497	3.9
Refugees	6748	3.3	5047	3.2	4271	1.1	81	1.4	14790	2.0	1287	6.9	7497	3.9
Sub-Total	625325	98.2	225243	85.8	395290	99.8	19215	86.4	486774	61.5	84138	96.7	64383	33.7
Migrants	431065	100	104009	100	1474	100	16379	100	37545	100	68476	100	230	100
Refugees	194260	94.3	121234	76.5	393816	99.8	2836	48.4	449229	59.6	15662	84.4	64153	33.6
Far East Programme	10522	1.7	312	0.1	532	0.1	254	1.1	599	0.1	435	0.5	3223	1.7
Non-European Refugees	83	0.0	1516	0.6	1	0.0	169	0.8	30276	3.8	369	0.4	3227	1.7
Latin America Resettlement Program	897	0.1	28286	10.8	23	0.0	2000	9.0	157394	19.9	1119	1.3	56163	29.4
Indochina Special Program	213	0.0	7045	2.7	170	0.0	597	2.7	115838	14.6	977	1.1	63978	33.5
Grand Total	637040	100	262402	100	396016	100	22235	100	790881	100	87038	100	190974	100
Migrants	431065	67.7	104009	39.6	1474	0.4	16379	74	37545	4.7	68476	79	230	0.1
Refugees	205975	32.3	158393	60.4	394542	100	5856	26	753336	95	18562	21	190744	100
*The period from Sept. to Dec. 1979 was not available at the sources advised. During this period 136,056 individuals (1,896 migrants & 134,160 refugees) were assisted by ICEM towards all the destinations. These data have not been incorporated here. Sources: IOM-SW/Library, ICEM. "The World-Wide Dimensions of ICEM's Activities", 44th Session, MC/1278, 05.11.1979; ibid., ICM, "Report of the Director on the Work of ICM for the Year 1980", 47th Session, MC/1334 01.04.1981, Tables I, II, III.														

Table 2.2: Individuals Moved under the Auspices of ICEM, 1 February 1952 - 31 December 1980 – South/Central American destinations

Emigration Countries	Immigration Countries																					
	Argentina		Bolivia		Brazil		Chile		Colombia		Ecuador		Paraguay		Peru		Uruguay		Venezuela		Central America Panama Caribbean	
	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
Austria	1272	1.0	88	4.8	3323	2.7	504	4.3	320	3.5	12	0.6	20	1.6	19	0.5	78	0.5	932	1.1	85	1.1
Migrants	73	0.1	79	7.2	1106	1.1	49	0.6	80	1.0	11	0.6	5	0.6	10	0.3	0	0.0	64	0.1	37	1.0
Refugees	1199	22.5	9	1.2	2217	12.2	455	14.7	240	19.8	1	0.5	15	3.3	9	0.9	78	17.0	868	21.0	48	1.3
Belgium	177	0.1	74	4.0	1643	1.4	265	2.2	261	2.9	74	3.4	46	3.7	155	3.7	18	0.1	263	0.3	195	2.6
Migrants	160	0.1	70	6.4	1501	1.5	252	2.9	252	3.2	74	3.8	45	5.7	155	4.9	15	0.1	249	0.3	189	4.9
Refugees	17	0.3	4	0.5	142	0.8	13	0.4	9	0.7	0	0.0	1	0.2	0	0.0	3	0.7	14	0.3	6	0.2
France	240	0.2	72	3.9	966	0.8	213	1.8	16	0.2	0	0.0	15	1.2	4	0.1	121	0.8	219	0.3	94	1.3
Refugees	240	4.5	72	9.6	966	5.3	213	6.9	16	1.3	0	0.0	15	3.3	4	0.4	121	26.3	219	5.3	94	2.6
Germany	672	0.5	301	16.4	5776	4.8	1729	14.7	642	7.0	448	20.8	215	17.2	430	10.2	184	1.3	813	1.0	295	4.0
Migrants	367	0.3	184	16.9	3302	3.2	1191	13.7	533	6.7	393	20.2	58	7.3	358	11.3	80	0.6	326	0.4	236	6.1
Refugees	305	5.7	117	15.6	2474	13.6	538	17.3	109	9.0	55	26.7	157	34.3	72	6.9	104	22.6	487	11.8	59	1.7
Greece	1015	0.8	1	0.1	8001	6.6	81	0.7	50	0.5	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	64	0.4	226	0.3	11	0.1
Migrants	834	0.7	0	0.0	6998	6.8	50	0.6	33	0.4	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	62	0.4	162	0.2	11	0.3
Refugees	181	3.4	1	0.1	1003	5.5	31	1.0	17	1.4	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	2	0.4	64	1.5	0	0.0
Italy	97499	79.3	212	11.5	63867	52.8	4002	33.9	2835	31.1	388	18.0	189	15.1	654	15.6	7246	50.9	43031	52.6	728	9.8
Migrants	96096	81.7	110	10.1	58339	56.7	2848	32.8	2320	29.3	361	18.5	128	16.1	620	19.7	7125	51.7	42091	54.2	682	17.7
Refugees	1403	26.4	102	13.6	5528	30.4	1154	37.2	515	42.6	27	13.1	61	13.3	34	3.3	121	26.3	940	22.7	46	1.3
Malta	0	0.0	0	0.0	13	0.0	4	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	2	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
Migrants	0	0.0	0	0.0	13	0.0	4	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	2	0.1	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
Portugal	120	0.1	5	0.3	664	0.5	6	0.1	6	0.1	31	1.4	8	0.6	4	0.1	0	0.0	4098	5.0	18	0.2
Migrants	120	0.1	4	0.4	636	0.6	0	0.0	6	0.1	29	1.5	8	1.0	4	0.1	0	0.0	4098	5.3	17	0.4
Refugees	0	0.0	1	0.1	28	0.2	6	0.2	0	0.0	2	1.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	0.0
Spain	19325	15.7	608	33.1	25475	21.0	3117	26.4	4035	44.2	821	38.1	521	41.6	1564	37.2	6464	45.4	28698	35.1	2690	36.3
Migrants	19304	16.4	608	55.7	25429	24.7	3108	35.8	4003	50.6	809	41.5	518	65.2	1561	49.5	6463	46.9	28235	36.3	2267	59.0
Refugees	21	0.4	0	0.0	46	0.3	9	0.3	32	2.6	12	5.8	3	0.7	3	0.3	1	0.2	463	11.2	423	11.8
Others	959	0.8	57	3.1	5760	4.8	1315	11.1	693	7.6	275	12.8	43	3.4	452	10.8	60	0.4	2562	3.1	442	6.0
Migrants	671	0.6	36	3.3	5589	5.4	1190	13.7	691	8.7	271	13.9	33	4.2	445	14.1	37	0.3	2476	3.2	405	10.5
Refugees	288	5.4	21	2.8	171	0.9	125	4.0	2	0.2	4	1.9	10	2.2	7	0.7	23	5.0	86	2.1	37	1.0
Areas Outside Europe	39	0.0	4	0.2	251	0.2	14	0.1	9	0.1	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	232	0.3	42	0.6
Refugees	39	0.7	4	0.5	251	1.4	14	0.5	9	0.7	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	232	5.6	42	1.2
Sub-Total	121318	98.7	1422	77.3	115739	95.6	11250	95.4	8867	97.1	2049	95.1	1057	84.4	3284	78.2	14235	100	81074	99.1	4600	62.0
Migrants	117625	100	1091	100	102913	100	8692	100	7918	100	1948	100	795	100	3155	100	13782	100	77701	100	3844	100
Refugees	3693	69.4	331	44.3	12826	70.6	2558	82.4	949	78.4	101	49.0	262	57.2	129	12.3	453	98.5	3373	81.4	756	21.1
Far East Program.	280	0.2	102	5.5	5121	4.2	432	3.7	15	0.2	16	0.7	178	14.2	37	0.9	7	0.0	113	0.1	11	0.1
Non-European Ref.	70	0.1	238	12.9	198	0.2	114	1.0	12	0.1	0	0.0	0	0.0	821	19.5	0	0.0	106	0.1	287	3.9
L.America Resettl.	1273	1.0	77	4.2	10	0.0	1	0.0	209	2.3	65	3.0	3	0.2	44	1.0	0	0.0	507	0.6	2221	29.9
Indochina Sp. Prog	3	0.0	0	0.0	4	0.0	0	0.0	25	0.3	24	1.1	15	1.2	15	0.4	0	0.0	43	0.1	300	4.0
Grand Total	122944	100	1839	100	121072	100	11797	100	9128	100	2154	100	1253	100	4201	100	14242	100	81843	100	7419	100
Migrants	117625	95.7	1091	59.3	102913	85.0	8692	73.7	7918	86.7	1948	90.4	795	63.4	3155	75.1	13782	96.8	77701	94.9	3844	51.8
Refugees	5319	4.3	748	40.7	18159	15.0	3105	26.3	1210	13.3	206	9.6	458	36.6	1046	24.9	460	3.2	4142	5.1	3575	48.2

Sources: see Table 2.1

Table 2.3: Individuals Moved under the Auspices of ICEM 1 February 1952 - 31 December 1980 - Totals						
Emigration Countries	Total Immigration Countries Table 2.1		Total Immigration Countries Table 2.2		Grand Total	
	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
Austria	445437	18.7	6653	1.8	452090	16.4
Migrants	36385	5.5	1514	0.4	37899	3.8
Refugees	409052	23.7	5139	13.4	414191	23.5
Belgium	22609	0.9	3171	0.8	25780	0.9
Migrants	8064	1.2	2962	0.9	11026	1.1
Refugees	14545	0.8	209	0.5	14754	0.8
France	94557	4.0	1960	0.5	96517	3.5
Refugees	94557	5.5	1960	5.1	96517	5.5
Germany	284794	11.9	11505	3.0	296299	10.7
Migrants	122921	18.6	7028	2.1	129949	13.0
Refugees	161873	9.4	4477	11.7	166350	9.4
Greece	177842	7.5	9449	2.5	187291	6.8
Migrants	133779	20.3	8150	2.4	141929	14.2
Refugees	44063	2.6	1299	3.4	45362	2.6
Italy	453042	19.0	220651	58.4	673693	24.4
Migrants	115963	17.6	210720	62.1	326683	32.7
Refugees	337079	19.5	9.931	25.8	347010	19.7
Malta	58639	2.5	19	0.0	58658	2.1
Migrants	58639	8.9	19	0.0	58658	5.9
Portugal	10077	0.4	4960	1.3	15037	0.5
Migrants	8274	1.3	4922	1.4	13196	1.3
Refugees	1803	0.1	38	0.1	1841	0.1
Spain	87837	3.7	93318	24.7	181155	6.6
Migrants	13853	2.1	92305	27.2	106158	10.6
Refugees	73984	4.3	1013	2.6	74997	4.2
Others	225813	9.5	12618	3.3	238431	8.6
Migrants	161300	24.5	11844	3.5	173144	17.3
Refugees	64513	3.7	774	2.0	65287	3.7
Areas Outside Europe	39721	1.7	591	0.2	40312	1.5
Refugees	39721	2.3	591	1.5	40312	2.3
Sub-Total	1900368	79.6	364895	96.6	2265263	81.9
Migrants	659178	100	339464	100	998642	100
Refugees	1241190	71.9	25431	66.2	1266621	71.7
Far East Programme	15877	0.7	6312	1.7	22189	0.8
Non-European Refugees	35641	1.5	1846	0.5	37487	1.4
Latin America Resettlement Programme	245882	10.3	4410	1.2	250292	9.1
Indochina Special Programme	188818	7.9	429	0.1	189247	6.8
Grand Total	2386586	100	377892	100	2764478	100
Migrants	659178	27.6	339464	89.8	998642	36.1
Refugees	1727408	72.4	38428	10.2	1765836	63.9
<i>Sources: see Table 2.1.</i>						

Chapter 3:

Policy and Control Bodies for Transport through ICEM

Any organisation, in order to function, apart from a mandate, also needs certain mechanisms to achieve its goals. This chapter aims to understand the mechanism established for the operation of the *Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration*. By concentrating on the case of the transport sector, it is endeavoured to highlight the operation of its mechanism in combination with its human resources. The ICEM member-states had adopted policies and strategies for the control of the mechanism of the Organisation, either by the employment of their nationals within ICEM or even by their participation in the representative bodies of ICEM.

Drafting the organisational structure of each agency is of vital importance in order for the organisation to fulfil its mandate, to pursue its objectives, and provide the means for the successful execution of its mission.¹ Each international organisation employs specific means to achieve its goal which have certain “regularities in perceptions and attitudes, [taking] the form of organizational ideology”, as R. Cox and H. Jacobson have suggested.²

The chapter is divided into three sections. The first section aims to highlight the importance of transportation in the function of ICEM as well as in its operational budget. Data for the course of transport expenses are provided, in comparison with the rest of the operational expenses of ICEM, as well as data for the course of transport expenses per migrant destination.

Starting with an overview of the ICEM organisational structure in Headquarters and in country-Missions, the second section of this chapter, having the examination of the Department of Transport as its base, traces the political decisions in relation with this Department and the conflicting interests around the migrants’ transport. Reforms and reorganisations in this Department were recurrent. The intended restructure of 1965 works as an example in examining the role of the member-states and of the transport sector in administrative matters. The objections of

¹ Christopher Balding, Daniel Wehrenfennig, “Theorizing International Organizations: An Organizational Theory of International Institutions”, *Journal of International Organizations Studies*, 2:1 (2011), p. 8.

² Robert W. Cox, Harold K. Jacobson et.al., *The Anatomy of Influence. Decisions making in international organization*, New Haven, 1973, p. 22.

member-states against reorganisations are discussed in relation with the profits derived from ICEM's transport work. The section concludes with the application of the principal-agent theory that the member-states wanted to control the appointment of staff in ICEM in support of their national interests around transportation; staff appointments were a political decision and rather meritocratic.

The third section is devoted to the examination of the ICEM *Sub-Committee on the Coordination of Transport*, a consultative body of the Organisation where representatives of each member-state could participate. Through the study of the role of this Sub-Committee, the strategies and competing financial interests of the member-states are highlighted, as they tried to secure the transport interests of their countries. Thus, the Sub-Committee is studied as a means to secure the ICEM transport business for the regular scheduled transport means of the ICEM member-states. It is found that the member-states participating in this Sub-Committee were also those who financially benefited the most from the ICEM transport funding. The chapter concludes by noticing an informal governance system in the proceedings of ICEM, as the main decisions were part of private consultations.

Transport and its dominant role



As explained in Chapter 2, the function of the *Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration* was made possible through the contributions of its member-states. The Administrative Budget covered expenses related to salaries, communication costs, office costs and staff travel costs, among others. From the Operational Budget, all the expenses related to the implementation of migrant/refugee schemes were paid, including the transport cost, to the provision of services, the support to voluntary agencies' programmes, and the technical support to member-states.³

Transport had a dominant role in the function of ICEM, as well as in its expenses. For the period between 1953 and 1959, transport expenses covered more than two-thirds of the Operational Budget (Figure 3.1). In 1953-1959, transport expenses totalled 84 percent, the services cost 8 percent and other expenses 7 percent. The same pattern continued in the 1960s (Figure 3.2). For the whole decade, the transport expenses amounted to 77.4 percent, the services 14.3 percent, and the other


³ For more, see Franghiadis, op.cit., pp. 99-103, 106-120.

expenses to 8.3 percent. For the period 1970-1976 (Figure 3.3), the percentage for the annual transport expenses decreased without losing their supremacy in relation to the rest of the expenses. In 1970-1976, a total of 69 percent were devoted to transport expenses, 26.7 to services, and 4.3 percent to other expenses.⁴

The high percentage of transport cost, as opposed to the development of migrant/refugee services, reveals the intention of the member-states to constitute ICEM as a mechanism for the management of the logistic part of the migrants' movement, only secondarily as a mechanism for the development of supportive services facilitating in the preparation, settlement, and integration of the population moved. The slight increase noticed from the 1960s on has to be attributed to the policy of the United States and, consequently, of ICEM, which concentrated in the needs of Latin American countries under the *Alliance for Progress* and the *Migrant Selective Programme* respectively, as discussed in Chapter 2.



⁴ For analytical data and information on the sources of figures 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, see here Table 1, Annex: Total Operational Expenditure, 1953-1959 (US\$); Table 2, Annex: Total Operational Expenditure, 1960-1969 (US\$) and Table 3, Annex: Total Operational Expenditure, 1970-1976 (US\$).



The cost of transport did not only refer to the payments to the transport companies but also included expenses related to the preparation of the migrants' and refugees' documentation prior and after their voyage. This explains also the amounts noticed in Tables 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 below. However, the greatest cost involved, undoubtedly, relied on the payment towards the transport companies for the movement of ICEM migrants and refugees. The proximity between the country of origin and the country of destination, the number of persons transferred, and a number of other factors regulated the cost of travel.

Table 3.1: ICEM Movements and Expenditure per Destination, 1966-1969				
Destination	Migrants	%	Expenditure	%
Australia	106,757	38.2	35,244,655	63.5
USA	53,298	19.1	5,556,808	10
Israel	50,390	18.0	4,389,185	7.9
South Africa	23,873	8.5	4,730,784	8.5
Latin America	12,753	4.6	2,651,016	4.8
Canada	18,298	6.5	1,541,137	2.8
Other	14,085	5.0	1,417,070	2.6
Total	279,454	100	55,530,655	100
<i>Sources:</i> IOM-SW/Library, Annex III, "ICEM Movements and Expenditure According to Destinations (January-December 1966)", MC/827/Add.1, 13.04.1967; <i>ibid.</i> , Annex III, "ICEM Movements and Expenditures According to Destinations", MC/EX/209/Add.1, 01.06.1968; <i>ibid.</i> , Annex III, "ICEM Movements and Expenditures According to Destinations, January – December 1968", MC/911/Add.1, 01.04.1969; <i>ibid.</i> , Annex IV, "ICEM Movements and Expenditure According to Destinations, January – December 1969", MC/EX/228, 28.05.1970.				

From Table 3.1 it is confirmed that Australia, apart from the main country of destination for ICEM migrants for the period 1966-1969, was also the most expensive one, costing to ICEM transport funds about 63 percent. At the same time, destinations like the United States which received the half of the Australian migrant and refugee intakes, cost one-sixth of the amount paid for transport to Australia.

In Table 3.2, which starts from 1970 and ends in 1973, the last year before Australia's withdrawal from ICEM, it is noticed that while Israel, received nearly the double of Australian migrant and refugee intakes, it cost about \$17 million less for ICEM. Certainly, the distance from Europe for both countries, favoured Israel. With the considerable decrease of the migrants going to Australia, it is also noticed that the total number of migrants increased, while the total expenditure decreased in comparison with the period 1966-1969.

Table 3.2: ICEM Movements and Expenditure per Destination, 1970-1973				
Destination	Migrants	%	Expenditure	%
Australia	78,561	25.8	27,309,981	50.4
USA	66,350	21.8	7,705,258	14.2
Israel	111,440	36.5	9,879,029	18.2
South Africa	16,767	5.5	3,518,792	6.5
Latin America	12,482	4.1	2,868,690	5.3
Canada	8,630	2.8	801,669	1.5
Other	10,784	3.5	2,051,682	3.8
Total	305,014	100	54,135,101	100
Sources: IOM-SW/Library, Annex IV, "ICEM Movements and Expenditure According to Destinations, January-December 1970", MC/EX/242/Add.1, 17.05.1971; <i>ibid.</i> , Annex III, "ICEM Movements and Expenditure According to Destinations, January-December 1971", MC/EX/269/Add.1, 25.05.1972; IOM-GR, MC/EX Executive Committee, 41 to 45-46-47 Session, Annex III, "ICEM Movements and Expenditure According to Destinations January - December 1972)", MC/EX/284/Rev.1, 28.05.1973; IOM-SW/Library, Annex III, "ICEM Movements and Expenditure According to Destinations, January-December 1973", MC/1087/Add.1, 26.04.1974.				

For the case of the Latin American countries in both periods (Tables 3.1 and 3.2), it is noticed that they received approximately the same number of migrants while maintaining the cost of transport at about the same level. It is significant to note that the Latin American countries were more interested in migrant/refugee services, including the provision of technical support from the ICEM side and secondarily in the transport funding. In this direction, the Latin American countries accused Australia of the deficits in ICEM Operational Budget and unsuccessfully requested

the reduction of movements to Australia for less expensive destinations, including said Latin American countries.⁵

Table 3.3: ICEM Movements and Expenditure per Destination, 1974-1980				
Destination	Migrants	%	Expenditure	%
Australia	10,615	1.2	5,890,696	2.0
USA	516,222	58.4	201,343,006	67.3
Israel	90,111	10.2	13,771,827	4.6
Others	33,964	3.8	11,525,083	3.8
Latin America	33,081	3.7	10,877,873	3.6
Canada	72,290	8.2	6,284,970	2.1
Europe	127,875	14.5	49,677,190	16.6
Total	884,158	100	299,370,644	100

Sources: IOM-SW/Library, Annex III, “ICEM Movements and Expenditure According to Destinations, January–December 1974”, MC/1126/Add.1, 04.04.1975; *ibid.*, Annex III, “ICEM Movements and Expenditure According to Destinations, January –December 1975”, MC/1157/Add.1, 02.04.1976; *ibid.*, Annex III, “ICEM Movements and Expenditure According to Destinations, January–December 1976”, MC/1190/Add.1, 28.03.1977; *ibid.*, Annex III, “ICEM Movements and Expenditure According to Destinations, January–December 1977”, MC/1225/Add.1, 01.03.1978; *ibid.*, Annex III, “ICEM Movements and Expenditure According to Destinations, January–December 1978”, MC/1257/Add.1, 04.04.1979; *ibid.*, Annex III, “ICEM Movements and Expenditure According to Destinations, January –December 1979”, MC/1300/Add.1, 28.03.1980; *ibid.*, Annex III, “ICEM Movements and Expenditure According to Destinations, January–December 1980”, MC/1334/Add.1, 01.04.1981.

Continuing to the last period of expenditures of 1974-1980 (Table 3.3), the United States received more than a half of the total migrants/refugees transported by ICEM and cost about 67 percent of ICEM transport funds. This result was a consequence of the movement of Indochinese refugees that culminated during this period. This also explains the first appearance of Europe in the charts, as many Indochinese refugees landed in European countries before their final resettlement overseas.

With consideration to the dominant role of transport in the work of the *Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration*, the Organisation had to initially establish the infrastructure for the optimal management of the funds entrusted. Therefore, the organisational structure and the *migration infrastructure*⁶ of ICEM bodies related to transport matters will be examined in the next pages in order to understand the implemented mechanisms of the transport policy of ICEM as well as the operational stages of ICEM’s migratory machinery rather than the movement of the migrants themselves.

⁵ For more, see Ioannis Limnios-Sekeris, “Imbalances in Decision-Making Processes: Commonwealth versus Latin American countries”, in Lina Venturas (ed.), *op.cit.*, pp. 89-92.

⁶ For the notion of migration infrastructure, see B. Xiang, J. Lindquist, “Migration Infrastructure”, pp. S122–S148.

As far as ICEM is concerned, its main bodies for the drafting and execution of its transport policy were the *Department of Transport* and the *Sub-Committee on the Co-ordination of Transport* (SCCT). The former was a body of the ICEM Administration composed of bureaucrats, namely international civil servants, selected from candidates coming mainly from the member-states of the Organisation. The Department was entrusted with the task of drafting and executing the transport policy, as determined by the Council. On the other hand, the SCCT was a technical body of consultative nature for the transport policy of ICEM. The representatives of each member-government were invited to participate in the SCCT's meeting and they were selected by their respective governments as members of their national delegation in the Organisation's proceedings.

ICEM Headquarters and the Department of Transport

Before we start discussing the Department of Transport, it would be worth having a general overview of the organisational structure of the Headquarters of the *Intergovernmental Committee of European Migration* in Geneva. The structure underwent constant change, as we will also emphasise more specifically in the case of the Department of Transport. Specifically, the structure of 1959 will be used as an example of the administrative and operational scheme of ICEM.

As seen in Chart 4.1, in 1959, ICEM had five Departments under the general supervision of the Office of the Director, namely the *Department of Operations*, *Department of Shipping*, *Department of Plans and Liaison*, *Department of Personnel and Administrative Service*, and the *Department of Budget and Finance*. We will not discuss the functions of these Departments, but each one had specialised Sections, which were subordinate to the Chief of the respective Department. The ICEM Departments employed two types of staff members: the officials and the employees. The officials, as we will discuss further below, were international civil servants who were hierarchically higher graded staff and were appointed under a recruitment and selection process by officials of the ICEM member-states. The employees constituted the base of the hierarchy and were usually nationally recruited staff selected by the officials of the ICEM Administration.


Locally, in the countries of its member-states, ICEM was represented by a country Mission under one Chief of Mission who acted based on instructions received

from the ICEM Geneva Headquarters. In 1959, ICEM operated sixteen country Missions. Some Missions, though, had additional sub-offices, making for a total of eighteen offices.⁷

It is understood that ICEM maintained an extensive mechanism at its Headquarters, which interplayed in the administrative and operational stages of migration along with the country Missions.

⁷ In 1959, ICEM maintained offices in the below countries: Austria, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Italy, Spain, Hong Kong, one in Argentina/Uruguay, one in Brazil/Paraguay, one in Colombia/Costa Rica, Chile, Panama, Venezuela, one in Australia/New Zealand, Federation of Rhodesia & Nyasaland, Union of South Africa and in the United States. In the case of some Latin American countries, the operation of ICEM locally was governed by one country Mission. More particularly, Uruguay, Paraguay and, Costa Rica had no ICEM country Missions but only ICEM sub-offices. However, they were under the country Missions of neighbouring countries, Argentina, Brazil, and Colombia, respectively. In New Zealand though, ICEM was not represented in 1959, but the Organisation's affairs for the country were covered by the Mission in Australia. For more see NARA/13th Session of the Ex. Comm. of the ICEM, Geneva, November 3, 1959, ICEM Ex. Committee, "Information Paper on the Organization, Functions and Staff Structure of the Administration", 13th Session, MC/EX/INF/11, 25.09.1959.

Chart 3.1: ICEM Organisational Chart, 1959⁸



Delving into specifics, the Department of Transport, under whichever name it had,⁹ was the ICEM Administration's designated department through which the transport policy of the Organisation, under all forms (sea, air, rail/road), was drafted and proposed to the Council for approval to be implemented. The Department was administered by a Chief who was subordinate to the ICEM Director. The Department

⁸ NARA/13th Session of the Ex. Comm. of the ICEM, Geneva, November 3, 1959, ICEM, "Information Paper on the Organization, Functions and Staff Structure of the Administration", 13th Session, MC/EX/INF/11, 25.09.1959.

⁹ *Department of Shipping* in 1952, *Department of Operations and Transport* in 1958, *Department of Shipping* in 1959, *Department of Operations and Transport* in 1966, *Department of Transport* in 1969, *Department of Operations and Transport* in 1974.

oversaw various tasks: the conclusion of agreements and price negotiations with the transport owners or their brokers, the booking and blocking of space in transport means, coordination of transport schedules, inspection of transport means, the voyage performance and escort of migrants, arranging the reception, accommodation, and embarkation of migrants, and the verification of migrant documents in line with the entry regulations of the sending and receiving countries.¹⁰

“Efficiency” and “staffing” of the Department were two of the recurrent objectives of the ICEM Administration throughout the period under examination; this resulted in consecutive re-organisations of the Department’s structure. More specifically, between 1952 and 1974, eight important re-organisations occurred, changing its structure and functions and correcting setbacks of previous re-organisations. ICEM, as a living organisation, needed to adapt not only to changes in the migratory field it served, but also to changes and technological innovations in transportation and, more importantly, to the ICEM Administration’s budget limitations.

Changes to how the ICEM Administration conducted its work were not always welcomed by the member-states. At the end of 1965, a deficit of \$225,000 in the Administrative Budget of the following year caused the Director to announce his intention for a restructure in the Headquarters’ mechanism. His plans included the merging of the *Department of Transport* with the *Department of Migration Programmes*. The Director’s proposal was met with strong disagreement from Australia, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, and the UK, which highlighted the importance of transportation in ICEM’s work and the potential risks to ICEM’s transportation policy resulting from the intended changes to the administrative structure. The aforementioned countries argued in favour of maintaining the Department of Transport at its current composition.¹¹

¹⁰ NARA/5th Session of the ICEM, Geneva, April 16-24, 1953, ICEM, “Report of the Director to Date and Prospects for 1953”, Annex IV, “Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration. Functional Organization”, MC/9/Rev.1, 28.04.1953; NARA/8th Session of the Council and the Ex. Comm. of ICEM, Geneva, 11/30/54; 11/30-12/4/54 and 12/4/54 respectively, ICEM, “Information Paper on the Organizational and Staff Structure of the Administration”, 8th Session, MC/INF/16, 26.11.1954, Annex II, Annex V.

¹¹ IOM-SW/Library, ICEM, “Report of the Sub-Committee on the Co-ordination of Transport”, 24th Session, MC/744, 02.12.1965; IOM-SW/Library, ICEM, “Report of the Sub-Committee on the Co-Ordination of Transport”, 25th Session, MC/779, 11.05.1966. The merger of the two Departments would save \$35,000 annually, see IOM-SW/Library, ICEM, “Report of the Twenty-Fifth Session of the Council of the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration”, 26th Session, MC/793/Rev.1, 18.11.1966.

Germany judged that the decision of the ICEM Administration had “hypothetical value” in an economic perspective. Thus, considering that the Department of Transport spent two-thirds of ICEM’s budget, Germany asked for a “sufficient standing” to reflect the Department’s operation. Germany highlighted the unsuccessful reorganisation of the Department in 1958, directly questioned ICEM Administration’s capacity for reforms, and urged the Administration to refrain from practices, but proved to be unsuccessful.¹² On the other hand, Australia indicated that it did not question the Director’s authority to administer his staff as preferred, but remarked that the Director had “no authority to take decisions with political implications”;¹³ this opinion was shared by Italy and Spain.¹⁴

Based on the reasoning of Australia and the other countries, it is easy to understand that the member-states approached the operation of ICEM, and particularly of the Department of Transport, through a political lens rather than impartially. Specifically, who was working in said Department, how this Department operated, and where its resources directed were all matters concerning politics and not management. This conclusion can be certified, as it will be discussed below, by the member-states’ eagerness to attract a bigger slice of the ICEM’s transport workload and funds. Furthermore, it was an implied reminder by the aforementioned states that the ICEM Administration was not to form policy and act autonomously,¹⁵ but rather to execute policy for the benefit of the member-state’s governments to achieve their political objectives.

In this line, the opposition to the Director’s aforementioned plans also came from inside the Organisation. J. Hübener, the Chief of the Department of Transport at the time, criticised the planned abolishment of the Department to the ICEM Director and warned that in such a case, “it would become apparent that ICEM has lost its

¹² IOM-SW/Library, ICEM, “Report of the Sub-Committee on the Co-ordination of Transport”, 24th Session, MC/744, 01.12.1965, Annex I, “Statement by Mr. Goller (Federal Republic of Germany)”, MC/744.

¹³ IOM-SW/Library, ICEM, “Report of the Twenty-Fifth Session of the Council of the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration”, 26th Session, MC/793/Rev.1, 18.11.1966.

¹⁴ IOM-SW/Library, ICEM, “Report of the Sub-Committee on the Co-Ordination of Transport”, 26th Session, MC/806, 16.11.1966.

¹⁵ This is the case for the contemporary international organisations, which are recognised as autonomous actors in global governance from their member-states, see Jörn Ege and Michael W. Bauer, “International bureaucracies from a Public Administration and International Relations perspective”, in Bob Reinalda (ed.), *Routledge Handbook of International Organization*, New York, 2013, pp. 138-139.

original tasks, for which it had been created”; Hübener foresaw the withdrawal of member-states as an after-effect.¹⁶

The stance of Germany in this matter presents a particular interest. Considering that J. Hübener was a German national, the Director of ICEM informed the German government in advance and in writing about the intention to abolish the Department of Transport, including J. Hübener’s position.¹⁷ Thereafter, on a visit of an ICEM official to Nuremberg for further discussions with the German government, it was mentioned by a Government official that they supported the ICEM Administration’s decision “to reduce administrative costs – disregarding the repercussions this might have on German nationals”. Therefore, the German delegation to the forthcoming Plenary Session of the Organisation was instructed not to intervene “in favour of maintaining the independence of the Department of Transport”. However, lobbying from Greece and the Netherlands during the Session proceedings against the Department’s abolition caused the German delegation to seek instructions from Bonn. Then, the German government recommended its delegation to respond in favour of the retaining of the Department of Transport, but to give “no strong support”.¹⁸

In addition, and in contrast with the discussions in Nuremberg four months after, the German government sent a letter to ICEM through its Geneva representative, protesting the decreasing number of German nationals in leading positions within the ICEM Administration. They also highlighted the repercussions that the abolishment of the Department would have on the number of ICEM staff members of German nationality.¹⁹

From the above, it is understood that inconsistencies existed in the positions adopted by the member-governments in an effort to protect their interests within the Organisation. Coalitions and the formation of close relationships between member-states with common interests emerged in an effort to retain or achieve certain mutual

¹⁶ IOM-SW/Registry, ICEM I 1951-1980, J. Hübener, Department of Transport to B.W. Haveman, “Abolition of Department of Transport”, 30.09.1965.

¹⁷ IOM-SW/Registry, ICEM-Germany-Latin America I, B. W. Haveman to Dr. J. Duntze, Head of Division, Federal Ministry for the Interior, Bonn, 01.10.1965.

¹⁸ IOM-SW/Registry, ICEM I, 1951-1980, H. M. Dreyer, “Note for the file: For Director only, Post of the Chief of Department of Transport”, 26.01.1966.

¹⁹ IOM-SW/Registry, ICEM - Germany - Latin America I, Delegation permanente de la Republique federale d’Allemagne aupres des Institutions internationales a Genève to ICEM Geneva, “Note”, 04.04.1966.

objectives, and the power of lobbying on the proceedings of ICEM became a common tactic when member-states sought greater alliances.²⁰

Following the opposition from the member-governments, the Director ordered a survey regarding the findings, conclusions, and recommendations for the role to be fulfilled by the Department of Transport. The Adviser to the Director presented the results of the survey in April 1966 in a report clearly depicting the Director's logic. Thus, it was supported that the main responsibilities of the Department of Transport were those of a "booking agent"—namely, the space-negotiations with transport companies that coincided with the movement plans, which were developed by the Department of Migration Programmes. Another function of the Department of Transport was to give advisory assistance to the Director on transport matters, negotiations with the transport companies regarding rates for sea and air transport, and flag distribution issues with member governments. The Adviser recommended that the merger of the Department of Transport with the Department of Migration Programmes would produce greater employee efficiency, important cost reductions, and that transport liaison and negotiations would improve in the total operational flow of the transport.²¹

Germany rejected the conclusions and suggestions of the Director's Adviser and doubted the Advisor's independence and "objective judgement" and asked the matter to be referred to the ICEM Council.²² The ICEM Administration, on the other hand, did not surrender and supported its reorganisation plan by attempting to influence the disagreeing governments through the Missions in the countries of member-states. Therefore, the Deputy Director asked the ICEM Mission in Athens to illustrate to the Greek government that the Greek shipping interests could gain "a better share" of flag distribution "if a closer political direction is exercised by the Director's Office after the planned consolidation takes effect", in contrast with the

²⁰ Coalitions between member-states in the proceedings of ICEM were certainly not restrained within the countries with transport interests. For more see, I. Limnios-Sekeris, "Imbalances in Decision-Making Processes", pp. 87-96. For the function of clubs within international organisations, see Mélanie Albaret, "Multilateralism under transformation. International organizations and 'clubs'", in B. Reinalda (ed.), *Routledge Handbook of International Organization*, pp. 512-523.

²¹ IOM-SW/Library, ICEM, "Headquarters Organization (Interim Report). The Transport Function as an Element in the Organization and Operations of ICEM (An Analysis with Recommendations)", 25th Session, MC/775, 12.04.1966.

²² IOM-SW/Library, ICEM, "Report of the Sub-Committee on the Co-Ordination of Transport", 25th Session, MC/779, 11.05.1966.

current set-up of the Department of Transport.²³ ICEM Athens met with Greek government officials and noticed a change of climate in their initial attitude on the matter, as Greece had expressed opposition for the consolidation during previous ICEM Sessions. However, the Government mentioned that they would consult the Greek shipowner Chandris before the government's final decision was taken. Chandris passenger liner shipping company, at that time, served the route between Greece and Australia and, like the Greek government, initially seemed to not favour the intended merger.²⁴ The Deputy Director revisited the discussion and noted increased possibilities for Chandris' company to extend its business with ICEM if the format of the Department of Transport changed.²⁵

In the case of Germany and Greece, we can notice the stance of the ICEM Administration, which, in order to retain the political balances and support in its objectives, bargained privately and informally with each member-state, away from the established bodies of ICEM. In addition, the ICEM Administration did not hesitate to 'promise' the extension of its business with specific business-partners and member-states, in exchange for their support. Lastly, the affiliation between a businessman, namely Chandris, and the policy of an ICEM member-government on a matter of administrative nature is revealing of the business approach that the governments adopted towards migration and their membership in ICEM.

After continuously pressing and reassuring several member-governments through diplomatic channels by the ICEM Administration, the merging of the Department of Transport with the Department of Migration Programmes took place at the end of 1966; it was postponed for a year due to the initial opposition of the member-states. The new Department was named the *Department of Operations and Transport*,²⁶ and was managed by the Assistant Director for Operations, who was subordinate to the Director. In 1967, the new Department was staffed by 12 officials and 19 employees.²⁷

²³ International Organisation for Migration – Mission in Greece (hereafter IOM-GR), Shipping (1966-1968), W.M. Besterman to A. Alexandraki, Deputy Chief, ICEM Liaison Mission Athens, 07.10.1966.

²⁴ IOM-GR/Shipping (1966-1968), Ch. Alexandraki, Deputy Chief of Mission, Athens to W. M. Besterman, Deputy Director, ICEM Geneva, 25.10.1966.

²⁵ IOM-GR/Shipping (1966-1968), W.M. Besterman to A. Alexandraki, Deputy Chief, ICEM Liaison Mission Athens, 31.10.1966.

²⁶ IOM-SW/Library, ICEM "Report of the Director on the Work of the Committee for the Year 1966", 27th Session, MC/827, 29.03.1967.

²⁷ IOM-SW/Library, ICEM, "Plan of Operations and Budget and Plan of Expenditure for 1967: Second Revision", 28th Session, MC/848, 09.10.1967. The staff number changed in 1968 when the officials

The changes in the organisation's structure took place mainly with the succession of ICEM Directors, wherein each one wanted to implement his [it was always a 'he'] organisational and administrative model. In 1958, in particular, when the merger of the Department of Transportation with another Department was attempted, it was initiated by the newly elected director Marcus Daly—an American businessman who, upon the time of his appointment, did not have any experience in governance, nor in migration.²⁸ Daly, as was customary with the ICEM Directors, was imposed by the United States government. He tried to manage ICEM as a business-entity: a model of management deriving from the capitalist business-minded approach of the United States, requiring cost cutting and the maximisation of profits. Daly endeavoured to weaken the policy-making power of the various Departments and their Chiefs, with the simultaneous centralisation of powers and expansion of responsibilities directed toward the Director's office.²⁹ This decision can also be viewed as a way to establish prominence in the Director's office³⁰ as well as an effort for the weakening of the high-ranking officials of the Transport Department. Daly's practices were met with ambivalence by the member-states, and this may be the reason his service did not renew for a second term, as was 'conventional' for the majority of ICEM Directors. The balances between the member-states, as well as the satisfaction of the more prominent member-states within ICEM, carried more weight from the selection of the most efficient and less costly management of the Department of Transport; this thinking also governed Daly's successors.

Another aspect that needs to be addressed, in addition to the organisational structure of the Department of Transport, are the human resources of said Department. Staffing the Department was of vital importance for its function, as well as for the balances between the member-states. ICEM had a constitutional obligation, "except in special circumstances", to recruit its staff "among the nationals of countries whose Governments [were] Members of the Committee, taking into account, as far as

numbered 13 persons, and the employees 18, see, IOM-SW/Library, ICEM, "Plan of Operations and Budget and Plan of Expenditure for 1968: First Revision", 29th Session, MC/879, 17.10.1968.

²⁸ NAA/A446, 1966/46170, 1973549, G. Jockel, Permanent Representative to Heyes, n.d. [September 1958].

²⁹ NARA/9th Session of the Council of ICEM, Geneva, November 13-19, 1958, ICEM, "Report of the Sub-Committee on the Co-Ordination of Transport", 9th Session, MC/322, 12.11.1958; IOM-SW/Registry, 8/2, Shipping–Air, Air Policy, General, Vol. III, H.R. Hoekstra, Chief of the Department of Shipping to TransWorld Airways Geneva, 14.10.1958

³⁰ Michael Barnett, Martha Finnemore, *International Organizations in Global Politics*, Ithaca, London, 2004, p. 42.

possible, their geographical distribution”.³¹ Consequently, the organisational machinery of ICEM was staffed by bureaucrats, namely international civil servants selected mainly by nationals of the Organisation’s member-states. This was a way for the member-governments to secure that their nationals would take care of their interests. At the same time, they gained knowledge and experience in international politics, an experience which was hoped to be beneficial after their separation from ICEM and return to national institutions. Furthermore, it was also a form of recoupment for the expenses that each country had to invest for the Organisation’s functioning. The ICEM employees, according to the Organisation’s Constitution, were asked to be loyal to ICEM and perform their duties by seeking or receiving no “instructions from any Government or from any authority external to the Committee”.³²

It is not surprising that the countries mainly interested in the administration of the Department of Transport were those with well-established transport companies (shipping and, later, airline companies) to various destinations. The Netherlands, Germany, and Italy were the countries always represented with highest-ranking officials at said Department, either by occupying the seat of the Chief, of the Deputy Chief, or of Officers.³³

Italy, in particular, was very pressing and demanding in its request for the increase of its representation in ICEM staffing and, more specifically, at the Department of Transport. In 1952, in a letter to the ICEM Deputy Director, Italy imposed additional recruitments of Italians by mentioning that as soon as the Organisation’s lifetime was prolonged that “a new Italian official will be hired, who will be assigned to [the Department of] Shipping [...] in consideration of the particular

³¹ NARA/6th Session of the ICEM, Venice, October 12-21, 1953, ICEM Geneva, “Constitution”, MC/55, November 1953.

³² Ibid.

³³ Dutch nationals were found at the chair of the chief of the Department four times with, J. M. Vos (1952), J.J. Van Loon (1952-1955), H.R. Hoekstra (1956-1958), and J. Van den Brink (1960-1962). Germans, on the other hand, administered the Department in 1959-1960 with Otto Golbs-Wilms and in 1963-1967 with J. Hübener. In 1958-1959 the head of the Department was of Australian origin, A. R. Driver, and between 1967-1969 and 1974-1981 Danish, S.K. Christensen. There is no certain information in the archives about the nationality of E. Jacob, chief of the Department of Transport from 1969-1972. Italy was represented in the Department with shipping officers (L. Armanino 1953-1955, L. De Leon, 1963-1967, De Franchis 1968-1969, among others) and Greece had at least one shipping officer employed by ICEM for the period 1955-1963, N. Kaloyeropoulos.

Italian interest in this sector of activity”.³⁴ In 1962, the Italian government also warned the ICEM Administration “that increasing difficulties could be expected” in their relations in case the latter did not approve the upgrade of the ranking of an Italian official as well as the hiring of an Italian national on a senior post at the Department of Transport. Italy also remarked that the “cold war is on”,³⁵ a direct threat towards the ICEM Administration.

The ICEM Administration, from its perspective, tried to please the demands of Italy, an important emigration and maritime member-state, and did not respond to its menaces. Quite the contrary, in 1955, the Administration privately announced to the Italian government the qualifications and functions needed for an Italian official to fill the position of the Deputy Chief of the Shipping Department.³⁶ Thus, it is understood that the main qualification of the position to be filled was the nationality of the incumbent and secondarily his/her professional characteristics.

Germany, likewise, especially from the 1960s on, wanted the increase of the percentage of its nationals within the ICEM’s staff.³⁷ Positions at Headquarters of ICEM were preferred by Germany, since they attributed greater value to a post in Geneva rather than in country missions.³⁸ Germany found its nationals leading in the Department of Transport for several years. However, when Germany felt that its nationals in leading positions within the Organisation decreased, the Government complained to the ICEM Administration on the “strong disproportion to the size” of its contribution to ICEM’s budget.³⁹

³⁴ IOM-SW/Registry, ICEM-Italy, 1951-1980 I, Justo Giust del Giardino, Directeur General de l’Emigration, Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres Rome to Pierre Jacobsen, Direttore Generale Aggiunto, CIME Ginevra, 65/72654/5710, 18.11.1952.

³⁵ IOM-SW/Registry, ICEM-Italy, 1951-1980 I, P. Gibson, “Note for File, Italy”, 31.07.1962. At the end of 1968, ICEM officials of Italian nationality acquired 12.5 percent, while the Italian employees 16.3 percent; a total of 15.6 percent, see IOM-SW/Registry, ICEM-Italy, 1951-1980 II, For the Director only, “Italy’s Position in ICEM (1968)”, n.d.

³⁶ IOM-SW/General, Transport General-NAC Accordo, “Summary of the Conversation Between the Director General in charge of Emigration, Ambassador Maschia and Mr. Van Loon, Chief of the Department of Shipping of the ICEM (Rome, 2 February 1955)”.

³⁷ IOM-SW/Registry, ICEM-Germany-Latin America I, M. Daly to K. Cartens, Under-Secretary of State, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, Bonn, 23.06.1961.

³⁸ IOM-SW/Registry, ICEM-Germany-Latin America I, G.H. Geller to the Director, “Visit to Germany”, 30.08.1960.

³⁹ IOM-SW/Registry, ICEM-Germany-Latin America I, Delegation permanente de la Republique federale d’Allemagne aupres des Institutions a Genève to ICEM Geneva, “Note”, 04.04.1966. ICEM Director disagreed with this argument and mentioned that Germany contributed in 1965 5 percent of the ICEM budget, while 5 percent of the ICEM officials were German nationals, and 5.6 percent of the employees of the ICEM were also of German nationality, see *ibid.*, [Director, ICEM Geneva to Permanent Delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany to the international institutions in Geneva], “Note”, 12.04.1966.

Germany was an important emigration member-state for ICEM, which, towards the 1950s and especially since the early 1960s, had been transformed to an immigration country, receiving the vast majority of intra-European migrants. The retention of its membership was of high importance for the ICEM Administration, not only in economic terms (e.g., financial contribution to ICEM budgets), but also political terms, as it did not want to jeopardise a German withdrawal during the 1960s when ICEM was transforming as an Organisation, as discussed in Chapter 2.

The member-states (principals) of ICEM wanted to control the staff appointments and, subsequently, their nationals working for ICEM (agent) in order to be able to support their national interests, especially when the interests of ICEM diverged from those of its member-states. The officials working for the *Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration* did not lose their national political orientation, as noted in the case of other intergovernmental organisations too.⁴⁰ Furthermore, the staff selection based on nationality and not merit was not an ICEM practice, but a general practice for IOs that had to balance the representation between their member-states.⁴¹ The Department of Transport was the key to large sums channelled to the shipping and airline companies doing business with ICEM. If the policy of this Department could be controlled, or even be known before its implementation, the profits for the transport sector and, more widely, for the national economy of each member-state would be positively impacted. The examination of the role, its development, and the work of the Department of Transport gives an opportunity to highlight the conflicting interests of the member-states of ICEM, as they were formed around the transportation of migrants through ICEM.

Sub-Committee on the Coordination of Transport

Since transport was the main service offered by ICEM and, for assorted reasons, one of vital importance for the member-governments, it was considered as the first sector in need of coordination between the ICEM Administration and the member-states. In November 1951, during the Brussels Conference and a few days before the official establishment of PICMME, a *Working Party of Experts on Shipping* was set in order

⁴⁰ Simon Anderfuhren-Biget, Ursula Häfliger and Simon Hug, “The values of staff in international organizations”, in Bob Reinalda (ed.), *op.cit.*, p. 272.

⁴¹ M. Barnett, M. Finnemore, *op.cit.*, p. 8.

to study the transport situation and respond to questions such as the existence of shipping shortage on specific migrant routes, the handover and operation of IRO passenger ships by the new agency, and the establishment of the required infrastructure for the operation of this machinery.⁴²

The Working Party, among others, stated that *close co-operation between countries interested in emigration, immigration and transport is necessary to allow the full use of the existing tonnage available*; and it recommended that *an inter-governmental shipping group consisting of representatives of governments, [...] would meet [...] to ensure co-operation and liaison [...] between governments and commercial shipping interests concerned*.⁴³

This “shipping group” was also foreseen on the Establishing Resolution of the Committee,⁴⁴ and it was finally established as the *Intergovernmental Sub-Committee for the Coordination of Transport*—a technical body, with representatives of each member-government who would advise ICEM on “matters relating to the coordination of transport”. Another important task of the Sub-Committee was to adopt measures for the channelling of the ICEM migrants to regular services and the research of difficulties depriving this population from regular scheduled lines. Furthermore, the Sub-Committee investigated the standards of accommodation of IRO chartered passenger ships as well as the examination of migrants’ air movement.⁴⁵

The Sub-Committee was established as a means to control the ICEM Administration from not taking the migrant business, and therefore the revenue, away from the established regular scheduled sea routes. This was also in conformity with the general United States policy and the Marshall Plan objectives for the strengthening of the private sector and its cooperation with the public sector.

⁴² Members of the Working Party were shipping experts of the Delegations of France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, the United States, experts of the IRO and the *Organisation for the European Economic Cooperation* (OEEC), as well as immigration specialists of Australia and Canada, and an Observer from Norway, see NARA/Conference on Migration, Brussels, Belgium, November 26-Dec. 5, 1951, Migration Conference, Brussels, “Report of the Working Party of Experts on Shipping”, Plenary Session, MCB/7, 30.11.1951.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ AGMFA/Central Service/1952/72/4/1, Migration Conference – Brussels (26 November – 5 December 1951), “Resolution to establish a Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe (Adopted at the 13th Meeting, 5 December 1951)” Annex I, PIC/22.

⁴⁵ NARA/1st Session of the PICMME, Brussels, December 6-8, 1951, PICMME, “Memorandum on the Formation of an Intergovernmental Sub-Committee for the Coordination of Transport”, 1st Session, PIC/5/Rev. 2, 14.12.1951.

With the ratification of the ICEM Constitution, the Sub-Committee took formal status and, in 1954, was renamed the *Sub-Committee on the Coordination of Transport* (SCCT). Participation in the Sub-Committee proceedings was open to all member-governments of ICEM,⁴⁶ and, therefore, their number fluctuated from session to session.

Table 3.4: Member-States and Number of their Delegations' Attendance in ICEM ISCCT/SCCT Meetings, 1952-1980							
Germany	44	South Africa	18	Switzerland	4	Costa Rica	1
Italy	43	Canada	17	Argentina	3	Panama	1
Netherlands	42	Malta	12	Uruguay	3	Paraguay	1
USA	39	Brazil	8	Dominican Republic	2	Scandinavian countries*	1
Australia	35	UK	7	Ecuador	2	Venezuela	1
Greece	30	Israel	4	Honduras	2	Uganda	1
Belgium	30	Nicaragua	4	Rhodesia	2	Denmark	0
France	26	Norway	4	Austria	1	Peru	0
Spain	26	Sweden	4	Colombia	1		
<i>Note:</i> Attendance does not include two sessions in 1963 and one in 1970. <i>Note:</i> Reference to <i>Scandinavian countries</i> and for each of these countries separately is based on the reference made in the sources. <i>Source:</i> See Table 5, Annex: Member-States Participation at the ICEM Sub-Committee on Coordination of Transport Meetings, 1952-1981 (except 1963, 1970).							

More specifically, it seems that the member-governments with a greater share in the ICEM transport business were the more regular participants in SCCT's sessions. Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, USA, Australia, and Greece were the members with more attendances in SCCT's meetings (Table 3.4) and, simultaneously, were the members with the greatest revenue gained from the ICEM transport business.⁴⁷ On the other hand, regarding the chairman—an honorary position—elected during the sessions of the SCCT meetings, France, another country with transport interests in ICEM, was the country elected the most to this post, followed by Italy and Germany.⁴⁸ Thus, participation in SCCT proceedings can be perceived also as a means for the direction and control of the ICEM transport policy by the interested member-states along their

⁴⁶ NARA/ICEM Council and Exec. Com, 1st Session of Council Resolutions Adopted, ICEM, "Resolutions Adopted at the Eighth Session of the Committee (No. 77) and the First Session of the Council (Nos. 78(I) – 94 (I))", MICEM/40/54, see Resolutions No. 81 (I) and No. 82 (I).

⁴⁷ See Tables 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, 5.5, 5.6, and 5.7 here. Germany had accumulated around \$18 million through transport means under its national flag in 1956-1980; Italy \$102 million; the Netherlands \$38 million; the United States \$210 million, Australia \$34 million, and Greece \$27 million. The number of attendances has to be viewed also in relation to the time of membership of each member government since for example, Australia withdrew from ICEM in 1973. For the years of membership and withdrawal of each member-state, see Table 4, Annex.

⁴⁸ France was elected fifteen times, Italy nine, and Germany eight. For more see Table 5, Annex.

wishes; as a consequence, the attraction or retention of the transport-business and its revenue was directed to their national transport-businesses.

However, we need to keep in mind that participation in the ICEM Sessions was, on the one hand, subject to the availability of governmental diplomats appointed in Geneva; the *Permanent Delegations to International Organisations and United Nations in Geneva*, as was termed the Missions of the diplomatic corps in Geneva since 1961, was tasked to organise and coordinate their country's representation in the work of the several international organisations in Geneva. On the other hand, if a country was not represented in Geneva, the travel of governmental or bureaucratic personnel was required. The vast majority of the ICEM member-states had established diplomatic corps in Geneva.⁴⁹ Nevertheless, those who did not could be represented through other friendly states.

The terms of function of the *Sub-Committee* were not prescribed by any Resolution or any other formal document. However, the SCCT was entrusted with the task of studying, commenting, and reporting on the Director's report on transport, which was prepared before each Session. The SCCT's report was then presented by the Executive Committee to the Council and, after discussion, was approved.⁵⁰ The members of SCCT convened twice a year, but from 1961-1962, the need for budget economies initiated a discussion for the reduction of the meetings to one per year,⁵¹ which was finalised in 1970.⁵²

The ICEM Administration, officially, considered the SCCT as one of the "most important bodies" of the Organisation, not only due to the importance that transportation occupied in ICEM's work and budget, but also due to the fact that shipping governmental experts participated in its proceedings.⁵³ Furthermore, the

⁴⁹ It is confirmed from the sources advised the representation of the below countries in Geneva: Argentina, Austria, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Germany, Greece, France, Israel, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, South Africa, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States and of Uruguay. However, the above list does not exclude the diplomatic representation of the rest mentioned countries in Table 3.4 in Geneva.

⁵⁰ IOM-SW/Library, Sub-Committee on Coord. of Transport 1974-1981, "ICM's Transport Policy", s.a. [1981].

⁵¹ IOM-SW/Library, ICEM, "Report of the Fifteenth Session of the Council of the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration", 16th Session, MC/510/Rev.1, 17.04.1962; *ibid.*, ICEM, "Report of the Sub-Committee on the Coordination of Transport", 18th Session, MC/556, 14.11.1962.

⁵² IOM-SW/Library, ICEM Executive Committee, "Report of the Sub-Committee on the Co-ordination of Transport", 33rd Session, MC/984, 24.11.1970.

⁵³ IOM-SW/Library, ICEM, "Report of the Sub-Committee on the Co-ordination of Transport", 21st Session, MC/655, 13.05.1964.

ICEM Administration praised SCCT's "difficult and pivotal" tasks and the importance of its deliberations to the Administration's work.⁵⁴

However, the efficiency of the Sub-Committee and the respect for its work by its member-governments varied throughout the years. Australia, in particular, in 1958, questioned the effectiveness of SCCT, considering it as "an ineffectual body of doubtful value" and "out of touch of the thinking of Member Governments generally".⁵⁵ Delegates from Belgium, Peru, and Denmark, in 1981, argued the need for SCCT to receive a clear definition of functions in order to increase its efficiency, as well as to attract the interest of more delegates.⁵⁶

Even within ICEM, its officials were ambivalent regarding the role and scope of the Sub-Committee. In 1952, before its official establishment, a high-ranking official of PICMME doubted the value of the recommendations of the ISCCT members since it was *made up presumably of shipping experts whose primary interest [...] lie in the field of private commercial shipping enterprise. Consequently, it is unlikely that any recommendations of this Committee can be entirely free from the interests fundamentally represented by its membership*;⁵⁷ this was a clear indication for the prevalence of business interests over migration from certain member-states in their participation in PICMME/ICEM.

From 1966 onwards, the number of member-state representatives at the SCCT meetings fell considerably (Table 4, Annex). As a result, this development increased the doubts within ICEM about the efficiency of this body. In 1981, there were thoughts inside the ICEM Administration proposing the orchestration of "a motion in the Executive Committee to abolish or suspend the meetings of the Subcommittee". It was thought that SCCT had completed its task and that there were no issues to be coordinated in the transport sector, as in the 1950s. An ICEM official attributed the decrease in attendance of its meetings simply to "tradition" and to "loyalty to the organization" from some of its member-states. The suggestion was either the

⁵⁴ IOM-SW/Library, ICEM "Report of the Sub-Committee on the Co-ordination of Transport", 22nd Session, MC/690, 11.11.1964; IOM-SW/Library, ICEM, "Report of the Sub-Committee on the Co-ordination of Transport, 29th Session, MC/887, 26.11.1968.

⁵⁵ Ioannis Limnios-Sekeris, "The Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration and the Transport Business (1952-1960)", in L. Venturas, *op.cit.*, p. 128.

⁵⁶ IOM-SW/Library, ICEM, "Report of the Sub-Committee on the Co-ordination of Transport", 47th Session, MC/1336, 02.07.1981.

⁵⁷ IOM-SW/Registry, ICEM II, 1951-1980, W.A. Wood, Jr., Maj. Genera, Chief, US Office, Migration Committee Washington DC to Hugh Gibson, Director General, Migration Committee Geneva, 15.09.1952.

reconstitution of SCCT and the definition of clear terms of function, or its abolishment and the undertaking of its tasks by the Executive Committee. The ensuing continuance with no change was considered an “embarrassment” for the Organisation.⁵⁸

In sum, the *Sub-Committee on the Coordination of Transport* was firstly a body of ICEM that enabled the member-governments to guard their demand for the use of regular scheduled means of transport and secondly, and more importantly, to guard the direction of the transport business towards the transport means under their national flag. Through the SCCT, the strategies and competing financial and business interests of the ICEM member-states were revealed as well as their effort to defend and preserve their transport interests. The composition of SCCT mainly of governments with maritime interests throughout the period under examination considerably reduced the effectiveness of the Sub-Committee; this occurred at a time when, in the 1960s onwards, the cost of air-transport was very competitive to the cost of sea-transportation. Disregarding its deficiencies, as a technical advisory body of ICEM, the SCCT directed the course of the transport sector of the ICEM between 1952 and 1980.

ICEM, apart from being an organisation that assisted in the handling of part of the population problems of Europe and the Western overseas countries, was also a source for managing and redistributing important funds internationally. Controlling the core of the Organisation’s activities through a few member-states, either by staffing key-Departments and/or influencing the policy-formation of the Organisation, could direct funds towards their likings. Likely tendencies from the ICEM Administration with

⁵⁸ IOM-SW/Genera, Sub-Committee on Coord. of Transport 1974-1981, D. Hunter to G. Maselli, S. Christensen, G. Sliwik, “Future of the Subcommittee on Transport”, 21.10.1981; *ibid.*, S.K. Christensen, G. Sliwik to G. Maselli, “Mr. Hunter’s memo dated 21/10/81 concerning future role of the Sub-Committee on Transport”, 23.10.1981. According to the draft of terms of function of the SCCT, it was recommended (a) to undertake the study of transport matters in the Director’s report, (b) comment on it, and (c) refer it to the Council and Executive Committee; (d) the study and recommendation on specific matters of a transport nature; (e) to advise the Director on transport matters and (f) to provide guidance or recommend on transport matters to the Council, Executive Committee or the Director. The terms suggested did not actually empower the SCCT with tasks it did not exercise before, but it mentioned that it will convene when requested to do so by the other bodies of ICEM. For the draft terms of reference, see IOM-SW/Library, ICEM, “Suggestions on Terms of Reference of the Sub-Committee on the Co-ordination of Transport”, 47th Session, MC/1354, 03.11.1981.

regard to radical reformations in the ICEM proceedings or conduct of business were not welcomed by the member-states and were met with their coordinated opposition. To a significant extent, a system of *informal governance* prevailed in the ICEM proceedings,⁵⁹ since the main decisions were not taken in the main policy-bodies of ICEM, but were a product of ‘behind-the scenes’ private consultations, either between member-states or between the ICEM Administration and certain governments. Lobbying was an important way for both parties to achieve their objectives, also seen in other ICEM proceedings.

Transport assistance for migrants and refugees was incorporated within ICEM’s structures and was followed throughout the lifespan of the Organisation. However, a group of powerful ICEM member states ‘dominated’ over ICEM and controlled the Organisation’s machinery, including the staff of vital Departments. Therefore, said member states could force the Organisation into practices it would not follow if the ICEM Administration could act more independently.⁶⁰ This attitude is widely discernible in the formation and implementation of the transport policy of ICEM, as it will be discussed in the following chapter.

⁵⁹ Randal W. Stone, “Informal Governance in International Organizations: Introduction to the special issue”, *Review of International Organizations*, 8:2 (2013), pp. 121-136.

⁶⁰ M. Barnett, M. Finnemore, *op.cit.*, p. 165.

Chapter 4:

Transport Policy of ICEM

This chapter aims to examine the transport policy of the *Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration*, in an effort to understand how the ICEM ‘apparatus’ operated regarding the sea and air transport, along with the developments noticed that took place throughout the years of its operation. It is argued that ICEM was run as a business-entity, targeting in the lowering of expenses for its funders and producing profits for its partners, among others—a business institution with social character.

The chapter is divided into eight sections. The first section offers an introduction in the conditions of the post-WWII transport sector and in the rationality behind the transport policy of ICEM. It is understood that ICEM worked as a means to fill the gaps in the migrants’ transportation. The formation of the ICEM transport policy and of its Constitution is approached as a way for its member-governments to shield their transport interests by promoting the use of scheduled regular liner shipping and airline companies. The funds of ICEM allocated to the transport sector are perceived as merely a substitution for the diminishing governmental mail sea subsidies and for the funds supporting the ‘nascent’, mainly state-owned, airline companies.

In the second section, the migrant traffic characteristics are discussed, proving that a general transport pattern did not exist from the ICEM side for the several sea and air routes it served. Three principles are identified in the ICEM’s transport policy: a) economy, b) distribution of the traffic work between the member-states, and c) support of the scheduled regular liner shipping and airline companies. The ICEM Administration attributed itself as “neutral broker” and its transport policy to be governed by “free and fair competition”.

The third section analyses the use of the United States reserve military fleet for the emergency transport of migrants and refugees. The financial, operational, and military reasons for the utilisation of such a fleet for ICEM’s disposal by the United States are discussed. In addition, ICEM’s commitment and weakness towards the policies of the United States are revealed, as well as ICEM’s attempt to use the military vessels as an operational experiment and an attempt for the decrease of fare prices.

Section four unfolds the maritime and air transport policy of ICEM, showing clear continuities with the transport policy of IRO, the fleet which stood out as a crucial reason for the establishment of PICMME/ICEM. The provision of statistical data on the modes of transport employed per destination presented in section five reflect the transformation undertaken in the wider transport sector. It is discussed how ICEM was adapted in the transport revolution of the 1960s-1970s.

The advantageous treatment and relationship of ICEM with the transport companies is discussed in the sixth section, under which ICEM enjoyed reduced fares for the migrants and refugees it transported. As one of the greatest single purchasers of transport space, ICEM applied 'average fares', and not the lowest possible it could achieve, as a means for the sustainability of the transport sector and the retention of its interest in ICEM's work. The ICEM's practices for the lowering of the cost of transport are highlighted and the Organisation's business approach in the managing of migrants' transport is revealed. Hence, the policy formation was a procedure requiring the combination of multiple factors in maintaining the balance between all the interested parties.

The seventh section argues that the ICEM transport policy was centralised in its implementation, and tendencies for deviation from the official policy by the country Missions were suppressed. Lastly, section eight concludes the chapter with a question of why ICEM did not acquire its own fleet. It is supported that the plans of ICEM for the purchase of its own means of transport could not be implemented, as the Organisation's relation with the transport sector was not meant to be a competing one, but supportive to its reconstitution; the existence of an ICEM fleet would make its existence unconstitutional.

The Transport Context & the ICEM Policy Framework

Before discussing the transport policy of ICEM, it would be enlightening to understand the transport situation in the early 1950s, when PICMME/ICEM initiated its operations. By 1950, the shipping sector found itself at the crossroad of a new era. The labour-intensive system prior to the Second World War increased the labour-costs in the post-WWII globalised economy, and ship-technology made further steps; that was translated into cargo shipping large-scale transport operations in order to take

advantage of economies of scale, as M. Stopford notes.¹ The sea-transport sector was undergoing changes, as bigger vessels were constructed to serve the needs of dry and liquid cargoes. On the ship passenger front, things remained stagnant after the 1940s. The world shipping tonnage could not completely serve the needs of the increasing passenger traffic, as passenger ships were short of supply. In 1957, for example, according to an ICEM survey, there were less than 300 passenger ships belonging to liner shipping companies of 5,000 gross registered tons and of 100 passenger capacity. Out of these 300, about 100 were not ocean-going, and 60 out of the remaining 200 were permanently used to transfer migrants on the sea routes they already served.² From the 140 remaining passenger ships, 120 were not chartered, 15 were occasionally chartered and 5 were regularly chartered on full-time basis. At the same time, new buildings of passenger ships were not forthcoming before 1961,³ since, in 1956, the shipyards were fully occupied with orders for 3 to 4 years ahead, and the building cost was 400 percent above the 1945 level and 50 percent above the 1952 level.⁴ At the same time, many of the operating vessels were about to be withdrawn from service to become scraps within the near future.

On the other hand, air transport was underdeveloped and, during the first years of the 1950s, was not the most financially favourable solution. However, since the revitalization of international trade was considered an imperative factor for the post-WWII reconstruction, air transport acted as a means for the achievement of such a goal. Thus, military cargo and bomber aircraft were converted to commercial civil service, and, in 1948, there were 83 percent more aircraft in airline use in comparison to 1938; this development was supported also by the increased war aircraft-construction,⁵ as correspondingly happened with the conversion of war-built military vessels to passenger vessels. Moreover, the infrastructure for air transport was under

¹ M. Stopford, *Maritime Economic*, pp. 35, 499.

² Those ships connected the United States with South America, Africa, and the Far East, and Europe with Africa, the Far East, and the Pacific.

³ 100 liners from the 140 were connecting Europe with North and South America (60 and 40 correspondingly), 20 Australia and New Zealand and the 20 last ships were running occasional routes on traffics with the most profits.

⁴ NARA/ICEM, Council Documents, MC/Sixth Session, ICEM, "Report of Task Force on Transport to the Director of the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration, March 1957", 6th Session, MC/233/Rev.1, 10.05.1957; NARA/5th Session of the Council and the Executive Committee of ICEM, Geneva, September 20-October 6, 1956, ICEM, "Report of the Sub-Committee on the Co-ordination of Transport", 5th Session, MC/206, 01.10.1956.

⁵ In 1948 there were 3,646 aircraft, most of them in the United States and Europe. For more see, M. Dierikx, *Clipping the Clouds*, pp. 37-38, 41.

establishment in the early post-WWII years, not only in the form of airport construction, but also on a political level and bilateral and international agreements.⁶

ICEM, from its side, understood that inadequate transport means was translated into prevention of migration for Europeans. This was also one of the reasons for its establishment: to fill the gaps in the transport sector for the migrants who could not migrate without international assistance due to the shipping shortage and lack of resources. To that end, what ICEM had to do in order to implement its programme was not only to rely on the available tonnage, but to retain the available means of transport in its service, to seek the reconversion of passenger ships permitting their migrant use, and to create a new transport business to support its cause. These were some of the considerations that ICEM took into account in the formation of its transport policy.

As it has briefly been mentioned, the transport policy of ICEM was drafted by its Administration. Then, it was discussed by the *Sub-Committee on the Coordination of Transport* and the other instruments of ICEM (partially by the *Sub-Committee on Finance* and, more extensively, by the *Executive Committee*). The Council re-examined the policies recommended, and it decided upon their adoption. Following this, the Department of Transport implemented the policies that were decided. In its formation, the transport policy of the Organisation was affected by three main factors: a) the migration flows, b) the technological developments in transport means and c) the political balances within ICEM.

Regarding the migration flows, the departure or arrival points, as well as the size of each traffic, required different arrangements from the side of the Organisation. For instance, the magnitude of migration to the Federation of Rhodesia & Nyasaland (today's Zambia and Malawi), in comparison to the flows towards Argentina, was significantly lower as a total as well as per voyage. Consequently, short and long distance, as well as small and large flows, were elements of importance in the formation of the transport policy of the Organisation, among other factors.

Additionally, the technological developments in the transport sector were always of vital importance for the volume of migration. In the 20th century, such developments or innovations, as bigger and faster passenger ocean liners were

⁶ For instance, in December 1944 took place the *Convention on International Civil Aviation*; in February 1946 was concluded the Bermuda Agreement; in 1947 the *International Civil Aviation Organisation* (ICAO) was established, and even earlier in September 1919 the *International Air Traffic Association* (IATA), among many others.

adopted or aircraft, and later jets and jumbo-jets, facilitated and considerably increased the migrant flows. These were some of the many factors that the ICEM Administration had to take into consideration in the configuration of its transport policy.

Lastly, the ICEM Administration, in drafting the transport policy, also had to keep in mind the balance between its member-governments, since many of them had interests in the transport businesses under their national flag. Their desire to use specific modes of transport or transport companies for the transfer of their migrants had to be respected by ICEM as well as the balance between the shipping and airline companies. All these factors needed to take into consideration the cost, quality, duration, and safety of the transfer. When these preconditions were not adhered to, friction between the ICEM Administration and the member-states was inevitable, as it will be discussed more extensively in the following three chapters.

On the planning of transport programmes, the ICEM Administration was guided firstly by the provisions of the Constitution which foresaw the use of “normal shipping and air transport services” and “from time to time” the use of “additional transport facilities”.⁷ Additionally, the Resolution No. 99 (II), adopted in 1963, imposed the need for maximum economy in securing transportation, by the right of choice of the migrants between sea and air modes of transport, by the standards of the transport means used and the accommodation offered, and also by the requests of the individual governments.⁸

As it is understood, ICEM was obliged by its Constitution to search for space initially on passenger ships of scheduled regular liner shipping companies and, when such space was not adequate, to charter ships or aircraft for a single or a series of trips exclusively for its migrants. It should be remembered that the Constitution was drafted with the instructions of the United States to best serve mainly its own interests and, regarding the transportation sector, the interests of the most influencing countries as opposed to all member-states. The Constitution was a legally binding document, securing the interests of the most important governments. We need to keep in mind that, in the early 1950s, the government mail sea-subsidies were reduced and the imposition of the use of scheduled regular transport companies by the member-states

⁷ NARA/6th Session of the ICEM, Venice, October 12-21, 1953, ICEM Geneva, “Constitution”, MC/55, November 1953.

⁸ IOM-SW/Library, ICEM, “Report of the Director on Transport”, 12th Session, MC/623, 16.09.1963.

to ICEM was another way to secure funds for the viability of their services; it can be perceived as a mere substitution of subsidies. At the same time—as it will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5—in the 1950s, apart from the case of the United States, the airlines were mainly state-owned businesses which were heavily subsidised. Therefore, the support through ICEM transport funds of this ‘nascent’ means of transport was of great financial, political, and practical importance for some member-states.

ICEM, as one of the largest single purchasers of passenger space on scheduled regular means of transport in the world,⁹ especially during the 1950s, had the power to ensure minimum or reduced rates on the passenger ships and aircraft it used. Furthermore, it had the power to encourage and initiate the establishment of new regular services when they did not exist or were inadequate.

Migrant Traffic Particularities

The migrant traffic presented several difficulties and challenges that the ICEM Administration had to cope with. Firstly, the migrant traffic was one-way traffic and of one-time nature. It was sensitive to seasonal fluctuations and constituted a difficult trade to establish a long-term programme of operations or to benefit from new shipbuilding. Furthermore, the migrant traffic was vulnerable to the competition of other traffics;¹⁰ tourism, for example, produced considerably increased and more sustained profits and allowed more viable planning, as it will be discussed in Chapter 7. In addition, since migration flows and migration policies of the countries were neither stable nor predictable, ICEM was obliged to negotiate short-term contracts with the shipping and airline companies. The contracts were usually signed with charterers and ranged between two and six months.¹¹ Consequently, the shipping and airline companies had a noticeably brief time to develop a decent and adequate return traffic (passenger and/or cargo) and thus offset the costs. All these conditions

⁹ IOM-SW/Registry, 2/1/IMCO/Plans&Liaisons. Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization, Vol. I, E. Bettini, Chief of Department of Plans and Liaison to E.G. Epinat, Deputy Director, “Establishing of Relations with IMCO (Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization)”, 30.05.1958.

¹⁰ IOM-SW/General, Transport General-N.A.C. Accordo, ICEM, “The Work of the Migration Committee”, 16.03.1955.

¹¹ IOM-SW/Registry, 1/1/AUST/Correspondence with Govt – Australia, Vol. III, ICEM Liaison Mission Canberra, “Summary of Discussions Held Between Officials of ICEM and the Department of Immigration in Canberra from 2nd February to 5th February 1959”, n.d.

deprived ICEM from lower fares than the ones achieved, which were upwardly adjusted accordingly.

Apart from the above particularities, each sea and air route had its unique characteristics regarding the means of transport used. In South and Central America, for example, the shipping liner companies serving this sea route were adequate to support the regular passenger traffic as well as the ICEM traffic. Consequently, the use of chartered sea and air transport by ICEM for the exclusive transport of its migrants was not necessary. In South Africa and Rhodesia, ICEM made bookings on shipping and airline companies for small numbers of migrants and chartered aeroplanes for group movements, since the use of passenger ships was not a financially viable solution for the latter group. The movements to the United States were made through bookings on passenger ships of private shipping liner companies. Additionally, ICEM used naval ships from the *US Military Sea Transportation Service* (MSTS) after arrangements were made for time-charter, as will be discussed further below. The use of aeroplanes (scheduled and non-scheduled ones) was the most common means of transport to the United States for ICEM migrants from the middle-1950s on, in contrast to other migrant destinations. The transatlantic air-traffic had developed since 1946 and was generally considered as the most profitable air route for the airlines. For movements to Canada, ICEM usually chose passenger ships of liner shipping companies and chartered passenger ships for its migrants. When ICEM faced space shortages, it chartered aircraft for specialised movements, and it also initiated new regular air service. Canada and Australia were the most difficult sea and air routes served by ICEM. The passenger ships performing in the Australian sea route, in particular, due to the long distance of the voyage from Europe and the comparatively limited revenue for the shipping companies, were insufficient to serve the regular passenger and ICEM traffic combined. Therefore, ICEM chartered ships and aircraft for a series of voyages and flights for its migrants, while ICEM initiated the discussions and efforts for the establishment of new regularly scheduled services from the North and South of Europe.¹²

¹² NARA/ICEM Council Documents, MC/Sixth Session, ICEM, "Report of Task Force on Transport to the Director of the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration, March 1957", 6th Session, MC/233/Rev.1, 10.05.1957. In 1955 in particular the UK passenger shipping lines transferred to Australia 53,000 migrants, the passenger ships used by ICEM 40,000 migrants (with 7 regular ships performing 25 voyages and 6 chartered ships performing 12 voyages), the Italian passenger shipping companies 12,000 migrants, and the Dutch state passenger ships 10,000 migrants.

As it is understood, there was not a specific transport pattern adopted by the ICEM Administration. Its transport workload was adjusted to the characteristics of each route and the existing available means of transport (ship/air, scheduled/chartered) and, certainly, was based on the wishes of the involved member-states. Variations, though, occurred also within a specific route over the years since political balances, business interests, and technological innovations altered the initial established transport patterns.

Three main principles regulated the ICEM transport policy: a) the use of the most economical means of transport, b) the distribution of its traffic between its member-governments, and c) the support of scheduled regular liner shipping and airline companies. All these principles were not necessarily derived from the ICEM Administration's own volition, but some came also from the member-states' imposition.

During the 1950s, when the ICEM Constitution was drafted and came into force, there was no question about what means of transport were the "most economical" for the migrants' transportation. Sea transport means prevailed in the overseas transport towards all destinations for ICEM migrants; at least for the first half of the decade. During the second half of the 1950s and more importantly during the 1960s, the reign of passenger ships was challenged by aeroplanes. By the 1970s, air transport dominated sea transport for ICEM traffic. The transition from sea to air means of transport did not come without changes to the Organisation's policy and in the balance between the member-states and the transport companies; these aspects will be discussed in Chapters 5 and 6. From its side, the ICEM Administration adopted a policy rhetoric of "free and fair competition" under which the most economical service was chosen without flag discrimination.¹³

Regarding the distribution of traffic, the ICEM Administration tried to render transport services to its member-states, as far as possible, in proportion to their contributions to ICEM's Operational and Administrative Budgets; this was conceived as an act of recouping the member-states' financial investment to the Organisation's work.¹⁴ Additionally, ICEM had centred its policy on a fifty-fifty percent share of its

¹³IOM-SW/Registry, ICEM III, 1951-1980, J. Segond, Legal Officer, Department of Personnel and Administrative Services to the Director, 06.11.1959; IOM-SW/Library, ICEM, "Report of the Sub-Committee on the Co-ordination of Transport", 16th Session, MC/524/Rev.1, 10.04.1962.

¹⁴ IOM-SW/Library, ICEM, "Report of the Sub-Committee on the Co-Ordination of Transport", 25th Session, MC/779, 11.05.1966.

total transport (sea and air traffic) between the migrant sending and the receiving country, provided that fares were virtually the same and that the competing transport companies were flying the flag of the ICEM member-states. The fifty-fifty percentage sharing was a policy established in the United States since 1934, and it was termed as “preference” legislation or a policy of “flag discrimination”. In the likelihood that the receiving or the sending country was not an ICEM member, its share was provisioned to be rendered to a transport company within the members of the Organisation.¹⁵

However, ICEM’s binding to the policy of national flag preference and the sharing of the traffic deprived the ICEM Administration from more economical transport solutions. Thus, the policy principles of ICEM were often self-recanted. The ICEM Administration wanted to act as a ‘neutral broker’, but the interests of the ICEM member-states were generally divergent or a peculiarity characterising the migrant transport did not necessarily allow the ICEM Administration to implement its policy.

Military Ships at ICEM’s disposal

PICMME/ICEM started its operations with the ‘dowry’ of the IRO passenger ships, which came at its disposal at the time of its establishment. In many ways, the availability of the IRO passenger ships was also one of the reasons that the post-WWII politicians of the Western bloc sought the successive state in the provision of international assistance to refugees and migrants after the termination of IRO operations. The risk of the IRO passenger ships reverting to their pre-WWII occupation hastened the establishment of PICMME/ICEM. Indeed, this discussion was already on the table since 1950 at the earliest.¹⁶ The United States, since mid-1951, was elaborating the establishment of a new intergovernmental ‘apparatus’ with the view “to avoid a hiatus during which the experienced personnel of the IRO and the control of ships and facilities of the IRO might be lost pending determination of long-range migration policy”. Thus, it was proposed the United States, as the leading

¹⁵ IOM-SW/Library, ICEM, “Report of the Sub-Committee on the Co-Ordination of Transport”, 42nd Session, MC/1226, 20.03.1978. For the 50:50 policy in the US, S.G. Sturmey, *British Shipping and World Competition*, pp. 163, 166-167.

¹⁶ NAA/A1838, 861/8/4, Cable, Department for External Affairs, Canberra to Australian High Commissioner in London, 3540, to Australian Embassy in Paris, 148, to Australian Embassy in Washington, 332, Restricted, 26.07.1950.

post-WWII power, to hasten and call a conference no later than September 1951 in order to secure “the shipping unit of the IRO”.¹⁷

This conference actually took place in December 1951 in Brussels, wherein the PICMME/ICEM was established. Two months later, PICMME was endowed with 10 vessels from the IRO fleet, which had already been converted for migrant use, and was negotiating the chartering of two more passenger ships initially from the IRO fleet.¹⁸

Said IRO fleet that became available to PICMME/ICEM also included military vessels. These vessels belonged to the United States Reserve Fleet that, after WWII, were surplus to military needs. Thus, their employment for other purposes apart from strictly military became possible, since the transport of refugees and displaced persons under IRO began in 1947. More than 420,000 refugees and displaced persons were transported through the US Naval Ships during the IRO period, with most of them originating from Europe and destined to Australia, Canada, Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela, Chile, and Peru.¹⁹

The responsibility for the Reserve Fleet was transferred from the US *Army Transportation Corps* of the Department of the Army and was centralised in 1949 under the unified Department of Defence and, particularly, the Department of Navy and its new authority named *Military Sea Transportation Service (MSTS)*.²⁰ MSTS’ goal was to *provide, under one authority, control, operation and administration of ocean transportations for personnel [...], material [...], mail and other cargo for all agencies or departments of the National Military Establishment [...] and as authorized or directed for other government agencies or departments of the United States subject to established priorities.*²¹

¹⁷ NARA/Records Relating to Migration Matters, 1948-1954, Kotschnig to Hickerson through Sandifer, “International Migration Activities”, 506, Confidential, 12.07.1951.

¹⁸ NAA/A1838, 932/9/1 Part 1, United States, “Mutual Security Act Extension. Staff Memorandum on Migration of Surplus Manpower”, Washington, 20.03.1952. The ships transferred to PICMME were 5 vessels from the US Naval Services of 1222 and 1317 passenger capacity, 3 commercial chartered ships (Castelbianco, Fairsea, and Anna Salen), and 2 more were in negotiations (Nelly and Skaubryn), in NARA/PICMME, 1952, February 18-23, 2nd Session, Geneva, PICMME, “Programme of Operations of the Committee for the Year 1952 (February to December)”, 2nd Session, PIC/26, 15.02.1952.

¹⁹ IOM-SW/General, OPS-20-003/Transport MSTS/ICEM 1952-1953, W.A. Wood Jr., Major General, US Army Retired, Chief, US Office IRO to Robert A. Lovett, Secretary of Defence, Washington, 25.02.1952.

²⁰ Op.cit.

²¹ IOM-SW/General, OPS-20-003/Transport MSTS/ICEM 1952-1953, Secretary of Defence Washington, “Directive: Military Sea Transportation Service”, 02.08.1949.

Five of the vessels belonging to the MSTS fleet were transferred from IRO to PICMME and were initially employed in the North Atlantic Sea routes towards the United States and Canada.²² PICMME and MSTS reached an agreement within few months after the Organisation's establishment,²³ under which PICMME/ICEM could benefit from the use of the military vessels for migrant transfers if no military needs existed. In the event of such, they had to be returned to MSTS. The vessels' service was on a cost-reimbursable basis, and the cost was calculated based on the days of travel of the vessels rather than the number of the migrants carried.²⁴ Therefore, and with regards to cost reduction, ICEM had to ascertain full shipments and the least possible delays for a trip. In addition, the return traffic to Europe was combined with revenue-producing lifts in the instance of students, for example,²⁵ thus lowering the total cost of the operation, as it will be discussed later in this Chapter.

Until 1955, a term in the ICEM-MSTS agreement foresaw that: *ICEM will indemnify and hold harmless the United States Government and the Department of the Navy against all loss, cost, or liability on account of any injury or death to ICEM officials, personnel or migrants, or damage to their property transported by MSTS...* From its side, ICEM asked for the signing of a declaration by each migrant who embarked on these passenger vessels,²⁶ mentioning: *I surrender all rights, claims or demands if any [...] against the United States Government, the Department of the Navy, [...] the vessels involved in the said transportation, their officers and crew, arising out of my death or my injury to my whether mental, physical or otherwise any loss or damage to any personal or other property in my possession or under my control [...] which may arise directly or indirectly from my transportation [...].* At the

²² NARA/PICMME, 1952, Feb. 18-23, 2nd Session, Geneva PICMME, "Programme of Operations of the Committee for the Year 1952 (February to December)", 2nd Session, PIC/26, 15.02.1952.

²³ The conclusion of an agreement and not a contract with MSTS was not accidental. For the Committee officials the agreement was considered a more viable and practical instrument, rather than a Navy-type contract, IOM-SW/General, OPS-20-071/Transport-MSTS-ICEM July-December 1955, E.J. Van Horne, Colonel, US Army Retired to J.J. van Loon, Geneva, 31.08.1955.

²⁴ In 1952 the average daily cost of the vessels' operations was \$5,536; a cost that was adjusted regularly by MSTS and varied based on the operational status of the vessel (carrying migrants, sailing empty, docked). IOM-SW/General, OPS-20-072/Transport MSTs-ICEM, January-June 1955, W.M. Callaghan, Vice Admiral, USN, Department of the Navy, Military Sea Transportation Service, Washington DC to Major General W.A. Wood Jr., Chief, United States Office IRO, MSTs-5/ef, Ser 1951M5, 01.02.1952.

²⁵ NARA/3rd Session of the Council, Geneva, Oct. 17-22, 1955 and the Ex. Comm., October 6-22, 1955, ICEM, "Report of the Director on Transportation", 3rd Session, MC/153, 10.09.1955.

²⁶ IOM-SW/General, OPS-20-072/Transport MSTs-ICEM, January-June 1955, F.C. Denebrink, Vice Admiral, USN, Commander Military Sea Transportation Service, Department of the Navy, Military Sea Transportation Service Washington to Colonel E.J. van Horne, USA (Ret.) Deputy Chief, US Office, ICEM Washington DC, Ser 42M31, 14.06.1955.

same time, the migrants were not covered by any type of insurance while on board ship.²⁷ This was a rather restrictive declaration for the transfer of migrants by vessels that were far from luxurious and not designed for passenger/civil transportation. Nevertheless, the need for the legal fortification of the United States government and authorities, the addressing of urgent transport needs, and the unwillingness of ICEM to jeopardise its relationship with the United States in case of unfortunate events on board, subsequently, compromised migrants' protection. However, since 1956, this practice was discontinued, since ICEM insured the migrants from its expenses²⁸—a responsibility that usually burdened the sea transport companies.

The MSTs ships, as indicated, were chosen only in case of emergency. This was not only due to their excessive cost, but also because ICEM's transport policy dictated a clear preference on scheduled means of transport. Specifically, emergencies were considered a) the increased visa production and the lack of adequate shipping within the period before the visas-expiration, b) the lack of space in shipping liner companies, c) or availability of space in shipping liner companies, but under financially unfavourable fares compared to the MSTs and other passenger vessels chartered by ICEM.²⁹

The ICEM operation of MSTs vessels was expensive. Apart from the cost of transport, ICEM undertook a series of maintenance of the vessels' expenses. Indicatively, after the end of the use of the vessels, ICEM had to pay for their reconversion from passenger to military standards and vice versa when a new emergency arose. Therefore, ICEM had to ensure their continued operation in migration traffic, in order to avoid reconversion expenses. Other expenses undertaken by ICEM were the modifications needed while the vessels were in ICEM use and their obligatory refit at the costly American yards after ninety-days of operations.³⁰ To

²⁷ IOM-SW/Registry, ICEM III, 1951-1980, Captain Francesco Scarfi, "Voyage Report Prepared by Captain Francesco Scarfi Concerning USNS "General Harry Taylor" on its Voyage from Bremerhaven to Halifax to New York and Return from New York to Southampton to Bremerhaven", Rome, 07.08.1952.

²⁸ IOM-SW/General, OPS-20-071/Transport-MSTs-ICEM July-December 1955, J.J. van Loon, Chief, Department of Shipping, ICEM Geneva to L. Mills, C.T. Bowring (Insurance) Ltd, London, 13.09.1955.

²⁹ IOM-SW/Registry, ICEM III, 1951-1980, P. Jacobsen to Maj. Gen. W.A. Wood Jr., Washington DC, 21.08.1952.

³⁰ IOM-SW/General, OPS-20-083/Transport General-US Navy-MSTs-From 1949, G. Krause, Acting Director, Department of Shipping to Director, Migration Committee, "United States Naval Ships in Migration Movements", 08.08.1952; IOM-SW/General, Transport General-N.A.C. Accordo, Deputy Chief, Office of Shipping to Director, Migration Committee, "Nationality of Transports Used by Migration Committee", SC/GK/PD, 22.05.1953. The conversion cost in 1955 for one MSTs vessel was

lower further the operational cost, ICEM adopted the voluntary employment of migrants as naval workers while on board, instead of a professional crew, for menial jobs (work in the cafeteria, dining rooms, kitchen, cleaning, and storeroom). In every voyage, around 75 migrant men, women, and, in some cases, even underage boys were selected for work on board, receiving remuneration for each working day. No insurance covered them in case of a work-accident. Apart from that, all the passengers had to clean their compartments and make their beds; this self-service voyage³¹ was characteristic even for migrant passengers who had financially contributed to their fares.

The selection of migrants as naval workers was a decision from the ICEM Administration. In the case of employment of a US Naval crew, the total crew cost would amount to approximately 50 percent of the total per-day expenses, considering that the vessels under MSTs had larger and better paid crews even from the regular passenger vessels. In addition, the hiring of a naval crew would reduce the space available for migrants.³² The use of MSTs vessels by ICEM raised fundamental concerns, such as the selection of migrants as workers aboard ship, not only from ICEM member-states, but also from the staff on board, who referred to this system as “something unheard of in maritime practice” and of “poor administration”.³³

Other disadvantages of MSTs vessel use were of a more political and business nature, since the member-states of ICEM wanted the largest possible involvement of their transport sector in the ICEM traffic. The Netherlands, Germany, and Italy

\$150,000. IOM-SW/General, OPS-20-072/Transport MSTs-ICEM, January-June 1955, J.J. van Loon, Chief, Dept of Shipping, for the Acting Director, ICEM Geneva to Colonel, E.J. van Horne, ICEM Liaison Mission Washington DC, “United States Refugee Relief Act; Employment of MSTs ships for assisted movements ex Germany and Austria”, 22.03.1955; IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/1/Shipping Policy-Liaison with Washington, Vol. I, J.J. Bratton to J.J. van Loon, Chief, Department of Shipping, “Visit to Washington DC in Connection with Initial Sailing of USNS “Langfitt””, 03.08.1955.

³¹ IOM-SW/Registry, ICEM III, 1951-1980, Captain Francesco Scarfi, “Voyage Report Prepared by Captain Francesco Scarfi Concerning USNS “General Harry Taylor” on its Voyage from Bremerhaven to Halifax to New York and Return from New York to Southampton to Bremerhaven”, Rome 07.08.1952; IOM-SW/General, OPS-20-016/Transport Escort Officers-Voyage Reports 1956-1957, Rodolphe Regamey, Senior Escort Officer, “Voyage Report USNS “General W.C. Langfitt ex Bremerhaven, 02.07.1955”, N. York, 13.07.1955; *ibid.*, Rudolph Regamey, Senior Escort Officer, “Voyage Report USNS “General W.C. Langfitt” Bremerhaven-New York Sept. 14th-Sept. 26th, 1955”, N. York, 27.09.1955.

³² IOM-SW/General, OPS-20-083/Transport General-US Navy-MSTs-From 1949 G. Krause, Acting Director, Department of Shipping to Director, Migration Committee, “United States Naval Ships in Migration Movements”, 08.08.1952; IOM-SW/General, OPS-20-002/Transport ICEM/MSTs, 1957-1958, Earl B. Smith, Director for Transportation and Petroleum Logistics to Francis Case, United States Senate, TF, 12.03.1957.

³³ IOM-SW/General, OPS-20-030/Transport 1956, Mrs. Rieder, Trip Staff to Head, ICEM Washington, File #24, 12.02.1956.

expressed strong reservations by highlighting the lack of standards of comfort, according to reports from government officials who inspected or escorted the migrants on these “very primitive” and “disappointing” vessels. More importantly, it was mentioned that the MSTs vessels “brought about a competition in the transport of migrants” with the national Merchant Marines, considering also that the aforementioned countries had increased shipping interests in the ICEM business. Their reports were considered biased by the ICEM Chief of the Washington D.C. Office, who was a proponent of the MSTs vessels, a retired US military officer, and also previously employed by IRO.³⁴

The belief in the unsuitable conditions on board the MSTs vessels was also shared by the migrants travelling on these ships. Indicative of this is a poem written by a migrant passenger, mocking the disproportionate size of the beds as well as the ignorance of the ICEM Headquarters to the conditions on board.³⁵

Despite the important shipping shortages in the Australian sea routes in 1952, the employment of the MSTs vessels was considered uneconomical, especially in the absence of return traffic.³⁶ Moreover, the living standards on these passenger ships were not sufficient for such a 30-day trip. Disregarding the above considerations, in 1957, the unavailability of transport means for the transfer of approximately 2,950 persons, mainly from Greece, before the end of the Australian fiscal year, along with the closure of Suez Canal and the withdrawal of two passenger ships, caused ICEM to re-examine the utilisation of MSTs vessels in this traffic. Thus, the ICEM Chief of the Department of Operations, who was Australian, proposed the employment of MSTs vessels in the Australian sea routes for this transportation. By acknowledging “the disadvantages of this vessel”, the opinion was justified that “the Greek migrants would be much happier in Australia than sitting around waiting for transportation”.³⁷

³⁴ IOM-SW/Registry, ICEM III, 1951-1980, W.A. Wood Jr., Major General, US Army Retired, Chief, US Office, Migration Committee Washington DC to P. Jacobsen, Deputy Director, 15.08.1952. Regarding the reports, *ibid.*, H. Otto, “Report regarding the inspection of the US MSTs ss. “General Harry Taylor”, 05.07.1952; *ibid.*, Rosenhagen, “Extract of the report on inspection of “General Taylor” in Bremerhaven on June 15, 1952. Annex to letter dated 4 July 1952 which was not enclosed owing to a mistake”, n.d.; *ibid.*, Captain Francesco Scarfi, “Voyage Report Prepared by Captain Francesco Scarfi Concerning USNS “General Harry Taylor” on its Voyage from Bremerhaven to Halifax to New York and Return from New York to Southampton to Bremerhaven”, Rome, 07.08.1952.

³⁵ For the poem, see here Annex, E.J.M., “A Dilemma at Sea, or should the LANGFITT be called TIGHTFITT”.

³⁶ IOM-SW/Registry, ICEM III, 1951-1980, P. Jacobsen to Maj. Gen. W.A. Wood Jr., Washington DC, 21.08.1952.

³⁷ IOM-SW/General, OPS-20-066/Transport-MSTs, A.R. Driver, Chief, Department of Operations to J.J. van Loon, “Langfitt”: Possible use ex Greece to Australia”, 7/40/1, 15.03.1957.

In the meantime, the US government had already proposed the establishment of a migrant shipping service on the Australian sea route, distinct from the normal shipping service, as there were “ships in mothball status” available in the United States; this proposal was initially favoured by the Australian government.³⁸

Irrespective of the fact that the routing of MSTs vessels outside the North Atlantic was not included within their mandate, in 1957, ICEM discussed with the US Maritime Commission the enactment of special legislation in this direction. Australia was a crucial commercial and military partner of the United States, but shipping remained an essential link in the strengthening of their partnership.³⁹ Therefore, the passing of this legislation was achieved and two MSTs vessels were employed on the Australian sea routes in 1957 for one voyage each.⁴⁰

It needs to be clarified, though, that ICEM did not only use military vessels, but also military aircraft from the US *Military Air Transport Service* and the US *Air Evacuation Service* for the transport of migrants suffering from specific diseases. This was the case in mid-1958, when the transfer of refugees from Germany and Austria suffering from tuberculosis had to travel to the United States. The selection of these transport means was based on the fact that the air passage of these migrants should meet particular public health requirements that the private airlines did not meet. Later on, in 1975 and 1976, military airlift was also chosen in the case of the Indochinese refugee crisis.⁴¹

The use of MSTs vessels by ICEM was concentrated in the 1950s. Considering that they transported more than 67,200 migrants and refugees between

³⁸ NAA/A446, 1966/46165, H.J. Grant to Heyes, “ICEM Shipping: Australian Movements”, Confidential, 23.01.1957.

³⁹ NARA/ICEM, Council Documents, MC/Sixth Session (1st copy), ICEM, “Summary Record of the Forty-Ninth Meeting held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva on Tuesday, 9 April 1957, at 10 a.m.”, 6th Session, MC/C/SR/49, 21.05.1957.

⁴⁰ NARA/7th Session of the Council of ICEM, Geneva, October 7-12, 1957, ICEM, Annex, “Report of the Director on Transport covering Performance from 1 March 1957 to 31 August 1957, and Prospects”, MC/259 05.10.1957; NARA/8th Session of the Council of ICEM, Geneva, May 8-14, 1958, ICEM, “Report of the Director on the Work of the Committee for the Year 1957”, 8th Session, MC/283, 06.03.1958. The progressive smoothening of the traffic on the Australian sea routes did not require further employment of MSTs vessels, making a high-ranking US official point out the moral of “crying wolf” for Australia which in early 1957 presented with grave terms its lack of shipping; a request that involved extended work of the US Congressional Committees and of the State Department for their final approval. NAA/A446, 1966/46168, “Brief for Australian Delegation to I.C.E.M. Executive Committee and Council Commencing 26th September 1957 and 7th October 1957 at Palais des Nations, Geneva”, Confidential, Restricted, 20.09.1957.

⁴¹ IOM-SW/General, PRL-20-036/Resettlement in USA 1958, Robert Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary to Neil McElroy, Secretary of Defence, 17.06.1958; IOM-SW/General, OPS-20-043/Transport: World Airways, Cable, GVA to Wash GEWA172, 27.07.1979.

1952 and 1957,⁴² their use seems rather extensive. In the 1960s, the increase in the available passenger shipping tonnage towards all sea routes and the employment of aircraft made the use of MSTs vessels unnecessary and were discontinued.

What were the reasons behind the MSTs employment and the American persistence for the vessels utilisation? Firstly, the availability of these military transport means for ICEM use was advantageous with respect to the American prioritisation for the timely redistribution of part of the European population, which was considered as a response towards stability and prevention of upheavals within the Western Bloc. The use of MSTs's vessels was in line with the interests of the American and Western Bloc defence.

Apart from that, in the 1950s, the MSTs vessels were actively involved in the US wars, such as the Korean War (1950-1953) and the Vietnam War (1955-1975). Transporting migrant-passengers on a specific number of these costly vessels by ICEM preserved their operational status at a time when the Maritime Administration and the Navy were not committed to maintaining the reserve fleet.⁴³ Another financial incentive can be noted, especially if we think of the dramatic increase of the US military budget during the Korean War.⁴⁴ The funding for the MSTs vessels under ICEM use came from the general ICEM operational budget and not the US defence budget, which was a good practice for the decrease of US defence expenses.

From an operational point of view, the vessels stood ready to address urgent military needs by travelling closer to the war-areas, especially when the vessels were employed on the Australian sea routes and, secondarily, to Europe. ICEM member-states disagreed on the use of MSTs vessels; the United States government had the

⁴² IOM-SW/General, OPS-20-094/Transport, P. Jacobsen, "Aid-memoire: Supplementary material", n.d. [03.06.1955]; NARA/3rd Session of the Council, Geneva, Oct. 17–22, 1955 and the Ex. Comm., October 6–22, 1955, ICEM, Annex, "Background Material for the Sub-Committee on the Co-Ordination of Transport", MC/160, 15.10.1955; NARA/4th Session of the Council and the Ex. Comm. of ICEM, Geneva, February 14–26, 1956, ICEM, Annex, "Report of the Director on Transportation Covering Performance from 1 October 1955–31 January 1956 and Prospects for 1956", MC/180, 20.02.1956; NARA/5th Session of the Council and the Ex. Comm. of ICEM, Geneva, September 20–October 6, 1956, ICEM, "Report of the Director on Transport Covering Performance from 1 February 1956–31 August 1956 and Prospects. Working paper on the Sub-Committee on the Co-ordination of Transport", 5th Session, MC/W/39, 24.09.1956; NARA/ICEM, Council Documents, MC/Sixth Session (1st copy), ICEM, Annex I, Appendix 1, "Distribution of Traffic by Flag of Carriers Since 1 February 1952", MC/235, 06.04.1957; NARA/7th Session of the Council of ICEM, Geneva, October 7–12, 1957, ICEM, Annex, "Report of the Director on Transport covering Performance from 1 March, 1957 to 31 August, 1957, and Prospects", MC/259, 05.10.1957.

⁴³ A. Gibson, A. Donovan, *The Abandoned Ocean*, pp.176-181.

⁴⁴ Specifically, the US defence budget increased from \$15.5 billion in August 1950 to \$70 billion in December 1951. In total, in 1952-1953 17.8 percent of the US GNP was directed into defence expenditures, while in 1949 only 4.7 percent. For more, Judt, *Postwar*, pp. 151-152.

opinion that “the proper leverage [should be] applied to the Italian Government with an off-the-record explanation as to why we feel it so highly desirable”, so the desired outcomes could be achieved.⁴⁵ The vivid support of the ICEM Chief of the Washington DC office is not surprising nor his argument with the ICEM Deputy Director on the use of said vessels. The ICEM Chief’s previous appointments as US Army major general and Chief of the IRO Office in Washington DC, which had used MSTs vessels, made him a true advocator for the MSTs vessels within ICEM, as well as for the wishes of the United States government.

The employment of MSTs means of transport deprived the scheduled regular transport means, when available, from further profits. This ‘battle’ was not instigated by the shipping companies themselves, but from their governments, which, at the same time, were owners of sea transport companies, as was the case with Italy and the Netherlands. The main argument against MSTs vessels was the precarious living conditions aboard ship; the use of said vessels in the Australian sea routes in 1957-1958 for the transport of Greek migrants and Hungarian refugees cannot be considered incidental. Southern Europeans and refugees were considered as passengers accustomed to lower living standards; thus, no considerable complaints were forthcoming. Greater opposition could be expected in a likely transfer of Western Europeans by MSTs ships or of migrants from Italy—a country whose maritime flag was well-represented in the Australian sea routes. The lack of insurance for ICEM migrants travelling on MSTs ships conveys ICEM’s commitment to American policies as well as the Organisation’s weakness when facing its most important member-state, the United States; as an international organisation, it could not resist the will of the US with respect to migrants’ safety on board.

The work of inexperienced migrant passengers aboard ship, even underage, without military work authorisation or being enlisted in national seafarer’s records,⁴⁶ reveals ICEM’s eagerness to massively transport the migrants under the minimum possible cost despite having an impact on the viability and welfare of the migrants’ on board. For the rest of the non-working migrants on board, travelling by MSTs vessels did not mean any financial savings in comparison with the passenger ships of liner

⁴⁵ NARA/Records of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs. ICEM 1953-1956, Scott McLeod, Administrator to Clare Booth Luce, American Ambassador Rome, 24.08.1954.

⁴⁶ Before 1978 when the Seaman’s Discharge Book was standardized by the *International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers* (STCW), each country issued its own Seaman’s Books, www.imo.org/en/OurWork/HumanElement/Pages/STCW-Conv-LINK.aspx, retrieved 15.01.2022.

shipping companies used by ICEM. However, they were forced to receive lower-standard transport services requiring making their beds and cleaning their compartments, while in the case of liner shipping companies these tasks would be undertaken by professional stewards.

At the same time, the employment of the MSTs vessels can also be seen as a ‘declaration of independence’ of ICEM from the liner shipping companies.⁴⁷ In the case of Australian sea routes, it can be examined as an operational experiment, since, in 1957, the US government wanted to sell several C-4 type vessels to its allies, as the US had “ships in mothball status”. The replacement of the vessels of liner shipping companies, which demanded fare increases with MSTs vessels in the Australian sea routes, can be conceived as a political manoeuvre from the side of the ICEM Administration, not only an operational response.

Maritime and Air Policy

The ICEM transport programme frequently required the provision of additional space that was offered by the liner shipping companies. When such a need emerged, ICEM chartered passenger vessels for mass migrant movements for a series of voyages between two or more ports, or for a specific period. The chartering of passenger ships was made by the Organisation under a charter agreement, namely the “Bulk Booking Note”, where the whole number of passenger accommodation was made available for ICEM.⁴⁸ Thus, ICEM had to guarantee full, or nearly full, loads at a pre-agreed price, resulting in serious financial losses when this condition was not achieved.⁴⁹

In the mid-1961, a decade after ICEM’s birth and when the overseas traffic had changed considerably, the ICEM Administration renounced the Bulk Booking Note form and was restricted in bulk bookings on scheduled regular liner passenger ships. The reason behind this development was the increase of space on passenger ships of liner shipping companies, the competition of air-traffic, and the wish of

⁴⁷ IOM-SW/General, Transport General-N.A.C. Accordo, G. Krause, Deputy Chief, Department of Shipping, J. Van den Brink, Shipping Operations Officer to Dr. Van Loon, Chief, Department of Shipping, “Report on Mr. Krause’s and Mr. van den Brink’s visit to Genoa, September 9th-12th, 1952, in connection with the establishment of the 3rd class passenger conference Mediterranean-Brazil/La Plata (Accordo)”, 15.09.1952.

⁴⁸ NARA/6th Session of the ICEM, Venice, October 12-21, 1953, ICEM Council, “Progress Report of the Director 1 January to 31 July 1953”, 6th Session, MC/33, 14.09.1953.

⁴⁹ IOM-SW/Library, ICEM, “Report of the Director on Transport”, 8th Session, MC/543, 04.10.1962. Usually, the percentage guaranteed by the Committee was 95.

ICEM member-governments and of its business-partners for greater, if not exclusive, use of liner shipping companies, as the ICEM Constitution dictated. At the same time, the reduction in migrant movements⁵⁰ did not allow ICEM to guarantee full passenger load.

The new method adopted for reservations of space in passenger ships of liner shipping companies, was through the “Letter of Agreement”, which did not specify the number of migrants or rates paid.⁵¹ The Letter of Agreement was not as analytic as the Bulk Booking contracts, but it highlighted the terms of cooperation between the shipping companies and the Organisation.⁵²

In either case of bookings, ICEM had a policy of equitable distribution of its traffic between the liner shipping companies sailing regularly from the same port.⁵³ The same was also pursued by the ICEM Administration for the space allocation between sea and air means of transport. However, it was not always feasible to be achieved, especially after the 1950s when the balance between sea and air means of transport shifted in favour of the latter.

The use of air transport for the movement of migrants and refugees did not appear with the establishment of ICEM. Its ‘predecessor’, IRO, had successfully transported at least 15,383 refugees by air between 1949 and 1952. ICEM took advantage of the flexibility offered through this means of transport in order to transfer 3,793 migrants and refugees within the thirteen months of its establishment.⁵⁴ Comparing the aforementioned number of ICEM air-transferred migrants with the

⁵⁰ IOM-SW/Library, ICEM, “Report of the Director on Transport”, 16th Session, MC/514, 06.03.1962; IOM-SW/Library, ICEM, “Report of the Sub-Committee on the Co-ordination of Transport”, 16th Session, MC/524/Rev.1, 10.04.1962.

⁵¹ IOM-SW/General, OPS-20-104/Shipping General, J. Van den Brink, Chief of Department of Shipping to B.G. Epinat, Acting Director, “Transition from Bulk Booking Note contract to Letter of Agreement”, 08.11.1961.

⁵² For a comparison between the two forms of contracts, see IOM-SW/General, ICEM-Australia I, D.J. Chandris, Deputy Chairman, Greek Australian Line Co. LTD and O. Golbs-Wilms, Chief, Department of Shipping, ICEM Geneva, “Bulk Booking Note”, 27.01.1960 and IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/GRE/Transport Liaison with Greece, vol. III, Antony J. Chandris Chairman, Greek Australian Line SA/ Australia Line SA/ Okeania SA and J. Hübener, Chief, Division of Transport, ICEM, “Letter of Agreement between the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration and the Greek-Australian Line S.A., the Australia Line SA, Piraeus, Okeania SA, Piraeus”, London, 26.11.1964. In sum, the Bulk Booking Notes described in detail the life on board the ship, the ship’s operation and management, and the financial side of the transport (currency, reverberations of default of terms, among others). The Letters of Agreement noticed the execution of the trips based on national laws and described the obligations of each contracting party.

⁵³ IOM-SW/Library, ICEM, “Report of the Sub-Committee on the Co-ordination of Transport”, 18th Session, MC/556, 14.11.1962.

⁵⁴ IOM-SW/General, OPS-20-079/Transport Air/North America, E. J. Van Horne, Colonel, Acting Chief, US Office Washington to J. J. Van Loon, Chief, Office of Shipping, PICMME Geneva, 21.04.1953; *ibid.*, “IRO-ICEM Airlift Program”, n.d.

total air transport traffic on a world-wide basis in 1952, which numbered 39.5 million passengers, it is understood that the ICEM percentage did not follow the transport trends of that time.⁵⁵ Nevertheless, the operating mechanism for the air transport of migrants preceded the Organisation's establishment, and with this foundation, from the 1950s onwards, ICEM progressively improved.

Emulating IRO, ICEM initially chose air transport for its migrants who belonged to vulnerable categories that could not be transferred by sea. Within these categories, single or pregnant women were included as well as unaccompanied children, the elderly, or even urgent cases wherein visa authorisation was due to expire.⁵⁶ However, with the growing prevalence of air transport over sea transport, non-vulnerable categories were increasingly included.

ICEM, from the beginning of its operations, acknowledged the advantages of air transport and tried to include them in its transport programme. More specifically, the irregularities of the migrant traffic correlated with the operational flexibility of aircraft that could easily be redirected or suspended. Aircraft could respond to urgent and timely transfers when required, especially in cases of visa-expiration or towards the last months of the fiscal years in the immigration countries. Furthermore, the migrants could be landed near their final destination,⁵⁷ an advantage not shared by sea transport, in cases where migrants had to be settled more inland.

For the selection of airline companies, ICEM adopted a bidding system whereby the airlines had to bid for a certain number of charter-flights, with ICEM accepting the lowest bid.⁵⁸ However, ICEM's bidding policy presented several restrictions and difficulties in its 'literatim' implementation, which constituted its function as problematic, as it will be discussed in Chapter 5. Regarding the number of seats booked on regular scheduled trips, the ICEM Administration directly contacted

⁵⁵ Dierikx, *op.cit.*, p. 246, Appendix: Air Transport Statistics.

⁵⁶ NARA/PICMME, 1952, February 18-23, 2nd Session, Geneva, PICMME Council, "Programme of Operations of the Committee for the Year (February to December)", 2nd Session, PIC/26, 15.02.1952; IOM-SW/General, OPS-20-079/Transport Air, PICMME, "General instructions No. 16: Migration services movements Control – Air movements", 26.05.1952.

⁵⁷ IOM-SW/Registry, 1/1/ITA/Operations Correspondence with Govt Italy, vol. IV, "The Work and Achievements of the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration. An Example of International Co-operation in Migration, The Origins of ICEM", n.d. [1960].

⁵⁸ IOM-SW/Library, ICEM, "Report of the Sub-Committee on the Co-ordination of Transport", 18th Session, MC/556, 14.11.1962.

the airlines or the designated travel agents based on the arrangements that had preceded the ICEM member-governments.⁵⁹

The ICEM air-contracts were ruled under the terms of the *Letter of Agreement*, which described the management of the trip, the conditions on board, the airline's and ICEM's obligations, financial issues and penalties for the non-abidance of the agreed conditions,⁶⁰ namely the same conditions as the ones governing the normal scheduled air services⁶¹ outside the ICEM traffic jurisdiction.

One difficulty that emerged from the air transport of migrants was the limited luggage allowance permitted on board. In the transfers by sea, ICEM provided between 100 and 150 kilos of luggage allowance for its migrants, free of charge. Regarding aeroplanes, the free luggage allowance was 20 to 30 kilos. ICEM, in order to avoid any discrimination against the air-transferred migrants, contracted freight agencies for the transport of heavy luggage on cargo ships that operated two or three times per month. The unaccompanied luggage was delivered to the migrants after their departure to their new residence,⁶² and delays were always a topic of discomfort.⁶³ This large amount of luggage allowance is indicative of the type of emigration wished to be served through the Organisation. The ICEM Administration, as well as its member-governments, wished and worked on the prospect of a

⁵⁹ IOM-SW/Registry, ICEM III, 1951-1980, "Report on Review of ICEM's Air Transport Position", n.d. [1967]

⁶⁰ Some of the obligations of the carrier were the provision of bus transportation at its expense at origin and destination; ICEM's right to reschedule on seven days' notice; penalties for failure to depart as scheduled or for cancellation. IOM-SW/Registry, 8/2/68/Shipping, British Eagle International Airways Ltd Previously Cunard Eagle Airways LTD, vol. I, E. J. van Horne, Air Transport Section, Dept of Shipping to J.K. Maunder, Sales Manager, Charter, Cunard Eagle Airways Ltd London, "MIEAG 12/1165 ETD 6 June 1962", 29.05.1962.

⁶¹ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/3, Shipping Liaison with Germany, Policy, vol. III, J. van den Brink, Chief of Department of Shipping to H. Heegard, Chief, ICEM Liaison Mission, Bad Godesberg, "Air movements to Australia", 28.06.1961.

⁶² IOM-SW/General, Transport General-NAC Accordo, ICEM Geneva, "Baggage Procedure", General Instruction, Shipping No. 301, 25.05.1954; IOM-SW/Library, ICEM, "Report of the Director on Transport", 20th Session, MC/623, 16.09.1963. Throughout the years the luggage allowance differed. The cost for the transport of unaccompanied baggage to Australia, for example, in 1965 was \$18 per 100 kilos, a cost which was added to the cost of transport. For more, see IOM-SW/Library, ICEM, "Report of the Sub-Committee on the Co-ordination of Transport", 24th Session, MC/744, 02.12.1965. From mid-1973 the free unaccompanied luggage allowance for migrants going to the United States and Canada was discontinued, and the migrants had to bear these charges. The reason behind it was the increased cost of transportation and storage charges involved, IOM-SW/Registry, 8/11/Revolving Fund-Individual Cases/Movements-General Policy, vol. 4, S.K. Christensen, Chief, Department of National Migration and Refugee Assistance, ICEM Geneva to All Voluntary Agencies; Migration Committee Liaison Missions and Offices, "ICEM Standard Fixed Passage Rates for 1972 – Amendment No.23", 29.05.1973.

⁶³ The migrants' belongings arrived even after three months, see IOM-Greece (hereafter IOM-GR)/MC/EX Executive Committee, 41 to 45-46-47 Session", ICEM Ex. Committee, "Report of the Sub-Committee on the Co-Ordination of Transport", 43rd (Special) Session, MC/EX/291, 28.05.1973.

permanent settlement of the population transferred. Therefore, the 100 kilos permitted allowed the migrants to carry their household appliances, their working tools, and nearly all their belongings to their new homelands.

How they moved: modes of transport employed

To what extent were both sea and air transport means utilised? The answer differs depending on the year, as well as on the countries of origin and destination. Between 1952 and 1980, ICEM transported more than 2,760,000 migrants and refugees.⁶⁴ During the first years of the Organisation's operations, the use of shipping was the norm. As it has been mentioned, between February 1952 and March 1953, 3,793 migrants and refugees were transferred by air.⁶⁵ Between 1952 and 1957, 16.5 percent of the total migrants moved under the auspices of ICEM had been transferred by air, specifically, 128,000 people⁶⁶ out of a total of 773,252.⁶⁷ During the 1950s, sea transport means were the most common and economical solution of transport for the migrants. Meanwhile, in the general passenger traffic from 1956, more passengers travelled between the United States and Europe by air rather than by sea; especially from 1957, airlines had also surpassed other land transport means (buses and trains) for domestic travel in the United States.⁶⁸ Despite this increase in air travel in the 1950s, the aviation industry was still under development during these years, especially with regard to long-distance voyages.

Unfortunately, there are no analytical statistics for the 1950s regarding the means of transport employed from and towards the ICEM emigration and immigration countries. However, for the 1960s and 1970s, the data available indicate the transport revolution that took place between these decades as well as of the characteristics of each migrant route.⁶⁹

⁶⁴ See Table 2.3, here.

⁶⁵ IOM-SW/General, OPS-20-079/Transport Air/North America, "IRO-ICEM Airlift Program", [21.04.1953].

⁶⁶ IOM-SW/General, OPS-20-094/Transport, Documentation File No. 14, "Part II: Chapter II, Transport", n.d.

⁶⁷ Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration, *ICEM Handbook*, 1962, p. 44, Table "ICEM movements to Immigration Countries".

⁶⁸ Roger E. Bilstein, "Air Travel and the Traveling Public. The American Experience, 1920-1970", in William F. Trimble (ed.), *From Airships to Airbus. The History of Civil and Commercial Aviation*, vol. 2, *Pioneers and Operations*, Washington, London, 1995, p. 105.

⁶⁹ The year selection for tables 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, 4.6, 4.7 was made based on the available data on the archival records and the retention of the country-categorisation of the original data.

Table 4.1: 1960-1968: Transport Employed by ICEM from Emigration Countries

	Total	Sea	%	Air	%	Rail	%
Austria	48,780	0	0.0	46,753	95.8	2,027	4.2
Belgium	13,298	1,238	9.3	12,053	90.6	7	0.1
France	39,479	25,263	64.0	14,178	35.9	38	0.1
Germany	61,783	31,342	50.7	30,240	48.9	201	0.3
Greece	74,820	47,849	64.0	26,964	36.0	7	0.0
Italy	215,549	159,644	74.1	54,676	25.4	1,229	0.6
Malta	27,424	14,702	53.6	12,722	46.4	0	0.0
Netherlands	53,197	29,792	56.0	23,405	44.0	0	0.0
Spain	79,211	47,393	59.8	31,811	40.2	7	0.0
Other countries	26,010	10,700	41.1	14,593	56.1	717	2.8
Hong Kong	8,150	4,695	57.6	3,453	42.4	2	0.0
Total	647,701	372,618	57.5	270,848	41.8	4,235	0.7

Sources: IOM-SW/Library, ICEM, "Report of the Director on Transport", 16th Session, MC/514, 06.03.1962; *ibid.*, ICEM, "Report of the Director on Transport for the Year 1963", 21st Session, MC/643, 24.03.1964; *ibid.*, ICEM, "Report on Operations: Part III: Transport", 25th Session, MC/771 (Part III), 21.03.1966; *ibid.*, ICEM, "Addendum to Report of the Director on the Work of the Committee for the Year 1966. Report of the Director on Transport for the year 1966", 27th Session, MC/827/Add.1, 13.04.1967; *ibid.*, ICEM, "Addendum to Report of the Director on the Work of the Committee for the Year 1968. Report of the Director on Transport for the year 1968", 30th Session, MC/911/Add.1, 01.04.1969.

Table 4.2: 1960-1968: Transport Employed by ICEM to Immigration Countries

	Total	Sea	%	Air	%	Rail	%
Argentina	14,995	14,488	96.6	507	3.4	0	0
Australia	240,277	163,763	68.2	76,514	31.8	0	0
Brazil	28,910	27,088	93.7	1,822	6.3	0	0
Canada	43,645	22,043	50.5	21,602	49.5	0	0
Chile	2,329	1,596	68.5	733	31.5	0	0
Colombia	3,335	1,819	54.5	1,516	45.5	0	0
Israel	133,229	78,277	58.8	54,952	41.2	0	0
New Zealand	8,455	4,466	52.8	3,989	47.2	0	0
South Africa	31,617	7,516	23.8	24,101	76.2	0	0
USA	87,694	17,750	20.2	69,944	79.8	0	0
Uruguay	3,822	3,766	98.5	56	1.5	0	0
Venezuela	28,155	25,909	92.0	2,246	8.0	0	0
Other overseas	3,619	1,248	34.5	2,363	65.3	8	0.2
Other in Europe	17,621	2,910	16.5	10,484	59.5	4,227	24.0
Total	647,701	372,618	57.5	270,848	41.8	4,235	0.7

Sources: see Table 4.1.

During 1960-1968, 57.5 percent of the ICEM transport programme was executed through sea transport means (Tables 4.1 & 4.2), while 41.8 percent was with aeroplanes. The last percentage is quite impressive if we consider that, between 1952 and 1957, only one-sixth of migrants were transferred by air. Thus, the ICEM Administration, within approximately a decade from its establishment, expanded its transfer options and nearly equally distributed its transport work between both means of transport. This resulted in the alteration of its operational procedures in the management of the migrant voyage and the expansion of the pool of ICEM's partners and, consequently, the establishment of a new market for business.

Impressive percentages for air transportations from countries with no access to the sea (Austria) and countries lacking important maritime tradition, but at the same time owners of airline companies (Belgium and South Africa), are noticed (Tables 4.1 & 4.2). In addition, the percentages noted in the case of the United States, and secondarily of Canada, are indicative of the transformations taking place in the transatlantic transportation in the period.

Specifically, some factors that contributed to the increased use of air transport means were the establishment of the economy fare in 1958 and the amelioration of aircraft technology with the introduction of jet aircraft in 1961-1962. The jet-era saw faster and larger aircraft with increased passenger-capacity; hence, the entire aviation industry 'democratised' itself. Once a luxury means of transport, airlines began to open their business to passengers of not only high incomes. At the same time, a considerable decrease in airfares caused airlines to be able to fill their new jets more easily. Thus, for the first time, air transport means directly competed with sea transport means in some routes that both served. For the ICEM traffic, we notice this competition in the cases of Germany, Malta, Canada, Colombia, and New Zealand (Tables 4.1 & 4.2). The airlines, though, maintained a second non-jet fleet (propeller-driven), which could be employed for non-full fare clientele, including the migrant transport. In addition, decolonisation, withdrawal from Empire possessions, and the establishment of national airlines in the newly independent states made the established airlines of the West adhere to globalisation and to expand their network

towards the North Atlantic, the most lucrative service, as well as between the developed and developing countries.⁷⁰

Nonetheless, the selection between sea and air means of transport within the ICEM traffic was influenced by the geographical position of the countries involved, as well as with the preferences of the countries and the businesses employed in the context of their national economies. Austria, for example, as a country of the European mainland, has no exit to the sea. At least, in the early 20th century, it subsidised the port of Trieste to facilitate the sea transfers of its nationals, but, even under these circumstances, this port did not achieve the same traffic rates as neighbouring ones in Germany and Italy.⁷¹ Likewise, in 1960-1968, the transport of Austrian nationals was made by air to overseas destinations or by rail to Germany and Italy. Italy, Greece, Germany, France, and the Netherlands on the other hand, as countries with important maritime tradition and developed maritime infrastructure, retained increased percentages of transport by sea, but also decent percentages of air transfers (Table 4.1).

On the side of the immigration countries, the relative proximity of Europe to the countries of the North Atlantic, and the increased political support of the United States for air transport, constituted the transatlantic air-crossings as the most preferred way of transport in the 1960s. From the 131,339 migrants/refugees transported by ICEM to the United States and Canada in 1960-1968 (Table 4.2), only one-third of them were transported by sea (39,793) and the rest by air (91,546). It is also necessary to keep in mind that it was a period when the tourist traffic was also gaining momentum in the transatlantic voyage. On the contrary, the long distance between Europe and Australia made sea transport means prevail in the 1960s—a situation that was maintained to a great extent until the following decade.

⁷⁰ M. Dierikx, *Clipping the Clouds...*, pp. 47-48, 60, 70-71; Lyth, Peter J., Marc L. J. Dierikx, "From privilege to popularity. The growth of leisure air travel since 1945", *Journal of Transport History*, 15:2 (1994), pp. 106-107; Peter Lyth and Hans-Liudger Diener, "Introduction", in Hans-Liudger Diener and Peter Lyth (eds), *Flying the Flag. European Commercial Air Transport since 1945*, New York, 1998, pp. 4-5.

⁷¹ Less than 7 percent of Austrian emigrants left through Trieste port in 1907-1912. For more, see Brunnbauer, *op.cit.*, pp. 80-81.

Table 4.3: 1969-1978: Transport Employed by ICEM from Emigration Countries							
	Total	Sea	%	Air	%	Rail/Road	%
Austria	202,675	0	0.0	200,898	99.1	1,777	0.9
Belgium	10,215	13	0.1	9,975	97.7	227	2.2
France	26,278	12,476	47.5	13,782	52.4	20	0.1
Germany	31,333	6,278	20.0	25,055	80.0	0	0.0
Greece	34,146	18,685	54.7	15,461	45.3	0	0.0
Italy	122,958	29,205	23.8	93,097	75.7	656	0.5
Malta	12,835	2,638	20.6	10,197	79.4	0	0.0
Netherlands	12,868	3,667	28.5	9,201	71.5	0	0.0
Spain	64,158	3,616	5.6	60,542	94.4	0	0.0
Other Europe	43,599	4,919	11.3	38,677	88.7	3	0.0
Outside Europe	48,074	339	0.7	47,700	99.2	35	0.1
Far East	130,472	10	0.0	130,462	100	0	0.0
Total	739,611	81,846	11.1	655,047	88.6	2,718	0.4
* From 1977 the Netherlands has been included in the "Other Europe" category. Sources: IOM-SW/Library, ICEM, "Addendum to Report of the Director on the Work of the Committee for the Year 1970. Report of the Director on Transport for the year 1970", 37th (Special) Session, MC/EX/242/Add.1, 17.05.1971; <i>ibid.</i>, ICEM, "Addendum to Report of the Director on the Work of the Committee for the Year 1971. Report of the Director on Transport for the year 1971", 41st (Special) Session, MC/EC/269/Add.1, 25.05.1972; <i>ibid.</i>, ICEM, "Addendum to Report of the Director on the Work of the Committee for the Year 1973. Report of the Director on Transport for the year 1973", 38th Session, MC/1087/Add.1, 26.04.1974; <i>ibid.</i>, ICEM, "Addendum to Report of the Director on the Work of the Committee for the Year 1975. Report on Transport", 40th Session, MC/1157/Add.1, 02.04.1976; <i>ibid.</i>, ICEM, "Addendum to Report of the Director on the Work of ICEM for the Year 1977. Report on Transport", 42nd Session, MC/1225/Add.1, 01.03.1978; <i>ibid.</i>, ICEM, "Addendum to Report of the Director on the Work of ICEM for the Year 1978. Report on Transport", 44th Session, MC/1257/Add.1, 04.04.1979.							

In 1969-1978, the sea transport means were progressively disappearing from ICEM's agenda, acquiring only 11 percent of the total transport work of ICEM (Tables 4.3 & 4.4), in comparison to the percentages of the previous periods of 83.5 percent in 1952-1957 and of 57.5 percent in 1960-1968. Decent percentages in sea transfers were preserved mainly in some maritime countries, like Greece and France, and towards distant overseas immigration countries of the southern hemisphere, where many of them lacked developed airlines.

The employment of air transport for most of the countries of origin and destination approached and, in many cases, exceeded 90 percent in 1969-1978 (Tables 4.3 & 4.4). This achievement is not strange to the wider developments that commenced during this period in the aviation industry. Firstly, the introduction of the so-called 'jumbo-jets' or 'wide-bodied' aircrafts further increased the passenger capacity of commercial aviation, flying faster and twice as many passengers as any previous aeroplane. At the same time, airfares continued their declining trend, and the

aviation industry entered a period of mass movement, heavily benefited also by the increase of tourism, the improvement of living standards, along with the increase of world trade and level of consumption. This upward trend was only temporarily disrupted by the consequences of the 1973 Oil Crisis.⁷²

Table 4.4: 1969-1978: Transport Employed by ICEM to Immigration Countries							
	Total	Sea	%	Air	%	Rail/Road	%
Argentina	4,981	2,854	57.3	2,126	42.7	1	0.0
Australia	120,724	49,720	41.2	71,004	58.8		0.0
Bolivia	1,020	150	14.7	870	85.3		0.0
Brazil	10,983	3,490	31.8	7,482	68.1	11	0.1
Canada	27,139	285	1.1	26,854	98.9		0.0
Central America Panama & Caribbean	5,096	281	5.5	4,807	94.3	8	0.2
Chile	2,819	625	22.2	2,182	77.4	12	0.4
Colombia	3,302	549	16.6	2,753	83.4		0.0
Ecuador	1,494	271	18.1	1,223	81.9		0.0
Europe	76,048	313	0.4	73,052	96.1	2,683	3.5
Israel	189,552	14,830	7.8	174,722	92.2		0.0
New Zealand	2,957	865	29.3	2,092	70.7		0.0
Paraguay	377	99	26.3	277	73.5	1	0.3
Peru	2,088	298	14.3	1,788	85.6	2	0.1
South Africa	28,807	5,535	19.2	23,272	80.8		0.0
Uruguay	332	210	63.3	122	36.7		0.0
USA	247,694	320	0.1	247,374	99.9		0.0
Venezuela	8,250	1,143	13.9	7,107	86.1		0.0
Others non L. America	5,948	8	0.1	5,940	99.9		0.0
Total	739,611	81,846	11.1	655,047	88.6	2,718	0.4
*From 1976 South Africa is included in the category "Outside Europe". Sources: see Table 4.3.							

Simultaneously, the establishment of new airlines, mergers, and the development of independent non-scheduled charter companies increased competition in the aviation industry, and, in 1973, the charter airlines had already achieved a share of 20 percent of the business compared to 2 percent in 1963.⁷³ This competition worked for the benefit of the flying public and, in the case of migration, for the ICEM Administration that could negotiate financially better agreements with the airline companies.

⁷² Kenneth Hudson and Julian Pettifer, *Diamonds in the Sky. A Social History of Air Travel*, London, 1979, pp. 193, 199, 204-207, 233; Dierikx, *op.cit.*, pp. 73-74, 77, 93, 99.

⁷³ Lyth and Dierikx, *op.cit.*, pp. 109-110; Dierikx, *op.cit.*, pp. 91-93; Roger E. Bilstein, "Airlines, Entrepreneurs and Bureaucrats: the American Experience", in Dienel and Lyth (eds), *op.cit.*, p. 246.

Table 4.5: 1979-1980: Transport Employed by ICEM from Emigration Countries							
	Total	Sea	%	Air	%	Rail/Road	%
Austria	31,396	0	0	31,282	99.6	114	0.4
Belgium	2,159	8	0.4	2,151	99.6	0	0.0
France	562	3	0.5	539	95.9	20	3.6
Germany	3,840	16	0.4	3,819	99.5	5	0.1
Greece	5,897	2	0.0	5,895	100	0	0.0
Italy	68,919	63	0.1	68,810	99.8	46	0.1
Malta	467	0	0.0	467	100	0	0.0
Portugal	7,502	10	0.1	7,492	99.9	0	0.0
Spain	9,862	1	0.0	9,861	100	0	0.0
Other Europe	1,241	2	0.2	1,239	99.8	0	0.0
Outside Europe	8,965	2	0.0	8,903	99.3	60	0.7
Far East	398,459	0	0	398,422	100	37	0.0
Total	539,269	107	0.0	538,880	99.9	282	0.1
<i>Sources:</i> IOM-SW/Library, ICEM, “Addendum to Report of the Director on the Work of ICEM for the Year 1979. Report on Transport”, 44th Session, MC/1300/Add.1, 28.03.1980; <i>ibid.</i> , ICEM, “Addendum to Report of the Director on the Work of ICEM For the Year 1980. Report on Transport”, 47th Session, MC/1334/Add.1, 01.04.1981.							

In 1979-1980, those transported by sea (0.02 percent) were fewer even from those transported by rail or road (0.1 percent) (Tables 4.5 and 4.6); this was a complete reversal of the transport realities of ICEM thus far. It was also a period when the total number of migrants and refugees transported by ICEM had also decreased in comparison with the previous years. The vast majority of ICEM migrants and refugees were transported by air and this development continued until the present moment in the transport programme of the Organisation (IOM). This change in transport patterns also resulted in the progressive conversion of the transoceanic passenger vessels into cruise ships—a process that had started from the second half of the 1960s and was completed in the 1970s, as it will be discussed in Chapter 7.

Concomitantly, towards the end of 1978, the aviation industry endured another transformation, this time of a more political nature rather than a technological one. The consequences of the intense competition forced the United States government to deregulate its air transport sector both in domestic and international sectors. This meant that US airlines were not restricted in serving specific air-routes anymore based on governmental authorisation. The airline companies could employ their aircraft in all routes on a competitive basis, while federal control over rates was abolished, and the IATA regulations for restrictive levels of fares were dismantled. Thus, the

American airlines were free to cut their fares further and compete on new routes, which strengthened the US airlines in the competitive international arena.⁷⁴

The European airlines did not remain aloof from these developments and, in July 1979, the European Commission initiated discussions with its member-governments for the deregulation and liberalisation of the aviation industry at the European level. During the 1980s, the developments in the US aviation market dragged the rest of the world into its example, and the withdrawal of the long-established national and transnational regulatory structures was realised.⁷⁵

Table 4.6: 1979-1980: Transport Employed by ICEM to Immigration Countries							
	Total	Sea	%	Air	%	Rail/Road	%
Australia	4,312	0	0.0	4,312	100		0.0
Canada	57,315	0	0.0	57,315	100		0.0
Israel	27,065	0	0.0	27,065	100		0.0
New Zealand	2,715	2	0.1	2,713	99.9		0.0
USA	354,335		0.0	354,335	100		0.0
Europe	79,286	2	0.0	79,099	99.8	185	0.2
Other non L. America	5,191	3	0.1	5,151	99.2	37	0.7
Latin America	9,050	100	1.1	8,890	98.2	60	0.7
Total	539,269	107	0.0	538,880	99.9	282	0.1
<i>Sources:</i> See Table 4.5.							

Table 4.7: 1960-1980: Transport Employed by ICEM						
Total	Sea	%	Air	%	Rail/Road	%
1,926,581	454,571	23.6	1,464,775	76.0	7,235	0.4
<i>Sources:</i> Personal elaboration based on sources of Table 4.1, 4.3, 4.5						

In 1952-1980, more than 2,760,000 migrants and refugees were transported under the auspices of ICEM. From 1952 to 1959, sea transport means were of pivotal importance for the transport programme of ICEM. However, during the rest of the period of the Organisation's operations, ICEM took advantage of the revolution that commenced in the transport sector with the rapid development of the air transport; this development benefited the ICEM Budget, its operational work, its partners, and the migrants and refugees themselves. The results presented in Table 4.7 provide a

⁷⁴ K. Hudson and J. Pettifer, *Diamonds in the Sky*, p. 198; Dierikx, *op.cit.*, pp. 121-122; R. E. Bilstein, "Airlines, Entrepreneurs and Bureaucrats", pp. 227-228, 246.

⁷⁵ Dierikx, *op.cit.*, pp. 111, 122.

clear picture of the developments in the transport sector and how they shaped the migrant/refugee transportation through ICEM.

The ICEM fare policy: cost-reduction & revenue-production practices

ICEM's fare policy was not as flexible as its Administration wished it to be. The policy could not negotiate fares far below the minimum allowed fares established by its member-governments,⁷⁶ or below the rates offered by the various trade associations of which sea transport and airline companies might be members, i.e., shipping Conferences and the *International Air Transport Association* (IATA).

From its side, the ICEM Administration was based on negotiations for "reasonable fares", namely fares lower than the ones available in the free market, but high enough to allow for a margin of profit for the transport companies, especially when the bulk of the traffic was made up by ICEM migrants and was not combined with other passenger traffics (e.g., tourist traffic or general passenger traffic). In this sense, ICEM sought to retain the interest of the transport companies in migrant-business and, hence, to be able to use these means of transport for its purposes. Thus, ICEM did not pay "minimum fares" on the means chosen, but "average fares"—the average of the sum between the three-scale fares available on a passenger ship.⁷⁷

The introduction of tourist class airfare in 1951-1952 and, more importantly, of the economy class in 1958,⁷⁸ along with other factors, made aeroplanes more approachable for ICEM traffic and put its Administration in a more advantageous position when negotiating migrant airfares with the airline companies.

Even so, the ICEM shipping and airline fares were much lower than the ones available in the free market and sometimes even lower than the established migrant fares. For instance, in 1966-1967, the ICEM shipping fares from Spain towards Latin American destinations were 22 percent lower in comparison to the shipping fares for non-assisted migrants, and the ICEM airfares towards Australia were 45 percent lower

⁷⁶ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/30/Liaison with Spain, Vol. II, O. Golbs-Wilms, Chief of Department of Shipping to J. Van den Brink, Acting Deputy Chief, "Shipping rates from Spain to destinations in South America beyond the Panama Canal", 11.12.1959.

⁷⁷ NARA/ICEM Council Documents, MC/Sixth Session, ICEM, "Report of Task Force on Transport to the Director of the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration, March 1957", 6th Session, MC/233/Rev.1, 10.05.1957.

⁷⁸ Peter J. Lyth, Marc L. J. Dierikx, "From privilege to popularity", p. 99; Jenifer van Vleck, *Empire of the Air. Aviation and the American Ascendancy*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, 2013, p. 215.

than those in the free market.⁷⁹ It is indicative that, in 1977, ICEM transferred 58,000 people at a cost of \$14,100,000, while the fares obtained by the ICEM Administration were between 35 percent and 78 percent lower than the free market. If ICEM had been obliged to pay full fares, the total cost for this amount of movement would have been \$32 million,⁸⁰ more than double than what was paid, derived from internationally collected funds.

However, ICEM's consideration was that reduced fares should not mean lower standards of accommodation for migrants or lower standards of transport. A high-ranking official of ICEM noted his worries to the Director that, if ICEM adopted a business-minded approach on its fare policy, namely the lowest possible cost (fares) for the greatest possible profit (amount of migrants transported), the Organisation would lose its humanitarian spirit and "would become a deterrent" to migration "instead of assisting" it, as its mandate dictated. This was because the liner shipping companies, being unable to achieve the revenue expected, would increase the fares of non-ICEM migrants who progressively would not be able to afford the cost of their fares. Thus, he suggested the ICEM fares should not go beyond a minimum limit depriving the passenger ships of profit from their business.⁸¹

The fares of ICEM were formed based on the type of the transport means used,⁸² their standards,⁸³ the voyage distance, and the season of the operational year.⁸⁴ Regarding aeroplanes, additional preconditions were of importance: departure and arrival during workday/weekday or day/night, individual flight or chain flights, number of pick-ups, and number of aircraft seats.⁸⁵ Furthermore, the passenger

⁷⁹ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/SPA/Transport Liaison with Spain, Vol. III, Department of Operations and Transport, "Aide Memoire: Advantages of ICEM's Transport Services", n.d. [1966-1967]

⁸⁰ IOM-SW/Registry 8/1/USA/Transport Liaison with U.S.A., Vol. II, S.K. Christensen, "Note for the Record", 20.07.1978.

⁸¹ IOM-SW/General, Transport General-N.A.C. Accordo, E. Bettini, Department of Plans and Liaison to Director, "ICEM Policy regarding shipping fares", 26.11.1958.

⁸² Ship, aircraft or rail.

⁸³ Classification based on the age of the transport means, speed, and accommodation: Dakota/Jets – ships of A/B category - dormitories/cabin class. Regarding the passenger ship classification, see M. Stopford, *Maritime Economics*, pp. 658-662.

⁸⁴ High or low season. IOM-SW/Registry 8/6/16/Shipping. Technical Data on Passenger Ships, vol. I, N. Kaloyeropoulos, Department of Shipping to O. Golbs-Wilms, Chief of Department, "Ship's rating schedule", 09.02.1960.

⁸⁵ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/SPA/Transport Liaison with Spain, vol. III, E. Jacob, Chief, Department of Transport to G. Gomez de la Serna, Special Representative, ICEM Liaison Mission Madrid, "Movement of Spanish Guest-Workers", 06.03.1972. The time of "buying" space also mattered for the chartering of aircraft. Between October and December, the major tour operators were concluding the charter-flights schedules for the following year and started negotiations with the non-scheduled airlines.

vessels chartered by ICEM were chartered as one-class (third class) ships and the aircraft as economy class.

But what did ICEM do to achieve better fares or to lower the cost of transport? The answer includes assorted options adopted: a) the migrants' contribution to the travel cost, b) collaborations with other agencies, and c) support and development of the return traffic.

Apart from a few cases, the ICEM transport assistance was not free of charge for the migrants, but it was a discounted transfer for the financially underprivileged migrants. This means that the migrants' trip was financed by the member-governments, as well as by pre-payments and reimbursements of the transport cost from the migrants' side. More specifically, the largest sum was contributed a) by the United States on a per capita basis, the main financial supporter of ICEM, b) from the migrants' countries of origin and destination, and c) a percentage was paid by the migrants themselves.⁸⁶ The cost for the migrants fluctuated per year and its amount was related to the annual financial situation of the Organisation. Therefore, when referring to migration through ICEM, we should consider it as subsidised and not free of charge.⁸⁷

As a rule, a sea passage, or a flight, in order to be financially effective, needed to be implemented with its full transport capacity. When ICEM could not ensure the necessary migrants for a chartered trip, it tried to fill the vacancies through other sources and means. One option was through the assistance offered to Voluntary Agencies with which ICEM collaborated. As discussed in Chapter 2, the Voluntary Agencies were non-governmental organisations, usually of religious background,⁸⁸ which assisted categories of migrants who did not fall under the mandate of ICEM. The trip of these migrant categories was not subsidised by any government or ICEM, but they were provided with a loan in case they lacked the full amount to cover their

⁸⁶ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/5/Shipping, Australia Migration, Vol. I, ICEM, "Considerations Submitted by the Director to the Working Group", 14-MIS, 03.12.1956; Ioannis Limnios-Sekeris, «Η Μετανάστευση των Ελλήνων στην Αυστραλία κατά τις Πρώτες Μεταπολεμικές Δεκαετίες», unpublished MA thesis, University of Crete, Rethymno, 2013, pp. 69-70; Giota Tourgeli, Lina Venturas, "Guiding the Migration Apparatus in Peripheral States of the "Free World"", in L. Venturas, *op.cit.*, pp. 250-254.

⁸⁷ Apart from the first months of PICMME/ICEM operation when no charges on migrants were imposed.

⁸⁸ Some of the Voluntary Agencies cooperating with ICEM were the *World Council of Churches*; *International Catholic Migration Commission*; *National Catholic Welfare Conference*; *Secours Catholique*; *National Catholic Welfare Conference*; *Lutheran World Federation*; *Hebrew Aid Migrant Society* (HIAS) – *United HIAS Service*, among many more.

fares. The collaboration between ICEM and the Voluntary Agencies started in 1952, when PICMME/ICEM initiated its operations. The benefits derived from this collaboration for the Voluntary Agencies were that their beneficiaries could secure transportation, especially during periods of scarcity of transport means, and the migrants benefited from the lower prices achieved through the arrangements of ICEM. From its side, ICEM benefited when vacancies were filled on its chartered transport means by loading auxiliary migrants. Furthermore, ICEM increased its total workload considerably and 'secured' the collection of migrant-loans through the network of the Voluntary Agencies in the immigration countries where the migrants settled.⁸⁹

Similar assistance was also offered to self-paying migrants who migrated to overseas countries. Since the findings for appropriate transport means to travel was inadequate, ICEM allocated a certain percentage of the transport means it chartered and availed it to self-payers. The disposal of the space was made through normal commercial channels, and, particularly in Greece, Germany, and Austria, through travel agencies which allocated it to their clients. However, the self-payers did not benefit by the lower fares of ICEM, or any other financial assistance provided to ICEM migrants, but only from the arrangements in finding a passenger ship or aircraft in time. ICEM, though, ensured that the shipping and airline companies would receive their intended profits without additional cost to ICEM. It also kept the travel agencies satisfied; it is important to note, given the fact that the relationship between the travel agencies and ICEM fluctuated over the early years of ICEM's operations, as it will be discussed in Chapter 7. A last benefit was that ICEM ensured the covering of the full passenger capacity of the transport means it chartered, avoiding discrepancies from the agreements it had concluded with the sea transport companies.

The ICEM Administration tried to persuade the Voluntary Agencies to influence the self-payers through their field staff in order to travel under the auspices of ICEM and the Voluntary Agencies.⁹⁰ This attitude reveals an informal competition

⁸⁹ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/2/Shipping – Air, Air Policy, General, vol. III, John J. Bratton, Operations Officer to William P. Hildred, Director General, International Air Transport Association, Canada, 08.08.1958. The amounts loaned to migrants were rarely collected in full. According to a survey, in 1952-1953 and 1954, the repayment amounted to 37 percent. However, the percentage collected varied per destination. More specifically migrants who travelled to the US and Canada were reimbursed up to 80 percent, and 65 percent for those who migrated to Australia. The percentages of repayments from the migrants going to Latin America were much lower.

⁹⁰ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/1/Shipping Policy – Liaison with Washington, Vol. I, E.J. van Horne, Deputy Chief, US Office to Roland Elliott, Director, Immigration Services, Church World Service, 25.04.1956.

of ICEM with firms of the private sector (mainly travel agencies) from which the ICEM Administration hoped to attract the traffic.

Lastly, ICEM, when possible, in some cases, allowed the sea transport companies to sell, in the free market, a percentage of space on the passenger vessels it chartered for the exclusive transportation of its migrants. This worked for the benefit of the passenger shipping companies in order to generate return traffic through tourists.⁹¹ However, this facilitation was only feasible when ICEM did not face travel urgencies with migrants ready for transport.

The key to the viability of the ICEM transport sector was the development of return traffic for the transport means it chartered, at least, in the most vulnerable routes. This was known to ICEM, since IRO was obliged to pay high fares to cover the cost of both legs of a trip. Thus, IRO controlled the embarkations of both the outbound and inbound voyage. With the establishment of PICMME/ICEM, and with the comparative improvement of the tourist traffic, in comparison with the period of 1946-1951 when IRO operated, the Organisation's Administration permitted the sea transport companies to find passengers on the return voyages of the transport means it chartered. This was an arrangement that permitted the participation of ICEM in the profits gained, which made the reduction of the fares for the ICEM migrants possible,⁹² the retention of the interest in the traffic of the shipping liner and airline companies, and the laying of the foundations for the establishment of regular lines. The revenue-sharing agreement regarding the return traffic resulted in the owning transport companies having either a fixed amount per passenger or sharing profits with ICEM.⁹³ The traffic on the return voyage ranged between regular passengers, returning refugees, migrants, troops,⁹⁴ and students participating in exchange

⁹¹ NARA/ICEM, Council Documents, MC/Sixth Session, ICEM, "Report of the Sub-Committee on the Co-Ordination of Transport", 6th Session, MC/235, 06.04.1957; IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/2/Shipping Canada, 1951-1968, P. Jacobsen to C.E.S. Smith, Director of Immigration, Department of Citizenship and Immigration Ottawa, Canada, 27.01.1954.

⁹² IRO's participation in the profits of the return traffic was by direct rebates, by taking 1/12 of each return fare received by the passenger shipping company. IOM-SW/General, Transport General-N.A.C. Accordo, Charters and Block Space Section (SC/PD) to Chief, Office of Shipping, "Control of Return Voyage of Bulk-Booked Ships", 20.05.1953.

⁹³ IOM-SW/General, Transport General-N.A.C. Accordo, ICEM, "The Work of the Migration Committee", 16.03.1955.

⁹⁴ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/28/Shipping Policy - Liaison with Rhodesia/Nyasaland, vol. I, D. Stansby to Director, ICEM Geneva, 15.07.1960; IOM-SW/General, Transport General-N.A.C. Accordo, Van Loon, Chief, Department of Shipping to Acting Director, "Trip to Italy, 23 January-4 February 1955", 07.02.1955. More specifically, French troops were transferred by ICEM vessels from Saigon, among others.

programmes.⁹⁵ When the return traffic was not secured, there was always the possibility for the transport companies to refuse the execution of the ICEM trip.⁹⁶

The development of return traffic for some routes was a process requiring time and money to be invested. Thus, losses from the side of ICEM at its initial stages were inevitable. This concerned mainly the Australian route, when, between 1945 and 1956, more than 1,200,000 people had been settled in Australia, while for the same period, the return traffic did not exceed 500,000 people.⁹⁷ The problems on the Australian sea and air routes remained a persistent concern for ICEM throughout its operations, but the progressive increase of tourist traffic alleviated the scarcity of backhauls.

Nevertheless, ICEM faced different challenges with each means of transport used. Thus, despite the unity of the general transport policy of ICEM, as discussed earlier, the policy adopted for sea and air transport also presented unique characteristics.

Transport Policy Implementation

Much has been said heretofore on the transport policy of the Organisation, but who implemented this policy? As it has been indicated at the beginning of this chapter, ICEM employed a centralised model on the implementation of its transport policy, which was derived from the Department of Transport. The various country Missions of the Organisation were not allowed to proceed to negotiations or bookings with the transport companies locally. All communications, negotiations, agreements, and booking arrangements were made directly from the ICEM Headquarters in Geneva. Only the Hong Kong ICEM Office could make bookings, except from air transport charters,⁹⁸ ICEM Rome was allowed to embark a small percentage of migrants

⁹⁵ IOM-SW/General, OPS-20-072/Transport MSTs-ICEM, January-June 1955, Sherman Adams, Assistant to the President, White House to John E. Bowman, Executive Director, Council on Student Travel, New York, 06.05.1955. A particular trip of students produced for ICEM \$75,000, *ibid.*, J.J. van Loon, Chief, Department of Shipping to P. Jacobsen, Deputy Director, "Fare for MSTs", 09.05.1955.

⁹⁶ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/24/Shipping. Ormos Shipping Co. (Goulandris), vol. I, G. Krause, Acting Chief, Office of Shipping to J.L. Goulandris, Ormos Shipping Company Ltd London, 21.10.1954.

⁹⁷ IOM-SW/Registry, 1/1/CAN/Operations. Corresp. With Govt Canada, vol. I, D. M. Sloan, Secretary, "Minutes of a Meeting between Officials of the Canadian Government, Department of Citizenship and Immigration, the United States Department of State and the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration, held in Ottawa, Thursday and Friday, August 16th and 17th, 1956".

⁹⁸ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/FEA/Transport Liaison with Far East, J. Van den Brink, Chief of Department to A.W. Clabon, Hong Kong, "Supplementary Transportation Needs – Latin America", 8/1/33,

without reference to Geneva,⁹⁹ and the United States ICEM Mission was involved in the calls for bids at the early years of ICEM's operations, which was discontinued in 1958. In general terms, the country Missions were only involved in the provision of booking estimates and migrant reception coordination functions.¹⁰⁰

The reason for such a centralisation was ICEM's need to retain a strong position with the performance of all bookings from Geneva. Thus, it could obtain reduced fares since it negotiated for larger figures, and if shortfalls occurred, it could embark migrants from other countries and avoid cancellations and penalties. Consequently, Geneva had sufficient supervision of all bookings. Moreover, the Headquarters had to keep up with certain rules and agreements with the member-states and to maintain the space allocations and the distribution between various flags and means of transport.¹⁰¹

The country offices were not always obedient to the ICEM Administration's directives. When such diverging tendencies occurred, frictions were noticed between Geneva and the Missions. In 1959, for example, difficulties emerged with the ICEM Madrid Office regarding the bookings requested. Madrid was constantly changing the booking reservations; thus, the ICEM Administration was blamed for "unfairness" from the liner shipping companies.¹⁰² When the Madrid Mission continued making bookings locally, officials from the Headquarters were very critical, conceptualising their role as the "letter box for Madrid" and characterised Madrid's actions of sending bookings for confirmation a "more or less humiliating position" for the Headquarters. The head of the responsible Department advised the Headquarters to take the "matter into their own hands" and conclude with a "speedy decision".¹⁰³

24.01.1961; *ibid.*, J. Van den Brink, Chief of Department of Shipping to A.M. Clabon, Joint Migration Committee/UNHCR Hong Kong, 10.01.1961.

⁹⁹ This exception was possibly made due to the importance of Italy as an emigration country and its ports which constituted transit hubs for the neighbouring countries (Austria and Greece). The leeway permitted was 5-10 percent more or fewer embarkations without Geneva's approval, see IOM-SW/General, OPS-20-095/Transport, Sea Commercial – America/Latin America, J. J. Van Loon, Chief, Office of Shipping to Hugh Gibson, Director, "Report on Trip to Italy, October 23-29, 1953", 31.10.1953.

¹⁰⁰ IOM-SW/Registry 8/1/1/Shipping Policy – Liaison with Washington, vol. I, Marcus Daly to R. L. Beukenkamp, Chief, ICEM Liaison Mission Washington DC, 05.09.1958.

¹⁰¹ IOM-SW/Registry, 1/1/SPA/Liaison with Government – Spain, vol. 13, R. Pointe to Chief, ICEM Liaison Mission Madrid, 20.12.1963.

¹⁰² IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/30/Liaison with Spain, vol. II, J. Van den Brink to A. R. Driver, Chief, Department of Operations and Transport, "Bookings ex Spain", 08.04.1959.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, J. Van den Brink, Department of Operations and Transport to Mr. Driver, "Bookings ex Spain", 21.08.1959.

Aspirations and ambitions from the field staff for greater responsibilities, as well as pressure from the local authorities and stakeholders, but also the migrants themselves for rapid response on their transport needs, drove Missions to deviate from the policies drafted from the ICEM Administration. However, tendencies for steps of flexibility in booking procedures were progressively noticed throughout the decades. The first step towards decentralisation was the permission for some country-Missions to proceed with individual bookings by air transport means with no special approval from Geneva; this type of migration included very few cases, though. Nevertheless, even for these bookings, the selection of liner shipping and airline companies had to be based on rules drafted from the ICEM Administration.¹⁰⁴ This flexibility was extended to all Missions in 1967 and, on the path of decentralisation of the booking operations, it was additionally decided that the Missions could make adjustments on passenger ships and aircraft one week before the departure of the migrants, following HQs' basic allocations.¹⁰⁵

After 1967, the chiefs of ICEM Missions continued claiming steps for the liberalisation of the centralised control on bookings.¹⁰⁶ However, it was considered that the disadvantages of furthering such steps outnumbered the advantages.¹⁰⁷ The climate changed four years later with the succession of the Dutch ICEM Director by an American and, in 1971, several high-ranking officials of the ICEM Administration were in favour of a greater decentralisation of bookings on airlines. This started on a trial-basis for individuals and small groups on scheduled air transport services from Germany to South Africa. Others suggested complete decentralisation for all bookings on airlines, in view of projected economies in communication expenses and rapid

¹⁰⁴ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/3/Transport Liaison with Germany, vol. IV, J. Hübener, Chief of Department of Shipping to S. Christensen, Chief, ICEM Liaison Mission Bad Godesberg, 23.12.1965.

¹⁰⁵ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/Transport. General Policy, vol. IV, G. Maselli to Th. Bakkers, "Decentralization of Booking Operations", 19.06.1967.

¹⁰⁶ IOM-SW/Registry, ICEM V, 1951-1980, W. M. Besterman to the Director, 25.02.1969.

¹⁰⁷ E.g. increased communication expenses between the Missions and Headquarters for the maintenance of overall programme control; pressure from local agents and possible exposure to temptation for ICEM employees; an increase of commercial bookings rather than charters following pressure from Voluntary Agencies; competition for space between Missions; complications for group bookings on commercial flights; additional overall staff costs, for more see IOM-SW/ Registry, ICEM V, 1951-1980, G. Maselli, Assistant Director for Operations to J. F. Thomas, "Transport Meeting", 19.12.1969.

response on emergency cases locally.¹⁰⁸ However, complete liberalisation did not commence, and the HQs retained their centralisation on transport bookings.

An ICEM Fleet?

Considering the substantial number of people annually transported by ICEM, one would naturally speculate: why ICEM did not form its own fleet of passenger ships and aircraft for the transfer of its migrants and refugees instead of depending on the chartering and bookings on scheduled regular means of transport?

The truth is that such a discussion for the purchase of passenger ships and aircraft took place within ICEM twice, but the ideas never came to fruition. In 1955, with an impending withdrawal of passenger ships reaching their age-limit, ICEM contemplated the idea of purchasing C-4 vessels from the United States government at a nominal rent with a loan guaranteed by interested ICEM member-states. This endeavour was named the *Luxemburg C-4 project*. Under this project, the passenger ships were planned to be converted into simple, but comfortable, migrant-passenger vessels and be registered under a non-maritime NATO-flag in order to “prevent national jealousy”. With the continual employment of the vessels, it was foreseen that they would pay off the loans of the purchase. The initial change of the American to another flag would save ICEM from the excessive cost of American crews and American repair yards,¹⁰⁹ as was the norm for the US-flag passenger ships; changing the flag was a business-minded solution and well-established practice in the maritime enterprises. However, legislative complications, among other difficulties, did not allow the project to materialise.

At the same time, in 1955, ICEM was also contemplating the purchase of five to eight aircraft to operate on a yearly basis on round-flights between Europe and Australia: a purchase that would cost between \$2.9 and \$13.8 million, based on the chosen aircraft type.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., Chief, Department of Transport to Director, “Air bookings to South Africa”, 18.05.1971; *ibid.*, S. K. Christensen, Department of National Migration and Refugee Assistance to Director, “Air bookings to South Africa”, 25.05.1971.

¹⁰⁹ IOM-SW/General, OPS-20-012/Transport Risks and Liabilities 1957, J.J. van Loon, Chief, Department of Shipping to Director, “Shipping Points for your Forthcoming Visit to Washington”, 31.08.1955.

¹¹⁰ IOM-SW/General, OPS-20-079/Transport Air, J. J. Van Loon, Department of Shipping to Acting Director, “Purchase of Aircraft”, 07.06.1955.

In 1969, the matter for the purchase of aircraft was deliberated again, but it did not materialise either. There were many reasons behind the reluctance of the Organisation. Firstly, its fleet of aircraft would be technologically obsolete after years of employment, not only in cabin-comfort, but also in matters of safety, as it was a time when technological developments in the aviation industry were rapid. Therefore, this large investment would lose its value in the short-term. Furthermore, while the construction of an aircraft required one year, the training of captains required about ten years. Considering that each aircraft needed five captains in order to be fully operational, the cost involved to build such an infrastructure would have been greater than potential profit for ICEM. Additionally, there was a need for training facilities for the rest of the crew and a need for a reserve-crew to be spread over various airports. What is more, restrictions in the aviation industry would deny ICEM the possibility to operate flights “against remuneration”, but only for its “own use”, namely the transfer of its migrants. This would have resulted in the aircraft returning empty to Europe, whereas through chartering, important revenue could be produced from this traffic, as it has been mentioned earlier. However, what had the most impact on ICEM’s decision was the unanimous opposition and protest that was expected from the side of the airline companies if ICEM endeavoured to “intrude into the private commercial air travel market”; such action would be seconded by the ICEM member-states, which were the absolute or main stakeholders of the airlines flying the national flag in Europe. Many of the airline business-partners of ICEM were either maintaining a second fleet for the ICEM business, which would become redundant if not used for such a purpose, while other airlines with no surplus fleet relied on ICEM business for a firm annual income. If ICEM owned a fleet, its relations with the airlines would have been disrupted. Meanwhile, ICEM would have been in need of the facilities and services of the airlines for the training of its crew and the maintenance of its fleet. Under these conditions, the cost for ICEM would result in “sky-high” prices.¹¹¹

After all, the *Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration* was established to support and strengthen the scheduled regular lines and not to inaugurate a parallel service in competition with the existing ones, as it has been supported earlier. ICEM’s role was different from its predecessors, namely IRO, which was

¹¹¹ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/2/Transport. Air Policy-General, vol. VI, E. Jacob, Department of Transport to John F. Thomas, “Purchase or Lease of Aircraft by ICEM”, 30.09.1969.

established to respond to the emergent resettlement of the refugee population in Europe. From ICEM's establishment, it was expected to continue alleviating communist tendencies in countries of the Western Bloc as well as enhance private and commercial interests. Thus, the plans for the purchase of ICEM's own means of transport could never be materialised and were confined to academic conversations within the ICEM Administration. The Organisation's partners were awaiting ICEM to fulfil its Constitutional promise; such a promise would translate into profits for the transport businesses and the member-states' national economies.

As it was discussed in this chapter, ICEM, in its initial steps after its establishment, benefited from the organisational structure of IRO in transport related issues. Apart from the passenger vessels it 'inherited', ICEM was based on the contracting methods of IRO in order to develop its own policies and procedures for the selection of its business partners. The ICEM Administration ran the Organisation as a business-entity with a social character by trying to affect economies through its policy for the internationally collected funds it managed, but also, at the same time, by making room for profits for the benefit of its transport-partners. It also endeavoured to remain in line with the technological developments in the transport sector, both for the optimal execution of its transport programme as well as for the response to the needs of its member-states. However, in the selection of the transport means for ICEM use, not only operational and financial indicators were considered, but also political ones. Those reasons, in many cases, prevailed over the operational and financial ones and subverted the ICEM policies; this will be the topic of the following chapter.

Chapter 5:

ICEM, State Migration Policies and Transport: deviating from the rules for the sake of profit

With the knowledge of the official transport policy of ICEM, as discussed in Chapter 5, the goal of this chapter is to analyse the distance of this policy from its actual implementation. The incentives of the governments' participation in ICEM are discussed, their willingness to participate in the ICEM migrant transport work, and their intervention in the implementation of ICEM's official transport policy in support of their transport companies. ICEM is recognised as a state-led organisation, maintaining a 'client'-oriented approach in the commencement of its business, capable of bypassing its formal transport policy in order to serve the interests of important member-states.

The establishment of an international intergovernmental organisation is a collective endeavour of governments in order to be assisted in matters requiring coordination and action at an international and/or regional level. Therefore, the governments that founded the international intergovernmental organisations expect them to act based on the mandate and regulations agreed upon with the rest participating member-states. The organisations under the United Nations system, apart from the wishes of their member-states, ought to operate based on the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* principles. The *Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration* (ICEM) though, as an organisation established outside of the United Nations system, was endowed with operational powers, not humanitarian ones, towards the population it was assisting. Therefore, ICEM was only liable to its member-states, and not to any binding human rights treaty.¹ It was a state-led organisation, foremost responsible for its member-states, rather than the migrants and refugees.² Thus, ICEM mainly had to implement the wishes of its member-states, which were its 'clients', if we want to refer to commercial terms, namely those who established, funded, and retained ICEM functional; said member-states were given priority rather than the population of migrants and refugees transported under ICEM auspices that the Organisation was asked to serve.

¹ Martin Geiger and Antoine Pécoud, "The Politics of International Migration Management", in Martin Geiger and Antoine Pécoud (eds), *The Politics of International Migration Management*, New York, 2010, pp. 13-14.

² Bradley, *op.cit.*, p. 25. A different view from Geiger's and Pécoud's, *op.cit.*, on IOM (successor of ICEM) and its current respect for humanitarian principles is offered by Bradley, see *ibid.*, pp. 17-28.

Under these circumstances, it is understood that in order for the Organisation to continue to be operational, its member-states should be pleased by the services offered. Therefore, the ICEM Administration tried to adopt a client-oriented approach to the commencement of its business. This approach had repercussions in ICEM's function, since the wishes of its member-states did not conform to the formal policy and procedures of the Organisation and, more specifically, to its transport policy. From their side, the member-states had their own agenda and goals to fulfil through their participation in ICEM, which were not necessarily governed by humanitarian incentives. How these relations and wishes developed will be revealed in the following pages.

The chapter is divided into four sections. The first section discusses the distribution of the transport funds to the state and private transport companies. The policies of the ICEM member-states are examined in their effort to attract the largest possible share of the transport funds for their state and private-owned transport companies. A parallel system for the deviation and ineffectiveness of the ICEM transport policy is recognised. The conclusion of binding agreements between ICEM and certain member-states gives the impression of a shifting of ICEM's actual work from the transportation of migrants to the funding of transport companies. It is proved that the ICEM transport partners were often selected based on leverage, influence, and negotiation power of each member-state rather than being based on the Organisation's transport official policy rhetoric.

Considering that different business interests applied from each member-state, the second section examines the conflicts that arose between the member-states. Three main subjects of confrontation are distinguished: a) the use of passenger ships of liner shipping companies and passenger aeroplanes over the ships and aeroplanes chartered by ICEM, b) the use of shipping over airline services and, finally, c) matters related to the safety at sea and in the air. The selection of transport means by the side of ICEM is recognised as a political and financial decision rather than operational. In addition, ICEM's *humanitarian entrepreneurialism* is highlighted through its attempt to establish an international system for the inspection of passenger vessels transporting migrants. The Organisation identified this gap in the international system and endeavoured to rectify it. Through these debates, the formation of groups within the ICEM member-states stands out, as well as the policy of the ICEM Administration in support of its interests and maintenance of its work.

The third section is based on the examination of the policies of four ICEM member-states (Belgium, Greece, Brazil, and Australia), in support of the transport companies under their national flag. It is argued that politics and business went hand-in-hand in migration through ICEM, since a close partnership was maintained between the governments and the state/private-owned transport companies. It is thus shown that the real governance in transport policy through ICEM resided foremost with the transport companies, as expressed through the member-governments and secondarily with the ICEM Administration policy planning.

The last section of the chapter observes a system of *clientelism* within ICEM, where the satisfaction of favours towards member-states was followed by expectations for political objectives for the ICEM Administration. ICEM's effort to avoid a likely weakening of its role in the eyes of its member-states, or even their withdrawal from the Organisation, also reveals ICEM's characteristic of *humanitarian entrepreneurialism*, under which the Organisation's survival depended on identifying gaps in the migration systems and filling them with services.

A Remunerating Business: State policies in the accumulation of revenue from ICEM transport programme

As explained in Chapter 4, when a group of migrants was ready for transport, the ICEM Administration chartered whole passenger vessels or aircraft for a trip or a series of trips/flights, or bulk booked space in scheduled liner passenger ships serving specific routes. The ICEM Administration had been requested by its member-states to channel the population transferred to regular liner shipping and airline companies and only when the existing regular transport services were not sufficient to proceed with the chartering of transport means exclusively for ICEM migrants. This was a way to support the sustainability of the existing sea/air routes through the internationally collected funds that ICEM managed.

To offer a better understanding of the revenue in question, Table 5.1 provides us with what was at stake.

Table 5.1: Amounts Paid by ICEM per Mode of Transport, 1956-1980					
Year	Sea & Rail		Air		Total
	Amount US \$	%	Amount US \$	%	Amount US \$
1956					27,381,473
1957					33,183,426
1958, Jan-Jun					8,251,412
1959	19,956,597	86.2	3,193,406	13.8	23,150,003
1956-59	19,956,597		3,193,406		91,966,314
1960	17,054,863	77.2	5,049,632	22.8	22,104,495
1961	12,351,065	73.4	4,475,776	26.6	16,826,841
1962, Jan-Jun	4,676,741	69.6	2,042,907	30.4	6,719,647
1963	8,454,004	65.1	4,531,269	34.9	12,985,273
1964	9,234,660	63.3	5,362,006	36.7	14,596,665
1965	8,471,026	61.0	5,426,628	39.1	13,897,654
1966	6,146,474	53.2	5,403,757	46.8	11,550,231
1967	4,635,547	43.9	5,918,738	56.1	10,554,286
1968	6,652,136	43.3	8,698,380	56.7	15,350,516
1969	6,998,250	38.7	11,077,374	61.3	18,075,623
1960-69	84,674,766	59.4	57,986,466	40.7	142,661,233
1970	5,966,332	35.5	10,864,864	64.6	16,831,196
1971	4,403,102	31.6	9,518,958	68.4	13,922,060
1972	2,536,232	20.5	9,867,423	79.9	12,403,655
1973	904,371	8.2	10,073,819	91.8	10,978,190
1974	439,247	3.9	10,739,530	96.1	11,178,777
1975	368,389	2.5	14,436,668	97.5	14,805,057
1976	254,865	1.5	16,437,184	98.5	16,692,049
1977	125,504	0.9	13,976,488	99.1	14,101,992
1978	35,055	0.1	25,114,372	99.9	25,149,427
1979	24,169	0.0	91,786,155	100	91,810,324
1970-79	15,057,266	6.6	212,815,461	93.4	227,872,727
1980	2,943	0.0	125,630,256	100	125,633,198
1956-80					588,133,472
1959-80	119,691,572	23.1	399,625,589	77.0	519,317,161
<i>Note: For the years 1958 and 1962 there were no available statistics for the period of July until December in the sources advised. However, this lack does not considerably alter the total outcome.</i>					
<i>Sources: See sources in Tables 5.4, 5.5, 5.6, and 5.7 below.</i>					

What we can glean from the data in Table 5.1 is that within twenty-four years, when available statistics existed, ICEM distributed more than half a billion dollars to the transport companies, presenting a steadily increasing transport budget per decade of operations. It is remarkable that, between the 1960s and the 1970s, the cost of transport nearly doubled, while within one year, in 1980, when the outburst of Indochinese refugee movements culminated, the annual cost of transport nearly touched the cost of the whole decade of 1960. The fluctuations in the revenue earned by the means of transport used by ICEM is also noteworthy. Until 1966, the surface means, predominantly the shipping companies, excelled in the transport work of ICEM, while

aeroplanes accumulated a steadily increasing sum of money. Thereafter, the wider technological developments in the aviation industry favoured the progressive replacement of passenger vessels by aeroplanes as the main means of transport for the ICEM migrants, especially in the 1970s; this also directed the related ICEM funds towards the airline companies.

Regarding the sums distributed through ICEM, the member-states wanted to attract the largest possible share of the Organisation's traffic and funds for the transport companies operating under their national flag or, in general, for the benefit of their national Treasuries. The benefits from the attraction of this business were multiple, not only the maintenance and potentially the strengthening of the viability of the transport companies, but also the support of their national transport infrastructure (ports, airports) with the payment of the relative fees and in-port/airport services (towing, landing right fees, among others), and the strengthening of their wider national economy (inland transportation to reach the ports/airports, shops and restaurants around the ports, hotels for short-term stay before departure, employment opportunities and taxes collected through these services).

These sums of money were important incentives in themselves for the member-states to exert pressure on the ICEM Administration for favourable treatment and selection of their state-owned and private-owned transport companies in the transport of the ICEM migrants. Especially in the early formative years for the Organisation, the conclusion of binding agreements with important member-states committed the ICEM Administration in the selection of its business partners.

Indications for a pre-arrangement of the financial benefits derived from the Organisation's operations between certain member-states was offered in a speech by the Italian General Director of Emigration, who, in 1955, during an official visit in Rome of the ICEM Director, mentioned: "When ICEM was created it was agreed that Italy should receive 38% of the financial benefits made available to the organization, Germany another 38% and the Netherlands, Austria and Greece together the remaining 24%". He explained, though, that these percentages were not materialised, due to lower German, Dutch, and Austrian migrations to overseas, as opposed to the increasing needs of Italy which received "benefits which are considerably inferior to those indicated in

the 38%”.³ Italy, until the 1960s, was always receiving more than 30 percent of the total revenue from ICEM’s transport payments (Tables 5.2, 5.4, 5.5). What is important to deduce from this statement is the predetermination of the distribution of ICEM’s funds to a few countries, which were not based on the offers they submitted for the winning of an ICEM transport contract. Fundamentally, the perception and the shifting of the ICEM’s actual work from the transportation of migrants to the funding of transport companies should be noted.

This is also the reason that the integrity of ICEM’s formal policy was questioned even by its staff. In 1953, an ICEM official characterised the Organisation’s transport policy as “empty fiction”,⁴ since he recognised that the ICEM Administration did not have full control over the selection of the transport companies with which they would cooperate. The ICEM Administration wanted to act as “neutral broker”⁵ in the planning of its transport programme, namely, to collect the offers from the interested transport companies in the ICEM’s transport work and subsequently, based on their offers, choose its business partner. However, in practice, the choice of flag was not entirely free.⁶ Many ICEM member-states had established protective regulations or even legislation regarding the use of their transport means, thus bypassing the ICEM transport policy.

The ICEM Director himself, in 1961, admitted that the policy rhetoric of “free competition”, as explained in Chapter 4 and always advertised by his Administration, was difficult to achieve due to the fact that “certain agreements [were] drawn up in the early days of ICEM”.⁷ This was a direct acceptance, at the highest level of the ICEM hierarchy, for the existence of a parallel system next to the official ICEM transport policy ‘assisting’ in its deviation and ineffectiveness. Apparently, not all member-states had the power to conclude such agreements for their benefit. Certain countries had

³ IOM-SW/Registry, 1/1/ITA/ICEM Correspondence with Govt Italy, Vol. II, “Statement Read by Ambassador Mascia, General Director of Emigration, on 8 June 1955, at an Official Meeting During Mr. Tittmann’s Visit in Rome”, n.d.

⁴ IOM-SW/General, OPS-20-079/Transport Air/North America, E.J. Van Horne, Acting Chief, US Office Washington to George L. Warren, Adviser on Refugees and DPs Department of State, Washington, DC, 20.05.1953.

⁵ IOM-SW/Library, ICEM, “Report of the Director on Transport”, 20th Session, MC/623, 16.09.1963

⁶ IOM-SW/General, ICEM III, 1951-1980, J. J. Van Loon, Chief, Office of Shipping to Hugh Gibson, Director, “Analysis of Shipping Activities, Migration Committee for Eprio 1 February, 1952 to 30 June, 1953”, 12.08.1953.

⁷ IOM-SW/General, SIT-00-054/Reports. Trip Reports. Reports from the Missions-Countries/UK, E.K. Rahardt, “Memorandum for the File: Report on courtesy visit to the United Kingdom Government June 26 and 27”, 03.07.1961.

increased negotiation power in ICEM's work; said power derived from their political and financial role within and outside the Organisation.

More specifically, regarding the restrictive policies adopted by the ICEM member-states, the United States had enacted the exclusive use of American means of transport for migrants/refugees moving under certain schemes into its territory since the early 1950s.⁸ In the 1960s, when the aforementioned laws and refugee schemes were completed, the United States came to an understanding with the ICEM Administration that 75-80 percent of the total traffic between Europe and the United States would be undertaken by US transport companies.⁹

Italy's post-WWII priority was the reconstitution of its merchant fleet. The Italian state heavily financed state and private shipping companies by subsidies or loans, thus assisting in the revitalisation of Italian emigration and in the promotion of the foreign exports and tourism. The ultimate goal was the increase of foreign currency towards the country's Treasury.¹⁰ In this context, Italy established a protectionist maritime policy for its merchant fleet. Firstly, Italy agreed with ICEM on the priority of the Italian regular liner passenger shipping companies over the foreign ones.¹¹ In order to support its mercantile marine and protect its maritime interests, the Italian government consistently denied the transfer of its migrants by air.¹² In the 1950s, the Italian airlines (*Alitalia* and *LAI*) were not engaged in migration transport and sea movements remained the priority. Nevertheless, in 1956, the Italian government and ICEM concluded an agreement on the conditions for air movements, which granted

⁸ NARA/5th Session of the ICEM Geneva, April 16-24, 1953, ICEM, "Report of the Director to Date and Prospects for 1953", 5th Session, MC/9/Rev.1, 28.04.1953; IOM-SW/Registry, 1/1/NETH/Operations. Correspondence with Govt-Netherlands, Vol. II, B.G. Epinat to Mr. J.A.U.M. van Grevenstein, Director of Emigration Services, Ministry of Social Affairs and Public Health, the Hague, "ICEM/Netherlands Agreement, 1958 and 1959", 1/1/NETH, 16.01.1959. These specific programmes were the *Displaced Persons Act* and the *Refugee Relief Act* of 1953 which provisioned that the refugees transported to the United States under these laws and with the partial or complete expenses of the US, should be carried by transport means registered under the US flag, if available. The same applied also under the ESCAPEE Programme, the Public Law 85-316, and several others. IOM-SW/Registry, 8/2/5/Transports, Sabena Airlines, Vol. I, P. Jacobsen to J. Desy, Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et du Commerce Extérieur Bruxelles, 22.05.1954.

⁹ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/USA/Transport Liaison with U.S.A., Vol. II, Eric M. Hughes, Senior Migration Officer, Department of State to J. Van den Brink, Chief, Dept. Of Shipping, ICEM Geneva 17.01.1962; *ibid.*, J. Van den Brink to Eric M. Hughes, Migration Officer, The Secretary of State, Washington DC, SHP/62/1/29, 29.01.1962.

¹⁰ Roberto Giulianelli, "Ship financing in Italy in the first half of the twentieth century", *International Journal of Maritime History*, 28:2 (2016), pp. 348-355.

¹¹ IOM-SW/General, OPS-20-103/Shipping General Special, A.F. Schnitzer, Acting General Counsel to Dr. Krause, Shipping Division, "Agreements", 23.09.1952.

¹² IOM-SW/General, OPS-20-079/Transport Air, L. Armanino to J.J. van Loon, "Voyage Report on Trip to Rome and Milan 30 September/4 October 1954", 07.10.1954.

priority to Italian airline companies, secondarily to foreign ones with regular air transport services in Italy, and thirdly to other foreign airline companies selected after a bidding procedure.¹³ If these preconditions were not fulfilled, Italy refused landing rights to the ICEM charter-flights.¹⁴

Table 5.2: Flag Distribution for ICEM migrant movements by sea, 01.02.1952- 31.01.1956

Flag	%
Italy	31.2
Panama	19.4
US	13.3
Sweden	6.8
Argentina	7.0
France	5.9
Norway	5.1
Netherlands	4.9
Greece	3.9
Canada	1.6
Others	0.9
Total	100

Sources: NARA/4th Session of the Council and the Executive Committee of ICEM, Geneva, February 14-26, 1956, ICEM, “Annex, “Report of the Director on Transportation Covering Performance from 1 October 1955-31 January 1956 and Prospects for 1956”, MC/180, 20.02.1956.

Table 5.3: Flag Distribution for ICEM migrant movements by air, 01.02.1952- Sept. 1955

Flag	%
USA	73.2
Netherlands	19.5
Scandinavia	3.1
Belgium	3.0
Others	1.2
Total	100

Sources: See Table 5.2

Lastly, the Dutch government, apart from the first two years of the Organisation’s operation,¹⁵ maintained an adequate fleet of passenger vessels and aircraft under its possession or charter; thus, the Government acted as booking agent for the needs of ICEM traffic. Therefore, the exclusive use of the Dutch fleet for the transport of its

¹³ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/2/ITA/Shipping-Air, Air Policy–Italy, Vol. I, Federico Pescatori, Italian Government, P. Jacobsen, ICEM, “Agreement of the Conditions for Flights of the Migration Committee with Italian Migrants”, HQ 3079, SHP 322, 05.04.1956; *ibid.*, Ministero Degli Affari Esteri, Roma to Missione di Collegamento, CIME Roma, “Memorandum”, 64/27340/1888, 09.10.1959.

¹⁴ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/2/ITA/Shipping-Air, Air Policy–Italy, Vol. I, Francis E. Walter, Chairman, House of Representatives US, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee No.1 to George S. Oberdorf, Assistant to President, The Flying Tiger Line Inc. Washington, 27.08.1956.

¹⁵ In 1952 the Netherlands was short of shipping space towards Australia and Canada and relied on the Committee for the chartering of vessels, IOM-SW/Registry, 1/1/NETH/Operations. Correspondence

nationals was secured through an agreement between the Government and the ICEM Administration.¹⁶

The restrictive policies of these countries were fruitful in the accumulation of the greatest percentage of the ICEM migrant transport services. More specifically, between February 1952 and January 1956, Italy and the United States carried out 44.5 percent of the ICEM migrant maritime traffic (Table 5.2). Regarding the air migrant movements, until September 1955, the United States alone handled three-fourths of the ICEM respective movements, and, together with the Netherlands, the two countries handled 92.7 percent of movements (Table 5.3). These percentages for the voyage by air are not any different from the general transport trends of the period when air movements were only viable in the transatlantic route. Unfortunately, though, there are no explicit data on the sums of money corresponding to the aforementioned percentages for each flag. Nevertheless, it is clear that shipping received the greatest part of the ICEM payments.

The same policies continued the trend of revenue-concentration in the second half of the decade, when the transport companies of three countries alone, Italy, the United States and the Netherlands, received 69.5 percent of ICEM's total payments in 1956-1959 (Table 5.4).

It is of interest that, in 1959, 82.6 percent of the amounts paid by ICEM for the transport of its migrants were directed to sea transport companies—a total of around US\$20 million, of which 54 percent was directed to Italy alone (\$10.8 million). The air transport means received around \$3.2 million (13.8 percent), and approximately two-thirds of this amount ended up to the Netherlands and the United States; the year 1959 signalled the constant increasing representation of air transport means in ICEM traffic and a steadily decreasing trend for the revenue directed to shipping companies, which continued up until 1967. In 1967, it was the first time that the amounts received by

with Govt – Netherlands Vol. I, “Summary of discussions held on 29th January 1952 in the office of the Netherlands Government Commissioner for Emigration at the Hague, between officials of the Netherlands Emigration Service and representatives of the Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe, with regard to Dutch migration plans, possibilities and difficulties”, n.d.

¹⁶ NAA/A446, 1962/67291, Department of Immigration, “The Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration in Relation to Australia’s Immigration Policy and Procedures”, 23.06.1958; IOM-SW/Registry, 1/1/NETH/Operations. Correspondence with Govt – Netherlands Vol. I., ICEM Australia, “Memorandum of Agreement”, 20.11.1954; *ibid.*, P. Jacobsen to B.W. Haveman, Government Commissioner for Emigration, The Hague, 12.06.1956.

airline companies (US\$5.9 million) exceeded the ones of sea transport means (\$4.6 million),¹⁷ (Table 5.1).

Table 5.4: ICEM Payments to Transport Companies (sea & air) According to Flag Distribution in 1956-1959		
Flag	US\$	%
Argentina	4,013,137	4.4
Australia	329,499	0.4
Belgium	432,949	0.5
Canada	305,646	0.3
France	2,742,390	3.0
Germany	827,350	0.9
Great Britain	1,551,031	1.7
Greece	2,566,115	2.8
Israel	2,585,542	2.8
Italy	30,343,819	33.0
Netherlands	14,857,727	16.2
Panama	4,953,901	5.4
Scandinavia	2,629,168	2.9
South Africa	289,862	0.3
Spain	4,004,879	4.4
US	18,705,472	20.3
Others	827,827	0.9
Total	91,966,314	100
<i>Note:</i> In the total, the period for July-December 1958 has not been included, due to lack of data in the sources advised. However, this lack does not considerably change the final outcome. <i>Note:</i> Data for Scandinavia include mainly Norway which in 1956-58 accumulated \$2,445,276. In 1956 Australia, Belgium, South Africa, and Spain were included in <i>Others</i>. <i>Sources:</i> NARA/ICEM, Council Documents, MC/6th Session, Annex I, Appendix 1, “Distribution of Traffic by Flag of Carriers Since 1 February 1952”, MC/235, 06.04.1957; Annex I, Appendix 2, “Payments made to the flags participating in the Committee traffic in 1956”, MC/235, 06.04.1957; NARA/8th Session of the Council of ICEM, Geneva, May 8-14, 1958, Annex I, “Report of the Director on Transport covering performance from 1 September 1957 to 28 February 1958 and prospects”, MC/288, 07.05.1958; NARA/9th Session of the Council of ICEM, Geneva, November 13-19, 1958, ICEM, “Report of the Director on Transport Covering Performance from 1 March 1958 to 31 August 1958 and Prospects”, 9th Session, MC/315, 15.10.1958; NARA/12th Session of the Council of the ICEM, Naples, May 5-13, 1960, ICEM, “Report of the Director on Transport Covering Performance from 1 September 1959 to 29 February 1960 and Prospects”, 12th Session, MC/388, 04.04.1960.		

In the 1960s, the competition in the migrant transport market increased, especially with the greater participation of airline companies in the transport work of ICEM. During

¹⁷ More specifically, the Netherlands received 35.9 percent and the United States 28.3 percent, and interestingly 19.5 percent for Israel. NARA/12th Session of the Council of the ICEM, Naples, May 5–13, 1960, ICEM, “Report of the Director on Transport Covering Performance from 1 September 1959 to 29 February 1960 and Prospects”, 12th Session, MC.388, 04.04.1960; IOM-SW/Library, ICEM Executive Committee, “Addendum to Report of the Director on the Work of the Committee for the Year 1967. Report of the Director on Transport for the year 1967”, 31st (Special) Session, MC/EX/209/Add.1, 01.06.1968.

this time, it is indicative that 72.5 percent of the ICEM traffic was directed towards transport companies of four countries, foremost being the Italian, followed by the Australian, Greek, and Dutch shipping and airline companies (Table 5.5).

Italy, as a major country of emigration, managed to retain its revenue from the ICEM transport work. During the 1960s, Italy received more than a half of the total amount ICEM paid to sea transport means and a comparatively increased percentage from the migrant movements by its airlines. By retaining its strong opposition against transportation by air,¹⁸ Italy assured increased revenue for its mercantile marine, which remained the preferable mode of transport for the Italian government.¹⁹ However, from as early as 1957, *Alitalia* had been established as the official Italian national airline. This development took place after Alitalia's merger with LAI and after the Italian government purchased Alitalia's share from private companies. Alitalia was placed under the *Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale* (IRI – *Institute for Industrial Reconstruction*), a state-owned company under which the government's shipping and ship-building interests were also concentrated. At the first glance, the concentration of maritime and aviation companies under IRI seemed contradictory, as potential conflicts of interest could be realised in the promotion and investment on each mode of transport, but, in reality, it did not. The Italian government subsidised Alitalia, and, between 1959 and 1970, the airline entered a period of rapid growth. Alitalia's destinations increased, its aircraft fleet was renewed, and the airline enjoyed increased governmental protection including the free of charge use of airports and air traffic control facilities. The assistance offered made Alitalia the sixth largest airline in Europe in a brief amount of time.²⁰ In this context, despite that even in the 1960s Italy had a clear preference on the migrants' movement by sea means of transport, since the mid-1950s Italy had already

¹⁸ IOM-SW/General, SIT-00-054/Reports. Trip Reports. Reports from the Missions-Countries/Italy, Warren Graham Fuller, ICEM Rome to Epinat, Acting Director, ICEM Geneva, "Review of 1961 and prospects for 1962", 29.12.1961; NAA/A446, 1966/46174, "Report of the Australian Delegation to the Fifteenth Session of the Executive Committee and Twelfth Session of the Council of ICEM", April/May 1960.

¹⁹ IOM-SW/Library, ICEM, "Report of the Sub-Committee on the Co-ordination of Transport", 20th Session, MC/625, 16.10.1963.

²⁰ A. Mantegazza, "Alitalia and Commercial Aviation in Italy", pp. 161-166, 179, 181-182. In 1956 Alitalia received landing rights in Rhodesia and in 1960 Italy and Australia signed an agreement for their air connection through their national airlines, both ICEM destinations, see IOM-SW/Registry, 8/2/ITA/Shipping-Air, Air Policy-Italy, Vol. I, Ministero degli Affari Esteri, D.G.E. Ufficio V to Delegazione Permanente Italiana presso il Centro Europeo delle Nazioni Utime e le Organizzazioni Internazionali Ginevra, "Emigration to Rhodesia-Italian Airlines Calling at Salisbury", 65/59511/C, 03.08.1956; IOM-SW/Registry, 8/2/Shipping-Air, Air Policy. General, Vol. III, Senate Canberra, "Air Agreements with Italy and France", 09.03.1960.

started creating the preconditions for the employment of its airline in the migrant transport. Thus, in case flights from Italy were considered necessary by ICEM, then the Italian government asked priority to be given to Alitalia.²¹

The entrance of Australian and Greek flags in the top-four ranks of the ICEM payments to transport companies in the 1960s (Table 5.5) also has its roots in the employment of new transport companies and the support they enjoyed by the respective governments. Regarding the Australian flag, the government of Australia, from the start of the 1960s, eagerly sought the expansion of the business cycle of its national airline, *Qantas*, by signing agreements with France and Italy for the air-connection with Australia. The air connection with France took place in 1960, while the connection with Italy would be inaugurated when Alitalia felt ready to start the operation of such a service.²²

Apart from these arrangements, Australia initiated discussions with ICEM Administration in order for *Qantas* to attract business also from the ICEM's migrant transport programme.²³ Australia had the power to request a separate migrant transport agreement with ICEM, since it was the second most important financial contributor to ICEM's operations and the first country of resettlement for ICEM migrants and refugees. The Australian government took every chance in highlighting these elements to the ICEM Administration.²⁴

In one of the many conferences with the ICEM officials, the Australian government elaborately referred to the "restrictive practices imposed by some of the receiving nations" in the selection of their transport companies for the transportation of their migrants, namely legislations protecting the exclusive use of their national means of transport, or refusal of landing rights, among others. It was highlighted that the adoption of restrictive practices was not within Australia's intentions as long as *Qantas* would receive a "high proportion" of the ICEM's charter flights to Australia. ICEM,

²¹ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/5/Shipping/Liaison with Australia Policy, J. van den Brink, Special Assistant (Transport) to the Director – J. Hübener, Chief of Transport Division, Memo for B.W. Haveman, "Briefing for the meeting with the Australian representatives on 21 March 1963, concerning share of Australian flag in air transport from Europe to Australia", 19.03.1963.

²² IOM-SW/Registry, 8/2/Shipping-Air, Air Policy. General, Vol. III, Senate Canberra, "Air Agreements with Italy and France", 09.03.1960.

²³ NAA/A446, 1966/46175, 1973664, J. T. Fogarty, "ICEM Migrant Charters. Notes by Director of International Relations Mr. J. T. Fogarty", 11.09.1960.

²⁴ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/5/Shipping/Liaison with Australia Policy, T.H.E. Heyes, Secretary Department of Immigration, Canberra to Marcus Daly, Director, ICEM Geneva, 19.10.1960; *ibid.*, P. R. Heydon, Secretary, Department of Immigration, Canberra to B. G. Epinat, Acting Director, ICEM Geneva, 17.11.1961.

from its side, stressed its preference for the abstention of “political factors” in the selection of transport companies,²⁵ but promoted the selection of the means of transport in consideration of their competitive financial offers. Based on these extortions, and considering Australia’s important operational and financial position within ICEM, an agreement between the ICEM Administration and Australia was concluded in 1963, under which at least 70 to 80 percent of the chartered ICEM flights from Europe to Australia would take place through Qantas.²⁶ The proposal of such an agreement was not welcomed by the ICEM Chief of the Department of Transport, who internally characterised it as “completely untenable”, endangering “the implementation of the terms of Constitution”.²⁷ However, the Chief’s disagreements on the selective satisfaction of the Australian transport claims were not enough to jeopardise a potential Australian dissatisfaction from the ICEM Administration, an important immigration-state and one of the top financial contributors in ICEM budgets.

Meanwhile, Australia had also initiated bilateral discussions with the Greek government for a fifty-fifty share of the total migrant traffic from Greece by Greek passenger ships and Qantas’ aeroplanes.²⁸ The Greek Minister of Mercantile Marine characterised the Australian bilateral request as “unacceptable discrimination” and requested the traffic sharing to be at a European level and not bilateral.²⁹ Australia, in its request, was assisted by the ICEM Chief of Mission in Canberra—an Australian citizen and former staff of the Australian Department of Immigration—who privately counselled the Greek side that the rejection of the Australian request could result in the decrease of the non-subsidized migration quota of Greeks towards Australia,³⁰ which

²⁵ NAA/A446, 1966/46175, 1973664, “Report on Discussions with the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM) on the Carriage of Migrants to Australia by Air – Geneva 28.9.60-30.9.60”, n.d.

²⁶ IOM-SW/Registry, ICEM III, 1951-1980, “Summary of discussions between Australian representatives and ICEM concerning air transport of ICEM migrants from Europe to Australia”, 21/22.03.1963.

²⁷ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/5/Shipping/Liaison with Australia Policy, J. van den Brink Division of Transport for the Director to W.G. Kiddle, Acting Chief, ICEM Liaison Mission Canberra, “Committee chartered flights to Australia”, 25.01.1963.

²⁸ AGMFA/Central Service, 1962/17/9/1, [General Australian Consulate in Athens], “Aide Memoire”, n.d. [23.01.1962].

²⁹ AGMFA/Central Service, 1962/17/9/1, Σ. Κωτιάδης, Υπουργός Εμπ. Ναυτιλίας, Διεύθυνσις Μελετών to Υπουργείον Εξωτερικών, Δ/νσιν Οικ. Υποθέσεων Ι and Υπουργείον Εσωτερικών Δ/νσις Αποδημίας-Μεταναστεύσεως, «Συμμετοχή αεροπλάνων Qantas εις μεταφοράς μεταναστών», 74 01/170, 30.01.1962.

³⁰ AGMFA/Central Service, 1962/17/9/1, Φ. Άννινος-Καβαλιεράτος, Πρέσβυς, Royal Embassy of Greece, Canberra to επί των Εξωτερικών Υπουργείον Διεύθυνσιν Οικονομικών Υποθέσεων, «Μέσα μεταφοράς μεταναστών εις Αυστραλίαν», Confidential, AY23-27, 28.08.1962.

was a direct threat on behalf of the Australian government mediated through an ICEM official.

It is of interest to note that, for the movements of Germans departing from Germany to Australia, a most desirable migrant nationality according to the Australian immigration policy, a reciprocal 50 percent share was maintained for the national airlines, as both governments had bilaterally agreed.³¹ It seems, though, that Australia's agreements with ICEM, Greece and Germany were part of a coordinated effort of the Australian government to increase Qantas' workload in the early 1960s.

Regarding Greece, in 1959, the first regular passenger shipping line to Australia was established by a privately owned liner shipping company, named *Greek-Australian Line* by the shipowner Chandris. The *Greek-Australian Line* rapidly developed its fleet during the 1960s, resulting in increased revenue for the Greek flag. Furthermore, the Greek government tried to protect the *Greek-Australian Line* by cancelling scheduled ICEM chartered flights to Australia and by directing these migrants to Chandris' vessels. In combination with the governmental assistance, the competitive attitude of the *Greek-Australian Line* greatly assisted the capital accumulation for the company,³² as it will extensively be discussed below and in Chapter 8.

From the 1950s, regarding the Netherlands and the migrant transport agreement for ICEM's exclusive use of the Dutch fleet, as referred to earlier, the Dutch government became the main shareholder of KLM Airlines, owning over 95 percent of its stock during the first post-WWII decade and more than 80 percent in the 1960s, which assisted the company financially, managerially and politically. Not only did the Dutch government subsidise the airline, but also assisted in the expansion of its international network and the technological renewal of its fleet.³³ Under these circumstances, the Dutch government sought the employment of the aeroplanes of its national airline by ICEM.

³¹ IOM-SW/Registry, ICEM III, 1951-1980, "Report on Review of ICEM's Air Transport Policy", n.d. [1967]

³² Ioannis Limnios-Sekeris, "Stakeholders and competition in the transportation of migrants: moving Greeks to Australia in the post-War era", *Journal of Transport History*, 36:1 (2015), pp. 101-106.

³³ Marc Dierikx, "KLM: an Airline Outgrowing its Flag", in H.L. Dienel and P. Lyth (eds), *op.cit.*, pp. 139-141, 144, 146-148.

Table 5.5: ICEM Payments to Transport Companies According to Flag Distribution in 1960-1969						
Flag	Sea & Rail		Air		Total	
	US\$	%	US\$	%	US\$	%
Argentina	1,398,827	1.7	8,951	0.0	1,407,779	1.0
Australia			19,367,990	33.4	19,367,990	13.6
Austria			42,366	0.1	42,366	0.0
Belgium	3,694	0.00	1,249,648	2.2	1,253,342	0.9
Brazil			125,504	0.2	125,504	0.1
Canada			626,861	1.1	626,861	0.4
Colombia			184,159	0.3	184,159	0.1
France	1,464,153	1.7	691,008	1.2	2,155,163	1.5
Germany	489,001	0.6	2,566,028	4.4	3,055,029	2.1
Greece	16,416,005	19.4	434,172	0.7	16,850,196	11.8
Israel	3,491,996	4.1	6,266,949	10.8	9,758,949	6.8
Italy	45,428,650	53.7	5,679,467	9.8	51,108,117	35.8
Liberia	317,760	0.4			317,761	0.2
Netherlands	6,588,503	7.8	9,482,894	16.4	16,071,405	11.3
Panama	2,418,927	2.9			2,418,929	1.7
Scandinavia	24,233	0.0	375,534	0.6	399,767	0.3
South Africa			2,460,989	4.2	2,460,989	1.7
Spain	4,310,500	5.1	1,731,025	3.0	6,041,530	4.2
Switzerland			494,200	0.9	494,200	0.3
UK	884,452	1.0	942,196	1.6	1,826,649	1.3
US	608,238	0.7	5,022,980	8.7	5,631,218	3.9
Others	829,829	1.0	233,546	0.4	1,063,376	0.7
Totals	84,674,766	59.4	57,986,466	40.6	142,661,233	100
<i>Notes:</i> In the total, the period for July-December 1962 is not included, due to lack of data in the sources advised. However, this lack does not considerably change the final outcome. <i>Sources:</i> NARA/14th Session of the Council of the ICEM, Geneva, May 11-17, 1961, ICEM, Annex I, “Committee Payments According to Flag Distribution for 1960”, 17th Session, MC/453, 30.03.1961; IOM-SW/Library, ICEM, “Report of the Director on Transport”, 16th Session, MC/514, 06.03.1962; <i>ibid.</i>, ICEM, “Report of the Director on Transport”, 18th Session, MC/543, 04.10.1962; <i>ibid.</i>, ICEM, “Report of the Director on Transport for the Year 1963”, 21st Session, MC/643, 24.03.1964; <i>ibid.</i>, ICEM, “Report on Operations: Part IV Transport”, 23rd Session, MC/715 (Part IV), 29.03.1965; <i>ibid.</i>, ICEM, “Report of the Director on the Work of the Committee for the Year 1965”, 25th Session, MC/768, 22.03.1966; <i>ibid.</i>, ICEM, “Addendum to Report of the Director on the Work of the Committee for the Year 1966. Report of the Director on Transport for the year 1966”, 27th Session, MC/827/Add.1, 13.04.1967; <i>ibid.</i>, ICEM, “Addendum to Report of the Director on the Work of the Committee for the Year 1967. Report of the Director on Transport for the year 1967”, 31st (Special) Session, MC/EX/209/Add.1, 01.06.1968; <i>ibid.</i>, ICEM, “Addendum to Report of the Director on the Work of the Committee for the Year 1968. Report of the Director on Transport for the year 1968”, 30th Session, MC/911/Add.1, 01.04.1969; <i>ibid.</i>, ICEM, “Report of the Director on the Work of the Committee for the Year 1969 (including Report on Transport)”, 35th (Special) Session, MC/EX/228, 28.05.1970.						

In the 1970s, the ICEM transport expenses doubled (Tables 5.5 & 5.6) in comparison with the previous decade. The reason behind this is not only the increase of territories ICEM served, as mentioned in Chapter 2, but also due to the oil crisis of 1973 and 1979,

which directly affected the transport sector and the fares that ICEM was obligated to pay to the transport companies. However, the sums of money directed to the shipping companies in the 1970s for migrant transportation diminished (Table 5.6). Italy and Greece retained their prominent positions, but received less than one-seventh and approximately one-third of the 1960s revenue, respectively. A new era of the ICEM migrant traffic and of the migrant transportation in general had already opened in favour of air transport, following the general trend in passenger traffic.

In the 1970s, the United States dominated in the ICEM payments board (40.2 percent of the total revenue - Table 5.6). With great difference in the revenue accumulation, new and known ‘players’ followed, such as Israel, France, and Italy – with these three collecting 24.6 percent of the total payments, nearly half the percentage of the United States.

The considerably increased percentage of the United States’ revenue is explained from the continuation of ICEM migrant intakes from European countries in addition to the movements of the Chilean refugees from Spain who were directed through Spain mainly to the United States in the first half of the 1970s, as mentioned in Chapter 2. In the second half of the 1970s, the refugee intakes from Indochina are prominent,³⁴ as they were constantly increasing since 1977. In 1979, in particular, the Indochinese refugee movement to the United States increased by 288 percent in comparison with the previous year.³⁵

The refugee movements from Indochina are also the reason for the increased revenue directed to French airline companies (Table 5.6). France was the second country, after the United States, for the resettlement of refugees coming from the Indochina region.³⁶ Throughout France’s participation in ICEM, it consistently retained relatively low percentages from the ICEM revenue (Tables 5.2, 5.4, 5.5). France was considered as a “sympathising country”, not directly involved in the migrant movements apart from refugee movements from its territory (Tables 2.1, 2.2, 2.3 of Chapter 2). France’s participation in ICEM can be perceived as a chance for the financial support of its passenger shipping companies that were mainly concentrated in

³⁴ Mainly Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Hong Kong, the Philippines, and Japan.

³⁵ IOM-SW/Library, ICEM Council, “Addendum to Report of the Director on the Work of ICEM for the Year 1977. Report of Transport” 42nd Session, MC/1225/Add.1, 01.03.1978; *ibid.*, ICEM Council, “Addendum to Report of the Director on the Work of ICEM for the Year 1979. Report on Transport”, 45th Session, MC/1300/Add.1, 28.03.1980.

³⁶ IOM-SW/Library, ICEM, “Special Programme for the Resettlement of Refugees from the Indo-China Area. Situation as at 31 March 1979”, 43rd (Special) Session, MC/1260, 04.05.1979.

South American sea routes, secondarily in Australian sea routes, and, later, in Australian air routes.³⁷

Table 5.6: ICEM Payments to Transport Companies According to Flag Distribution in 1970-1979						
Flag	Sea & Rail		Air		Total	
	US\$	%	US\$	%	US\$	%
Argentina	29,421	0.2	694,676	0.3	724,097	0.3
Australia			13,337,701	6.3	13,337,701	5.9
Austria			12,555	0.0	12,555	0.0
Belgium			4,304,972	2.0	4,304,972	1.9
Brazil			769,913	0.4	769,913	0.3
Canada	1,050	0.0	1,607,590	0.8	1,608,640	0.7
Chile			320,885	0.3	320,885	0.1
Colombia			781,329	0.4	781,329	0.3
France	9,921	0.1	18,166,907	8.5	18,176,828	8.0
Germany	13,766	0.1	11,051,530	5.2	11,065,296	4.9
Greece	5,142,929	34.2	2,201,242	1.0	7,344,171	3.2
Israel	504,750	3.4	19,207,065	9.0	19,711,815	8.6
Italy	7,100,407	47.2	11,018,428	5.2	18,118,835	7.9
Netherlands	116,333	0.8	4,850,317	2.3	4,966,650	2.2
Panama	1,410,476	9.4			1,410,476	0.6
Portugal	448	0.0	848,580	0.4	849,028	0.4
Scandinavia			5,356,263	2.5	5,356,263	2.4
South Africa			1,968,706	0.9	1,968,706	0.9
Spain	215,896	1.4	5,535,023	2.6	5,750,919	2.5
Switzerland			6,327,893	3.0	6,327,893	2.8
UK	286,890	1.9	3,906,469	1.8	4,193,359	1.8
US	4,205	0.0	91,601,694	43.0	91,605,899	40.2
Venezuela			788,655	0.4	788,655	0.3
Others	220,774	1.5	8,207,068	3.9	8,427,842	3.7
Totals	15,057,266	6.6	212,865,461	93.4	227,922,727	100

Sources: IOM-SW/Library, ICEM, “Addendum to Report of the Director on the Work of the Committee for the Year 1970. Report of the Director on Transport for the year 1970”, 37th (Special) Session, MC/EX/242/Add.1, 17.05.1971; *ibid.*, ICEM, “Addendum to Report of the Director on the Work of the Committee for the Year 1971. Report of the Director on Transport for the year 1971”, 41st (Special) Session, MC/EC/269/Add.1, 25.05.1972; IOM-GR/MC/EX Executive Committee, 41 to 45-46-47 Session, ICEM, “Report of the Director of the Committee for the Year 1972”, 43rd (Special) Session, MC/EX/284/Rev.1, 28.05.1973; IOM-SW/Library, ICEM, “Addendum to Report of the Director on the Work of the Committee for the Year 1973. Report of the Director on Transport for the year 1973”, 38th Session, MC/1087/Add.1, 26.04.1974; *ibid.*, ICEM, “Addendum to Report of the Director on the Work of the Committee for the Year 1974. Report of the Director on Transport for the year 1974”, 39th, MC/1126/Add.1, 04.04.1975; *ibid.*, ICEM, “Addendum to Report of the Director on the Work of the Committee for the Year 1975. Report on Transport”, 40th Session, MC/1157/Add.1, 02.04.1976; *ibid.*, ICEM, “Addendum to Report of the Director on the Work of the Committee for the Year 1976. Report on Transport”, 41st Session, MC/1190/Add.1, 28.03.1977; *ibid.*, ICEM, “Addendum to Report of the Director on the Work of ICEM for the Year 1977. Report on Transport”, 42nd Session, MC/1225/Add.1, 01.03.1978; *ibid.*, ICEM, “Addendum to Report of the Director on the Work of ICEM for the Year 1978. Report on Transport”, 44th Session, MC/1257/Add.1, 04.04.1979; *ibid.*, ICEM, “Addendum to Report of the Director on the Work of ICEM for the Year 1979. Report on Transport”, 45th Session, MC/1300/Add.1, 28.03.1980.

³⁷ IOM-SW/Library, ICEM, “Report of the Sub-Committee on the Co-ordination of Transport”, 24th Session, MC/744, 02.12.1965.

The migration movements to Israel were mediated by the *Jewish Agency for Israel* (JAI), which acted initially as a private agency and then as a semi-governmental agency.³⁸ Israel's traffic was derived mainly from Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa.³⁹ It was an effort to populate the newly acquired territories after the formation of the State of Israel (1948). This effort has been supported also by the *International Refugee Organisation* (IRO), which, by September 1950, had assisted the movement of 111,500 Jews from Central Europe to Israel.⁴⁰ In this context, aside from the individual migration of Jewish refugees since 1952, land settlement schemes were projected to take place in Israel in 1953 in an effort to accelerate its population.⁴¹

From 1956, Israel maintained high percentages in ICEM payments for transportation (Tables 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6), especially because tensions in North Africa promoted the transfer of Jewish refugees from the region, mainly from Algeria and Morocco (1955-1956), which were fighting for their independence from France; important financial contribution from the United States through ICEM was also included.⁴² Likewise, after the Six-Day War between Arab countries and Israel (1968-1969), the Polish government forced its Jewish community to flee. Thus, ICEM resettled around 6,400 Jews from Poland in 1968-1969 as well as more than 45,000 Soviet Jews who travelled mainly to Israel after the issuance of exit permits from the Soviet Union in 1971.⁴³

The movements to Israel as being of a refugee nature was not feasible to schedule in advance. Thus, the state transport companies *ZIM Shipping Lines* and *EL AL* airlines were preferred. Both companies were also participating and were competitive towards other shipping and airline companies in routes not only of their direct migrant-interest; for example, ZIM Shipping Lines were involved in the transatlantic services. After the 1972 incidents in the Olympic Games in Munich wherein Israeli athletes were killed, EL AL airlines assumed the transfer of its

³⁸ IOM-SW/General, SIT-00-091/ICM Documents Israel 1969 to 1977, "Background Notes for ICEM Participation in Movements to Israel", 30.03.1972.

³⁹ IOM-SW/General, SIT-00-091/ICM Documents Israel 1969 to 1977, "Briefing Note Covering Israel Movements", 28.03.1969.

⁴⁰ NARA/Records related to the IRO and DP Commission, Herbert C. Madison, United States Government to Laurence A. Dawson, Assistant Adviser on Refugee and Displaced Persons, 29.03.1951.

⁴¹ NARA/Land Settlement Meeting Florence – Sept. 1953, ICEM, "Meeting of Land Settlement Experts, Florence: Land Settlement in Israel", LSF/10, 29.09.1953.

⁴² NARA/ICEM-General 1953 thru 1956, Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation: "Migration of Jews from North Africa to Israel", 23.09.1955; *ibid.*, Florecen Kirlin, Acting Assistant Secretary to Francis E. Walter, Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee No. 1, 09.05.1955.

⁴³ Ducasse-Rogier, *op.cit.*, p. 56.

immigrants for security reasons—an argument that passed through Israel and was finally accepted by ICEM and, in this way, benefited EL AL airlines’ profitability.⁴⁴

In 1980, the United States led the transport programme of ICEM/ICM not only in terms of revenue (75.3 percent of the total), but also in actual terms of migrant and refugee intakes (Table 5.7). More specifically, the United States received 199,052 migrants and refugees through ICM out of a total of 290,116. Thus, 68.6 percent of the total ICM migrants and refugees assisted were directed to a single country—the United States.⁴⁵

Table 5.7: ICEM Payments to Transport Companies According to Flag Distribution in 1980						
Flag	Sea & Rail		Air		Total	
	US\$	%	US\$	%	US\$	%
Argentina			35,100	0.0	35,100	0.0
Australia			823,585	0.7	823,585	0.7
Belgium			896,698	0.7	896,698	0.7
Canada			567,281	0.5	567,281	0.5
Chile			58,361	0.0	58,361	0.0
Colombia			127,035	0.1	127,035	0.1
France			6,139,437	4.9	6,139,437	4.9
Germany			3,225,385	2.6	3,225,385	2.6
Greece	233	7.9	144,041	0.1	144,274	0.1
Israel			1,867,885	1.5	1,867,885	1.5
Italy	1,800	61.2	2,858,682	2.3	2,860,482	2.3
Netherlands			1,767,746	1.4	1,767,746	1.4
Portugal			909,232	0.7	909,232	0.7
Scandinavia			1,664,478	1.3	1,664,478	1.3
Spain	910	30.9	1,023,433	0.8	1,024,343	0.8
Switzerland			2,196,174	1.7	2,196,174	1.7
UK			3,137,106	2.5	3,137,106	2.5
US			94,618,437	75.3	94,618,437	75.3
Venezuela			80,980	0.1	80,980	0.1
Others			3,489,179	2.8	3,489,179	2.8
Totals	2,943	0.0	125,630,256	100	125,633,198	100
Source: IOM-SW/Library, ICEM, “Addendum to Report of the Director on the Work of ICM For the Year 1980. Report on Transport”, 47th Session, MC/1334/Add.1, 01.04.1981.						

It is worth reminding, though, that not all the countries presented in the tables above became members of ICEM at the same time, nor did all the countries retain their membership for the whole decade as presented in the Tables 5.4, 5.5, 5.6 and 5.7. In the 1950s, and up until the 1970s, the ICEM membership composition was in constant change. For instance, in 1952-1959, eight more members joined the *Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration*, including Spain in 1956—a country with a

⁴⁴ IOM-SW/General, SIT-00-091/ICM Documents Israel 1969 to 1977, E. Laor, Permanent Representative of Israel, The Jewish Agency for Israel, Geneva to John F. Thomas, Director, ICEM Geneva, 98-G340, 26.02.1973.

⁴⁵ IOM-SW/Library, ICEM, “Addendum to Report of the Director on the Work of ICM for the Year 1980. Report on Transport”, 47th Session, MC/1334/Add.1, 01.04.1981.

developed transport sector. In the 1960s, eight more members joined ICEM while six withdrew, including Canada and France. At the end of 1973, Australia followed suit, amongst others in the 1970s.⁴⁶ Consequently, a country's withdrawal from ICEM restricted its access to the Organisation's migrant transport services, while remaining members retained access. Conversely, the addition of new member-states meant increased competition in the ICEM distribution of migrant transport.

Of particular interest is the case of Panama and Liberia. Panama, throughout the years examined, received considerable percentages in the ICEM migrant transport shipping services, even without being a member of ICEM, at least for the greater part of the 1950s (Tables 5.2, 5.4, 5.5, 5.6). This was in contrast with the ICEM transport policy that preferred the transport companies of member-states. As it is known in the maritime world, Panamanian and Liberian flags were "flags of convenience", as they were called then, or, alternatively, international "open registries", as they are called today. Therefore, the flag does not represent the nationality of the passenger vessels' ownership, but it was a business choice of the shipping companies.

More explicitly, according to national maritime laws, every ship needs to be registered in a country's registry, and, in order to do so, a "genuine link" between the ownership and the national registry needs to exist: namely, the same nationality of the owner or the owning company. In the post-WWII era, the "flags of convenience" broke this "genuine link" and allowed the registration of ships owned by persons or companies, disregarding their nationality, after the payment of an annual fee. The shipping companies that registered their vessels under flags of countries of open registries gained a myriad of benefits: the limited taxation provided, the freedom in crew selection of various nationals, a more lenient inspection system, and clemencies in the shipping company legal system. Panama and Liberia were the two major flags of convenience in the 1950s-1970s; foremost, American and Greek shipowners, followed by the Italians, heavily used these flags during this period.⁴⁷

The ICEM Administration eagerly sought Panama's membership in ICEM. The reason was not to find another resettlement outlet for European migrants, but primarily

⁴⁶ For more on the ICEM membership per year, see Table 4, Annex.

⁴⁷ Stopford, *Maritime Economics*, pp. 671-672; Gelina Harlaftis, "The Greek Shipping Sector c. 1850-2000", in Lewis R. Fischer and Even Lange (eds), *International Merchant Shipping in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries: The Comparative Dimension* No. 37, Research in Maritime History, IMEHA, St. John's Newfoundland, 2008, pp. 84, 90-91; Gelina Harlaftis, "Greek Shipowners and State Intervention in the 1940s: A Formal Justification for the Resort to Flags-of-Convenience?", *International Journal of Maritime History*, 1:2 (1989), pp. 56, 58-59.

to protect the interests of the shipping companies that collaborated with ICEM. The ICEM policy for the preference of transport companies under the flag of its member-states jeopardised the use of the passenger vessels owned by nationals of their member-states, but their vessels were flying the flag of a non-member-state. More specifically, the main problem for the ICEM Administration was that the Italian-owned shipping companies were flying the Panamanian flag. The ICEM Administration wanted to protect the interests of these shipping companies. Therefore, a visit to the Panamanian government was organised in 1958 wherein the Representative Authorities of Italy⁴⁸ and the United States were present in Panama in order to discuss a likely Panamanian membership in ICEM. The United States, though, had been pressing Panama to join ICEM since 1952-1953.⁴⁹ Panama finally joined ICEM at the end of 1958,⁵⁰ in an effort for the country and the passenger shipping companies to secure more profits from the ICEM transportation business.

The United Kingdom (UK), on the other hand, was one of the main countries of the Western Bloc that did not join ICEM at the time of its establishment. The UK abstention worried its Commonwealth partners. Since 1952, Australia, along with the United States and other member-states, campaigned in favour of a British adherence to ICEM. In the 1950s, the UK did not recognise any direct benefit from its participation in ICEM, especially when the former was obliged to financially contribute to the latter's Budgets.⁵¹ The consecutive efforts of the ICEM Administration in persuading the British government to join proved fruitless. Therefore, the Chief of ICEM Office in the United States, after consultation with the ICEM Deputy Director and of the Chief of the Department of Shipping, approached the managing director of the English *Orient Line* and chairman of the *Australian Passenger Conference*,⁵² which had already

⁴⁸ IOM-SW/Registry, 1/1/PAN. Operations, Correspondence with Govt. Panama, Vol. I, Raymond Y. Rodie, Dept. of Plans and Liaison to Emilion Bettini, "Panama", 21.11.1958.

⁴⁹ IOM-SW/General, EXT-03-02-003/ICEM Membership 1954-1959, P. Jacobsen to J. Van Loon, Chief, ICEM Liaison Mission Washington D.C., 20.04.1956.

⁵⁰ NARA/9th Session of the Council of ICEM, Geneva, November 13-19, 1958, ICEM, "Resolution No.175 (IX) Admission of the Government of the Republic of Panama as a Member of the Committee", 9th Session, MC/323, 27.11.1958.

⁵¹ NAA/A446, 1966/46194, Cablegram, Australian Consulate-General in Geneva to DEAC, 58, Restricted, 04.04.1952; *ibid.*, Cablegram, Department of External Affairs, Canberra to Australian High Commissioner's Office London, 1321, Restricted, 17.04.1952 - Repeated Savingram to Australian Consulate General Geneva.

⁵² The Shipping Conferences, a British invention, was a collective private body, where the participating shipping companies shared mutual business interests. More details on these conglomerations involved in ICEM work follow in Chapter 6. For an overview of the Conference system, see S.G. Sturme, *British Shipping and World Competition*, pp. 271-299.

participated in the ICEM migrant transport services.⁵³ The ICEM official, in order to prove the benefits of the liner shipping companies from a British ICEM membership, mentioned that ICEM could fill the vacant berths presented in the British passenger ships during the first months of the year, resulting in revenue for the shipping companies, among other business opportunities. He noted that other Commonwealth migrant-receiving countries were already members of ICEM, with which the UK had already close trade-financial-political ties, amongst others; he also stressed the political and financial importance of ICEM for the United States, as well as the American support towards a prospective UK membership. Therefore, the ICEM official proposed that the managing director of the Orient Line, along with the rest of the British shipping lines participating in the Australian shipping Conference, should lobby and recommend the country's membership in ICEM to the British government.⁵⁴ The managing director of Orient Line rejected the ICEM proposal, since, as he noted, he did not "feel disposed to make representations to our Government in regard to membership of ICEM. That seems to me a purely political matter on which we are in no position to express any opinion".⁵⁵

In the following years, ICEM, American, and Australian efforts continued in persuading the UK to join,⁵⁶ which finally happened in 1961. Italy and the Netherlands were not excited with this development, as reported by the Australian delegate in the ICEM Session,⁵⁷ mostly because the UK would now have a legitimate share in the ICEM traffic and, consequently, Italian and Dutch shares would shrink.

The UK joined ICEM when the *World Refugee Year* (1959-1960) ended and the organisation was involved in new traffic and thus new business opportunities were expected. Furthermore, there was pressure from the British P&O Shipping Group and others, at a time when new shipbuilding orders with increased passenger capacity vessels, which had been heavily subsidised by the British government, were on the way

⁵³ IOM-SW/General, EXT-03-02-003/ICEM Membership 1954-1959, J.J. van Loon, Chief, US Office to H.R. Hoekstra, Chief, Department of Shipping ICEM Geneva, 25.05.1956.

⁵⁴ IOM-SW/General, EXT-03-02-003/ICEM Membership 1954-1959, J.J. Van Loon to Mr. Ford Geddes, Orient Line, London, Personal, 28.05.1956.

⁵⁵ IOM-SW/General, EXT-03-02-003/ICEM Membership 1954-1959, Ford Geddes, London to J.J. van Loon, Washington USA, 15.06.1956.

⁵⁶ NAA/A446, 1966/46169, "Report of the Australian Delegation. ICEM Tenth Session of the Executive Committee and Eight Session of the Council", Restricted, May 1958; NAA/A446, 1966/46171, A. L. Nutt to Heyes, 10.04.1959; NAA/A446, 1966/46172, George L. Warren, Advisor to the Department of State on Refugees and Migration Matters to Heyes, 08.10.1959.

⁵⁷ NAA/A446, 1966/46175, Armstrong, Confidential, 03.12.1960.

of delivery and were to be directed to the Australian sea routes. These sea routes, since the end of 1959, were experiencing increasing competition with the entrance and operation of new liner shipping services from Italy and Greece, resulting in the loss of P&O and Orient Lines primacy.⁵⁸ What is more, P&O Shipping Group had already lost, to the Italian-owned *Societa Italiana Trasporti Marittimi* (SITMAR) *Line*, two multi year and multi million dollar contracts with the Australian government for the transfer of the government-subsidised British migrants to the country.⁵⁹ With the British liner shipping companies taking an interest in all ICEM sea routes, from Australian to Latin American and South African sea routes, as well as in air traffic, ICEM membership seemed more advantageous in 1961 for the British government. As it was expressed by the Director of the British Ministry of Transport, his government was interested in the values of a) “free competition” between the transport companies conducting business with ICEM, “in order to ensure the best transport at the most reasonable cost” and b) non-flag-discriminatory policies with no restrictions in the handling of all traffic for the transport companies; the opposite was considered as “bad shipping policy for the United Kingdom”.⁶⁰ The truth is that all these values were endorsed by the ICEM Administration, but not necessarily applied.

The cases of Panama and of the United Kingdom are indicative of how business interests could dictate the membership of a sovereign state in an international agency and the intervention of said business interests in the migration management at a national and international level.

Politics and business went hand in hand in the transport of migrants through ICEM. Migration, under the auspices of ICEM, was politicised, as was the means of transport used. The selection of the ICEM partners did not always result from

⁵⁸ IOM-SW/Registry, ICEM-Australia I, Peter Gibson, Chief, ICEM Liaison Mission Canberra to M. Daly, Director, ICEM HQs, 2829, AUS/C/1, Personal, 05.12.1960. The ICEM Director, a political person, attributed the joining of the UK to the Cabinet change and the replacement of disagreeing with ICEM membership UK Treasurer and the pleasing of UK allies expecting them to join in, see *ibid.*, Marcus Daly to Peter Gibson, Chief, Migration Committee, Liaison Mission Canberra, 21.12.1960. However, only weeks after the announcement of the UK's adherence to ICEM, the Director and other representatives of P&O and Orient Line visited the Department for Immigration in Canberra for consultations on the Company's plans, *ibid.*, P. Gibson, Chief, ICEM Liaison Mission, Canberra to Director, ICEM HQs Geneva, 2900, AUS/C/1, 09.12.1960; Hope, *op.cit.*, p. 427.

⁵⁹ IOM-SW/Registry, ICEM-Australia I, J. Van den Brink, Chief of Department of Shipping to P. Gibson, Chief of Mission Canberra, “Movements 1960/61”, 40/4/AUST, 22.03.1961; IOM-SW/General, 153/Miscellaneous/Historical General Related Matters 1968-1973/Australia, F. Zurek, ICEM Representative Australia to Director, ICEM Geneva, 1042 AUS/N/1, 03.04.1970.

⁶⁰ IOM-SW/General, SIT-00-054/Reports. Trip Reports. Reports from the Missions-Countries/UK, E.K. Rahardt, “Memorandum for the File: Report on courtesy visit to the United Kingdom Government June 26 and 27”, 03.07.1961.

meritocratic criteria based on “free and fair competition”, as the ICEM transport policy ‘theory’ claimed, and as explained in Chapter 4. In reality, the selection of ICEM partners was based on the leverage, influence, and negotiation power of each member-state. As seen in Chapter 3, the member-states had created policies and instruments to control ICEM’s work in order to take advantage of services and funds managed by ICEM. In various instances, as one ICEM official reported, some of the important member-states were “using the Committee to advance their own shipping interests and [...] migration [was] of purely secondary consequence to them”.⁶¹ The member-states had their own agenda in their membership in ICEM. When their objectives differed from other members or from the ICEM Administration, conflict followed suit.

When it comes to conflict

As indicated earlier, the member-states of ICEM had different aspirations, wishes, and agendas that they wanted to achieve through their participation in ICEM. Many times, their agenda proved to be contradictory to the Organisation’s best interest and, more specifically, to the funds it managed. Three main subjects of important dispute between various groups of member states within ICEM related to transport policy and function are prominent: a) the use of scheduled regular liner ships and aeroplanes over chartered ships and aeroplanes for the exclusive transport of ICEM migrants, b) the use of sea versus air transport means, and c) matters related to safety at sea and in the air. The reactions of the ICEM Administration and its member-states are discussed in the next pages.

- Scheduled regular liner ships and aeroplanes vs. Chartered ships and aeroplanes by ICEM:

According to the Brussels Resolution, the Organisation was called to “coordinate a shipping programme utilizing [the scheduled regular liner ships] to the maximum extent possible and the chartered [passenger] ships [by ICEM] transferred from the IRO to secure those movements, for which [...] [the scheduled regular liner ships were]

⁶¹ IOM-SW/Registry, ICEM III, 1951-1980, W.A. Wood, Jr., Maj. Genera, Chief, US Office, Migration Committee Washington DC to Pierre Jacobsen, Deputy Director, Migration Committee Geneva, 09.09.1952.

inadequate”.⁶² The ICEM Constitution, in 1954, with a slightly more lenient wording regarding the exclusivity of scheduled regular liner ships and by adding air transport to the text, signified that the “movement of migrants should *as far as possible* be effected by the normal shipping and air transport services but that, from time to time, there is [...] need for additional transport facilities”.⁶³

Therefore, the ICEM Administration officials repeatedly and diplomatically highlighted, to the scheduled regular transport companies, that ICEM’s role was “supplementary to scheduled tonnage”; thus, the ICEM did not intend to substitute the pre-existing regular transport services, but to cover the additional transport needs of part of the migrant public. In this context, a system of communication with the Shipping Conferences⁶⁴ and the non-Conference passenger shipping company members was established under which ICEM informed them, on a regular basis, of its needs for space on their means of transport. Additionally, and from their side, the Conferences or the shipping companies informed the ICEM Administration about the vacancies on their passenger vessels in order to be filled by ICEM passengers.⁶⁵ When the ICEM Administration had already chartered passenger ships for the exclusive transport of its migrants in a route served by a Conference member-line or an independent passenger liner shipping company of an ICEM member-state with vacant space, both requested the cancellation of the trip of the ICEM chartered ship.⁶⁶ This request was usually approved, and these migrants were directed to their passenger vessels.

It is understood that ICEM was asked to work for the sustainability of the existing scheduled liner shipping routes after WWII. However, in the 1950s and 1960s, fares on the scheduled liner shipping and airline companies were higher than the fares that the ICEM Administration could ensure from the chartering of ships and aeroplanes for the exclusive transport of its migrants. This is also one of the reasons that the phrase “as far as possible” was added in the ICEM Constitution of 1954. Based on the leniency

⁶² AGMFA/Central Service, 1952/72/4/1, “Resolution to Establish a Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe (Adopted at the 13th Meeting, 5 December 1951)”.

⁶³ NARA/6th Session of the ICEM, Venice, October 12-21, 1953, ICEM, “Constitution”, MC/55, November 1953. Emphasis added.

⁶⁴ For more on the role of the Shipping Conferences, see Chapter 6.

⁶⁵ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/2/Shipping Division. Policy – Liaison with Canada, Vol. I, J.J. van Loon, Chief, Office of Shipping to J.R. Robillard, Chief, Canadian Government Immigration Mission, Baden, Germany, Personal, 15.02.1954.

⁶⁶ IOM-SW/General, OPS-20-094/Transport, W.H. Roper, Atlantic Conference, Copenhagen to J. J. van Loon, Chief, Office of Shipping, ICEM Geneva, 02.07.1954.

that this phrase provided, the ICEM Administration had more freedom to select the means of transport (regular or chartered) to be used based on the cost and quality offered. Eventually, ICEM could also (attempt to) restrain the political pressure imposed by the member-states, which wanted the exclusive use of scheduled regular means of transport.

In 1955, the ICEM Administration was overly concerned about the increased cost of transportation and initiated a discussion with the member-states for the additional use of chartered ships and aeroplanes by ICEM. Before bringing the matter to the ICEM institutions, the ICEM Deputy Director discussed it with the United States. He attributed the increased costs to the policy that promoted the use of scheduled regular liner ships and aeroplanes. Therefore, he suggested a different interpretation of the relative clauses of the Brussels Resolution and of the Constitution in order for the ICEM Administration to have better access in the charter market of transport means. The ICEM Deputy Director suggested that both scheduled regular liner ships and aeroplanes and chartered ships and aeroplanes would have the same priority for ICEM selection, irrespective of their simultaneous availability. He proposed that the selection criterion not only rely on the passenger capacity and the “standards of welfare and safety”, but also to take into consideration the price offered by the transport companies, with the ultimate goal being the savings in the ICEM funds. Acknowledging that, by bringing this matter for discussion in the ICEM institutions, the Administration would have to confront the opposition of the maritime countries (Italy, Greece, Spain, France); the ICEM Deputy Director privately asked for the US’s support on the Administration’s views as well as for the actual establishment of this policy. Upon that, the ICEM Deputy Director would try “to solicit the support of those Member-Governments who are sympathetic towards the difficult financial situation of the Committee and who would have the interest of assisted migration foremost at heart”,⁶⁷ namely instead of having as main interest of their participation in ICEM the support of the transport industry.

The above tactic initiated by the ICEM Deputy Director does not come as a surprise if we consider the American political influence within the Organisation. In case a policy of the ICEM Administration had the support of the United States, the probability of its success increased. The letter from the ICEM Deputy Director

⁶⁷ IOM-SW/General, Transport General–N.A.C. Accordo, P. Jacobsen, Acting Director to George L. Warren, Advisor on Refugees and Displaced Persons, Washington, 12.04.1955.

simultaneously reconfirms the system of *informal governance* in the operation of ICEM,⁶⁸ since the desirable outcomes were a product of private consultations and of influence on member-states, rather than an outcome based on formal procedures. Nevertheless, these practices were far from ICEM Administration's monopoly, as it will be seen.

In the next SCCT meeting, the ICEM Administration, in view of the increased cost of transport, stressed that preference for scheduled regular liner shipping companies should be given only if their fares were lower than the chartered ships and aeroplanes. The ICEM Administration clarified that no change in the transport policy was implied, but it was a way for the strengthening of the ICEM Administration's negotiating power over the liner shipping companies and the shipping Conferences. Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Germany, Norway, and Sweden—countries that, at that moment, did not have great stakes in the transportation business of ICEM—supported the opinion of the ICEM Administration. The United States, while agreeing on the reasonableness of the ICEM Administration's proposal, requested ICEM not to compete with the scheduled regular liner shipping companies and airlines. Italy, a long-established maritime country, suggested ICEM to seek price reductions from the scheduled regular liner shipping companies,⁶⁹ rather than chartering other passenger vessels. A few months later, Italy criticised the ICEM Administration for its thinking and urged its decisions not to be driven only by the “price of transportation”.⁷⁰

This discussion resulted in the adoption of Resolution No. 99 (II), which resolved that the ICEM Director would *ensure the maximum economy in securing transportation, utilizing commercial facilities to the maximum extent that they are available and adequate to conform with this policy*.⁷¹ Under this clause, *economy* was the prerequisite in the selection of transport means. However, the scheduled regular liner shipping and airline companies retained their priority in case they were conformed to the element of economy. The ICEM Administration seemingly garnered a win with

⁶⁸ R. W. Stone, “Informal governance in international organizations”, pp. 121-136.

⁶⁹ NARA/2nd Session of the Council and the Executive Committee of ICEM, Geneva, April 21-May 4, 1955, ICEM, “Report of the Sub-Committee on the Co-ordination of Transport”, 2nd Session, MC/132, 25.04.1955.

⁷⁰ NARA/3rd Session of the Council, Geneva, Oct. 17-22, 1955 and the Ex. Comm., October 6-22, 1955, ICEM, “Report of the Sub-Committee on the Co-ordination of Transport”, 3rd Session, MC/160, 15.10.1955.

⁷¹ NARA/2nd Session of the Council and the Executive Committee of ICEM, Geneva, April 21-May 4, 1955, ICEM, “Resolution No.99 (II) Resolution on the Report of the Sub-Committee on the Co-ordination of Transport (Adopted at the 12th meeting, 28 April 1955)”, 2nd Session, MC/139, 28.04.1955.

the support of the ‘solicited’ member-states by the ICEM Administration and, foremost, of the United States.

After the adoption and implementation of this policy, Italy accused the ICEM chartered passenger vessels of unfair competition against the scheduled regular liner shipping companies, especially on the homebound trip. The ICEM chartered ships embarked regular passengers/tourists for Europe in financially favourable terms to the latter, since no commission to booking agents was required.⁷²

Despite the new policy under Resolution No. 99 (II), the following years saw continued financial difficulties for ICEM. The ICEM Director, in 1959-1960, initiated anew the discussion with the United States, seeking support for a greater use of charters for air transport in an effort to lower ICEM’s transport costs.⁷³ According to the ICEM Director, savings of one million dollars could have been achieved in 1959 if the ICEM Administration was free to select the cheapest means of transport. Despite the intensified competition in the transport companies, ICEM could not fully benefit from better fares due to the conflicting business interests of its member-states.⁷⁴ The United States responded positively to the ICEM Administration’s request for support for a greater economy as long as the laws of the member-states were respected.⁷⁵

It is important here to remember the reason that ICEM Administration relied on American support. The United States, thus far in 1960, was the greatest financial contributor to ICEM by providing 46 percent of its total expenses. It was the country guaranteeing ICEM’s actual operation.⁷⁶ Amidst the Cold War, the American incentives for supporting ICEM were of a more political nature. Despite the lack of US state-owned liner shipping or airline companies, well-developed shipping and airlines companies, both scheduled and non-scheduled, participated in the ICEM migrant transport services under the American flag. Furthermore, since 1954, the wider policy

⁷² IOM-SW/General, Transport General–N.A.C. Accordo, Luciano Mascia, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Director General for Emigration Rome to Epinat, Deputy Director ICEM Geneva, 65/22100/985, Rome, 16.06.1958.

⁷³ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/1/Shipping Policy–Liaison with Washington, Vol. I, Marcus Daly to McCollum Deputy Administrator, Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, Office of Refugees and Migration Affairs, Dept of State, Washington, 10.07.1959.

⁷⁴ NARA/12th Session of the Council of the ICEM, Naples, May 5-13, 1960, ICEM, “Report of the Sub-Committee on the Coordination of Transport”, MC/396 (E), 06.05.1960.

⁷⁵ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/1/Shipping Policy–Liaison with Washington, Vol. I, George L. Warren, Adviser to the Department of State on Refugee and Migration Matters to Marcus Daly, Director, ICEM Geneva, 29.07.1959.

⁷⁶ More specifically, in 1959 the US contributed 30 percent of the administrative budget and 48 percent of the operational budget of ICEM, see A. Franghiadis, *op.cit.*, Tables 3, 6, 8 in pp. 101, 105-106, 108 respectively.

of the United States favoured the development of aviation, nationally and internationally, and, in 1960, carried 58 percent of the global air traffic, while Europe carried 24 percent and the rest of the world carried 18 percent.⁷⁷

The discussion for lower transport cost continued in the ICEM governing instruments. The ICEM Director, in view of the deficits in the ICEM finances, requested greater freedom in the chartering of passenger ships and aircraft by ICEM for the exclusive transport of its migrants. The European maritime countries involved, especially Italy, Greece, and Spain supported that “nothing should be done to disturb the shipping market”⁷⁸ and called for the ICEM Administration not to deviate from ICEM’s policy on the preference towards the scheduled regular liner shipping companies. Italy, in particular, warned that ICEM Administration’s practices “would stir competition”. It also accused ICEM of acting as a private enterprise “guided strictly by economic considerations”, blaming ICEM Administration for opportunism for taking “advantage of the present shipping crisis to create more and more difficulties for shipping lines”. This attitude could be “detrimental” with the end of the crisis, since, according to Italy, the ICEM Administration would have dispersed “the best means of transport now available”. Italy, along with Greece and Spain, did not hesitate to call the ICEM Administration for “prudence” before any change in policy was made. The Netherlands, more modestly, characterised the adoption of the “cheapest means of transport” as unwise in response to the ICEM’s financial difficulties. Greece praised the long-term operational and financial benefits offered to ICEM by the regular shipping lines.⁷⁹ In view of the start of the operation of a regular liner shipping company from Greece to Australia, Greece bilaterally requested from ICEM the exclusion of chartered transport companies, invoking the “letter and the spirit of the Constitution”, which dictated the use of scheduled regular liner shipping and airline companies by ICEM.⁸⁰

⁷⁷ Between 1956-1961, the United States shared nearly \$300 million for the development of foreign airline companies, while the State Department with the assistance of American international airlines worked for capacity-building assistance in allied countries for the development of national airlines. J. Van Vleck, *Empire of the Air*, pp. 200, 229-231, 238.

⁷⁸ NARA/11th Session of the Council of ICEM, Geneva, November 12-20, 1959, ICEM, “Report on the Eleventh Session of the Council of the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (adopted at the 104th meeting on 5 May 1960)”, 12th Session, MC/380/Rev.1, 25.05.1960.

⁷⁹ NARA/11th Session of the Council of ICEM, Geneva, November 12-20, 1959, ICEM, “Report of the Sub-Committee on the Co-ordination of Transport”, 11th Session, MC/361, 13.11.1959.

⁸⁰ IOM-SW/General, PRL-20-126/Greek Migrants to Australia/Greece-General, A. Joannides to Epinat, “Telephone conversation with Miss Alexandraki, Deputy for Liaison, Greece Mission, April 12, at 10.40 a.m.”, 12.04.1961.

The United States seconded the ICEM Administration's argument for economy in transport cost and underlined that, as long as migration was supported by international funding, the maximum economy was imperative in order for this funding not to be interrupted—an implied statement defining the conditions under which the United States would continue financing the transport of migrants through ICEM. Australia, which was seeking a greater deployment of its airlines in the ICEM air transport work, moderately supported the ICEM Administration by claiming that “all possibilities of transport” should be explored⁸¹ and, at the time, avoided taking a clear position in favour of air transportation.

It is noteworthy that, in the above discussion in the ICEM Session, representatives of shipping companies were present, as they had requested to observe the meeting; this was a clear indication of the penetration of the private sector in the ICEM's policy formation. The debate ended up by giving to the ICEM Administration a “certain freedom of judgement” within the established ICEM transport policy to use chartered means of transport for the exclusive transport of its migrants.⁸²

What is noticed from the previous discussions was the creation of sub-groups within ICEM by member-states sharing common interests. This is more visible in the case of the maritime member-states, which, in view of the tendencies for a change in the ICEM transport policy and the technological developments in air transport, had a lot at stake. The Italian, Greek, Spanish, and French delegates cooperated during the ICEM Sessions for the achievement of mutual goals and the retention of the policy of preference towards the scheduled regular liner passenger ships. Occasionally, they met before the commencement of the ICEM Sessions in order to agree on a common policy-line,⁸³ or exchanged letters requesting support in maritime matters.⁸⁴ Conglomerations

⁸¹ NARA/11th Session of the Council of ICEM, Geneva, November 12-20, 1959, ICEM, “Report of the Sub-Committee on the Co-ordination of Transport”, 11th Session, MC/361, 13.11.1959.

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ AGFMA/Central Service, 1963/35/7/1, Ελ. Γεωργαντόπουλος to Υπουργείον Εμπορικής Ναυτιλίας, Διεύθυνσιν Μελετών 1^{ov} Διεύθυνσιν Διοικήσεως, 06.05.1963.

⁸⁴ IOM-GR/Shipping 1952-1962, C. O. Wendling, Chief of Mission, Athens to M. Daly, Director, ICEM Geneva, 06.04.1960. The Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a letter to the Greek MFA requesting support in the upcoming ICEM Session in their request for the exclusive use of surface means in migrants' transport through ICEM. In this request, the ICEM Mission Athens suggested to the Greek Minister for Interior the Greek Delegation in ICEM Council to maintain a unified policy in the matter of migrants' transport, while explaining and trying to persuade why the Italian suggestion was not for the benefit of Greece, *ibid.*, Αλ. Ιωαννίδου, Υπαρχηγός της Αποστολής «Σημείωμα δια τον Κύριον Υπουργόν των Εσωτερικών: Ενιαία γραμμή δια την Ελληνικήν Αντιπροσωπείαν εις την Σύνοδον του Συμβουλίου και της Εκτελεστικής Επιτροπής της ΔΕΜΕ εν Νεαπόλει κατ' Απρίλιον-Μάιον 1060», Απόρρητον, Athens, 12.04.1960.

were not an unusual practice for the ICEM member-states, nor for the international organisations. It was a way for a group of countries sharing the same interests to achieve cumulating results.⁸⁵ On the other hand, the United States acted as a quasi-‘manager’ of ICEM. The ICEM Administration first discussed its policy-proposals with the United States officials, and then, upon the American political concurrence, these policies were brought for discussion with the rest member-states, where they were finally approved with American backing.

In any case, the chartering of passenger ships and aeroplanes by ICEM did not stop, but it fluctuated from year to year, per destination, and based on the ICEM operational needs. In 1958-1967, 1129 chartered flights by ICEM took place (500 to the United States, 629 to all other destinations).⁸⁶ In 1962, though, all ICEM migrants were transported by scheduled regular liner ships and aeroplanes.⁸⁷ Conversely, in 1969, ICEM chartered an aircraft every second day for the transport of its migrants from Europe, while about five scheduled regular liner passenger ships and/or aircraft embarked ICEM migrants every day.⁸⁸ The requests from the member-states for increased use of scheduled regular transport means did not stop. The ICEM Administration responded to their demands by requesting that the interested member-states increase their financial contributions in order for ICEM to satisfy their request.⁸⁹

In the following years, the further evolution in the aviation industry, with the introduction of jumbo jets, affected the pattern in migrant transportation. The increased transfer capacity and speed of jumbo jets resulted in a high percentage of empty seats on transatlantic flights. Therefore, the United States recommended ICEM to block space in scheduled regular airline services, rather than chartering aeroplanes for the transport of its migrants. In 1970, it was calculated that ICEM requirements for transport space on the transatlantic routes was only one percent of the scheduled transport services capacity.⁹⁰ The ICEM Administration followed the US advice to

⁸⁵ For the formation of other opposing groups within ICEM see, I. Limnios-Sekeris, “Imbalances in Decision-Making Processes”, *op.cit.*, pp. 87-96.

⁸⁶ IOM-SW/Registry, 10/1/1/USA1961-1975, F. Van Rossom, Division of Transport to S.K. Christensen, “ICEM Charter Flights”, 18.03.1968.

⁸⁷ IOM-SW/Library, ICEM, “Report of the Director on Transport”, 18th Session, MC/543, 04.10.1962.

⁸⁸ More specifically, bookings on 798 scheduled air services transporting 12,518 migrants were made, and by 81 chartered aircraft transported 13,182 migrants. IOM-SW/Library, ICEM, “Report of the Director on Transport for the First Six Months of 1969”, 31st Session, MC/935, 14.10.1969.

⁸⁹ IOM-SW/Registry, 10/1/1/ITA 1951-1968, G. Maselli to the Director, “Visit to Rome of Mr. Bettini and myself on 9th, 10th and 11th of December 1970”, 06.01.1971.

⁹⁰ IOM-SW/Library, ICEM, “Report of the Sub-Committee on the Co-ordination of Transport”, 33rd Session, MC/984, 24.11.1970.

book group flights in scheduled regular airline services. Hence, the percentage of the migrants moved by chartered aircraft was reduced to 44 percent in 1973. The simultaneous increase in fuel prices, due to the oil crisis, paid its merit, as well as the more frequent service of each air route.⁹¹ Due to the competitiveness of the ICEM group and the individual fares, no aircraft were chartered in 1977.⁹² Thereafter, the chartering of aircraft by ICEM for the transport of its migrants/refugees was chosen in case of crises, such as the crisis in Southeast Asia, when the movement of people from Indochina required immediate operational actions by ICEM.⁹³

The debate over the employment of scheduled regular liner passenger ships and aircraft versus chartered passenger ships and aircraft by ICEM was approached by the ICEM Administration under an operational and financial scope. For certain member-states this question was purely a business matter. The member-states competed for the employment of their state and private owned means of transport in order to secure the viability of the sea and air routes they served. It was also an effort to continue the capital accumulation through migrant transportation and to eliminate the need for direct governmental assistance in case the state-owned transport companies presented deficits. The role of the United States, once again, proved instrumental in the formation of the policies for the direction or conduct of business of the ICEM Administration—a role respected by the ICEM Administration's hierarchy, which resorted to the US leverage for the formation of the policies it recommended.

Nevertheless, the member-states had divergent interests that they wanted to succeed through their participation in ICEM. Therefore, friction did not stop at the debate on the scheduled regular liner ships and aeroplanes versus ICEM chartered ships and aeroplanes. The mode of transport employed (sea or air) was also of significant importance since the progressive changes in the transport sector were detrimental for the business interests of many countries and of many ICEM business partners.

⁹¹ IOM-SW/Library, ICEM, "Report of the Sub-Committee on the Co-ordination of Transport", 28th Session, MC/1089, 27.05.1974.

⁹² IOM-SW/Library, ICEM, "Addendum to Report of the Director on the Work of ICEM for the Year 1977. Report on Transport", 42nd Session, MC/1225/Add.1, 01.03.1978.

⁹³ IOM-SW/Library, ICEM, "Addendum to Report of the Director on the Work of ICEM for the Year 1980. Report on Transport", 47th Session, MC/1334/Add.1, 01.04.1981.

- Shipping vs. Airline Services:

As indicated, the selection of the transport means of ICEM was far from being merely an administrative and operational decision. It was equally, if not foremost, a political and financial decision, which required delicate tactics from the ICEM Administration's side. This was the case also for the selection between shipping and airline services, which, especially from the 1960s, constituted a recurrent discourse in the ICEM Sessions.

It has already been mentioned that ICEM had used aircraft for the transfer of migrants and refugees from the first year of its operations. The air transportation of vulnerable or urgent to be transferred cases was preferred, but these cases were the exception. In the early 1950s, the transfer by sea was comparatively less expensive towards all the ICEM destinations, while the transportation by air was largely associated with luxury, mainly due to the increased cost involved. What is more, until 1954, IATA maintained restrictions to its member-airlines on the chartering of their aircraft for the exclusive transport of migrants. Nevertheless, due to the regular shipping shortages faced until the mid-1950s, as discussed in Chapters 2 and 4, aeroplanes gained a foothold in the ICEM transport services,⁹⁴ since the ICEM operational needs for the timely transfer of its migrants made the finding of an alternative to shipping means of transportation imperative. The ICEM Administration believed that "all means or available transport had to be explored", as well as the advantages of air transport.⁹⁵ As early as 1954, the ICEM Administration favoured the use of aeroplanes in case no "delay or extra cost" occurred, in comparison with surface transport means.⁹⁶

With the forthcoming replacement of the obsolete piston engine aircraft by the technologically advanced jets, the ICEM Administration, in 1959, eagerly sought to take advantage of a larger deployment of the latter in the ICEM traffic. By using the air transport means "as a threat" against the shipowners, the ICEM Director aimed at the

⁹⁴ In 1954 there were shipping shortages from Italy, also in 1956 the Hungarian crisis required increased employment of air transport means, IOM-SW/General, OPS-20-079, Transport Air, L. Armanino to J.J. van Loon, "Voyage Report on Trip to Rome from 13 to 17 July 1954", 20.07.1954; NAA/A446, 1966/46165, H.J. Grant to Heyes, "ICEM Shipping: Australian Movements", 23.01.1957; Hudson et. al., *op.cit.*, pp. 130-133.

⁹⁵ NARA/10th Session of the Council of ICEM, Geneva, April 7-10, 1959, ICEM, "Report of the Sub-Committee on the Co-Ordination of Transport", 10th Session, MC/342/Rev.1, 17.04.1959

⁹⁶ NARA/8th Session of the Council and the Ex. Comm. of ICEM, Geneva, ICEM, "General Report of the Director: Supplement Covering the Period 1 October to 15 November 1954", 8th Session, MC/91/Add.1, 25.11.1954.

reduction of sea fares⁹⁷ and the induction of competition between the two modes of transport. Already, two years earlier, ICEM officials had tried to influence the Australian government to establish a migrant air-service through its national airline, Qantas, in the same footpath as KLM had followed earlier.⁹⁸

However, the long-established tradition of sea transport, especially from countries with an important maritime sector, did not make aeroplanes instantly attractive to all migrants, and many refused to fly for psychological reasons.⁹⁹ The ICEM Administration, though, wanted to “keep abreast” with the new developments in the transport sector¹⁰⁰ and to get more experience in air transport.¹⁰¹ Therefore, the ICEM Administration’s official policy was the migrants’ “freedom of choice” in the selection of their mode of transport (sea or air).¹⁰²

In intra-ICEM correspondence, the Administration’s respect for this principle was not so rigid. The ICEM Director, in 1961, instructed his Chief of Operations, irrespective of the preference of some migrants for sea movement, their wishes not to be followed if there were no “valid reasons against airflights”.¹⁰³ Likewise, in 1969, the ICEM Chief of Department of Transport recommended that the Chief of ICEM Mission in Germany try to use his “influence to induce migrants to travel by air”; the latter responded that he would continue the “campaign”.¹⁰⁴

The ICEM Director, in 1961, was opposed to the idea of reverting to a policy favouring sea transport means as his predecessors had followed; said policy

⁹⁷ IOM-SW/Registry, 1/1/AUST/Correspondence with Govt – Australia, Vol. III, ICEM Liaison Mission Canberra, “Summary of Discussions Held Between Officials of ICEM and the Department of Immigration in Canberra from 2nd February to 5th February, 1959”, n.d.

⁹⁸ NAA/A446, 1966/46165, H.J. Grant to Heyes, “ICEM Shipping: Australian Movements”, Confidential, 23.01.1957.

⁹⁹ NARA/5th Session of the Council and the Executive Committee of ICEM, Geneva, September 20 – October 6, 1956, ICEM, “Report of the Sub-Committee on the Co-ordination of Transport”, 5th Session, MC/206, 01.10.1956.

¹⁰⁰ NARA/11th Session of the Council of ICEM, Geneva, November 12 – 20, 1959, ICEM, “Report of the Sub-Committee on the Co-Ordination of Transport”, 11th Session, MC/361, 13.11.1959.

¹⁰¹ NARA/13th Sess. Docs MC/425-MC/441, ICEM, “Report of the Sub-Committee on the Co-Ordination of Transport”, 13th Session, MC/427, 01.12.1960.

¹⁰² NARA/ICEM, Council Documents, MC/Sixth Session (1st copy), ICEM Executive Committee, “Report of the Group of Experts on Shipping”, Restricted, MC/EX/42, 28.03.1957.

¹⁰³ IOM-SW/General, 313/Historical Background 1950’s–1960’s, Marcus Daly to Mr. Watson, Chief, Department of Operations, “Air and Sea Transportation”, 09.02.1961.

¹⁰⁴ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/3/Transport Liaison with Germany, Vol. IV, E. Jacob, Chief of Dept to A. Catsicas, ICEM Liaison Mission Bad Godesberg, 12.08.1969; *ibid.*, A. Catsicas, Chief, Liaison Mission ICEM Germany to Director, ICEM Geneva, POL/5, 14.08.1969. In the SCCT Report of 1968, the “right” of migrants in the selection of means of transport, was reported by the Administration that had continued “as far as possible”; an important change of wording from the side of the Administration, see IOM-SW/Library, ICEM, “Report of the Sub-Committee on the Co-ordination of Transport”, 29th Session, MC/887, 26.11.1968.

continuously increased the ICEM transport cost. The ICEM Director wanted the creation of a more competitive relation between sea and air transport means in the ICEM migrant transport services. Therefore, he supported the competition between the two modes of transport and dismissed “any responsibility to fill unused space [...] on commercial ships” which was beyond ICEM commitments.¹⁰⁵ Thus, in the second half of 1965, for the first time in ICEM migrant transport services, movements by air exceeded those by sea,¹⁰⁶ breaking the thirteen years of passenger vessels’ domination in the ICEM transport programme.

Simultaneously, the changes in the labour market brought about new realities in migration. The dominant conception of migrants in the early-1950s as a “surplus population” was altered in the mid-1960s with the immigration countries looking for cheap “manpower”, as labour was scarce, and the immigration countries needed workforce for immediate placement.¹⁰⁷ In addition, the economies of developed and developing countries required a more selective migration based on skills. The increasing need for skilled migration from the overseas immigration countries had, since the early 1960s, faced the progressive economic prosperity in Europe and thus the reluctance for overseas migration, as well as the diminishing traditional migration sources due to the increase of intra-European migration and the competition from Western European immigration countries. In this new context, the technological improvements in the aviation industry facilitated the acceleration of migration, as the faster, bigger, and more comfortable aircraft responded in a timely manner.

In the ICEM member-states, two main opposing groups representing shipping and airline interests were formed. As air transport was becoming financially advantageous towards certain routes and this mode of transport was chosen by the ICEM Administration, the resistance from the maritime countries and the shipping companies became fiercer. The main countries openly opposed to air transport were France, Germany, Greece, Italy, and Spain, while modestly opposed was the Netherlands. France, in particular, in an ICEM Session in 1959, defended the

¹⁰⁵ IOM-SW/General, 313/Historical Background 1950’s–1960’s, Marcus Daly to D. Zissopoulos, Secretary General, Ministry of Interior, 40/4/Gre, 27.02.1961: Draft.

¹⁰⁶ IOM-SW/Library, ICEM, “Report of the Director on the Work of the Committee for the Year 1965”, 25th Session, MC/768, 22.03.1966. In 1966 in particular the ICEM cost for an air-voyage to US was \$100 and by sea more than \$200, *ibid.*, ICEM, “Report of the Sub-Committee on the Co-Ordination of Transport”, 25th Session, MC/779, 11.05.1966.

¹⁰⁷ IOM-SW/Library, ICEM, “Report of the Sub-Committee on the Co-Ordination of Transport”, 25th Session, MC/779, 11.05.1966.

Organisation's "traditional policy", which dictated the employment of "slow means" for the transport of migrants; said mode of transport, according to the French delegate, enabled the migrants' adaptation to the idea of migration under humane conditions of transfer.¹⁰⁸

Greece, which, as mentioned from the end of 1959, had inaugurated a new regular liner shipping route to Australia, rigidly opposed the use of air transport. At the ICEM Sessions, Greece opposed the Administration's assertion on the competitiveness of air transfer in general by requesting the provision of data for the Australian route from Southern European countries. When the ICEM Administration provided these data, it was proved that sea transfer was cheaper for the South European-Australian route. Greece, with Italy's support, highlighted that sea transfer was in line with the general policy and of financial benefit for ICEM¹⁰⁹ and asked for its preference over aeroplanes. Under the pressure of Greek shipowners, the Greek government permitted only individual flights provided that there was no space available on Greek passenger ships.¹¹⁰ As the French and Italians did, Greece projected the humanitarian aspect of sea transfers and the need for the psychological preparation of the migrants. Greece did not hesitate to emphasise the country's important capital investment in the shipping industry and in the migration transport.¹¹¹ In an effort to bypass air transport and oppose the ICEM Administration's arguments on shipping shortage, the Greek government assured its readiness to assist in the finding of additional shipping space when needed.¹¹²

¹⁰⁸ NARA/10th Session of the Council of ICEM, Geneva, April 7-10, 1959, ICEM, "Report of the Sub-Committee on the Co-Ordination of Transport", 10th Session, MC/342/Rev.1, 17.04.1959.

¹⁰⁹ NARA/13th Sess. Docs MC/425-MC/441, ICEM, "Report of the Sub-Committee on the Co-Ordination of Transport", 13th Session, MC/427, 01.12.1960; NARA/14th Session of the Council of the ICEM, Geneva, May 11-17, 1961, ICEM, "Report of the Sub-Committee on the Co-Ordination of Transport", 14th Session, MC/464, 11.05.1961.

¹¹⁰ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/5/Shipping/Liaison with Australia Policy, J. van den Brink, Special Assistant (Transport) to the Director, J. Hübener, Chief of Transport Division, Memo for B.W. Haveman, "Briefing for the meeting with the Australian representatives on 21 March 1963, concerning share of Australian flag in air transport from Europe to Australia", 19.03.1963.

¹¹¹ IOM-SW/Library, ICEM, "Report of the Sub-Committee on the Co-Ordination of Transport", 26th Session, MC/806, 16.11.1966; *ibid.*, ICEM, "Report of the Sub-Committee on the Co-ordination of Transport", 31st Session, MC/944, 03.12.1969; *ibid.*, ICEM, "Report of the Sub-Committee on the Co-ordination of Transport", 33rd Session, MC/984, 24.11.1970.

¹¹² IOM-SW/Library, ICEM, "Report of the Thirtieth Session of the Council of the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration", 31st Session, MC/928/Rev.1, 08.12.1969.

Germany, as well as Spain, in the late 1950s, wanted to be consulted by the ICEM Administration before any definite change of policy.¹¹³ German opposition to air transfer was based on the support of its maritime and migration infrastructures. It was mainly concentrated on the use of its ports for the transfer of migrants and the transmigrants¹¹⁴ from neighbouring countries like Austria, for instance. Thus, it eagerly promoted the advantages of its ports and supported their connections with Canada and especially with Latin American countries¹¹⁵ in an effort to sustain the competition of the Italian ports where a substantial number of migrants heading to Latin American countries were coming from. Germany eagerly promoted its sea connections with Australia¹¹⁶—a sea-route that was not financially advantageous in comparison with the Italian ports, which were closer to the Suez Canal,¹¹⁷ the gateway to the Indian Ocean. Greater use of air transport would bring important financial difficulties for Germany. Its ports would be redundant for migrant traffic, as air transfer from neighbouring countries would potentially increase, and, therefore, the need for their train transfer to Germany would collapse. Furthermore, the competition between the German ports (Hamburg/Cuxhaven vs. Bremerhaven) and the neighbouring ones (Antwerp and Rotterdam), which continued since the 19th century, culminated with the attempt to secure migrant traffic. Hamburg and Bremerhaven were two of the greatest and busiest ports of Europe in the 20th century, and the homeports of great German shipping lines *HAPAG* and *Hamburg Süd*—amongst others in Hamburg—and *Norddeutscher Lloyd* (NDL) in Bremen, and were important shipbuilding centres that dominated in the cities' economies.¹¹⁸

¹¹³ NARA/10th Session of the Council of ICEM, Geneva, April 7-10, 1959, ICEM, "Report of the Sub-Committee on the Co-Ordination of Transport", 10th Session, MC/342/Rev.1, 17.04.1959.

¹¹⁴ For the financial importance of transmigrants in local communities, see P. K. Sebak, "A Transatlantic Migratory Bypass", op.cit.

¹¹⁵ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/3/Transport Policy, Liaison with Germany, Vol. I, G. Krause to Regierungsdirektor Dr. Neupert, Bundesverkehrsministerium Hamburg, 13.11.1953; IOM-SW/Registry, 1/1/ARG/Correspondence with Government—Argentina Vol. II, Jean Wiazemsky, Office of Operations to E. Storich, Chief, ICEM Liaison Mission B. Aires, "Conversations with Minister Gard in Rome", 20.05.1954.

¹¹⁶ IOM-SW/Library, ICEM, "Report of the Sub-Committee on the Co-Ordination of Transport", Thirtieth Session, MC/917, 22.05.1969; *ibid.*, ICEM, "Report of the Sub-Committee on the Co-ordination of Transport", 33rd Session, MC/984, 24.11.1970.

¹¹⁷ In 1954 the savings from the embarkation of German migrants in Genoa, including the respective cost of rail, instead of Bremerhaven was estimated at least £15 or \$42 per adult. IOM-SW/General, Transport General—N.A.C. Accordo, Chief, Office of Shipping to Acting Chief, Office of Budget and Administration, "Economies in the Operational Budget", 19.02.1954.

¹¹⁸ Michael B. Miller, *Europe and the Maritime World. A Twentieth-Century History*, New York, 2012, pp. 34-46, 77-78, 80; For the German shipyards, Gelina Harlaftis and Christos Tsakas, "The Role of Greek Shipowners in the Revival of Northern European Shipyards in the 1950s", in Niels P. Petersson,

In addition, *Camp Lesum* in Bremen, still in operation in early 1960s, was the pre-embarkation and transit centre for migrants, refugees, and trans-migrants, and would lose its value in the service of the German migration field. According to the bilateral agreement with Australia, Germany was obliged to run such a centre for the pre-embarkation preparation of those bound for Australia as well as for those going to Canada and, through the *Refugee Relief Act* programme, to the United States. According to the Migration Office of the Australian Embassy in Cologne, there had been “a lot going on behind the scenes in regard to shipping and air movement and the use of the Bremen-Lesum camp”.¹¹⁹ The German government expressed its opposition to air transport when available sea transportation from German ports was scheduled;¹²⁰ namely, they did not impose the use of national flag passenger ships, but the use of maritime infrastructure. In 1963, though, sea transport from Germany to Australia was more expensive than by chartered aircraft.¹²¹ However, in light of the development of its national airline, *Lufthansa*, and its airport infrastructure, the German government accepted 35 percent of the migrants departing from Germany to be transferred by air, preferably by Lufthansa.¹²² Germany promoted the use of its airports, since a respective competition between the German airports was taking place,¹²³ for the attraction of greater passenger traffic.

Stig Tenold, Nicholas J. While (eds), *Shipping and Globalization in the Post-War Era Contexts, Companies, Connections*, e-book, 2019, pp. 186-188, 197-199.

¹¹⁹ NAA/A446, 1966/46175, Australian Embassy Migration Office in Cologne to R.E. Armstrong-Geneva, 25.11.1960; IOM-SW/Registry, 1/1/GER/Operations, Correspondence with Government – Germany, Vol. V, H. Heegard, Chief, Liaison Mission Germany to Marcus Daly, Director, ICEM Geneva, “Camp Bremen-Lesum”, ADM/3004, 16.09.1958; IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/3/Shipping Liaison with Germany, Policy, Vol. III, H. Heegard, Chief, Liaison Mission Germany to Director ICEM Geneva, “Embarkation of Migrants”, OPS/1132A, 5888, 01.06.1960. From 1958 Camp Lesum in Bremen faced financial deficits and the Bremen Senate had reduced its staff and transit capacity since the Camp’s workload had considerably reduced.

¹²⁰ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/3/Shipping Liaison with Germany, Policy, Vol. III, H. Heegard, Chief ICEM Liaison Mission Germany to Director ICEM Geneva, “Departure Plan for the First Half-Year 1963-Australia”, OPS/AUS/2, 24.01.1963.

¹²¹ More specifically according to ICEM Administration in 1962 sea transport from Germany to Australia cost \$330.36 per capita, and by chartered aircraft \$314.30, see IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/3/Shipping Liaison with Germany, Policy, Vol. III, J. van den Brink, for the Director to H. Heegard, Chief ICEM Liaison Mission Germany, “Transport Programme first half year 1963 – Germany/Australia”, 30.01.1963.

¹²² IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/3/Shipping Liaison with Germany, Policy, Vol. III, H. Heegard, Chief ICEM Liaison Mission Germany to Director ICEM Geneva, “Transport Programme First Half-Year 1963 Germany/Australia”, OPS/AUS/2, 04.02.1963.

¹²³ The airports competing on ICEM traffic were those of Hamburg, Cologne/Bonn, Frankfurt and Bad Godesberg. IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/3/Transport Liaison with Germany, Vol. IV, “Gründe für die Verlegung der Charterflüge nach den USA vom Flughafen Hamburg auf den Flughafen Köln” n.d. [13.08.1965]; *ibid.*, A. Catsicas, Chief, Liaison Mission ICEM Germany to Director, ICEM Geneva, POL/5, 14.08.1969.

Italy, for decades, had heavily invested in its maritime industry and, after the end of WWII, created new financial institutions for the reconstitution and modernisation of its commercial fleet. Its immediate goal was the revitalisation of emigration, the promotion of sea tourism and exports, and the reactivation of domestic shipyards.¹²⁴ Bearing an increased importance and leverage within ICEM compared to other emigration member-states, Italy had managed beforehand to establish a protected system for its flag and especially of its well-established maritime industry. Firstly, Italy had raised restrictions on the use of non-Italian passenger vessels and aircraft for the transport of Italian migrants. Secondly, in many cases, Italy refused the provision of landing rights to aircraft of foreign airline companies (scheduled and non-scheduled). In 1954, the Italian government authorities instructed the airport officials of the country to prohibit the embarkation on aircraft of migrants holding Italian passports in an effort to protect and assist the Italian liner shipping companies and industry over the competition of foreign airlines.¹²⁵ Considering the agreements Italy had with the ICEM Administration on the priority of its flag over the foreign ones, as discussed earlier, the Italian shipping was not directly threatened from the increasing use of air transport as Greece and Germany were. Therefore, Italy did not participate so eagerly in the discussion on ICEM Sessions related to the increased use of air transport means as it did in the case of the use of ICEM chartered transport means. Italy supported the other maritime countries (Greece, Germany, France, the Netherlands, and Spain) in their claims against air transportation and did not fail, though, to instruct the ICEM Administration to respect the migrants' freedom of choice between sea and air transportation and not to exert any pressure in their selection.¹²⁶

On one side were the maritime countries, and on the opposite side were the countries in favour of air transfers including Australia, Belgium, Brazil, and the United States. What united these countries was the state ownership of airline companies in the case of Australia and Belgium, the political links between the airline ownership and the government in the case of Brazil, and the existence of an important privately owned and developing aviation industry in the case of the United States; besides, this country was actually paying the greatest part of ICEM transport operations.

¹²⁴ R. Giulianelli, "Ship financing in Italy", pp. 347-353.

¹²⁵ IOM-SW/General, OPS-20-079/Transport Air, L. Armanino to J.J. van Loon, "Voyage Report on Trip to Rome and Milan 30 September/4 October 1954", 07.10.1954.

¹²⁶ IOM-SW/Library, ICEM, "Report of the Sub-Committee on the Co-ordination of Transport", 27th Session, MC/833, 17.05.1967.

Initially, Australia had an ambivalent position towards the selection of mode of transport, possibly due to diverging interests within the government itself. From 1955, Australia promoted the principle of economy in the selection of transport means. Australia believed that migrants should not “be allowed to travel by a more expensive land and sea route, where cheaper and more satisfactory air travel was available”. It highlighted that the migrants should be persuaded to “travel by the method proposed by the Committee”.¹²⁷ In 1959, the Australian Department of Immigration expressed preference on the transportation of migrants to Australia by sea, since it was recognised that it permitted a certain period for the migrants’ optimal adaptation to the idea of resettlement. In addition, during the 25-30 days of sea voyage, migrants took accelerated English language courses, they could carry their luggage and working tools, and the reception mechanisms in Australia were readily available in ports rather than airports. The Australian Immigration officials promoted the air transfer through Qantas for vulnerable migrants.¹²⁸ Nevertheless, the Australian delegate in the ICEM session supported that his government tended to be in favour of sea transport for the aforementioned reasons, but stated a willingness to explore the advantages of air transport.¹²⁹

Until 1959, Australia did not have an important claim in participating in the ICEM migrant transport services, since there were no Australian-owned passenger shipping companies in this sea route, nor were its airline companies appropriately ready to transport migrants from Europe. The turning point in Australian policy was noted in 1960. Qantas’ introduction into the jet-era from 1958-1959 assisted the government in the expansion of Qantas’ employment in the ICEM transport programme. Until the mid-1960s, Qantas owned a considerable number of jets, while the government kept investing in Qantas’ fleet by setting its first jumbo jets into operation in 1971.¹³⁰ Thus, in 1960, Qantas established its migrant traffic from Europe, and the Australian government wanted to support it through ICEM funding. Hence, the Australian

¹²⁷ NARA/3rd Session of the Council, Geneva, Oct. 17-22, 1955 and the Ex. Comm., October 6-22, 1955, ICEM, “Report of the Sub-Committee on the Co-ordination of Transport”, 3rd Session, MC/160, 15.10.1955.

¹²⁸ IOM-SW/Registry, 1/1/AUST/Correspondence with Govt–Australia, Vol. III, ICEM Liaison Mission Canberra, “Summary of Discussions Held Between Officials of ICEM and the Department of Immigration in Canberra from 2nd February to 5th February, 1959”, n.d.

¹²⁹ NARA/11th Session of the Council of ICEM, Geneva, November 12–20, 1959, ICEM, “Report of the Sub-Committee on the Co-Ordination of Transport”, 11th Session, MC/361, 13.11.1959.

¹³⁰ Jim Glab, “From the Outback to the World: Qantas at 85 years”, *Air Transport World*, November (2005), p. 62.

delegates in ICEM meetings supported their country's claims in this traffic by highlighting their substantial financial contributions for the migrants' transport.¹³¹ In order to mollify the opposition from some emigration countries like Greece, which was concomitantly requesting the increase of the Greek emigration quota to Australia, the Australian government considered satisfying the Greek request while, at the same time, increasing the percentage of those to be moved by air.¹³²

It is of interest to note that the change in the Australian migrant transport policy was purely a result of financial reasons. The Australian government that had invested in new technology jet aeroplanes wanted to use the older redundant fleet of the 34 propeller-driven aircraft of Qantas in the ICEM migrant traffic.¹³³ Concurrently, in its bilateral migration agreement with the UK government, outside of ICEM scope, Australia did not insist on the air transport of the British migrants.¹³⁴ Australia did not have the same negotiation-power over the UK government in order to impose its preference for the use of its airline, as important British shipping interests were at stake in the Australian sea routes. In addition, according to the Australian immigration policy of the time, the British were considered as the most "desired" settlers in comparison to other Europeans. Thus, Australia would not risk losing this important for the country's migrant intake. Lastly, as migration through ICEM was co-subsidised by the US government through ICEM, Australia's migration cost and the cost of Qantas' operation was comparatively reduced.

The Australian Minister for Immigration, in a personal discussion with ICEM officials in 1962, confessed his "strong preference for sea travel" for social and psychological reasons.¹³⁵ This opinion, of course, was opposite to the central Australian policy, as expressed in the ICEM institutions and bilaterally with the ICEM

¹³¹ NARA/13th Sess. Docs MC/425-MC/441, ICEM, "Report of the Sub-Committee on the Co-Ordination of Transport", 13th Session, MC/427, 01.12.1960; NAA/A446/1966/46175, Australian Embassy Migration Office in Cologne to R.E. Armstrong-Geneva, 25.11.1960; NARA/14th Session of the Council of the ICEM, Geneva, May 11-17, 1961, ICEM, "Report of the Sub-Committee on the Co-Ordination of Transport", 14th Session, MC/464, 11.05.1961.

¹³² IOM-SW/Registry, 1/1/AUST/Correspondence with Govt-Australia, Vol. VI, Department of Plans and Liaison, "Notes on discussions between Mr. Heydon, Secretary, Department of Immigration, Australia, and Mr. Haveman, Director, ICEM: Friday, 13 July, 1962", n.d.

¹³³ AGMFA/Central Service, 1962/17/9/1, A.T. Σγουρδάτος, Διευθυντής Πληρεξούσιος Υπουργός Β' Υπουργείου Εξωτερικών, Διεύθυνσις Οικονομικών Υποθέσεων Τμήμα 1 to Β. Πρεσβεία Καμπέρας, Αθήνα, Φ1056AY-217, 11.09.1962. J. Glab, "From the Outback to the World", p. 60.

¹³⁴ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/4/Transport. Liaison with Italy, Vol. IV, Jan van den Brink, Division of Transport to B.W. Haveman, "Report on duty trip to Genoa and Rome on 10 and 11 June 1963", 13.06.1963.

¹³⁵ IOM-SW/Registry, 1/1/AUST/Correspondence with Govt-Australia, Vol. VI, Peter Gibson, "Note for the File", 26.06.1962.

Administration. Thus, it is understood that the Australian Immigration Department acknowledged the benefits of sea transport for the migrants (language tuition and cultural orientation, which assisted in smoother integration), while other governmental entities individually appreciated Australia's involvement in ICEM traffic. These diverging opinions did not alter the Australian policy, which continued in favour of the increase of air transport to 70-85 percent of air movements by Qantas. Thus, the Australian delegates praised the ICEM Administration for its "first-class work" in the field of transport¹³⁶ and the increasing percentage of air transport.

In sum, it is understood that the ICEM Administration maintained a dual policy in respect with the selection between sea and air transport means. Despite the principle of equal treatment between both modes of transport and the official statements during the ICEM Sessions, the Administration, especially during the 1960s, worked in favour of air transport and for the substitution of passenger vessels.

Nevertheless, migration and ICEM, unavoidably, followed the general technological innovations taking place in the wider transport sector. Aeroplanes dominated over sea transport means, and eventually the migrant traffic, along with the general passenger traffic, adjusted to new realities. However, for the member-states, how the ICEM migrant transport trade was conducted affected them significantly. Any operational change in the conduction of the migrant trade activated new political, financial, administrative, and entrepreneurial realities for the member-states and the participating businesses in the trade. The adjustment from sea to air transport was neither easy nor quick. It required state and private investments for the establishment or strengthening of transport infrastructures and businesses. It is only indicated that the adjustment to jet technology exceeded the \$3 billion expenses in the United States.¹³⁷ Therefore, the resistance from certain maritime countries in the 1960s towards a

¹³⁶ IOM-SW/Library, ICEM, "Report of the Sub-Committee on the Co-Ordination of Transport", 25th Session, MC/779, 11.05.1966. Similar requests for a 50:50 share of the migrant traffic from Italy and Spain were submitted also from Colombia in favour of its airline *Avianca* in 1963, in a period when migration to Colombia was considerably increasing, see IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/6/Shipping-Liaison with South America, Vol. II, J. van den Brink, Special Assistant to the Director (Transport), Division of Transport to A. Venegas Tamayo, Chief, ICEM Liaison Mission Bogota Colombia, "Reception of ICEM migrants in Cartagena", 30.05.1963.

¹³⁷ Apart from the purchase cost of the new airplanes, the ground airport facilities, and equipment needed to be adjusted to the new technology, as well as the strengthening and lengthening of runways, the expansion of passenger terminals and maintenance facilities, alteration in ticketing and luggage procedures, amongst others. The same expenses applied to the transition from jets to jumbo-jets. For more, see Van Vleck, *op.cit.*, pp. 247, 272-274.

transition or alteration of the ICEM transport practices of the 1950s was intense—much was at stake.

ICEM was an organisation born out of the capitalist system; it followed the financial and business practices of the states that formed it, prominently, of the United States. In this line, the ICEM Directors were in close contact with the United States government regarding the formation of ICEM transport policy before the rest of the governments became aware. ICEM followed the capitalist principles in the conduction of its transport duties, namely the increase of competition with ultimate goal the cost reduction. This was, in the long-term, detrimental for certain national business and fiscal interests, even if assurances and projections towards member-states that “sea transport would never disappear” were made by the ICEM Chief of the Department of Transport in 1966.¹³⁸

- Safety at Sea & in Air:

The transoceanic voyage throughout the 19th and the first half of the 20th century was far from uneventful. Several safety and fatal incidents have been noted with migrants on board ships; the most well-known incident was the shipwreck of *Titanic* in 1912 which numbered about 1,500 victims. *Titanic*’s sinking belatedly led the international community to the adoption of the *International Convention for the Safety at Sea*, which was signed in London in 1948, installing terms for the construction of vessels, their configuration, and their life saving appliances.¹³⁹ The authorities of the signatory governments had to inspect the vessels within their territory and ports and, based on the terms of the Convention and their national regulations, issued safety certificates.

The *International Refugee Organisation* (IRO) received severe criticism from part of the Press, which called its vessels as *slave ships* or *floating coffins*, highlighting cases of refugee-passengers committing suicide while on board ship or the high infant mortality.¹⁴⁰ With the establishment of PICMME/ICEM, the Director declared a commitment to improving the standards in the ships used by the Organisation.¹⁴¹ In

¹³⁸ IOM-SW/Library, ICEM, “Report of the Sub-Committee on the Co-Ordination of Transport”, 26th Session, MC/806, 16.11.1966

¹³⁹ For the *International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1948*, available online at <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/1960/1.html>, retrieved 27.08.2022.

¹⁴⁰ NAA/A1838, 80/1/3/2/1, F. Nosov, “With the Slavs on the Fifth Continent”, *The Slavs*, Dec. 1950.

¹⁴¹ NARA/PICMME, 1952, February 18-23, 2nd Session, Geneva, PICMME, “Report of the Sub-Committee for the Co-ordination of Transport”, PIC/39, 22.02.1952.

September 1952, a few months after PICMME's initiation of operation, a Committee of Experts under the *International Labour Organization* (ILO) convened in Naples and made recommendations for new standards on accommodation and welfare of migrants on board ships and unsuccessfully proposed the signing of an International Convention on the subject.¹⁴²

ICEM participated in the aforementioned event. The Organisation generally based the selection of means of transport for its migrants on the standards of accommodation agreed by the ILO Committee Experts. In addition, throughout its operation and along with the shipowners, the Organisation sought further improvements in the passenger vessels it used.¹⁴³ Nevertheless, it was admitted that, especially during its first years, the ICEM Administration chose ships of lower standards that were unsuitable for long voyages and voyages through tropical zones.¹⁴⁴ It was a formal confession by the ICEM Administration made in front of all its member-states at the ICEM plenary Sessions, implying that the welfare of its migrants was of secondary importance in comparison with the deadlines and programme requirements set by immigration countries and the interests of the shipping companies.¹⁴⁵ In certain cases, some passenger vessels selected did not even meet the London 1948 International Convention for the Safety at Sea,¹⁴⁶ endangering foremost migrant lives and secondly the reputation of the *Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration* and of the governments involved.

¹⁴² IOM-SW/General, Transport, Welfare, to J.J. van Loon, Chief, Department of Shipping, "Report on the Meeting of I.L.O.'s Committee of Experts on Accommodation and Welfare of Migrants on Board Ships - September 22nd-25th, 1952", 09.10.1952. At the *ILO Committee of Experts* participated representatives from Italy, France, Norway, the USA, Germany, and the Netherlands. Observers had been sent from WHO, PICMME, the International Shipping Federation, International Workers' Federation, the Shipowners' Group, and ILO. For more, *ibid.*, ILO, "Committee of Experts on the Accommodation and Welfare of Migrants on Board Ship List of Members and Observers", Annex/2, [n.d.]. Recommendations made at the ILO convention included the reduction in dormitory size, improvements in ventilation, sanitary facilities, and life-saving equipment, and instalment of the air-conditioning system, among others.

¹⁴³ NARA/8th Session of the Council and the Ex. Comm. of ICEM, Geneva, ICEM, "General Report of the Director for the Period 1 May-30 September 1954", 8th Session, MC/91, 20.10.1954.

¹⁴⁴ NARA/3rd Session of the Council, Geneva, Oct. 17-22, 1955 and the Ex. Comm., October 6-22, 1955, ICEM, "Report on Progress Since the Second Session of the Council covering the period 1 May-15 August 1955. Submitted by the Director", 3rd Session, MC/152, 09.09.1955; *ibid.*, ICEM, "Report of the Sub-Committee on the Co-ordination of Transport", 3rd Session, MC/160, 15.10.1955.

¹⁴⁵ Limnios-Sekeris, "The Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration and the Transport Business (1952-1960)", pp. 130-131.

¹⁴⁶ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/6/Shipping. Policy-Liaison with S. America, Vol. I, Luigi Armanino to Edgardo Storich, ICEM Liaison Mission Buenos Aires, 20.10.1953.

With the increase of the complaints on the conditions on board ships from the migrants' side, ICEM started discussing, in 1956, the establishment of a special inspection service at the port of embarkation for the passenger vessels under ICEM contract sailing to Australia; this trip was one of the longest and encountered increased difficulties.¹⁴⁷ Starting with inspections of the vessels in the Australian sea routes was considered necessary, as, in many cases, the lifesaving and fire-fighting appliances were found to be in a "deplorable state".¹⁴⁸ The Australian government warned ICEM that in the future, it would not permit such passenger vessels to leave the first port of call in Australia unless the repairs were fixed as had actually prohibited departure of two Italian and one Greek vessel in early 1956.¹⁴⁹

Nevertheless, the problems did not stop, and passenger vessels used by ICEM with valid safety certificates faced safety problems. Two incidents that put migrant lives at risk made the ICEM Administration examine a more rigid inspection system. More specifically, in April 1958, *Skaubryn*, a Norwegian passenger vessel chartered by ICEM, sank in the Indian Ocean after a fire broke out in the vessel's engine. No loss of life occurred, as the migrants were safely transferred to other vessels that were called for assistance. Thereafter, in May 1959, the Spanish passenger vessel *Montserrat* experienced multiple problems on its way to Australia. The vessel stopped for two days amidst the Indian Ocean because of damages in its engines. Following this event, the engines stopped working two more times, resulting in the prolongation of the trip to 55 days instead of 21. In addition to the above, problems in the air-conditioning system and inadequate supply of food and lack of water produced tension between the crew and the ICEM passengers from Greece and Spain.¹⁵⁰

The *Montserrat* incident was discussed in the Australian Senate, and a protest in strong terms was lodged at ICEM declaring Australia's intention to discuss the incident in the ICEM Council. In this context, Spain asked the ICEM Administration's intervention in ascertaining Australia's actual intentions in order to avoid such a

¹⁴⁷ NARA/4th Session of the Council and the Executive Committee of ICEM, Geneva, February 14-26, 1956, ICEM, "Report of the Sub-Committee on the Co-ordination of Transport", 4th Session, MC/180, 20.02.1956.

¹⁴⁸ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/5/Shipping, Policy Liaison with Australia & N. Zealand, Vol. I, C.H. McFadyen, Secretary, Department of Shipping and Transport, Melbourne to Secretary DIMC, "Migrant Ships – Life Saving and Fire Equipment", 55/2536, 14.03.1956.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., T.H.E. Heyes, Secretary, DIMC to the Acting Chief of Mission, ICEM Canberra, 20.03.1956; "Liner's lifeboats rotting", *Sydney Daily Telegraph*, 20.03.1956.

¹⁵⁰ Limnios-Sekeris, "Stakeholders and competition", p. 109; Limnios-Sekeris, "The Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration and the Transport Business", pp. 129-130.

surprise in the Council.¹⁵¹ Therefore, the ICEM Administration initiated a private discussion with the governments of Australia, Spain, and Greece, and the Montserrat owning shipping company, *Transatlantica Company*. An adverse Press campaign on the Montserrat voyage had repercussions for all the involved parties, and the Spanish government expressed its worries that its prestige was at stake. The ICEM Director chose to “hush up the whole affair”¹⁵² and, in view of “solidarity and friendship of governments”, to abstain from discussing Montserrat in the ICEM Council, as it was considered only a “maritime incident”. However, the ICEM Director, as a compromise, suggested deliberating a general discussion on the topic of safety of life at sea in the ICEM Session¹⁵³ “without offending the susceptibilities of legitimate companies and without violating the sovereignty of national laws”.¹⁵⁴ It is worth noting here that, even according to a report of the *United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organisation* (UNESCO) in 1958, the Spanish merchant fleet was already, to a large extent, obsolete. Some vessels built before 1898 were still in operation, while two-thirds of the Spanish merchant fleet had been constructed before the Second World War.¹⁵⁵

Based on the understanding concluded with the governments involved, in early 1960, the ICEM Administration prepared and shared, with all the ICEM member-states, a guide for the safety at sea and in the air of migrants moved by ICEM. The guide foresaw that, besides the inspections of the national authorities for the issuance of safety certificates of the passenger vessels, ICEM would examine these certificates anew. It would inspect all the passenger ships it chartered for the exclusive transport of its migrants at least once in a year, ensuring that these vessels met the ICEM requirements regarding life-saving equipment, fire-fighting appliances, accommodation, amenities, services, and welfare. For the passenger ships employed on a contractual basis for the

¹⁵¹ IOM-SW/Registry, 1/1/SPA/Operations. Correspondence with Government-Spain, Vol. VI, Carlos M. R. De Valcarcel, Ministerio de Trabajo to Bartolome Jorge Epinat, Director Adjunto del CIME Ginebra, 16.10.1959.

¹⁵² NAA/A446, 1966/46172/1973606, Bob Armstrong-Australian Delegation to the European Office to the UN, Geneva to Heyes, Personal and Confidential, 03.11.1959; IOM-SW/Registry, 10/1/1/SPA 1951-1968, C. Fedele to A.R. Driver, “Visit of Mr. De Valcarcel to the Director on 2 July 1959”, 10.07.1959.

¹⁵³ NAA/A446, 1966/46172/1973606, L.J. Arnott-Permanent Representative to the Secretary DEAC, “ICEM Migration Ship ‘Montserrat’”, 524, 22.10.1959; IOM-SW/Registry, 1/1/SPA/Operations. Correspondence with Government-Spain, Vol. VI, Leopoldo Boado, Under Secretariat of the Merchant Marine, General Directorate of Shipping to B.G. Epinat, Deputy Director of ICEM Geneva, 31.10.1959; *ibid.*, B.G. Epinat to Carlos Maris Rodriguez de Valcarcel, Directeur general, Institute espagnol d’Emigration Madrid, 02.11.1959.

¹⁵⁴ IOM-SW/Registry, 1/1/SPA/Operations. Correspondence with Government-Spain, Vol. VI, B.G. Epinat to Carlos Maria Rodriguez de Valcarcel, Directeur general, Institute espagnol d’Emigration Madrid, 02.11.1959. Sentence translated from Spanish.

¹⁵⁵ Eichengreen, *op.cit.*, p. 212.

first time, ICEM would request an independent surveyor appointed by the shipping company to inspect the vessel's life-saving equipment and fire-fighting appliances in front of an ICEM observer. Regarding the safety in air, the system of surveillance by national regulatory authorities would be maintained. In addition, the ICEM officers would continue visiting the competent aviation authorities of ICEM member-states to observe the control procedures applied to aircraft clearance.¹⁵⁶

The aforementioned guide was discussed in the session of the ICEM *Sub-Committee on the Coordination of Transport* (SCCT) and the ICEM Council in May 1960. The maritime countries of Spain, Italy, Germany, Greece, France, and secondarily the Netherlands declared that ICEM had no authority and legal justification to conduct or to request further inspections. On the contrary, ICEM had to accept the safety certificates issued by the competent national authorities and, if needed, to consult them for additional information. According to the aforementioned countries, ICEM's competence stopped in the selection of the best passenger ships and opposed the appointment of a Safety Inspection Officer by ICEM. Instead, they suggested the presence of an ICEM representative during the inspection by the national authorities for comments concerning the conditions of hygiene and comfort acceptable to the country of destination. The ICEM Director reminded that not all the ICEM member-states were signatories of the 1948 *International Convention on the Safety of Life at Sea* under which the national certificates were issued. Therefore, he requested a decision from the ICEM member states if the proposed presence of an independent observer during the inspections by the national authorities for the issuance of a safety certificate was unnecessary, as well as if the existence of national safety certificates relieved ICEM of the responsibility of the safety conditions on the vessels transferring its migrants.¹⁵⁷

Australia, supported by Canada, New Zealand, the Scandinavian countries, and the United States, agreed with the inspection system suggested by the ICEM Director, considering that ICEM and the participating governments had, collectively and individually, a moral responsibility towards its migrants on safety issues. It was also

¹⁵⁶ NARA/12th Session of the Council of the ICEM, Naples, May 5-13, 1960, ICEM Information, "Safety at Sea and in the Air of Migrants Moved by ICEM", 12th Session, MC/INF/80, 28.03.1960; *ibid.*, Annex I, "Questions Referred to in Paragraph 51", MC/396; *ibid.*, ICEM Summary Records, "Summary Record on the One Hundred and Fifth Meeting, held at the Mostra d'Oltremare, Naples on Friday, 6 May 1960, at 10.15 a.m.", 12th Session, MC/C/SR/105, 14.06.1960.

¹⁵⁷ NARA/12th Session of the Council of the ICEM, Naples, May 5-13, 1960, ICEM, "Report of the Sub-Committee on the Co-Ordination of Transport", 12th Session, MC/396 (E), 06.05.1960.

reminded that the arrival of several passenger ships in Australia with inadequate safety devices gave rise to unfavourable publicity to ICEM and Australia.¹⁵⁸

Without being able to reach an agreement on the ICEM Director's request, the member-states concluded the question of the ICEM inspections. It only reconfirmed their concern for the safety of persons transferred by ICEM and instructed the Director to ensure this concern was met.¹⁵⁹ The ICEM Administration continued an *ad hoc* and, on an unofficial basis, the inspection of vessels chartered by ICEM with the support of an independent surveyor appointed by the shipping company and acceptable to ICEM; meanwhile, an ICEM official also observed the inspection. This form of inspection had already taken place in three countries after mutual agreement with the shipping companies and reflected the moral responsibility of ICEM for the safety of the transport means selected. The legal responsibility was covered by the safety certificates issued by the national authorities. Australia was disappointed with the non-formalisation of the inspection procedure.¹⁶⁰ Italy, Spain, and Greece maintained their disagreement with the existence of a second system of inspection. Nevertheless, they accepted that it was conducted on an unofficial basis and after consultation with the shipping companies.¹⁶¹

It is of interest to note that, despite Italy's disagreements with the ICEM inspection system, when mechanical problems were detected on FANU vessels carrying Italian migrants, Italy did not miss the opportunity to request ICEM's intervention and inspection of the vessels.¹⁶² However, the financial difficulties faced

¹⁵⁸ NAA/A446, 1966/46174/1973657, I.D. Emerton, Australian Delegation to the ICEM Naples to R.E. Armstrong-DIMC, Personal, Confidential, 05.05.1960; NARA/12th Session of the Council of the ICEM, Naples, May 5-13, 1960, ICEM, "Summary Record on the One Hundred and Fifth Meeting, held at the Mostra d'Oltremare, Naples on Friday, 6 May 1960, at 10.15 a.m.", 12th Session, MC/C/SR/105, 14.06.1960.

¹⁵⁹ NARA/12th Session of the Council of the ICEM, Naples, May 5-13, 1960, ICEM, "Summary Record on the One Hundred and Fifth Meeting, held at the Mostra d'Oltremare, Naples on Friday, 6 May 1960, at 3.20 p.m.", 12th Session, MC/C/SR/106, 15.06.1960.

¹⁶⁰ NAA/A446, 1966/46174/1973657, I.D. Emerton, Australian Delegation to ICEM, Naples to R.E. Armstrong, DIMC, 5, Personal & Confidential, 11.05.1960; NARA/13th Session of the Council of the ICEM, Geneva, December 1-9, 1960, Annex II, "Safety of Life at Sea of Migrants Moved by ICEM", MC/422, 27.10.1960.

¹⁶¹ NARA/13th Sess. Docs MC/425-MC/441, ICEM, "Report of the Sub-Committee on the Co-Ordination of Transport", 13th Session, MC/427, 01.12.1960.

¹⁶² IOM-SW/General, 313/Historical Background 1950's-1960's, Warren Graham Fuller, Chief of Mission ICEM Rome to Marcus Daly, Director ICEM Geneva, c42, 21.03.1961.

by ICEM in the first half of 1966 resulted in the complete discontinuance of the inspection system of passenger vessels and aeroplanes due to budgetary limitations.¹⁶³

In conclusion, from the *Montserrat* incident, an effort was made to conceal this security incident, not only from the side of the ICEM Administration, but also from the flag country of the passenger vessel, Spain. In the event that the *Montserrat* incident was discussed to a greater extent, ICEM endangered its reputation, Spain would face sanctions for non-compliance of its safety certificates with the London 1948 Safety Convention and the transport company would face both fines and adverse reputation, risking its viability. However, it was not the first time that a member-state was asking the ICEM Administration not to raise matters of non-compliance with safety protocols on their passenger vessels. In 1953, in light of the problems in the Argentinean *Dodero Line* passenger ships, the government of Argentina mentioned to ICEM that it “would not like to be involved in unfavourable criticism following non-compliance with the London Convention”.¹⁶⁴

The ICEM Administration publicly confessed the selection of not suitable or below-standards passenger vessels while complying with requests for discretion of its member-states when a safety incident occurred. This handling of safety issues was in contradiction with the public advocacy of the ICEM Administration in favour of the upgrade of the standards of safety and accommodation on the vessels it used. The stance of the ICEM Administration reveals that its member-states were in the centre of its interests and not the migrants, reconfirming that ICEM was a state-led organisation.

The formation of opposing groups within ICEM is visible also in the case of inspections. The maritime member-states were grouped against the member-states in the promotion of additional safety inspections on vessels; the common characteristic of the latter was that all owned airline companies. Different business interests dictated different strategies among the ICEM member-states. We also need to keep in mind that, in 1960, when the discussion on inspections took place, the air-trip competed for a growing slice of the ICEM transport work.

On the other side, the maritime countries defended their inspection systems and were opposed to ICEM’s intentions; it was seen as an effort for intrusion into matters

¹⁶³ IOM-SW/General, ICEM IV, 1951-1980, Department of Transport, “Memo for Chief, Department of Administration”, 28.06.1966.

¹⁶⁴ IOM-SW/General, OPS-20-095/Transport, Sea Commercial-America/Latin America, J. J. Van Loon, Chief, Office of Shipping to Hugh Gibson, Director, “Report on Trip to Italy, October 23-29, 1953”, 31.10.1953.

of national sovereignty. In this additional system of inspections, the Italian liner shipping companies participating in ICEM transport work reacted as well by claiming that they “did not see any possibility” for additional inspections from the ones foreseen by the Italian law and the international sea convention.¹⁶⁵ The claim of ‘sovereignty’ was what decreased ICEM’s momentum, as its Administration was always sensitive in national sovereignty matters.

However, the ICEM system of inspection was finally established indirectly, even on an informal basis. ICEM’s intention can be seen as an effort for the welfare of migrants in transit and as an effort for the protection of ICEM’s reputation. We can also examine this endeavour as an attempt from ICEM’s side to fill a gap it identified in the international system. More specifically, the *Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organisation* (IMCO) was the specialised organisation of the *United Nations* for regulating maritime transport, and it also enacted the rules for the inspection system. IMCO, though, had no operational power to conduct such inspections. This duty was delegated to the competent national maritime authorities. ICEM acknowledged this gap in the international system and considered filling it, at least for the transport means of which it made use. This is an indication of ICEM’s *entrepreneurialism* in which it identified gaps in the existing migration systems, raised awareness, and claimed the filling of these gaps through its services. A *humanitarian entrepreneurialism*, as it has recently been characterised, distinguished ICEM from its early years up until its most recent history.¹⁶⁶

Indirect Pressure: Transport Companies & Governments

The governments had an important incentive to support their transport companies to enlarge their business, since their outcomes were inextricably linked with the national economy. The employment of a regular overseas route financially mobilises not only the transport company, but also the wider local and national economy/economies where it operates. More specifically, in 1962, through the regular service of two passenger vessels from Greece to Australia, the *Greek-Australian Line* spent a total of 70.5-75.5

¹⁶⁵ IOM-SW/General, SIT-00-054/Reports. Trip Reports. Reports from the Missions-Countries/Italy, O. Golbs-Wilms, Chief of Department of Shipping, “Note for the File: Discussion in Milan on 8 and 9 February, 1960, with Messrs. Gicacchino Lauro and Venbacher of Flotta Lauro”, 11.02.1960.

¹⁶⁶ Bradley, *op.cit.*, pp. 8, 49-50.

million Greek Drachmas (GDR)—or US\$2.35-2.51 million—in the 1960s currency terms (Table 5.8). The above sums were the result of the employment of only two passenger vessels in a certain sea route, not considering the rest of *Greek-Australian Line*’s passenger vessels or even the vessels of other companies under the same flag, nor the company’s expenses at the ports where it called, as well as in Australia: its final destination.

Table 5.8: Expenses by the <i>Greek-Australian Line</i> in 1962 paid in the Greek market	
Type of Expenses	Amounts (in million GDR)
Crew salaries	35
Office staff salaries	2
Office expenses	3
Vessels’ Food supplies purchased in Greece	12-13
Repairs in Greek industries	7-8
Direct and indirect taxes towards the state	4.5
Payments to other public organisations	7-8
<i>Note:</i> The exchange rate in US\$ to Greek drachmas currency in 1960-1972 was 1 US\$ for 30 drachmas.	
<i>Source:</i> «Η Τριετία της Γραμμής Αυστραλίας», <i>Naftika Chronika</i> , 662/421, 01.01.1963.	

The economic contribution through the employment of passenger vessels or aircraft was important. Economic sectors apart from the shipping sector were mobilised through the overseas transfer of migrants and of passengers in general.¹⁶⁷ For example, hotels, restaurants, and retailer shops were established and operated in order to accommodate, feed, and supply the migrating/travelling population. These businesses employed staff, paid taxes, and were supplied by or supplied other local businesses. In the return traffic of the passenger vessels, they transported tourists, amongst others, who contributed to the currency reserves of the country by using the services of the aforementioned businesses.

The private-owned transport companies acknowledged their negotiation power, and, in the case of the ICEM transport programme, they exerted the necessary pressure on their governments. From their side, the governments mediated with the ICEM Administration in order to facilitate the greatest possible employment of their transport companies in the ICEM’s transport business. In the case of state-owned transport companies, there was no external-to-the-government mediation for the submission of

¹⁶⁷ For example, the vessels were equipped with a kitchen, furniture, and linen for the decks and berths, among others. An overview of the contribution of the shipping sector to the Greek economy in the post-WWII period offers, Gelina Harlaftis, *Greek Shipowners & Greece 1945-1975*, London, 1993, pp. 61-126.

such requests. The government's desires were submitted directly to the ICEM Administration after a discussion with the various Ministries and governmental organisations.

Hereunder, we will focus on the examination of the relation between the governments and the state/private owned transport companies regarding the involvement of the latter in the ICEM transport business. The cases of Belgium, Greece, Brazil, and Australia are examined in more detail; said cases are indicative of the level of intrusion of the private sector in politics and in migration, as well as of the politics in business.

- Belgium:

Belgium was not a country directly involved in emigration through ICEM, since less than 26,000 Belgian emigrants and refugees from Belgium were assisted by ICEM between 1952 and 1980 (see Tables 2.1, 2.2, 2.3). However, the country had a keen interest in migration business. This interest was admitted by the Belgian representative in a meeting of the *Sub-Committee on the Co-ordination of Transport* (SCCT), when he stated that his country was “not vitally concerned with the problem of migration”, but what kept Belgium within ICEM was the transportation of “migrants and refugees on Belgian” transport companies.¹⁶⁸ This was a direct expression of the business and financial incentives of the Belgian government from its membership in ICEM.

In this direction, as early as 1953, *Sabena Airlines*, the country's state-owned airline company, proposed a change to the Belgian government in the way of contribution to ICEM. Instead of financial contributions, it contemplated offering in-kind services in the form of seats in its aeroplanes for use by ICEM. The Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which was under Sabena's pressure to satisfy its demands, requested the allocation of a larger number of emigrants for the country's airline from ICEM.¹⁶⁹

In 1953-1954, Belgium proceeded to a free financial contribution to the ICEM operational budget, which would not be linked to a specific purpose of the ICEM

¹⁶⁸ IOM-SW/Library, ICEM, “Report of the Sub-Committee on the Co-ordination of Transport”, 38th Session, MC/1089, 27.05.1974.

¹⁶⁹ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/2/5/Transports, Sabena Airlines, Vol. I, Ministère des Affaires étrangères, Commerce Extérieur Bruxelles to Jacobsen, Directeur du CIME Geneve, BCG/Belg/92/926, 11.09.1953.

Operational Budget, but the ICEM Administration could use this sum of money based on its needs. After doing so, the Belgian government demanded its airline to be considerably used in the ICEM migrant transport services. Belgium did not hesitate to warn the ICEM Administration that, by failing to award contracts to Sabena Airlines, they would be obliged to pay their contribution in kind, namely air transport services instead of cash;¹⁷⁰ the Belgian government constantly repeated the warning when it felt that the level of its financial contribution did not correspond with the extent of Sabena Airlines' employment in the ICEM transport programme.¹⁷¹

Sabena Airlines, in the early 1950s, was expanding and tried to strengthen its routes to European countries, the Near East, Africa, and the United States and requested ICEM's support in this direction. In 1954, ICEM did not have considerable migrant traffic to the Near East and to Africa, while towards the United States, the American shipping and airline companies retained their exclusivity. After a month of the Belgian declaration in SCCT meetings, the ICEM Administration privately asked Belgium and Sabena Airlines to make "concrete offers" for intra-European flights for certain groups of refugees that currently ICEM transported from Germany, Austria, and Trieste to England¹⁷² and from Athens to Brussels. The ICEM Administration hastened to declare that Sabena Airlines' offers were not the most competitive in comparison with those received by other airlines, but Sabena Airlines would be awarded the contract anyway in the event that the funding for these flights was secured by the donor of the movements;¹⁷³ this promise violated ICEM procedures regarding the offering of contracts to the most competitive bid by the interested airlines.

The Belgian government, in order to secure the contract, pressed and managed Sabena Airlines to lower its offers for the ICEM flights,¹⁷⁴ with the ICEM Chief of Transport promising anew that this discount would make the airline's offer more easily acceptable by the ICEM Administration.¹⁷⁵ The Belgian government, in acknowledging

¹⁷⁰ NARA/ICEM, MC/60-89 Seven Session, April 1954, ICEM, "Report of the Sub-Committee on Co-Ordination of Transport", 7th Session, MC/82, 29.04.1954.

¹⁷¹ NARA/11th Session of the Council of ICEM, Geneva, November 12-20, 1959, ICEM, "Report on the Sub-Committee on the Co-Ordination of Transport", 11th Session, MC/361, 13.11.1959.

¹⁷² IOM-SW/Registry, 8/2/5/Transports, Sabena Airlines, Vol. I, J.J van Loon, Chief, Office of Shipping to J. Desy, Ministere des Affaires etrangeres et du commerce exterieur Bruxelles, 21.05.1954; *ibid.*, P. Jacobsen to J. Desy, Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres et du Commerce Exterieur Bruxelles, 22.05.1954.

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*, J.J van Loon, Chef de la Division des Transports to J. Desy, 11.06.1954.

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, J. Desy, Ministere des Affaires etrangeres et du commerce exterieur Bruxelles to J.J. van Loon, Chef du Service des Transports, CIME Geneve, 76600/Belg/92/927, 24.06.1954.

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, J. J. van Loon, Chef de la Division des Transports to J. Desy, Ministere des Affaires, Etrangeres et du Commerce Exterieur, Bruxelles, 15.07.1954

the uncompetitive offers by its airline, also expressed its gratitude for the influence of certain ICEM officials of the final acceptance of the offers, as well as the ICEM Administration for the contract to their airline.¹⁷⁶ In direct contradiction with the aforementioned ‘private’ arrangements for the award of contracts, a few months later, the ICEM Administration, before announcing Sabena Airlines’ successful employment in ICEM traffic in a SCCT meeting, repeated that “charter contracts are always awarded to the lowest bidder”.¹⁷⁷

In the early 1960s, Belgium claimed a larger share of the ICEM migrant transport programme. However, based on the principle of reciprocity of the ICEM transport programme, where priority was given to the transport companies of the emigration and immigration countries and secondarily to the other interested transport companies of the member-states, Sabena Airlines did not receive the access its government hoped for. Therefore, in 1962, the Belgian delegate criticised the settling by bilateral agreements of the distribution of migrant transport and supported that this practice would lead to deterioration and “destruction of the spirit of international cooperation and good fellowship” in ICEM. He called for the adoption of a policy of “sound economic considerations” in the selection of ICEM business partners.¹⁷⁸

Belgium, as a country with low emigration rates through ICEM, wanted the ICEM’s transport business to operate under entrepreneurial terms, namely the signing of contracts with the most competitive bidder. This was in contrast with the preferences of other countries with larger migration rates such as Italy, which, under the system employed by ICEM, had access to greater revenue. However, when the interests of its state-owned airline were affected, the Belgian government did not allow the transport market to be self-regulated. Thus, upon information that Sabena Airlines’ offers were not competitive enough, the government intervened and asked the airline to discount them. Belgium sought its financial contribution towards ICEM to work as indirect subsidisation of its national airline and persistently pressed ICEM for a greater employment of the airlines’ aircraft.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid., Chef Adjoint Service des Transports to J. Desy, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères et du Commerce extérieur, Bruxelles, 21.09.1954; *ibid.*, J. Desy, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères et du Commerce Extérieur to G. Krause, Adjoint du Service des Transports, CIME, 76600/Belg/92/927, 27.09.1954.

¹⁷⁷ NARA/8th Session of the Council and the Ex. Comm. of ICEM, Geneva, ICEM, “Report of the Sub-Committee on Co-Ordination of Transport”, 8th Session, MC/99, 30.11.1954.

¹⁷⁸ IOM-SW/Library, ICEM, “Report of the Sub-Committee on the Co-ordination of Transport”, 16th Session, MC/524/Rev.1, 10.04.1962.

Building close relations with ICEM staff for the attraction of information on the bidding results for ICEM transport contracts and warnings or ‘indirect extortions’ to ICEM Administration were only a few methods applied by the Belgian government in its effort to enlarge Sabena Airlines’ share of ICEM migrant transport programme. The ICEM Administration maintained an ambiguous policy: during the ICEM Sessions, it supported the selection of the lowest bidders and bilaterally admitted the uncompetitive offers of those finally selected. The ICEM Administration did not hesitate to promise contracts to the Belgian airline, even if Sabena offered uncompetitive fares, proving that the ICEM transport business and selection of transport partners were foremost a political and financial decision with political and financial incentives (maintenance of membership and receipt of financial contributions).

- Greece:

Australia was the most preferred immigration outlet for the Greeks through ICEM. Nevertheless, in the 1950s, the route from Greece to Australia was not regularly served by any Greek-owned passenger shipping company, but the route’s service was rather opportunistic. In 1959, the shipping company of the Chandris brothers established the *Greek-Australian Line* (GAL), which served the aforementioned route on a regular basis, inaugurating a new market for its passenger vessels with the assistance of ICEM and of the national-migrant traffic. The company was not welcomed by its competitors and, as it will be discussed in Chapter 8, an orchestrated embargo was imposed during the first years of its operation. However, the company succeeded in a quick development and increased its fleet with four passenger vessels within five years from its establishment.

As a traditional maritime country, Greece supported the Greek-Australian Line in securing the largest possible traffic through ICEM. Even before the first voyage of the company’s passenger vessel, the Greek government requested the ICEM Administration to secure all the migrant traffic from Greece to Australia to the Greek passenger vessel.¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁹ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/13/Shipping Liaison with Greece, Vol. I, A.Vlachos, Delege Permanent, Delegation Permanente Hellenique Aupres des Organisations Internationales Geneve to Marcus Daly, Directeur, CIME Geneve, 1173, 05.09.1959.

Lacking the political strength of Italy and its vast passenger liner shipping industry with regular connections to Australia, Greece could not adopt a rigid migrant transport policy excluding the use of aeroplanes between Greece and Australia. Therefore, the Government adopted a policy under which air transfers were allowed when there were no sailings of passenger vessels under the Greek flag. In this direction, the Greek-Australian Line took advantage of its especially close relation with the *Greek Ministry of Mercantile Marine*, which, by acting as its channel of influence within the Greek government, consistently requested the cancellation of scheduled ICEM charter flights and the transfer of the migrants by the passenger vessels of the Greek-Australian Line.¹⁸⁰ According to the ICEM Chief of Mission in Australia, Anthony Chandris was “quite dictatorial in his threats to “instruct” the Greek Government to withhold traffic rights for ICEM charterflights” in order to secure the filling of his passenger ships.¹⁸¹ The pressure towards the Greek government for flight cancellations was glaringly observed by ICEM, which intervened by advising Chandris “not to exercise too much pressure on the Greek Government”.¹⁸²

Chandris was also pressing ICEM, especially when the departure date of his passenger vessels approached. A staff member of ICEM Mission in Greece in the early 1960s recalls Chandris’ eagerness to make the most out of the ICEM source of passengers:

It was Good Thursday, and we were working up until the night as we had not finalised the document processing of a family in order to get on board Chandris’ ship. We were working in order for Chandris not to lose even one berth. Otherwise, he would not start the journey! [...]
*We were heavily pressed to prepare the migrants’ documentation.*¹⁸³

¹⁸⁰ IOM-GR/Shipping 1952-1962, Γ. Ανδριανόπουλος, Υπουργός Εμπορικής Ναυτιλίας to Υπουργείον Εσωτερικών, Δ/νσιν Μεταναστεύσεως, «Χρησιμοποίησις αεροπλάνων προς μεταφοράν μεταναστών», 31747/1514, 28.04.1960; *ibid.*, Γ. Ανδριανόπουλος Υπουργός Εμπ. Ναυτιλίας to Υπουργείον Εσωτερικών Δ/νσιν Μεταναστεύσεως, «Γραμμή Ελλάδος-Αυστραλίας», 8362/220, 28.01.1961.

¹⁸¹ IOM-SW/Registry, ICEM-Australia I, Peter Gibson to Director, ICEM HQs Geneva, “Movements 1960/61”, 3881, AUS/N/1, 15.03.1961.

¹⁸² IOM-SW/Registry, ICEM-Australia I, J. van den Brink, Chief of Dept of Shipping to P. Gibson, Chief of Mission Canberra, “Movements 1960/61”, 40/4/AUST, 22.03.1961.

¹⁸³ Personal interview by T.Y. to the author, 18.04.2019. The text has been slightly changed for readability purposes.

A high-ranking official of the Greek-Australian Line, in the 1960s, has a different emphatically opposing view regarding the relations of the company with ICEM, as well as for the company's 'independence' from governmental assistance:

*Our cooperation with ICEM was excellent. Regarding our cooperation with the Greek Government, we did not ask for its support. We did not have a need for support. Neither financial assistance for our passenger ships, nothing. We did not have any reason to seek financial support or any kind of support from the Government.*¹⁸⁴

Chandris' relationship with the Greek Ministry of Mercantile Marine was built on business and family relationships. The central-wing Minister for Mercantile Marine, Isidoros Mavridoglou (Sept. 1965-Dec. 1966), was a relative of the shipowner while the Minister's brother was a close associate of the Greek-Australian Line.¹⁸⁵ All these were known to the ICEM Mission in Athens as well as the competition between the Greek Ministry of Mercantile Marine and the *Greek Ministry of Interior*, as the former claimed a more active role in migration matters. Therefore, in 1960, when the *Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs* was forming the governmental policy for transport matters in view of the forthcoming ICEM Council session, the Greek Ministry of Mercantile Marine proposed to be supported from the Greek representatives the exclusive use of sea transport means in the ICEM transport services to Australia, irrespective of the cost involved. The ICEM Athens Mission confidentially became aware of this suggestion and directly informed the Greek Minister of Interior on the adoption of the position to be supported by the Greek delegation in the next ICEM Council meeting by highlighting that the Ministry of Interior had not been consulted beforehand.¹⁸⁶

The actions of the ICEM Mission in Athens reveal a direct intervention in Greek politics and a clear indication of the governmental division in matters of migrant

¹⁸⁴ Personal interview by K.Z. to the author, 20.10.2017. The text has been slightly changed for readability purposes.

¹⁸⁵ I. Limnios Sekeris, "Stakeholders and competition in the transportation of migrants", p.105.

¹⁸⁶ IOM-GR/Shipping 1952-1962, C.O. Wendling, Chief of Mission, Athens to M. Daly, Director, ICEM Geneva, 06.04.1960; *ibid.*, Αλ. Ιωαννίδου, Υπαρχηγός Αποστολής, «Σημείωμα δια τον Κύριον Υπουργόν των Εσωτερικών: Ενιαία γραμμή δια την Ελληνικήν Αντιπροσωπείαν εις την Σύνοδον του Συμβουλίου και της Εκτελεστικής Επιτροπής της ΔΕΜΕ εν Νεαπόλει κατ' Απρίλιον-Μάϊον 1960», Απόρρητον, 12.04.1960.

transport policy. ICEM Athens was aware of the competition between the Greek Ministries of Interior and of Mercantile Marine, and, by not having the best relation with the Greek-Australian Line, ICEM Athens tried to prevent a larger engagement of the Chandris company in ICEM transport programme.

Chandris, though, escalated the pressure towards the Greek government for the support of his business interests through the Press, which he substantially subsidised with regular advertisements of his shipping company. Thus, a series of articles were produced criticising the transfer of Greek ICEM migrants to Australia on foreign means of transport and, foremost, of the government's incompetence to put a halt to such practices.¹⁸⁷ The Greek Minister of Interior admitted to ICEM that the "Government is under great pressure to assist in developing and maintaining the Greek flag route to Australia", and he seized the opportunity to criticise ICEM for its pressure to Greece to accept greater percentages of air transfers in conjunction with the practices that ICEM followed with other member-states.¹⁸⁸

The Greek Ministries of Interior and of Mercantile Marine, in the 1960s, followed the wishes of Chandris and cancelled ICEM scheduled flights when the passenger vessels of GAL could transport them. Meanwhile, GAL's tactic to secure the whole traffic from Greece for its passenger vessels was to regularly inform the Government and ICEM of the berth capacity of its passenger vessels;¹⁸⁹ ICEM would thus have no excuse for the direction of the Greek migrants to foreign means of transport. When sudden opportunities for additional numbers of migrants to be transferred occurred, Chandris, with the 'silent concurrence' of the Greek Ministry of Mercantile Marine, redirected vessels from other sea routes and requested the

¹⁸⁷ Ibid. "A Strange Action by ICEM: it was decided that 50% of Greek Migrants will be transferred by foreign aircrafts. A blow for Greek Line", *To Vima*, 17.10.1961; *ibid.*, "The Australian Line", *To Vima*, 19.10.1961; *ibid.*, "The Transport of Migrants", *Estia*, 18.10.1961; «Η Απαράδεκτος Τακτική», *Naftika Chronika*, 633/392, 15.10.1961; «Περισσότερας κατανόησιν και συμπαράστασιν», *Naftika Chronika*, 634/393, 01.11.1961; Αντώνιος Ι. Χανδρής, «Το Επιβατηγόν Υπερωκεάνιον Ο εισφέρον τα περισσότερα κλάδος», *Naftika Chronika*, 783/542, 15.01.1968.

¹⁸⁸ IOM-GR/Ministry of Interior Jan 1st 1959 – 31st December 1963, "Notes Covering Discussions with Mr. G. Rallis – Minister of Interior, Greece, May 23, 1962", Athens, 24.05.1962.

¹⁸⁹ IOM-GR/Shipping (Australia–New Zealand) from: 1 January 1963 to 31 December 1965, Π. Ι. Παναγιωτόπουλος, Γραμμή Ελλάδος Αυστραλίας Α.Ε. to Υπουργείον Εσωτερικών, Διεύθυνσιν Μεταναστεύσεως, 27.12.1963; *ibid.*, Π. Ι. Παναγιωτόπουλος, Γραμμή Ελλάδος Αυστραλίας Α.Ε. to Υπουργείον Εμπορικής Ναυτιλίας, 13.02.1964; *ibid.*, S. Delinikos, Director General, Ministry of Interior Dept of Emigration to ICEM Athens, "Programme of departures of migrants to Australia for the second semester of 1964", 79795, 01.08.1964; *ibid.*, Π. Ι. Παναγιωτόπουλος, Γραμμή Ελλάδος Αυστραλίας Α.Ε. to Υπουργείον Εμπορικής Ναυτιλίας, 08.02.1965; IOM-GR/Shipping (1966–1968), Φ. Ζάϊμης, Υπουργός Εσωτερικών to ΔΕΜΕ, «Πρόγραμμα αναχωρήσεων εις Αυστραλίαν Αου εξαμήνου 1966», 115150/65, 31.01.1966.

cancellation of the ICEM flights; the Greek Ministry of Interior and ICEM were infuriated because of Chandris' opportunism and the disruption of the migrant transport programme.¹⁹⁰ GAL continued its aggressiveness towards the Greek Ministry of Interior for the lack of governmental strength to demand the same treatment by ICEM as the one enjoyed by Italy and the Netherlands, which did not allow the transport of their migrants through other than national means of transport.¹⁹¹

Chandris tried to halt competition at any cost. He did not only try to influence the Greek government and to press ICEM for greater migrant allocations on his passenger vessels, but, according to the ICEM representative in Australia, he was even considering blackmailing the Australian authorities. By promising his tolerance for greater use of air transfers, Chandris sought the intervention and influence of the Australian government against his shipping company's competitors.¹⁹² Chandris had the ability to act so; one high-ranking officer at GAL since January 1960 remembers, possibly with some exaggeration, that "Chandris had personal relations with all the Prime Ministers of Australia, as well as the leaders of opposition, from 1960 to 1980-1985".¹⁹³

From its side, the Greek government relied on GAL for suggestions on purely political and administrative matters, such as the forthcoming re-organisation of the ICEM Department of Shipping in 1966,¹⁹⁴ as discussed in Chapter 3. Furthermore, in 1970, the Australian government requested the admittance of 1,000 more Greek migrants. This request was initially turned down by the Greek military government, due to a lack of workforce present in the Greek industry. GAL intervened by pursuing the matter "at high level" within the Greek military government and asked to concede to "at least some additional movements".¹⁹⁵ The Greek-Australian Line thus tried to

¹⁹⁰ IOM-GR/Shipping (Australia–New Zealand) from: 1 January 1963 to 31 December 1965, Ch. Alexandraki, Acting Chief of Mission, Athens to Director ICEM Geneva, 19.11.1965; *ibid.*, Φ. Ζάμης, Υπουργός Εσωτερικών to Γραμμήν Ελλάδος-Αυστραλίας ΑΕ, «Περί της εγκρίσεως της εκτάκτου αεροπορικής μεταφοράς μεταναστών εις Αυστραλίαν μέσω ΔΕΜΕ», 107111, 20.12.1965.

¹⁹¹ IOM-GR/Shipping (1966-1968), Π. Ι. Παναγιωτόπουλος, Γραμμή Ελλάδος Αυστραλίας Α.Ε. to Υπουργείον Εσωτερικών, Δ/νσιν Αποδημίας και Μεταναστεύσεως, 22.01.1966.

¹⁹² IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/5/Shipping/Liaison with Australia Policy, G.W. von Armin, ICEM Liaison Mission Australia and New Zealand to J. Hübener, Chief, Dept of Transport, ICEM HQs, Personal, 04.02.1966.

¹⁹³ Personal interview by M.L. to the author, 07.08.2017.

¹⁹⁴ IOM-GR/Shipping (1966-1968), Ch. Alexandraki, Deputy Chief of Mission to W.M. Besterman, Deputy Director, ICEM Geneva, 25.10.1966.

¹⁹⁵ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/GRE/Transport Liaison with Greece, Vol. III, Cable, ICEM Geneva to ICEM Athens, AU296, 29.09.1970; *ibid.*, Cable, ICEM Athens to ICEM Geneva, UA386, 01.10.1970; IOM-

influence the government's policy on the annual migrant outflow for its business interests. In the same line, when Australia proposed to manage all travel requirements and movements of Greek migrants, bypassing ICEM, GAL and its booking agent tried to influence the Greek government not to accept such a proposal. The reason behind this was that the shipping company might lose a share of the traffic, and its agents would no longer be entitled to the ICEM booking fees for the migrant passengers booked by ICEM through the agents,¹⁹⁶ thus losing an important revenue.

Also, in the case of Greece, the concession of political power to business interests is clear; family relationships, politics, and business were blended in Greece's participation in ICEM transport traffic. The Greek-Australian Line used the Greek Ministry of Mercantile Marine as its 'Press Office' and 'booking agent' towards its requests for greater migrant allocations to its passenger vessels; a clear depiction of the degree of governmental engagement in the migrant transport business. It is useful to remember that, from 1958 to 1974, one of the main axes of the Greek maritime policy was the return of the Greek-owned ships in the Greek shipping Registry in an effort to halt the competition of the Registries of flags of convenience.¹⁹⁷ This policy guaranteed favourable treatment to shipping companies. It seems that, apart from tax incentives and absence of state intervention in the commencement of the shipping companies' business, the climate of this era permitted a tolerance for some shipowners' interventions in the national migration policy.

- Brazil:

With ICEM's exhortation in 1955, the Brazilian government sought to increase its operational contribution by offering transport services through the private-owned Brazilian airline *Panair do Brasil*¹⁹⁸ – the only Brazilian international airline company at that time. The enhancement of the transport sector was included in the development

SW/General, PRL-20-124/Migration from Greece to Australia, John F. Thomas to P. Gibson, Chief, ICEM Liaison Mission Athens, 16.10.1970.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid., G. Maselli, Assistant Director for Operations to J.F. Thomas, "Greece/Australia Movements", 12.01.1970.

¹⁹⁷ G. Harlaftis, *Greek Shipowners & Greece 1945-1975*, pp. 129-134, 140-143.

¹⁹⁸ IOM-SW/Registry, 1/1/BRA/Operations. Correspondence with Govt-Brazil, Vol. IV, Warren Graham Fuller, Chief of Mission ICEM Brazil to Dr. Carlos Viriato Saboya, Presidente do Instituto Nacional de Imigracao e Colonisacao, G-496, 08.09.1955; *ibid.*, Jean Wiazemsky, Department of Operations to Warren G. Fuller, Chief, Liaison Mission Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, "Brazilian contribution to ICEM Operations", 07.11.1955.

programme of the Kubitschek Administration (1956-1961), which, as its slogan “fifty years to five” dictated, endeavoured to develop sectors of the Brazilian economy rapidly.¹⁹⁹ From 1962, the Brazilian government was more interested in participating in the ICEM transport programme and internally sought the possibilities of employing Brazilian private owned shipping and/or airline companies in a percentage of 50:50 with the emigration countries.²⁰⁰ Since no Brazilian shipping company was able to participate in the traffic, in 1962, Brazil favoured Panair do Brasil’s participation by claiming half of the annual Brazilian migrant intakes through ICEM to be transferred through the airline. Simultaneously, in 1962, Panair do Brasil had just increased its fleet with new aircraft, and its owners, having declared their support to the new President of the country, João Belchior Marques Goulart, had the necessary political support for the extension of their businesses. The Government would cover the fare difference between sea and air transport in an effort to increase the airline’s competitiveness and attract more business. Since this matter also involved the countries of emigration, this arrangement could start only after the necessary negotiations were concluded. In the meantime, Brazil declared that it would not allow *Swissair* to transport migrants to Brazil at advantageous fares.²⁰¹ Brazil’s assertiveness made the country’s appearance possible for the first time at the ICEM tables for the payments to transport companies per flag in the first half of 1962;²⁰² previously, the Brazilian flag had been absent.

In this direction, the Brazilian government requested Panair do Brasil to lower its fares in the level of shipping fares. From its side, the Government subsidised the airline with the cost difference for the migrants and refugees transported from Spain, Italy, Greece, and other countries. From July 1963, the Government intended to double its per capita contribution for every migrant transported by Panair do Brasil. Conversely, it would cease its contribution for the migrants transported by transport

¹⁹⁹ Roberto Goulart Menezes and Ana Reresia Reis da Silva, “Brazil. Development and immigration in the “long exceptional period” (1929-1979)”, in Maria Damilakou and Yannis G.S. Papadopoulos (eds), *Migration and Development in Southern Europe and South America*, London and New York, 2022, pp. 60-61.

²⁰⁰ IOM-SW/Library, ICEM, “Report of the Sub-Committee on the Co-ordination of Transport”, 16th Session, MC/524/Rev.1, 10.04.1962.

²⁰¹ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/6/Shipping-Liaison with South America, Vol. II, J. van den Brink, Chief of Dept. of Shipping to G. Kenedi, Chief, ICEM Liaison Mission, Rio de Janeiro Brazil, “Discussions on Transport with Brazilian Delegates”, 18.04.1962; IOM-SW/Registry, 1/1/BRA/Operations. Correspondence with Govt-Brazil, Vol. IX, “Summary of the meeting with Minister Malton Faria of the Brazilian Delegation, to XVIII ICEM Council Session, on Thursday, 15th November, 1962”, n.d.

²⁰² IOM-SW/Library, ICEM, “Report of the Director on Transport”, 18th Session, MC/543, 04.10.1962.

means other than Panair do Brasil²⁰³ in violation of the ICEM regulations for the subsidisation of the migrant voyage from both emigration and immigration countries.

The ICEM Administration advised the Brazilian government on the difficulties of the implementation of its unilateral decision and mediated in the negotiations between Brazil and the interested emigration governments and their Civil Aviation Authorities in order to reach a solution.²⁰⁴ The agreements with some emigration countries giving “100% priority” in the use of their transport means, as in the case of Italy and Spain, were a product of the 1950s, the formatting years of ICEM. The ICEM Administration acknowledged that these clauses could not be implemented in the 1960s considering the different balances that existed within ICEM. Thus, the ICEM Administration found itself trapped in its early policy of selective treatment towards specific member-states. The suggestion of the ICEM Chief of Transport to “get rid of these old agreements” was not realistic, but he feared that the insistence on more than fifty percent share for the flag of a member-state could “mean the end of any migration”.²⁰⁵

The Brazilian government, despite feeling that the ICEM agreements with Italy and Spain were not binding for the country, conceded twice in the postponement of the effect of its new form of contribution in the ICEM budgets.²⁰⁶ In the meantime, the ICEM Administration, in its effort not to openly encounter the actions of its early years, directed all the emigrants from Greece to Panair do Brasil flights for two months, since no Greek business interests were involved in this route.²⁰⁷

²⁰³ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/6/Shipping-Liaison with South America, Vol. II, Milton Faria, Chef du Departement consulaire et d’immigration du Ministere des Relations exterieures to B.W. Haveman, Directeur, CIME Geneve, “Transport d’immigrants. Participation de la “Panair do Brasil S.A.””, 02.05.1963.

²⁰⁴ Ibid., B.W. Haveman to Ministre Milton Faria, Chef du Departement Consulaire at d’immigration du Ministere des Relations exterieures Rio de Janeiro, 17.05.1963; *ibid.*, J. van den Brink, Division of Transport to B.W. Haveman, “Your inquiry about impact of Brazilian decision (Minister Faria’s letter of 2 May 1963) on our transport problems ex Greece, Italy and Spain”, 21.05.1963.

²⁰⁵ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/6/Shipping-Liaison with South America, Vol. II, J. Hubener, Chief Division of Transport to B.W. Haveman, Director, “Minister Faria’s letter of 22 July 1963”, 06.08.1963.

²⁰⁶ Ibid., Milton Faria, for the Minister of State, Chief of the Department of Consular Affairs and Immigration to Bastiaan W. Haveman, Director of ICEM Geneva, 558.(00), DIm/DCI/658.(00), 22.07.1963.

²⁰⁷ Ibid., Aide-Memoire, 14.08.1963; IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/4/Transport. Liaison with Italy, Vol. IV, Joseph B. McFadden, Directeur Adjoint du CIME, Geneve to Service Direttore Generale Dell’Emigrazione, Rome, 01.10.1963. While the negotiations with Italy and Spain were driving to a dead-end, Brazil revised its demands. Brazil clarified that the fifty percent share requested referred to those who had previously travelled by sea. Until this percentage was reached, Brazil would abstain from its contribution to those transferred by sea. On the contrary for those migrants transported by air, Brazil would deposit a double contribution, namely \$80 per capita, IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/6/Shipping-Liaison

The discussions for the participation of Panair do Brasil did not conclude with any agreement, since the political balances changed against the airline after the Brazilian coup of April 1964. The military government disbanded Panair do Brasil in February 1965, firstly by withdrawing the operational certificate from the airline—the right to fly internationally—and then by forcing it into bankruptcy. Panair do Brasil’s air routes, fleet, and other assets were shared with the Brazilian *Varig Airlines* and another domestic airline company. Thereafter, the transport system, prior to the negotiations with Panair do Brasil, was reinstated.²⁰⁸ Panair do Brasil’s disbandment after the coup was the result of its shareholder’s support for the overthrown President, while Varig Airlines’ establishment as the main leader in the Brazilian aviation market was the result of strategic partnerships with the military government.²⁰⁹

The Brazilian case assists us in evaluating the dynamic relationship between the governments and the private business interests as well as its weakening with the change of the political climate. Panair do Brasil was promoted by the Brazilian government thanks to certain business and political relations established between them. The emergence of another government, even a military one, resulted in the halt of competition in the Brazilian ICEM transport route, since the main Brazilian international airline company was replaced, and, therefore, the main ICEM business partner in Brazil changed.

Through the Brazilian claim for a business share for Panair do Brasil, the defects of the ICEM transport policy emerged, since it offered a preferential treatment to the shipping and airline companies for certain ‘important’ member-states over others. The Brazilian unilateral tactic to withdraw its financial contribution for the migrants’ transportation by sea transport means violated the ICEM principals for the tripartite subsidisation of the migrant voyage. It also proved that the agreements through ICEM

with South America, Vol. II, Milton Faria, Chief of the Consular and Immigration Department to Bastiaan W. Haveman, Director, ICEM Geneva, DIm/658.(00), 31.01.1964.

²⁰⁸ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/4/Transport. Liaison with Italy, Vol. IV, A. Corcos, A/Chief, Dept of Migration Programmes to J. Harrison, J. Hubener, Ed. Bocerra, “Movements to Brazil”, 17.02.1965; *ibid.*, W.M. Besterman to l’Ambassador Antonio Correa do Lago, Representant permanent du Bresil aupres de L’Office Europeene des Nations Unies Geneve, 22.02.1965. Carolina Castellitti, “Varig, “a Real Brazilian Embassy Outside”: Anthropological reflections on aviation and national imaginaries”, *Journal of Transport History*, 40:1 (2019), p. 85.

²⁰⁹ C. Castellitti, “Varig”, p. 86. It is interesting that the day of the disbandment of *Panair do Brasil*, Varig Airlines had already been prepared to execute Panair’s scheduled flight from Rio to Paris. Apart from the disbandment of *Panair do Brasil* the rest businesses of the two owners of the airline were nationalised (e.g., coffee company, insurance company, a television channel, among many more). For more, see the documentary directed by Marco Altberg, *Panair do Brasil: uma história de glamour e conspiração*, 2007.

were of lesser value than those bilaterally agreed, setting the whole ICEM system into question. Finally, it highlighted the ICEM Administration's incapacity to set the rules of conduct in its transport programme.

- Australia:

Australia, for the greater part of the 1950s, was not able to participate in the ICEM migrant traffic through *Qantas* despite the extent of the country's involvement in migrants' and refugees' reception through ICEM. Australia's geographical distance from Europe, the main ICEM source of migrants, in combination with the limitations of air technology in the 1950s, narrowed the prospects of *Qantas*' significant employment in the ICEM transport programme. In the 1950s, *Qantas*' only participation in the ICEM traffic was through its collaboration with the *British Overseas Airways Corporation* (BOAC), the British state airline company, under which each airline executed part of the flights connecting Europe with Australia,²¹⁰ or when *Qantas* chartered BOAC's aircraft.

With *Qantas*' introduction into the jet-era in 1958-1959, the governmental funds invested were expected to be compensated with the largest possible employment of *Qantas*' aircraft. ICEM was an important market for the airline, and the government devoted all its efforts in acquiring the majority of ICEM charter-flights for *Qantas* towards Australia, also considering the prospects of the ICEM air transport programme. In 1960, the *Australian Department of Civil Aviation*, in informal discussions with the ICEM Chief of Planning who was of Australian nationality and former governmental official, informed said official about Australia's intentions for *Qantas* and asked the airline's bids to "be given very serious consideration". In the case of the selection of airlines from countries not contributing in the migrant traffic to Australia, protective measures for *Qantas*' benefit would be sought, as the Australian Department of Civil Aviation officials warned. The ICEM Chief of Planning proposed that the Australian Department of Civil Aviation make representations to the ICEM Administration asking for "reasonable use of the Australian carrier"; ICEM "would have to take notice of" such a request. Following this advice, the Australian Department of Civil Aviation

²¹⁰ NARA/8th Session of the Council of ICEM, Geneva, May 8-14, 1958, ICEM "Report of the Director on Transport covering performance from 1 September 1957 to 28 February 1958 and prospects", MC/288, 07.05.1958, Annex I.

requested Qantas to bring its offers for ICEM charter-flights “down to bedrock”²¹¹ so they could be set competitively.

Following this, the Australian Department of Civil Aviation officials visited the ICEM Headquarters in September 1960. The ICEM Chief of Planning was present in the discussions wherein the Australian officials requested the use of the Australian national airline for the transfer of immigrants to the country based on “national interest and prestige”. The Australian officials noticed the possibility for Qantas’ offers to be uncompetitive, but they made sure that said offers would be the minimum possible without compromising the quality of the service to be offered. They urged the ICEM Administration to accept these offers by reminding that ICEM had accepted higher offers from member-states in the past that followed restrictive practices in the selection of the transport companies while the deficits were absorbed by all the contributing countries. However, they explained that the adoption of restricting practices was not in Australia’s intentions. The ICEM Deputy Director and the Chief of the Department of Shipping agreed that the element of “national interest” would be considered. In this line, the officials of the Australian Department of Civil Aviation gave instructions to the Qantas London Office to start lobbying with ICEM officials for commercial negotiations.²¹²

At the end of 1961, the *Australian Department of Immigration* made it officially known to the ICEM Administration that Qantas would be able to transport 15,000 migrants annually from 1962. Australia, as the main immigration outlet receiving 30 percent of all ICEM immigrants, expected its airline to be given the commensurate position at a time when the country substantially contributed to the migrants’ transport costs.²¹³

As seen in the case of Greece, an intragovernmental disagreement was observed in Australia as well regarding the transportation of migrants coming from the conflicting interests of two Departments. On one side, the Australian Department of Civil Aviation, as the responsible authority for Qantas’ operation and having a more commercial approach in migration, did not value the benefits of sea transport for the

²¹¹ NAA/A446, 1966/46175, J.T. Fogarty, “ICEM Migrant Charters. Notes by Director of International Relations Mr. J. T. Fogarty”, 11.09.1960.

²¹² Ibid., “Report on Discussion with the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM) on the Carriage of Migrants to Australia by Air – Geneva 28.9.60-30.9.60”, n.d.

²¹³ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/5/Shipping/Liaison with Australia Policy, P.R. Heydon, Secretary DIMC to B.G. Epinat, Acting Director, ICEM Geneva, 17.11.1961.

migrants as the Department of Immigration did, since there was no financial benefit for the Australian airline. Thus, the Department of Civil Aviation defied the ICEM policy on the selection of the transport companies based on their financial offers and wanted all charter-flights to be allocated between the interested immigration and emigration countries. They promoted Qantas and considered that the airline should be given priority, since it was a regular operator. In the event of the selection of a foreign airline, they denied the provision of landing rights. On the other side, the Department of Immigration, by acknowledging the constraints of the multilateral funding, conceded in the sharing of the traffic when Qantas' offers were not financially competitive.²¹⁴ In many instances, these two Departments came in direct confrontation when the transport means of ICEM migrants were to be selected.

The intragovernmental disagreements were not periodic. In 1970, the ICEM Administration referred to a "tug of war" between the Department of Immigration and Qantas regarding the fares quoted by the airline. The ICEM officials were brought into a "very difficult position", as confessed to the Australian officials, since the monopoly sought by Australia for Qantas²¹⁵ would have repercussions in the competitiveness of the ICEM's bidding system.²¹⁶ The Australian Department of Civil Aviation wanted to exclude outsiders from the Australian air-traffic and to 'dictate' to the ICEM Administration how the monthly migrant flights towards Australia would be allocated.²¹⁷

Australia adopted restrictive tactics towards competition and protective ones towards Qantas policy. More specifically, the access to information through the Australian high-ranking ICEM officials on how and with which arguments to impose pressure on the ICEM Administration seemed pivotal for the success of the Australian

²¹⁴ IOM-SW/Registry, ICEM-Australia I, W. G. Kiddle, A/Chief of Mission to Director, ICEM HQs Geneva, 5045, AUS/C/1, 30.11.1962; *ibid.*, W. G. Kiddle, A/Chief of Mission to Director, ICEM HQs Geneva, "Proposed Jet Flight ex Austria 28th December, 1962", 4756, AUS/R/1, 23.11.1962.

²¹⁵ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/2/20/Transport. Qantas Airlines, Vol. XXVIII, F. Zurek, ICEM Representative Australia to Director, ICEM Geneva, "Qantas Charter Flight Prices", 1124, AUS/N/1, AUS/R/1, 16.06.1972.

²¹⁶ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/5/Shipping/Liaison with Australia Policy, J. van den Brink, Chief of Operation to Kiddle, Acting Chief of ICEM Liaison Mission Canberra, "All flights Australia – July/December 1962", 20.07.1962; *ibid.*, J. van den Brink, Division of Transport to B.W. Haveman, "Australian flights January/June 1963", 11.01.1963.

²¹⁷ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/5/Shipping/Liaison with Australia Policy, J. van den Brink Division of Shipping, for the Director to R.W. Furlonger, Permanent Representative of Australia to the European Office to the UN, Australian Consulate General, Geneva, "ICEM flights Europe/Australia – First six months 1963", 23.01.1963.

objectives. In addition, delays in the clearances for the granting of landing rights,²¹⁸ or completely denying their granting to competitors,²¹⁹ were some of the measures applied against competition and the subversion of ICEM Administration's policy to Qantas' ultimate benefit. What is more, Australia abstained from the conclusion of bilateral air agreements and the offering of reciprocal rights with/to countries and airlines that Australia considered not within Qantas' business interest.²²⁰ The disagreements between the involving Departments came from the different mandates and goals they had to fulfil. From the side of the Australian Department of Immigration, the migrants' smooth preparation before disembarking to Australian soil seemed a priority, while, for the Australian Department of Civil Aviation, the strengthening and optimal employment of the national airline was its main thought. However, these disagreements remained internal and did not reach the ICEM Council Sessions, where the Australian policy was uniform. Australia, though, compromised and circumvented the ICEM bidding system for its airline's benefit. Australia was able to act so based on its political and financial capacity.

From the example of these four countries, similar patterns can be traced. Firstly, it can be said that the selection of transport means for the ICEM migrant transport programme was not based on bureaucratic and logistic procedures, but quite the contrary. It was the result of the influence of shipping and airline businesses towards the governments, as well as of political and financial pressure, and, in several cases of extortions, from the side of governments towards the ICEM Administration. These elements confirm the belief that the ICEM transport policy was not solid, but prone to the pressure of

²¹⁸ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/2/72/Transport, British United Airways, Vol. II, G.W. Forster, Charter Manager, for British United Airways (Services) Limited, London to Director General of Civil Aviation, Melbourne C.I., Australia, GWF/SW/Comm., 30.06.1964; *ibid.*, G.W. Forster, Charter Manager, for British United Airways (Services) Limited, London to J. Hubener, Chief of Division, ICEM Geneva, GWF/SW/Comm., 01.07.1964.

²¹⁹ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/5/Shipping/Liaison with Australia Policy, "Melbourne – 28th June, 1968, Meeting in Canberra with Australian Authorities", n.d.

²²⁰ Some countries that received Australia's denial were Yugoslavia, Denmark, Belgium, Sweden, Switzerland, Norway, Czechoslovakia, Soviet Union, Taiwan, and South Korea, between 1969 and 1970, see IOM-SW/General, 153/Miscellaneous/Historical General Related Matters 1968-1973/Australia E. Jacob, Department of Transport to Director, through G. Maselli, 01.06.1970. It is of interest, that when Canberra wanted in 1969 to secure a loan in Switzerland, the Swiss Government asked in exchange for the provision of reciprocal traffic rights for Swiss Air, see IOM-SW/Registry, ICEM V, 1951-1980, E. Jacob to the Director through Mr. Maselli, "New air services from Yugoslavia to USA and Australia", 22.12.1969.

influential member-states, an “empty fiction”, as noted at the beginning of this chapter by an ICEM official.

In many cases, the ICEM Administration succumbed to the demands of the transport companies and of the member-states. The assistance offered by ICEM officials, who were either nationals of a government submitting a specific request (e.g., Australia) or had close ties with a government official (e.g., Belgium), was pivotal for the success of the desirable outcome for the member-states. However, the ICEM Administration, in order to be relieved from the pressure from some member-states, did not hesitate to promise contracts of secondary importance to certain transport companies (e.g., contracts for intra-European trips to Sabena Airlines); thus, the ICEM downgraded its own official policy procedures.

From the side of the member-governments, the concession to a national migration transport policy was not guaranteed for all the related governmental authorities from the outset. Disagreements between ministerial departments related with transport and those related with migration management were occasionally rough and time-enduring, since they served diverging principles (profitability of transport means vs. optimal migration management).

However, the type of ownership for the means of transport (state or private-owned) participating in ICEM transport programme had no difference regarding the support they enjoyed from the respective governments. For both types of ownership, the ultimate goal was the increase of their revenue by increasing their transport volume. In the case of private-owned transport means, though, kinship and/or business alliances with members of the government were significant for the security of governmental support or had detrimental consequences when lost. Nevertheless, the governments were in direct relation with the shipping and airline companies, and, in many cases, they requested them to lower their fares in order to be considered competitive from the ICEM Administration—a direct intervention in the regulation of the transport market.

Some governments managed to circumvent the ICEM transport policy when they disagreed with the means of transport selected for a migrant trip by not granting landing rights to foreign airlines. This was a way to be protected by foreign transport competition by claiming sovereignty rights over a territory; some governments repeatedly acclaimed this tactic and such a claim received special attention by the ICEM Administration. However, which or how often each country could claim such a tactic was linked with the political leverage it carried within ICEM.

In sum, the real governance in migration transport policy through ICEM lies foremost with the transport companies, as expressed through the member-governments, and secondarily with the ICEM Administration policy planning. The transport businesses were actually involved in the ICEM politics by expressing and influencing their opinion or raising disagreements even on purely administrative and political issues, not only organisational/executive ones. From their side, the member-states actively involved them, since the transport companies were the means for the attraction and direction of internationally collected funds managed by ICEM towards their national treasuries. The transport policy of the ICEM Administration was constantly adjusting to the claims of the transport businesses, as these claims were mediated by the governments, another indication of the prevalence of informal governance in the function of ICEM. Politics and business went hand in hand in migration through ICEM, since a close partnership was maintained between the governments and the transport companies, whether state or private-owned.

Keeping the clientele and keeping it happy

Retaining the ICEM membership intact, if not increasing it, was vital for the ICEM Administration. Withdrawal of a member-state from ICEM had chain effects in the financial situation of the ICEM budgets, the migration prospects of other migrant sending or receiving member-states, as well as on the operational traffic load of ICEM. Apart from prestige, increased membership was an indication of effectiveness for an international organisation. The consequences were aggravated when an important country, such as Australia, decided to withdraw its membership from ICEM.

Australia's withdrawal tendencies started at the end of 1967, when the Australian government authorised travel offices in Europe to receive travel applications of prospective migrants and to assist them in their documentation for immigration visas. The government offered a fee to the travel agencies for each migrant they assisted in concluding all the bureaucratic formalities.²²¹ This could be considered as a competitive action against ICEM, which felt that it was losing part of the business it handled.

²²¹ IOM-SW/Registry ICEM III, 1951-1980, "Report on Review of ICEM's Air Transport Position", n.d. [1967].

In the same year, Australia tried to reach a bilateral agreement with emigration countries from Europe under its *Special Assistance Passage Programme*. Under this scheme, the Australian government met all the financial expenses for the selection of skilled or semi-skilled migrants without requiring any per capita contribution from the emigration country and without the involvement of ICEM in the organisation of transportation. In 1967, the first Europeans to migrate under this scheme were mostly Italians and Germans to a lesser extent.²²²

Acknowledging that Australia wanted to establish a bilateral migration mechanism, the ICEM Administration did not want to remain aloof from any development in the migration field, especially when the signing of a bilateral migration agreement compromised its primacy in said field. Therefore, after negotiations with the Italian government, the ICEM Administration ascertained its involvement in the Special Assistance Passage Programme for migration from Italy, which took place with ICEM's assistance and the cost was paid by Australia.²²³ Italy was an important 'client' for the *Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration*, and its Administration did not want to let another important member-state act bilaterally, as doing so would prove that the member-state had nothing more to gain from a membership in ICEM.

In the same direction, before the Spanish Director General for Emigration met the Australian officials, the ICEM staff, fearing that negotiations on a bilateral agreement between the two countries would arise, made sure to present to the Spanish Director beforehand with arguments against it. Among others, the negative effects of such an agreement, according to ICEM, were the political disadvantages for the handling of part of the migration programme within the national territory by an immigration country, rather than an international organisation. In addition, the unequal sharing of the migration traffic between the transport companies under each flag was considered as a possible consequence, since Australia, as the country which would solely finance the migration movement, would prefer its own airline companies. With ICEM's involvement, the Spanish Director was assured that the Spanish transport companies would have an equal share of the traffic.²²⁴

²²² IOM-SW/General, 153/Miscellaneous/Historical General Related Matters 1968-73/Australia, Walter M. Besterman to Gomez de la Serna, "Visit of Mr. Garcia de Saez to Australia", Draft, SKC/pp, 14.10.1968.

²²³ Ibid.

²²⁴ Ibid.; IOM-SW/General, 153/Miscellaneous/Historical General Related Matters 1968-73/Australia, "Note on Australian Programmes from Italy", n.d.

The ICEM Administration followed the same tactics when Australia, in its further emancipation from ICEM in 1970, wanted to undertake all the functions implemented by ICEM under the general Australian *Assisted Passage Scheme*—the main scheme for migration to the country. When Australia approached the governments of Germany, Greece, and Italy for the signing of separate bilateral migration agreements with Australia, the ICEM Administration hastened to remind them of the benefits derived from the handling of these movements by ICEM: the control of the migration programme without compromising sovereignty rights, the provision of information of migrants on the resettlement conditions by a neutral entity and equitable use of national transport companies for the transportation of migrants, avoidance of criticism by governments on promotion of emigration, and economy from the establishment of a national emigration service.²²⁵

Italy and Greece responded negatively to Australia's invitation for the commandeering of national migration, having a respect for ICEM's assistance, which also assured a share for their transport industries through the ICEM's transport programme. In this line, the ICEM Chief of Mission in Germany indicated to the German officials that if they, along with the rest of the main European member-states, expressed their disagreement on the Australian plan, it would restrain Australia's aspirations.²²⁶

From the above, it is indicative of the level of the intervention by ICEM Administration's side on the migration policy of its member-states. This intervention was an effort by ICEM to secure its longevity and operations in all these emigration countries as well as to halt a forthcoming Australian withdrawal, proving that migration was a field requiring international cooperation, while bilateral actions would not have had the same success. ICEM acted as a commercial entity that tried to retain its clientele in order to remain operational and profitable. This was a common attitude in the international organisations' setting, which tried for the extension of the longevity of its agency, also in view of the maintenance of their staff structure. Such an approach was felt necessary for the ICEM Administration, since ICEM would lose an annual

²²⁵ IOM-SW/General, PRL-20-124/Migration from Greece to Australia, S.K. Christensen, Department of National Migration and Refugee Assistance to Director, "Greece", 03.02.1970.

²²⁶ AGMFA/CS/1962/25/8/1, Υπουργείον Εξωτερικών, «Σημείωμα Θέματα αρμοδιότητος Διευθύνσεως Αποδήμου Ελληνισμού προ συζήτησιν μετά του εν Βόννη Πρέσβεως της Αυστραλίας κ. Watt κατά την ενταύθα επίσκεψίν του», n.d. [1962]; IOM-SW/Registry, ICEM VI, 1951-1980, S.K. Christensen, "Note for the Record, Australia", 22.04.1970; John Yiannakis, *Odysseus in the Golden West: Greek Migration, Settlement and Adaptation in Western Australia since 1947*, 2009, pp. 60-64.

contribution of at least US\$440,000 with the loss of an important member-state like Australia. Consequently, a considerable decrease in ICEM staff would be necessary; the volume of migration under ICEM would be reduced; ICEM would lose its importance to its business partners, foremost to the transport companies if it was unable to claim advantageous fares, and thus resulting in increased difficulties and cost for migration through ICEM.²²⁷

Australia officially withdrew from ICEM on the 1st of January 1974, and it had stopped using the ICEM services actively since July 1973. Qantas also withdrew its special low fares for ICEM migrants. Consequently, the ICEM Administration's organisational structure was reorganised, the administrative expenses were forced to be reduced, including staff, firstly because of its temporary reduction in ICEM's workload²²⁸ and secondly because of the cut on its funds with the loss of Australian financial contribution. However, ICEM continued its involvement in Australian migration from some European countries, but only for family reunification cases occurring through the voluntary agencies.²²⁹

Nevertheless, the ICEM Administration was not the only one applying intervention policies for its own benefit. Occasionally, the member-states, or their officials and employees, approached ICEM with requests not deriving from its mandate. Their ultimate goal was to take advantage of the mechanism established by ICEM and the transport services it offered. When such a need occurred, they used their argumentation and applied influence towards the ICEM Administration in order for their wishes to be met with ICEM's positive response. Even within the first month of the Organisation's establishment, its Administration received requests for the shipment of an official's household furniture, of an employee's children, the transfer of a journalist, and of personal automobiles of IRO officials.²³⁰

²²⁷ IOM-SW/General, PRL-20-124/Migration from Greece to Australia, S.K. Christensen, Department of National Migration and Refugee Assistance to Director, "Greece", 03.02.1970; IOM-SW/General, 153/Miscellaneous/Historical General Related Matters 1968-1973/Australia, S.K. Christensen to Director, "Letter of 20 November 1969 from the Australian Ambassador, Mr. Loveday", 25.11.1969.

²²⁸ This reduction was in a short time offset by the increase in refugee movements to other countries, and the Asians evacuating Uganda, as seen in Chapter 3.

²²⁹ IOM-SW/Registry, 1/1/ITA/Liaison with Govt. Italy, Vol. 5, "Extract from "Notiziario Emigrazione" No. 4, dated 28 January 1974", n.d.; IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/3/Transport Liaison with Germany, Vol. IV E. Jacob, Department of Operations and Transport to Ministry of Transport, Department of Civil Aviation Bonn, 17.01.1974.

²³⁰ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/1/Shipping Policy – Liaison with Washington, Vol. I, J. M. Vos, Director, Division of Shipping to Major General W.A. Wood, Jr., Migration Committee Washington, "Special Shipments for Migration Committee Aboard USNS's", 16.03.1952.

In the following years, requests for favours from the side of member-states included the provision of free air/sea tickets to journalists to cover subjects of immigration interest at a country of resettlement.²³¹ In order to satisfy such a request, the ICEM Administration had to bypass the IATA regulations with a certain ‘trick’ in order to not compromise finding itself breaking IATA rules. In an Australian request for the free air-transfer of a journalist to Australia by an ICEM flight, the ICEM had to negotiate the signing of a contract between the journalist and the airline so the journalist could be considered as airline staff. Based on IATA regulations, the use of migrant fares for categories of passengers other than migrants was prohibited.²³²

Other favours followed: the transfer of a Brazilian diplomat was requested to undertake training in several European countries, with the cost requested to be charged to the ICEM Operational Budget;²³³ the security of economic passage for the family of an Australian radiologist to Europe was solicited whose services were used by ICEM in The Hague;²³⁴ a senior official of the Australian Department of Immigration requested to be transferred while travelling on leave rather than duty, as he undertook a new post in Australia;²³⁵ in addition, the use of ICEM services was sought for the development of tourism plans of Spain and the transport of Spanish officials to Latin American destinations, including the cover of per diem allowance.²³⁶

When there was immediate or expected benefit from responding to a favour, the ICEM Administration was more flexible. For example, in 1966, the Hamburg Senate requested the heads of emigration services to travel to Australia as escort officers on an

²³¹ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/5/Shipping, Policy Liaison with Australia & N. Zealand, Vol. I, T.H.E. Heyes, Secretary DIMC, to C.O. Wendling Chief ICEM Liaison Mission Canberra, 08.11.1954.

²³² IOM-SW/Registry, 1/1/AUST/Correspondence with Govt – Australia, Vol. II, E.W. Director, Public Relations, DIMC to Mr. Clabon, Chief of Mission ICEM Canberra, “Proposed Visit of Australian Radio Commentator Fischer-Karwin”, 58/10785, 18.02.1958; *ibid*, A.W. Clabon, Chief of Mission ICEM Australia to Chief, Public Information Officer, Geneva, “Proposed visit of Mr. Heinz Fischer-Karwin Austrian Radio Commentator”, 3878, AUS/K/1, 19.02.1958.

²³³ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/6/Shipping–Liaison with South America, Vol. II, Milton Faria, Chief, Consular and Immigration Department to G. C. Kenedi, Chief of ICEM Mission in Rio de Janeiro, DIm/658(00), 08.08.1963.

²³⁴ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/13/Shipping Liaison with Greece, Vol. I, Jane Moody, Acting Chief of Mission Athens to Director, Migration Committee, Geneva, 17.08.1953.

²³⁵ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/5/Shipping/Liaison with Australia Policy, Peter Gibson, Chief of Mission Australia to Director ICEM HQs, 2521, AUS/R/1, 11.11.1960. The same requests for the transfer of senior officials on charter flights were deposited also from Spain, IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/SPA/Transport Liaison with Spain, Vol. III, S.K. Christensen, Chief of Department of Operations and Transport to Braggiotti, Chief of Mission, ICEM Liaison Mission Madrid, “Operational Narrative Report”, 05.12.1967.

²³⁶ IOM-SW/Registry, 1/1/SPA/Correspondence with Government - Spain, Vol. 10, Gaspar Gomez de la Serna, Jefe de la Mision to Director CIME Ginebra, “Viaje del Sr. Diaz Aguilar a Hispanoamerica”, SP/I 416, 18.10.1968.

ICEM charter-flight in order to get acquainted with the migrant-flights handling.²³⁷ Disregarding that ICEM did not use escorts in its charter-flights, ICEM conceded to the Hamburg request for the transfer of one official out of the two initially requested. The response to this favour was decided based on considerations that might favour the facilitation of ICEM's operations in Germany, as ICEM relied on the personnel requested to be transferred.²³⁸ Thus, ICEM allowed one of the escort officials to travel with the status of Observer, granting them a free ticket on a roundtrip flight to Australia.²³⁹

It is observed that a parallel system of clientelism existed within ICEM, enabling the receipt of favours from the ICEM's 'clients' that guaranteed the immediate or forthcoming fulfilment of governmental objectives for ICEM. From its part, ICEM wanted to retain its 'clientele'. When competition on the provision of migration services bilaterally occurred by states, the ICEM Administration did not lose time to start a campaign for 'client-hunting' and the promotion of ICEM's value in order to retain its member-states, as well as its primacy in migration and transportation services, as any business of the private sector would do. Survival and necessity for the continuing existence of ICEM were the basis on which the ICEM Administration's successful entrepreneurialism laid. ICEM identified gaps in the existing migration systems, raised awareness, and claimed the filling of these gaps through its services, thus reconfirming the characteristics of *humanitarian entrepreneurialism*²⁴⁰ that prevailed in its work, as mentioned earlier.

ICEM, as the rest of the international organisations, acted as a forum where its member-states could meet regularly, discuss matters of mutual interest that needed coordination

²³⁷ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/7/Transport. Escort Staff, Vol. IX, Poerschke, Regierungsdirektor, Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg, Behörde Für Wirtschaft und Verkehr, Amt Für Hafen und Schifffahrt to A. Catsicas, Leiter der Verbindungsstelle bei der Deutschen Bundesregierung des Zwischenstaatlichen Komitees für Europäische Auswanderung, ICEM Bad Godesberg, "Gelegentlicher Einsatz eines "escort officers" bei Auswanderer-Flügen nach Australien", G-Z, H2, 12.09.1966

²³⁸ Ibid., A.Catsicas, Chief, Liaison Mission ICEM Bad Godesberg to Director, ICEM Geneva, "Request from Hamburg's Senate", POL/5, 14.10.1966; *ibid.*, J. Hübener, Chief of Department to A. Catsicas, Chief, Liaison Mission Bad Godesberg, 28.10.1966; *ibid.*, A.Catsicas, Chief, Liaison Mission ICEM Bad Godesberg to Director, ICEM Geneva, POL/5, 09.11.1966.

²³⁹ Ibid., J. Hübener, Chief of Department to A. Catsicas, Chief, Liaison Mission Bad Godesberg, 25.11.1966.

²⁴⁰ Bradley, *op.cit.*, pp. 8, 49-50.

on an international level, and to accomplish goals that the member-states could not achieve individually. From its part, ICEM implemented and monitored the actions requested by its member-states. ICEM had to enforce the rules upon which all the member-states had agreed in order to achieve desirable mutual goals. As customary with the international organisations, the member-states, with their participation, were delegating authority and power to them in order to fulfil their interests without conceding their sovereignty.²⁴¹

In the case of ICEM, specific member-states retained more power within the Organisation, demanded and achieved favourable treatment, and received greater profits than what corresponded to other member-states. They stood capable in averting the formal ICEM procedures and in creating a parallel mechanism subverting the actual authority of the ICEM Administration based on their negotiation-power and leverage within ICEM.

In this parallel scheme of administration and commencement of business, ICEM also had its merit. The unstable soil on which its basis stood in the early years of its establishment, when the Organisation worked on a provisional basis, made the conclusion of binding agreements with specific member-states possible. However, these agreements proved to be dysfunctional when, in the following decades, ICEM was more stable and had to face a different migrant climate, different realities in the transportation sector, as well as altered dynamics within its member-states.

ICEM was a state-led organisation, lacking the fundamental power or advocacy of other international organisations of its time. In many instances, the optimal function of the transport sector was a priority for some member-states, rather than migrant/refugee rehabilitation themselves, that ICEM was mandated to facilitate and manage. For many member-states, the ultimate goal of their participation in ICEM was the accumulation of revenue for their transport sector and their Treasuries. This is the reason that some governments openly supported the claims of the transport companies flying their national flag towards the ICEM Administration, thus proving that the real governance in transport policy through ICEM lied foremost with the transport companies, as expressed through the member-governments and, secondarily, with the ICEM Administration policy planning.

²⁴¹ T. Gutner, *International Organizations in World Politics*, pp. 7-8.

ICEM, as a non-profit international organisation, produced profits for others through its operation. From the transport of migrants, many business opportunities emerged for both passenger shipping and airline companies as well as for the ICEM member-governments. ICEM benefited from and supported the migration industry that was established and developed through its operation. ICEM created an extensive migration infrastructure, assisted in the opening of new markets for the private sector, ensured financial revenue for the transport industry, and favoured the commercialization of the migratory flows. In the next chapter, the dynamics between ICEM and the transport companies *per se* will be discussed, focusing on the three most important geographical territories in an effort to ascertain the importance of this traffic per sea and air routes served by ICEM.

Chapter 6:

ICEM and the Shipping and Airline Companies

The goal of this chapter is the examination of the relationship of the *Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration* with its business partners, mainly from the transport sector, the shipping and airline companies. The ICEM Administration, according to the Organisation's mandate, was authorised and was funded to intervene on behalf of its member-states in view of a solution to their population problems. With the migrants ready to be transferred, what was remaining for the fulfilment of ICEM's aims was the successful establishment of its business network.

The ICEM member-states were not the only ones competing for the direction of the Organisation's transport business towards the companies under their national flag, as discussed in the previous Chapter. The 'monopolistic' institutions of the shipping and airline companies collectively, namely the Shipping Conferences and IATA, but also the individual transport companies, participated actively in the negotiations with the Organisation and tried to make the most out of the ICEM's operation with the least possible concessions. ICEM, from its side, acknowledged that the relationship with its business partners was of crucial importance, since their partnership would result in the execution of ICEM's mandate and the ultimate response towards the member-states' needs. The optimal function of this relationship would avail the ICEM Administration to manage the funds entrusted with success by its member-states, to maintain the balances between competing transport companies and national interests, and to continue proving the necessity of the agency's existence to its member-states.

ICEM is recognised as a development factor for the post-WWII transport sector; it was a hub for the creation and distribution of transport work for shipping and airline companies of its member-states. As a non-profit international organisation, its operation produced profits for the private sector and favoured the commercialisation of the migratory flows. From the transport of migrants, many business opportunities emerged for the shipping and airline companies, and secondarily for other enterprises, as well as for the ICEM member-governments. ICEM benefited from and supported the *migration industry* created around it. The Organisation established an extensive *migration infrastructure*, assisted in the opening of new markets for the private sector, and ensured financial revenue for the transport industry.

In this chapter, we will discuss the importance of ICEM for the transport companies, as well as for their monopolistic institutions in the three most important geographical territories where ICEM operated: the North Atlantic, the South Atlantic, and Australian sea and air routes. It is found that the impact of the ICEM traffic for the transport companies varied based on the following variables: the time (season and hour of travel), geography/traffic route, and the mode of transport. These variables also determined the prices of transport. Therefore, the main questions that concern the chapter are the challenges and different dynamics per sea and air route and the profitability of the ICEM migrant transport programme for the companies participating in it. We will examine these issues by tracing the relationship between ICEM Administration and the transport companies and by making an attempt to ascertain the importance of ICEM on each sea and air route.

This chapter has five sections. The first and the second section of the chapter highlight the importance of ICEM for the transport companies. Through ICEM's operation new transport companies were established or attempted to be established, new sea/air routes were inaugurated. However, the dynamic of the ICEM migrant traffic was not the same for each migrant route. The fluctuations per decade and traffic are examined, as well as the way that business interests were adjusted to it. It is found that the level of dependence of each transport company on the ICEM transport programme varied based on their access to other traffics, a crucial component also for the ICEM's policy.

The examination of the relation between ICEM and the "monopolistic" institutions of the maritime and aviation industries, the shipping conferences, and IATA, respectively, is the subject of the third section. The concessions that each counterpart (Conference or ICEM) was willing to make varied based on the level of its dependence on the ICEM migrant transport programme. It is supported that the *North Atlantic Conference* (NAC) and IATA shared common characteristics in their approach with ICEM. With considerable access to the passenger and tourist traffic, both NAC and IATA maintained an increased negotiation power towards ICEM regarding the fare negotiations. This is in contradiction with two Conferences on the South American sea routes, where ICEM was the main traffic provider for the shipping companies operating in these routes. ICEM's adjustment or configuration of the traffic is discussed, based on the power relations developed per traffic.

Following, the fourth section highlights the fare negotiations with the transport companies on the Australian traffic, which, regarding the ICEM traffic, was free from Shipping Conference's commitments. The bargaining tactics of the sea transport companies are highlighted, as well as the cooperation between competing liner shipping companies aiming to reach higher fares in passenger traffic. It is supported that the liner shipping companies were 'self-excluded' from the ICEM passenger traffic, since their offers ended up uncompetitive in a period of increasing competition from the aeroplanes. A dominant role is attributed to ICEM on the Australian traffic in its regulation by the establishment of a distinct service to support its transport programme and by the application of its operational experiments.

Tracing the actual profitability of the ICEM migrant transport traffic for the transport companies is one of the main challenges that this dissertation encountered. The fifth section is an attempt to ascertain this profitability. It is found that the impact of the ICEM traffic for the transport companies varied based on the time, the geography/traffic route, and the mode of transport. The case of the Australian traffic in the 1960s is used as a means in the effort to understand the impact on the profitability of the transport sector of the ICEM migrant transport programme. It is concluded that the value of the ICEM traffic for the transport companies varied between three categories of importance: *vital*, *important supplement*, and *insignificant*. However, in the case of Qantas, the ICEM transport programme also offered the opening of a new charter market inextricably dependent on ICEM's work. The chapter acknowledges ICEM's dependence on the services of the private sector, which was a crucial component in the implementation of ICEM's mandate. ICEM institutionalised its relationship with the private sector, adhering to previous practices on an international and intergovernmental setting.

The Transport Sector

A position of this dissertation is that *the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration* (ICEM) also worked as a factor for the revival, strengthening, and development of the post-WWII transport sector, thus resulting in the further development of trade and tourist traffic between the ICEM member states. With the employment of the shipping and airline companies in ICEM's transport work, new liner shipping companies and airline companies were established, as well as traffic routes

from Europe to overseas. Their traffic load was strengthened with ICEM's operation in already established locations.

Different challenges were presented by the various sea and air routes when the Organisation was established, as well as throughout the years of ICEM's operation. The North and South Atlantic scheduled regular passenger traffic by sea from Europe, for example, was in a comparatively less vulnerable situation from the South African sea traffic or the Australian sea traffic, which periodically faced important shipping shortages. Therefore, the value of the ICEM migrant transport programme varied per destination for the transport companies. It is noteworthy that, in many cases, the prospective establishment of new passenger shipping companies was directly negotiated by the shipowners or by the national governments with the ICEM Administration. This was a way for the new passenger shipping companies to secure at least a percentage of revenue through the ICEM migrant transport programme and, based on the assurances given, to ascertain the company's viability and then decide on its establishment. This was the case in the Australian sea routes, when, in 1955, a businessmen consortium interested in conducting business in the shipping sector and, before buying their fleet, sought guarantees for ICEM's backing.¹ The same applies for the South African sea routes, with several liner shipping companies and prospective shipping companies discussing potentials of the employment of their passenger vessels in the sea routes of South Africa directly with ICEM Administration.² A more vivid and successful endeavour was the establishment of the *Greek-Australian Line*, which, in 1959, came into being only when it had secured a contract with ICEM for the handling of its migrant traffic between Greece and Australia. A few years earlier, its predecessor, ELMES shipping company, withdrew from the same route when the ICEM revenue decreased considerably, as it will be discussed later.

However, even at the more developed sea and air routes, which did not exclusively rely on migrant traffic, as the North Atlantic had, ICEM's contribution was important. Due to the lack of space in liner shipping companies between April and October 1954, around 10,000 migrants and refugees would have not been transported

¹ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/5/Shipping, Policy Liaison with Australia & N. Zealand, Vol. I, C.O. Wendling Chief, ICEM Australia to J.J. van Loon, Chief, Office of Shipping, ICEM HQs, 2569, AUS/N/1, 13.05.1955.

² IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/AFR/Transport. Liaison with Africa, J. van den Brink, Chief of Department of Shipping to Monty Rosen, Director, Globe Travel Club (Pty) Ltd, 29.08.1961; *ibid.*, James W. Stewart, Resident Representative, ICEM Pretoria to Director, ICEM Geneva, A/18, 22.10.1963.

if ICEM did not exist.³ ICEM chartered ships for the exclusive transport of these 10,000 migrants, thus producing additional revenue for the passenger shipping industry with the payment of the corresponding costs.

ICEM's contribution did not stop in the development and enhancement of the sea traffic, but also in its maintenance. With the gradual domination of aeroplanes towards all ICEM routes, the prolongation of the employment of passenger ships of liner shipping companies in specific transoceanic crossings in the 1970s became possible due to ICEM's migrant traffic.

Referring now to the aeroplanes—a means of transport linked with luxury until the greatest part of the 1950s— they were introduced to a wider passenger public through ICEM, thus becoming financially accessible for a wider range of peoples; this development was also facilitated by the rapid technological changes in the second half of the 20th century. New commercial passenger air routes were established through ICEM's operations and new opportunities emerged for the scheduled and non-scheduled airline companies. The governments acknowledged ICEM's contribution to their national economy through the passenger distribution to the transport companies under their flag. This facilitated the states' financial participation towards ICEM's work.⁴

The ICEM Administration was aware of its bargaining power, as well as of the particularities of the ICEM migrant traffic. According to the ICEM Director in 1969, *[...] the cold facts are that we produce a ready [...] reliable [...] market that can be counted on without the expensive sales pitch [...] We are a cheap crowd, and we are a profitable crowd for the lines. Any company that can be assured of a stable number of clients well before the year starts has the advantage. This is cash, from reliable players [...] we do not let or rarely let space go unfilled.*⁵ However, the actual bargaining power of ICEM towards the transport companies mismatched with the level of the latter's dependency on the migrant traffic. The ICEM Administration acknowledged the disproportions and built its relationship and cooperation with the transport companies and with their representative collective bodies per traffic on different bases. The ultimate goal was the maintenance of the optimal business relationships between ICEM

³ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/2/Shipping Division. Policy–Liaison with Canada, Vol. I, J.J. van Loon, Chief, Office of Shipping for the Deputy Director to C.E.S. Smith, CDCI, 29.12.1954.

⁴ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/Transport. General Policy, Vol. IV, “Minutes of Meeting on Transport Matters held on 27 April 1970”.

⁵ From Director's notes, IOM-SW/Registry, ICEM V, 1951-1980, “Shipping Meeting”, 26.09.1969.

and the transport sector. How successful this goal was will be the subject of the next pages.

Traffic Dynamics

The migrant and refugee flows were not, and are still not, stable, at least for long intervals. Migrant trends are on a constant redefinition and configuration, following national and international economic and labour transformations, policies on human mobility in emigration, transit, and immigration countries. Based on the policies applied, the migration trends vary, as well as the trends for related business opportunities. In the transport sector for instance, when flows towards a sea/air route increase, new transport companies are established, others increase their fleet capacity and others simply retain the level of their revenue. When flows decrease or elapse, adaptation in the new climate follows: either by changing the business plan of each company, by decreasing their means of transport in one route, by partially or entirely relocating their business interests in other passenger traffic routes, or even by changing their business orientation,⁶ amongst many other business options.

From Tables 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3, the variations in the dynamic of the ICEM migrant and refugee traffic are examined in an effort to understand where the migrants and refugees were directed per decade, and, consequently, where transportation business opportunities were presented.

During the first decade of ICEM's operation, the migrant and refugee traffic was nearly equally divided between the three main sea and air routes: the North American countries, Oceania, and the Southern American route (Table 6.1). To these three directions, 88.5 percent of the migrants and refugees were transported—a total of 849,000 persons. These trends correlate with the general migration trends of the period when the majority of the migrant population was destined for the United States, Canada, Australia, and secondarily to Brazil and Argentina.

⁶ For instance, the conversion of vessels from passenger traffic to cargo traffic.

Table 6.1: ICEM Traffic per Immigration Route, Feb. 1952-Dec. 1959				
Traffic	Migrants	Refugees	Total	%
Oceania	210,461	70,713	281,174	29.3
North America	87,049	236,938	323,987	33.8
South America	221,564	22,910	244,474	25.5
Israel	860	51,655	52,515	5.5
Other Overseas	13,655	4,963	18,618	1.9
Other Europe	0	38,602	38,602	4.0
Total	533,589	425,781	959,370	100
<i>Notes: Oceania includes data for Australia and New Zealand; North America refers to Canada and the USA; South America refers to Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Uruguay, Venezuela, and other states from Latin America; Others Overseas refers to South Africa Rhodesia and Nyasaland, amongst others.</i>				
<i>Source: NARA/12th Session of Council, ICEM, "Progress Report of the Director 1 January - 29 February 1960", 20th Session, MC/386, 24.03.1960.</i>				


In the 1960s, the migration opportunities offered, mainly in Australia, shifted the interests of the transport companies towards the routes of Oceania (Table 6.2). In addition, the improvement of living standards in many European countries and the increase of intra-European migration resulted in the decrease of the total migration under ICEM. However, the establishment of new liner shipping companies in the Australian sea routes was a consequence of the change in migrant preferences, as well the strengthening of the presence in these sea and air routes of the already established transport companies. Furthermore, the population effort of Israel was enforced, benefiting the Israeli transport companies, as well as the liner shipping companies of the wider neighbouring countries, like Greece, which compensated their comparative losses from the North Atlantic sea route.

Table 6.2: ICEM Traffic per Immigration Route 1960- 1969				
Traffic	Migrants	Refugees	Total	%
Oceania	187,670	97,331	285,001	38.6
North America	42,449	112,096	154,545	21.0
South America	79,630	5,228	84,858	11.5
Israel	600	147,717	148,317	20.1
Other Overseas	36,772	5,959	42,731	5.8
Other Europe	0	22,197	22,197	3.0
Total	347,121	390,528	737,649	100
<i>Notes: Others Overseas refers to South Africa and Central American countries.</i>				
<i>Source: IOM-SW/Library, ICEM, "Report of the Director on the Work of the Committee for the Year 1969 (Including Report on Transport)", 35th (Special) Session, MC/EX/228, 28.05.1970.</i>				

The transportation scenery changed considerably in the 1970s in the traffic routes served by ICEM (Table 6.3). As discussed in Chapter 2, the transformation of the Latin American programmes and their focus on a more selective migration since the 1960s rather than quantitative migration, along with the Australian withdrawal from ICEM, imprinted their impact on the total configuration of the ICEM traffic towards these destinations. Towards these two immigration outlets, less than 13.5 percent of the ICEM total traffic was directed in the 1970s. On the other hand, the launch of the refugee programme of the United States with increased flows from Indochina added new traffic routes and new transport companies joined in the ICEM transport programme, along with the pre-existing ones. The traffic to Israel remained at about the same level as in the 1960s.

Table 6.3: ICEM Traffic per Immigration Route, 1970- 1979				
Traffic	Migrants	Refugees	Total	%
Oceania	49,025	41,603	90,628	9.9
North America	9,206	420,627	429,833	47.1
South America	26,852	4,710	31,562	3.5
Israel	14	192,998	193,012	21.1
Other Overseas	28,180	10,791	38,971	4.3
Other Europe	96	129,242	129,338	14.2
Total	113,373	799,971	913,344	100
<i>Notes: Others Overseas refers to South Africa and Central American and Caribbean countries.</i>				
<i>Source: IOM-SW/Library, ICEM, "Report of the Director on the Work of ICEM for the Year 1979", 45th Session, MC/1300, 28.03.1980.</i>				

Figure 6.1 below assists us to visualise the transformations in the ICEM traffic per immigration region between the 1950s and 1970s, as discussed above. None of the immigration routes could be characterised as linear. Significant fluctuations are noticed in all immigration routes through ICEM—a development which is linked to the migration policies enforced per decade.



However, the importance of the ICEM migrant transport programme for the shipping and airline companies varied depending on the transport companies' access and dynamic to other traffics (passenger, tourist, cargo traffic) that they handled within one or more sea/air routes. Therefore, the level of dependence of transport companies on the ICEM transport programme also defined the policy followed by ICEM, with its Administration either taking advantage of its position over its business partners, or simply adjusting to the realities formed by the transport companies.

Tracing the importance of the ICEM traffic for every sea and air route or transport company is not easy. Lack of information on total annual departures or arrivals per country or the lack of financial results of transport companies per route makes the formulation of exact results impossible. However, in the below pages, indications will indirectly be provided, at least, for the three main sea and air routes: the North Atlantic, the South American, and the Oceania routes.

Passenger Transport Cartels and ICEM

As S.G. Sturmeý explains, a Shipping Conference *is an association of competing liner owners engaged in particular trade who have agreed to limit the competition existing among themselves. As a minimum, they will have agreed to charge [...] fares for each class of traffic according to an agreed schedule of charges and to show no*

discrimination among shippers. The Conference system is a British invention, and it is a collective private body wherein the participating shipping companies share mutual business interests. Their goal is the regulation of competition between the companies sharing a single trade, constituting the “primary unit of power in liner shipping” since 1880, according to A. Cafruny. Some of the means the Conferences employ to achieve their goals includes through the regulation of the level of fares, the traffic division per route or port, and the determination of the number of sailings between the participating shipping companies. In addition, the maintenance of the traffic within the Conference member-lines and the exclusion of independent shipping companies is an additional important aspect of the work of the cartel, in the direction of the monopolisation of the traffic.⁷

In the aviation industry, the corresponding Conference is the *International Air Transport Association* (IATA), established in 1945, as the successor of the *International Air Traffic Association* of 1919. Respectively, IATA, a private organisation, ensured the regulation of the air traffic by limiting the competition on air routes served by more than one airline by excluding the outside airline competitors and by evenly distributing the revenue between its member-airlines. IATA regulated the level of fares between its member-airlines, as well as the whole execution of air trips from seating to drinks and meals offered per fare paid.⁸

As it is understood, in either case, the transport companies participating in the above airline and shipping Conferences were regular scheduled passenger transport companies. They could not act autonomously in the determination of their fares, only collectively, based on the policies of each Conference. From their side, the Conferences negotiated the fare prices with external entities bulk booking space on the transport means of their members, consulted their members, and thereafter announced their decision on the intended agreements.

ICEM was in close contact with Shipping Conferences, as well as with IATA. The Shipping Conferences involved in ICEM’s work were foremost the *North Atlantic Conference*, as well as the *Accordo Passeggeri Mediterraneo – Brasile/Plata* and the *Accordo Passeggeri Venezuela*—represented shipping liner companies with interests in

⁷ Sturmev, *op.cit.*, pp. 271-275, 283; Peter N. Davies, «Θαλάσσιο Εμπόριο και Μεταφορές τον 19^ο αιώνα», in Gelina Harlaftis (ed.), *Ιστορία και Ναυτιλία 16^{ος} – 20^{ος} αιώνας*, Athens, 2005, pp. 257-258; A. W. Cafruny, “The Political Economy of International Shipping”, pp. 94-95.

⁸ K. Hudson and J. Pettifer, *Diamonds in the Sky*, pp. 138-139; Dierikx, *Clipping the Clouds*, p. 23.

one or more of the respective traffic routes. However, it needs to be clarified that not all the regular scheduled shipping liner companies participated in one or more of the aforementioned conglomerations. ICEM cooperated also with independent-from-Conference membership shipping liner companies. The same did not apply in the case of scheduled airline companies, which all were members of IATA; nevertheless, ICEM also contracted non-scheduled/chartered airlines which were not IATA-members.

How this relationship started and developed, what the relationship meant for ICEM's work and for the respective Conferences, and the differences per traffic are some of the questions to be answered below.

- The North Atlantic Conference

With its establishment, one of the first actions of PICMME/ICEM was to secure shipping space for the migrants it was intended to transport overseas. The *North Atlantic Conference* (NAC) was the only Shipping Conference serving Western Europe and the USA/Canadian sea routes⁹ and the most well-established and influential passenger shipping Conference in existence. PICMME/ICEM, after several meetings since 1952, came into an agreement with NAC in October 1953. Under this agreement, both would coordinate a programme based on passenger space availability and requirements in migrant traffic across the North Atlantic. The goal was that the NAC passenger vessels would not sail light and that ICEM would secure space on scheduled regular liner passenger ships. To avoid the deviation of the passenger traffic to chartered passenger vessels, NAC and ICEM would study the provision of supplementary shipping space, when needed, and would agree on a fare prices scale so the ICEM's mass migrant movements would take place at the best possible rates. The aforementioned objectives were achieved through regular exchange of information and

⁹ In 1963 the member-lines of NAC included *American Export Line, American President Line, Canadian Pacific, Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, Cunard Line, Europe-Canada Line, Greek Line, Hamburg Atlantic, Holland-America Line, Home Lines, Incres S.S. Co., ITALIA, National Hellenic Line, Norddeutscher Lloyd, Norwegian America Line, Orange Line, Polish Ocean Lines, Swedish American Line, United States Line, ZIM Lines, IOM-SW/Registry*, 8/1/11/Shipping. Atlantic Conference Lines, Vol. IV, Atlantic Passenger Steamship Conference, "Advertised Minimum Rates-1964", M.R.19, December 1963.

periodical meetings between the ICEM Administration and the Conference member-lines.¹⁰

In general terms, ICEM expressed its “gratitude for the spirit of co-operation” by the Conference. Their relationship was characterised as working in a problem-solving direction and to be beneficial for the migrant traffic and all the involved parties (emigration/immigration countries, shipping lines, ICEM).¹¹ From their side, the member-lines of the Conference did not omit to express their “sincere appreciation” for the cooperation by ICEM.¹²

As discussed in Chapter 5, since the shipping companies were in direct communication with their governments, they were well aware of ICEM’s commitment for preference on scheduled regular means of transport, as well as on ICEM’s assurances given to the governments. Correspondingly, this information passed on the Conferences through their member-lines. NAC was aware of how the ICEM services could work to the necessary extent possible for the benefit of its member-lines and the avoidance of revenue-losses.¹³ Thus, the outcome was the creation of parallel schemes of communication and increased pressure in relation to transport matters towards ICEM.

It is important to clarify, though, that in the North Atlantic sea traffic, no shipping companies operated outside the North Atlantic Conference; thus, the Conference member-lines had no fear of outside-Conference competition from another shipping liner company,¹⁴ and they could form their fare prices to the level its member-lines wished. What is more, the North Atlantic sea traffic did not face the same challenges as other traffics did. The main and most remunerative traffic for the NAC member-lines was the tourist traffic, which was the axis that regulated the companies’ operation. The migrant traffic had a subordinate, merely insignificant, but certainly

¹⁰ IOM-SW/General, Transport General–NAC Accordo/North Atlantic, W.H. Roper, Secretary, Atlantic Conference, Kent to J.J. van Loon, Chief, Office of Shipping, ICEM Geneva, 05.10.1953; *ibid.*, J.J. van Loon, Chief, Office of Shipping to W.H. Roper, Secretary, The Atlantic Conference, Kent, 09.10.1953.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, J.J. van Loon, Chief, Office of Shipping for the Director to W.H. Roper, Secretary, Atlantic Conference, Kent, 16.02.1954.

¹² *Ibid.*, W.H. Roper, Secretary, Atlantic Conference, Cannes to J.J. van Loon, 02.03.1954.

¹³ IOM-SW/General, Transport General–NAC Accordo, G. Krause, Deputy Chief, Department of Shipping to J.J. van Loon, Chief, Department of Shipping, “Report on visit of Mr. Krause and Mr. Storich to Rome August 20th – 24th, 1952”, 26.08.1952; IOM-SW/General, Transport General – NAC Accordo/North Atlantic, Mr. Krause, Deputy Chief, Office of Shipping to Van Loon, Chief, Office of Shipping, “Report on duty trip to Cannes from February 29 to March 2, 1954”, 03.03.1954.

¹⁴ IOM-SW/General, Transport General–NAC Accordo, P. Jacobsen, Acting Director to George L. Warren, Advisor on Refugees and Displaced Persons, Washington, 12.04.1955.

complimentary, role in comparison with the respective total passenger and cargo traffics. Thus, the ICEM Administration followed the Conference's dictations and price policy.¹⁵ NAC did not proceed to significant fare-concessions towards ICEM, as its member-lines did not want to compromise the greater profits from the bookings through the travel agents. When a discussion for fare reductions came up, the NAC member-lines were seeking assurances for the increase of its bookings from ICEM.¹⁶

In 1955, the ICEM Administration's tactic for the attraction of fare concessions from NAC was to explain the benefits derived out of the work of ICEM. More specifically, the ICEM Administration supported that the migrant-passengers were booked for transportation *en masse* and not as individual bookings; they were travel-ready in time (documentation, counselled before embarkation); the migrants were assembled and embarked/disembarked with the assistance of ICEM staff, which also managed the migrants' heavy luggage. These procedures required dedicated staff and ICEM funding, a cost that otherwise would have been undertaken by the shipping companies, as happened in the case of passengers booked through travel agents. To the travel agents, the NAC member-lines offered ten percent commission for their work; such a handling fee was claimed by the ICEM Administration for its migrants. This fee was to keep the ICEM fare prices low, would retain the traffic with the liner shipping companies, and would not jeopardise the decrease of the number of the migrants annually supported due to budget limitations.¹⁷

The NAC member-lines acknowledged ICEM's arguments and, since October 1955, provided a handling fee of \$10 per adult migrant on fully paid passages booked. The handling fee was granted under the conditions that a) the migrants were not self-payers, but were subsidised by ICEM; b) the bookings were made by ICEM through the agents of the shipping companies; c) ICEM would inform NAC on all air/sea charters to take place outside the Conference member-lines; and d) ICEM and the cooperating voluntary agencies would not enter into competition with the member-lines and their sub-agents, nor disturb the existing arrangements with the agents.¹⁸ The latter

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/11/Transport. Atlantic Conference Lines. Vol. V, J. Hübener, Department of Transport to B.W. Haveman, "Atlantic Passenger Steamship Conference", 20.10.1965.

¹⁷ IOM-SW/General, Transport General – NAC Accordo/North Atlantic, J.J. van Loon, Chief, Office of Shipping for the Director to W. Roper, Atlantic Conference, Kent, JJVL/psd, 27.08.1955.

¹⁸ IOM-SW/General, Transport General–NAC Accordo/North Atlantic, W. H. Roper, Atlantic Conference, Kent to J.J. van Loon, Chief, Department of Shipping, ICEM Geneva, 20.10.1955; *ibid.*, J.J.

was a rather restrictive context for the provision of a fare discount of the aforementioned magnitude. Considering that the Conference's role was the elimination of outside competition, the aforementioned rules can easily be contextualised. This agreement was about to terminate after six months of implementation. However, it was under consecutive renewal under the same terms, at least until 1971,¹⁹ as it is known from the available archival sources.

With the increase of competition in the North Atlantic traffic from the air transport means, ICEM, in the mid-1950s, sought additional concessions such as the establishment of a special migrant fare for the North Atlantic Sea traffic. Voices within ICEM to boycott the NAC passenger ships until they consented to such a special fare were not heard simply out of fear of potential friction with the member-states involved. According to the ICEM Chief of the Department of Shipping, the handling fee arrangement was considered as the best that could be achieved. However, internally, he criticised the abilities of the current and past staff of the Department of Shipping, who came to such a restrictive for ICEM agreement with NAC.²⁰

Again, in 1965, when the air transport in the North Atlantic was cheaper than transport by sea, the ICEM Administration's requests included the increase of the handling fee and the establishment of a one-way group fare for ICEM migrants.²¹ One year later, NAC suggested a moderate increase of the amount of the handling fee initially requested, payable at the end of each operational year, under the condition the ICEM migrants booked were not less than those carried during the previous year.²² These terms were not irrelevant with the transformations taking place in the North

van Loon, Chief, Department of Shipping for the Director to W. Roper, Atlantic Conference, Kent, JJVL/psd, 02.11.1955.

¹⁹ From April 1959 the handling fee offered by NAC was formed to \$12 for adults and \$6 for children between 1 and 12 years of age. Furthermore, the agreement was renewed every six months, and then annually. IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/11/Shipping. Atlantic Conference Lines, Vol. IV, "Atlantic Conference: "Handling Fees"", n.d. [1965]

²⁰ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/13/Shipping Liaison with Greece, Vol. I, H. R. Hoekstra, Chief, Department of Shipping to P. Gibson, Chief of Mission, ICEM Liaison Mission Athens, 11.12.1957.

²¹ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/11/Shipping. Atlantic Conference Lines, Vol. IV, J. Hübener, Chief of Department of Transport to R.M.L. Duffy, Secretary, Atlantic Passenger Steamship Conference, Kent, 05.03.1965; *ibid.*, J. Hübener, Chief of Department of Transport to American Export Lines, New York; Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, Paris; Cunard Line, Liverpool; Greek Line, Paris; Holland-America Line, Rotterdam; Italia SpA, Genoa; National Hellenic Line, Genoa; Norddeutscher Lloyd, Bremen; Norwegian American Line, Oslo; Swedish American Line, Gothenburg; United States Line, N.York; Zim Lines, Haifa, "ICEM Movements to North America", 06.04.1965.

²² IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/11/Transport. Atlantic Conference Lines, Vol. V, R.M.L. Duffy, Secretary, Atlantic Passenger Steamship Conference, Kent to J. Hübener, Chief of Department of Transport, ICEM Geneva, "ICEM Fares to North America", 21.04.1966.

Atlantic traffic, and the direct competition from the aircraft in all traffic-types (tourist, business, migrant traffic). To reiterate, since 1958, more passengers had travelled between Europe and the Americas by air rather than by sea.²³ Seven years later, in 1965, out of 100 passengers, only 14 travelled by sea,²⁴ namely about 1:7. Therefore, the NAC terms were simply a way for its member-lines to secure supplementary traffic for their passenger vessels.

Without having the power over NAC to impose a better financial deal, ICEM acceded, but such an objective never materialised, since the gap with the airline fares was steadily growing. At the same time, the ICEM Administration had received the Council's approval to apply economies in the transport of migrants by the chartering of passenger vessels and aircraft in case the regular scheduled ones offered uncompetitive fares, as seen in Chapter 4. Thus, a new request in 1967 from the ICEM Administration for increase of the handling fee²⁵ was denied anew by the NAC member-lines.²⁶

Experiencing a series of unsuccessful efforts for fare concessions by NAC, the ICEM Administration did not hesitate to collaborate privately with NAC member-lines in order to be bilaterally assisted in their objectives. More specifically, at the end of 1965, the ICEM Administration came into consultations with the *American Export Line* in order for the company to lobby with the rest NAC member-lines and support ICEM's request for a reduced group migrant fare. In exchange, the ICEM Administration would approach the Canadian Ministry of Immigration in order for the latter to concede on the arrival of ICEM migrants also via New York port and not directly via Halifax, as the Canadian government wished. This arrangement would favour the business interests of the *American Export Line*, which called in New York and would avoid costly deviations.²⁷

ICEM tried to follow NAC's flow, since the ICEM Administration was not in a position of power to negotiate better agreements. Therefore, whenever the Conference could carry additional migrants, it requested and succeeded in the cancellation of the

²³ Dierikx, *Clipping the Clouds*, p. 60.

²⁴ Hyde, *Cunard and the North Atlantic 1840-1973*, p. 296.

²⁵ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/11/Transport. Atlantic Conference Lines, Vol. V, S.K. Christensen, Chief of Department of Operations and Transports to R.M.L. Duffy, Secretary, Atlantic Passenger Steamship Conference, Kent, "ICEM Sea Fares to North America: additional handling fee of \$4.00", 01.03.1967.

²⁶ Ibid., R.M.L. Duffy, Secretary General, Atlantic Passenger Steamship Conference, Kent to S.K. Christensen, Chief of Department of Operations and Transport, ICEM Geneva, 26.04.1967.

²⁷ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/4/Transport. Liaison with Italy, Vol. IV, "Note for the File: Use of American Export Line Ships for ICEM Migrants", 13.12.1965.

transport means chartered by ICEM for the benefit of its member-lines.²⁸ In addition, the ICEM Administration, in order not to face cancellation clauses and meet its commitments with NAC member-lines, whenever possible, tried to press the immigration countries for the operational ‘clearing’ of their forthcoming migrants so they could become ready for transportation. Nevertheless, their pressure was not always welcome, as the Canadian Director of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration stressed to ICEM in 1954, *Canada has no commitment to North Atlantic Conference, [...] we do not intend to exert extra effort for the sole purpose of filling ICEM ships with arrivals that may not coincide with the optimum period of employment opportunities in Canada.*²⁹

What is important to note from the case of the *North Atlantic Conference* is that ICEM’s relationship with its business partners was dynamic and varied based on the dependence of the latter from the ICEM migrant traffic and resources. In the case of NAC, ICEM was in a disadvantageous position and could not impose its preferences, as it did in other circumstances. ICEM was mainly following the flow that NAC directed. In its effort to succeed in some of its requests, the ICEM Administration tried to act indirectly. In exchange for the effort of some NAC shipping companies to influence the rest member-lines in favour of ICEM requests, ICEM promised interventions to its member-states for the granting of business favours to its collaborators, a practice like those applied by the companies, as seen in Chapter 5.

- *The ‘Accordos’: the agreements with the shipping companies of the South Atlantic*

In the South Atlantic, two main Conferences regulated the traffic with Europe. These were the *Accordo Passeggeri Mediterraneo – Brasile/Plata* and the *Accordo Passaggeri Venezuela*. Both Conferences were mainly constituted by Italian passenger shipping liner companies and secondarily by foreign ones, and the Conferences’ operation was in direct relation with the Italian government. Both were established in

²⁸ IOM-SW/General, OPS-20-094/Transport, W.H. Roper, Atlantic Conference, Copenhagen to J.J. van Loon, Chief, Office of Shipping, ICEM Geneva, 02.07.1954; *ibid.*, J.J. van Loon, Chief, Office of Shipping for the Director to W.H. Roper, Secretary, Atlantic Conference, England, 05.07.1954.

²⁹ IOM-SW/General, Transport General–NAC *Accordo/North Atlantic*, C.E.S. Smith, Director, Department of Citizenship and Immigration, Immigration Branch, Ottawa to P. Jacobsen, B31672, 09.02.1954.

the first half of the 1950s, during a decade when the conference system reached its peak.³⁰

More specifically, the *Accordo Passeggeri Mediterraneo – Brasile/Plata* (APMBP) was founded in Genoa a few months after the establishment of PICMME/ICEM in August 1952. Six of the founding member-lines were from Italy; Spain, France and Argentina were represented by one liner shipping company each. The function of the Conference followed NAC's example, and its emigrant fare-scale was based on the *Noli Massimi* of the Italian government, namely the maximum permitted fares charged for emigrants departing from Italy. APMBP's establishing reason was the regulation of ICEM traffic in this route. After the first months of the Organisation's operation, a "cut-throat" competition started between the Italian liner shipping companies which engaged in a fare-war in their effort to secure ICEM migrants, thus endangering the financial viability of their sailings. Therefore, the APMBP would regulate the competition in the third class.³¹ The establishment of the APMBP, as well as the conclusion of an agreement with ICEM, was promoted by the Italian government.³²

The realities faced on the Mediterranean – Brazil/Argentina sea routes were different from the North Atlantic ones. First of all, no considerable tourist traffic existed, only spontaneous Italian emigrants, while the trade traffic that the APMBP vessels carried in conjunction with the passengers was diminishing. Therefore, the liner shipping companies heavily relied upon the ICEM traffic. The Italian liner shipping company, ITALIA, which had important links within the Italian government, was leading the APMBP.³³ The agreement of ICEM with APMBP foresaw the allocation of

³⁰ M. Stopford, *Maritime Economics*, p. 688.

³¹ The 1952 member-lines were the Italian: Società Italiana di Armamento "SIDARMA"; "Italnavi" Società di Navigazione per Azioni; "ITALIA" Società per Azioni di Navigazione; Giacomo Costa fu Andrea; Achille Lauro-Armatore; Società Italiana Trasporti Marittimi "SITMAR"; Ybarra y Sociedad Anonima (Spain), Société Générale Transports Maritimes (France) and Flota Argentina de Navegación "FANU/Dodero" (Argentina). IOM-SW/General, Transport General-NAC Accordo, "Accordo Passeggeri Compagnia del Mediterraneo", n.d.; *ibid.*, F. Fiocchi, Secretary, Accordo Passeggeri Mediterraneo-Brasile/Plata to PICMME Geneva, 02.09.1952; *ibid.*, Accordo Passaggeri Mediterraneo-Brasile/Plata, "Member Lines", n.d. [September 1952].

³² IOM-SW/General, OPS-20-094/Transport, Documentation File No.14, "Part II: Chapter II, Transport", n.d. [1957]

³³ IOM-SW/General, Transport General-NAC Accordo, G. Krause, Deputy Chief, Department of Shipping, J. Van den Brink, Shipping Operations Officer to Dr. Van Loon, Chief, Department of Shipping, "Report on Mr. Krause's and Mr. van den Brink's visit to Genoa, September 9th – 12th, 1952, in connection with the establishment of the 3rd class passenger conference Mediterranean-Brazil/La Plata (Accordo)", 15.09.1952.

all the third-class space of the member-lines for the ICEM traffic. In return the APMBP lines would provide advantageous fare reductions.³⁴

A different approach than the one adopted with NAC was followed by the ICEM Administration in the requests for fare price increases by APMBP. From its side, the ICEM Administration refused fare increases claiming financial difficulties in the ICEM finance and by arguing that a possible increase would reduce the number of migrants to be moved.³⁵ The APMBP invoked its northern colleagues and the fare prices they enjoyed, raising questions of “discrepancy”, of “legitimate concern”, and of “discrimination made in their disfavour”.³⁶ On a more dominant tone, the ICEM Chief of Department of Transport expressed his ‘disappointment’ on the request for fare increases by APMBP, which would also result in a decrease of Italian emigration,³⁷ implying the shipping companies’ national role, apart from their business interests.

Under this way, ICEM managed to maintain the rates adopted with APMBP in 1952 until the early 1955,³⁸ when the first fare increase was conceded. In the same year, a *sliding scale system* was adopted, under which the rates were adjusted based on the actual operating costs of the passenger vessels.³⁹ The next fare increase request came

³⁴ NARA/5th Session of the ICEM, Geneva, April 16-24, 1953, ICEM, “Report of the Sub-Committee on Co-Ordination of Transport”, 5th Session, MC/15, 22.04.1953; IOM-SW/General, OPS-20-094/Transport, J.J. van Loon, Chief, Office of Shipping to Hugh Gibson, Director, “Analysis of Shipping Activities, Migration Committee for Period 1 February 1952 to 30 June 1953”, 14.08.1953.

³⁵ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/21/BRA/Shipping. Accordo Passaggeri Mediterraneo Brasile/Plata, Vol. I, J. J. van Loon, Chief, Office of Shipping for Director to France Fiocchi, Secretary, Accordo Passeggeri Mediterraneo-Brasile/Plata, 17.02.1954.

³⁶ IOM-SW/General, Transport General–NAC Accordo, F. Fiocchi, Secretary, Accordo Passeggeri Mediterraneo-Brasile/Plata, Genova to J.J. van Loon, Chief, Office of Shipping, ICEM Geneva, 30.07.1953; *ibid.*, F. Fiocchi, Secretary, Accordo Passeggeri Mediterraneo-Brasile/Plata, Genova to J.J. van Loon, Chief, Office of Shipping, ICEM Geneva, 12.04.1954.

³⁷ IOM-SW/General, Transport General–NAC Accordo, J.J. van Loon, Chef de la Division des Transports to Franco Fiocchi, Secrétaire, Accordo Passeggeri Mediterraneo-Brasile/Plata, Genova, 19.05.1954.

³⁸ IOM-SW/General, Transport General–NAC Accordo, F. Fiocchi, Secretary, Accordo Passeggeri Mediterraneo-Brasile/Plata, Genova to J.J. van Loon, Chief, Office of Shipping, ICEM Geneva, 25.11.1954; IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/21/BRA/Shipping. Accordo Passaggeri Mediterraneo Brasile/Plata, Vol. I, L. Martel, J.J. van Loon, Riunione tenuta a Roma nei giorni 1 e 2 febbraio 1955 fra i Rappresentanti del CIME e le Compagnie dell’ “Accordo Passeggeri Mediterraneo Brasile/Plata”, Addendum to the Agreement between the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM) and the Lines of the Accordo Passeggeri Mediterraneo Brasile/Plata signed in Rome on June 2nd, 1954 (v. Circ. 366/P), 02.02.1955.

³⁹ E.g. crew-wages, fuel, repairs, crew/passenger provision; administrative expenses. IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/21/BRA/Shipping. Accordo Passaggeri Mediterraneo Brasile/Plata, Vol. I, Memorandum for ICEM, “Sliding Scale System for Variation in Passage-Rates for Conveyance to South America of Emigrants to by ICEM–Formula Proposed by the Lines of the “Accordo Passaggeri Mediterraneo–Brasile/Plata”, n.d. [July 1955]; *ibid.*, J. J. van Loon, Chief, Department of Shipping to F. Fiocchi, Secretary, Accordo Passeggeri Mediterraneo-Brasile/Plata, Genoa, “ICEM Rates to South America”, 26.09.1955.

from APMBP in 1958, when ICEM initially denied the level of the increase requested but offered half of it.⁴⁰ Upon the rejection of the ICEM proposal by APMBP, the ICEM Administration denied the conclusion of a meeting with the APMBP member-lines on the basis that there was no room for fare concession from its side.⁴¹ However, the fares were finally agreed to be increased two months later.⁴²

A similar story occurred in the ICEM sea traffic to Venezuela. When it started becoming noticeable, the Italian passenger liner shipping companies were grouped under a Conference to regulate the third-class sea traffic between Europe and Venezuela, which, in its vast majority, was ICEM traffic. As a result, the *Accordo Passageri Venezuela* (APV) was established in 1955. Member-lines of APV were only Italian shipping liner companies, and five out of the seven were simultaneously members of the *Accordo Passeggeri Mediterraneo Brasile/Plata* (APMBP), while both ‘Accordos’ shared the same Secretary.⁴³ These facts predisposed the connection between both Conferences,⁴⁴ as well as their policies toward ICEM.

With their introduction to ICEM as a Shipping Conference, APV asked for a considerable fare increase. Their request was based on the lack of trade traffic to/from Venezuela, as well as on the nearly non-existent return traffic.⁴⁵ Their claims were considered ‘unfounded’ by the ICEM Administration. ICEM rejected their request

⁴⁰ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/21/BRA/Shipping. *Accordo Passaggeri Mediterraneo Brasile/Plata*, Vol. I, O. Golbs-Wilms, Deputy Chief of Department of Operations and Transport, “Note for the File: Meeting with Representatives of *Accordo Passeggeri Brasile/Plata* on 28 November 1958”, 28.11.1958; *ibid.*, Marcus Daly to F. Fiocchi, 06.12.1958.

⁴¹ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/21/BRA/Shipping. *Accordo Passaggeri Mediterraneo Brasile/Plata*, Vol. I, B.G. Epinat to F. Fiocchi, 14.01.1959; *ibid.*, F. Fiocchi, Secretary, *Accordo Passeggeri Mediterraneo–Brasile/Plata* to ICEM Geneva, “ICEM’s fares to Brazil, Uruguay and the Argentine”, 29.01.1959.

⁴² *Ibid.*, F. Fiocchi, Secretary of the *Accordo*, for and on behalf of the Lines, A.R. Driver for the Director, “Minutes of a meeting held in Geneva on 16 March 1959, between the representatives of the *Accordo Passeggeri Mediterraneo Brasile/Plata*, and the representatives of the Administration of ICEM”, n.d.

⁴³ Members of the *Accordo Passeggeri Venezuela* in 1955 were Giacomo Costa fu Andrea; F. Lli Grimaldi Armatori; “Italia” SpAN; Achile Lauro Armatore; Società Italiana di Armamento “Sidarma”; Società Italiana Trasporti Marittimi “SITMAR”; Sical Oceanica SA, see IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/21/VEN/Shipping, *Accordo–Passeggeri Venezuela*, Vol. I, F. Fiocchi, Secretary, *Accordo Passeggeri Venezuela*, Genova to ICEM Geneva, “ICEM Rates to Venezuela”, 09.11.1955; *ibid.*, F. Fiocchi, Secretary, *Accordo Passeggeri Mediterraneo-Brasile/Plata*, Genoa to ICEM Geneva, “Tariff Situation for conveyance of emigrants attended to by ICEM to Venezuela”, 07.02.1955. Only Grimaldi shipping line and Sical Oceanica SA were not participating in the *Accordo Passeggeri Mediterraneo-Brasile/Plata* and the Italmavi and the three non-Italian lines in the *Accordo Passeggeri Venezuela*.

⁴⁴ The connection between APMBP and APV is not novel in the Conference system. The Shipping Conferences were linked between them through the shipping companies which were members of several Conferences. In addition, the Conference concluded agreements between them for the sharing of information that might impact their operations, Sturmeijer, *op.cit.*, p. 273.

⁴⁵ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/21/VEN/Shipping, *Accordo–Passeggeri Venezuela*, Vol. I, F. Fiocchi, Secretary, *Accordo Passeggeri Mediterraneo-Brasile/Plata*, Genoa to ICEM Geneva, “Tariff Situation for conveyance of emigrants attended to by ICEM to Venezuela”, 07.02.1955.

twice, since it recognised a comparatively increased number of self-paying migrants from Italy, a rewarding return traffic from Caribbean, and flourishing traffic from Venezuela.⁴⁶ The ICEM Administration, in its discussions with APV, tried to avoid the references with the Brazil/Plata traffic and preferred to consider these traffics individually in its own respective merit, as both had different structure;⁴⁷ APV liked this correlation very much. This was a way for ICEM to keep its distance from the obvious links between the two ‘Accordos’ and to confront each one as a different entity.

However, the ICEM Administration followed the same tactic as with APMBV regarding the rejection and postponement of their fare increase requests. By invoking its budget difficulties, ICEM highlighted that an increase in fares would have had negative implications in the volume of migration, while the revenue for the liner shipping companies would remain at the same level, if not diminished. Nevertheless, a *sliding scale system* was also adopted for the Venezuela traffic.⁴⁸

In the case of the ‘Accordos’, the engagement between two private organisations and a government is remarkable. In the case of APMBP, the Italian government was the one to promote the conglomeration of the liner shipping companies under a Conference so as to halt competition, while the leadership within APMBP was entrusted with ITALIA Line, a subsidised line of the Italian state-owned group *Finmare*. Finmare, before 1945, was a powerful Italian group of state-owned shipping companies, owning forty percent of the total Italian fleet. After the end of WWII, its role was to meet the national demand for passenger and freight transport and, more significantly, to protect the public capital invested in the shipping and shipbuilding industry of the country.⁴⁹ Therefore, its role in the formation of both ‘Accordos’ should be examined under these lenses of the governmental protectiveness of the national maritime industry. In the case of APV, the hegemony of the Italian Ministry of

⁴⁶ Ibid., J.J. van Loon, Chief, Department of Shipping to Franco Fiocchi, *Accordo Passeggeri Mediterraneo–Brazile/Plata*, “ICEM Rates to Venezuela”, 21.03.1955; *ibid.*, G.Krause, Acting Chief, Department of Shipping to F. Fiocchi, *Accordo Passeggeri Mediterraneo–Brazile/Plata*, 18.05.1955.

⁴⁷ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/21/VEN/Shipping, *Accordo–Passeggeri Venezuela*, Vol. I, G. Krause, Acting Chief, Department of Shipping to *Accordo Passeggeri Venezuela Genova*, “ICEM Rates to Venezuela”, 17.11.1955.

⁴⁸ Ibid., F. Fiocchi, Secretary, *Accordo Passeggeri Venezuela* to G. Krause, Acting Chief, Department of Shipping ICEM, “Conveyance of migrants to Venezuela”, 14.01.1956; *ibid.*, G. Krause, Acting Chief, Department of Shipping to F. Fiocchi, Secretary, *Accordo Passeggeri Venezuela Genova*, “Conveyance of migrants to Venezuela”, 14.02.1956; *ibid.* H.R. Hoekstra, Chief, Department of Shipping to F. Fiocchi, *Accordo Passeggeri Venezuela*, 16.07.1957; *ibid.* H.R. Hoekstra, Chief, Department of Shipping to F. Fiocchi, Secretary, *Accordo Passeggeri Venezuela*, 31.08.1957.

⁴⁹ Guilianelli, “Ship Financing in Italy”, pp. 347, 350, 353.

Merchant Marine was a reality, as, in 1956, the Ministry sent a strong letter to APV, since the latter's request to ICEM for fare increases should have been sent as request from the Ministry.⁵⁰

Both 'Accordos' were established because of the traffic produced out of the work of ICEM. The continued increase of the traffic and the prospects it promised were sufficient reasons for the liner shipping companies to congregate under Conferences and regulate the fare prices for the ICEM traffic. In the case of Venezuela, the ICEM traffic increased three-fold in 1953 (from 1021 in 1952 to 3788 in 1953) and continued increasing the following years (4985 in 1954).⁵¹ In the case of the traffic between the Mediterranean Sea and Brazil-Argentina, the ICEM traffic comprised 12 percent of the total traffic in 1952, reached 33 percent in 1953, and climbed to 71 percent within the first four months of 1954.⁵² This dependence of the sea transport companies on the inbound traffic (from Europe to Brazil-Plata and Venezuela) from ICEM transport programme gave the ICEM Administration an increased negotiation power and the leading role in the fare-negotiations; this reality was also admitted by the Acting Director of ICEM to high-ranking US officials.⁵³

What is more, the shipping liner companies could also rely on an important outbound traffic with disappointed migrants returning to Europe from Latin American countries (including ICEM migrants who now returned on their own cost), as well as on the cargo trade that vessels of liner shipping companies could combine with passenger traffic from Latin America to Europe (e.g. meat and wool, among others).⁵⁴

Meanwhile, the ICEM officials did not present the same respect to the 'Accordos' as they did with NAC. Indicative of this is the reference of an ICEM official for APMBP as "a so-called 'conference'" which was a "loosely established

⁵⁰ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/21/VEN/Shipping, Accordo-Passeggeri Venezuela, Vol. I, Michele Russo to J.J. van Loon, "Venezuela Route – ICEM Rates", 06.03.1957.

⁵¹ Ibid., F. Flocchi, Secretary, Accordo Passeggeri Mediterraneo-Brasile/Plata, Genoa to ICEM Geneva, "Tariff Situation for conveyance of emigrants attended to by ICEM to Venezuela", 07.02.1955.

⁵² IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/21/BRA/Shipping, Accordo Passaggeri Mediterraneo Brasile/Plata, Vol. I, Accordo Passeggeri Mediterraneo-Brasile/Plata, "Minutes of the Special Meeting held at the Hotel Excelsior, Rome, June 1st-2nd, 1954, between the Representatives of the "Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration" (I.C.E.M.) and the Representatives of the Member Lines", n.d.

⁵³ IOM-SW/General, Transport General-NAC Accordo, P. Jacobsen, Acting Director to George L. Warren, Advisor on Refugees and Displaced Persons, Washington, 12.04.1955.

⁵⁴ Ioannis Limnios-Sekeris, "Migration as a Business: Organizing the transport of migrants from South to South", in Maria Damilakou and Yannis G.S. Papadopoulos, *Migration and Development in Southern Europe and South America*, London and New York, 2022, pp. 166-167.

organization” with the purpose being to “force the Committee to pay higher rates”.⁵⁵ The difference in the ICEM Administration’s attitude did not go unnoticed, and the ‘Accordos’ highlighted the discriminatory behaviours against them in comparison with their northern colleagues.

- *The International Air Transport Association (IATA)*

Without having the same level of expertise in aviation, as in maritime issues, the PICMME/ICEM Administration approached IATA in 1952 to seek advice on several aviation technicalities.⁵⁶ The PICMME/ICEM-IATA relationship was slow to develop, more than likely also due to the progressive development of the aviation industry in the 1950s. In the following years, the introduction of IATA discounted fares: the family fare in 1955-56 became available for the general passenger public, was welcomed by ICEM, and was accompanied by ICEM’s suggestion towards IATA for further concession for migrant families as a humanitarian gesture to support their first settlement stages.⁵⁷ IATA, despite respecting the difficulties such passenger-groups faced, was unable to offer competitive sea-traffic rates due to “strict economic considerations [...] particularly severe in the case of air transport”.⁵⁸

ICEM developed a ‘defending’ stance toward IATA, since ICEM did not have the power to impose its fare-policy. Thus, what ICEM did was to try to protect its business from IATA’s restrictive regulations. The most representing example is the adoption of IATA Resolution 045 in early 1958. Under this Resolution, the application of lower fares than the IATA established fares was possible on chartered flights of its member-airlines only for specific passenger-categories.⁵⁹ A crucial precondition was that the cost of charter should have been fully covered by a government, an agency, or

⁵⁵ IOM-SW/Registry, ICEM III, 1951-1980, W.A. Wood, Jr., Chief, US Office, Migration Committee Washington DC to Pierre Jacobsen, Deputy Director, Migration Committee Geneva, 09.09.1952.

⁵⁶ E.g., air contracts, rates and procedures, IATA’s regulations in aircraft chartering. IOM-SW/General, OPS-20-079/Transport Air, J.J. van Loon, for the Director to Mr. Quinharken, IATA Clearing House, London, 31.10.1952; *ibid.*, A.J. Quin-Harking Manager, IATA Branch Office, Clearing House London to J.J. Van Loon, PICMME Geneva, C/22, 06.11.1952; *ibid.*, H. Gibbons, Assistant Secretary, Traffic Committee, IATA Montreal to J.J. van Loon, PICMME Geneva, 5086, 13.11.1952.

⁵⁷ IOM-SW/General, OPS-20-094/Transport, J.J. Van Loon, Chief, Department of Shipping to the President, IATA Montreal, RC/JBL, 12.05.1955.

⁵⁸ IOM-SW/General, OPS-20-094/Transport, J.W.S. Branckeer, Traffic Director, IATA Montreal to J.J. van Loon, Chief, Department of Shipping ICEM Geneva, 10,091a, 24.05.1955.

⁵⁹ Specifically, on immigrants, emigrants, displaced persons and members or dependents of the armed forces.

an organisation financially supported by one or more governments. In case the passengers participated in the cost of transport, this Resolution did not apply,⁶⁰ and the airlines offering lower than IATA fares were subject to sanctions. Resolution 045 was introduced in the same year when the *Economy Fare Class* (1958) was established.⁶¹ It could thus be perceived as IATA's effort to withhold the revenue losses from businesses out of its strictly commercial ones, namely the scheduled regular air flights.

The problem for ICEM was that its migrants were partially participating in their transport cost.⁶² Due to the ambiguous wording of the resolution, ICEM might be excluded from chartering aircraft of IATA member-airlines. Under these circumstances, the business partners' pool of ICEM would be limited only to the non-scheduled charter airlines, resulting in fleet limitations and potential cost increases due to the decreasing level of competition. Taking the above into consideration, the ICEM Administration engaged in a 'rally' of consultations involving its Headquarters' staff, the local ICEM Missions' staff, the IATA member-airlines, and the ICEM member-states in order to share their views on the interpretation of the Resolution.⁶³

Upon receipt of their comments, and based on the variations in the interpretation of the resolution received,⁶⁴ the ICEM Director personally addressed the member-governments of his Organisation. He highlighted that, through Resolution 045, *a limitation can be imposed by a private organization on the orderly carrying out of activities of an intergovernmental organization acting under the instructions from its Member Governments*. He stressed that the member-airlines of IATA under the flag of the ICEM member-states might be deprived from ICEM business and proposed the governments to "take whatever action" they deemed appropriate to prevent it. Leaving nothing to chance, he suggested that each member-government submit its reservations

⁶⁰ NARA/8th Session of the Council of ICEM, Geneva, May 8-14, 1958, ICEM, "Report of the Sub-Committee on the Co-Ordination of Transport", 8th Session, MC/288, 07.05.1958; Annex II, "IATA Resolution 045, effective 21 April 1958", MC/288.

⁶¹ Peter Lyth and Hans-Liudger Dienel, "Introduction", in H.-L. Dienel and P. Lyth (eds), *Flying the Flag*, p. 6.

⁶² The ICEM migrants contributed to a small extent to their transportation cost by paying before the trip or after by repaying the loan granted by ICEM.

⁶³ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/2/Shipping-Air, Air Policy. General, Vol. III, Cable, Promigrant Geneva to Promigrant Canberra al128; Rio De Janeiro ar878; Pretoria e4023; Athens au135; Salisburyhod az035; Bad Godesberg ad234; Vienna am200; Oslo a0004; Bogota; Madrid (et.al), 15.04.1958; *ibid.*, B.G. Epinat to B.W. Haveman, Government Commissioner for Emigration, Ministry of Social Affairs, The Hague, 15.04.1958. The same document was sent on the same day to the governments of Belgium, Israel, Switzerland, and France, *ibid.*

⁶⁴ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/2/Shipping-Air, Air Policy. General, Vol. III, O. Golbs-Wilms, A/Chief of Department of Shipping to Mr. J.K. Christie, Minister of the Union of South Africa, Bern, 12.06.1958.

on Resolution 045 and ask for ICEM's exemption. He even provided them with the wording under which their reservation should be transmitted to IATA and requested the member-states to inform him on the actions they would follow.⁶⁵

The ICEM Director's and his Administration's actions are indicative of the importance they gave for the retention of the availability of IATA's pool of member-airlines for ICEM, as well as of the 'panic' that prevailed with the release of this Resolution. The ICEM Director literally dictated the policy that each national government should follow in order to secure ICEM's interests; such an action could be interpreted as an indirect intervention in government policy making. On the other hand, if this resolution was enforced, the IATA airlines under the flag of the ICEM member-states' would be deprived from further business and the ICEM transport cost would increase. Thus, it can be argued that the ICEM Director was also working towards the interests of ICEM's business partners through his actions, who were only a small portion of the IATA member-airlines, as well as of the national economies of its member-states.

Following the efforts of the ICEM Administration and the intervention of its member-governments, IATA member-airlines amended the Resolution 045 by allowing chartering in lower fares than the IATA ones in case the whole or *part* of the cost was borne by the governments.⁶⁶

After the incident with IATA Resolution 045, which was discovered by ICEM only "by accident",⁶⁷ the ICEM Administration observed IATA's work more diligently, since its restrictions were directly affecting ICEM's business. In combination with its good relations with its member-states, ICEM managed to circumvent other restrictive IATA policies. More tellingly, disobedience of an IATA resolution by a member-airline imposed sanctions not only by IATA, but also by the governments where they operated. However, in case a government issued a "Government Order" permitting an airline

⁶⁵ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/2/Shipping–Air, Air Policy. General, Vol. III, Marcus Daly to Minister for External Affairs, Department of External Affairs, Canberra, Australia, 01.08.1958; *ibid.*, ICEM, "Aide Memoire, International Air Transport Association with particular reference to Resolution 045", n.d. Identical letters were sent to the governments of Austria, Belgium, France, Greece, Italy, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Israel, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Sweden, South Africa, USA, Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Venezuela, and Spain.

⁶⁶ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/2/Shipping–Air, Air Policy. General, Vol. III, J.W.S. Brancker, Traffic Director, IATA to John J. Bratton, Operations Officer, US Office, ICEM Washington, 10,045, 19.11.1958. Emphasis added.

⁶⁷ NARA/8th Session of the Council of ICEM, Geneva, May 8-14, 1958, ICEM, "Report of the Sub-Committee on the Co-Ordination of Transport", 8th Session, MC/288, 07.05.1958.

under its flag to apply lower fares than the IATA ones, the airline was obliged to follow. This provision was based on IATA Resolution 200g, and ICEM did not miss the opportunity to take advantage of it when needed.⁶⁸ If we consider that, until the 1970s, most of the airlines were state-owned, the governments had an important incentive for the issuance of such orders, as they also contributed to ICEM budgets and the migrants' transportation cost.

It is fair to note that this was not only an ICEM practice. As an ICEM official mentioned in 1972, certain governments tended to issue such orders for the private travel of government officials or members of parliament, family members, and "good friends". Likewise, certain airlines were "soliciting" such government orders for their benefit.⁶⁹

ICEM's relation with IATA is characterised by the continuous efforts of the ICEM Administration to disassociate itself from IATA's restrictive resolutions, the enactment of which did not necessarily direct to ICEM's work, but certainly affected it. ICEM's stance towards IATA remained defensive, but the ICEM Administration managed to withhold thanks to the relations it had established with its member-states and the aviation industry. The ICEM Administration did not have the power to impose its wishes to IATA, but had the power to indirectly circumvent the resolutions not favouring the commencement of its business.

From the aforementioned, we can conclude that the relationship of ICEM with the airline and shipping Conferences was governed by the level of dependence of the latter from the ICEM migrant traffic. ICEM could determine, to a considerable extent, the management of the traffic, where the majority of the total passengers were provided by ICEM. Where ICEM's migrant transport programme constituted only a fragment of the total revenue of the shipping and airline companies, the ICEM Administration tried to commence its business with the lowest possible cost or by subverting the restrictive policies for its own benefit. Therefore, ICEM's negotiation power varied considerably.

⁶⁸ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/1/Latin America Schemes, E. Jacob to E. Becerra, Executive Assistant, "Reduced fares from Europe to Argentina", 18.02.1969; IOM-SW/Registry, ICEM III, 1951-1980, "Report on Review of ICEM's Air Transport Position", n.d. [1967]

⁶⁹ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/2/Transport. Air Policy-General, Vol. VI, Chief, Department of Transport to Director, cc.: Deputy Director; Department of National Migration and Refugee Assistance, Mr. Schilt, "IATA Resolutions concerning free or reduced fare or rate transportation", 16.08.1972.

The interplay between the public and the private sectors is indicative in the case of airline and shipping Conferences and ICEM's work. Firstly, some shipping Conferences were established due to ICEM's operation, after governmental encouragement and initiative. In some cases, governments even indirectly managed the operation of the Conferences. However, when certain Conference policies endangered state finances, governmental intervention secured the relative fiscal interests. According to T. Judt, the interplay between the states and private-owned companies is also one of the reasons for the success of the post-1945 European capitalism, since the state "lubricated the wheels of commerce, politics and society" in various ways⁷⁰ by creating business and employment opportunities.

The absence of Australia from the above discussion on Conferences does not indicate an omission. In the case of the Australian sea route, the main Conference that existed was the *Australian Passenger Conference*, members of which were mainly liner shipping companies from the United Kingdom; this country did not participate in ICEM for long. Therefore, ICEM cooperated for the sea routes from Europe to Australasia, mainly independent from Conference membership sea transport companies.⁷¹ Nevertheless, different alliances and dynamics were established in this traffic, as it will be discussed further below.

The Australian routes

In contrast with some traffic routes, where the liner shipping companies were organised in Conferences in order to regulate the third-class fare level, in the case of Australasian sea routes, ICEM was the one to seek their regulation; the Australasian sea traffic was most vulnerable in the early 1950s in shipping shortages, as explained. Therefore, in August 1953, with the assistance of the ICEM Administration two shipping companies, the Italian *SITMAR* and the French *Compagnie des Messageries Maritimes* formed the *Europe Australian Passenger Service* (EAPS). EAPS was formed as a service, not as a Conference, in order to ensure regular connection between the ports of Northern Europe

⁷⁰ Judt, *op.cit.*, pp. 361-362.

⁷¹ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/5/Shipping, Policy Liaison with Australia & N. Zealand, Vol. I, C.O. Wendling, Chief of Mission Australia to J.J. Van Loon, Chief, Office of Shipping, ICEM HQs, "Reduced Freight Rates", AUS/N/1, 20.07.1954; IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/5/Shipping/Liaison with Australia Policy, Keith Trace, Lecturer, Faculty of Economics and Commerce, University of Melbourne to [ICEM Geneva], 25.09.1964.

and Australia and secondarily of New Zealand. The shipping companies comprising EAPS came into an agreement with ICEM, with the latter providing the companies exclusively with its migrant-passengers on a regular basis, as long as safety standards and ICEM requirements were met. The companies from their side guaranteed continued service of the sea routes⁷² and negotiated the level of their fares directly with ICEM.⁷³

The level of the fares paid by ICEM also regulated the quality of cooperation of the sea and air transport companies with the ICEM Administration. Wherever the traffic was free from Conferences, ICEM negotiated directly with the sea transport companies and the governments involved. The case of Australia is indicative of the study of the mechanisms developed by the liner shipping companies in the attraction of greater fares from ICEM.

More specifically, the request for fare increases in the Australian sea route started in 1956, when the shipping companies from Northern and Southern Europe claimed considerable financial concessions from ICEM's side. In the case of EAPS shipping companies, ICEM, with an unprecedented dynamic, rejected their request for fifteen percent and later adjusted to a ten percent increase in the fares. ICEM, instead, offered a five percent increase, thus resulting in the loss and ultimately the end of EAPS, which had already been established. Regarding the sea transport companies from Southern Europe, ICEM came into an agreement on the fare level with two out of the three shipping companies, resulting in the withdrawal of three passenger vessels from ICEM's disposal. However, the closure of the Suez Canal towards the end of 1956 aggravated ICEM's position, since the increase in operational costs of the vessels, including the fuel prices, made additional fare concessions by ICEM necessary.⁷⁴

It has to be clarified, though, that the timing of the 1956-1957 fare increases and the withdrawal of the shipping companies from the Australian sea routes is not incidental with other parameters of the traffic. The establishment of the sea routes from Europe to Australia by ICEM was successful, as long as the companies could be ensured

⁷²IOM-SW/General, OPS-20-094/Transport, Documentation File No.14, "Part II: Chapter II, Transport", n.d.; IOM-SW/General, OPS-20-103/Shipping General Special, J.J. van Loon, ICEM Chief, Office of Shipping; R. Carour, Director General, Compagnie des Messageries Maritimes; L.T. Volazzi, Director, Societa Italiana Transporti Marittimi SITMAR, "Europe-Australia Passenger Service, Covenant", 04.12.1953.

⁷³NARA/3rd Session of the Council, Geneva, Oct. 17-22, 1955, and the Ex. Comm., October 6-22, 1955, ICEM, "Report of the Director on Transportation", 3rd Session, MC/153, 10.09.1955.

⁷⁴NARA/ICEM, Council Documents, MC/Sixth Session (1st copy), ICEM, "Report of the Director on the Work of the Committee for the Year 1956", 6th Session, MC/223/Rev.1, 01.04.1957; *ibid.*, ICEM, "Report of the Sub-Committee on the Co-Ordination of Transport", 6th Session, MC/235, 06.04.1957.

with return traffic. Particularly, and due to the lack of noteworthy tourist sea traffic, the French authorities in Saigon had arranged the chartered passenger ships by ICEM returning from Australia to load French soldiers leaving Saigon to Marseilles. In 1955, this traffic was about to dry up and the last soldiers were to embark on French-flag passenger vessels.⁷⁵ The loss of revenue from the shipping companies resulted in the submission of requests for fare increases to ICEM. ICEM's refusal to meet the level of their request resulted in the *Hellenic Mediterranean Line* (ELMES), which operated between Greece and Australia the change of its business orientation, with the conversion of one of its passenger ships into cargo and the sending of its second vessel to scrap.⁷⁶ The upset on the ICEM's business in this traffic was simultaneously presented as a chance for the ICEM Administration to introduce the *Military Sea Transportation Service* (MSTS) vessels in this sea route as discussed in Chapter 4, as well as to increase its air operations to Australia—an operational test in one of its more distant and costly, but important, destinations.

The increase of the Australian migration programme in 1958-1959 with large migrant intakes from Europe revitalised the interests of the liner shipping companies, which returned in this sea route and eliminated the shipping shortages.⁷⁷ Again, the traffic established from ICEM's operation did not involve shipping companies' members of a Conference. At the same time, the interest of airline companies, which now quoted competitive to shipping fare prices, added an extra pressure to the shipping competitors in this route,⁷⁸ as well as a chance for ICEM to lower its transport cost.

With the stabilisation of the new traffic competitors, requests for fare increases started anew. The sea transport companies had the national governments on their side, which guaranteed representation in the ICEM policy and consultative instruments in order to support their demands. Indicatively, Greece, in 1963, was represented in the ICEM Council by a high-ranking member of the Ministry of Mercantile Marine who managed to be elected Chairman in the *Sub-Committee on Coordination of Transport*

⁷⁵ IOM-SW/General, Transport General-N.A.C. Accordo, Van Loon, Chief, Department of Shipping to Acting Director, "Trip to Italy, 23 January–4 February 1955", 07.02.1955.

⁷⁶ NARA/ICEM, Council Documents, MC/Sixth Session (1st copy), Annex I, Appendix 1, "Distribution of Traffic by Flag of Carriers Since 1 February 1952", MC/235, 06.04.1957.

⁷⁷ NARA/11th Session of the Council of ICEM, Geneva, November 12-20, 1959, ICEM, "Report of the Director on Transport Covering Performance from 1 March 1959 to 31 August 1959 and Prospects", 11th Session, MC/357, 29.09.1959.

⁷⁸ NARA/12th Session of the Council of the ICEM, Naples, May 5-13, 1960, ICEM, "Report of the Director on Transport Covering Performance from 1 September 1959 to 29 February 1960 and Prospects", 12th Session, MC.388, 04.04.1960.

so as to support better the fare increases for the newly established *Greek-Australian Line*. The policy-tactic that was adopted by the ICEM Administration at that time was to transpose the fare requests to its member-states by asking, beforehand, for the agreement of the governments involved (Italy, Greece, Spain, Malta, Australia and New Zealand) in the allocation of the necessary additional funds.⁷⁹

The trend that can be traced in these fare increases was that the sea transport companies requested a great fare increase and ICEM accepted a considerably lower percentage. This was the case in 1963 when several sea transport companies requested an eight percent increase in fares due to increased costs, and ICEM approved a four percent increase.⁸⁰ In 1967, when a fifteen percent increase in fares was requested, the ICEM Administration finally accepted a four percent increase.⁸¹

It is also of interest to note that the participating shipping companies in the sea routes of Southern Europe to Australia joined forces in their claims towards ICEM by setting aside the daily competition between them temporarily for the sake of a greater cause. Therefore, they co-signed letters sent to the ICEM Administration requesting fare increases. The nucleus of these joint efforts from 1963 to 1969 were three companies, two from Italy *Lloyd Triestino*, *Flotta Lauro* and one from Greece, the *Greek-Australian Line*.⁸² ICEM had been inquiring about such endeavours since 1954, when the possibility was noted that liner shipping companies would form an alliance

⁷⁹ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/1/GRE General, J. del Pino, Chief of the Division of Liaison and Research to C.O. Wendling, Chief of Mission, ICEM Athens, 08.05.1963; IOM-SW/Library, ICEM, "Report of the Sub-Committee on the Co-ordination of Transport", 20th Session, MC/625, 16.10.1963; IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/5/Shipping/Liaison with Australia Policy, J. van den Brink, Special Assistant to the Director (Transport) to Mr. Kiddle Acting Chief of ICEM Liaison Mission, Canberra, 29.05.1963.

⁸⁰ IOM-SW/General, OPS-20-091/Conference Documents 1951-1973, ICEM, Sub-Committee on Budget and Finance, "Increase in Sea Transport Rates", SCBF/29, 18.04.1963.

⁸¹ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/5/Shipping/Liaison with Australia Policy, G. Maselli, Assistant Director for Operations to B.W. Haveman, "Negotiations with the Shipping Lines on the requested increase of shipping rates", 40/4/AUS, 10.07.1967; IOM-SW/Library, ICEM Executive Committee, "Report of the Sub-Committee on the Co-ordination of Transport", 31st (Special) Session, MC/EX/213, 11.06.1968.

⁸² The 1963 fare increase request letter was co-signed by *Cogedar*, *Flotta Lauro*, *Fratelli Grimaldi*, *ITALIA*, *Linea C Giacomo Costa fu Andrea*, *Lloyd Triestino*, *SITMAR* and the *Greek Australia Line*, see IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/4/Transport. Liaison with Italy, Vol. IV, ICEM Geneva, "Minutes of meeting held in Genoa on 10/12/63 between ICEM's and ship lines representatives", 09.12.1963; the 1967 fare request by *Lloyd Triestino*, *Cogedar*, *Greek Australia Line* and *Flotta Lauro*, IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/5/Shipping/Liaison with Australia Policy, G. Maselli, Assistant Director for Operations to B.W. Haveman, "Negotiations with the Shipping Lines on the requested increase of shipping rates", 40/4/AUS, 10.07.1967; and the 1969 and 1972 requests by the *Greek Australia Line*, *Flotta Lauro*, *Lloyd Triestino*, IOM-SW/Registry, ICEM V, 1951-1980, E. Jacob, Chief of Department of Transport to Chandris Lines, The Mediterranean and Overseas Shipping Agency SpA Genoa; *Flotta Lauro*, Naples; *Lloyd Triestino*, Trieste, 14.08.1969; IOM-SW/Registry, 8/12/Transport, Quotations of Prices, Offers of Spaces, Vol. XI, Chief, Department of Transport to Director, "Adjustment in Sea Fares to Australia", 24.01.1972.

and artificially force the prices up. ICEM called for a ‘free and fair competition’, as its policy-motto was, by asking the fare prices “to bear a clear relation to reality”.⁸³

In the mid-1960s, with the increasing competition of aeroplanes, the requests of the liner shipping companies for fare increases met with ICEM Administration’s warning that they might set their services as not financially attractive for ICEM, acknowledging the danger of being self-excluded from the ICEM transport programme. Australia did the same, which had business incentives from a potential greater participation of its airline *Qantas*.⁸⁴ The shipping companies in 1967 declared that they were ready to accept such a risk and, in view of rising costs, submitted requests for fare increases varying between four and fifteen percent.⁸⁵ In 1969, the ICEM Administration, after the approval of the interested governments, accepted a request for a shipping fare increase of three percent instead of ten percent initially requested. However, it was noted by ICEM that even a two percent increase would make shipping fares slightly higher than airline fares.⁸⁶

Certainly, this fare increase request was not the last. The 1971 and 1973 US dollar devaluations, the continued closure of the Suez Canal (1967-1975), and the increasing fuel prices were factors that were reflected in the operational costs of the sea transport companies.⁸⁷ Relative requests for fare increases were submitted, either mutually as in 1972,⁸⁸ or individually as in 1973, from the Italian shipping company *Lloyd Triestino*.⁸⁹ Nevertheless, these requests were also met with Australia’s

⁸³ NARA/8th Session of the Council and the Ex. Comm. of ICEM, Geneva, 11/30/54; 11/30-12/4/54 and 12/4/54 respectively, ICEM, “Report of the Sub-Committee on Co-Ordination of Transport”, 8th Session, MC/99, 30.11.1954.

⁸⁴ IOM-SW/Library, ICEM, “Report of the Sub-Committee on the Co-ordination of Transport”, 23rd Session, MC/719, 04.05.1965.

⁸⁵ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/5/Shipping/Liaison with Australia Policy, G. Maselli, Assistant Director for Operations to B.W. Haveman, “Negotiations with the Shipping Lines on the requested increase of shipping rates”, 40/4/AUS, 10.07.1967.

⁸⁶ IOM-SW/Registry, ICEM V, 1951-1980, G. Maselli, Assistant Director for Operations to J.F. Thomas, “Australia – Request of increase in passage sea fares”, 29.08.1969; *ibid*, E. Jacob to the Director’s Office, “Summary of the Meeting between the Shipping Lines and ICEM Administration held in Geneva, 26 September 1969”, 06.10.1969.

⁸⁷ For the wider impact of the Suez Canal crisis, of the dollar devaluations, and the fuel crises, see Judt, *Postwar*, pp. 453-456; Aldcroft, *The European Economy 1914-2000*, pp. 194-200.

⁸⁸ Initially, the shipping companies proposed an 8.5 percent increase; the Administration discussed on 5 percent increase. IOM-SW/Registry, 8/12/Transport, Quotations of Prices, Offers of Spaces, Vol. XI, “Meeting held in the ICEM Conference Room on 7 March 1972 at 15:30 hours”, n.d.

⁸⁹ The requested increase was 16 percent. IOM-SW/Registry, 8/12/Transport, Quotations of Prices, Offers of Spaces, Vol. XI, Lloyd Triestino to ICEM Geneva, “Increase in migrant rates”, DIC/TRAF/P/WV 893, 16.05.1973.

disapproval, which did not value the reasoning for such increases.⁹⁰ Australia, since July 1973, was preparing its withdrawal from ICEM and had taken over all the transportation arrangements for the subsidised migrants, leaving the preparation of the relatively small percentage of non-subsidised migrants to ICEM.⁹¹ For this last category, the relative fare, which did not require the approval of the governments involved, was increased by 14 percent in August 1973,⁹² and additional fare increases followed in 1974.⁹³

Fare increases in view of devaluation of national currencies were not only met in the case of the US dollar, but also in other currencies. For instance, the Spanish peseta devaluations of 1959 and 1967 resulted respectively in 15 percent and 18-20 percent requests from ICEM for fare increases by the Spanish shipping companies.⁹⁴ ICEM accepted the increase based on the rising costs involved rather than on the devaluation reasoning which was perceived as a domestic Spanish affair.⁹⁵ All these fare increases, though, took place at a time when the ICEM airline fares towards all the ICEM destinations remained either unchanged or were decreasing, favouring thus their competitiveness against the sea transport means.⁹⁶

⁹⁰ Ibid., H.M. Loveday, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Australia to the UN Office at Geneva to Director, "ICEM – Shipping Fares", 31.07.1972.

⁹¹ Ibid., E. Jacob, Chief, Department of Transport to Lloyd Triestino, Trieste, "Increase in migrant rates", 13.06.1973.

⁹² Ibid., Chief, Department of Transport, memo to Director, Deputy Director, "Increase in Sea Fares to Australia and South Africa", 12.07.1973.

⁹³ The fare increases applied were 6 percent in January, 7 percent in March, 4 percent in July and 4 percent in September 1974. IOM-SW/Registry, 8/12/Transport, Quotations of Prices, Offers of Spaces, Vol. XI, G. Sliwik, Department of Operations and Transport to Mr. Christensen, Mr. Van Rossom, Mr. Schuin, "Fare increases in 1974 resulting from fuel surcharge", 17.02.1975.

⁹⁴ The Spanish shipping companies referred were *Compania Transatlantica Espanola*; *Ybarra*; *Naviera Aznar*, IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/30/Liaison with Spain, Vol. II, C. Fedele to John F. Thomas, 03.08.1959; IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/SPA/Transport Liaison with Spain, Vol. III, E. Jacob to Deputy Director, "Report on my visit to the Spanish Institute for Emigration in Madrid and to Ybarra Lines in Sevilla, concerning sea fares from Spain to Latin America", 11.11.1968.

⁹⁵ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/30/Liaison with Spain, Vol. II, O. Golbs-Wilms, Chief of Department of Shipping, "Note for the File: Meeting with Spanish shipowners in Geneva on 3 December 1959", 08.12.1959. NARA/12th Session of the Council of the ICEM, Naples, May 5-13, 1960, ICEM, "Report of the Director on Transport Covering Performance from 1 September 1959 to 29 February 1960 and Prospects", 12th Session, MC.388, 04.04.1960.

⁹⁶ IOM-SW/Library, ICEM, "Report on Operations: Part III: Transport", 24th Session, MC/736 (Part III), 14.10.1965; *ibid.*, ICEM, "Addendum to Plan of Operations and Budget and Plan of Expenditure for 1966: Second Revision. Report of the Director on Transport for the first six months of 1966", 26th Session, MC/796/Add.1, 29.09.1966. The application of the *International Route Charge* (IRC) at the end of 1971, which was the cost of use of services for air navigation and air safety, a cost formerly undertaken by the governments and then by the airlines, resulted in a fare increase from November 1971. However, this was a development change that affected the entire aviation industry, IOM-SW/Registry, ICEM V, 1951-1980, Chief, Department of Transport to the Director, "Increased costs of air transportation effective 1 November 1971", 05.10.1971.

The sea traffic from Europe to Australia was mainly ICEM traffic. It took place in parallel with the traffic commenced by passenger liner shipping companies originating from the United Kingdom and of the traffic under the Australian government-chartered passenger vessels for the transport of British migrants. The transport of British migrants by Australia offered more attractive terms for the sea transport companies, but, based on the magnitude of this traffic, only few of companies had the chance to come into partnership with the Australian government. Therefore, the ICEM traffic was their only alternative in these sea routes. ICEM, from its side, organised and regulated the traffic by establishing the *Europe Australian Passenger Service* and by providing the incentives for the greater participation of more passenger shipping and airline companies.

ICEM took advantage of its domination in the European-Australasian migrant traffic in its negotiations with the shipowners. When the fares quoted were not competitive, the ICEM Administration did not hesitate to terminate its business relationship with a shipping company (EAPS and ELMES). ICEM had alternatives and wanted to exploit them. Such alternatives were the use of air transport means or the MSTs vessels.

From their side, the shipping companies applied a policy practice of “asking for more, to get a few”. Their requests for fare increases always had great declination from what was finally accepted by the ICEM Administration. In order for the participating shipping companies to raise their stand over ICEM, they formed an alliance, a quasi-Conference in the 1960s. It seems, though, that the liner shipping companies were ‘self-excluded’ from the ICEM transport programme between Europe and Australia. Their increasing operational cost and the consequent fare increases made their offers non-competitive, in contradiction with the decreasing airline fares. In conformity with the ICEM policy for economy in transportation, the constant increase in shipping fares made the ICEM Administration favour transport by air. Australia’s withdrawal from ICEM in 1974 not only resulted in the decrease of the ICEM traffic load from Europe, but also made many liner shipping companies change business direction, either by converting into cargo or by employing their passenger ships in the cruising business.

It needs to be clarified that the ICEM fares, even when increased, continued far below the rates available in the free market, both for air and sea means of transport,

regular or chartered ones.⁹⁷ The ICEM Administration had managed to achieve considerable reductions from the transport companies and wanted to maintain its favourable treatment.

How profitable was the ICEM traffic?

Not all companies are established with the purpose of profitability. Some companies, especially state-owned ones, are established with political, diplomatic, and strategic incentives, or, in order to produce indirect benefits, opportunities and profits to other businesses. This is also the case for the state-owned airline companies since the 1920s and until a great part of the 1950s, which were not market-driven, but they were surrounded by a safety-net in relation to their expenses and profitability.⁹⁸ *Iberia Airlines*, the Spanish state-owned airline company, acted as a means of diplomacy through which the dictatorship of General Franco (1939-1975) tried to confront the political isolation of its regime and especially since the 1950s to portray the foreign policy and the development efforts of the country.⁹⁹ In Argentina, for example, the national airline, *Aerolineas Argentinas*, continued commencing uneconomic flights, in order for the Argentinean flag to travel greater distances from the capital areas, as well as abroad. Through its operation in these areas, affirmation of the government's sovereignty and presence was sought—a customary practice for countries with colonial or former colonial territories—as well as the setting of the conditions for the expansion of the industrial exports.¹⁰⁰ Likewise, on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean, *Air France's* goal in the 1950s was to be financially stable, neither profitable nor unprofitable. This balance assured that the company would not go bankrupt, or the Treasury would not need to cover the airline's operational losses, while the intense

⁹⁷ For instance, on the line from Europe to Australia the ICEM rates were lower by 45-50 percent for air charters from the corresponding commercial adult rates in 1965; 37-42 percent from regular airlines; 18-26 percent from regular shipping companies. On the route Europe-USA was 60 percent lower from air charter, Europe-North America 5 percent from regular shipping lines. On the route Italy to Venezuela 21 percent and Spain to Venezuela 3-4 percent lower than regular shipping lines. From Italy to South Africa 32 percent lower than regular shipping lines. IOM-SW/Library, ICEM, "Report on Operations: Part IV Transport", 23rd Session, MC/715 (Part IV), 29.03.1965.

⁹⁸ P. Lyth, H.L. Dienel, "Introduction", pp. 12-13; P. J. Lyth, L. M. J. Dierikx, op.cit., p. 98.

⁹⁹ Javier Vidal Olivares, "Latin America in the internationalisation strategy of Iberia, 1946-2000", *Journal of Transport History*, 40:1 (2019), pp. 106-108.

¹⁰⁰ M. Piglia, "Carry our colours and defend our interests", pp. 56-57.

pressure for wage increases from the trade unions was quieted by the airline's moderate incomes.¹⁰¹

In their majority, the non-market-driven operation of the Western state-owned airline companies changed towards the end of the 1950s, when a period of increased competition was inaugurated in the aviation world and in the transport sector in general. The participation of the airline companies in the ICEM transport programme in the early-1950s could be examined as a way of compensation for the unprofitability of this still 'nascent' means of transport and as a way for the reduction of the state subsidisation.

Considering the difficulties to trace the profitability of the ICEM migrant transport traffic for the shipping and airline companies, with certainty, it can be argued that the impact of the ICEM traffic for the transport companies varied based on the following variables: the time (season and hour of trip), geography/traffic route, and the mode of transport. These variables determined the prices of transport. As discussed earlier, the North Atlantic traffic did not have any important dependency from the ICEM transport programme since its profitability relied on the general passenger/tourist/cargo traffic. On the other hand, the South American and the Australasian sea routes, in their majority, during the 1950s and 1960s, were depending on ICEM and the wider migration flows.

Based on the lack of solid financial results from the transport companies participating in ICEM transport programme, we will hereunder attempt to exert indirect conclusions regarding the value of ICEM's traffic for the participating companies in the Australian sea/air routes during the 1960s—a decade when the Australian migration, through and outside ICEM, culminated. Therefore, the Tables 6.4a and 6.4b below present the total passenger arrivals to Australia¹⁰² that embarked from various European countries, and the mode of transport (sea/air) is specified. Tables 6.5a and 6.5b present the total ICEM migrant arrivals to Australia, for the same period and from the same European embarkation points, divided again based on the mode of transport employed.

From the data of Tables 6.4a and 6.4b, the general migration policy of the Australian Government is confirmed, which prioritised the migrants based on their

¹⁰¹ N. Neiertz, *op.cit.*, p. 21.

¹⁰² These data include everyone who arrived in Australia in the 1960s as a migrant (subsidised directly by the Australian Government or under ICEM's auspices or non-subsidised migrants), tourists, and general passengers, amongst others.

country of origin. More specifically, the migrants from the United Kingdom were the top priority for Australia, and this is confirmed by the total migrant intakes from the country (978,214 intakes in the 1960s, Table 6.4b). Second were migrants coming from the countries of Western Europe and last the Southern Europeans.

The above statistics can be easily explained by the wider Australian immigration policy of the period. It needs to be clarified here that the country's immigration policy was governed by the *White Australia* policy, which has been adopted since 1901. *White Australia* policy dictated that Australia has to be maintained as a white and Anglo-Saxon nation by denying the entry of non-white population into the country, such as African migrants and Chinese. Based on this discriminatory immigration policy, a hierarchy of the white population prevailed. At the top of the immigration hierarchy climax were the Anglo-Saxons, with whom Australia's population base originated. Then the Western European migrants followed in this hierarchy, as common cultural elements were shared, and they could more easily be "assimilated" from the dominant British culture, in contrast with the Southern Europeans who were at the bottom of the climax of the eligible for immigration to Australia nationalities.¹⁰³

Considering that migration under the auspices of ICEM was subsidised and open to migrants from Western and Southern Europe, the data of Tables 6.4b and 6.5b allows us to reconfirm the priorities of the Australian immigration policy. More specifically, from Table 6.4b, the disproportion between the total passenger arrivals to Australia from Italy and Greece is noticed (354,442 and 146,177 respectively) and the total migrant intakes through ICEM in Table 6.5b (71,091 and 59,390 respectively). This great difference reveals the reluctance of the Australian government to contribute to the migration of a group of countries, the Southern Europeans, who were not within its priorities for settlement in the country. On the opposite stand were the countries from Western Europe, as only around 1:3 from Germany and 1:2 from the Netherlands travelled to Australia outside the auspices of ICEM. However, for the last two countries, additional subsidised migration schemes were operated only by the Australian government, while a well-established German and Dutch community pre-existed,

¹⁰³ For more on the White Australia policy, see James Jupp, *From White Australia to Woomera: The story of Australian Immigration*, Cambridge, 2007², pp. 6-21.

making the travels from/to Australia of settled migrants of these nationalities more frequent.

More specifically now, regarding the migration transport, Table 6.6 and Graph 6.3 explain the percentage of ICEM movements out of the total Australian overseas arrivals based on the data of tables 6.4a, 6.4b, 6.5a and 6.5b. This juxtaposition provides us with good indications on the dynamic of the ICEM transport programme towards Australia. It is crucial to highlight that the data provided do not necessarily concern the nationality of the means of transport, but only the port/airport of embarkation, which was served by several shipping and airline companies of different flags.

Therefore, in the case of the maritime passenger traffic from Germany, Malta, and Spain between 1960 and 1969 towards Australia, we notice from Table 6.6 and Graph 6.1 that the ICEM traffic possessed a percentage between 74 and 87 of the total arrivals. Important percentages are also noticed in the case of Greece (43.7 percent), the Netherlands (35.7 percent), and Italy (22.2 percent). On the other hand, the contribution of ICEM traffic in arrivals to Australia from France and the United Kingdom were nearly non-existent, 0.1 percent and 0.01 percent, respectively.

Regarding the air traffic, the vast majority of the arrivals to Australia in 1960-1969 from Spain and Malta were ICEM migrants, 85.6 percent and 78.3 percent, respectively (Table 6.6 and Graph 6.2). Nearly half of the total air traffic from Germany, the Netherlands, and Greece was composed of ICEM migrants. On the opposite side stood the ICEM air traffic from Italy (13.3 percent), France (0.1 percent), and the United Kingdom (0.02 percent), in comparison with the total arrivals from these countries.

From the above, the conclusion we can draw is that the traffic created out of ICEM's operation in the 1960s was the vital, and only, reason for the employment of passenger vessels and aircraft between specific countries (Spain and Malta) and an important supplement in the passenger loading for other shipping and airline companies (Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, Italy). Therefore, we can conclude that their employment in the ICEM traffic towards Australia during the 1960s was a vital, if not only important, fact for their profitability and viability. On the other hand, the ICEM traffic from France and, more importantly, the United Kingdom, the main and most preferred emigration country according to the Australian immigration policy of the time, was simply insignificant. Lastly, the low percentage of air transfers from Italy is

also a reflection of the transport policy of the country, which had a clear preference on sea means of transport.

Country of Embarkation	Table 6.4a: Total Overseas Passenger Arrivals to Australia per mode of transport, 1960-1969																	
	1960			1961			1962			1963			1964			1965		
	Sea	Air	Total	Sea	Air	Total	Sea	Air	Total	Sea	Air	Total	Sea	Air	Total	Sea	Air	Total
France	734	209	943	382	368	750	1,175	297	1,472	807	218	1,025	466	88	554	567	501	1,068
Germany	12,180	2,543	14,723	3,987	2,228	6,215	2,677	1,701	4,378	2,614	1,861	4,475	3,062	2,292	5,354	2,764	3,053	5,817
Greece	7,438	1,898	9,336	7,435	1,726	9,161	11,761	2,317	14,078	9,770	2,893	12,663	17,620	2,323	19,943	17,983	3,045	21,028
Italy	32,861	2,147	35,008	29,529	2,773	32,302	26,877	3,630	30,507	25,497	5,255	30,752	26,450	6,261	32,711	27,451	9,037	36,488
Malta	1,405	789	2,194	1,506	564	2,070	1,565	,608	2,173	3,043	3,025	6,068	3,127	2,866	5,993	3,005	2,706	5,711
Netherlands	8,365	3,558	11,923	6,452	2,543	8,995	4,208	1,968	6,176	3,638	2,131	5,769	4,114	2,689	6,803	4,472	2,660	7,132
Spain	784	153	937	945	252	1,197	2,143	1,787	3,930	1,133	794	1,927	19	321	340	25	538	563
UK/Ireland	56,091	8,482	64,573	60,099	8,250	68,349	56,497	11,046	67,543	62,236	20,997	83,233	62,003	37,332	99,335	65,377	51,262	116,639
	119,858	19,779	139,637	110,335	18,704	129,039	106,903	23,354	130,257	109,051	39,138	148,189	117,411	56,380	173,791	122,166	75,246	197,412

Sources: Australian Bureau of Statistics/Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, Canberra, Australia, “Overseas Arrivals and Departures 1962”, Australian Demographic Review (ADR hereunder) 183; *ibid.*, “Overseas Arrivals and Departures. Total and Short-Term Movement 1963”, ADR, 191; *ibid.*, “Overseas Arrivals and Departures. Quarter and year ended December 1964”, ADR, 217; *ibid.*, “Overseas Arrivals and Departures. December quarter and year ended December 1965”, [ADR], n.n; *ibid.*, “Overseas Arrivals and Departures. Quarter and year ended December 1966”, [ADR], n.n; ; *ibid.*, “Overseas Arrivals and Departures. December quarter 1967”, [ADR], n.n; *ibid.*, “Overseas Arrivals and Departures. December quarter 1968”, [ADR], n.n; *ibid.*, “Overseas Arrivals and Departures. December quarter 1969”, [ADR], n.n;

Country of Embarkation	Table 6.5a: Total Migration to Australia under ICEM per Mode of Transport, 1960-1969																	
	1960			1961			1962			1963			1964			1965		
	Sea	Air	Total	Sea	Air	Total	Sea	Air	Total	Sea	Air	Total	Sea	Air	Total	Sea	Air	Total
France	0	1	1	0	0	0	2	0	2	4	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0
Germany	9,825	2,067	11,892	3,968	1,777	5,745	1,567	1,030	2,597	1,855	1,108	2,963	1,835	1,386	3,221	1,667	1,322	2,989
Greece	3,330	1,220	4,550	3,648	1,101	4,749	4,748	1,428	6,176	4,827	1,775	6,602	6,921	1,419	8,340	4,642	1,294	5,936
Italy	11,973	48	12,021	8,094	159	8,253	4,701	114	4,815	4,251	338	4,589	4,631	770	5,401	4,883	1,324	6,207
Malta	1,292	513	1,805	1,410	442	1,852	1,251	607	1,858	2,555	1,400	3,955	3,005	2,716	5,721	2,522	2,506	5,028
Netherlands	4,890	2,931	7,821	2,653	1,333	3,986	1,137	764	1,901	1,034	745	1,779	1,293	878	2,171	1,329	938	2,267
Spain	815	198	1,013	623	253	876	2,312	1,785	4,097	603	820	1,423	0	319	319	0	503	503
UK	3	17	20	13	17	30	2	5	7	9	14	23	12	23	35	1	10	11
	32,128	6,995	39,123	20,409	5,082	25,491	15,720	5,733	21,453	15,138	6,200	21,338	17,697	7,511	25,208	15,044	7,897	22,941

Sources: IOM-SW/Library, ICEM, “Report of the Director on Transport”, 16th Session, MC/514, 06.03.1962; IOM-SW/Library, ICEM, “Report of the Director on Transport for the Year 1963”, 21st Session, MC/643, 24.03.1964; IOM-SW/Library, ICEM, “Report on Operations: Part III: Transport”, 25th Session, MC/771 (Part III), 21.03.1966; IOM-SW/Library, ICEM, “Addendum to Report of the Director on the Work of the Committee for the Year 1966”, 27th Session, MC/827/Add.1, 13.04.1967; IOM-SW/Library, ICEM, “Addendum to Report of the Director on the Work of the Committee for the Year 1968”, 30th Session, MC/911/Add.1, 01.04.1969.

Country of Embarkation	Table 6.4b: Total Overseas Passenger Arrivals to Australia per mode of transport, 1960-1969														
	1966			1967			1968			1969			1960-1969		
	Sea	Air	Total	Sea	Air	Total	Sea	Air	Total	Sea	Air	Total	Sea	Air	Total
France	705	790	1,495	620	754	1,374	607	1,227	1,834	597	1,143	1,740	6,660	5,595	12,255
Germany	2,957	3,141	6,098	3,072	3,631	6,703	2,226	4,163	6,389	2,594	6,113	8,707	38,133	30,726	68,859
Greece	14,647	2,951	17,598	8,464	4,462	12,926	9,304	6,554	15,858	5,495	8091	13,586	109,917	36,260	146,177
Italy	25,812	11,110	36,922	26,460	12,840	39,300	23,143	15,228	38,371	24,493	17,588	42,081	268,573	85,869	354,442
Malta	1,044	1,306	2,350	1,037	1,229	2,266	922	1,070	1,992	539	1,484	2,023	17,193	15,647	32,840
Netherlands	5,031	2,920	7,951	4,376	3,486	7,862	5,084	4,741	9,825	2,982	5,627	8,609	48,722	32,323	81,045
Spain	17	715	732	38	556	594	235	968	1,203	301	1,183	1,484	5,640	7,267	12,907
UK/Ireland	68,296	46,554	114,850	63,048	48,264	111,312	68,410	51,811	120,221	62,801	69,358	132,159	624,858	353,356	978,214
	118,509	69,487	187,996	107,648	79,077	186,725	110,887	92,541	203,428	100,496	121,681	222,177	1,119,696	567,043	1,686,739
<i>Sources:</i> See table 6.4a															

Country of Embarkation	Table 6.5b: Total Migration to Australia under ICEM per Mode of Transport, 1960-1969														
	1966			1967			1968			1969			1960-1969		
	Sea	Air	Total	Sea	Air	Total	Sea	Air	Total	Sea	Air	Total	Sea	Air	Total
France	3	0	3	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	4	4	10	5	15
Germany	1,815	998	2,813	2,055	1,408	3,463	1,721	1,260	2,981	2,083	1,882	3,965	28,391	14,238	42,629
Greece	3,725	750	4,475	3,020	698	3,718	6,832	680	7,512	6,346	986	7,332	48,039	11,351	59,390
Italy	4,951	2,078	7,029	3,848	1,650	5,498	5,518	1,966	7,484	6,817	2,977	9,794	59,667	11,424	71,091
Malta	949	1,306	2,255	843	1,235	2,078	830	729	1,559	429	800	1,229	15,086	12,254	27,340
Netherlands	1,529	851	2,380	1,056	718	1,774	1,424	1,226	2,650	1,064	1,233	2,297	17,409	11,617	29,026
Spain	0	721	721	0	537	537	26	548	574	29	542	571	4,408	6,226	10,634
UK	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	40	86	126
	12,972	6,704	19,676	10,823	6,246	17,069	16,351	6,409	22,760	16,768	8,424	25,192	173,050	67,201	240,251
<i>Sources:</i> See table 6.5a															

Country of Embarkation	Table 6.6: Percentage of ICEM Movements out of the Total Australian Overseas Arrivals by Mode of Transport, 1960-1969																	
	1960			1961			1962			1963			1964			1965		
	Sea	Air	Total	Sea	Air	Total	Sea	Air	Total	Sea	Air	Total	Sea	Air	Total	Sea	Air	Total
France	0	0.5	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.1	0.5	0.0	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Germany	80.7	81.3	80.8	99.5	79.8	92.4	58.5	60.6	59.3	71.0	59.5	66.2	59.9	60.5	60.2	60.3	43.3	51.4
Greece	44.8	64.3	48.7	49.1	63.8	51.8	40.4	61.6	43.9	49.4	61.4	52.1	39.3	61.1	41.8	25.8	42.5	28.2
Italy	36.4	2.2	34.3	27.4	5.7	25.5	17.5	3.1	15.8	16.7	6.4	14.9	17.5	12.3	16.5	17.8	14.7	17.0
Malta	92.0	65.0	82.3	93.6	78.4	89.5	79.9	99.8	85.5	84.0	46.3	65.2	96.1	94.8	95.5	83.9	92.6	88.0
Netherlands	58.5	82.4	65.6	41.1	52.4	44.3	27.0	38.8	30.8	28.4	35.0	30.8	31.4	32.7	31.9	29.7	35.3	31.8
Spain ¹⁰⁴	10.4	129.4	108.1	65.9	100.4	73.2	107.9	99.9	104.2	53.2	103.3	73.8	0.0	99.4	93.8	0.0	93.5	89.3
UK/Ireland	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	26.8	35.4	28.0	18.5	27.2	19.8	14.7	24.5	16.5	13.9	15.8	14.4	15.1	13.3	14.5	12.3	10.5	11.6
<i>Sources: see tables 6.4a and 6.5a.</i>																		

Country of Embarkation	Table 6.6: Percentage of ICEM Movements out of the Total Australian Overseas Arrivals by Mode of Transport, 1960-1969														
	1966			1967			1968			1969			1960-1969		
	Sea	Air	Total	Sea	Air	Total	Sea	Air	Total	Sea	Air	Total	Sea	Air	Total
France	0.4	0.0	0.2	0.2	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1
Germany	61.4	31.8	46.1	66.9	38.8	51.7	77.3	30.2	46.7	80.3	30.8	45.5	74.5	46.3	61.9
Greece	25.4	25.4	25.4	35.7	15.6	28.8	73.4	10.4	47.4	115.5 ¹⁰⁵	12.2	54.0	43.7	31.3	40.6
Italy	19.2	18.7	19.0	14.5	12.9	14.0	23.8	12.9	19.5	27.8	16.9	23.3	22.2	13.3	20.1
Malta	90.9	100	96.0	81.3	100.5	91.7	90.0	68.1	78.3	79.6	53.9	60.7	87.7	78.3	83.3
Netherlands	30.4	29.1	29.9	24.1	20.6	22.6	28.0	25.9	27.0	35.7	21.9	26.7	35.7	35.9	35.8
Spain	0.0	100.8	98.5	0.0	96.6	90.4	11.1	56.6	47.7	9.6	45.8	38.5	78.2	85.7	82.4
UK/Ireland	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	10.9	9.6	10.5	10.01	7.9	9.1	14.7	6.9	11.2	16.7	6.9	11.3	15.5	11.9	14.2
Sources: see tables 6.4a and 6.5a.															

¹⁰⁴ The increased percentages presented on the total transportations by ICEM from Spain are possibly due to inconsistencies in the calculation of embarkations from Gibraltar, a British territory in Spain by ICEM and the Australian statistical authorities.

¹⁰⁵ The inconsistencies in the maritime embarkations in 1969 from Greece are possibly due to the jet-ship operation of the *Greek Australian Line* after the closure of the Suez Canal. Under the ship-jet operation, the Greek migrants were transported by air to Aden or Djibouti and from there by the *Greek Australian Line* vessels to Australia.






Table 6.7: Total Revenue per Traffic of the Qantas Airline, 1960-1964 – expressed in AUF					
Revenue Category	1960/1961	1961/1962	1962/1963	1963/1964	Totals
Traffic Revenue	31,169,618	30,027,595	36,013,241	40,211,224	137,421,678
Charter Revenue	1,646,473	1,142,023	1,437,509	1,957,978	6,183,983
Contract Work for other Operators	3,289,967	3,019,417	3,162,166	3,184,334	12,655,884
Other Revenue		211,550	213,784	319,280	744,614
Total Revenue	36,106,058	34,400,585	40,826,700	45,672,816	157,006,159
<i>Sources: Parliament of Australia, Qantas Empire Airways Limited, “Annual Report 1961-62 for the year ended 31st March 1962”, n.d.; ibid., Qantas Empire Airways Limited, “Annual Report 1963-64. Report and Financial Accounts for the year ended 31st March 1964”, n.d.</i>					

On another level of examination of the profitability of the ICEM transport programme, the scarce available financial results of the national Australian airline, *Qantas*, are compared with the ICEM payments towards transport companies under the Australian flag. Considering that no other important Australian airline or shipping company participated in the ICEM traffic in the 1960s, we will be provided with safe indications regarding the impact of ICEM’s work on this specific airline company. One problem, though, with the data presented below is that the Australian sources use fiscal year, while ICEM calendar year.¹⁰⁶ Additionally, the *Qantas*’ data do not specify the revenue earned per traffic route. Thus, in each ‘revenue category’ of Table 6.7, sums earned by *Qantas*’ domestic flights are included, as well as of international flights outside ICEM’s destinations.

If we compare the total revenue of *Qantas* for the fiscal years 1960/61-1963/64 (Table 6.7), with the total payments earned by *Qantas*’ employment in ICEM transport programme for the calendar years 1960-1964 (Table 6.8),¹⁰⁷ we will conclude that at least 4.7 percent of *Qantas*’ total revenue came from ICEM for these, not strictly comparable, time-periods.

¹⁰⁶ The Australian fiscal year starts in April and ends in March of the next calendar year. The ICEM financial year, starts in January and ends in December of the same calendar year.

¹⁰⁷ In sum, the period of July-December 1962 is not included due to the lack of relative data from the IOM archive.

Table 6.8: ICEM Payments to Transport Companies of Australian Flag, 1960-1964, expressed in AU£¹⁰⁸	
1960	1,221,500
1961	1,047,765
1962 (Jan.-June)*	690,648
1963	2,187,085
1964	2,279,629
Total	7,642,674
Sources: NARA/14th Session of the Council of the ICEM, Geneva, May 11-17, 1961, ICEM, "Report of the Director on Transport Covering Period from 1 October 1960 to 28 February 1961 and Prospects", 14th Session, MC/453, 30.03.1961; IOM-SW/Library, ICEM, "Report of the Director on Transport", 16th Session, MC/514, 06.03.1962; <i>ibid.</i> , ICEM, "Report of the Director on Transport", 18th Session, MC/543, 04.10.1962; <i>ibid.</i> , ICEM, "Report of the Director on Transport for the Year 1963", 21st Session, MC/643, 24.03.1964; <i>ibid.</i> , ICEM, "Report on Operations: Part IV Transport", 23rd Session, MC/715, 29.03.1965.	

Having in mind what was discussed in Chapter 5 that, for the early 1960s, Qantas' employment in ICEM transport programme was mainly through the chartering of flights by ICEM for the exclusive transport of its migrants and not embarkations on regular scheduled flights, the picture changes considerably. ICEM could be considered the main, if not the only, source for 'Charter Revenue' for the Australian airline company (AU£6,183,983), as the relative revenue exceeded the sums received by ICEM (AU£ 7,642,674), as indicated in Tables 6.7 & 6.8.

In sum, it can be argued that the importance of the ICEM transport programme in the Australian sea routes, for the majority of participating shipping companies in the 1960s, was a great incentive for the continued employment of their passenger vessels in this route. The viability of certain passenger connections by sea from Europe to Australia (e.g., Malta, Spain, Germany and Greece) was inextricably dependent on the ICEM migrant traffic; thus, it could be considered *vital* for the companies' operation. In other instances (e.g., the Netherlands and Italy), it was an *important supplement* to the total revenue of the shipping companies; while for a few countries (e.g., the United Kingdom and France), it was simply *insignificant*.

Regarding the air connections on the same route, the operational flexibility of aircraft allowed the production of revenue in shorter periods due to the faster completion of a voyage. Again here, from specific European air routes towards

¹⁰⁸ The exchange rate used is 0,89286A£ = 1US\$, based on <http://fx.sauder.ubc.ca/etc/USDpages.pdf>, retrieved 02.08.2021.

Australia, the income produced by ICEM was vital for the operation of the airlines. But, in the case of Qantas, it could be argued that the airline's profitability did not rely on ICEM's transport work, especially when we keep in mind the total earnings of the airline. Qantas' employment in the ICEM transport programme contributed to the company's profitability by providing secured collateral to its core business revenue, as well as creating prospects for the increase of its general passenger traffic. At the same time, Qantas' role as a state-owned company had wider political and financial implications. What is important to be highlighted, though, is the creation of a new service/market of charter flights by ICEM in the case of Qantas. The chartered flights of Qantas exclusively served the needs of ICEM, thus creating the foundations on which the future chartering services of the company relied.

In general, it can be said that the profitability of the ICEM migrant transport services counted differently in relation with the transport means used and the route served. In the 1960s, while ICEM traffic was vital for many shipping companies, in comparison, ICEM traffic was simply an important or, at least decent, supplement for most airlines' total revenue.

Based on this chapter, it is important to remember that the relationship of ICEM with its business partners was dynamic and varied based on their dependence from the ICEM migrant transport programme. ICEM did not maintain the same negotiation power with all of its business partners—a reality also experienced with its member-states. In certain instances, ICEM was mainly following the flow that the transport companies designed, while in others, ICEM was the one configuring the management of the entire traffic.

One main goal of the chapter was to ascertain the profitability of the ICEM traffic for the shipping and airline companies. Such an attempt is difficult without access to the financial results of the participating transport companies. It was revealed, though, that the variables of time (season and hour of trip), geography/traffic route, and the mode of transport determined to what extent the companies were attached to ICEM and how they were maintained. Therefore, a categorisation escalating from *vital*, *important supplement*, and simply *insignificant* can characterise the relationship of the shipping and airline companies with the ICEM traffic.

Indirectly, we can attempt to place the shipping transport companies in the first category, *vital*, provided that they were participating in the traffic between Europe and Australia as well as those in the traffic between Southern Europe and South Atlantic. In the category of *important supplement*, we can place the maritime traffic in the North Atlantic as well as the air traffic towards Australia. For the rest of the migrant traffics, the variable of time regulated the importance of ICEM for the airline companies participating in the North Atlantic air routes, which varied between the last two categories per decade.

Concluding this chapter, we can argue that the *Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration* maintained a stable and continuing relationship with actors of the private sector throughout its operation. The transport sector, in particular, was one of the crucial components for the successful implementation of ICEM's mandate. ICEM followed the practices of other preceding international organisations, which, in their work, involved actors of the private sector. Most United Nations' specialised agencies, in particular, structured their partnership with the private sector at the turn of the 20th century while, up to the 1990s, mutual suspicion prevailed in the relationship of UN and the business sector, constituting it thereon largely as "critical stakeholder".¹⁰⁹

An early step for a partnership between a UN specialised agency and private sector businesses is the 1975 attempt of the *World Health Organisation* (WHO) to establish an extended programme with private pharmaceutical enterprises and academic institutions in the context of a research programme targeting tropical diseases. All partners participated financially in the project. Based on this research, a drug was developed by a for-profit pharmaceutical group. The pharmaceutical company donated the drug for a certain period in the late 1980s for public use. It needs to be stressed, though, that apart from building a good reputation and good publicity for the company, this donation was not without financial incentives. In the United States, the government deducted corporate donations from the annual taxable income of the company up to ten percent. WHO, from its side, structured its partnership with the private sector in the late 1990s and 2000s, with the UN Global Compact that followed aimed at enhancing the cooperation of UN agencies and enterprises.¹¹⁰ However, the prominent example of

¹⁰⁹ Gilles Carbonnier, Piedra Lightfoot, "Business in Humanitarian Crises: For Better or for Worse?", in Z. Sezgin and D. Dijkzeul (eds), *The New Humanitarians in International Practice*, pp. 169-170.

¹¹⁰ Auriane Guilbaud, "Big Pharma, the World Health Organization, and the co-constitution of international policies against river blindness", in F. Giomi, C. Keren, M. Labbé, *Public and Private Welfare in Modern Europe*, pp. 185-187, 190-192, 194, 200-202.

international organisations partnership with the private sector lies with the *United Nations Children's Fund* (UNICEF), which, in 1997, created a *Private Sector Division*, later renamed to *Private Fundraising and Partnership Division*.¹¹¹

The private sector, by cooperating with an international/intergovernmental organisation, does not lose its main objectives for profit or shareholder-value-maximisation, but this relationship is conceived as a way for the enlargement of business and access to international contracts, as well as reputation building. However, both the private sector and the international/intergovernmental organisation influence the economies where they operate, the distribution of wealth, income, and power.¹¹²

ICEM was an international organisation that institutionalised its relationship with the international organisations with the private sector businesses from the first days of its establishment. ICEM enhanced the collaboration between international, public, and private sectors and constituted them as a crucial component for the implementation of the Organisation's mandate. Important amounts of money were directed to the private sector through ICEM's operation, and, secondarily, partnerships for private fundraising activities were endeavoured, as it will be discussed in the next chapter. In this context, the competition between ICEM's partners in several cases was intense in their effort to seize opportunities emerging from such partnerships. These aspects will be examined in the following chapter.

¹¹¹ L. B. Andonova, *Governance Entrepreneurs...*, pp. 70-76, 151, 161-162, 195. For the UN partnership with private sector businesses, see C. Gregoratti, "UN-Business Partnerships", pp. 309-321.

¹¹² G. Carbonnier, P. Lightfoot, "Business in Humanitarian Crises", pp. 172-174, 187.

Chapter 7:

Partners and Competitors in the Migrant Transport Market: ICEM and its relations with transport companies, travel agents and other enterprises

The aim of the seventh chapter is to examine the delicate relationship between the *Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration* and its business partners, as well as the development and other opportunities emerging out of the Organisation's operations in migrant transport for its business partners.

As an ICEM business partner pointed out, the ICEM's humanitarian work "is fine if it doesn't cost a bundle of money".¹ Starting from this sentence, it can be gleaned that the transport companies, as actors of a capital-based economy, chased profit. Hence, their operation was governed by the market rules; they were not humanitarian agencies. Building interpersonal relationships for more access to business opportunities, lobbying with governments, and exerting pressure towards ICEM were some of the 'assets' in the hands of the sea and air transport companies so as to get a bigger slice of ICEM's work. When ICEM traffic stopped being profitable, or when other traffics developed and proved more remunerative, some transport companies simply abandoned ICEM and changed business direction.

The ICEM Administration, on the other hand, despite not having profit as its starting point, did not differ much in its practices from its business partners. ICEM favoured friendly-companies, promised more access to its work to some, loaned funds for its partners' investments, searched for cost-reduction, and promoted competition in the transport sector; these factors reconfirmed the argumentation of previous chapters that understand ICEM as a business institution with social character.

In the first formative years of the work of ICEM, the building of a network of transport companies was a priority for the Organisation so as to be able to implement its mandate. Therefore, concessions from the side of ICEM were necessary until the Organisation built its negotiation power with its business partners. These concessions set ICEM apart from its standard operating procedures and enhanced tendencies of favouritism. The first section of the chapter examines these aspects, as well as cases of

¹ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/5/10/Shipping. Freedman & Slater, Vol. I, John H. Bratton, United States Office, ICEM Washington to P. Jarell, ICEM Geneva, Personal, 26.01.1973.

disputes, along with opportunities for collateral businesses emerging out of the collaboration of the transport companies with ICEM.

As a development agency of the West, ICEM was in line with the policies for an increase of trade rates. The second section traces the collateral businesses that emerged out of the ICEM migrant traffic for its business partner, examining how the combination of migrant and cargo trades was achieved and promoted.

ICEM is distinguished as a factor instigating competition in the transport sector in the third section, as well as a development factor not only for the increase of trade rates, but also for the tourist traffic, with which ICEM ended up competing for the availability of transport means for its purposes. ICEM proved to be vulnerable in the competition of tourist traffic, especially in the North Atlantic, which was the most developed one, and progressively also in the South Atlantic. Long-established transport partners of ICEM re-evaluated their relationship with the Organisation. When the ICEM migrant transport programme stopped being as profitable as it was initially, they altered their stance towards the ICEM.

The fourth section of the chapter attempts a wider overview of the relationship between the transport companies themselves. The transport companies participating in the ICEM migrant transport programme adopted three practices in their effort to deal with the competition in the field of migration transport. These were a) collaboration between them, b) subversion of the competitors, and c) indirect pressure through governmental channels or through the Press. The characteristics of these practices are examined, also including the illegal manifestations of their effort to survive and/or dominate over the competition on specific routes. From its part, ICEM actively enhanced this competition in the transport sector through its very way of operation.

The fifth section is devoted to the examination of the relationship of ICEM with secondary businesses of the private sector. Concentrating in the case of travel agents, ICEM is approached as an organisation having access to the same pool of 'customers', thus reducing the travel agents' clientele. ICEM came in direct confrontation with the travel agents in several countries where it operated. From the travel agents, ICEM was perceived as an 'intruder' in their initially exclusive area of business, depriving them from business opportunities that they would have seized if ICEM did not exist. The travel agents' race against ICEM Mission in Greece and in other countries is highlighted, as well as the 'policy manoeuvre' of ICEM Mission in Greece for the de-

escalation of the agents' opposition. The section reconfirms ICEM's role in the increase of competition.

Indications for the relationship of ICEM with other businesses of the private sector (real estates, provision of medical equipment and services, hotels, large-scale enterprises) are provided in the last section of the chapter, activating different economies through the migration business that ICEM created. The case of a mining company assisted by ICEM in the selection of migrant-workers reconfirms that ICEM's primary goal was to serve the needs of its member-states, even when migrants' exploitation was involved.

ICEM and the transport companies: constructing a business relationship

In general, the relationship and cooperation between ICEM and the shipping and airline companies was always characterised during the ICEM Sessions and in the official documents as cordial and problem-solving.² The shipping and airline companies were referred to as cooperative and adaptable in the particularities of the migrant traffic.³ This image was, many times, at odds with what the ICEM and transport companies' correspondence indicated. As it is expected, ICEM did not enjoy the same level of cooperation from all of its business partners. Fare negotiations was an important reason for friction, but apparently was not the only one. The relationship between the ICEM Administration and the transport companies was far from peaceful, and below we will examine, apart from these cases, the collateral opportunities derived for the companies out of the ICEM transport programme.

During the early years of the Organisation's establishment, the creation of a pool of sea transport companies to implement its transport work was a challenge.

² NARA/ICEM MC/60-89 Seven Session, April 1954, ICEM, "Annual Report of the Director for 1953", 7th Session, MC/61, 27.02.1954; IOM-SW/Library, ICEM, "Addendum to Plan of Operations and Budget and Plan of Expenditure for 1966: Second Revision. Report of the Director on Transport for the first six months of 1966", 26th Session, MC/796/Add.1, 29.09.1966; *ibid.*, ICEM Council, "Addendum to Report of the Director on the Work of the Committee for the Year 1975. Report on Transport", 40th Session, MC/1157/Add.1, 02.04.1976.

³ NARA/2nd Session of the Council and the Executive Committee of ICEM, Geneva, April 21-May 4, 1955, ICEM, "Report on the Work of the Committee for the Year 1954. Submitted by the Deputy Director", 2nd Session, MC/128, 11.03.1955; NARA/13th Sess. Docs MC/425-MC/441, ICEM, "Report of the Sub-Committee on the Co-Ordination of Transport", 13th Session, MC/427, 01.12.1960; IOM-SW/Library, ICEM, "Addendum to Report of the Director on the Work of the Committee for the Year 1966. Report of the Director on Transport for the year 1966", 27th Session, MC/827/Add.1, 13.04.1967; IOM-GR/MC/EX Executive Committee, 41 to 45-46-47 Session, ICEM Ex. Committee, "Report of the Sub-Committee on the Co-ordination of Transport", 43rd (Special) Session, MC/EX/291, 28.05.1973.

Concessions from ICEM's side were necessary in order to 'stand on its feet' and progressively increase its capacity and leverage over its business partners. In this direction, ICEM adopted a role of quasi business/maritime advisor to some shipping companies. The Norwegian *Skaugen Line*, for example, was contemplating the selling of two of its passenger vessels in 1953. The ICEM Chief of Shipping contacted the shipowner and advised him not to sell or convert any of his passenger vessels for other traffic "without first consulting" and informing ICEM. He stressed the forthcoming prospects of ICEM traffic in the following year and invoked "In all friendship [...] to wait and see", promising his preparedness "to discuss other arrangements", guaranteeing continuous employment of the Skaugen's Line's passenger ships. The Chief of Shipping wanted to secure the passenger vessels' availability for ICEM, thus he even expressed his will to mediate in the finding of a buyer with whom ICEM could potentially work in the future,⁴ namely amongst the shipping companies of the ICEM member-states. Based on the encouraging assurances given, the Skaugen shipowners retained and reconditioned their passenger vessels⁵ while ICEM rewarded their cooperation by continuing employment of their passenger ships.

In the same context of securing space and establishing good relations with regular liner shipping companies, but a further step ahead, ICEM also acted as a quasi-'banker'. In 1954, ICEM planned to advance \$600,000 to a liner shipping company in order to facilitate the reconditioning of one of its passenger vessels; likewise, in 1959, \$175,000 were advanced to another liner shipping company. The advanced monies should be, and were, repaid by the provision of transport services to ICEM.⁶ Under this arrangement, ICEM not only assisted in the improvement of the conditions of transfer for its migrants, but also enhanced the cooperation with the private sector. However, the reconstruction or conversion of private owned passenger vessels through the advancement of international funds allocated for migration transport purposes could also prove to be precarious.

⁴ IOM-SW/General, Transport General-N.A.C. Accordo, J.J. van Loon, Chief, Office of Shipping to Sigurd Skaugen, Oslo, 21.09.1953.

⁵ IOM-SW/General, Transport General-N.A.C. Accordo, I.M. Skaugen, Shipowners to Hans van Loon, ICEM Geneve, SS/Th.k., Oslo, 23.09.1953.

⁶ IOM-SW/General, OPS-20-103/Shipping General Special Cable, Promigrant Geneva to Wesflank London, n.d.; NARA/13th Session of the Council of the ICEM, Geneva, December 1-9, 1960, ICEM, "Financial Report for the Year 1959", 13th Session, MC/416, 02.08.1960, Part A, Financial Statements, Including the Report of the External Auditors.

The standing and importance of each transport company within the national economy also had their merit in the support given by its government and the pressure imposed towards ICEM. It also formed the company's attitude towards ICEM. For example, Angelo Costa, owner of the Italian *Costa Shipping Lines*, was president of the Association of the Italian Industrialists (*Confindustria*) for fifteen years (1945-1955, 1965-1970). Having a wide range of business activities and considerable political influence within Italy, he could demand migrant transport services from ICEM that his company considered as fair participation.⁷ The complex relationship between businesses and politics made the ICEM Deputy Director directly criticise the Italian Minister for Merchant Marine in 1954; the complaint was the insufficient cooperation especially from the state-controlled shipping companies. Certainly, ICEM, as an intergovernmental organisation, did not have the power to actually choose its business partners and certainly could not exclude a state-owned company from its transport work as a private enterprise might. Therefore, the ICEM Deputy Director simply requested a more flexible and understanding relationship with these companies from the Italian Minister.⁸

There were also instances when the conventional business norms from the companies' side were transgressed. The Israeli state-owned *ZIM Shipping Line* heavily complained to ICEM when it noticed that one of its competitors, the *Greek Shipping Line*, received additional passengers from ICEM and not ZIM Shipping Line: *Could nothing be done [...] in our favour or are we regarded as stepchildren? [...] we expect a favourable reply. Our Manager visited [...] the Chief of your Service in Athens and was promised that the matter would be taken up with the Head Office in Geneva. I think you are his boss.*⁹

More aggressively, in 1979, in view of the loss of a contract for the transfer of Indochinese refugees, the President of the American private-owned *World Airways* wrote to ICEM: *We insist that you immediately disclose the foregoing requested*

⁷ *New York Times*, 03.07.1976, www.nytimes.com/1976/07/03/archives/angelo-costa-dies-italian-shipowner-and-industrialist.html, accessed 23.04.2021; IOM-SW/General, Transport General-N.A.C. Accordo, G. Krause, Deputy Chief, Department of Shipping to J.J. van Loon, Chief, Department of Shipping, "Report on visit of Mr. Krause and Mr. Storich to Rome August 20th–24th, 1952", 26.08.1952.

⁸ IOM-SW/General, PRL-20-166/The Migration Process-Countries/S.A.S., P. Jacobsen to the Director, "Report on Visit to Italy – 16/19 November 1954", 22.11.1954.

⁹ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/13/Shipping Liaison with Greece, Vol. I, E. Popper, Shoham Maritime Services Ltd, Passenger Dept Management, Haifa to G. Krause, Deputy Chief, Office of Shipping ICEM, PSM/120, 23.03.1954.

*information to World and other bidders [...] Your failure to disclose this information forthwith will result in our request of the appropriate government authorities representing American taxpayers to investigate immediately your procurement and other practices [...]. We Americans do not follow your foreign practices of secretive and underhanded methods. We play it straight, not cute. Approximately eight percent of my personal income is funding your operation and other US Government programs and I demand your reply now, not tomorrow or hours from now, but immediately.*¹⁰

From its side, the ICEM Administration involved the United States government in this incident, which explained the reasons for *World Airways'* failure in the ICEM tender.¹¹ It continued monitoring the President's work, not only closely related to ICEM activities, but also those which had legal implications for the President. More specifically, a newspaper excerpt was found in the IOM's archives concerning the World Airways President's conviction for sexual harassment against one of his staff in the following months after sending the letter to ICEM.¹² This excerpt, which certainly was of no use in the ICEM transport policy formation, is an indicative fact on the comprehensive filing conducted by ICEM for its business partners.

Moments of tension with transport companies was not a phenomenon experienced only in the ICEM Headquarters. Two days before the sailing of a group of eighty migrants from Greece, *Potamianos Shipping Lines* cancelled the contract as it was unable to transfer the migrants in time, thus making costly arrangements necessary in short notice by the ICEM Mission in Athens in order to enable the migrants' departure. The ICEM Athens Chief of Mission, exceeding his role, warned the company that "as far as I am concerned, we shall never use [your] ships again" and asked the ICEM Administration for "vigorous to say at least" reactions towards the shipping company to request compensation for breaching the contract.¹³

¹⁰ IOM-SW/General, OPS-20-043/Transport: World Airways, Mailgram, James A.S. Leach, House Office Bldg., Washington DC to ICEM Geneva, 29.09.1979.

¹¹ IOM-SW/General, OPS-20-043/Transport: World Airways, Cable, GVA to WASH, GEWA178, 07.08.1979.

¹² Ibid., Laura A. Kiernan, "Airline to Pay \$52,500 in Sex Harassment Case", *Washington Post*, 06.05.1980. Similar archival material can be found also in the case of the Argentinean FANU Directors' imprisonment for fraud, with the ICEM official sarcastically referring to them as our "beloved FANU Directors" and as a "fine collection of gentlemen". For more see IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/6/Shipping, Policy-Liaison with S. America, Vol. I, Edgar Storich to G. Krause, Chief, Dept of Shipping, ICEM Geneva, ARG/I/5, 145, 29.02.1956.

¹³ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/20/111/Transport, Peter Gibson, Chief of Mission, ICEM Geneva to C.K. Grierson Rickford, Chief, Office of Operations ICEM Geneva, "Embarkations", 21.04.1954.

Having in mind that governmental politics and business coincided, the Netherlands government, owning a state-fleet, accused the ICEM Administration of anti-Dutch conduct in 1956. After the replacement of the last Dutch ICEM Chief of Shipping by a German national, the Dutch government felt that their passenger vessels did not have the same access in ICEM traffic.¹⁴ It is worth mentioning that the Dutch official who made this complaint was B.W. Haveman, who, six years later, was appointed as ICEM Director.

During the same year, the newly appointed ICEM Chief of Shipping, a German national, rejected the offer for the employment of a vessel that the German government promoted due to uncompetitive fare quotation. Because of the complaints he received from the German government, he left a window open for the vessel's use by mentioning, "If you could give me any advice which may enable me to find a solution in favour of SS Berlin, please do not hesitate to do so".¹⁵ Maybe this was a polite way to excuse such a rejection to his national government, but it also could be an indication of favouritism over national interests.

The ICEM Administration shared the worries of its business partners. When the ICEM migrant movements decreased, it reassured the partners on the recovery of the movements and emphasised how their interests coincided. ICEM's aim was the opening of new migrant outlets for its migrants' resettlement; this would prolong the necessity of ICEM's existence and would also result in additional business opportunities for the transport companies.¹⁶ In the meantime, when ICEM was not able to respond to its contractual commitments with the shipping companies, it approached the national governments seeking for their leniency. In 1961, due to the decrease of the Australian immigration programme, ICEM intervened with the government of Australia requesting to permit the immigration of an additional 500 Greeks;¹⁷ such an approach favoured the business interests and ICEM's obligations towards the private sector, even at the expense of the optimal national migration management. Additionally, when

¹⁴ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/1/Shipping Policy–Liaison with Washington, Vol. I, G. Krause, to J.J. van Loon, Chief, ICEM Liaison Mission Washington DC, 24.02.1956.

¹⁵ IOM-SW/General, OPS-20-095/Transport, Sea Commercial–America, H.R. Hoekstra, Chief, Department of Shipping to Oberregierungsrat Dr. O. Golbs-Wilms, Bundesverkehrsministerium, Abteilung Seeverkehr Hamburg, "Bookings on S.S. Berlin", 8/10/3, 05.03.1956.

¹⁶ IOM-SW/General, OPS-20-095/Transport, Sea Commercial–America/Latin America, M. Donini, "Italia", Genoa/o J.J. Van Loon, Chief, Office of Shipping, ICEM Geneva, 15.01.1955; *ibid.*, J.J. van Loon, Chief, Office of Shipping to Mario Donini, Direttore "Italia" Genoa, 21.01.1955.

¹⁷ IOM-GR/Αυστραλία 1952 μέχρι 31-12-1962, X. Αλεξανδράκη, Υπαρχηγός της Αποστολής to Δημ. Ζησόπουλον, Γενικών Γραμματέα Υπουργείου Εσωτερικών, 27.07.1961.

ICEM cancelled an air-contract with the American *Riddle Airlines*, the airline abstained from its legal right to seek compensation. Thus, ICEM, considering the legal and financial consequences this cancellation could have, contemplated the allocation of an additional flight or the provision of an ‘advantage’ in future calls for bids as a reward to the airline,¹⁸ thus bypassing the formal procedures of the Organisation’s transport policy.

Although the selection of ICEM’s business partners was made based on standard operating procedures in theory, the ICEM Administration valued the quality of service it received from the transport companies and close relationships with some were developed. The French liner shipping companies, *Societe Generale de Transports Maritimes* and *Chargeurs Réunis*,¹⁹ ranked among ICEM’s “best friends”, according to an ICEM official. Where it was feasible, the ICEM Administration tried to maintain, if not to increase, their traffic. Additionally, it tried to prevent the diversion of migrants to other shipping companies with which ICEM did not share the same level of cooperation, even if they have had an increased national interest in the traffic. This was the case for the transfer of several German migrants by *Chargeurs Réunis* to Argentina, instead of the Argentinean state-owned shipping company—*Flota Argentina de Navegación de Ultramar* (FANU). The ICEM Chief of Mission in Argentina, along with “his friends in FANU”, were planning to request the approval of the migrants’ transfer from the French shipping company from the Argentinean government, believing that they would “be in a position to obtain the approval” without implications in the relationship with *Chargeurs Réunis*;²⁰ clear favouritism and, possibly, a multisectoral entanglement is indicated. Conclusion of contracts as a means to achieve additional objectives was another practice applied by the ICEM Administration. In 1967, it contemplated responding positively to the sharing of traffic by the *British*

¹⁸ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/2/67/Shipping, *Riddle Airlines*, Vol. II, J. Hubener, Chief of Division of Transport to J.J. Bratton, Acting Chief, ICEM Liaison Mission Washington DC, 13.09.1963.

¹⁹ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/6/Shipping, Policy–Liaison with S. America, Vol. I, D. Stansby, Chief of Mission Brazil to J.J. van Loon, Chief, Office of Shipping, ICEM Geneva, “Shipping Companies”, RJ-333, 02.06.1954; *ibid.*, G. Krause, Acting Chief, Office of Shipping to Stansby, ICEM Brazil, “Shipping Companies”, 8/1/6, 21.06.1954.

²⁰ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/6/Shipping, Policy–Liaison with S. America, Vol. I, G. Krause, Acting Chief, Department of Shipping to Jean Wiazemsky, “Letter Chief Mission Buenos Aires to Chief, Department of Operations, dated 13 July 1955, on German Dependents Scheme-Shipping fares”, 22.07.1955.

United Airways, as putting “a little business their way from time to time, it would do us no harm in the UK”.²¹

When the services that ICEM received did not follow the terms of the contract signed with the transport companies, the ICEM Administration did not hesitate to directly contact the owners of the respective company. In 1970, consecutive inconsistencies between the agreed and offered luggage space provision on the American *Capitol Airways* flights were noticed, resulting in leaving behind migrants’ luggage. The ICEM Administration accused the airline of violation of the contract, misleading offers, and “most disappointing” services, concluding that “hardly a single charter flight has so far been performed to our entire satisfaction”.²² ICEM removed the *Capitol Airways* from the eligible airline companies for participation in its tenders and reinstated it only when compensation has been received from the owner of the airline.²³ In other instances, strong complaints were directed towards the transport companies and the governments involved before ICEM took further actions. *Alitalia* for example, in several ICEM chartered flights, was found to have embarked additional non-ICEM passengers or, in scheduled flights, to have replaced ICEM migrant passengers with regular passengers.²⁴

Cooperation with the agents of the shipping companies in several cases also proved to be a struggle. In 1952, the agents of a shipping company increased the per capita cost of fare initially agreed upon, forcing ICEM to request additional budget allowances from its funders in order to fulfil the voyage in time.²⁵ In another instance, in 1957, the agents of the Argentinean FANU Shipping Line did not accept bookings

²¹ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/2/72/Transport, British United Airways, Vol. II, E. K. Rahardt, Chief of Mission ICEM Brazil to G. Maselli, Chief, Department of Latin American Programmes, ICEM Geneva, CM/RJ/137, 09.08.1967.

²² IOM-SW/Registry, 8/2/33/Transport, Capitol Airways, Vol. IX, E. Jacob, Chief of Department of Transport to Robert A. Colhoun, Vice President Sales, Capitol International Airways Inc. Nashville, Tennessee, 20.08.1970.

²³ Ibid., E. Jacob, Chief, Dept of Transport to Director, “Settlement of dispute with Capitol International Airways”, 02.12.1970; ibid., E. Jacob, Chief, Dept of Transport to J.J. Bratton, ICEM Representative Washington DC, 26.05.1971.

²⁴ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/2/16/Transport, Alitalia, Vol. XV, P. Leofreddi, Chief Movement Section, ICEM Supervisor at enplanement, “Enplanement Flight Report”, 29.10.1971; IOM-SW/Registry, ICEM-Italy III, 1951-1980, Cable, Roma to ICEM Geneva, VA598, 12.11.1971; IOM-SW/Registry, 8/2/16/Transport, Alitalia, Vol. XVI, E. Jacob, Chief, Dept of Transport to C. Galli-Zugaro, Alitalia Zurich, 04.10.1972.

²⁵ IOM-SW/General, OPS-20-095/Transport, Sea Commercial-America, J. van den Brink, Department of Shipping to Thos. Cook & Son, Hamburg, Germany, “S.S. America – ex Bremerhaven 24th and ex Le Havre 26th – for New York”, 10.11.1952.

through ICEM unless its Administration agreed to pay higher fare rates;²⁶ ICEM was caught by surprise, since, based on its agreement with the government of Argentina, it was obliged to book a specific percentage of migrants on FANU passenger vessels. What is more, in 1959, the agents of the Spanish sea transport company, *Naviera Aznar*, refused to hand back the documents of a group of migrants they transported to ICEM as a means of pressure towards ICEM for the “last minute” decreases in the number of migrants embarked. The ICEM Administration asked for the intervention of the President of Naviera Aznar to handle the “overzealous underlings” of his company.²⁷ Blackmailing practices were not new in the business world of the private sector, and these practices also persisted in the dealings with an international organisation, the ICEM.

The progressive decrease of the overseas migrant traffic and, conversely, the increase of the tourist traffic resulted in the loss of several passenger ships from ICEM’s use, amongst other reasons. Apart from the tourist traffic that will be discussed in more details below, additional competition with the Australian government was derived by the non-ICEM immigration programme. As indicated, the Australian government contracted passenger vessels for the transfer of subsidised migrants originating from the United Kingdom and other Western European countries. The advantages of the Australian contracts were not based on the fares that Australia offered. Their financial attractiveness relied on several factors: the relative financial security accompanying them, namely increased number of migrants carried per voyage; the long-term contracts offered, thus giving the opportunity to the sea transport companies to plan the selling of the remaining space, as well as to renew their fleet by seeking more easily attractive loans; avoidance of several port-calls and expensive deviations; low competition, since the contracts were shared between two sea transport companies; and of more homogeneous groups of migrants to carry—“well educated” passengers—with similar habits (diet, living standards).²⁸

²⁶ IOM-SW/General, OPS-20-095/Transport, Sea Commercial–America/Latin America, Cable, Geneva to Promigrant Buenosaires, ak072, 22.07.1957.

²⁷ IOM-SW/Registry, 1/1/SPA/Operations. Correspondence with Government-Spain, Vol. VI, Edgar Storich, ICEM Spain to C. Fedele, Department of Operations and Transport, ICEM Geneva, SP/I 552, 13.07.1959.

²⁸ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/5/Shipping/Liaison with Australia Policy: “Melbourne-28th June 1963, Meeting in Canberra with Australian Authorities”, n.d.

On the other hand, a passenger vessel employed by ICEM had to face increased competition from other shipping companies while, at the same time, they had access to a considerably lower number of migrants per sailing, and the migrant passengers' number varied until the actual day of sailing. The short-term contracts by ICEM had no value when the shipping company sought bank loans, the companies could not plan ahead for the vacant berths or return traffic. Furthermore, calls at various ports were required, thus delaying the voyage and increasing the cost. Lastly, ICEM migrant traffic involved the transfer of various ethnic groups with different habits and living standards; the transport companies had to be adjusted and several governmental rules applied depending on the specific nationals carried.²⁹

These conditions were an additional reason for the loss of seaworthy passenger vessels from ICEM's use, despite Australia declaring that it had no intention to compete and lure passenger ships away from ICEM.³⁰ Apart from that, the transformations taking place in the transport sector, mainly in the 1970s, with the predominance of aeroplanes, caused several passenger shipping companies to change traffic orientation, restricting the pool of ICEM business partners even further. The Argentinean *ELMA* shipping line, successor of FANU, as well as the French *Messageries Maritimes*, converted their last passenger ships into cargo in 1969-1972, with the latter company noticing a loss of \$6.2 million in 1970-1971 out of the company's passenger employment.³¹

From the above, we should not exact the conclusion that the relationship between the ICEM Administration and the transport companies was simply full of friction. The companies acknowledged and took advantage of the benefits and potentials that their cooperation with ICEM provided. First of all, companies promoted the advantages of their means of transport to the ICEM Administration by sharing advertising material, praising the comfort and quality of their passenger vessels and

²⁹ For instance, the vessels carrying Spaniards through ICEM, irrespective of the vessel's flag, had to be accompanied by Spanish crew and doctors, IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/5/Shipping/Liaison with Australia Policy: "Melbourne-28th June 1963, Meeting in Canberra with Australian Authorities", n.d.

³⁰ IOM-SW/General, ICEM-Australia II, Department of Immigration, Canberra, "Notes on Discussions with Mr. J. van den Brink, Special Adviser on Transport to the Director of ICEM held, Tuesday, 25th June and Wednesday, 26th June 1963", 02.07.1963.

³¹ IOM-SW/Registry, ICEM V, 1951-1980, John F. Thomas to Herr Bundesminister für Verkehr, Bonn, "Ermassung von Flugtarifen für ICEM", 07.03.1969; *ibid.*, Chief Department of Transport to Director, "Sea Connections from Northern Europe to Latin American Countries", 18.09.1972.

aircraft.³² They invited ICEM high-ranking staff to experience these comforts on voyages or cruises by their passenger vessels and aircraft,³³ or invited them at parties on board ship;³⁴ such an alternate way of business-diplomacy can be considered on the verge of ‘bribery’ from the side of the transport companies in their effort to increase their commercial engagement with ICEM.

Collateral Businesses: New opportunities in cargo trade through ICEM traffic

Through collaboration with ICEM, opportunities for collateral businesses, along with migration traffic, arose. Based on the belief that trade followed emigration through the increase of demand in national goods in the receiving countries,³⁵ the 1954 dispute between the British shipowners and the Australian government for the reduction of freight rates on Australian exports did not pass unnoticed. The ICEM Administration acknowledged this conjecture as a chance for the EAPS shipping companies to increase their revenue through cargo trade. Simultaneously, and consequently, ICEM could have valid reasons that, through vessels combining both trades (passenger and cargo), it could achieve fare reductions. Such a traffic combination was a long-term policy of the Australian governments even before the formation of the Australian Federation in the late 19th century and continued as such in the post-WWII period. The combination of passenger and cargo traffic was also within the interests of the Greek government, not only for the increase of its trade rates with Australia, but also with the countries in-

³² See promotional leaflets, IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/BEL, Transport Liaison with Belgium, Sitmar Linie, “Castel Felice”, n.d.; IOM-SW/Registry, 8/3/21/AUR, Shipping. “Aurelia”, Vol. V, COGEDAR Line, Passenger Service Europe Australia m/v “Aurelia” T/S “Flavia”, n.d.; IOM-SW/Registry, 8/12/Shipping Division, Individual Offers and Space+Quotation of Prices, vol. I, Hellenic Mediterranean Lines, “Timetable and Tariffs”, n.d.; IOM-SW/Registry, 8/2/1/Transport, Offers of Air Transportation, Vol. XI, F. van Rossom, Chief of Division of Transport to J.J. Bratton, ICEM Liaison Mission Washington DC, 14.02.1969.

³³ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/Transport. General Policy, Vol. IV, W.M. Besterman to Messrs. Flotta Lauro, Genoa, 16.09.1965; IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/10/Shipping Liaison with Netherlands, Vol. II, H.N. Dutilh, Holland-America Line, Rotterdam to A.R. Driver, ICEM Geneve, “s.s. Rotterdam – North Sea day-trip, August 26th”, 30.07.1959; IOM-SW/Registry, 1/1/SPA/Correspondence with Government – Spain, vol. VII, Edgar Storich, ICEM Spain to Director, ICEM Geneva, SP/1, 516, 20.10.1960; IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/AAZ, Transport. Liaison with Austria, Vol. I, Kenneth H. Summers, Chief of Liaison Mission to Austria to Director, ICEM HQs, KHS/hk, 31.10.1963.

³⁴ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/Transport. General Policy, Vol. IV, Lucion Fiorentino, Achille Lauro Armatore to J. Hübener, ICEM Geneva, LF/EP/IP, 19.02.1966,

³⁵ In 1956 it was noticed that the chocolate exports from Germany to Canada increased five times since German migration started toward Canada, IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/10/Shipping Liaison with Netherlands, Vol. II, H.R. Hoekstra, Chief, Department of Shipping to D.W. Haveman, Government Commissioner for Emigration, Ministry of Social Affairs, the Hague, 04.06.1956.

between, like Djibouti and Ethiopia, where considerable Greek communities had established. In 1954, the available vessels for use by ICEM were not fit for freight trade. The ICEM Administration, in its effort to attract additional sea means of transport in the Australian sea routes, used the combination of trades as an argument in its negotiations with interested passenger shipping companies,³⁶ and thus, it set the bases for future endeavours.

The shipowners who contemplated or actually got involved in the Greek-Australian sea traffic in 1959 took advantage of these opportunities by implementing mixed passengers and cargo vessels with refrigerators. This was also within the interest of the Australian Department of Trade in 1959,³⁷ which, in 1962, appointed a Trade Commissioner to the Australian Embassy in Athens to expand the trade relations between the two countries.³⁸ Therefore, the vessels of the *Greek-Australian Line* of Chandris carried mail, olives, and olive oil, apart from ICEM migrants, from Greece and other products from neighbouring countries, like Bulgaria. On southbound trips, they carried refrigerated meat from Australia to Aden (Yemen), Egypt, and to Greece, especially for the needs of the Greek Army.³⁹ This trade was expanded by Chandris with the establishment of another parallel purely cargo shipping line, which operated between 1961 and 1963, by four freighters for the trade of meat from Australia and New Zealand to the United States, Canada, Red Sea, Japan, and Europe.⁴⁰

It is important to remember, though, that the *General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade* (GATT) in 1949 and, more tentatively, from 1955-1956 and 1960-1962 had concluded a successful series of rounds of negotiations for the decrease of tariffs, with

³⁶ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/5/Shipping, Policy Liaison with Australia & N. Zealand, Vol. I, C. O. Wendling, Chief of Mission Australia to J.J. van Loon, Chief, Office of Shipping, ICEM HQs, AUS/N/1, 18.06.1954; *ibid.*, J.J. van Loon, Chief, Office of Shipping to C.O. Wendling, Liaison Mission Canberra, "Reduced Freight Rates", 08.07.1954; IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/13/Shipping Liaison with Greece, Vol. I, Peter Gibson, Chief of Mission ICEM Athens to Director ICEM Geneva, "Extra Charges on the ss "Cyrenia" & "Tasmania"", ADM/26, 03.05.1956. F. Broeze, "Our Home is Girt by Sea", pp. 460-463.

³⁷ NAA/A446, 1962/65076, "Memorandum on Discussions with Mr. T.H.E. Heyes. Held at ICEM Headquarters, Geneva, on Thursday 28th May 1959", n.d.

³⁸ AGMFA/CS/1962/25/8/1, "New Trade Commissioner for Athens (Statement by Acting Minister for Trade, the Hon. Senator Denham Henty)", 330, 30.03.1962.

³⁹ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/4/PAT, "PATRIS" Voyage Reports, Vol. I, H. Reckstock, Senior Esc. Off. M/V Patris, Fremantle to M. Russo, Technical Consultant, Department of Shipping, ICEM Geneva, 06.05.1961; *ibid.*, H. Hackstock, Sen. Escort Officer, N. Lambrinopoulos, Master, "Voyage Report No. 9 to Australia, M/V Patris Gross 18400, 37, Net 10927, 68 SVVY Gal", n.d. [1961]; William H. Miller, *The Chandris Liners*, Yorkshire, 1993, p. 10.

⁴⁰ «Οικτρά η Αντίδραση κατά της Ελληνικής Γραμμής Αυστραλίας», *Naftika Chronika*, 612/371, 01.12.1960; «Η Δευτέρα Γραμμή προς την Αυστραλία», *Naftika Chronika*, 659/418, 15.11.1962; «Δια την σύστασιν φορτηγού γραμμής Ελλάδος-Αυστραλίας», *Naftika Chronika*, 715/474, 15.03.1965; W. H. Miller, *The Chandris Liners*, p. 10.

ultimate goal being the liberalisation of international trade. Meanwhile, in 1958, the *European Economic Community* (EEC) had been established, facilitating further trade liberalisation within Europe and with overseas countries. Increase of world trade rates was a firm American policy and was vividly assisted in the establishment of the aforementioned trade-oriented organisations, amongst many others. Therefore, the adopted policies in the European and international level resulted in the annual increase of exports from Western Europe by eight to nine percent during the 1960s.⁴¹ ICEM's effort for the combination of passenger and cargo trade can be considered as taking place in the side of the wider policies for the increase of international trade rates, while concomitantly working in the context of maintenance of the viability of the migrant routes.

In addition, in cases of emergency and need of coordinated and in time actions, several shipowners responded to the calls of ICEM for the transportation of relief supplies. In 1974-1975, when ICEM had undertaken the provision of relief goods to Cyprus after the Turkish invasion, the Greek shipowners Martinos, Karageorgis, Livanos, and Kalimanopoulos were the first to offer their services free from cost in order to assist the Greek Cypriots.⁴² Their response certainly involved national sentiments, but it also worked as good publicity at a time when the Greek shipowners did not have the best public image due to their close collaboration with the colonels of the Greek military Junta (1967-1974).⁴³ Nevertheless, in 1975, a total of 200 out of 380 tons of relief supplies were transported by the shipowners free from cost.⁴⁴ From the

⁴¹ Richard N. Cooper, "Economic aspects of the Cold War, 1962-1975", in Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (eds), *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, Vol. II, *Crises and Detente*, Cambridge, New York, 2010, pp. 47, 51, 56-57; Gutner, *op.cit.*, pp. 171, 174-175; Aldcroft, *op.cit.*, pp. 144-147.

⁴² IOM-SW/Registry, 8/6/10/1/Cyprus Relief, Vol. I, S.K. Christensen, Department of Operations and Transport, "Note for the Record", 03.09.1974; *ibid.*, Ch. Alexandraki, Chief of Mission ICEM Athens to John F. Thomas, Director, ICEM Geneva, 24.10.1974; *ibid.*, Ch. Alexandraki to Director, ICEM Geneva, 02.11.1974; IOM-SW/Registry, 8/6/10/1/Cyprus Relief, Vol. II, John F. Thomas to G. Calimanopoulos, Managing Director, Hellenic Lines Ltd, c/o Brokerage & Management Corp. New York, 06.12.1974.

⁴³ For the relationship of the Greek shipowners with the Greek dictators, see G. Harlaftis, *Greek Shipowners & Greece 1945-1975*, pp. 163-166. Regarding the effort of the Greek shipowners to change their public image after the fall of the Greek military dictatorship, see Ilias G. Mpsias, «Στρατηγικές επικοινωνίας στη Ναυτιλία σε περιόδους κρίσεων: Συλλογική οργάνωση του εφοπλισμού και δημόσια εικόνα στην πρόιμη μεταπολιτευτική περίοδο της Ελλάδας», Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Aegean, Chios, 2021.

⁴⁴ IOM-SW/Library, ICEM, "Addendum to Report of the Director on the Work of the Committee for the Year 1975. Report on Transport", 40th Session, MC/1157/Add.1, 02.04.1976.

side of the airlines, fundraisings were co-organised as a response to urgent needs of the ICEM's work.⁴⁵

Migrants or Tourists? Stirring up & Facing up the Competition

In the three decades following the end of the Second World War, the transport sector was in constant change. The transport companies got access to more profits, thus facilitating the combination of traffics from the ICEM business partners. The transition of some transport partners of ICEM from migrant to tourist traffic and/or cargo traffic can be examined as progress, since it involved investment, better service provision, and access to greater revenue. ICEM, from its side, facilitated this transition through the funds it distributed for the migrants' transfer. These funds also acted as incentives for the upgrade of transport services, especially in the 1950s, when the tourist traffic was progressively gaining momentum. Therefore, it can be argued that ICEM worked as a development factor in the sector of passenger transportation and as a factor for the increase of competition in the traffic it served. However, this competition created from and around ICEM also had implications on the Organisation's work.

As an agency of the capitalist-oriented countries, ICEM incorporated the US policies on the intensification of inter-capitalist competition.⁴⁶ ICEM created opportunities out of the services it provided and worked for the lowering of fare prices and economies of scale on its work. It also created opposing pairs favouring the instigation of competition in the transport sector. This was mainly through the selection between airlines and shipping companies and between chartered means of transport and regular scheduled ones—a side-effect of its actual work to transport the migrants. When Italy objected to the request of ICEM Administration for more liberty in the chartering of passenger ships and aircraft for the exclusive transport of its migrants, it justified that it “would disturb the normal pattern of trade, would stir competition...”.⁴⁷ This allegation confirmed ICEM's intentions.

One of the practices of the ICEM Administration to stir competition was the encouragement of more than one transport company to participate at a specific sea/air

⁴⁵ IOM-SW/Library, ICEM, “Report on Operations: Part III: Transport”, 25th Session, MC/771 (Part III), 21.03.1966.

⁴⁶ G. Arrighi, “The world economy and the Cold War, 1970-1990”, p. 27.

⁴⁷ NARA/11th Session of the Council of ICEM, Geneva, November 12-20, 1959, ICEM, “Report of the Sub-Committee on the Co-Ordination of Transport”, 11th Session, MC/361, 13.11.1959.

route. This was the case in late-1953, when ICEM wanted to lower the migrants' transfer cost and attempted to break the monopoly of an Argentinean liner shipping company in the traffic to Europe by encouraging a French passenger shipping company to enter this sea route.⁴⁸ Likewise, when, in the mid-1950s, the Greek-Australia sea route was served only by the Greek shipping line ELMES, the ICEM Mission in Athens contemplated approaching the ELMES' competitors in order to join in, since "a little healthy competition would do no harm".⁴⁹ Nevertheless, other operational and financial considerations restrained this suggestion from being implemented.⁵⁰

Apart from the competition that ICEM intensified, it also experienced competition of a parallel and more profitable traffic that coexisted with the migrant one—the tourist traffic. The post-WWII development of tourism constituted a clear policy in the Western bloc, and, more specifically, of the United States. In 1948, a dedicated *Travel Development Section* was established within the *Economic Cooperation Administration*, with offices in sixteen countries participating in the Marshall Plan. The initial objective was the promotion of the *American Way of Life* in Europe through the American tourists visiting the Old Continent. The ultimate goals were the fighting of communism as well as European reconstruction by the circulation of foreign currency in European countries and increase of trade and employment via tourism, which was a more sustainable development method than the emergency provision of American funds through Marshall Plan, and an important instrument for the diplomatic and political economy of the United States amidst the Cold War. In this direction, the Travel Development Section and the United Nation agencies lobbied with European governments for the simplification of visa issuance and border crossing procedures, as well as for the progressive lowering of cost of travel by sea and air. In addition, the Travel Development Section offices surveyed the Americans on their travel preferences and, amongst others, trained tourist enterprises in Europe on how to adjust in the preferences and standards of living of the American tourists. The first outcomes of this effort were more impressive in the 1960s; the procedure was facilitated

⁴⁸ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/6/Shipping. Policy-Liaison with S. America, Vol. I, J.J. van Loon, Chief, Office of Shipping to ICEM, Liaison Mission Buenos Aires, Argentine, "Carrying Under Argentine Flag", 30.11.1953.

⁴⁹ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/13/Shipping Liaison with Greece, Vol. I, Peter Gibson, Chief of Mission Athens to J.J. van Loon, Chief Office of Shipping, Migration Committee, Geneva, 09.07.1954.

⁵⁰ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/13/Shipping Liaison with Greece, Vol. I, G. Krause, Acting Chief, Office of Shipping to P. Gibson, ICEM Liaison Mission Athens, "Shipping Matters", 19.07.1954.

by numerous factors such as the economic growth in Western world, the increase of consumption, the improvement of standards of living, the furtherance of globalisation with the comparatively easier access to information (literacy, television, newspapers), and the labour-law reformation in many countries introducing paid vacations for the workforce. The United Nations, acknowledging the development prospects of tourism, named 1967 as “International Tourist Year”⁵¹ while the *World Bank* introduced a specialised office for tourism that implemented 24 projects for tourism development in 18 countries.⁵²

Migration and tourism were, and still are, interrelated, since tourist traffic could be produced out of the migrant traffic and vice-versa. Progressively, though, the ICEM migrant traffic became more vulnerable in the competition of the tourist traffic.⁵³ As in the case of the migrant traffic, the tourist traffic did not develop with the same pace towards all routes. The North Atlantic was the most developed tourist traffic since the 1950s. This is one of the reasons it was comparatively better equipped in passenger tonnage and aircraft space. Thus, ICEM did not establish a distinct migrant traffic, but utilised the pre-existing transport infrastructure. Even since 1953, ICEM experienced seasonal difficulties in finding adequate space for its migrants destined to the United States and Canada. *PANAM Airlines*, since March 1953, occasionally declared that they were unable to offer charter services to ICEM due to tourist traffic.⁵⁴ This was a reality also experienced from the sea means of transport destined to North Atlantic countries⁵⁵ and, more intensively, between July and September.⁵⁶ It must be noted that, as early as in 1957, it was estimated that 80 percent of the total North Atlantic trade was tourist

⁵¹ M. Dierikx, *Clipping the Clouds*, pp. 59-60, 73; Van Vleck, *op.cit.*, pp. 211-214, 216-217; M. Mazower, *Dark Continent*, p. 309.

⁵² Michalis Nikolakakis, «Μοντέρνα Κίρκη» Τουρισμός αι ελληνική κοινωνία την περίοδο 1950-1974, Athens, 2017, p. 40.

⁵³ Allan M. Williams, C. Michael Hall, “Tourism and migration: new relationships between production and consumption”, *Tourism Geographies*, 2:1 (2000), pp. 7-8, 11-12.

⁵⁴ IOM-SW/General, OPS-20-079, Transport Air/Civil Aeronautics Board USA, E.J. Van Home, Colonel, Acting Chief, US Office, ICEM Washington to Dr. J.J. Van Loon, Director, Dept of Shipping, ICEM Geneva, 21.10.1952.

⁵⁵ NARA/5th Session of the ICEM, Geneva, April 16-24, 1953, ICEM Geneva, “Report of the Director to Date and Prospects for 1953”, 5th Session, MC/9/Rev.1, 28.04.1953.

⁵⁶ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/2/Shipping Division. Policy-Liaison with Canada, Vol. I, Director, Department of Citizenship and Immigration, Immigration Branch, Ottawa to P.M. Towe, Economic Division, Dept of External Affairs, Ottawa, 19.05.1953.

traffic. Therefore, the migrant traffic had less than 20 percent access in tonnage. On the other hand, the Australian trade was estimated to be over 50 percent as migrant traffic.⁵⁷

South American sea routes faced the same difficulties since 1960, especially for the passenger vessels originating from Spain during the high tourist season, since, apart from the regular tourist traffic, the cruises flourished during certain months.⁵⁸ Since 1963, ICEM faced additional difficulties in the sea routes from the Northern European ports to Australia where, apart from the tourist traffic, an increasing rate of self-paying migration was noticed.⁵⁹

In the 1960s, the competition from the tourist traffic was more intense for ICEM at a time when overseas migration by sea was also decreasing. For instance, the Spanish shipping company *Naviera Aznar* lost about 33 percent of its third-class transatlantic customers in 1962-1963, while the Spanish shipping line *Ybarra* gained 60 percent of its annual revenue purely from cruises in 1966.⁶⁰ Consequently, ICEM's access in passenger shipping space narrowed. As early as 1963, the Italian SITMAR Shipping Line and the British P&O shipping group of companies had ceased accepting ICEM bookings while P&O identified itself in the late 1960s as "holiday operator". In addition, the Italian shipping company *Cogedar* accepted ICEM bookings only during certain months of the year.⁶¹ Other long-established ICEM business partners cancelled scheduled sailings when an opportunity for a cruise arose, as it happened with the Italian shipping companies *Flotta Lauro* and *Lloyd Triestino*,⁶² thus subverting the operational planning of ICEM for a chance of greater profit through cruises. Even if ICEM believed, in 1952, that the sea transport companies unsatisfied with its fare offers "will find their own way to the Committee",⁶³ ICEM did not maintain the same confidence

⁵⁷ NARA/ICEM, Council Documents, MC/Sixth Session (1st copy), ICEM Executive Committee, "Report of the Group of Experts on Shipping", Restricted, MC/EX/42, 28.03.1957.

⁵⁸ NARA/13th Session of the Council of the ICEM, Geneva, December 1-9, 1960, ICEM, "Report of the Director on Transport Covering Performance from 1 January to 30 September 1960 and Prospects", 13th Session, MC/422, 27.10.1960; IOM-SW/Library, ICEM, "Report of the Sub-Committee on the Co-Ordination of Transport", 18th Session, MC/556, 14.11.1962.

⁵⁹ IOM-SW/Library, ICEM, "Report of the Director on Transport", 20th Session, MC/623, 16.09.1963.

⁶⁰ Gaetano Cerchiello, "Cruise market: a real opportunity for transatlantic shipping lines in the 1960s – the case of the Spanish company Ybarra", *Journal of Transport History*, 6:1 (2014), pp. 24-25, 33.

⁶¹ IOM-SW/Library, ICEM, "Report of the Director on Transport", 20th Session, MC/623, 16.09.1963. For P&O, Miller, *Europe and the Maritime World*, p. 325.

⁶² IOM-SW/Registry, ICEM V, 1951-1980, E. Jacob, Chief, Department of Transport to Deputy Director, "Sea movements from Italy to Australia", 23.12.1970.

⁶³ IOM-SW/General, Transport General–N.A.C. Accordo, G. Krause, Deputy Chief, Department of Shipping, J. Van den Brink, Shipping Operations Officer to Dr. Van Loon, Chief, Department of Shipping, "Report on Mr. Krause's and Mr. van den Brink's visit to Genoa, September 9th-12th, 1952, in

in the 1960s. The attractiveness of the ICEM transport programme did not remain intact throughout the years, as the *United States Line*'s end of cooperation with ICEM since 1965 confirms.⁶⁴ For the Spanish shipping companies, the ICEM traffic was less remunerative from the general passenger traffic after the 1967 peseta devaluation,⁶⁵ while the Italian *Costa Armatori SpA Line* only served tourist traffic and withdrew the special migrants' fares after 1980.⁶⁶

From the side of the airline companies, not responding to ICEM calls for bids for its flights was not rare. This was the case of the American private owned airlines *PANAM* and *TWA*, which served a high level of general passenger traffic,⁶⁷ as well as of the state-owned airlines of Belgium and Spain, *Sabena* and *Iberia*, respectively, at a time when their governments complained about the airlines' low representation in ICEM transport programme.⁶⁸ Additionally, the ICEM Administration did not receive even one answer on its call for bids.⁶⁹ For the scheduled airlines, especially after the 1979 deregulation of the US air traffic, the ICEM traffic was considered "as low yield revenue and hence low-priority business". This was what the ICEM Director pointed out in 1980, since the airlines cancelled bookings made by ICEM or off-loaded ICEM passengers en route.⁷⁰ The ICEM Administration scolded *PANAM Airlines* in 1979, since ICEM received no response on its express of interest for four *PANAM* flights. The airline was accused of opportunism by giving any preference to ICEM's

connection with the establishment of the 3rd class passenger conference Mediterranean-Brazil/La Plata (Accordo)", 15.09.1952.

⁶⁴ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/USA/Transport Liaison with U.S.A., Vol. II, W.M. Besterman to J.L. Carlin, Chief, Refugee and Migration Affairs, US Mission to International Organizations, Geneva, 23.08.1965.

⁶⁵ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/SPA/Transport Liaison with Spain, Vol. III, G. Maselli to Mr. Jacob, "Duty Trip to Spain", 01.11.1968.

⁶⁶ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/12/Transport, Quotations of Prices, Offers of Spaces, Vol. XI, Linea "C" *Costa Armatori SpA* to ICEM Geneva, "South and Central American liner services 1980", Traff.Pass.PE/eb, 06.03.1980.

⁶⁷ NARA/ICEM-General, 1953 thru 1956, George L. Warren to Mr. McLeod, "Availability of United States Flag Planes to ICEM", 26.09.1955; IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/USA/Transport Liaison with U.S.A., Vol. II, W.M. Besterman to J.L. Carlin, Chief, Refugee and Migration Affairs, US Mission to International Organizations, Geneva, 23.08.1965.

⁶⁸ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/BEL/Transport Liaison with Belgium, B.G. Epinat to le Ministre des Affaires etrangeres Ministere des Affaires etrangeres Bruxelles, 10.08.1960; IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/SPA/Transport Liaison with Spain, Vol. III, G. Masselli to D.C. Braggiotti, Chief, ICEM Liaison Mission Madrid, 31.03.1967; IOM-SW/Registry, 8/2/72/Transport, British United Airways, Vol. II, S.K. Christensen, "Note for the Record: Charterflights Spain/USA", 31.05.1968.

⁶⁹ IOM-SW/General, 313/Historical Background 1950's-1960's, J. van den Brink, Chief of Department of Shipping to Marcus Daly, Director, "Shipping situation September/October 1960", 05.10.1960.

⁷⁰ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/2/81/Transport, Northwest Orient Airlines, Vol I, James L. Carlin to R.J. Wright, Northwest Airlines Inc. Minnesota, 20.08.1980.

“humanitarian programmes” and turning to the client who paid more; this accusation was not accepted by PANAM.⁷¹

Apart from the tourist traffic, other periodic global events disturbed the normal ICEM’s traffic. The *Olympic Games* and *World Expositions/World Exhibitions* decreased the access of ICEM in passenger tonnage and aircraft space even further. Aircraft charters for these events were scheduled well in advance, involving more remunerative fares for the airlines, while the bookings on scheduled regular liner shipping companies were made months before the start of the event.⁷²

ICEM was able to implement its transport work thanks to its close co-operation with the passenger shipping companies and by the progressive opportunities the air transport offered. ICEM could neither have long-term planning nor sign long-term contracts securing passenger space.⁷³ Such a practice would have been precarious due to the very unpredictable nature of migration and the migrant traffic and for the fact that this traffic was implemented by an international organisation, which relied on the policies formed by the governments and the funding they provided. Simultaneously, long-term contracts would be financially precarious also for the transport companies, which could be financially exposed in case of mass cancellations.⁷⁴

Therefore, the ICEM Administration, when no alternative was available, adjusted to the seasonal scarcity of transport means towards specific routes. It tried to ascertain the support of its member-states for the modification of migrants’ departure/arrival time⁷⁵ and, where possible, concentrated the majority of its traffic within specific months. ICEM also organised flights during weekends or

⁷¹ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/2/14/Transport. Pan American Airways, Vol. 18, G. Sliwik, Chief, Division of Transport, Department of Operations and Transport to Daniel Tharin, Director for Switzerland, PANAM Geneva, 11.07.1979; *ibid.*, Robert P. Jones, Director-Charter Operations, PANAM Tours & Charters to G. Sliwik, Chief, Division of Transport, ICEM Geneva, 24.07.1979.

⁷² NARA/13th Session of the Council of the ICEM, Geneva, December 1-9, 1960, ICEM, “Report of the Director on Transport Covering Performance from 1 January to 30 September 1960 and Prospects”, 13th Session, MC/422, 27.10.1960; IOM-SW/Library, ICEM Executive Committee, “Addendum to Report of the Director on the Work of the Committee for the Year 1967. Report of the Director on Transport for the year 1967”, 21st (Special) Session, MC/EX/209/Add.1, 01.06.1968.

⁷³ NARA/4th Session of the Council and the Executive Committee of ICEM, Geneva, February 14-26, 1956, Annex, “Report of the Director on Transportation Covering Performance from 1 October 1955-31 January 1956 and Prospects for 1956”, MC/180 [20.02.1956].

⁷⁴ IOM-SW/Library, ICEM Executive Committee, “Report of the Sub-Committee on the Co-ordination of Transport”, 21st (Special) Session, MC/EX/213, 11.06.1968.

⁷⁵ NARA/5th Session of the Council and the Executive Committee of ICEM, Geneva, September 20-October 6, 1956, ICEM, “Report of the Director on Transport Covering Performance from 1 February 1956-31 August 1956 and Prospects. Working paper on the Sub-Committee on the Co-ordination of Transport”, 5th Session, MC/W/39, 24.09.1956.

departures/arrivals during night hours provided that the space offered met its financial limitations,⁷⁶ and ICEM concentrated in air chartering when it was operationally and financially advisable. When chartering was not feasible, ICEM turned to more expensive options by booking space on regular scheduled flights. The increasing aircraft passenger capacity, particularly after the introduction of jumbo-jets, facilitated this option.

A side-effect from the increasing interest on tourist traffic was the reconditioning and improvement of the living standards on the passenger ships participating in ICEM transport programme;⁷⁷ ICEM actively sought this development along with the shipping companies. However, it was also one of the reasons that caused ICEM to lose long-established partners, since their passenger vessels, after reconditioning, concentrated on the more rewarding tourist traffic;⁷⁸ the development axis of ICEM's work is thus confirmed for the transition of, at least some of, the shipping companies to more remunerating traffics. However, it was a risk acknowledged by the ICEM Administration.⁷⁹ During the winter months, though, when the tourist traffic reduced, ICEM migrants could enjoy better travel conditions.⁸⁰

For the operational viability of the means of transport, the trade of transportation needed to be of a value to cover not only the operational expenses, but also to allow a profit for the transport company. When the trade value of the migrant traffic became insufficient for the shipping and airline companies, they turned to other traffics that could produce more profit. For some companies, the tourist traffic surpassed the value of the migrant traffic. Then, the ICEM Administration was forced to find alternative means of transport, either by cooperating with new transport companies, like the non-scheduled charter airlines, or by simply adjusting to more expensive transport solutions.

⁷⁶ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/2/Transport. Air Policy-General, Vol. VI, E. Jacob, Chief of Department of Transport to Chiefs of Missions, Europe and Australia, ICEM Washington and New York, 20.03.1970.

⁷⁷ NARA/2nd Session of the Council and the Executive Committee of ICEM, Geneva, April 21-May 4, 1955, ICEM, "Report on the Work of the Committee for the Year 1954. Submitted by the Deputy Director", 2nd Session, MC/128, 11.03.1955.

⁷⁸ IOM-SW/General, Transport, Welfare, G. Krause, Deputy Chief, Department of Shipping to Miss Wilson, Deputy Chief, Department of Operations, "Minimum Standards of Migrant Ships", 01.04.1955.

⁷⁹ NARA/5th Session of the Council and the Executive Committee of ICEM, Geneva, September 20-October 6, 1956, ICEM, "Report of the Sub-Committee on the Co-ordination of Transport", 5th Session, MC/206, 01.10.1956.

⁸⁰ IOM-SW/Library, ICEM Executive Committee, "Addendum to Report of the Director on the Work of the Committee for the Year 1967. Report of the Director on Transport for the year 1967", 31st (Special) Session, MC/EX/209/Add.1, 01.06.1968.

ICEM, through its work, contributed to the development of tourist traffic as well as to the transition of some transport companies from migrant to tourist traffic. The transfer of migrants created potential tourist traffic in the long run. Such a development took place through the inauguration of new sea and air connections from Europe with overseas destinations, the allocation of space in the transport means chartered by ICEM to general traffic, as well as with the successful settlement of ICEM migrants who, after years, returned to their homelands as tourists, or were visited by family members and friends in their new countries. Meanwhile, the upgrade on the facilities of the utilised transport means created the conditions for the combination of migrant and tourist traffic, at least, until the means of transport used by ICEM were converted into one-class, namely tourist-class passenger ships.

For years though, ICEM was followed by a repetitive reputation of a “Cooks’ tour” agency.⁸¹ ICEM fought to prove that it was not only a transport agency, but an organisation that worked in the axes of development through international migration. This messaging was not clear-cut, and this is one of the reasons that, in many countries, the competition with the travel agents was direct and fierce, as it will be examined further below.

From Cooperation to Competition: the ICEM transport partners

The world of international civil aviation is a jungle where all the animals are wild and extremely unfriendly to each other. It is a case of a dog eating dog, and considerations of sympathy for ICEM or an Immigration programme are quite secondary to those of dealing harshly with the competitors to the national airline.⁸²

The above excerpt provides a clear picture on the working climate in the international civil aviation world in the early 1960s. According to the author of the letter, the airlines approached migrant transport clearly with a business approach. No sentiments were given towards the agencies when offering such contracts, nor towards the scope these

⁸¹ NAA/A446, 1966/46169, 1973547, “Report of the Australian Delegation. ICEM, Tenth Session of the Executive Committee and Eight Session of the Council”, Restricted, May 1958. The title “Cook’s tour” agency referred to the most known and first successful organised tourism agency established in London in 1841 and flourished since 1851 by Thomas Cook. For more, see Eric J. Hobsbawm, *The Age of Capital 1848-1875*, London, 1975, pp. 240, 243.

⁸² IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/5/Shipping/Liaison with Australia Policy, P. Gibson, Chief of Mission Australia to Director, ICEM HQs, “MISAB 15/282”, 4206, AUS/R/297, 11.04.1961.

agencies served. It was simply a business contract that they managed to gain against the fierce competition they faced on a national and international level. The same description could also be extended to the maritime passenger transport sector of the time, since the same level of competition was involved. Each transport company tried to face competition with a variety of means. In the preceding chapters, discussion has been made on the battle between shipping and airline companies, the chartered and scheduled liner passenger ships, as well as the scheduled and non-scheduled airlines. Each time, different pairs of opposites and couplings met based on the interests and opportunities at stake. Hereunder, we will not only concentrate on these pairs of competition, but we will examine how the various competing schemes evolved and the forms they took. Collaborations, subversion, indirect governmental, and Press pressure were only few means standing in the way of prevailing over competitors in the ICEM migrant transport programme.

Certainly, such practices were not a novelty of the post-1945 period. As highlighted in Chapter 1, the shipping companies in the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century collaborated under the form of Shipping Conferences or by establishing new companies following mergers. They also subverted established agreements by withdrawing from the shipping cartels, by starting ‘rate-wars’, and even by seeking the direct and indirect support of national governments and the Press in their effort to expand and advertise their business and restrict or harm foreign competition. Such an example was the production of articles in the Press: supposed migrants describing severe conditions on board ship, amongst other examples.

Focusing on the post-WWII migrant traffic and, more specifically, the traffic under the ICEM migrant transport programme, we can start from examples of collaboration. In the maritime world, the liner shipping companies were accustomed to entering into agreements to maintain certain percentages for the sharing of a particular traffic between them. The percentage allocated per shipping company was related to their tonnage dynamic on a certain sea route, as well as on their concentration on the traffic they served (e.g., migrant traffic). Thus, it was not necessary that each company shared the same percentages on different sea routes. For example, in the Brazil/Plata sea routes from Southern Europe, the Italian shipping company, *ITALIA*, was entitled to around 42 percent of the traffic, around 35 percent for the Italian *Costa Line*, and

around 21 percent for the French line *SGTM*.⁸³ Nevertheless, in 1965, in the sea routes from Italian ports to Venezuela, Costa Line was entitled to 59 percent of the traffic, while 41 percent of it was for *ITALIA*;⁸⁴ this contradicted the percentages shared with the neighbouring traffic of Brazil/Plata.

When the clauses of the agreements were not attained, friction followed not only between the companies involved, but also with the ICEM Administration. The companies pressed ICEM for “a more comprehensive assistance”, and invoked the heavy costs that burdened them.⁸⁵ Especially during the 1960s, increasing conflicts between state and private-owned Italian passenger liner shipping companies emerged in the Australian and the South American sea routes.⁸⁶ Heated debates took place in 1968 inside the Italian Ministry of Merchant Marine, which intervened to set the agreements into new foundations. The Ministry tried to redefine the companies’ relation with ICEM, especially when accusations for ‘disfavour’ or ICEM’s ‘discrimination’ against a shipping company were filed out of the conflicting competition of the shipping companies.⁸⁷

In other instances, cooperation reached the verge of illegality, as was the case of submission of collusive biddings for the joint attraction of ICEM contracts. In this case, some airline companies offered identical low bids per seat for the same or similar number of flights. If their actions were revealed, they could be charged for unfair competition and violation of antitrust laws.⁸⁸ Nevertheless, when their competitors suspected such actions, they did not hesitate to report it to ICEM and to the appropriate

⁸³ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/21/BRA/Shipping. *Accordo Passaggeri Mediterraneo Brasile/Plata*, Vol. I, J. van den Brink to H.R. Hoekstra, Chief, Department of Shipping, “Distribution of space among owners belonging to the *Accordo Passeggeri Brazil/Plata* from 1 October to 31 December 1956 (month of December still estimated)”, 12.12.1956.

⁸⁴ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/21/BRA/Shipping. *Accordo Passaggeri Mediterraneo Brasile/Plata*, Vol. I, Enrico Costa, Giacomo Costa fu Andrea to De Leon, CIME Geneva, Genova, 03.02.1965.

⁸⁵ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/3/21/FLA/Shipping. “*Flaminia*”, Vol. V, Lloyd Triestino, Soc. Per Az. Di Navigazione – Sede in Trieste to Dept of Shipping, ICEM Geneva, “M.v. *Flaminia* ex Trieste 6 April 1961 to Australia”, 2774 us/G1, 17.04.1961.

⁸⁶ IOM-SW/Registry, ICEM III, 1951-1980, A.G. Natale to the Deputy Director, “Shipping”, 05.06.1968.

⁸⁷ IOM-SW/Registry, ICEM-Italy, 1951-1980 IV, G. Maselli, Assistant Director for Operations to W.M. Besterman, “My visit to Rome (29 May – 4 June 1968)”, 17.06.1968; *ibid.*, A.G. Natale to Director, “Notes on talks held in Rome with the Italian Authorities”, 20.05.1968.

⁸⁸ IOM-SW/General, OPS-20-064/Transport of Hungarian Refugees, Coates Lear, Attorney for Overseas National Airways, Inc to Docket Section, Civil Aeronautics Board, Washington DC, 05.09.1957; IOM-SW/Registry, 1/1/AUST, Correspondence with Govt–Australia, Vol. VI, Department of Plans and Liaison, “Notes on discussions between Mr. Heydon, Secretary, Department of Immigration, Australia, and Mr. Haveman, Director, ICEM: Friday, 13 July 1962”, n.d.

national authorities such as the Civil Aeronautics Board in the United States, which regulated the air traffic towards the country.⁸⁹

With the larger use of aviation in migrant transport in the 1960s, the passenger shipping companies had to face an addition to the maritime competition. Therefore, on another level of cooperation, some shipping companies refused to transport the heavy luggage of the ICEM migrants travelling by air in case their berths were not filled.⁹⁰ In this way, they wanted to ascertain that they would have fully covered the passenger capacity of their vessels in an effort to put a halt to the expansion of their competitor.

When cooperation did not work well for both parties, the option of subversion of standing agreements was always available. For instance, in 1960, the Dutch *KLM Airlines* had undertaken the ground handling of the *Pan-American Airlines* (PANAM) flights from the Dutch airports. Consecutive delays on PANAM flights had repercussions on KLM, since the public considered that the latter was to be blamed, something that KLM feared would deprive them from potential migrant-customers. Therefore, KLM accused PANAM of “bad propaganda” and announced, to ICEM, that when PANAM delayed more than four hours, KLM would take over the transportation of migrants to the United States, thus subverting the arrangements between the airlines, ICEM, and the respective governments. Certainly, this was not accepted by ICEM⁹¹ due to the American legislation protecting the transport companies under the US flag, but it is indicative of the actions KLM wanted to employ.

Attempts for the subversion of established agreements between a transport company and ICEM were not rare in the competitive migrant transport market. In 1952, the liner shipping company, *American President Lines*, offered fifty percent lower prices to PICMME than the ones enjoyed by the Organisation at that time, thus

⁸⁹ IOM-SW/General, OPS-20-064/Transport of Hungarian Refugees, L.C. Burwell, Jr., Director of the Board of Directors, Overseas National Airways, Washington to Colonel E.J. van Horne, Office of Shipping, ICEM Geneva, 10.09.1957.

⁹⁰ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/4/Transport. Liaison with Italy, Vol. IV, Lucio Fiorentino, Achille Lauro Armatore, Ufficio Passeggieri, Napoli to J. Hubener, ICEM Geneva, LF/EP/IP, 13.12.1963.

⁹¹ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/NETH/Transport Liaison with Netherland, Vol. III, Dr. J.P.G. Schmitz, KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, Manager Migrant Sales Division to J. Van den Brink, Deputy Chief Dept of Shipping ICEM Geneva, “Dutch migrants on American flag carriers”, HAG/LU/1186/AR/MdH, 11.07.1960; *ibid.*, J. van den Brink, Acting Chief of Department to Dr. J.P.G. Schmitz, KLM Royal Dutch Airlines The Hague, “MIPAN 12/1051 ex Schiphol ex Schiphol 7 July 1960 21:30 GMT”, 8/1/14, 15.07.1960.

requesting to be chosen over their competitors.⁹² In another instance, in the same year, an airline company was informed on the fares offered by its competitors for several flights. Confidentially, it offered new, even lower, prices⁹³ to PICMME to gain the contract. These incidents were certainly not accidental. When, in 1968, the Argentinean government sought a more active participation of its state-owned airline company, *Aerolineas Argentinas*, a government official requested ICEM to confidentially inform them on the reduced tariffs offered by other competing Colombian and German state-owned airlines, among other companies.⁹⁴ This was a way for the government of Argentina to make its airline participate more actively in the migrant traffic by circumventing competition, as well as the ICEM formal transport policies, under which the bidding procedure was regarded ‘confidential’. Disregarding the above, the ICEM Administration responded positively to such a request.⁹⁵ Once again, ICEM’s role as instigator of competition in the migrant transport market is proved in this way, as noted in Chapter 6 and the importance of links within the ICEM Administration for the promotion of the interests of each member-state. Access to business information was an important element for the companies in order to enlarge their business cycle. However, if some transport companies received such private information from ICEM staff, under payment or not, it is not answered by the advised archival sources.

Another level of competition prevailed between the regular scheduled and the non-scheduled airlines in the United States. According to the American aviation policy, until 1955, the scheduled airlines had priority in the ICEM transport programme. If a non-scheduled airline wanted to perform a flight, it had to apply first for a waiver to the United States Civil Aeronautics Board, which proved the unavailability of the scheduled airlines due to equipment shortage to perform the required flight. In the case of the ICEM transport programme, a frequent practice of the scheduled airlines was to object to the issuance of the waiver. They acted so, either because they could actually

⁹² IOM-SW/Registry, 8/12/Shipping Division, Individual Offers and Space+Quotations of Prices, Vol. I, H.S. Campbell, Managing Director, European Division, American President Lines, Genoa to J.M. Vos, Director, Department of Shipping, PICMME, 03.07.1952.

⁹³ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/2/12/Shipping Division Air, Braathens S.A.F.E., Vol. I, Einar Frøysaa, BRAATHENS, South-American & Far East Airtransport A/S (SAFE) to Van den Brink, c/o IRO, Geneva, “22 refugees Calcutta – Hamburg”, 14.02.1952; *ibid.*, Ludv. G. Braathens, South American & Far East Air Transport A/S (SAFE) to PICMME Geneva, 19.02.1952.

⁹⁴ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/6/Shipping–Liaison with South America, Vol. II, Ricardo J. Siri, Acting Chief of Mission Buenos Aires to Director, ICEM Geneva, ARG.I/5, ARG.115. 873, 13.12.1968.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, S.K. Christensen, Chief of Department of Operations and Transport to Ricardo J. Siri, Acting Chief of Mission ICEM, Liaison Mission Buenos Aires, 23.12.1968.

perform a certain flight,⁹⁶ or because they simply wanted to block the non-scheduled airlines from the aviation market by bidding on calls of interest for flights, irrespective of their capacity to fulfil the required conditions of a call for bids.⁹⁷ In 1953, the ICEM Deputy Director made reference to a “battle between the American scheduled and non-scheduled” airlines.⁹⁸ This situation changed in 1955, when the United States Civil Aeronautics Board broadened its transatlantic policy by permitting ICEM to select American airline companies regardless of their status of operation, namely regular scheduled or non-scheduled.⁹⁹

Thereafter, and until the 1970s, the competition in the aviation industry of the United States received the form of a “price war”, according to reports reached ICEM, as the non-scheduled airlines were trying to join forces under an international association.¹⁰⁰ Around 1972, PANAM tried to combat the competition from the non-scheduled airlines by forming its own specialised department for charter flights.¹⁰¹ Especially with the US airline deregulation, which, as discussed in Chapter 4, gave to the US airlines the freedom to serve any air route under the fare they wanted, the competition in the air-sector unavoidably increased. In 1980, for example, the signing of a contract for multiple flights with *Transamerica Airline* (TV) raised the objection of another competing American airline company, the *Flying Tiger Line* (FTL). As FTL supported, Transamerica Airline’s bid did not follow the terms and conditions of the call for bids and violated the national laws of the country to where they would fly. Therefore, FTL objected to the validity of the contract and asked itself to undertake this contract and perform the flights.¹⁰² FTL complained to the State Department of the

⁹⁶ IOM-SW/General, OPS-20-079/Transport Air/Civil Aeronautics Board USA, E.J. Van Horne, Colonel, Acting Chief, US Office, ICEM Washington to J.J. Van Loon, Director, Dept of Shipping, ICEM Geneva, 06.10.1952.

⁹⁷ Ibid., L. Armanino to J.J. van Loon, Chief, Office of Shipping, “Summary Record of Meeting held on Saturday, February 13, 1954, between the representatives of Transocean Air Lines and the Migration Committee”, 13.02.1954.

⁹⁸ Ibid., P. Jacobsen to Hugh Gibson, Washington DC, 20.03.1953.

⁹⁹ IOM-SW/General, OPS-20-094/Transport/Documentation File No.14, “Part II: Chapter II, Transport”.

¹⁰⁰ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/2/Transport. Air Policy-General, Vol. VI, P. Jarrelli, Department of National Migration and Refugee Assistance to J.F. Thomas, “Future Policy for Air Transportation”, 14.06.1971.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., “PANAM lance les tarifs les plus bas sur l’Atlantique-Nord”, n.d. [1972]

¹⁰² IOM-SW/Registry, 8/2/4/Transport, Flying Tigers, Vol. XV, Cable, Los Angeles to Switzerland, 845, 02.09.1980.

United States by also expressing its ‘surprise’ and ‘distress’ to the ICEM Administration and warned with lawsuits.¹⁰³

The ICEM Administration rejected the accusations of FTL and considered the bid of Transamerica Airline as fulfilling the terms of its call.¹⁰⁴ In a parallel effort to soften the reactions of FTL, the ICEM Administration proposed the reduction of the duration of the contract to Transamerica Airline; such a proposal was not accepted by the airline, which warned the State Department and ICEM with a lawsuit.¹⁰⁵ This story ended with the ICEM Administration sending an explanatory letter to the United States government, revealing the bids and its thinking on the nomination of the contract to Transamerica Airline.¹⁰⁶ However, this case is indicative of the level of fierce competition in the attraction of transport contracts, the engagement of legal implications in the signing of contracts, and the expression of threats by the competitors.

In general terms, though, rules in the management of competition had been set, especially for the companies participating in Conferences. This is especially true for the *North Atlantic Conference* under which the participating companies could not advertise their companies and passenger vessels in a favourable light over their competitors.¹⁰⁷ Nevertheless, the Press got involved in the competition between the transport companies. Different business interests intertwined within a variety of enterprises, among them, transport companies and publishing groups. Thus, another weapon of the transport companies to combat competition was the indirect pressure and the production of rumours through the Press. In 1954, the adverse conditions of the voyage on passenger vessels of the Italian SITMAR Line had an extended coverage by the Press. Publication of articles referring to “appalling conditions” was perceived as the start of

¹⁰³ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/2/Transport. Air Policy-General, Vol. VI, G. Sliwik, “Note for the File”, 05.09.1980; IOM-SW/Registry, 8/2/4/Transport, Flying Tigers, Vol. XV, Cable, John E. Flynn, Senior Vice President – Administration the Flying Tiger Line Inc to ICEM Geneva, 674494, 05.09.1980.

¹⁰⁴ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/2/Transport. Air Policy-General, Vol. VI, Cable, Promigrant Geneva to US Mission Geneva, 608, 04.09.1980.

¹⁰⁵ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/2/4/Transport, Flying Tigers, Vol. XV, P. Jarrell, Chief, Division of Refugee Assistance, “Note for the File”, 24.09.1980.

¹⁰⁶ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/2/4/Transport, Flying Tigers, Vol. XV, Cable, Promigrant Geneva to US Mission Geneva, Promigrant 773, 25.09.1980.

¹⁰⁷ Graham P. Gladden, “Post Second World War trans-Atlantic travel for business and pleasure: Cunard and its airline competitors”, *Journal of Transport History*, 41:2 (2020), pp. 164-165.

a campaign from the competing shipping companies against SITMAR Line.¹⁰⁸ This was a well-established and effective practice of rival shipping companies since the 19th century; it aimed to hurt competitors' reputation and profitability directly to their clientele through the Press. It was achieved even by adding journalists and newspaper editors in the payroll system of an interested shipping company.¹⁰⁹

Due to the increasing competition from the airline companies against the sea transport companies, some passenger shipping companies were more receptive and adaptable in the new transport scenery. Even before WWII, an approach from the British liner shipping company, *Cunard Lines*, had been made towards the British airline companies, BOAC and *Imperial Airways*, to set a form of cooperation with Cunard Line participating in their shareholding. For many reasons, these endeavours were not fruitful, but, in early 1960, Cunard formed its own airline, the *Cunard Eagle Airways*; its chairman perceived air service as complementary and not competitive to shipping service.¹¹⁰ Cunard Lines' is not the only example of a shipping company entering the aviation market, but it is the one which is more related to the ICEM traffic. Several other shipping companies, including the *United States Lines*, also endeavoured their involvement in the aviation industry.¹¹¹ Other liner shipping companies sought a closer joint operation with airlines, such as the one to be discussed in Chapter 8 between the *Greek-Australian Line* and the air-chartered companies for the transfer of migrants from Greece to Djibouti.

The examples above were only an indication of the level and practices applied by the transport companies participating in the ICEM migrant transport programme. In contradiction with the periods of the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century, when non-subsidised migration was the norm, ICEM functioned as a forum in which business interests concentrated. When this concentration took on congestion characteristics, the reaction of the transport companies was either a subversion of established agreements, collaboration between companies for the attraction of a larger

¹⁰⁸ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/5/Shipping, Policy Liaison with Australia & N. Zealand, Vol. I, C.O. Wendling, Chief of Mission ICEM Australia to J.J. Van Loon, Chief, Office of Shipping ICEM HQs, AUS/N/12, 25.08.1954; *ibid.*, "Reply to Fairsea Criticism", *Sydney Morning Herald*, 26.08.1954.

¹⁰⁹ E. Blue, "Finding Margins on Borders", p. 9.

¹¹⁰ G. P. Gladden, "Post Second World War trans-Atlantic travel for business and pleasure", pp. 176-179; Gordon Boyce, "Transferring Capabilities across Sectoral Frontiers: Shipowners Entering the Airline Business, 1920-1970", *International Journal of Maritime History*, 13:1 (2001), pp. 6-8, 16-18. For a more extensive review of Cunard's participation in air travel, see Hyde, *Cunard and the North Atlantic 1840-1973*, pp. 296-302.

¹¹¹ For more examples see G. Boyce, "Transferring Capabilities across Sectoral Frontiers", pp. 19-34.

piece of ICEM's migrant transport work, and indirect pressure through the Press and the national governments against competitors. The very way of ICEM's function enhanced the competitive climate in the transport sector. However, these were only a few tools used by the transport companies to combat competition, as this emerged from ICEM's operation.

The business selections made by the *Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration*, in many cases, brought legal implications for the Organisation and the governments involved in a transport contract nomination. By risking the credibility of the formal ICEM transport policy, confidentiality was set aside in case greater causes were at stake.

Travel Agents & ICEM: a conflicting relationship

Before ICEM's establishment, only certain population movements took place with international assistance through the designated international organisations for displaced persons and refugees, as discussed in Chapter 2. Regarding the migrants, only specific categories were eligible for governmental assistance and their voyage was entirely or partially subsidised by the receiving state. Most of the migrant population had to manage, by themselves or through their supporting network in the countries of origin/destination, all the formalities for the progression of their documentation¹¹² as well as all the relative expenses. These procedures could also be undertaken by a travel agency after the payment of a fee.

The operation of the travel agencies was regulated through the national laws of the country where they operated. With the establishment of ICEM, the competition in the sector of the travel agents intensified, as the agents lost the monopoly of the management and facilitation of migrants' procession. This was during a period when the migration sentiment was growing, as well as the forthcoming opportunities and profits through the *migration business* of the time. Throughout Europe, the quality of ICEM's cooperation with the travel agents differed. The examination of this relationship provides a different angle on ICEM's work and its impact on different private businesses apart from the transportation companies. A vital difference in

¹¹² Invitation from a resident of the country of destination, issuance of the medical and other certificates from the public authorities, submission of the documents to the respective Embassy, searching and booking a ticket to the destination country, amongst many other formalities.

ICEM's relationship with the travel agencies was that ICEM's work did not depend on their availability as was the case of the shipping and the airline companies. The travel agents, in most of the cases, confronted ICEM as a competitor and, in other instances, as a potential pillar for the increase of their workload. The varying aspects of their cooperation are examined in this section, as well as the reactions received per country and how they were handled by the ICEM Administration; additionally, cases of migrants' exploitation by travel agents are examined with particular attention in the case of Greece.

Even within the first few months of PICMME/ICEM's establishment, several travel agencies, without knowledge on the extent of the services and operational mechanism that PICMME/ICEM would develop, urged the rendering of their services and sought cooperation with the Organisation in the countries where it would start operating. In Belgium, for example, travel agencies that previously had engaged in business with displaced persons, IRO, NGOs, and religious organisations approached ICEM in order to undertake part of the migrants' processing.¹¹³ The same applied in Italy,¹¹⁴ Germany,¹¹⁵ and Greece, among other countries.

The terms of operation of the travel agencies were defined by the national laws of each country. Already, since the second half of the 19th century, the receipt of a special licence and the deposition of a security bond were required. In several instances, though, this did not arise from a protective tendency against the potential migrants' exploitation, but rather it constituted a measure to calm the opposition of the landowners for the loss of agricultural workers.¹¹⁶

In Greece, the *Ministry of Interior* was responsible for the agencies' operation and supervision. An official of the Ministry in the issuance of the licence examined *the*

¹¹³ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/5/4/Shipping & Division, Agents-Belgium, Vol. I, Un Directeur, pour L'Agence Belge de Voyages Galilee, Bruxelles to Jacobsen, Directeur du CIMME Geneve, CB/JD, 16.05.1952; *ibid.*, R. De Wolf, Voyages Cosmopolite, Bureau de Tourism, Bruxelles to Van den Brink, ICEM Geneve, 08.05.1953.

¹¹⁴ IOM-SW/General, OPS-20-095/Transport, Sea Commercial–America/Latin America, J.M. Vos, Director of Shipping to Viaggi Viatur Turismo Genoa, JVDB/HS, 12.02.1952.

¹¹⁵ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/3/Transport Policy, Liaison with Germany, Vol. I, G. Krause for the Director to The Federal Ministry for Transport, Sea Transport Division Hamburg, "Bookings for migrants moved by the Migration Committee", 30.10.1952.

¹¹⁶ Kristian Hvidt, "Emigration Agents", *Scandinavian Journal of History*, 3:1-4 (1978), pp. 180-181; Katalin Stráner, "Emigration Agents and the Agency of the Urban Press: Approaches to Transatlantic Migration in Hungary, 1880s-1914", *Journal of Migration History*, 2 (2016), p. 355; Tara Zahra, "Travel Agents on Trial: Policing mobility in East Central Europe, 1889-1989", *Past and Present*, 223 (2014), p. 166. France enacted the necessity of a licence by the emigration agents in 1854, Denmark in 1868, Belgium in 1876, Hungary in 1886.

*honesty and in general the moral qualifications of its directors, so as [...] to provide the necessary possible guarantees towards the migrants, as well as towards the responsible migration authorities.*¹¹⁷ The reference to moral qualities does not surprise, since, in almost every period and in various countries, descriptions for migrants' exploitation by travel agencies were not rare.¹¹⁸ The ICEM Mission in Athens had no respect for the travel agencies sector, which was considered as "the [least] reputable of the firms in Greece", being a source of difficulties in the Mission's operation.¹¹⁹

The *Panhellenic Association of Travel Migration & Tourist Bureau*, the collective agency representing the private travel/tourism/migration agents all over Greece, was opposed to ICEM's operation from the first moment of its establishment. Ideally, the Panhellenic Association of Travel Migration & Tourist Bureau wanted ICEM's expulsion from Greece or, at least, the restriction of its responsibilities on migration. The newspaper, *O Ekso Ellinismos* (Greeks Abroad – OEE), the unofficial instrument of the Greek travel agencies and of the Panhellenic Association of Travel Migration & Tourist Bureau, repeatedly urged the potential migrants to contact the licensed travel agents for a safe and fast processing of their cases.¹²⁰ The role of the Press was pivotal in the spread of information all over the country directly to the public. If the public opinion could be shaped in favour of the travel agencies, then profitability was more secure.¹²¹ Concomitantly, a 'campaign' against ICEM was inaugurated, which asked the Greek government to denounce its agreement with PICMME/ICEM only two months after its signing, complaining that the terms agreed upon were "irrational and unenforceable".¹²² In its opposition against ICEM, the Panhellenic Association of Travel Migration & Tourist Bureau highlighted the difference between the Greek migrants and those of other countries to Greek government officials, since

¹¹⁷ AGMFA/CS/1954/1954/ΑΠ/1/Γενικού «Μετανάστευση», Συριώτης to GMFA, 17228/53, 28.01.1954. The security bond in 1954 was 40 million drachmas. The legal framework for the operation of agencies was based until 1967 were the following laws: 4756/1930, 1108/1931, and 2362/1953. For an extended study on Greek tourist agencies in the 19th and 20th centuries, see Aikaterini N. Papadoulaki, «Ιστορία των Τουριστικών Επιχειρήσεων στο 19ο και 20ό αιώνα. Ο ρόλος και η εξέλιξη των ταξιδιωτικών γραφείων & πρακτορείων», unpublished PhD thesis, HOU, 2011.

¹¹⁸ For cases of migrants' exploitation in the late 19th century and early 20th century, see Adam McKeown, "How the Box Became Black: Brokers and the Creation of the Free Migrant", *Pacific Affairs*, 85:1 (2012), pp. 35-38 and K. Hvidt, "Emigration Agents", pp. 179-203.

¹¹⁹ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/20/111/Transport, Jane Moody, Acting Chief of Mission, ICEM Athens to Director, ICEM Geneva, "Relationship with Travel Agencies in Greece", 09.09.1953.

¹²⁰ Indicatively, *O Ekso Ellinismos*, (hereafter *OEE*) 01.03.1952 and 01.04.1952.

¹²¹ K. Stråner, "Emigration Agents and the Agency of the Urban Press", pp. 357, 374.

¹²² *OEE*, 15.06.1952 and 01.01.1953.

Greeks used to rely on family and social networks for their migration; they were more independent and could not stand being patronised. The Panhellenic Association of Travel Migration & Tourist Bureau also appealed to the nationalist sentiment of the government, since, through the employment of a ‘foreign organisation’, the state lost taxes and revenue while the agents were on the edge of bankruptcy.¹²³ In its effort to seek wider political support for its position, the Panhellenic Association of Travel Migration & Tourist Bureau approached most of the members of the government, the leaders of political parties, as well as the Migration Council that was the government’s consultative body on national migration policy.¹²⁴

The aggressive attitude of the travel agencies against ICEM was also a common characteristic in the early 1950s in other countries where ICEM operated. In Austria, a delegation of travel agencies approached the Austrian government and asked for ICEM’s restriction in refugee migration. They equated ICEM with a travel agency, as both accomplished the same tasks, but ICEM lacked the appropriate licence and thus competed against the authorised travel agencies, which, as supported, could be more effective and financially profitable for the state.¹²⁵ In Germany, critics on “unfair competition” from ICEM’s side appeared in friendly to travel agents’ newspapers, while the agents brandished that they could cost less to the state than services from ICEM.¹²⁶ In other countries, rumours circulated through the Press of the imminent closing of ICEM in an effort to harm the popularity of the ICEM migration schemes and redirect the interested migrants towards the travel agents.¹²⁷

When ICEM stabilised its presence in Greece, the Panhellenic Association of Travel Migration & Tourist Bureau modified its policy against ICEM, since its

¹²³ IOM-GR/Travel Agencies, Σύνδεσμος Υπαλλήλων Γραφείων Ταξιδίων Τουρισμού και Μεταναστεύσεως-Σύνδεσμος εν Ελλάδι Αναγνωρισμένων Πρακτορείων Τουρισμού Ταξιδίων και Μεταναστεύσεως to Συμβούλιο Μεταναστεύσεως, 27.10.1952; OEE, 01.01.1953.

¹²⁴ AGMFA/SC/1953/115/3/2/1, Δρυμόνας-Βέγκος to Ζολώτας, 23.10.1952; *ibid.*, Γούτος-Πολύζος, «Πρακτικόν της 28^{ης} Συνεδριάσεως του Συμβουλίου Μεταναστεύσεως», 11.11.1952; OEE, 01.01.1954.

¹²⁵ IOM-SW/General, OPS-20-078/Austria, Operations 1958, G. Edward Borst, Chief of Mission ICEM Austria to A.R. Driver, Chief, Department of Operations, ICEM Geneva, I/1, III/3, 14.03.1957; *ibid.*, [Federation of Travel Agencies], Betrifft: “I.C.E.M. (Intercontinental Committee for European Migration)”, n.d. [March 1957].

¹²⁶ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/3/Transport Policy, Liaison with Germany, Vol. I, G. Krause for the Director to The Federal Ministry for Transport, Sea Transport Division Hamburg, “Bookings for migrants moved by the Migration Committee”, 30.10.1952.

¹²⁷ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/6/Shipping. Policy-Liaison with S. America, Vol. I, Edgar Storich, ICEM Buenos Aires to the Director, ICEM Geneva, ARG/I/5, 342, 06.05.1954; *ibid.*, “Un Comunicato del C.I.M.E.”, *Corriere degli Italiani*, n.d.; IOM-GR/Publications 1957-1966/1957-1965 Correspondence and Relations with the Greek Press, «Μετανάστευσις μέσω της Δ.Ε.Μ.Ε. », [1958].

withdrawal from the country was not foreseen. Therefore, the Panhellenic Association of Travel Migration & Tourist Bureau concentrated its opposition in ICEM's expanding activities in individual migration. The Panhellenic Association of Travel Migration & Tourist Bureau 'rallied' a new campaign by approaching the ICEM Mission in Athens, the Ministers of the Greek government, as well as the Consulates of the foreign countries represented in Greece. It blamed ICEM for arbitrariness in defining "indigent" migrants—the only migrant category ICEM was allowed to support in Greece—and sought to restrict ICEM's work in the assistance of the refugee migration and to paupers. They considered the migrants already assisted by ICEM to be "rich enough" to travel through the invitation of a family member in the receiving country and be assisted by the travel agencies. Thus, they accused ICEM that it had "detracted out of its own way", since it intermingled in agents' functions. In a dramatic tone, it was pointed out that ICEM's operation constituted an "injustice" for their sector, as it "dooms to death" families of the travel agents and resulted in the closing of the "lawful" travel agents; reasserting that ICEM's tasks could be faster and more efficiently and economically executed by the travel agents.¹²⁸

The ICEM Athens Mission defended its agreement with the Greek government and put a halt to its direct communication with the Panhellenic Association of Travel Migration & Tourist Bureau by requesting the intervention of the Greek Ministry of Interior, the responsible Ministry for the Mission's operation in Greece. From its side, the Chief of ICEM Mission in Athens highlighted, to the Minister of Interior as well as to the President and members of the Panhellenic Association of Travel Migration & Tourist Bureau, several changes: opportunities increased because of ICEM's work for the travel agents; independent, self-paid migration increased through chain-migration; tourist traffic to/from Greece developed with the increase of the Greek population abroad; the connections by sea between Piraeus, the main Greek port, and the overseas countries increased and space became available for the clientele of the travel agents;

¹²⁸ ICEM responded to these advertisements for the reconstitution of truth. IOM-GR/Travel Agencies, Il. Drymonas, President, J. Vengos, General Secretary to Director, ICEM Athens, "Necessity of Frankness", 13.08.1953; *ibid.*, Ηλ. Δρυμόνας to Π. Λυκουρέζον Υπουργόν Εσωτερικών και άπαντας τους κ.κ. Υπουργούς, «Διακυβερνητική Επιτροπή Μεταναστεύσεως Ελλάδος», 01.10.1953; *OEE*, 15.01.1953 and 01.10.1953; IOM-SW/Registry, 8/20/111/Transport, Panhellenic Association of Travel Immigration & Tourist Bureau to all Consulates Concerned, 08.07.1953.

finally, the favourable government migration policies following the impact of ICEM's work were only some of the benefits for the travel agents out of ICEM's operation.¹²⁹

The travel agents' lobbying with government officials caused ICEM Athens to notice, in 1954, an increasing sympathy towards the complaints of the travel agents by senior and junior officials of the Greek Ministries, who acknowledged that ICEM's activity was taking away business from the former.¹³⁰ During the same year, a more concentrated effort for the restriction of migration was made by the side of the Greek government. An initially legislated measure was the reduction of the eligible migrant categories for ICEM's assistance, with the blocking of specific age-groups from emigration. It also contemplated the provision of financial support for assisted emigration through ICEM to only one person per family unit. Consequently, the potential eligible emigrants for ICEM assistance were reduced,¹³¹ and, ultimately, they would be directed to the travel agencies.

The Panhellenic Association of Travel Migration & Tourist Bureau did not retreat from its claims on individual migration and raised this dispute to the *Greek Legal Council*, which was asked to define if serving this migrant group was included within the agreement between ICEM and the Greek government. The Legal Council, at the end of 1954, ruled in favour of the Panhellenic Association of Travel Migration & Tourist Bureau. After the objections raised by ICEM in 1955, the Legal Council overturned its original decision and agreed that ICEM's work in independent migration was included in the terms of the agreement with the government.¹³²

¹²⁹ IOM-GR/Travel Agencies, Αλ. Ιωαννίδου, Υπαρχηγός Αποστολής Συνδέσμου to Υπουργείου Εσωτερικών, ΕΣ/78, 23.11.1953; *ibid.*, Peter Gibson, Αρχηγός της Αποστολής to Ιω. Νικολίτσαν, Υπουργόν των Εσωτερικών, ΕΣ/270, 31.07.1954; IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/13/Shipping Liaison with Greece, Vol. I, Peter Gibson, Chief of Mission Athens to J.J. van Loon, Chief Office of Shipping, Migration Committee, Geneva, "Travel Agents", 07.06.1954.

¹³⁰ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/13/Shipping Liaison with Greece, Vol. I, Note, "Greek Travel Agents", 29.09.1954.

¹³¹ IOM-SW/General, PRL-20-126/Greek Migrants to Australia/Greece-General, Peter Gibson, Chief of Mission, ICEM Greece to Hugh Gibson, Director, ICEM Geneva, 10.08.1954; IOM-SW/General, SIT-00-071/Overall View-Countries/Greece, Peter Gibson, Chief of Mission, ICEM Greece to Hugh Gibson, Director, ICEM Geneva, "Economic and Political Report", 25.11.1954. In a similar governmental attempt in 1965 to restrict Greek emigration under ICEM, the shipping companies in Piraeus protested against the government through the Greek Press. These restrictions were perceived as an additional burden to the completion of the government-subsidised foreign shipping lines, for more, see IOM-GR/Monthly Press Reports, from November 1962 to December 1966, Information Office to Ch. Alexandraki, Deputy for Liaison, "Monthly Press Report – Feb-March 1965", 21.04.1965.

¹³² For the initial opinion, IOM-GR/Special Matters/Sponsored Migration, Σαμαλέας, n. 1113, 1535/91, 02.12.1954. For the final decision, *ibid.* Σαμαλέας, n. 698, 1533/71, 23.06.1955.

1955 was a landmark year in the cooperation of the ICEM Mission in Athens with the Panhellenic Association of Travel Migration & Tourist Bureau. The shipping shortage that ICEM faced in its early years of operation was a problem that was more intensively faced by the travel agents who had lower access in tonnage. Based on this, the ICEM Athens Mission availed a percentage of berths in the passenger vessels it chartered to the travel agents for the exclusive transport of ICEM migrants, thus stimulating the service of their customers, since they also had access to the scheduled routes of liner shipping companies. In a circular letter sent to its members, the Panhellenic Association of Travel Migration & Tourist Bureau praised ICEM and its Athens Chief for their “extensive, systematic and humanitarian work”, their friendly disposition, and the opportunities emerging through ICEM migration, which facilitated the increase of their workload with unsubsidised migrants who paid full fares to their agencies. Their member travel agencies were urged to work in good faith. Thereafter, the Panhellenic Association of Travel Migration & Tourist Bureau, as well as their unofficial Press instrument *O Ekso Ellinismos* (Greeks Abroad – OEE), not only abstained from criticising the ICEM’s work but, in several cases, applauded it.¹³³ The ICEM Chief of Mission in Athens, considering the quality of cooperation experienced in previous years and in seeing the Association’s attitude change, mockingly commented to his Headquarters that the circular letter “was not written in our Offices”.¹³⁴

Such a practice was also followed in Italy, as well as in Germany, for the self-paying migrants going to Canada, when scheduled transport means were not

¹³³ IOM-GR/Travel Agencies, Η. Δρυμωνάς, Πρόεδρος, Ι. Βέγκος, Γεν. Γραμματέας το Τακτικά Μέλη του Συνδέσμου, «Έκτακτος Εγκύκλιος του Συνδέσμου των Γραφείων Ταξιδίων, Τουρισμού και Μεταναστεύσεως», 19.07.1955; IOM-GR/Shipping 1952-62, P. Gibson to Νικολίτσας, ΕΣ/622, 11.07.1955; OEE, 15.09.1956 and 01.08.1960. The only exception to the peaceful co-existence of the Association and ICEM was in 1962 when the Association appealed against ICEM to the Council of State. ICEM was accused of acting as a travel agent and the Minister of Interior was accused because he did not abolish ICEM from Greece after the conclusion of the 20,000 migrants as the initial agreement foresaw. For the appeal, IOM-GR/Travel Agencies, Δημ. Τομπάς, «Αίτησις Ακυρώσεως», 02.07.1962. For the rejecting decision of the appeal, *ibid.*, «Το Συμβούλιο της Επικρατείας εν Ολομειλία», 2524/1964, 24.07.1964. In 1964 an announcement of the Association in the Greek Press, asked anew the abolishment of ICEM, along with the foreign state Migration Committees for migrant workers and technicians going to Europe, so both potential emigrants to be directed to their offices, in IOM-GR/Translations of Press Cuttings, from 1st Jan. 1964 to 31st Dec. 1964, “The pleas of the Panhellenic Association of Travel and Migration Bureaux”, *Naftemporiki*, 07.01.1964.

¹³⁴ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/13/Shipping Liaison with Greece, Vol. I, Peter Gibson, Chief of Mission ICEM Athens to P. Jacobsen, Deputy Director ICEM Geneva, 22.07.1955.

available.¹³⁵ It can be considered, though, as a diplomatic manoeuvre from the side of ICEM in order to de-escalate the tension and opposition from the side of the travel agents, to halt the bad publicity against ICEM's work, and to strengthen its profile as migration agency towards the public opinion and the sending/receiving migration states; this was achieved because ICEM indirectly facilitated the migration of a wider population. Additionally, ICEM assisted part of the private sector to which it was becoming the 'bread-provider', a response to a recurrent accusation against ICEM in Greece and in Italy. From an operational point of view, this practice had additional benefits. By availing space to travel agencies, ICEM had a higher degree of flexibility in the scheduling of its passenger ships,¹³⁶ especially in cases of last-minute cancellations.

The involvement of travel agents in migration business offered increased opportunities for profit not only for the agencies, but also for their employees. I.K., as an employee at a travel/migration agency since 1964, then director in its Australian Section since 1966, and owner of an agency since 1969, recalls:

*The commission I received from the office was 100 drachmas for every client I booked a sea ticket, and 300 drachmas for air. A lot of money back then! At the end I received 1800 drachmas as salary, and then 18, 20 thousand drachmas per month from air ticket commissions. A lot of money! [...] at least I and other Agencies, we were making good business.*¹³⁷

The profit margins were important, the system of commissions was an incentive by itself for many travel agents or subagents to work hard, and, for some, even to exceed the legitimate operation of their businesses or to misguide the uncertain potential

¹³⁵ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/2/Shipping Division. Policy-Liaison with Canada, Vol. I, Aide Memoire of Conversations Between Mr. C.E.S. Smith, Director of Immigration, Department of Citizenship and Immigration (Canada) and Mr. J. J. Van Loon, Chief, Office of Shipping, Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration", Ottawa, 21.07.1954.

¹³⁶ IOM-SW/General, EXT-03-02-003/ICEM Membership 1954-1959, J.J. Van Loon to Mr. Ford Geddes, Orient Line, London, Personal, 28.05.1956; IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/13/Shipping Liaison with Greece, Vol. I, N. Kaloyeropoulos to H.R. Hoekstra, Chief, Dept of Shipping, "Duty Trip to Athens/Piraeus: 3/8 November 1957; "Waterman" Sailing", 14.11.1957; IOM-SW/General, SIT-00-054/Reports. Trip Reports. Reports from the Missions-Countries/Greece, Brinley Thomas, "Report on a visit to ICEM Missions in Greece and Italy November 7th to 20th 1955", 12.12.1955.

¹³⁷ Personal interview by I.K. to the author, 15.01.2013.

migrants.¹³⁸ Thus, information on migrants' exploitation by agents or alleged 'agents' were brought to the attention of the ICEM Mission in Athens on regular intervals. Most of the incidents were reported outside the capital city of Athens, where the literacy level was lower, and access to information for the migration prospects in other countries was scarcer. In this context, many agents visited regional cities of Greece and pretended to be staff of ICEM or of Immigration Authorities of foreign countries. By claiming that "they had the know-how", they asked for payments in advance from the potential migrants in order to "assist" them. Thus, they detached a life-time's fortune¹³⁹ or deluded them with false promises, taking advantage of their desperation to migrate and forced them to pay over-charged sums for their documents.¹⁴⁰ ICEM Athens tried to put a halt to these incidents through advertisement campaigns in the local Press and by distributing announcements to the regional Authorities clarifying the ICEM's work and its non-representation by other entities outside ICEM.¹⁴¹

Another tactic applied by some travel agents was the attraction of migrants who had already started the migration procedures with ICEM. An Athenian travel agency advertised: *We also undertake the forwarding and in time service of migrants, who are about to travel through ICEM, as long as they authorise us in the receipt of their case from ICEM through the Chief of Gendarmerie.*¹⁴² In Greece and in Germany, the travel agents tried to get access to migrants who had started their processing with ICEM. Through correspondence, they were asking them for the necessary sums in order to undertake and hasten their emigration.¹⁴³ Access to ICEM migrants' information with

¹³⁸ K. Hvidt, "Emigration Agents", p. 186.

¹³⁹ OEE, 15.11.1954 and 01.09.1959; AGMFA/CS/1953/51/1/4/1, Norman Strachan, "Ten-year fortunes, spiv agents tell them", *The Argus*, 12.11.1953. Such a case of exploitation is reported at Chania, where an unlicensed agent systematically exploited potential migrants, by introducing himself as an ICEM representative. Some cases were brought to ICEM Mission in Athens, after the reporting by five illiterate girls who were requested to pay 500 drachmas each for the facilitation of their case and the information provision. While at the end they were referred to ICEM Athens for enrolment for migration to Australia. For many more cases, see IOM-GR/Travel Agencies, Αλ. Ιωαννίδου, Υπαρχηγός της Αποστολής to Δ. Ζησόπουλον, Γενικών Γραμματέα Υπουργείου Εσωτερικών, 1869, 28.01.1959; *ibid.*, «Δήλωσις», 24.01.1959; *ibid.*, Ν. Καλαϊτζεδάκης, «Υπεύθυνος Δήλωσις», 07.03.1959.

¹⁴⁰ IOM-SW/General, PRL-20-049/Refugee Relief Programme Migration from Greece and Greek Disaster Victims Edward B. Marks, "Background of Greek Government Emigration Restrictions", 03.02.1955.

¹⁴¹ IOM-GR/Travel Agencies, Χ. Αλεξανδράκη, Υπαρχηγός της Αποστολής to Νομάρχη Μεσσηνίας, 2482, 25.11.1960.

¹⁴² IOM-GR/Travel Agencies, Χ. Αλεξανδράκη, Υπαρχηγός της Αποστολής to Υπουργείου Εσωτερικών, Διεύθυνση Μεταναστεύσεως, ΕΣ/2405, 21.09.1960.

¹⁴³ IOM-GR/Travel Agencies, S. Avgerinos Hellas Express to E. Manoussopoulou, n.d.; *ibid.*, Diana Agency to P. Papadopoulos, 549, 27.03.1962; *ibid.*, Ελλάς Εξπρές to Ι. Φερετσάνη, 30.05.1962; IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/3/Shipping Liaison with Germany, Policy, Vol. III, Thos. Cook & Son, S.A. Frankfurt

certainty was also reachable through links with staff of the foreign Immigration Authorities in Greece and, potentially, also through some ICEM staff members working in the local Missions. These ‘trustful links’ shared the names and other personal data of the prospective ICEM migrants with some travel agents. Following, the agents approached them and tried to persuade them to abandon their migration through ICEM and choose them instead.¹⁴⁴ Cases of corruption in the consular offices were known to ICEM local Missions and were reported to the ICEM HQs, especially in the case of certain Latin American Consulates located in European emigration countries.¹⁴⁵ Nevertheless, the rejection of their proposal made some agents try to “rationalise” the migrants who did not recognise their ‘best interest’. The response of an agent to a migrant, who chose to migrate through ICEM and a voluntary agency instead of his travel agency, is revealing: *Do you understand what it is that you want? You want to travel through [the voluntary agency] and not like a human being through our office.*¹⁴⁶

The ICEM Mission in Athens always resisted the delivery of the migrants’ files to the travel agents.¹⁴⁷ Such an ‘accusation’ was denied by the Chief of ICEM Mission when he received the complaints of the President of the Panhellenic Association of Travel Migration & Tourist Bureau; the ICEM Chief supported that only a stricter control is applied and there is no question of refusal.¹⁴⁸ This assertion was in direct controversy with the internal correspondence of the Mission where, a month earlier, the Chief informed his staff that: *...no Travel Agency, with or without certified signature from the migrant, will ever be authorized to handle the affairs of migrants receiving assistance from the Committee. All cases of exception will have to be brought to the*

am Main, Agneturleiter to Zwischenstaatlich Komitee für Europäische Auswanderung, Verbindungsstelle bei der Deutschen Bundesregierung, “Herrn Eugen Strasser und Familie, Auswanderer nach Australien”, PPM/SCH/h, 10.04.1963; IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/3/Shipping Liaison with Germany, Policy, Vol. III, F.H. Burger, Hauptgeschäftsführer, Deutscher Reisebüro-Verband e.V., Frankfurt am Main to ICEM, Verbindungsstelle bei der Deutschen Bundesregierung, “Einschaltung von Reisebüro bei der Abwicklung von Auswanderer-Passagen”, Do/Zü, 22.04.1963.

¹⁴⁴ IOM-GR/Travel Agencies, D. Kotoulas, Orientation Officer to Ch. Alexandraki, Deputy for Liaison, “Travel Agencies Activities”, 09.02.1966.

¹⁴⁵ IOM-SW/Registry, 1/1/SPA/Operations. Correspondence with Government-Spain, Vol. IV, [Edgar Storich, Chief of Mission, ICEM Spain], “Migrant production and its difficulties in the field”, [February 1958].

¹⁴⁶ IOM-GR/Travel Agencies, Ολυμπία Εξπρές to Γ. Τσουκανάρη, 2696/ΑΠ, 01.06.1962.

¹⁴⁷ Personal interview by I.K. to the author, 15.01.2013.

¹⁴⁸ IOM-GR/Travel Agencies, Βέγκος – Γουνέλας to ΔΕΜΕ, 01.11.1960; *ibid.*, C.O. Wendling, Chief of Mission to Panhellenic Association of Travel Immigration and Tourist Bureau, 05.11.1960.

*personal attention of the Chief of Mission.*¹⁴⁹ A travel agent of the period justifies the ‘transfer’ of the migrants from ICEM to the agencies:

*ICEM was sending many migrants abroad, but it could not manage them, and we were compelled to assist them by asking for their files, in order to facilitate the emigrants’ voyage. ICEM could not handle it, they were delayed, and the clients were in a hurry.*¹⁵⁰

Certainly, in such a case, the migrants or their relatives had to pay the total amount of their fares, since they were no longer subsidised by ICEM. Nevertheless, the migrants’ voyage may be quickened since migration through ICEM was done in mass and could be delayed up to six months.

The tension between ICEM and the travel agents escalated to such a level that an ICEM staff quarrelled with a travel agent inside the ICEM Athens premises. According to the President of the Panhellenic Association of Travel Migration & Tourist Bureau, the ICEM staff accused the agents in front of some migrants as “exploiters” and urged them to avoid their services. This incident caused the mild recommendations of the Greek Ministry of Interior for de-escalation and the incident’s degradation by the ICEM Mission, which characterised it as unfounded complaints and stressed that: “Unfortunately, employees of Travel Agents demand, often with persistence, a deviation from the rules”.¹⁵¹

In the ICEM Headquarters in Geneva, though, the relationship of ICEM with the collective bodies of the travel agents in the United States, the *American Society of Travel Agents* – ASTA, and in Europe, the *Grand Order of European Tour Operators* – GOETO, was more cooperative. In 1967, ICEM approached both agencies to seek their collaboration in fund-raising activities related to refugee migration through ICEM.¹⁵² ICEM’s initial proposal was the voluntary surcharge of around \$0.25 per

¹⁴⁹ IOM-GR/Travel Agencies, Wendling, Chief of Mission to All Concerned, 15.10.1960.

¹⁵⁰ Personal interview by I.K. to the author, 15.01.2013.

¹⁵¹ IOM-GR/Travel Agencies, Βέγκος – Παπαγιάννης to ΔΕΜΕ, 08.07.1961. For the GMI intervention, *ibid.*, Δ. Ζησόπουλος, Γεν. Γραμματεύς, Υπουργείου Εσωτερικών to ΔΕΜΕ, 66604, 19.07.1961. For the ICEM’s response, *ibid.*, Χ. Αλεξανδράκη, Υπαρχηγός της Αποστολής to Πανελλήνιο Σύνδεσμο Γραφείων Ταξιδίων Τουρισμού και Μεταναστεύσεως, 2847, 25.07.1961.

¹⁵² IOM-SW/Registry, 11/1/Travel Agents, vol. I, J.P.G. Schmitz, “Aide-Memoire: ICEM Fundraising possibilities in circles of Travel Agents”, The Hague, 07.09.1967.

tourist ticket purchased through the members of both agencies.¹⁵³ The sums collected would be allocated to ICEM's Special Refugee Trust Fund. A stamp added on each ticket would signify the purchaser's contribution by mentioning "you travel for business or pleasure; they travel for their lives".¹⁵⁴ The whole campaign was to be administered by a private international foundation, which included members of both agencies in its Board.¹⁵⁵ It is not clear from the sources if this campaign finally took place. If it did occur-its outcome or even the negotiations for such an event with the travel agencies-it is an indicative element of the contradictory relations developed at the local and central level between ICEM and the travel agencies.

The travel agencies were businesses of the private sector that historically were notorious for their work on the verge of legality, as well as for its subversion, including migrant exploitation. This is the reputation that the *Panhellenic Association of Travel Immigration & Tourist Bureau* wanted, and tried, to dismiss by self-referring to its sector in each of its letters to the government or other authorities as "lawful", "legitimate", and "licensed", amongst other adjectives.

Undoubtedly, the operation of ICEM resulted in the decrease of their clientele. Eventually, it also created opportunities for the development of their work in other travel sectors. ICEM, though, got involved in the serving of self-payers—a category not in the direct priorities for international assistance.¹⁵⁶ Based on the ICEM policy, non-immigrants were not permitted to book passage on ICEM chartered passenger vessels and self-paying migrants were to be booked only if they could not secure a passage through a scheduled liner shipping company. If this was the case, then the booking could not take place too far in advance.¹⁵⁷ Nevertheless, according to the report from the External Auditors for ICEM's accounts in 1955, an external to ICEM entity, the support given by ICEM to the self-payers was described as such:

¹⁵³ Ibid., Walter E. Besterman to Nicolas Pliester, President, Grand Order of European Tour Operators, Monaco, 19.09.1967; *ibid.*, Walter E. Besterman to Gordon R. Girvan, President, American Society of Travel Agents, Inc. New York, 19.09.1967.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid., R.J. Walsh to Director, "Campaign to Give Refugees a Lift", 13.12.1967.

¹⁵⁵ The private international foundation was named *Fondation Internationale d'Aide aux Programmes du CIME*, IOM-SW/Registry, 11/1/Travel Agents, vol. I, B.W. Haveman, Director Geneva to A. Hibbeler, The Hague, 05.01.1968.

¹⁵⁶ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/13/Shipping Liaison with Greece, Vol. I, Peter Gibson, Chief of Mission, ICEM Athens to Director, ICEM Geneva, ADM/19, 30.05.1958.

¹⁵⁷ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/2/Shipping Division. Policy-Liaison with Canada, Vol. I, "Aide Memoire of Conversations between Mr. C.E.S. Smith, Director of Immigration, Department of Citizenship and Immigration (Canada) and Mr. J.J. van Loon, Chief, Office of Shipping, ICEM", Ottawa, 21.07.1954.

*In order to make use of surplus shipping space on certain voyages, the Committee has arranged with shipowners that they sell surplus accommodation. Approximately 3,650 of such self-paying passengers under these arrangements are known to be, or appear to be, migrants and have been included in the Committee's statistical records, and Income and Expenditure account has been credited and debited with the appropriate per capita transport costs.*¹⁵⁸

The above excerpt not only doubts the migration nature of the movements that took place as self-paying migrants, but it also admits that the Organisation funded their movement and included them in its statistics. In truth, it was supposed that such a self-paying movement was funded by migrants' own means, with ICEM remaining free from relative expenses and only facilitated the finding of a berth for their voyage overseas. In addition, it was a facilitation of the work of the travel agents in order to halt their opposition.

The ICEM Administration considered the wording of the External Auditors for its support to the self-payers as "not too pleasant imputations". It avoided correction of the document which was to be distributed to the member-states in order not to shed more light to a topic which could "arouse suspicions" from the contributing governments' side, as well as from the liner shipping industry.¹⁵⁹ Therefore, ICEM tried to silence such cases and, in many instances, continued assisting their migration, mainly from Greece and Italy. The reason is because, by assisting an additional population, useful quantitative results were produced for the population annually served, thus proving the member-states the ICEM's necessity for its existence. Secondly, assisting the self-payers was operationally useful since the ICEM Administration could more easily achieve full shipments and make the appropriate economies in case of unforeseen cancellations by its regular caseload. However, this ICEM practice erased competition not only with the travel agents, but as well as with the liner shipping companies, which otherwise would have benefited from this traffic on higher than

¹⁵⁸ NARA/Council Documents MC/Fifth Session Copy 1, ICEM, "Financial Report of the Year 1955. Submitted by the Director", 5th Session, MC/197, 26.04.1956, emphasis added.

¹⁵⁹ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/1/Shipping Policy-Liaison with Washington, Vol. I, J.J. van Loon, Chief, US Office ICEM Washington DC to H.R. Hoekstra, Chief, Dept. of Shipping ICEM Geneva, 06.06.1956; *ibid.*, H.R. Hoekstra to J.J. van Loon, 13.06.1956.

ICEM fares, thus reconfirming the earlier argument that ICEM was an organisation that stirred up competition.

Other businesses, some indications

At least until the 1970s, the transport companies absorbed the greatest part of ICEM's budget. However, the transport companies and the travel agencies were not the only companies dealing with ICEM. Many other businesses of the private sector dealt with ICEM, since, like every organisation, ICEM needed to be accommodated, its premises needed to be equipped with furniture, it needed to purchase consumable office products, and needed to be able to use telecommunication services. Some ICEM Missions owned vehicles and used buses for the transport of migrants; ICEM used legal counselling services from outside ICEM entities, and external auditors annually evaluated the Organisation's financial performance, amongst others. Part of the equipment in the possession of IRO was transferred to PICMME/ICEM after the liquidation of the former, including vehicles, medical equipment, office machinery, supplies, and furniture;¹⁶⁰ this was an established procedure among the international organisations as it also happened in the case of the assets and personnel of UNRRA, which were distributed between the rest specialised UN agencies, namely to IRO, FAO, UNICEF, WHO, and the World Food Programme.¹⁶¹ However, these were neither sufficient for a continuously expanding organisation, as ICEM was, nor did they last for its entire lifetime.

Tracing the aforementioned relationships and practices is not an easy task. One reason preventing us from thoroughly researching such aspects of ICEM's dealings with a greater part of the private sector is also that these transactions took place at a local level, and ICEM Headquarters were not actively involved; thus, no relative archival material is maintained in Geneva. Secondly, certain expenses were provided by the member-governments or through donations by NGOs and other entities.

¹⁶⁰ International Refugee Organization-France [thereafter IRO-FR]/Supplies, G. Esgate, Acting Chief, Department of Budget and Administration, PICMME to Col. O.E. Cound, International Refugee Organization, Liquidator, 04.03.1952; *ibid.* A.G. Stevens, Chief, Division of Supply & Transport to Chief, Department of Administration, "Property for PICMME", 28.02.1952; *ibid.*, "Minutes of a Meeting held in the Office of the Chief, Department of Administration, I.R.O.", 27.02.1952.

¹⁶¹ Lilianne Fan, "Regional Organisations and the Humanitarian System History, Trends and Implications", in Zeynep Sezgin and Dennis Dijkzeul (eds), *The New Humanitarians in International Practice. Emerging actors and contested principles*, London and New York, 2016, pp. 306-307.

Therefore, no direct ICEM expenses were involved. Lastly, part of the relative archival material was not accessible at the time of archival research. Nevertheless, some indications can be provided.

The accommodation of the ICEM Missions in the country offices, in most cases, was the responsibility of the hosting member-state. Thus, governments like Germany and Greece provided free accommodation for the local ICEM Missions and, in some cases, also provided accommodation for the ICEM Chief of Mission.¹⁶² In other countries, like in Australia, this arrangement was not followed, at least not for the entire period of ICEM's representation in the country. In 1965, the Canberra Mission was looking for new premises. The ICEM Chief of Mission negotiated an agreement with a real estate agency for the leasing of a suite to host ICEM Canberra offices¹⁶³ with a considerable rental increase regarding the amount paid so far. However, under which policy or terms the real estate office was chosen is not known.

Furthermore, prior to migrants' departure overseas, their medical examination was necessary, including their inoculation against certain diseases. The cost of the vaccines was usually undertaken by the governments of origin, as happened in Italy and in Germany.¹⁶⁴ However, before their trip, X-rays, blood tests, dermatological, and eye-examinations, amongst others, were required in order for a migrant to be considered fit to travel. Some ICEM Missions, like those in Germany and Austria, received medical equipment of \$62,300 value from IRO.¹⁶⁵ Others, like the ICEM Mission in Greece, owned equipped medical units. In 1970, in particular, the annual medical cost in ICEM Athens amounted to approximately \$15,000.¹⁶⁶ The ICEM Mission in Athens cooperated with private doctors and, at least in 1979, with a private Diagnostic

¹⁶² IOM-SW/Registry, 1/1/GER/Correspondence with Government Germany, Vol. I, H. A. Citroen, Chief, Liaison Office, PICMME Bonn to P. Jacobsen, "Report on Contacts with German Authorities regarding set-up of PICMME", ADM.2, 07.01.1952; IOM-SW/Registry, 8/20/111/Transport, Edward B. Marks, Chief of Mission, ICEM Athens to Director, ICEM Geneva, "Claim to Greek Government for Operational Expenses in 1952", 27.01.1953. The equipment of the training centres that ICEM maintained in several emigration countries, like Greece, was to a large extent made available through donations either from CARE, the Greek and Australian Red Cross and other NGOs.

¹⁶³ IOM-SW/Registry, 11/15/AUST/Management - Australia, Vol. II, G. W. von Armin, Chief of Mission ICEM Australia to Director, ICEM HQs, "Permanent Office Premises at Canberra", 1574, AUS/A/3, 01.07.1965.

¹⁶⁴ IOM-SW/Registry, 1/1/ITA/ICEM Correspondence with Govt Italy, Vol. II, C.K. Grierson Rickford, Chief, Office of Operations to G. Pesci, Acting Chief, ICEM Liaison Mission, Rome, "Prevention of Measles: Movements ex Italy", 24.05.1954.

¹⁶⁵ IRO-FR/Supplies, G. Esgate, Acting Chief, Department of Budget and Administration, PICMME to Col. O.E. Cound, International Refugee Organization, Liquidator, 04.03.1952.

¹⁶⁶ IOM-SW/General, PRL-20-124/Migration from Greece to Australia Peter Gibson, Chief of Mission, ICEM Athens to John F. Thomas, Director, ICEM Geneva, "Savings in Mission Costs", 22.04.1970.

Centre.¹⁶⁷ Once again, though, the procedures under which the Centre was selected or the procedures for the purchase of the medical equipment for the ICEM medical units are not accessible through the archival sources.

Migrants coming from cities away from the port/airport of departure or those transiting through other European countries had to be presented at the port/airport-city a couple of days before embarkation. Therefore, ICEM in Italy came into an agreement with several hotels in Genoa, securing short-term accommodation for ICEM migrants. According to the procedures established, the migrants, after arriving in Genoa, had to refer themselves to the respective ICEM office, and from there, they went to the hotels by buses. Following, they were allocated in rooms and daily meals were provided. Some hoteliers were long-term ICEM business partners, as was the *Hotel Torinese* for which references can be found in the archives, at least, from 1963 to 1977.¹⁶⁸ Interesting aspects of these business interactions that are not answered by the archival sources are: the procedure under which the hotels were selected, the accommodation cost paid by ICEM, the ownership of the buses transporting the migrants, or the quality of cooperation of these businesses with ICEM.

In general, though, the responsible entities for the employment of ICEM immigrants were the state services of the countries of migrants' destination. Consequently, ICEM could not influence the conditions or terms of employment of the migrants, but certainly was aware of them or, at least, could have access to such information. In 1957, a migration scheme to South Africa under the *United States Escapee Programme* was implemented by ICEM. Under this programme, the migrants selected had to work through the *South African Miners' Training Schools* for private mining companies for at least 4.5 years in occupations exclusively underground. The prospective migrants signed a binding contract, which was entitled "indenture",¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁷ IOM-SW/Registry, 14/300/GRE/Field Accounts–Greece, Vol. 16, Ch. Alexandraki to C. Schou, Senior Medical Officer, ICEM Geneva, 02.07.1979.

¹⁶⁸ IOM-SW/Registry, 10/1/1/ITA General 1951-1968, P. Jarrell, Senior Operations Officer, Division of Migration Programmes and Development Activities to C. Porta, Deputy Chief, ICEM Liaison Mission Rome, 7/GEN/ITA, 17.07.1963; IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/Transport. General Policy, Vol. IV, M. Pozzolini ICEM Representative Genoa to Director ICEM Geneva, "Lodging and maintenance costs for migrants embarking at Genoa to overseas countries", PTT/168, 06.12.1977.

¹⁶⁹ The term "indenture" is used to describe a migration system from China and India that took place in the 16th, 17th centuries, and until the 19th century for the "migration" to the colonies of the British and French Empires, including the Americas as *indentured servitude*. Under this system, someone overseas (an employer, a contract dealer, or the ship's captain), paid the transport cost of the potential indentured servants due to the latter's lack of means to finance their voyage. The indentured servants had to work for a specific period for the employer until they pay off their debt when they became immigrants; a temporary system of 'slave labour' of the time. Breaching the contract resulted in legal persecution for

foreseeing that, after the prescribed period of work in mines, the migrants would be eligible for a residency permit. In case they broke the contract before the foreseen period, they would be deported, and the cost would burden the deportees. In the third year of the programme's implementation, the already one year appointed ICEM Director, in his correspondence with the US State Department, acknowledged that the conditions of the contract were "onerous" and in violation of the *United Nations Declaration of Human Rights* (UNDHR), since the migrant-workers committed their "entire freedom" to the private employers. In the ICEM Director's effort to seek amelioration of the contract terms, the *South African Chamber of Mines* representative rejected it, as the strict terms of the contract were considered necessary so as "to keep the 'whip' over the" migrants¹⁷⁰ in order for them to continue working in the mines.

The case of the aforementioned programme for mine-work reconfirms that serving the needs of the receiving countries and, hence, of its business partners was ICEM's primary goal, even when migrants' exploitation was involved. This trend is also traceable in cases of the ICEM Administration's cooperation with the transport companies. In the case of the South African mines, the ICEM Director attempted to highlight, to the United States government, the problems derived by ICEM's participation in such movements, mainly because ICEM could be exposed to unfavourable criticism due to the violations of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights. The same also applied for the United States, the political supporter of ICEM and donor of the said movements;¹⁷¹ in this country, the "indenture" system had produced great political and social debates and fights in its early history. It is not known if the aforementioned scheme continued or was interrupted, however, the Union of South African Republic, well-known for its racial policy, continued receiving ICEM migrants for the next few years.

In another example of cooperation with the private sector, several enterprises approached ICEM seeking assistance in the selection of migrant-workers for their businesses. This was the case of a company in Colombia, which wanted to recruit

the indentured servant. For more on the indentured servitude system, Klaus J. Bade, *Migration in European History*, trsl Alison Brown, MA, 2003, pp. 82-86 and A. McKeown, "How the Box Became Black", pp. 22-34.

¹⁷⁰ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/21/111/Transport Policy, Marcus Daly to Robert S. McCollum, Deputy Administrator, Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, Department of State Washington, 07.07.1959.

¹⁷¹ Ibid.

several migrants from Italy¹⁷² or of the well-known German company, *Bosch*, which operated plants in Brazil. ICEM had adopted a policy of “open door”, as the ICEM Brazil Chief of Mission declared in 1969, under which ICEM tried, by any means, to support such requests from many firms.¹⁷³ If the selection of migrants from ICEM included the payment of a fee from the companies’ side to the ICEM Administration or to specific staff members, or any other form of concessions by the companies, it is not known yet.

As indicated, ICEM’s operation presented opportunities to a variety of businesses of the private sector; starting from the transport companies (inland and overseas, national, and international), the real estate sector, hoteliers, lawyers, medical sector, as well as industries. ICEM’s operation activated different economies and thus extended the net and the profits from the migration business to other business categories. As a purely operational Organisation serving states and not the migrants *per se*, negotiations with ICEM seemed more flexible foremost for the states and, as a consequence, also for the businesses of the private sector. This is especially visible in the early years of ICEM by the use of unsuitable ships, as mentioned in previous chapters, or the lower-standard provisions for migrants on board ships and aircraft, or even in its non-negotiation in relation with the mining migration scheme to South Africa. From the intervention of the ICEM Director in the aforementioned instance, it seems that the Director identified these misgivings and attempted to ‘melt’ them, but the operational context of the Organisation could not support interventions in matters of state ‘sovereignty’. However, tracing the relationship of ICEM with enterprises of the wider private sector, apart from the transport companies, is difficult, and the level and impact of their cooperation with ICEM needs to be investigated further using different archival material.

At the onset of the post-WWII period, in certain routes, the migrant traffic could stand on its own merit, notably towards Australia. With the progression of the years, in view

¹⁷² IOM-SW/Registry, 1/1/NETH/Operations. Correspondence with Govt–Netherlands, Vol. II G. C. Watson, Chief of Department to B.G. Epinat, 23.09.1960.

¹⁷³ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/6/Shipping–Liaison with South America, Vol. II, E.K. Rahardt, Chief of Mission Brazil to Director ICEM Geneva, “Bosch do Brasil”, PL/RJ/179, 29.09.1969.

of the decreasing number of the overseas migration, the increase of tourist traffic and of the level of the trade traffic and the need for the maintenance of the profitability of the transport companies made the combination of migrant traffic with other traffics (passenger, tourist, cargo) necessary. For the transport companies, this transition can be conceived as a process towards development. Although this development improved the quality of service provision offered, for ICEM, it was also the start of an additional competition to find timely suitable means of transport for its migrants.

The very function of ICEM created a climate of competition between its transport partners, considering that ICEM was an agency stirring up the competition throughout its work. ICEM functioned as a forum in which transport interests were concentrated. Consequently, the competition of the transport companies in certain instances was intense. Tools for the survival of the shipping and airline companies out of this competition were collaboration with other companies for the attraction of ICEM business, subversion of established agreements, and indirect pressure against the competitors by the Press or the national governments. Hypotheses for the entanglement between ICEM staff and the various business entities, or between the ICEM business partners, can be made, however, the archival material examined does not provide any certainty for such a conclusion.

Nevertheless, as ICEM encountered the competition of the tourist traffic in the transport sector, it also created an additional competition for another business sector—the travel agents. ICEM, as any enterprise of the private sector would do, competed for the increase of its workload by assisting categories of migrants that, before ICEM's establishment, had access only to the services of the private sector. Meanwhile, as an international organisation, it diplomatically compensated the travel agencies by the access it had and its capability in concluding agreements on an international level. This support for the migration of self-paying migrants is a clear indication of the eagerness of, at least, some of its country Missions to prove their effectiveness, either to the governments of the countries where they operated or even to the ICEM Headquarters. Increasing or decreasing the volume of ICEM's involvement in migration management locally fluctuated and adjusted to the evolving needs of the states. Correspondingly, the size of the human capital of the Organisation, as well as its funding, or even the whole existence of a Mission locally, were adjusted to said needs. Therefore, proof of the need of ICEM towards its member-states was one of the main considerations of the

Organisation, which was also achieved with indirect means, such as the assistance of self-payers or “appear to be” as migrants, according to the External Auditors for ICEM.

Further research is needed to shed light on the dealings of ICEM with other businesses of the private sector apart from the transport companies. Even if their financial impact was of a much lower dynamic, the understanding of the mechanisms employed or of the collateral opportunities emerging for the private sector out of their mingling with an international organisation would add to the research.

Chapter 8:

Migration Transport Business: the Greek case

Much has been said on the relationship of the *Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration* (ICEM) with the member-governments and with the transport companies. In this chapter, the discussion will concentrate directly on the relationships developed between the transport companies participating in the market-traffic created out of ICEM's operation with a focus on the case of Greece.

The migration business interests of Greek-owned transport companies were concentrated in two main directions: the North Atlantic and the Australasian sea and air routes. Both routes experienced national and international competition from sea and air transport means and sought governmental and ICEM support to face competition. Hereunder, the process for the establishment of the respective routes will be discussed, along with their strategies for dominance over national and international competitors. The examination of the case of the employment of Greek transport companies in the ICEM migrant transport programme to follow endeavours to assist in the identification of correlations with the practices applied on an international level by the transport companies, the links between the transport companies under the same flag, their response to foreign competition, and the extent of the competition between shipping and airline companies

The first section examines the North Atlantic transport trade, which was where the Greek maritime companies first concentrated regarding the migrant transport. The second section focuses on the Australasian sea routes, and it is divided in two parts marked by the establishment of the first regular scheduled liner shipping company of the Chandris brothers, the *Greek-Australian Line*.

The adopted practices noticed in the transport market of other ICEM destinations are also tested in the case of Greece, and examples of collaboration, subversion, and indirect pressure are highlighted. The establishment of passenger liner shipping companies under the Greek flag is examined in the context of the revival of the Greek Shipping Registry under the wider governmental financial and business policy. Migration under the auspices of ICEM is recognised as the medium for the success of this policy. It is reconfirmed that the role of ICEM for each sea route varied considerably, while the circumstances in which the national and international competition occurred in the Greek migrant transport market are contextualised in the

wider policies of each period. Lastly, the role of the Press is acknowledged as interwoven in the policy formation and intertwined with wider entrepreneurial interests.

From Greece to the North Atlantic

The establishment of a sea route from Greece to the North Atlantic under the Greek flag was turbulent. The first representation of the Greek flag on a passenger ship in this sea route started with great difficulties in 1907 with the pioneering shipping company of Moraitis serving the sea route only for one year. Moraitis' endeavours, as well as those in the following years, were short-lived. Between 1909 and 1924, L. Empeirikos served the sea route from Greece to the Americas through the *National Steam Navigation Co. LTD of Greece*, but, in 1924, the company's fleet was transferred to the British Shipping Registry. With the promise of financial support from the Greek government and the obligation to serve on a regular basis the sea route from Greece to North Atlantic ports, the Empeirikos shipping company reconstituted its services under the Greek flag in 1932. However, the unfulfilled promises of the government resulted in the end of the Empeirikos services in 1935.¹

In February 1939, the L. Goulandris brothers signed a ten-year contract with the Greek government for the service under the Greek flag of the sea route from Greece to North Atlantic ports. The operation of the shipping company, *Greek Line*, of Goulandris would be subsidised by the government. The first trip of the passenger vessel *Nea Hellas* took place in May 1939, but, a year later, its service was interrupted because of the Second World War; it resumed its operation in 1947.² With the establishment of PICMME/ICEM, the passenger vessel of the Greek Line was among the first to benefit from its migrant-passengers from Greece starting from 1952.

The lack of financial support to the passenger shipping companies from the Greek state's side was an identifying characteristic of the period before 1950. However, from 1951, a friendlier financial environment for the businesses in general was growing with the provision of financial incentives under Law Degree (LD) 1880/1951. This policy was enhanced in 1953 when the LD 2687/1953 constituted a key element for the development of the entrepreneurial and financial policy in Greece. LD 2687/1953

¹ A. I. Tzamtzis, *Τα Ελληνικά Υπερωκεάνια 1907-1977: Το χρονικό μιας εποχής τη νεότερης εμπορικής μας ναυτιλίας που έκλεισε οριστικά*, Athens, [1997], pp. 34-38, 42-43, 47-49, 52-55, 70.

² A. I. Tzamtzis, *Τα Ελληνικά Υπερωκεάνια 1907-1977*, pp. 75-76, 79, 86-87, 148-149.

offered financial and administrative advantages to Greek-owned businesses established abroad in case they were transferred within the Greek territory. More specifically, for the transport sector, and according to article 13 of LD 2687/1953, this law was translated into an effort of revival of the Greek Shipping Registry with the return under the national flag of vessels owned by Greeks abroad.³ In view of the promising prospects from the increasing tourist, migrant, and trade traffic to North Atlantic destinations, the Greek government sought the routing of a modern passenger vessel under the Greek flag to serve on a regular basis the sea route from Piraeus to North Atlantic ports. The negotiations between Greek Line and the Greek government did not progress because of the tax exemption requested by the company and rejected by the government. Consequently, in 1953, the Greek Line passenger vessel serving the sea routes from Greece to North America was registered under the Liberian flag, a popular flag of convenience of the period.⁴ Great criticism from the side of the Greek maritime Press was a side-effect of this business decision, accusing the Greek Line of the creation of a system of “tax impunity” for its benefit.⁵ Meanwhile, the Greek Line retained a monopoly in the service of the Greek-North Atlantic sea routes.⁶

The passenger vessels of the Greek Line were used by ICEM especially for the migrant transfers to Canada, as the company’s access to ICEM passengers heading to the United States was lower because of the American legislative restrictions. The Greek Line adopted a competitive attitude against the rest of the liner shipping companies, even within the *North Atlantic Conference* of which the Greek Line was a member. In its effort to circumvent competition, the Greek Line offered confidential fare reductions

³ The Law Degree 2687/53 for the “investment and protection of foreign capital” foresaw that in case a foreign Greek-owned vessel joined the Greek Registry, it could return to a foreign flag without the state’s permission in case the conditions in Greece stopped being satisfactory. In addition, advantages for the sale, insurance, profits, administration, contribution to Seamen’ Fund, mortgage, and financial and requisition were foreseen. What is more, the law was incorporated into the Greek Constitution making the change of the law provisions more difficult to change in time, for more G. Harlaftis, *Greek Shipowners & Greece 1945-1975*, pp. 130-132.

⁴ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/13/Shipping Liaison with Greece, Vol. I, Al. Joannides, Deputy for Liaison ICEM Athens to G. Krause, Acting Chief, Dept of Shipping Geneva, 24.02.1955; Tzamtzis, *op.cit.*, pp. 89-90; Maria Damilkou, “Migration and Ocean Liners”, in Katerina Papakonstantinou (ed.), *Ταξίδια στη Μεσόγειο και τους Ωκεανούς. 19^{ος}–20^{ος} αιώνας*, Athens, 2011, pp. 194, 196.

⁵ «Το λιβερτιανόν Ολυμπία», *Naftika Chronika*, 440/199, 01.10.1953; «Το «Ολύμπια»», *Naftika Chronika*, 442/201, 01.11.1953.

⁶ IOM-SW/General, OPS-20-095/Transport, Sea Commercial–America/Canada, G. Krause, Office of Shipping, “Memo: Booking of 200 Greek General Labourers to Canada”, 23.07.1953.

to ICEM, as well as secret commissions and fees to its shipping agents;⁷ these tactics carried the risk of heavy fines from the Conference.

The absence of a Greek flag vessel in the North Atlantic passenger sea trade was filled by another Greek shipowner, Eugenios Eugenides—president of the multinational shipping company, *Home Lines*. Eugenides stated his readiness beforehand to withdraw from the negotiations with the Greek government in case the Greek Line resumed its interest and agreed to the governmental terms. Without any change from the side of the Greek Line, Eugenides established the *National Hellenic American Line* (NHAL), a subsidiary of *Home Lines*, which would serve the sea route from Greece to the North Atlantic for a decade with at least eight trips per year. No tax exemptions were foreseen, while the company would provide free mail transfer and discounted fares for the public officials. In addition, a percentage of the vessel's profits would be directed to charitable purposes in Greece. The agreement with the Greek government was signed in December 1953, stating that the NHAL's passenger vessel in this route would enjoy exclusive rights and protection by the state. The first voyage under NHAL took place at the end of 1954 by the passenger vessel, *Queen Frederika*,⁸ named after the Queen of Greece of that period. Months before its first sailing, the company as well as the Greek government, approached and pressed ICEM in order to secure passengers for the vessel's dormitory and third-class space.⁹ At the same time, the Greek maritime Press praised the vessel's standards, as well as the patriotic sentiments of the shipowner.¹⁰

Meanwhile, ICEM did not want to create new monopolies and exclude competition for the benefit of NHAL. ICEM established a rule in 1954 under which about 60 percent of its North Atlantic sea traffic from Greece would be allocated to

⁷IOM-SW/General, OPS-20-095/Transport, Sea Commercial-America/Canada, G. Krause, Office of Shipping, "Memo: Booking of 200 Greek General Labourers to Canada", 23.07.1953; IOM-SW/General, Transport General-N.A.C. Accordo, J.J. van Loon, Chief, Office of Shipping, "Visit to Italy", 08.06.1954.

⁸IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/13/Shipping Liaison with Greece, Vol. I, Al. Joannides, Deputy for Liaison ICEM Athens to G. Krause, Acting Chief, Dept of Shipping Geneva, 24.02.1955; *ibid.*, G. Krause, Acting Chief, Office of Shipping to P. Gibson, ICEM Liaison Mission Athens, "Shipping Matters", 19.07.1954; *ibid.*, P. Gibson, Chief of Mission ICEM Athens to J.J. van Loon, Chief, Office of Shipping, ICEM Geneva, 09.12.1954; Tzamtzis, *op.cit.*, pp. 91-95; «Οι ορίζοντες της προσπάθειας», *Naftika Chronika*, 445/204, 15.12.1953.

⁹ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/13/Shipping Liaison with Greece, Vol. I, Peter Gibson, Chief of Mission Athens to J.J. van Loon, Chief Office of Shipping, Migration Committee, Geneva, 09.07.1954; *ibid.*, J.J. van Loon, Chief, Office of Shipping to Peter Gibson, Chief of Athens Mission, 24.12.1954.

¹⁰ «Ο κ. Ευγ. Ευγενίδης: Αι γραμμαί Νοτίου & Βορείου Αμερικής», *Naftika Chronika*, 442/201, 01.11.1953.

NHAL and about 40 percent to the Greek Line. The foreign liner shipping companies approaching Greek ports at the time, like the Israeli *ZIM Shipping Lines*, had access in the Greek ICEM market with a small percentage.¹¹

The Greek Line, though, opposed the agreement of the Greek government-NHAL and unsuccessfully appealed to the Greek Council of State for its cancellation; this caused the response of the Greek Ministry of Mercantile Marine to characterise Goulandris' reactions as unfounded and opportunistic.¹² The Greek Line culminated the competition with NHAL in mid-1955 by redirecting *Olympia*, one of its more modern passenger vessels, from the Mediterranean to the North Atlantic sea route, and redirected its oldest vessel, *Nea Hellas*, to the Western Europe-North Atlantic sea route. Passenger ships of both shipping companies sailing on the same dates was a recurrent theme in their intense competition, leaving the passenger sea route from Greece with no Greek vessel for at least two months. Thus, foreign shipping and airline companies seized the opportunity and started approaching the Greek ports; passenger vessels, like *ITALIA S.A.*, also embarked ICEM migrants by approaching the port of Patras.¹³

In this competitive environment, J. Goulandris, the owner of Greek Line “complain[ed] bitterly” to ICEM, as he pressed for greater migrant allocations for his passenger vessels and for an equal distribution of passengers with NHAL vessels.¹⁴ On its side, NHAL, as the protected national passenger shipping line, when bookings were made to the Greek Line, requested their cancellation in case such space was available on its vessel, thus making ICEM justify every booking made on foreign vessels instead of the Greek-flag liner shipping company.¹⁵

It is of interest to be noted that, until 1959, the general employment of the passenger vessels of both shipping companies was successful. More specifically, in the

¹¹ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/13/Shipping Liaison with Greece, Vol. I, J.J. van Loon, Chief, Office of Shipping to Peter Gibson, Chief of Athens Mission, 24.12.1954; *ibid.*, H. R. Hoekstra, Chief, Dept of Shipping to P. Gibson, Chief of Mission, ICEM Liaison Mission Athens, 11.12.1957.

¹² «Και πάλιν η υπερατλαντική γραμμή», *Naftika Chronika*, 458/217, 01.07.1954; «Απερρίφθη η Προσφυγή της Έκρηκ Λάιν», *Naftika Chronika*, 467/226, 15.11.1954; «Επιβεβλημένη απάντησις», *Naftika Chronika*, 464/223, 01.10.1954.

¹³ Tzamtzis, *op.cit.*, pp. 94-95, 98-101; E. Mpatis, «Η Υπερατλαντική Γραμμή», *Naftika Chronika*, 494/253, 01.01.1956; IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/13/Shipping Liaison with Greece, Vol. I, Peter Gibson, Chief of Mission, ICEM Athens to Hoekstra, Dept of Shipping, 17.12.1957.

¹⁴ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/13/Shipping Liaison with Greece, Vol. I, Peter Gibson, Chief of Mission to H. R. Hoekstra, Chief, Dept of Shipping, ICEM Geneva, “s.s. “Olympia” 1957”, 01.11.1957; IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/24/Shipping. Ormos Shipping Co. (Goulandris), J. Goulandris, Ormos Shipping Company, London to H.R. Hoekstra, Dept of Shipping, ICEM Geneva, JLG/JKR, 07.11.1957.

¹⁵ IOM-GR/Shipping: Canada, U.S.A., Brazil from 1-1-1962-1976, C.O. Wendling, Chief of Mission to J. Gould, Operations Officer, “Movements to Canada and USA”, September 1963.

voyage from Greece to North Atlantic ports, their passenger capacity was covered by about 86 percent for *Queen Frederika* of NHAL and 84 percent for *Olympia* of the Greek Line; on their return trip, the respective percentages were 66 and 62 percent. This is especially important because of the increasing foreign competition by liner shipping companies and airlines. Apart from *ITALIA S.A.*, the US shipping company, *American Export Line*, approached Piraeus in the mid-1960s. A few years later, in 1966, the Greek private-owned airline company, *Olympic Airways*, commenced direct flights from Athens to New York,¹⁶ competing in the Greek aviation market with the American *Trans-World Airlines (TWA)* and the various chartered air flights.

The end of the agreement of NHAL with the Greek government in December 1964 brought free competition to the sea route from Greece to the North Atlantic. The replacement of the United States immigration quota system in 1965 with an annual maximum number of immigrant intakes gave promises for the increase of the migrant traffic and, consequently, for the profitability of the route. The new US immigration policy created a preference system favouring family reunification, and the immigration of professionals, skilled migrants, and refugees.¹⁷ Therefore, in 1965, the Greece-North Atlantic sea route was served by three passenger vessels: two vessels of the Greek Line and one of NHAL. However, it needs to be noted that, in 1965, NHAL and the vessel, *Queen Frederika*, were sold to the shipowner Chandris who, at that time, was also engaged in the migrant traffic from Greece to Australia. The passenger vessel, *Olympia*, of the Greek Line raised the Greek flag in 1968 and, along with NHAL, shared the governmental support and protection offered by the new military government in Greece. Also, in 1968, Chandris replaced *Queen Frederika* with a new passenger vessel, the *Amerikanis*. It was an effort to compete the foreign modern passenger vessels in the corresponding traffic, as well as in the cruising market, where the shipping companies in the North Atlantic progressively resorted for revenue.¹⁸

¹⁶ Four years later, the percentage of the passenger capacity of both Greek-owned passenger vessels covered in the North Atlantic ports had decreased to about 65 percent, noticing a considerable decrease, see «Αι Υπερωκεάνιοι Γραμμαί», *Naftika Chronika*, 710/469, 01.01.1965. «Τα Υπερωκεάνια», *Naftika Chronika*, 390/349, 01.01.1960; «Να τερματισθή ο ανταγωνισμός», *Naftika Chronika*, 597/15.04.1960; «Η Δεκαετία της Ολυμπιακής», *Naftika Chronika*, 740/499, 01. 04.1966.

¹⁷ M. Damilakou, "Migration and Ocean Liners", p. 144; «Η Γραμμή Β. Αμερικής», *Naftika Chronika*, 693/452, 15.04.1964; Tzamtzis, *op.cit.*, pp. 103, 106. For the 1965 US Law entitled *Hart-Celler Immigration Reform Act*, see D. R. Gabaccia, *Foreign Relations*, pp. 172-175.

¹⁸ Tzamtzis, *op.cit.*, pp. 107-109, 150; IOM-GR/Shipping: Canada, U.S.A., Brazil from 1-1-1962-1976, I. Μαυριδόγλου, Υπουργείον Εμπ. Ναυτιλίας to Υπουργείον Εσωτερικών Γ. Δ/σιν Μεταναστεύσεως, Υπουργείον Εξωτερικών, Δ/σιν Οικ. Υποθέσεων, «Μετανάστευσις προς Β. Αμερικήν», 91910/3553, 23.12.1965; *ibid.*, Jean Schiltz, Operations Officer to Ch. Alexandraki, Acting Chief of Mission, "Visit

As known, the end of the North Atlantic migrant and largely of the passenger sea traffic was determined by the domination of the aeroplanes. Even since 1968, the concentration of the liner shipping companies in this traffic had downgraded; the Greek Line and Chandris had reduced their passenger voyages and increasingly focused on cruises. The official end of the North Atlantic passenger sea traffic from Greece came with the dissolution of the Greek Line in 1975, when the agreement with the Greek government ended.¹⁹

What we can keep from the case of the Greek passenger sea traffic to the North Atlantic is the effort of the Greek government to bring in the Greek Shipping Registry vessels owned by Greek shipowners abroad. The effort of the repatriation of Greek-owned vessels was not concentrated only in the transport sector, but, in general, in the Greek-owned foreign capital, foreseeing governmental, financial, and administrative facilitations for the companies. These policies assisted in the revival of the traffic to North Atlantic destinations under a Greek passenger ship, as well as the revival of the competition in this maritime market.

An intense competition was created in the Greek-North Atlantic sea route between the two Greek-owned liner shipping companies, in addition to the foreign competition by the shipping and airline companies. The role of the Greek maritime Press was aligned with the national shipping company, supporting its rights in the sea route from Greece, criticising the unnecessary competition between NHAL and the Greek Line, and by exerting pressure towards the government, as well as NHAL's competitors.

At the same time, the Greek-owned passenger vessels combined various passenger traffics (e.g., cruises, passenger traffic, migration traffic), increasing the competition in different passenger-markets, as well as their access to additional revenue. Both the Greek Line and NHAL embarked passengers in Italy, while the passenger vessels of the former also approached in Israel. The Greek Line established a second shipping service from Western Europe to North America, also embarking ICEM migrants from the ports of Western Europe. Apart from that, both companies cruised in the Caribbean coasts.

of Representative of ITALIA Line–Athens”, 19.10.1965; «Διαίτησία δια το Αμερικανίς», *Naftika Chronika*, 794/553, 01.07.1968.

¹⁹ K. Doukas, «Δεν εχάθη το παν δια το ελληνικό υπερωκεάνιον», *Naftika Chronika*, 879/632, 15.01.1972.

The role of ICEM was rather subordinate in the market regulation in the traffic from Greece to the North Atlantic, as it was also the case, in general, of North Atlantic sea traffic. The revival of this sea route did not begin by the employment of ICEM. However, the Greek national shipping line was strengthened from the supplementary provision of ICEM bookings. Both liner shipping companies, under no circumstances, would let the ICEM migrants travel by other means of transport in case they were able to carry them and profit from this transportation. Therefore, complaints and direct and indirect pressure towards ICEM and the Greek government were applied.

From Greece to Oceania

-Before Chandris:

Between 1951/52 and 1974/75, Australia received about 1,222,000 migrants from the United Kingdom and Ireland and about 338,000 from Italy.²⁰ This great population outflow, along with those from the neighbouring countries, resulted in the resurgence of the business interests in the transportation sector from these countries towards Australia. Thus, since the end of WWII, well-established British and Italian liner shipping companies reinstated the regular services with destinations in Australia and New Zealand. The regular airlines from several countries increased the competition even further by joining the traffic more actively since the mid-1950s. Therefore, when the Greek transport companies endeavoured to participate in the Australasian sea routes, they had to face a consolidated competition.

Migration from Greece to Australia was of a considerable magnitude, considering the general overseas migrations from the country. More specifically, between 1951-1952 and 1979-1980, around 207,000 migrants arrived in Australia from Greece (Table 8.1). The majority of them arrived during the 1960s (118,110). With the end of the *White Australia* policy in 1973 and the opening of new migration outlets for Australia from formerly excluded regions, like Asia and Africa, and in combination

²⁰ Australian Government, Department of Home Affairs, "Historical Migration Statistics", December 2020, <https://data.gov.au/data/dataset/historical-migration-statistics/resource/b59a15df-86ea-4c4c-95be-4dd9fc9f8ac4>, retrieved 13.11.2021. The migration from Greece to Australia for the period 1951/52-1974/75 numbered 201,000 persons.

with the general decrease of migration from Greece, the Greek migration to Australia decreased substantially in the 1970s (30,907, see Table 8.1).

Table 8.1: Australian Total Migrant Intakes from Greece, 1951-1980					
Fiscal Year	Greek Migrant Arrivals	Fiscal Year	Greek Migrant Arrivals	Fiscal Year	Greek Migrant Arrivals
1951–52	2,065	1960–61	7,619	1970–71	9,880
1952–53	1,605	1961–62	11,698	1971–72	5,618
1953–54	5,089	1962–63	10,908	1972–73	3,264
1954–55	12,527	1963–64	14,894	1973–74	3,883
1955–56	10,287	1964–65	16,991	1974–75	2,399
1956–57	8,768	1965–66	15,153	1975–76	1,489
1957–58	5,789	1966–67	9,826	1976–77	1,525
1958–59	5,510	1967–68	8,750	1977–78	1,165
1959–60	6,214	1968–69	11,489	1978–79	823
1951-60	57,854	1969–70	10,782	1979–80	861
		1960-70	118,110	1970-80	30,907
1951-1980			206,871		
Note: The years above refer to fiscal years (July to June of next year)					
Source: Australian Government, Department of Home Affairs, “Historical Migration Statistics”, December 2020.					

After the end of the Second World War, the Greek flag was first represented in the Greek-Australasian sea route in 1947, as the *Hellenic Mediterranean Line* (ELMES) of the shipowner Yannoulatos raised the Greek flag to its passenger vessel, *Cyrenia*, also approaching to the Italian port of Genoa. However, the service of this route was rather opportunistic. At the end of 1952, the vessel withdrew for two years due to the low migration rates to Australia,²¹ with the company accusing the Greek government of lack of support in view of foreign competition.²² At the same time, foreign liner shipping companies took the chance and started calling to the Greek ports. The Italian shipping company, *SITMAR Line*, advertised the inauguration of the approaches by one of its passenger vessels to Piraeus port in the Greek Press since the end of 1953, while the British *P&O Orient Line* advertised the calls of its four passenger vessels to Kalamata port since February 1954.²³ Therefore, the Greek migrants and the trans-migrants through Greece could embark on a passenger vessel from a Greek port to Australia at least once per month.

At the end of 1953, the forthcoming increase of the Australian immigration programme in 1954/55 (Table 8.1) reopened the discussion for the reactivation of the

²¹ Peter Plowman, *Australian Migrant Ships 1946-1977*, NSW, 2006, p. 54.

²² «Η γραμμή της Αυστραλίας», *Naftika Chronika*, 412/172, 15.08.1952.

²³ *OEE*, 141, 01.09.1953; *OEE*, 148, 15.12.1953.

sea route between Greece and Australia by a vessel under the Greek flag. The Greek government approached the shipowner of ELMES and J. Goulandris, owner of the Greek Line. Both turned down the governmental request if no state subsidisation was foreseen for the vessels' operation against the foreign competition.²⁴ ICEM, from its side, discussed with J. Goulandris a few months later, but in view of no assurances provided for the return traffic with the loading of French troops from Saigon, Goulandris withdrew his interest.²⁵

ELMES was finally persuaded and, in mid-1954, returned to the Greek-Australian sea traffic, especially because the ICEM programme to Australia was expanding, along with the general migrant traffic towards the country. The vessel received the 'moral support' of the Greek government, something translated into imposition of restriction on the competition by foreign companies. Under these circumstances, the Greek Ministry of Mercantile Marine requested, in early March 1954, the end of the approaches by foreign passenger vessels to the Greek ports.²⁶ At the same time, ELMES secured a contract with ICEM for the transport of its migrants.²⁷ A Press campaign was organised in Australia targeting the support of the travel agents and the Greek community.²⁸ In Greece, the maritime Press covered the re-establishment of the service in extent, requesting the support of the government and the passengers in Greece and abroad.²⁹ The ELMES operation was so successful that it constituted *Cyrenia* as "the big money maker" for its owners, as the ICEM Chief of Athens Mission commented.³⁰ In 1955, ELMES enlarged its presence in the traffic by adding the passenger vessel, *Tasmania*, to its fleet, thus attracting further business from ICEM by

²⁴ AGMFA/CS/1954/ΑΠ/3, Λαμπριανίδης to Υπουργείον Εξωτερικών, 60101/4464, 02.11.1953.

²⁵ IOM-SW/Registry 8/1/24/Shipping. Ormos Shipping Co. (Goulandris), Vol. I, J. Goulandris, Ormos Shipping Company, London to J.J. van Loon, ICEM Geneva, JLG/MLG, 20.09.1954; *ibid.*, G. Krause, Acting Chief, Office of Shipping to J.L. Goulandris, Ormos Shipping Company Ltd London, 21.10.1954.

²⁶ AGMFA/CS/1954/ΑΠ/3, Μαρινάκης to Υπουργείον Εξωτερικών, 18158/1503, 31.03.1954; P. Plowman, *Australian Migrant Ships 1946-1977*, p. 54.

²⁷ AGMFA/CS/1954/ΑΠ/3, Λάμπρος to Υπουργείον Εξωτερικών, 709/ΣΤ, 06.05.1954.

²⁸ AGMFA/CS/1954/140/1/1, Γ.Β. Τόλλης, Hellenic Publications, publisher of 'The Australian Greeks' Weekly Newspaper to Δ. Λάμπρον, Πρεσβευτήν Ελλάδος, Καμπέρραν Αυστραλίας, 15.04.1954.

²⁹ «Η γραμμή Αυστραλίας», *Naftika Chronika*, 453/212, 15.04.1954; «Η γραμμή Αυστραλίας», *Naftika Chronika*, 454/213, 01.05.1954.

³⁰ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/13/Shipping Liaison with Greece, Vol. I, Peter Gibson, Chief of Mission Athens to J.J. van Loon, Chief Office of Shipping, Migration Committee, Geneva, 09.07.1954.

a contract offered for five voyages,³¹ and by benefiting by the boarding of the last French soldiers from Saigon on the return traffic.³²

The operation of the two ELMES vessels withstood the competition of the foreign passenger vessels. More particularly, in 1956, when both ELMES vessels operated, only 1,100 ICEM migrants were transferred by two foreign vessels and around 4,000 by ELMES. However, a) the economic recession in Australia, b) the progressive decline of its immigration programme, c) the reduction of the available French soldiers from Saigon for the return traffic, and d) the problems in the safety and operation of the ELMES passenger vessels resulted in the final withdrawal of ELMES from the Australian sea route in the end of 1956, as well as the end of the Greek flag representation until the end of 1959.³³

Consequently, the Greek migrant transport market offered a way out to foreign competitors, foremost to the Italian liner shipping companies, *SITMAR Line*, *Cogedar Line* and *Lloyd Triestino*, which called at Piraeus port and the British *P&O Orient Line* whose vessels approached Navarino port on a regular basis; all vessels also embarked ICEM migrants. In addition, the airline companies expanded their presence in Greece and, thereon, connected Athens with Australian airports; such airlines included *Qantas*, *BOAC*, *Pan American* and *Air India* since 1956 and *KLM Airlines* from 1957.³⁴

The idea of re-launching the Greek-Australian sea route was expressed towards the end of 1957 by J. Latsis—a Greek shipowner who, according to ICEM, had no experience in passenger traffic, nor a suitable passenger ship for the trade yet. His interest was expressed at a time when the established Greek shipowners were not interested in putting “money in the Australia venture”, namely the ones of the North Atlantic passenger trade like Goulandris, as well as of the owners of the *National*

³¹ IOM-GR/Shipping 1952-62, Gibson to Νικολίτσα, ΕΣ/622, 11.07.1955; Plowman, *op.cit.*, p. 59; «‘Τασμανία’: Το νέον ελληνικόν υπερωκεάνιον δια την γραμμὴν Ελλάδος-Αυστραλίας», *Naftika Chronika*, 486/245, 01.09.1955.

³² Plowman, *op.cit.*, p. 59.

³³ IOM-GR/Ministry of Mercantile Marine, ICEM Athens, “Statistics of Greek migrants who departed on various ships from Greek ports with country of destination 1.1.56-30.9.57”; Plowman, *op.cit.*, pp. 54, 59.

³⁴ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/13/Shipping Liaison with Greece, Vol. I, N. Kaloyeropoulos to H.R. Hoekstra, Chief, Dept of Shipping, “Duty Trip to Athens/Piraeus: 3/8 November, 1957; “Waterman” Sailing”, 14.11.1957; *ibid.*, Peter Gibson, Chief of Mission, ICEM Athens to H.R. Hoekstra, Chief, Dept of Shipping ICEM Geneva, “Australia Shipping”, 24.01.1958; *ibid.*, N. Kaloyeropoulos, Dept of Operations and Transport to Mr. O. Golbs-Wilms, Deputy Chief of Dept, “Greek Regular Commercial Line to Australia, 13.01.1959; K. Athanasiades, «Η ζωή των Ελλήνων στην Αυστραλίαν», *OEE*, 217, 01.11.1956; *OEE*, 236, 15.08.1957.

Hellenic American Line.³⁵ The re-establishment of the Australian sea route was requested by the Greek pro-migration Press, which published in this regard,³⁶ and it was also within the wishes of the Greek Ministry of Mercantile Marine, which questioned ICEM Athens on the forthcoming prospects of the volume of Greek emigration to Australia.³⁷

The interest of Latsis mobilised wider spectrums of the Greek maritime community in 1958. The officials of the *National Hellenic American Line* met in June with the ICEM Administration in Geneva, informing on the request by the Greek government to employ their vessel, *Queen Frederika*, for two voyages to Australia for “political reasons”.³⁸ Six months later, and after the successful initial voyages, they contemplated the establishment of a regular liner shipping service to Australia.³⁹

The ‘political reasons’ underlined by the *National Hellenic American Line* must be linked with the liberalisation of the Australian immigration programme a few months earlier under which admission eased for additional migrant categories from the Southern European countries. The newly re-elected right-wing Greek government in May 1958, for fear of the rise of the left-wing political parties, the rise of unemployment in Greece, the decrease of exports, the deterioration of balance of external payments in 1957-1958, along with the global recession of 1958, wanted to take this advantage and facilitate the emigration of a larger number of Greeks to Australia.⁴⁰ Additionally, in March 1958, the burning and abandonment amidst the Indian Ocean of the Norwegian passenger ship, *Skaubryn*, transporting ICEM migrants going to Australia, enforced the will of the Greek government for a Greek flag passenger vessel.⁴¹

³⁵ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/13/Shipping Liaison with Greece, Vol. I, H. R. Hoekstra, Chief, Dept of Shipping to P. Gibson, Chief of Mission, ICEM Liaison Mission Athens, 20.09.1957.

³⁶ «Φλέγοντα Ζητήματα», *OEE*, 238, 17.09.1957; Ilias Drymonas, «Προς μιαν νέαν εξόρμησιν. Ανάγκη να ενδιαφερθή το κράτος για τον Ελληνισμό Αυστραλίας», *OEE*, 243, 01.12.1957.

³⁷ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/13/Shipping Liaison with Greece, Vol. I, St. Kotiades, Minister of Mercantile Marine, Direction of Studies to ICEM Greece Mission, “Prospects of development of Emigration to Australia”, 81698/2694, 14.12.1957.

³⁸ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/13/Shipping Liaison with Greece, Vol. I, O. Golbs-Wilms, Acting Chief of Dept of Shipping, ICEM Geneva to P. Gibson, Chief, ICEM Liaison Mission Athens, 07.06.1958. The first of the two voyages took place on 15.12.1958, see Plowman, *op.cit.*, p. 118.

³⁹ IOM-GR/Shipping 1952-62, Γ. Ανδριανόπουλος, Υπουργός Εμπορικής Ναυτιλίας to Υπουργείον Εξωτερικών, «Δρομολόγησις πλοίου εις γραμμήν Αυστραλίας», 89556/4114, 30.12.1958; «Η Γραμμή της Αυστραλίας», *Naftika Chronika*, 569/328, 15.02.1959.

⁴⁰ *OEE*, 252, 15.04.1958. For the financial situation in Greece in 1958, see Chrysafis I. Iordanoglou, *Η Ελληνική Οικονομία μετά το 1950*, vol. A, *Περίοδος 1950-1973: Ανάπτυξη, Νομισματική Σταθερότητα και Κρατικός Παρεμβατισμός*, Athens, 2020, pp. 99-100, 108, 120.

⁴¹ On board *Skaubryn* were 904 German and Maltese ICEM migrants. All the passengers were embarked on a British vessel sailing close to *Skaubryn* and they all were transferred to Aden. IOM-GR/Shipping

The interest of the Greek maritime community for the Australia sea route involved additional shipping companies. In July 1958, the *Navigation Pantaleon Shipping Company* expressed interest in joining ICEM migrant transport programme to Australia.⁴² In August, a Greek-Australian named Koutoupes informed the General Consulate of Greece in Sydney of his interest to purchase a passenger vessel under the Greek flag as long as ICEM support was secured. The discussion between Koutoupes and the Greek government progressed at such a stage, causing the government to request that ICEM abstain from bookings of Greek migrants on non-Greek passenger vessels so they could be directed in the forthcoming sailing under the Greek flag.⁴³

However, in December 1958, Latsis informed ICEM that he had purchased two passenger vessels with the intention of placing them under the Greek flag on the Greek-Australian sea route. Each vessel would sail every forty days from Piraeus and calls to Maltese ports were foreseen. Latsis would allocate more than two-thirds of the vessels' passenger capacity to ICEM needs,⁴⁴ thus securing standard revenue from each voyage. ELMES would undertake the operation of Latsis' service, considering the experience of the former in the route and in its cooperation with an intergovernmental organisation, as ICEM was. Latsis' venture enjoyed the support of the Greek government,⁴⁵ which, in turn, requested "influence and [...] sympathy" from the ICEM Deputy Director in the support of re-establishment of the service through Latsis' vessels.⁴⁶ In April 1959, the Greek Prime Minister promised "unlimited governmental support" to the shipowner, while many Ministers of the government, along with the Australian Consul-General in Greece, participated in the Press conference of Latsis' presenting his endeavour. During this luxurious event, which took place on a yacht sailing in the Greek islands, Latsis

1952-62, Αλ. Ιωαννίδου, Υπαρχηγός της Αποστολής to Ν. Ανδριανόπουλος, Υπουργός Εσωτερικών, 02.04.1958.

⁴² IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/13/Shipping Liaison with Greece, Vol. I, O. Golbs-Wilms, Acting Chief of Dept of Shipping, ICEM Geneva to P. Gibson, Chief, ICEM Liaison Mission Athens, 04.07.1958.

⁴³ Ibid., D. Kisopoulos, Gen. Secretary, Ministry of the Interior, Dir. Migration, Section Passports to ICEM Athens, "The putting in service of a Greek steamer on the Greece-Australia line", 3429, 09.08.1958; *ibid.*, G. Bensis, Delegeue Permanent, Delegation Permanente Hellenique Pres Des Organisations Internationales, Geneve to Marcus Daly, CIME Geneve, 1311/3, 13.10.1958.

⁴⁴ The vessels purchased by Latsis were *Hellas* and *Henriette*. IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/13/Shipping Liaison with Greece, Vol. I, John F. Thomas, Deputy Chief, Dept of Operations and Transport to O. Golbs-Wilms, "Greek Shipping", 31.12.1958; *ibid.*, John S. Latsis to Director, ICEM Geneva, 03.01.1959.

⁴⁵ Ibid., N. Kaloyeropoulos Dept of Operations and Transport to O. Golbs-Wilms, Deputy Chief of Dept, "Greek Shipping – Australian Route", 05.01.1959.

⁴⁶ Ibid., F. Potamianos to B.G. Epinat Deputy Director, ICEM Geneva, 10.01.1959.

declared the establishment of his regular liner shipping service to Australia as *fait accompli* with two vessels and the first voyage scheduled for December 1959.⁴⁷

Meanwhile, in July 1959, the Chandris brothers announced, to the ICEM Administration, their intention to establish a regular liner shipping service between Piraeus and Australia through a mixed passenger-cargo vessel named *Patris* that they had already purchased and would place under the Greek flag.⁴⁸ Chandris requested the ICEM Administration to meet and discuss together before the latter negotiated a contract with Latsis or any other shipowner.⁴⁹ According to the Press of the time, Chandris requested the Greek government's "exclusive and active moral support [...] with ICEM [and], the Conference", seeking the transport of Greek migrants and cargo to Australia for their passenger vessel. They also stressed that they would not accept the government to offer any material or moral support or credit to any other company, a condition which would create unfair competition and harm their business.⁵⁰ Therefore, the Chandris brothers made the terms known under which their company would conduct business and how they would tackle competition. K.Z., an officer at the Chandris Lines since 1960s, recollects about the relationship between Latsis and Chandris:

*Latsis was not so enthusiastic with Chandris, because he had already started something, and we ruined it. They were not friends. [...] There was definitely competition between them.*⁵¹

At that time, the competition between Latsis and Chandris also started involving the Greek Press. In the newspaper, *Eleftheria*, one of the leading centre-wing newspapers of the opposition of the time, it referred to Latsis, without naming him, as "A Greek shipowner who has never used foreign flag", that he has the oral and written encouragement of the Prime Minister, and who "is superior in many other points" compared to 'others'. By 'photographing' Chandris, it is mentioned that he came "a

⁴⁷ Ibid., N. Kaloyeropoulos, Dept of Operations and Transport to Mr. A.R. Driver through O. Golbs-Wilms, "Greek Line to Australia Press Reports", 01.04.1959; «Συνίσταται η Γραμμή Ελλάδος-Αυστραλίας», *Naftika Chronika*, 572/331, 01.04.1959.

⁴⁸ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/13/Shipping Liaison with Greece, Vol. I, Cable, London r1861 to ICEM Palais Wilson Geneva, 31.07.1959.

⁴⁹ Ibid., A.R. Driver, Chief of Dept of Operations and Transport, "Note for the File: Greek Shipping", 03.08.1959.

⁵⁰ «Ελλάς-Αυστραλία: Η Νέα Εθνική Γραμμή», *Naftika Chronika*, 580/339, 01.08.1959.

⁵¹ Personal interview by K.Z. to the author, 20.10.2017.

posteriori” and tries “to overthrow an effort which started a long time”, which “is by no means correct”, as well as “a way is searched that [...] [Latsis] be pushed aside”.⁵² With the postponement of the sailing of Latsis’ ships, additional articles on the Greek right-wing maritime Press were published referring to the change of use of one of Latsis’ vessels to a tourist ship for Mediterranean cruises.⁵³ Such an allegation was denied by the shipowner to ICEM a few days later. Latsis reconfirmed his focus in serving the sea route with two passenger vessels, as well as the inauguration of their operation during the first months of 1960.⁵⁴

Nevertheless, in August 1959, the Greek government accepted the petitions of both shipowners for their registration under the Greek flag for transoceanic voyages to Australia in accordance with the privileges of DL 2687/1953.⁵⁵ With the routing of Chandris passenger vessel in the Piraeus-Australia sea route, Latsis changed his plans and contemplated the routing of his vessels from Western European ports to Australia by also approaching in Greece.⁵⁶ In the meantime, the Greek government stressed to ICEM that it had no preference for any particular passenger ship but would appreciate their use for the transport of Greek migrants to Australia.⁵⁷ In this request, ICEM Athens acceded as long as the ships were in line with the ICEM requirements for migrants’ movements.⁵⁸ The Greek government, though, had already started to continuously participate in the ICEM *Sub-Committee for the Co-ordination of Transport* since November 1958,⁵⁹ targeting governmental representation of the increased forthcoming transport interests of the country in the Greek-Australasian sea route, also pending the upcoming connection of Greece with Australia by a new liner passenger shipping company.

⁵² IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/13/Shipping Liaison with Greece, Vol. I, N. Kaloyeropoulos to A.R. Driver, Memorandum, 19.08.1959. Reference is made to the newspaper *Eleftheria* of 14 August 1959.

⁵³ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/13/Shipping Liaison with Greece, Vol. I, “TS/S “Erietta” to become model tourist ship for cruises in the Mediterranean she will undergo proper alterations”, *Naftemporiki*, 09.11.1959; *ibid.*, “The New Liner Service Between Greece and Australia”, *Naftiliaka Nea*, 25.11.1959.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, Cable, Athina 1900 to Promigrant Geneva, 1503, 27.11.1959.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, A. Vlachos, Delege Permanent, Delegation Permanente Hellenique Aupres des Organisations Internationales Geneva to Marcus Daly, Directeur, CIME Geneva, 1142, 27.08.1959.

⁵⁶ «Η Νέα Εθνική Γραμμή», *Naftika Chronika*, 582/341, 01.09.1959.

⁵⁷ IOM-GR/Relations with the Government (1952-1958) Ministry of Interior, “Official calls of the Director to various members of the Government during his and Mrs. Daly’s visit to Greece 1 to 10 September 1959”, n.d.

⁵⁸ IOM-GR/Shipping 1952-62, C.O. Wendling, Chief of Mission, ICEM Athens to D. Makris, Minister of Interior, 22.02.1960.

⁵⁹ See Table 5, Annex.

Eventually, the establishment of the Latsis liner shipping company on the Greek-Australia sea routes never materialised. Consecutive postponements on the dates of sailing delayed the inauguration of this service.⁶⁰ At the end of 1960, one of the two vessels of Latsis was sold while the other one was laid up at the Piraeus port and directed to the Muslim pilgrim sea route to Mecca.⁶¹ Chandris' *Greek-Australian Line* (GAL) was the only liner shipping company under the Greek flag in the route, which organised sailings every two months under the passenger vessel, *Patris*. ICEM contracted the Chandris shipping company for the transport of ICEM migrants. The first voyage of *Patris* took place in December 1959. The day before the trip, a sanctification ceremony was organised in the presence of the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister, and government Ministers, among many more officials, giving a national dimension in the operation of the Chandris shipping company.⁶²

As supported in Chapter 6, the existence and operation of ICEM was instrumental for the establishment of the Greek-Australian Line of Chandris: a shipping company that based its operation from Greece on the signing of ICEM contracts. M.L., an officer at the Greek-Australian Line since January 1960, recollects:

*The migrant traffic [from Greece to Australia] increased; Antony Chandris got the blessing and the agreement of ICEM in Geneva, considering that the new shipping line had to receive its approval. Thus, Antony Chandris secured the support of ICEM, and therefore we had this great outflow to Australia.*⁶³

It needs to be revealed that the Greek liner shipping companies that actually engaged in the service of the sea route from Greece to Australia were not newcomers in the migrant/refugee transport, nor in their cooperation with an international organisation. Starting from Yannoulatos, through his shipping companies, *ELMES* and *China*

⁶⁰ IOM-GR/Shipping 1952-62, "Conference at the Ministry of Interior on subjects related to the transportation of migrants to Australia on Thursday, March 10th, 6:30 p.m.", 16.03.1960.

⁶¹ IOM-SW/General, ICEM-Australia I, J. van den Brink, Chief of Dept of Shipping to P. Gibson, Chief Migration Committee Liaison Mission Australia, 40/4/AUST, 07.12.1960; Tzamtzis, *op.cit.*, p. 120. For an interesting work on the religious trips of Hajjis to Mecca, see Michael B. Miller, "Pilgrims' Progress: The Business of the Hajj", *Past & Present*, 191 (2006), pp. 189-228.

⁶² «Νέον Ελληνικόν Υπερωκεάνιον», *OEE*, 293, 25.12.1959; «Τα Εγκαίνια της Γραμμής», *Naftika Chronika*, 390/349, 01.01.1960; Limnios-Sekeris, "Stakeholders and competition", p. 102.

⁶³ Personal interview by M.L. to the author, 07.08.2017.

Hellenic Lines, and the respective passenger vessels, *Cyrenia* and *Hellenic Prince*, he had been participating in the refugees' transfers under the *International Refugee Organisation* (IRO) since 1949 from Greece and Italy to Australia. Same applies for the Chandris brothers who, less successfully, through their London based company, *Charlton Steamship Co.*, chartered two passenger vessels to IRO in 1948: the *Charlton Monarch* and the *Charlton Sovereign*, for the transport of refugees from Europe to the East Coast of South America and to Australia. However, the mechanical problems faced on both passenger vessels did not allow Chandris ships longer engagement in IRO refugee traffic. Lastly, Goulandris vessel *Nea Hellas* was also contracted by IRO in 1949 for the transport of refugees from Genoa to Australia.⁶⁴ Foreign liner shipping companies also had the same experience with IRO that later continued cooperating with ICEM, such as *Skaugen Line*, *SITMAR Line*, and the *United States Line*.⁶⁵

With the knowledge acquired from the cooperation with IRO, Yannoulatos and Chandris could acknowledge the opportunities emerging out of the refugee/migrant traffic under ICEM. They had been familiar with the operation of international organisations, as well as with the technical operation of a migrant/refugee shipping route. Therefore, when their wider business interests correlated and could be combined with the scope of ICEM, they seized the opportunity and benefitted from the ICEM migrant traffic.

However, the interest of several shipping companies in the Greek Australian sea route in 1958-1959 was not incidental. It can be seen as the result of a combination of wider national and international maritime policies that affected the decision of the Greek shipping companies in registering their vessels in the Greek Shipping Registry. Starting from the Greek policies, we need to keep in mind that there were privileges for shipping companies like Law-Degrees 1880/1951 and 2687/1953, which provided financial, taxation, and administrative privileges specifically to the shipping companies that brought the vessels acquired abroad under the Greek flag. In addition to the aforementioned privileges, the opposition from the seamen's union was restricted. Meanwhile, during 1958, a hostile environment had been created for the vessels under flags of convenience, heavily affecting the Greek shipping companies which preferred them. Towards the end of 1958, the first international boycott against the flags of

⁶⁴ Miller, *op.cit.*, pp. 5-6; Plowman, *op.cit.*, pp. 38, 47, 54, 64; Tzamtzis, *op.cit.*, pp. 120-121.

⁶⁵ Plowman, *op.cit.*, pp. 29, 40, 58-59, 73, 95.

convenience was imposed, resulting in the decrease of these vessels' profitability. Therefore, in 1958, for some shipping companies, hoisting the Greek flag on their vessels seemed more advantageous in combination with the more attractive system formulated since the first half of the 1950s.⁶⁶ These circumstances resulted in the 'explosion' of interest from the Greek shipping companies regarding the revival of the Greek-Australasian passenger sea route.

The negotiation power of the Greek shipowners towards the Greek government and the Greek Press did not derive only from their shipping activities. Throughout the years, Goulandris, Eugenides, Latsis, and Chandris expanded, diversified, and globalised their businesses. L. Goulandris came from a maritime family numbering four generations of experience in the oceans, endeavouring not only in passenger shipping, but also in dry cargo, bulk carriers, and tankers, among others, under several flags. The same applies for E. Eugenides who had extended involvement in cargo trade between European countries, Argentina, and African countries and also made contributions in science. J. Latsis, apart from his involvement in dry cargo and tankers, acquired his own petroleum company in Elefsina in Greece in 1968 and built his own oil refinery and banking institution in the following years. Chandris, also starting from dry cargo and tanker trades, acquired their own shipyards in Salamis Island and a chain of hotels, and they were heavily involved in the industrial manufacturing sector producing electrical goods and appliances, in vehicle imports and sales, as well as in the insurance market for vessels and aircraft. In addition, Antony Chandris, in 1962-1964, was vice-president of the *Union of Greek Shipowners* and President of the Union in 1974-1980, thus having direct relations with the Greek and international Press. The shipowners-members of the Union were urged by A. Chandris to financially support, especially the maritime Press, by subscriptions in these media and by making them available for purchase in their vessels. Apart from the relations with the Press, A. Chandris, as President of the Union, had regular contacts with all the political parties, members of which were invited regularly to working meals in an effort to facilitate favourable legislation to shipping interests.⁶⁷ Under these terms, the entrepreneurial activity of

⁶⁶ Harlaftis, *A History of Greek Owned Shipping*, pp. 261-262; G. Harlaftis, *Greek Shipowners and Greece 1945-1975*, pp. 130-132, 134-135, 140.

⁶⁷ Yiannis Theotokas, Gelina Harlaftis, *Έλληνες εφοπλιστές και ναυτιλιακές επιχειρήσεις. Οργάνωση, διοίκηση και στρατηγική*, Athens, 2007, pp. 244-245, 222-226, 305-306, 461-462; Miller, *op.cit.*, p. 4; I. Bisias, *op.cit.*, p. 194-196, 222, 229-230, 233, 238. See also entries for J. Goulandris, E. Eugenides, I.

these shipowners affected the Greek economy at multiple levels (trade, oil refining, merchant marine, tourism, among others), as well as other national economies, facilitating the development of political links for the advancement of their business and their engagement with the Greek and foreign Press.

- Greek-Australian Line: Competition and business strategies

When Chandris asked for the Greek government's protection from the Conference competition, they were referring to the *Australian New Zealand Passenger Conference*, which was made up of four British liner shipping companies and one from New Zealand.⁶⁸ Secondly, they referred to the *Australian-New Zealand Cargo Conference*, which was composed of twenty-two shipping companies from Britain, Italy, France, the Netherlands, and Germany.⁶⁹

Both Chandris and Latsis had requested to join in the Passenger Conference, but their requests were turned down as the trade was considered as already “overtonnaged” by the Conference. With the inauguration of the *Greek-Australian Line's* (GAL) services, a fierce competition from the side of Conferences started. The booking agents of the Passenger Conference member-lines were instructed to blacklist GAL by not booking passengers on *Patris* until their berths had been filled. Such a prohibition, though, did not apply in the case of Italian and other non-British vessels serving the Australian sea route. Furthermore, agents were prohibited to advertise or display any favourable publicity of GAL's services. The agents that disobeyed these directives would lose the representation of the Conference member-lines—an important threat, as said vessels handled 60 percent of the whole passenger traffic from Australia to Europe,

Latsis and for A. Chandris at https://greekshippinghalloffame.org/?page_id=1387, retrieved on 11.12.2021.

⁶⁸Members of the Australian and New Zealand Passenger Conference in 1959 were *Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company*; *Orient Steam Navigation Company*; *Shaw Savill and Albion Company*; *Alfred Holt and Company (Blue Funnel Line)* and *New Zealand Shipping Company*. For more, Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, “Answers to Questions: Australian and New Zealand Passenger Conference”, 26.11.1959, accessible online at Parliament of Australia, https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/genpdf/hansard80/hansardr80/1959-11-26/0138/hansard_frag.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf, retrieved 14.11.2021.

⁶⁹ Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, “Adjournment Speech”, 27.04.1960, accessible online at Parliament of Australia, https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/genpdf/hansard80/hansardr80/1960-04-27/0085/hansard_frag.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf, retrieved 14.11.2021.

and 90 percent from Sydney. The same practices were also followed by the Cargo Conference, prohibiting the loading of *Patris* with any freight.⁷⁰

The Greek government, through the Ministry of Mercantile Marine, intervened in support of GAL through the Consular Port Authorities in London by pressuring the representatives of the reacting foreign shipping firms operating in Greece, by complaining to the Australian government through the Greek Ambassador in Canberra, and by bringing the matter to the attention of the *Organisation for European Economic Co-operation*.⁷¹

The British government declared that it was not able to respond to the Greek calls for support. Already, with little success, the UK had made 74 formal protests to 31 countries regarding flag discrimination practices affecting its shipping and trade interests during the 1950s.⁷² The blacklisting of GAL, though, was discussed at the Australian Parliament. A member of the Parliament heavily accused the Conferences of being “guilty of the most blatant restrictive trade practices” and for “discrimination”, asking the Government to take action against the monopoly control of the Passenger Conference and to respect the governmental policy of “free enterprise”.⁷³ From his side, the Australian Minister for Trade supported the operation of GAL and recognised it as an opportunity for the enhancement of trade between Australia and Greece apart from the migrant traffic. However, he indicated the government’s inability to oppose the British interests within the Conference,⁷⁴ feeling that the government was unable to intervene in a matter of the private sector.⁷⁵

The results of this “unofficial discrimination” of the Conferences, as termed by S.G. Sturmeý,⁷⁶ were that *Patris* would embark about 160 passengers on its first trip

⁷⁰ Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, “Adjournment Speech”, 27.04.1960; «Η Γραμμή Ελλάδος-Αυστραλίας», *Naftika Chronika*, 589/348, 15.12.1959; «Οικτρά η αντίδρασις κατά της Ελληνικής Γραμμής Αυστραλίας», *Naftika Chronika*, 612/371, 01.12.1960.

⁷¹ IOM-GR/Shipping 1952-62, F. Potamianos, Secretary General, Ministry of Mercantile Marine to Ministry of Interior Dept of Emigration, 13499/573, 13.02.1960; «Θετικός Απολογισμός», *Naftika Chronika*, 608/367, 01.10.1960.

⁷² Hope, *op.cit.*, p. 397.

⁷³ Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, “Adjournment Speech”, 27.04.1960. The MP who brought the matter in the House of Representatives was Fred Daly of the Labor Party.

⁷⁴ AGMFA/CS/1959/1/3/2/2, I.A. Τζούνης, Γραμματέυς Πρεσβείας Α’, Υπουργείον Εξωτερικών το Υπουργείον Εμπορικής Ναυτιλίας, «Δηλώσεις Υπουργού Εμπορίου Αυστραλίας επί θέματος υ/κ “Πατρίς”», 020842, 07.12.1959.

⁷⁵ *OEE*, 296, 15.02.1960.

⁷⁶ G.S. Sturmeý, *op.cit.*, p. 170.

from Australia to Greece and about 400 tons of freight. Chandris visited Australia and requested that the Greek community and the Greek community Press in Australia support Patris.⁷⁷ In addition, in order to mitigate the effects of the embargo, alongside with refrigerated meat and other cargo trade agreements made, the Chandris organised an advertisement campaign in Australia for the development of tourist traffic, offering to each of his passengers three days of hospitality in Greece. Furthermore, Chandris concluded an agreement with a travel organisation in Australia (*Overseas Travellers Club*) for the carrying of about 500 passengers per sailing from Australia, securing in this way the viability of the services. Within a year from the sailing of Patris, Chandris bought the passenger vessel, *Bretagne*. Bretagne sailed from Southampton, UK, thus inaugurating a new service, the *Europe Australia Line*, and competed with the British Conference member-lines within their ‘own’ territory by offering fares about fifteen to twenty percent lower than the Conference’s fares.⁷⁸ Simultaneously, the vessels of *P&O and Orient Line* continued approaching the Greek ports of Piraeus and Navarino, embarking ICEM migrants when the Chandris’ vessels did not have scheduled sailings.⁷⁹

In the following years, the effects of embargo eased and, in 1962, the Passenger Conference lifted the prohibition of ticket selling to the travel agents in Australia. Before that, in an effort to isolate GAL, the Conference approached the Italian liner shipping companies (*SITMAR, Cogedar and Flotta Lauro*) trying to eliminate the competition between them in the Australian sea routes. The Italian companies, in the absence of GAL, rejected the proposal. In a new meeting held in 1962 with GAL’s participation, the Conference and Italian companies agreed on a formula of cooperation under which their fare rates would stabilise, as well as the amount of commission paid to the travel agents.⁸⁰ This understanding did not result in any membership of GAL or of the Italian companies in the *Australian New Zealand Passenger Conference*, but was

⁷⁷ Angelos Mpouzalas, «Η μάχη μεταξύ του Ελλην. πλοίου ‘Πατρίς’ και των ξένων της γραμμής Αυστραλίας», *OEE*, 295, 01.02.1960; *OEE*, 296, 15.02.1960; «Το Α! Ταξίδιον του Πατρίς», *Naftika Chronika*, 593/352, 15.02.1960.

⁷⁸ IOM-SW/General, ICEM-Australia I, Peter Gibson Chief of Mission Australia to Director, ICEM HQs Geneva, 2992, AUS/N/1, 16.12.1960; «Η Γραμμή Ελλάδος-Αυστραλίας», *Naftika Chronika*, 589/348, 15.12.1959; «Τα υπερωκεάνια», *Naftika Chronika*, 390/349, 01.01.1960; «Το ‘Βρετάννη’ του Οίκου Χανδρή», *Naftika Chronika*, 632/391, 01.10.1961; Tzamtzis, *op.cit.*, pp. 121-122, 124.

⁷⁹ IOM-SW/General, ICEM-Australia I, Peter Gibson to Director, ICEM HQs Geneva, “Greece Form 40 Cases”, 3372, AUS/M/3, 31.01.1961; «Ενώ η αντίδρασις συνεχίζεται», *Naftika Chronika*, 616/375, 01.02.1961.

⁸⁰ “Victory for the Greek Australian Line”, *Naftika Chronika: a fortnightly English supplement*, 37, 15.04.1962.

an effort to halt the aggressive competition between them and an acknowledgment of the success of GAL in this traffic.

Two years later, in 1964, the Conference system was attempted to be regulated on an international level. The *Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences* was started being drafted from the *United Nations Conference on Trade and Development* (UNCTAD), in an effort to ease the restrictive policies of the Conferences and their openness to new members, as well as the traffic-sharing. The main goal of this *Code of Conduct* was the facilitation of the establishment of national shipping lines from developing countries.⁸¹

With the support of ICEM, the easing of the effects of the embargo and the increase of the Greek-Australian migrant traffic in 1961-1966 (Table 8.1), GAL stabilised its operation. Within a brief period, GAL enlarged its fleet by four more passenger vessels that were directed from Southampton to Australia with calls also in Piraeus.⁸² Nevertheless, the competition between the liner shipping companies connecting Europe with Australasia continued. Chandris, in view of the decrease of the Australian immigration programme in 1966-1967 (Table 8.1), also considered using the influence of the Australian government against GAL's main competitors, *Flotta Lauro* and *P&O Orient Line*, in 1966 in order to stop calling at Piraeus, in exchange for Chandris leniency on a greater use of *Qantas Airlines* from Greece.⁸³

Chandris managed to hold on the competition and, in 1970, amidst the multiannual closure of the Suez Canal (1967-1975), *Flota Lauro* and *Lloyd Triestino* found themselves in defence and joined forces against Chandris' ship-jet operation, which attracted Austrian migrant-passengers considering them as their market. More specifically, GAL chartered aeroplanes for the transport of migrants from Vienna and other European cities to Djibouti or Aden, wherefrom they embarked in Chandris' passenger vessels sailing to Australia.⁸⁴ What is more, Chandris in the same year, in

⁸¹ A. W. Cafruny, "The Political Economy of International Shipping", pp. 86, 99-101; M. Stopford, *Maritime Economics*, p. 689.

⁸² GAL's new vessels were *Bretagne* in 1961, replaced by *Ellinis* in 1963, *Australis* and *Queen Frederika* in 1965. *Patris* remained in the service of Greece-Australia sea routes. On the history and characteristics of the five vessels, advise W.H. Miller, *op.cit.*, pp. 8-12, 14-22, 28-33, 37-39 and Plowman, *op.cit.*, pp. 117-118, 121-122, 132-134, 137-139. The success of GAL because of the migration trade was also acknowledged by the wider maritime community, as Ioannis L. Goulandris admits in his article, «Η Υπερωκεάνιος Ναυτιλία», *Naftika Chronika*, 702/461, 01.09.1964.

⁸³ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/5/Shipping/Liaison with Australia Policy, G.W. von Armin, ICEM Liaison Mission Australia and New Zealand to J. Hübener, Chief, Dept of Transport, ICEM HQs, Personal, 04.02.1966.

⁸⁴ With the closure of the Suez Canal, the ship-jet operation of the Chandris vessels avoided the long hauls through the Cape of Good Hope in Southern Africa. Since 1972 the air charters were directed to

1970, signed a \$20 million contract with the Australian government for the transport of British subsidised migrants and other migrants admitted to Australia based on specific programmes funded solely by the Australian government. This contract had three years duration and was an important success of the company, which overthrew *SITMAR Line*, the fourteen year holder of the governmental contract.⁸⁵ Nevertheless, when the interest of GAL coincided with its foreign competitors, they joined forces against ICEM, as in the case of fare increases request from GAL, *Lloyd Triestino*, and *Flotta Lauro*, as discussed in Chapter 6.

In the field of competition by aeroplanes, as we remember, Chandris tried to press the Greek government for the cancelation of the ICEM chartered flights and to direct these migrant passengers to GAL's vessels; thus, the withdrawal of landing rights of aeroplanes was rather an established practice.⁸⁶ The use of the chartered aeroplanes by ICEM was also a reason for the formation in Greece of a *Committee for the Transport of Emigrants to Australia through ICEM* in 1961. This Committee was composed of representatives of the Greek Ministries of Interior, Foreign Affairs and Mercantile Marine, and, since 1972, also of the Department of Civil Aviation. The year of the inclusion of the Department of Civil Aviation in the Committee should not be perceived as incidental. It is the year that the Greek *Olympic Airways* inaugurated connections between Athens and Australia, while the Greek military government of the period (1967-1974) maintained very good relationship with the owner of the airline company, the well-known shipowners, and a businessman, Aristotle Onassis, as well as with a great number of other Greek shipowners. Thus, the role of this Committee was to advise on the means of transport to be used for the ICEM migrants departing from Greece to Australia,⁸⁷ a coordinated attempt to accommodate diverging interests and to secure the transport work of ICEM for the Greek flag.

Singapore, wherefrom the Chandris vessels embarked the passengers to Australia. IOM-SW/Registry, ICEM V, 1951-1980, Dr. Lucio Fiorentino, Achille Lauro Armatore to Dr. Giacinto Maselli, ICEM Ginevra, LF/IP, 17.11.1970; *ibid.*, E. Jacob, Chief Dept of Transport to Director through the Deputy Director, "Sea movements of migrants from Austria to Australia", 18.12.1970; W. Miller, *op.cit.*, p. 10.

⁸⁵ IOM-SW/General, 153/Miscellaneous/Historical General Related Matters 1968-1973/Australia, F. Zurek, ICEM Representative Australia to Director, ICEM Geneva, 1042 AUS/N/1, 03.04.1970; K. Doukas, «Το συγκρότημα του κ. Αντ. Χανδρή διεθνοποιείται», *Naftika Chronika*, 838/597, 01.05.1970.

⁸⁶ IOM-SW/General, ICEM-Australia I, Peter Gibson to Director, ICEM HQs Geneva, "Movements 1960/61", 3881, AUS/N/1, 15.03.1961.

⁸⁷ IOM-GR/Shipping 1952-62, Υπουργοί Εσωτερικών, Εξωτερικών, Εμπορ. Ναυτιλίας, «Σύστασις επιτροπής μεταφοράς μεταναστών εις Αυστραλίαν μέσω ΔΕΜΕ», εμπ.1941, 06.10.1961; IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/GRE/Transport Liaison with Greece, Vol. III, Peter Gibson, Chief of Mission, ICEM Athens to E. Jacob, Chief, Dept of Transport, "Movements by Olympic Airways from Europe to Australia", 19.04.1972; Limnios-Sekeris, "Stakeholders and Competition", p. 104.

Against the foreign competition, the Greek maritime and pro-migration Press stood on the side of Chandris' requests for more access in the traffic to Australia. Published articles revealed, apart from the lack of support towards GAL from the side of Greek government,⁸⁸ the unrestricted access of Italian passenger ships in the transportation of Greek migrants to Australia, at a time when the Greek vessels had a limit of only fifty Italian migrants per voyage.⁸⁹ In addition, criticism over ICEM for the transfer of Greek migrants by aeroplanes or foreign vessels instead of the Greek ones was a recurrent subject in part of the Greek maritime and pro-migration Press. This practice was characterised as a "scandal" and the attitude of ICEM as "unacceptable" and "hostile" towards GAL. The contribution of GAL in the national economy was highlighted and the Greek government was called to intervene in support of the Greek shipowner.⁹⁰ The support of part of the Press was ascertained also through the payment of lavish illustrated advertisements of the services of Chandris' vessel in each of their issue,⁹¹ as well as wider entrepreneurial relationships built with the publishing groups.

On the other side, part of the Greek anti-migration centre-wing and left-wing Press did not directly criticise GAL, but when mechanical problems were identified, it did not miss the opportunity to highlight them.⁹² In addition, when a considerable number of Greeks embarked on a Chandris vessel, they noted their distress for the outflow of young Greeks.⁹³ However, when the governmental change in 1963-1964 by a centre-wing government took place, such comments were omitted.⁹⁴

In the field of domestic competition, Chandris did not let other competitors undermine GAL's supremacy in the Greek Australian sea routes. Therefore, when Latsis announced his intention to the Press to schedule a series of voyages to Australia

⁸⁸ «Ο Πειραιϊκός Λιμίν Εδεξιώθη το 'Βρετάννη'», *Naftika Chronika*, 636/395, 01.12.1961.

⁸⁹ IOM-GR/Translations of Press Cuttings, 01.01.1964-31.12.1964, "Request for Measures Similar to Those Prevailing in Italy as Regards the Movement of Migrants", *Oikonomiki Ora*, 28.09.1964.

⁹⁰ «Επικίνδυνος Επιχείρησις», *Naftika Chronika*, 595/354, 15.03.1960; «Εις την Γραμμήν Αυστραλίας», *Naftika Chronika*, 625/384, 15.06.1961; «Η Απαράδεκτος Τακτική», *Naftika Chronika*, 633/392, 15.10.1961; «Αι Εξελίξεις εις την Υπερωκεάνιον Ναυτιλίαν», *Naftika Chronika*, 638/397, 01.01.1962; «Η Τριετία της Γραμμής Αυστραλίας», *Naftika Chronika*, 662/421, 01.01.1963.

⁹¹ For an overview of the advertisements *Naftika Chronika* indicatively see the issues 621/380, 15.04.1961, 686/445, 01.01.1964

⁹² «Το 'Βρετάνη' ενέπλευσε σήμερα συνεπεία βλάβης», *Ta Nea*, 5452, 28.03.1963; «Άγνωστος αριθμός τραυματιών. Πολλά άτομα είχαν παγιδευθή», *Ta Nea*, 5461, 08.04.1963; M. Mathioudakis, «Ημπορούσε να προληφθή η μεγάλη πυρκαϊά;», *Ta Nea*, 5462, 09.04.1963.

⁹³ «Τα Νέα του Πειραιώς», *Ta Nea*, 5414, 11.02.1963; «Ογκούται το κύμα της φυγής από την Ελλάδα», *Ta Nea*, 5582, 30.08.1963.

⁹⁴ For more see, *Ta Nea* in 1965.

starting in November 1964 by the passenger vessel, *Marianna IV*, Chandris organised a Press campaign characterising the sailing of Latsis' vessel as "illegal", considering that only his vessels retained the right for the service of Greek Australia sea route.⁹⁵ Latsis objected to the accusations and reconfirmed his will to perform the voyage "at any rate", as there were no legal obstacles.⁹⁶ Thus, he transferred the matter to the Legal Counsellor of the Greek Ministry of Mercantile Marine who decided in Latsis' favour;⁹⁷ this should not be considered as coincidence, as the governmental change in 1963-1964 with a centre-left-wing Greek government overturned the *status quo* of the business and political world of the time. Latsis and the Prime Minister G. Papandreou both originated from the Peloponnese and both maintained important business and political links with the Middle East;⁹⁸ these men and their descendants developed a relationship also in the years to follow.

However, within a few days, it was announced through the Greek Press that both shipping companies would cooperate for an "extraordinary sailing" of the Latsis vessel handled by GAL.⁹⁹ For this voyage, the ship's funnel was painted in Chandris colours,¹⁰⁰ and, according to the ICEM Athens Chief of Mission, the GAL purchased Latsis' vessel with the intention to resell it to Latsis upon the vessel's arrival to Australia.¹⁰¹

Olympic Airways, the Greek national airline owned by A. Onassis, did not constitute an actual competitor of Chandris. Olympic Airways inaugurated in the early

⁹⁵ IOM-GR/Shipping (Australia-New Zealand) 1963-1965, "For Australia T/SS 'Marianna' IV of the I.S. Latsis Shipping Co."; *ibid.*, Greek-Australian Line, "Notice", 10.11.1964; «Αι Υπερωκεάνιοι Γραμμαί», *Naftika Chronika*, 710/469, 01.01.1965.

⁹⁶ IOM-GR/Shipping (Australia-New Zealand) 1963-1965, I.S. Latsis Shipping Company, "Notice", 10.11.1964

⁹⁷ «Η Επιβουλή κατά του άρθρου 13», *Naftika Chronika*, 708/467, 01.12.1964.

⁹⁸ Prime Minister Georgios Papandreou during WWII transferred his government to Lebanon forming the National Unity Government in May-October 1944. Latsis, served the Muslim pilgrim sea route to Mecca, had extended business relationships with Libya, and developed important links with the oil-rich nations of the Middle East. Specifically, in 1969 Latsis established the oil company Petrola and in 1972 his oil refinery was founded also with funds from the Arab world. Therefore, the maintaining goal of the Greek governments since 1953 for the attraction of foreign funds into Greece was met with success. For more, Katerina Kapetanaki-Sifaki, *Η διεθνοποίηση του κεφαλαίου στην Ελλάδα. Η περίπτωση των διυλιστηρίων. Μια ανάλυση των σχέσεων Ελλήνων εφοπλιστών – πολυεθνικών εταιρειών πετρελαίου*, Athens, 1985, pp. 46-66, 105-106, 183-184.

⁹⁹ IOM-GR/Shipping (Australia-New Zealand) 1963-1965, "Notice", *To Vima, Kathimerini*, 20.11.1964; IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/GRE/Transport Liaison with Greece, Vol. III, Cable, ICEM Athens to Promigrant Geneve, UA015, 20.11.1964.

¹⁰⁰ Plowman, *op.cit.*, p. 76.

¹⁰¹ IOM-GR/Shipping (Australia-New Zealand) 1963-1965, Chief of Mission to Director ICEM, 30.11.1964; Limnios-Sekeris, "Stakeholders and Competition", p. 102.

1972 flights from Athens through Bangkok and Singapore to Sydney twice a week, and the Greek government requested ICEM to take its service into consideration.¹⁰² The restricted size of the airline's fleet limited Olympic Airways' participation in the ICEM migrant transport programme.¹⁰³ However, the airline's participation was based on a fifty-fifty share basis of the air-transported migrants by Qantas Airlines¹⁰⁴ without directly affecting the operation of Chandris passenger vessels.

However, in the second half of 1977, Olympic Airways, which was under the ownership of the Greek state since 1975, suspended its flights from Greece to Australia due to insufficient profitability in this route.¹⁰⁵ Chandris did the same with vessels, which arrived for the last time in Australia in December 1977,¹⁰⁶ 'surrendering' in the competition of aircraft and focusing entirely on the cruise business in the Atlantic, Caribbean, Pacific, Indian, and Indonesian oceans—a market which had joined, since 1961,¹⁰⁷ as a complimentary activity. Many more liner shipping companies followed suit,¹⁰⁸ and the cruises progressively became the main employment of their passenger vessels.

The establishment and operation of the Greek-Australasian sea route was directly linked with the assurances from the side of ICEM for the provision of migrant-passengers. ELMES, Latsis, Koutoupes, and Chandris sought the support of ICEM before the sailing of their vessels. When the ICEM support diminished, the liner shipping companies faced viability problems, as happened in 1956 when the insufficient number of migrant passengers provided by ICEM contributed to the end of

¹⁰² IOM-SW/Registry, 8/1/GRE/Transport Liaison with Greece, Vol. III, K. Panagopoulos, Ministry of Mercantile Marine, Transports and Communications Civil Aviation Service to Ministry of Interior, Emigration Dept, "Olympic Airways line to Australia", D3/G/38305/5370, 23.12.1971.

¹⁰³ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/22/111/Australia, Chief, Dept of Transport to Director, "Olympic Airways Service to Australia", 27.01.1972; IOM-GR/Shipping 1972-1978, E. Jacob, Chief, Dept of Transport to Chief of Mission, ICEM Athens, 02.02.1972.

¹⁰⁴ IOM-GR/Shipping 1972-1978, E. Jacob, Chief, Dept of Transport to P. Gibson, Chief of Mission, ICEM Athens, "Movements by Olympic Airways from Europe to Australia", 28.04.1972.

¹⁰⁵ IOM-SW/Registry, 8/12/Transport, Quotations of Prices, Offers of Spaces, Vol. XI, G. Sliwik to Director through Mr. Christensen, "Status Report on 1. Migrant Fares to Australia, 2. Group Fares from Portugal, 3. Migrant Fares by Sea on Costa", 26.08.1977.

¹⁰⁶ Commonwealth of Australia, "News Release from Immigration and Ethnic Affairs", IEA 103/77, 14.12.1977, accessible online at Parliament of Australia, <https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;orderBy=customrank;page=1;query=Chandris;rec=7;resCount=Default>, retrieved on 14.11.2021.

¹⁰⁷ «Τα πλέον απίθανα», *Naftika Chronika*, 779/538, 15.11.1967. For the employment of Chandris vessels in the Australasian sea route engagement also in the cruising market, see Miller, *op.cit.*, pp. 10, 12, 16, 21-22, 32-33, 37.

¹⁰⁸ On the transition of liner shipping companies from passenger to cruise market, see G. Cerchiello, *op.cit.*, pp. 25-29.

the ELMES services. Conversely, when the ICEM migrant traffic from Greece to Australia increased, it was quite a reason for the establishment of new shipping companies, as the Chandris brothers successfully did with the *Greek-Australian Line*. Therefore, a development role can be attributed to ICEM, since its operation made the re-establishment of the Greek Australasian sea route possible and, consequently, the activation of wider economic markets.

The support of the Greek government was always sought by the interested liner shipping companies, but indirect assurances and its moral support was the best that they received. Kinship and business relations with members of the Government were important tools for the indirect support of the business interests as seen in the case of Chandris when the Minister of Mercantile Marine (1965-1966) of the centre-wing Government was a relative of the shipowners, and the Minister's brother was a close associate of the Chandris shipping company. Likewise, Latsis had developed close links with the G. Papandreou Administration, which favoured his business interests. The governmental support was translated into an attempt to control and manage the market by reducing foreign and domestic competition by securing the passenger load through pressure over ICEM and political representation in foreign entities (foreign governments, governmental and international authorities, ICEM Administration). The Greek governments acted protectively towards ELMES and Chandris in line also with the wider national policy targeting the attraction of the foreign Greek capital into the 'motherland'.

When Latsis expressed his interest in re-establishing the sea route from Greece to Australia in 1957, the domestic competition was mobilised. The Chandris brothers tried to subvert Latsis' initiative by asking ICEM not to conclude any agreement before Chandris and ICEM had the chance to negotiate. Chandris' experience in the IRO traffic must have assisted in finding the most suitable vessel for the traffic, experience that offered the necessary head start in the establishment of the sea route to Australia and for the circumvention of Latsis. After the establishment of GAL, Chandris protected and competed for the primacy of their shipping company in the Greek-Australian sea routes. Chandris adopted an aggressive policy towards domestic and foreign competition from shipping and airline companies, as well as in their claims from the Greek government and the ICEM Administration. All elements reconfirm the opening citation of this Chapter, referring to the aviation sector and, more broadly, to the transport sector as a "jungle" where dog devours dog.

The incident of the embargo by the Conferences is indicative of the creation and protection of ‘monopolies’ and of the practices they adopted to forestall competition. Chandris, though, increased the opposition by raising the matter on a political level through the respective governments, on an entrepreneurship level by making agreements to increase the company’s traffic load, and on a public level through part of the Greek and foreign Press for indirect pressure and support of their claims. In the end, they prevailed over competition by combining, apart from cargo, migrant and tourism traffics from Greece and Europe to Australia, marking the next day in the passenger traffic by sea.

Concluding this chapter, we can argue that the advantages offered by the Greek governments (LD 2687/1953 and subsequent laws) in combination with the international maritime climate after 1958 were instrumental in the revival of the passenger traffic by sea towards the two main destinations of the Greek migrants—the North Atlantic and Australia. Thus, migration can be recognised as the medium for the success of this policy and the re-establishment of these passenger sea routes. However, whenever gaps in the Greek transport market were identified, they were easily covered by foreign competition. The direct imposition of restrictions in the access of the foreign transport companies from the Greek ports and airports was increasingly difficult in an era of trade liberalisation. Therefore, competition between the companies prevailed and the pressure towards ICEM was intense.

The shipowners consisted of an entrepreneurial group highly advantaged by the governmental policies in Greece since 1953, considering that their business endeavours on an international level were set as one of the prerogatives of the Greek state for its financial development. The return of Greek capital acquired abroad into the ‘motherland’ was one of the top priorities of the Greek governments until at least 1980. Thus, the business mentality of the shipowners favouring the diversification of their businesses by investing in various financial and business sectors was what attracted the Greek governments in their effort to please the shipowners’ interest, since their collateral interests affected larger parts of the Greek economy. Therefore, the Greek shipowners had an increased negotiation power over the Greek governments.

The role of the maritime and pro-migration Press was pivotal in the support of business interests and acted as a medium for the control and pressure lever towards the government and secondarily to ICEM. Different transport business interests were

combined with different Press enterprises based on wider entrepreneurial relationships. This is also the reason we notice Greek newspapers standing on the side of different shipping companies: in case disagreements erupted between them. The ‘dependency relationship’ between the Press and the transport businesses was maintained and strengthened out of the recurrent publishing and payment of advertisements on which the Press’s profitability largely relied.

As in the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century, the competition between the transport companies, not only in the case of foreign companies, but as well as in the Greek case, was not necessarily governed by the values of ‘free competition’. Cases of subversion and direct and indirect competition were noticed in all ICEM migrant destinations, with many of the disputes ending up to the Judicial Authorities. The migration business created out of ICEM’s operation enhanced competitiveness, but it also created opportunities for the transport companies as seen especially in the case of Greek-Australasian sea routes.

Conclusions

On the occasion of the 2015-2016 Mediterranean Refugee Crisis, an article published at a news site enumerated the chain of business-making through the refugee flows from Turkey to Greece. Apart from the shipping companies operating in the Northern Aegean, as was discussed in the Introduction, a great number of sectors flourished thanks to the allocation of European funds to Greece for the management of the refugee crisis. Specifically, funds were provided for the daily feeding of refugees (8 million Euros per month), renting of apartments and hotels for their accommodation; building of large refugee reception centres (purchase of containers cost 9.1 million Euros), cleaning services in the reception centres, purchase of the apartment's equipment, payment of utility bills, transportation (passenger vessels from the islands to the mainland, bus in the mainland), and telephone costs (the first thing that the refugees did after their landing was communicate with their families). On top of that, the Greek government, the international organisations, and NGOs hired a large number of people to facilitate the management of the refugee crisis. While, as in any period, cases of exploitation of refugees were far from rare. Specifically, charging a mobile telephone device could cost up to five Euros, overcharging taxi rides was frequent, and smugglers sold hope to refugees for a continuation of their trip to Western Europe. Lastly, the collateral profits were also an important aspect of the crisis. Specifically, based on the article, the islanders fought over who would take the engine of the boat that carried the refugees or even the whole boat. Given that almost 850,000 refugees passed through the Greek islands in 2015, boats and machines numbered in the thousands,¹ and the profit from them was substantial.

In any period, a crisis for some is an opportunity for others. This was the main thinking for the production of this dissertation. Human mobility, apart from the impact it brings on the life of those who move or stay behind, activates a series of economies at local, national, regional, and international levels in whichever period it takes place. This was also the main thinking and ambition of this dissertation, which endeavoured to research the mechanisms of international migration transportation and its management on an intergovernmental level for the post-Second World War period.

¹ Kostas Pliakos, «Μπίζνες στα Βαλκάνια: Βγάζοντας λεφτά από τους πρόσφυγες», cnn.gr, 27.08.2016, retrieved 31.07.2022 see www.cnn.gr/ellada/story/44167/mpiznes-sta-valkania-vgazontas-lefta-apo-toys-prosfyges.

Therefore, in the examination of post-WWII migration in this study, the international organisations were included, as well as the states and the private sector, mainly in the transport sector. Thus, human mobility was examined as commerce and the commercialisation of migration routes was the focus of this study.

More specifically, the main goal of this dissertation was to re-conceptualise post-WWII migration by including the role of the private sector, mainly of the transport sector. This sector was researched in the facilitation of migration, along with the international/intergovernmental organisations specialised in migration. The transport companies were approached as a link in the remunerating chain of migration transport, not as stimulators of migration. The provision of traffic load was mediated by ICEM. From their turn, the transport companies pressured the Organisation for the increase of their traffic, not the migrants themselves. This approach is also one of the main contributions of this dissertation, as it brings together different fields of research into a discussion: migration history, history of international organisations, transport history (maritime history & aviation history), and business history. Such an approach has not yet been attempted by the historiography of post-WWII migration and assists in understanding the interrelation of national and international politics, economy, labour market, and technology through the lens of migration. In addition, the examination is widened chronologically and geographically, thus reaching the developments noticed in the aforementioned fields until 1980, while the transnational approach adopted assists in the examination and combination of the developments in several emigration and immigration countries.

The interrelation and interlink between migration, international organisations, politics, economy, and the transport sector were examined through the establishment and work of the *Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration* (ICEM), the international organisation which is at the core of this dissertation. ICEM was examined in the context of the political, economic, geostrategic, and social system created in the first years after the end of WWII. The Cold War formed new realities in international politics and divided the world into two blocs. The United States was the leading country in the West and formed the policies to support the reconstitution of Western Europe and the integration of its European and other overseas allies into a multifaceted system that, ultimately, would secure the economic, political, and geostrategic interests of the United States.

A step towards these goals was by implementing the *European Recovery Programme* (ERP), the Marshall Plan. By having incorporated the New Deal policies, ERP targeted the recovery and reinforcement of the Western-European economies, production and trade, while a key element was the close cooperation endeavoured between the private and the public sectors. The ultimate goal was the alleviation of communist influence in Europe and the balance of power between the two Blocs.

The ERP came to a conclusion in 1951. Its implementation was costly for the United States, which had fully undertaken its funding. The international system though, with the support of the United States, had started even earlier from the end of the Marshall Plan to seek the restoration of the upheavals that arose with WWII. The way to do so was through bilateral and international cooperation in the context of international and intergovernmental organisations. Integration was set as a crucial component for the post-WWII world on a regional and global level in several sectors (economy, military, labour, health, among many other fields). This system of international cooperation, in many cases under the leadership of the United States, redistributed the financial cost among the participating member-governments and facilitated the finding of solutions to problems on an international scale.

In this dissertation, ICEM, as an intergovernmental agency under the leadership of the United States and comprised of its European and overseas allies, is perceived as a quasi continuation of the Marshall Plan. Both Marshall Plan and ICEM were established with the initiative of the United States under the Truman Administration. In particular, the establishment of ICEM was funded by the succeeding authority of ERP, the *Mutual Security Administration*, while the function of the Organisation, as a tool of the US Cold War development policies, was based on the ideals of ERP. While the Marshall Plan targeted the increase of production in Europe, ICEM worked for the increase of production in overseas countries via the European workforce it transported. Collaboration between the public and private sectors was a goal shared by the New Deal policies where Marshall Plan was based, as well as the Keynesian economic policies dominating between 1945 and the 1970s in the European economic policies. Apart from that, free international trade, development, and abundance of consumption were some of the EPR values that were endorsed also by ICEM. Within the context of multilateral integration, ICEM is considered as a means for the integration of the Western countries in matters of migration and its management.

The United States was the country under which initiative ICEM was established and, throughout the period under examination, remained the main funding and political power within ICEM. The Organisation acted as a vehicle for the United States to succeed in its Cold War priorities, as well as a means to further institutionalise its power with the establishment of an additional international agency under its leadership. The United States acted as a quasi-manager of the ICEM Administration. Every ICEM policy, before its proposal to the rest of the member-states, was discussed with the United States. If the United States concurred with this policy, then it was brought to the ICEM Council for discussion with the rest member-states, where it was approved with American backing. Out of the twenty-nine years (1951-1980) examined in this dissertation, an American citizen held the position of the Director of ICEM for twenty-five years; this practice continued until 2018. The continued directorship by an American citizen guaranteed that the work of ICEM would be aligned with the foreign policy of the United States.

The establishment of ICEM also underlines the role of the management of human mobility and the provision of ‘humanitarian’ assistance by the United States as a vehicle for the achievement of diplomatic and foreign trade interests. Correlations with the early 20th century are highlighted, as was the case of the *American Relief Administration* (ARA), which, by assisting in the reconstitution of post-WWI Europe, largely worked as an instrument for the establishment of political and trade relations with Europe while fighting the rising of Bolshevism in Europe. Both ARA and the Marshall Plan, but also ICEM, constituted parts of the foreign diplomacy of the United States, with the latter two targeting the limitation of the communist influence. Such a policy was not restricted in Europe. The United States President H. Truman wanted to expand into the field of ‘humanitarian’ and technical assistance in the so-called Third World countries, and this is what his *Point Four Programme* endeavoured.²

ICEM was established having a specific mandate, to facilitate the migration of the “excess” population from Europe, by providing transportation services. The setting up of the Organisation outside the United Nations system was chosen as a means for the United States and the member-states of ICEM to legitimise their population/migration policies. ICEM is recognised in this dissertation as a state-led

² Keith David Watenpugh, *Bread from Stones: The Middle East and the Making of Modern Humanitarianism*, Oakland, 2015, pp. 193-195.

organisation, foremost responsible to its member-states rather than the migrants and refugees it transported or to any binding human rights treaty. Therefore, ICEM lacked the power and advocacy that other international organisations of the time enjoyed, simply because it only had operational responsibilities rather than ‘humanitarian’/protection ones towards the population it was assisting. This adjustment to the needs of the member-states proved also the flexibility that ICEM services promised. It was also one of the reasons that made the Organisation last and made negotiations with the member-states and, therefore, with the business partners easier.

ICEM, along with the Cold War development policies of the United States, assisted in the importation of migrants who, through their labour in the private sector, would foster development rates by reducing the financial cost for the states and securing profits for the private sector. From the perspective of the private sector, though, the closest business partner of ICEM was the transport sector, in particular, the shipping and airline companies.

The transport sector under the Truman Administration constituted a key component in European recovery, as it could assist in the increase of international trade, development, and balance of payments. The shipping sector was supported under the Marshall Plan as well as the maritime infrastructures in Europe. Corresponding support was enjoyed by the airline companies of several countries which were supported with funds for the development of their fleets, either through the Marshall Plan or other international tools such as the *World Bank*. It should not be considered accidental that ICEM was asked to base its operation on the existing sea and air routes and did not acquire its own fleet of passenger vessels and aircraft as the *International Refugee Organisation* had, simply because the goal of the member-states of ICEM was to support the regular scheduled liner shipping companies already in operation under their flag. Such an objective was expressed in the ICEM Constitution, which bound the priority of the scheduled regular transport companies.

As it was supported in this dissertation, in a period of an intense shipping shortage, the existence of the IRO fleet seems to have accelerated the establishment of ICEM. The discussion on the future of the IRO fleet has continued, at least, since 1950, while the United States elaborated the establishment of a new intergovernmental organisation to undertake the organisation of migration in the mid-1951. Therefore, transportation, particularly the IRO fleet, constituted a crucial element in the establishment and operation of ICEM, the Organisation which succeeded IRO.

The transport sector was a critical component in the success of the work of ICEM, considering that shipping and airline companies transported the European “surplus population”, which would transform into a valuable labour force after landing in the overseas countries. Thereafter, the new labour force transferred by ICEM with its work would increase production, production would increase trade rates domestically and internationally, and, through that development rates would also improve. Therefore, it is not surprising that the main funding and expenses of ICEM were related to transport. These funds were also the lure for many member-states in their participation in the Organisation. The indications projected by this dissertation, on a pre-arrangement of the financial distribution of ICEM transport funds since its first days from its establishment, are quite telling. In particular, according to the Italian Ambassador in 1955, it was agreed, in 1951, that Italy and Germany would receive 38 percent of the transport funds of ICEM and that the Netherlands, Austria, and Greece together would receive the remaining 24 percent.³ Such a pre-arrangement of the transport funds between a few seems like a displacement of the main objective of ICEM, namely the redistribution of part of the European population to overseas countries, to a pure mechanism for the funding of transport companies, at least in the thinking and pursuits of some member-states.

As indicated, through ICEM, the migrants’ voyage was co-subsidised by the funds that ICEM managed, as well as from the emigration and immigration countries and the migrants themselves. The dissertation draws attention to the fact that, in the 1950s, in a period when the mail sea-subsidies were diminishing and the tourist and general passenger traffic had not yet developed, the ICEM subsidisation was sustaining the existing scheduled regular liner shipping companies. It acted also as a means for the development of new sea routes along with the enforcement of international trade rates through the combination of migrant and trade traffic. The operation of ICEM in the 1950s is also suggested to be perceived as a chance and a stepping stone for the liner shipping companies cooperating with ICEM to upgrade their fleet and their services provision, thus making their passenger vessels more ready for their transition into more profitable traffics in conjunction with the tourist traffic, a development taking place in the 1960s.

³ IOM-SW/Registry, 1/1/ITA/ICEM Correspondence with Govt Italy, Vol. II, “Statement Read by Ambassador Mascia, General Director of Emigration, on 8 June 1955, at an Official Meeting During Mr. Tittmann’s Visit in Rome”, n.d.

At the same time, in the early 1950s, the operation of the airline companies remained costly and predominantly state-owned companies burdened the state budgets. In the early 1950s, ICEM was the chance for airline services to be introduced to a wider public, which was outside of their financial spectrum so far. It also worked as compensation for the governments owning airline companies for their costly operation through internationally collected funds.

ICEM established its *migration infrastructure* and transport policy in order to ascertain the orderly operation of its transport programme and its cooperation with the transport companies. It claimed that it aimed at maintaining a “fair and free competition”, ensuring access to its transport work to all the transport companies under the flag of its member-states. It is supported in this study that ICEM was run as a business institution with a social character. ICEM, even if it was an international organisation, was born out of the capitalist system and it followed the financial and business practices it embodied, predominantly adopted by the private sector. Thus, ICEM instigated competition among the transport companies operating on the same sea/air routes, as well as between shipping and airline companies. It targeted cost reduction and profit maximisation for the Organisation and its business partners while it remained in line with the technological developments in the area of transport in view also of more savings. ICEM competed directly with the travel agencies, a sector that, with the establishment of ICEM, lost part of its former clientele. In addition, by trying to prove its efficiency to its member-states, ICEM did not hesitate to expand its clientele by providing assistance to self-paying migrants—a category of migrants not within the direct priorities for international assistance. That an enterprise of the private sector would choose such a tactic was in direct competition with the travel agents and, secondarily, with the scheduled liner shipping companies. Therefore, the very function of ICEM created a climate of competition between its transport partners. Overall, ICEM is a clear example of the capitalist model for the organisation of the economy as it was adopted by the United States, including the capacity of the market, private ownership, and entrepreneurial control.⁴

The interests of each of the ICEM member-states were not necessarily in line with the formal transport policy of the Organisation. Diverging interests, strategies, and

⁴ Charles S. Maier, “The world economy and the Cold War in the middle of the twentieth century”, in M. P. Leffler, O. A. Westad (eds), *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, Volume I, *Origins*, Cambridge, New York, 2010, p. 46.

competing financial interests of the member-states resulted in a battle for the control of the transport policy and programme of ICEM. What certain member-states did in order to get the most out of the transport funds of the Organisation was, first of all, to control the staffing of the Departments of ICEM with appointments of their nationals. It was revealed that staffing the Department of Transport was perceived by the member-states through a political lens and not operational or managerial, simply because it was the key to large sums directed to the shipping and airline companies. The control of the policy formation and implementation of this Department promised access to more profits for the transport companies. What was noticed in this study is that nationals of countries with well-established transport companies were the most common to be seen at the top of the hierarchy of the Department of Transport. Staff selection in this Department was made based on nationality, not based on merit. The staff working for ICEM, as well as for other international organisations, did not lose their national political orientation, as it was claimed that international staff should. The influence they could exert within the Organisation, or even the information and suggestion they could pass to their governments, was always a valuable asset for the success of a member-state's pursuits.

Additionally, the member-states interested in the transport work of ICEM, participated in the *Sub-Committee on the Coordination of Transport* in an effort to safeguard the interests of the regular scheduled means of transport under their national flag. Strategies and competing financial and business interests of the ICEM member-states were confronted in this venue and made the lobbying and group formation between interested member-states visible, e.g. the maritime member-states.

On another level, in the attempt to safeguard the transport interests of specific states, especially during the early formative years of ICEM, a dual transport policy was placed in force. This policy permitted the conclusion of binding agreements with important emigration and immigration member-states. ICEM, in its effort to consolidate its presence and make its existence necessary to its member-states, succumbed to requests of certain member-states, thus conceding priority of their flag in the transport work of the Organisations. Other member-states though, such as the United States, had enacted laws for the exclusive use of their flag in the transport of specific migrants and refugees. Certainly, these requests did not coincide with the formal policy and procedures of the Organisation.

Therefore, the transport policy of ICEM is identified, to a large extent, as self-recanted, thanks to the dominance of specific member-states and the political weakness of ICEM in the early years of its establishment. Hence, based on these agreements made, the ICEM Administration was committed to the selection of its business partners, thus creating a parallel system next to the official ICEM transport policy, which assisted in its deviation and ineffectiveness. This dissertation identifies a close relationship between politics and business in the case of the transport of migrants through ICEM. Migration under ICEM was politicised, as were the means of transport used. No meritocratic criteria were imposed in the selection of the ICEM business partners based on a “free and fair competition”, according to its transport policy doctrine; quite the contrary. The selection of ICEM partners was based on the leverage, influence, and negotiation power that each member-state carried.

Survival was one of the main considerations of ICEM throughout the period under examination. ICEM as an Organisation, but also its country Missions, always sought to prove the necessity of their services to the member-states, as well as their contribution to migration management. This conclusion is also drawn from the Organisation’s occupation with the self-paying migrants, which, as was highlighted, was a migrant category not within the eligible ones for international assistance, but a category that some ICEM country Missions assisted in their migration through the Organisation. We can also notice the survival strategies in the eagerness of ICEM to develop new services for its member-states by identifying gaps in the international system that it proposed to fill by itself. This brings us to the characteristic of *humanitarian entrepreneurialism* that run the operation of ICEM, as supported in this study; said characteristic was identified in the conception of the inspection system of passenger vessels that ICEM attempted to establish, but also in the services proposed to emigration member-states after the withdrawal of Australia from ICEM membership.

From their side, the transport companies had an increased role in the formation of the policies of ICEM, a role which had been delegated by the national governments. Representatives of the transport companies occasionally participated in the Plenary Council Sessions or Sub-Committee Sessions of ICEM; they advised their governments on purely administrative and political matters related to ICEM’s function (e.g. changes in the ICEM Department of Transport); they also influenced, participated and, in some instances, imposed the formation of the migrant transport policy of their governments. Such a practice was not new from the side of the transport sector, as, in the 19th and

early 20th centuries, the shipping companies pressed the governments when their interests in migrant transport were at stake. The governments, from their side, pressured ICEM politically and financially and sometimes even extorted the ICEM Administration for support of the business interests of the transport companies under their flag. Kinship and/or business relationships and alliances with members of the government could secure governmental support for the transport companies over ICEM.

One of the main ingredients promising such support was the financial impact of the transport sector on the economy of each country. ICEM, between 1952 and 1980, transported more than 2,760,000 migrants and refugees; such transport work was translated into more than half a billion dollars (1956-1980). However, the impact of the operation of the transport companies had multiplying effects on other sectors of the economy, activating larger parts of the economy and thus extending the net and the profits from the migration business to other business and economic areas.

ICEM, even if it was a non-profit international organisation, ensured profits for its business partners through its operation. It is highlighted in this study that ICEM worked as a hub for the creation and distribution of transport work for the shipping and airline companies of its member-states. It favoured the commercialisation of the migratory flows and many business opportunities emerged from ICEM's operation. New sea and air routes were established and the operation of others was strengthened with the additional migrant passengers ready to travel at regular time intervals under the ICEM auspices. New shipping companies were established and an extended *migration industry* flourished out of the ICEM operation, while an extensive *migration infrastructure* was built. This also drives the conclusion that ICEM was also a development factor⁵ for the transport sector in the post-WWII years. ICEM worked for the revival and strengthening of the transport businesses and new markets were opened for the private sector, including the tourist and trade traffics. What is more, investments in the transport sector were facilitated through the funding ICEM guaranteed out of its operation.

The impact of ICEM migrant transport work did not always match the level of dependency of the transport companies on the migrant traffic. Thus, it is found that the

⁵ For the role of ICEM as a development agency, see L. Venturas (ed.), *International "Migration Management" in the Early Cold War: The Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration*, Corinth, 2015.

ICEM migrant traffic varied between the levels of *vital* and *important supplement* for the transport companies' profitability, while, for other shipping and airline companies, it was simply *insignificant*. ICEM built its relationship and cooperation with the transport companies and their respective representative collective bodies per traffic on different bases, acknowledging the different dynamics. In this context, it is recognised that ICEM's migrant transport work was *vital* for the shipping transport companies in the Europe-Australia traffic and those in the Southern Europe-South Atlantic sea routes; it was also an *important supplement* for the North Atlantic sea routes and the Australian air routes. For the rest of the migrant traffic, the importance of ICEM for the airline companies varied between *important supplement* and *insignificant* based on the variables of the time/period of the commencement of each voyage.

In any case, the operation of the transport companies was governed by market rules; they were actors of a capital-based economy. They maintained the values of profit/shareholder maximisation and, by cooperating with an intergovernmental organisation, they did not acquire a 'humanitarian' perspective of their work. They were simply chasing profit. Therefore, when the ICEM migrant transport work or, in general, the passenger traffic stopped being as profitable as it was for the transport companies, they simply changed business orientation, transiting to tourist or cargo traffic.

The case of the Greek migration transport business clearly reveals these characteristics, as well as the eagerness of the Greek state to facilitate the Greek shipowners' work. Migration under ICEM is considered in this dissertation as a medium for the support of the success of the Greek state's wider policy, which attempted to attract the capital acquired abroad by Greeks into the motherland and for the reactivation of passenger sea routes. The shipowners are identified as a group of entrepreneurs with a mentality favouring the diversification and globalisation of their businesses. Hence, the attachment of the governments in the facilitation of their endeavours was continuous, as the impact of their work on the economy was multiple. From this relationship of dependence, the increased negotiation power of the Greek shipowners towards the Greek governments also emerges.

Above all, ICEM was a Cold War political tool of the West in its battle against communist influence, which was considered a security threat for the United States and its allies. ICEM endeavoured to achieve political balances within the Western Bloc with the redistribution of the European "surplus" population also by facilitating their development. Apart from its political role, ICEM was also an important tool for the

reactivation of the passenger transport companies especially in the early 1950s and a tool for their enforcement and development in the 1960s, besides its contribution in the increase of trade rates. This study is the first to highlight the support and contribution provided through ICEM to the transport sector. For many member-states, the migrants and refugees redistribution was simply not a consequence of the main goal of ICEM; the support of the transport industries was the principal reason for member-state participation in ICEM. Through the examination of many dissimilar archival records, it is my hope that the inextricable link between migration, international politics, and business interest in the second half of the 20th century was made understood. I hope that this dissertation has highlighted enough of these aspects and will prove to be an inspiration for additional studies that will adopt an interdisciplinary examination in the study of post-WWII migration.

The examination of national archival material from important emigration countries (e.g. Italy and Spain) and of immigration countries (e.g. Canada and Latin American ones), in addition to business archives from shipping and airline companies operating under ICEM (e.g. Qantas Airlines, Greek-Australian Line, Italian liner passenger shipping companies), would reveal new dimensions in the international migration management, as well as additional aspects of the migration business that flourished through ICEM in the second half of the 20th century.

Annex

Table 1, Annex: Total Operational Expenditure, 1953-1959 (US\$)

	1953		1954		1955		1956		1957		1958		1959		1953-59	
	\$	%	\$	%	\$	%	\$	%	\$	%	\$	%	\$	%	\$	%
Transport	13,544,274	73.9	24,186,133	86.1	27,630,377	88.5	30,342,991	86.9	38,984,735	84.3	20,535,956	83.0	23,673,745	83.8	178,898,211	84
Services	2,159,020	11.8	1,374,732	4.9	1,748,779	5.6	1,735,634	5.0	3,915,870	8.5	3,104,506	12.6	3,444,076	12.2	17,482,617	8
Other	2,635,015	14.4	2,538,007	9.0	1,829,945	5.9	2,846,854	8.2	3,346,572	7.2	1,093,580	4.4	1,138,120	4.0	15,428,093	7
Total	18,338,309	100	28,098,872	100	31,209,101	100	34,925,479	100	46,247,177	100	24,734,042	100	28,255,941	100	211,808,921	100

Sources: Personal elaboration based on Alexis Franghiadis, "Who Pays: Financing and Budget of the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (1952-1959), in Lina Venturas (ed.), *International "Migration Management" in the Early Cold War: The Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration*, University of the Peloponnese, Corinth, 2015, Table 16, p. 114.

Table 2, Annex: Total Operational Expenditure, 1960-1969 (US\$)

	1960		1961		1962		1963		1964		1965	
	\$	%	\$	%	\$	%	\$	%	\$	%	\$	%
Transport	2,353,7780	83.0	18,698,100	85.5	14,004,396	76.9	12,131,415	68.9	13,065,763	68.4	13,068,239	73.6
Services	379,4655	13.4	2,204,522	10.1	1,781,418	9.8	2,979,679	16.9	2,869,265	15.0	2,596,217	14.6
Other	104,1755	3.7	961,850	4.4	2,431,178	13.3	2,487,903	14.1	3,160,364	16.6	2,100,779	11.8
Total	2,837,4190	100	21,864,472	100	18,216,992	100	17,598,997	100	19,095,392	100	17,765,235	100
	1966		1967		1968		1969		1960-1969			
	\$	%	\$	%	\$	%	\$	%	\$	%		
Transport	12,273,437	78.6	11,211,056	73.9	15,811,650	78.3	18,378,295	80.9	152,180,131	77.4		
Services	2,398,654	15.4	3,046,696	20.1	3,193,578	15.8	3,313,306	14.6	28,177,990	14.3		
Other	936,809	6.0	904,760	6.0	1,179,360	5.8	1,034,980	4.6	16,239,738	8.3		
Total	15,608,900	100	15,162,512	100	20,184,588	100	22,726,581	100.0	19,6597,859	100		

Sources: IOM-SW/Library, ICEM, "Financial Report for the Year 1960", 15th Session, MC/477, 14.07.1961; *ibid.*, ICEM, "Financial Report for the Year 1961", 18th Session, MC/542, 19.07.1962; *ibid.*, ICEM, "Financial Report for the Year 1962", MC/616, 07.08.1963; *ibid.*, ICEM, "Financial Report 1 January-31 December 1963 and Report of the External Auditors", 21st Session, MC/645, 03.04.1964; *ibid.*, ICEM, "Financial Report 1 January-31 December 1965", 25th Session, MC/769, 04.04.1966; *ibid.*, ICEM, "Financial Report 1 January-31 December 1966 and Report of the External Auditors", 27th Session, MC/828, 12.04.1967; *ibid.*, ICEM "Financial Report 1 January-31 December 1968 and Report of the External Auditors", 30th Session, MC/912, 14.04.1969; *ibid.*, ICEM, "Financial Report 1 January-31 December 1970 and Report of the External Auditors", 37th (Special) Session, MC/EX/241, 12.05.1971.

Table 3, Annex: Total Operational Expenditure, 1970-1976 (US\$)								
	1970		1971		1972		1973	
	\$	%	\$	%	\$	%	\$	%
Transport	17,187,693	80.1	13,826,240	76.7	11,783,608	72.2	9,753,432	66.4
Services	3,647,301	17.0	3,656,603	20.3	3,876,002	23.8	4,044,979	27.5
Other	610,325	2.8	551,735	3.1	660,170	4.0	885,303	6.0
Total	21,445,319	100	18,034,578	100	16,319,780	100	14,683,714	100
	1974		1975		1976		1970-1976	
	\$	%	\$	%	\$	%	\$	%
Transport	8,200,024	60.6	5,483,450	52.4	7,273,687	60.2	73,508,134	69.0
Services	4,277,709	31.6	4,611,062	44.0	4,349,798	36.0	28,463,454	26.7
Other	1,060,610	7.8	375,227	3.6	452,530	3.7	4,595,900	4.3
Total	13,538,343	100	10,469,739	100	12,076,015	100	106,567,488	100
<i>Sources:</i> IOM-SW/Library, ICEM Executive Committee, "Financial Report 1 January-31 December 1970 and Report of the External Auditors", 37th (Special) Session, MC/EX/241, 12.05.1971; <i>ibid</i> , ICEM, "Financial Report 1 January-31 December 1972", 43rd (Special) Session, MC/EX/285, 28.05.1973; <i>ibid.</i> , ICEM, "Financial Report 1 January-31 December 1974 and Report of the External Auditors", 39th Session, MC/1127, 01.04.1975; <i>ibid.</i> , ICEM, "Financial Report 1 January-31 December 1976", 41st Session, MC/1191, 07.04.1977.								

Table 4, Annex: ICEM Membership							
Year	Admission of member-states	Withdrawals	Observer Status	Year	Admission of member-states	Withdrawals	Observer Status
1951	Austria, Belgium, Germany, France, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Canada, USA, Australia, Brazil, Chile			1966	Peru	France	
1952	Argentina			1967	Honduras; Nicaragua	New Zealand	
1953				1968	Dominican Republic; El Salvador	Venezuela; UK	
1954				1969			Cyprus
1955	Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Federation; New Zealand			1970			Venezuela
1956	Spain; Union of South Africa; Uruguay;			1971			
1957				1972			
1958	Panama			1973	Venezuela	Australia	
1959	Ecuador		San Marino	1974	Cyprus		Egypt
1960	Bolivia	Rhodesia and Nyasaland Federation		1975	Portugal		Canada
1961	UK	Sweden		1976			UK; Thailand
1962	Malta	Canada		1977	Turkey	Spain	Spain; Australia
1963				1978			
1964				1979			
1965				1980		Brazil	Sweden
				1981		Malta	France
<i>Sources:</i> IOM-SW/Library, ICEM, "Report of the Fifteenth Session of the Council of the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration", 16th Session, MC/510/Rev.1, 17.04.1962; <i>ibid.</i> , ICEM, "Withdrawal from Membership of the Government of Canada", 18th Session, MC/INF/102, 16.10.1962; <i>ibid.</i> , ICEM, "Withdrawal of the Government of France from Membership in the Committee", 26th Session, MC/INF/120, 30.09.1966; <i>ibid.</i> , ICEM, "Withdrawal of the Government of Venezuela from Membership in the Committee", 21st (Special) Session, MC/EX/INF/27, 01.06.1968; <i>ibid.</i> , ICEM, "Report on the Twenty-Ninth Session of the Council of the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration", 13th Session, MC/908/Rev.1, 30.05.1969; <i>ibid.</i> , ICEM, "Resolution No. 471 (XXXIII) Representation of the Government of Venezuela at Meetings of the Council", 33rd Session, MC/988, 30.11.1970; <i>ibid.</i> , ICEM, "Withdrawal of the Government of Australia from Membership in the Committee", 43rd (Special) Session, MC/EX/INF/35, 11.05.1973; <i>ibid.</i> , ICEM, "Withdrawal of the Government of Spain from Membership in the Committee and Application for Observer Status", 41st, MC/1199, 28.10.1977; <i>ibid.</i> , ICEM, "Application by the Government of Australia for Representation by an Observer", 41st Session, MC/1200, 18.10.1977; <i>ibid.</i> , ICEM, "Report on the Forty-Fourth Session of the Council of the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration", 45th Session, MC/1297/Rev.1, 20.11.1980; <i>ibid.</i> , ICEM, "Withdrawal of the Government of the Republic of Malta from Membership in the Committee", 47th Session, MC/INF/198, 07.10.1981; <i>ibid.</i> , ICEM, "Application by the Government of Cyprus for Representation by an Observer", 31st Session, MC/942, 17.11.1969; <i>ibid.</i> , ICEM, "Resolution No. 523 (XXXVII) Admission of the Government of Cyprus as a Member of the Committee", 37th (Special) Session, MC/1091, 28.05.1974; <i>ibid.</i> , ICEM, "Application by the Government of Canada for Representation by an Observer", 39th Session, MC/1134, 14.10.1975; <i>ibid.</i> , ICEM, "Application by the Government of Turkey for Membership in the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration", 41st Session, MC/1204, 11.11.1977; <i>ibid.</i> , ICEM,							

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Table 5, Annex: Member-States Participation at the ICEM Sub-Committee on Coordination of Transport Meetings, 1952-1981 (except 1963, 1970)

	Argentina	Australia	Austria	Belgium	Brazil	Canada	Columbia	Costa Rica	Denmark	Dominican Republic	Ecuador	France	Germany	Greece	Honduras	Israel	Italy	Malta	Netherlands	Nicaragua	Norway	Panama	Paraguay	Peru	Rhodesia	Scandinavian countries	Spain	Sweden	Switzerland	Venezuela	Uganda	Union of South Africa	Uruguay	USA	UK	Total	Chair	Vice-Chair	
2nd, 02/1952		1				1						1	1				1		1														1		7	France			
4th, 10/1952						1						1		1			1		1														1		6				
5th, 04/1953						1						1	1				1		1							1									6	France			
6th, 10/1953				1		1						1	1			1	1		1																	7	France	Germany	
7th, 04/1954		1		1		1						1	1				1		1															1		8	France		
8th, 11/1954		1		1		1						1	1				1		1															1		8	France		
2nd, 04/1955	1	1		1		1							1			1	1		1		1		1					1						1		12	France	Italy	
3rd, 10/1955		1		1		1						1	1				1											1						1		8	France	Italy	
4th, 02/1956		1				1						1	1				1		1						1			1		1						9	France	Australia	
5th, 10/1956		1				1						1	1	1			1		1						1			1		1						9	France	Netherl.	
6th, 04/1957		1	1	1		1	1					1	1	1			1		1								1							1		12	Italy	Netherl.	
7th, 10/1957		1		1		1						1	1				1		1								1						1		1		10	Italy	Netherl.
8th, 05/1958		1		1		1						1	1				1		1								1						1		1		10	Italy	Netherl.
9th, 11/1958		1		1		1						1	1	1			1		1								1						1		1		11	Italy	Netherl.
10th, 04/1959		1		1		1						1	1	1			1		1								1						1		1		11	Italy	Netherl.
11th, 11/1959	1	1		1		1						1	1	1			1		1								1		1				1		1		13	France	Netherl.
12th, 05/1960		1		1		1						1	1	1			1		1								1		1					1		11	France	Netherl.	
13th, 12/1960		1		1								1	1	1			1		1								1						1		1		10	France	Greece
14th, 05/1961		1		1								1	1	1			1		1		1						1		1					1	1	12	France	Spain	
15th, 10/ 1961		1		1								1	1	1			1		1								1									8	France	Germany	
16th, 04/1962	1	1		1	1							1	1	1			1		1								1					1		1	1	13	France		
18th, 11/1962		1		1	1							1	1	1			1		1		1						1								1	11	Australia		
19th,																																				0		Italy	
20th																																				0		Germany	
21st, 05/1964		1		1	1							1	1	1			1	1	1								1							1	1	12	Malta	Malta	
22nd, 11/1964		1		1	1							1	1	1			1	1	1								1					1		1	1	13	Malta	Greece	
23rd, 05/1965		1			1							1	1	1			1	1	1								1						1		1	1	12	Australia	France
24th, 12/1965		1			1					1		1	1	1			1	1	1								1						1		1	1	13	Malta	Nether.
25th, 05/ 1966		1			1			1				1	1	1			1	1	1								1						1		1		12	Australia	Malta
26th, 11/1966		1											1	1			1	1	1								1							1		8	Germany	Malta	

	Argentina	Australia	Austria	Belgium	Brazil	Canada	Columbia	Costa Rica	Denmark	Dominican Republic	Ecuador	France	Germany	Greece	Honduras	Israel	Italy	Malta	Netherlands	Nicaragua	Norway	Panama	Paraguay	Peru	Rhodesia	Scandinavian countries	Spain	Sweden	Switzerland	Venezuela	Uganda	Union of South Africa	Uruguay	USA	UK	Total	Chair	Vice-Chair		
27th, 05/1967		1											1	1			1	1	1								1						1		8	Italy	Germany			
28th, 11/1967		1											1	1			1	1	1								1						1		8	Italy	Germany			
31st Special Ex.Com Session, 06/1968		1											1	1			1		1								1						1		7	Spain	Italy			
29th,11/1968		1		1									1	1	1		1	1									1						1		9	Spain	USA			
30th, 05/1969		1		1									1				1	1									1						1		7	Germany				
31st, 12/1969		1		1									1	1			1	1	1								1						1		9	Italy	USA			
32nd,																																				0		USA		
33rd, 11/1970		1		1									1	1			1	1	1								1						1		9	Spain	Australia			
37th Special Ex. Com., 05/ 1971		1		1									1	1			1		1														1		7	Germany	USA			
41st Special Ex. Com., 05/1972		1											1	1			1		1								1						1		7	Italy	Nether.			
43rd Special Ex. Com., 05/1973		1											1	1			1		1												1	1	1		8	Germany	Germany			
38th, 05/1974				1									1	1			1		1	1												1	1	1		9	Germany			
39th, 04/1975													1	1			1		1	1		1									1	1	1		9	USA				
40th, 05/1976				1									1						1													1	1	1		6	Netherl.			
41st, 05/1977				1	1					1			1	1					1	1												1		1		9	Germany			
42nd, 03/1978				1						1			1				1		1													1		1		7	Germany			
44th Special Session, 05/ 1979				1							1		1		1	1	1		1	1														1		9	Germany			
45th,05/1980				1									1			1	1		1		1								1			1		1		9	USA			
Total 1952-1980	3	35	1	30	8	17	1	1	0	2	2	26	44	30	2	4	43	12	42	4	4	1	1	0	2	1	26	4	4	1	1	18	3	39	7					
49th Special Session of Ex. Com, 06/1981			1	1					1				1						1		1			1									1		8	USA				
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E.J.M., “A Dilemma at Sea, or should the LANGFITT be called TIGHTFITT”

It was peaceful and quiet on the “Langfitt”,
The goodnight tales had been read.
When suddenly there was crisis,
The child was too big for the bed.

Then up rose a modern Solomon,
“Cut the baby in half”, he said;
“The crib-size is U.S.A. standard;
It’s the child that has been over-fed”.

“No, no”, cried excitable Jutta,
“You’ll touch not a hair of his head”.
“Why, rather than have that happen,
“I’ll walk off the ship, instead”.

Not a word of this reached Geneva;
They thought all was calm and serene.
Now they’re asking the Escort Officer,
Will he kindly describe the scene.

Source: IOM-SW/General, OPS-20-071, Transport–MSTS–ICEM July-December 1955, E.J. van Horne, Colonel, Acting Chief, United States Office, ICEM Washington to J.J. Bratton, Department of Shipping, ICEM Geneva, Personal, 15.12.1955.

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