Πάντειο Πανεπιστήμιο Κοινωνικών και Πολιτικών Επιστημών
This paper examines whether there is a conflict between private damagesactions and leniency programmes in cartel cases.The paper’s first part offers an overview of the aforementioned notions andthe Community competition rules against cartels. It also discusses the Commission’sWhite Paper, which was issued in 1999, and the innovations it conferred towards amore effective system of public enforcement. Furthermore, it refers to the introductionof leniency programmes in the Greek legal system.The paper’s first part also presents the consequences of the discovery of acartel as far as the undertakings involved are concerned, namely the criminal andadministrative sanctions imposed by the Competition Commission, as well as theconsequences of a cartel in relation to third parties, i.e. their right to seek damagesbefore the Courts.Both civil and administrative courts have in some recent cases ruled thatindividuals, and more particularly customers and consumers of antitrust violators,have a right, pursuant to article 914 of the Greek Civil Code, to file an action fordamages suffered. The European Commission issued in 2005 its Green Paper fordamages actions, identifying therein a number of issues that constitute obstacles to amore efficient private enforcement system in Europe, followed by the 2006 and 2008Notices.The paper’s second part discusses the relation between private damagesactions and leniency programmes; moreover it examines the argument that privatedamages actions negatively affect leniency programmes, acting as a disincentive forcartel members to apply for leniency programmes in fear of facing substantialdamages by their victims.
Διπλωματική εργασία - Πάντειο Πανεπιστήμιο. Γενικό Τμήμα Δικαίου, ΠΜΣ "Δίκαιο και Ευρωπαϊκή Ενοποίηση", κατεύθυνση Ιδιωτικό Δίκαιο, 2010