

**The Social Democratic Experience in Greece and Turkey:  
PASOK and CHP's Powers**

Department Of Political Science and History Of  
Panteion University

By

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In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of  
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## **ABBREVIATIONS**

ADAV	: General German Workers' Association
AP	: Justice Party
CGP	: Republican Reliance Party
CHP	: Turkish Republican People's Party
CIA	: Central Intelligence Agency of the United States
CKMP	: Republican Peasants National Party
CUP	: Community of Union and Progress
DEA	: Drug Enforcement Agency
DEK	: Democratic Center Union
Dev-Genc	: Federation of the Revolutionary Youth of Turkey
DISK	: Confederation of Revolutionary Trade Unions of Turkey
DP	: Democratic Party
DPT	: State Plannin Organization of Turkey
DSP	: Democratic Left Party
EDA	: United Democratic Left
EDE	: National Democratic Union
EDIK	: Union of Democratic Center
EEC	: European Economic Community
EK	: Central Union
EKND	: Center Union-New Forces
EOKA	: National Organization of Cypriot Fighters
EP	: National Front



ERE	: National Radical Union
EU	: European Union
GDP	: Gross Domestic Product
GNP	: Gross National Product
GOT	: Government of Turkey
IMF	: International Monetary Fund
ISI	: Import-Substitute Industrialization
KEPE	: Center of Research and Planning
KKE	: Communist Party of Greece
KNPh	: New Liberals
MC	: National Front
MHP	: Nationalist Movement Party
NATO	: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
ND	: New Democracy
NSC	: National Security Council of the United States
NUC	: National Unity Committee
OCB	: Operations Coordinating Board of the NSC
OECD	: Organization for European Economic Cooperation
OPEC	: Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
PAK	: Pan-Hellenic Liberation Movement
PASOK	: Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement
SPD	: Social Democratic Party of Germany
SAPD	: Social Democratic Workers' Party of Germany

SARD : Socialist Workers' Party of Germany  
TIP : Workers Party of Turkey  
TRT : Turkish Radio and Television Corporation  
TUSIAD : Turkish Industrialists' Businessmen's Association  
YTP : New Turkey Party  
UK : United Kingdom  
UN : United Nations  
USA : United States of America

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## INTRODUCTION

Moving from general to specific offers an incredible comfort to study an issue. Seeing the entire map and then, zooming in where you would like to go step by step allows you to perceive the distinct major points and you can have the opportunity to confirm your hypothesis which you claim in the beginning of your road. However, you can observe the things after you have your idea and this is not a very natural way to approach. Moreover, the general can include the specific but not always reflect it. Conversely, moving from specific to general gives a chance to watch the things. You can see the details which are hidden in particular points, perceive the process and get the patterns. The patterns generally appear as reflections of entire or in other words, the specific is the pattern of the general. Thus, the specific is a part of the general and a way to be able to see the entire map touching the roads and streets of the countries. Moving from this point of view, perhaps, what Gramsci says about a political party has been the best and the most explicit statement to explain the reason and starting point of this study: “*Writing the history of a party means nothing but writing the general history of a country from a monographic point of view.*”<sup>1</sup> From factions to the voice of the people, political parties have always been in a process of change. The party types, organizations and functions have been the most common points to be researched by the scholars. However, the history of this process can be in itself a view to indicate the macro history of the world's political system. Accordingly, the history of those political parties can present the crucial parts of the history of the countries which hide the tips, the details and the points that can complete the puzzle. Sartori claims that the parties are the central intermediate structures between society and the government and thus they have the ability to touch both the governors and the governed by promoting the ideas which will shape the entire system.<sup>2</sup> In this framework, emergence and development

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1 Antonio Gramsci. (1949). *Note sul Machiavelli*. [http://www.liberliber.it/mediateca/libri/g/gramsci/note\\_sul\\_machiavelli/pdf/note\\_s\\_p.pdf](http://www.liberliber.it/mediateca/libri/g/gramsci/note_sul_machiavelli/pdf/note_s_p.pdf). 24.07.2014.

2 John Kenneth White. (2006). “What Is A Political Party?”. (ed.) Richard S. Katz and William Crotty. *Handbook of Party Politics*. London: SAGE Publications Ltd. pp. 7.

process of a political party in a political system can not only give an idea about organizational and political dimensions but also give an idea about the era with historical dimension. From this standpoint, this study aims to analyze the discourses and policies of the Greek Panhellenic Socialist Movement (Panellinio Sosialistiko Kinima- PASOK) and the Turkish Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi- CHP) which are from the centre-left of the political spectrum, in terms of social democracy, respectively, in the periods of 1974-1989 and 1965-1980. The period under discussion refers to the periods of rising social democratic rhetoric in both countries. Similarly those years involve significant historical turning points under the leadership of new, alternative governments which came to power with the promise of "change". Firstly, Turkey experienced a social democratic governance in a society that is defined as right-leaning and difficult political conjuncture. Then almost 10 years after CHP came to power, Greece had its first experience of "socialist" governance with PASOK and its charismatic leader Andreas Papandreou.

Greece and Turkey share many common values as the countries which emerged from the Ottoman Empire. Even though each country has unique structural differences which contain social classes, ethnic and religious groups and the partitions and polarizations in the system, similar political, social and economic approaches and policies have been always observed due to this mutual legacy coming from mutual history.

Various studies in the literature have explored the relations between Turkey and Greece in terms of the controversial issues or the European Union. And many studies which individually indicate economic, political and social structures, events and phenomenon of the countries with details. However, considerably less studies point out the comparative historical analysis of Turkey and Greece in terms of political parties and their ideologies. The comparative approach principally analyzes similarities and differences among countries by focusing on institutions and processes. Much of the world's political activity continues to occur within national borders and comparisons of policies, institutions and processes enable us to

understand critical features that distinguish one country's politics from another's.<sup>3</sup> Therefore, it is warranted to explore the samples of social democrat parties in two different countries and such a comparison can give us an opportunity to observe the similar policies, discourses and implementations of social democrat governments as responses to the needs of specific conditions. Similarities as the main dynamic of the study also indicate the differences in itself, in particular on the level of party types and organizations. However party types and organizations are not the constitutive points and targets of the study because here in this comparative study, simultaneously by giving the general information related to the structures of the political parties, the policy making processes and implementations within the social democratic view are the main points underlined in a historical context.

Kalyvas states that PASOK has an important place in young Greek democracy because of two reasons: First, this new party came to power in 7 years after it was founded in 1974 with an unquestionable success. Second, this was the first instance of democratic alternation of power and this democratic alternation of power had created a period of sharp polarization which appeared between PASOK and ND (New Democracy-Nea Dimokratia).<sup>4</sup> Last 40 years of Greek history has been undeniably shaped by the policies of PASOK and that is why studying on PASOK is substantially studying the contemporary Greek history. Similarly, Tassis underlines, PASOK as a hegemonic party which dominates the party system for years and he divides the Greek history after 1974 through PASOK.<sup>5</sup> Moreover, the Greek party system and the polarization and divisions in the political arena which emerged after the Coup D'etat in 1974, cannot be analyzed independently from PASOK because polarization in the political system deepened with the foundation of

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3 Mark Kesselman, Joel Krieger and William Joseph. (2011). *Introduction to Comparative Politics: Political Challenges and Changing Agendas*. USA: Wadsworth. pp.7-8.

4 Stathis N. Kalyvas. (1997). "Polarization in Greek Politics: PASOK's First Four Years, 1981-1985". *Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora*. 23:1. pp.83.

5 C. D. Tassis. (2003). "PASOK: From Protest to Hegemony". *The First Hellenic Observatory PhD Symposium On Modern Greece*. pp. 13.

PASOK and the game started to be played between two major umbrella parties, PASOK and ND. In this frame, where PASOK stands in the political spectrum is the first question that was taken into consideration in this study and even if the party defined itself as socialist, it was indicated by focusing on the policies and implementations through discrepancies of rhetoric that PASOK has been in the centre-left of political spectrum since the beginning of its first period.

As the party which founded the Republic of Turkey, CHP has a unique place in Turkish history however it is not possible to talk about just one party with its ideology, program, structure and even policies. Therefore we can unquestionably claim that there are four different CHPs since the beginning until today. First one is the founder of the Republic under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and Ismet Inonu. Despite the changes and some discontinuities by the effects of changing conjuncture, Ataturk and Inonu were coming from the same ecocole and thus first CHP could stay in the political scene until 1972. In 1972 a new period started in which the ideology of the party was transformed with a young and new leader, Bulent Ecevit. Now, Turkey had met the second and social democrat CHP which was discussed in this study. Second CHP with Ecevit was with the people for the people not “for the people despite the people” and this perception came with a new ideology which was called left-of-centre, -democratic left- that provided a different frame from the CHP's traditional structure and it was the beginning of social democracy in Turkey. Moving from this point, social democratic way of CHP can be named as a third way and it was clear that the party moved from Kemalism to the social democracy, preserving the Kemalist principles. The success of social democratic transformation process in CHP appears as a question due to the discrepancies as it was exactly observed in the case of PASOK.

The main research questions that the study answered are “Which similar dynamics that can be assessed within the context of social democratic discourses and do the policies of the parties enable us to study on this comparative analysis and did these similar dynamics create the similar results in both countries? It is important to balance between social democrat ideals or populist discourses and realities of foreign

policy and economy for the social-democrat parties. Because national interest can appear as a main crisis or economic conjuncture may force the parties to implement different policies than they promised. Therefore when the discourses on foreign policy and economy of both PASOK and CHP were researched within the frame of national interest and social democrat considerations, were they realistic? What were the social and political effects of the leaders (Andreas Papandreu and Bülent Ecevit) on the way to power in both countries?”

Researching a recent era study provided great convenience during data collection due to variety and high quantity of information however difficulties appeared in the process of analysis. The main difficulty which was faced was a confusion of today. Most of the scholars find the comparison between CHP and PASOK, inadequate or unrelated by conceiving today's politics. For this reason there are less articles which examine PASOK and CHP in a same study in the literature. Nevertheless, in this point, the thing that should be underlined once again is that this study primarily examines two similar approaches to the social democracy in terms of policy making processes and compares the social democratic characters of two centre-left parties, PASOK and CHP through discourses. This frame of the study makes the study different and presents a new perspective to the literature.

The study has been conducted by means of document analysis and relevant documents which contain books, articles, newspapers, party programs, manifestos and party election banners, were collected by visiting some prominent libraries in Greece and Turkey. Besides relevant documents, videos from election meetings, significant speeches and documentaries which were televised were watched and deeply analyzed. The analyses of the visual sources provided opportunity to observe similar ways of declamation of both Bulent Ecevit and Andreas Papandreu. Moreover some sources gave an important idea about the reflection of the people to the propoganda meetings of the parties. In this point as another source that was taken into consideration was the election results which indicate the behavior of voter as responses of social democratic rhetoric of the parties.



## CHAPTER 1

### SOCIAL DEMOCRACY AND SOCIAL DEMOCRAT PARTIES

#### 1.1 A Historical Phenomenon: Social Democracy From Bernstein To Giddens

Most of the studies which are about what social democracy is or what it is not, have reproduced past mistakes by repeating them and this reproduction has caused both the social democracy and its followers, social democrats to deadlock which they have not been able to overcome for years. According to some scholars, social democracy is a way of the socialists without the courage of revolutionary conviction which betrayed its ideological ancestor – it has been usually accepted as Marxism- or its past by approaching the liberalism and rejecting proletariat dictatorship and historical materialism. For some other scholars, social democracy is the dynamic and alternative power – or even the champions- of the changing world which have opened the doors of welfare state, aiming equality and solidarity.<sup>6</sup> Consequently, in the literature which has been mostly dominated by blacks and whites in terms of these two perspectives, perhaps, only way to conceive what the social democracy really means, can be possible with a short journey to history of social democracy. In order to deal with historical transformation process of Social Democracy and its theoretical background simultaneously -from the relation between Marxism and Social Democracy which had appeared as an ideology with the general terms during 19<sup>th</sup> century, to the World War I and from following chain of events that paralyzed the ideology to ‘Third Way’ policies- can ensure both to be conceived by today’s point which the ideology has reached after transformation periods and to be observed by its dimensions and targets. Therefore what is crucial to understand is the development of social democracy as a process.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Sheri Berman. (2009). “Understanding Social Democracy”. New York: Columbia University, Barnard College . <http://www8.georgetown.edu/centers/cdacs/bermanpaper.pdf>. pp. 3. 07.07.14

<sup>7</sup> Adam Przeworski. (1980). “Social Democracy as a Historical Phenomenon”. *New Left Review*. N.

To understand the constitutive features of Social Democracy as an ideology, it is necessary to underline the relation between Marxism and Social Democracy in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Even though Social Democracy is mostly considered as a revision of Marxism, some scholars such as Hatipoğlu object to it and claim that Social Democracy has never shown an organic unity with Marxism.<sup>8</sup> In this point, it is possible to emphasize that both perspectives may be simultaneously right and wrong according to our perspective. In other words they definitely need a comprehensive explanation with all dimensions before coming to a conclusion.

Orthodox Marxism refers to the combination of historical materialism and class struggle. Within this perspective, what Engels said can explicitly summarize what doctrine anticipates “*The materialist conception of history starts from the proposition that ... the final causes of all social changes and political revolutions are to be sought, not in men’s brains, not in men’s better insight into eternal truth and justice, but in changes in the modes of production and exchange. They are to be sought, not in the ‘philosophy’ but in the ‘economics’ of each particular epoch.*”<sup>9</sup> Conversely, capitalism and in particular capitalist democracy was the individualization of class relations and people, therefore, who were capitalists or wage-earners all appear in politics as undifferentiated ‘individuals’ or ‘citizens’. As Przeworski underlines that in the level of participation there were individuals instead of masses.<sup>10</sup> Moving from the frames of the ideologies, Social Democracy had appeared in the history as a way for Socialism and its values. In the first half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, when the notion –Social Democracy- had started to be used by the people, it had not got certain and clear meaning. It was a new offer to reach Socialist

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122. pp.28.

<sup>8</sup> Atakan Hatipoğlu. (2012). *CHP'nin İdeolojik Dönüşümü: Kemalizmden Sosyal Demokrasiye*. İstanbul: Kaynak Press. pp. 40.

<sup>9</sup> Friedrich Engels. (1962). *Anti-Dühring: Herr Eugen Dühring's Revolution in Science*. Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House. pp. 365-366.

<sup>10</sup> Adam Przeworski. (1980). “Social Democracy as a Historical Phenomenon”. *New Left Review*. N. 122. pp.29.

ideals and targets under the influence of both Marxist rhetoric which caused Social Democracy to be called as an ideology which is proletarian-revolutionary after 1880's<sup>11</sup> and liberalism with reformist ideas. This was an absolute confusion occurred in the beginning because there was a new and different ideology appeared inside the world of Socialists by 'rejecting' main principles of Marxist-Socialist way. That being the case, even the first theorists of this new ideology continued to call themselves as Socialists and they were unwilling to admit that they were mentioning something entirely different.<sup>12</sup> According to them what they were arguing was revising the Marxism not replacing it with something else. In this point of view, Social Democracy was a product of Socialists to revise or update the Marxism but what appeared at the end was not the revision of Marxism. And as the second point, the inspirations and signs of Marxism have always remained in the depths of Social Democracy although Marxism has never become a central view between social democrats and even has been rejected in the following decades.

Ferdinand Lassalle can be concerned as a first significant figure in the short history of Social Democracy. In the second quarter of the 19<sup>th</sup> century his grand theory had ideologically and deeply influenced the early 'social democrats'. According to Lassalle who divides history of humanity into three stages – these stages actually referred to the development of labour -, the first stage of humanity was solidarity without freedom which indicates the ancient or feudal period; second stage was freedom without solidarity which was the order of the capitalist/liberal world under the reign of capital and middle classes. The era of solidarity and freedom as a last stage was the most favorable one, introducing the principles of association. It is essential to underline at this point that those years when Lassalle's 'Grand Theory' and new approaches had started to emerge, coincide with the

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<sup>11</sup> Deniz Kavukçuoğlu. (2003). *Sosyal Demokraside Temel Eğilimler*. İstanbul: Cumhuriyet Books. pp. 13.

<sup>12</sup> Sheri Berman. (2009). "Understanding Social Democracy". New York: Columbia University, Barnard College . <http://www8.georgetown.edu/centers/cdacs/bermanpaper.pdf>. pp. 10.  
08.07.2014

revolutions happening in France during 1840's. Hence it is a big tip to understand his way of thinking under the influence of new ideas. Indeed, this influence may be observed in each step reaching to the foundation of social democrat ideology, too.

For Lassalle, state was not an organism of dominant classes to oppress the others because suffrage which would be taken by peaceful and legal means, could be enough for the victory of worker class. Likewise, statecraft might be directed to be more socialist in order to provide the solidarity of interests by the ways such as state subsidies for workers and in this way workers could have political power to regulate the norms to remove social injustices and economic imbalances. In fact, this was sort of a declaration of the disengagement from Marxism and thus both Marx and Engels had run a serious campaign against Lassalle. The main conflict was about the definition of the state because according to Marx state was an absolute tool or organism of dominant classes to oppress the masses and compromising with the state in this way was not possible so what Lassalle claimed was definitely unacceptable and a big mistake was made. That campaign against Lassalle's approach and his followers had been strongly continued to run in the Social Democratic Workers Party of Germany (SAPD) or as of today Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) which was established by the Congress of Eisenach with its unique party program that was a kind of combination of the approaches of Marx and Lassalle, in 1869.

SPD has been a guide for the ones who search about Social Democracy as a crucial fact for development of Social Democrat doctrine and for reaching today's level. Party programs, big debates, discussions during congresses which were organized by the prominent members or supporters of SPD -some of them such as Bernstein and Kautsky were actually the theorists of the doctrine and some others like Bebel and Liebknecht were the significant political figures of the ideology in Europe - had contributed in developing the ideology.

The first workers' association of Germany, the General German Workers' Association (Allgemeiner Deutscher Arbeiterverein- ADAV), was founded by Lassalle in 1863, with the purpose of seeking to advance the interests of the working class by universal suffrage and equality or in other words to work for the victory of

socialism through electoral politics by legal means. Lassalle was a contentious figure who dominated his Association and in particular his and Lassalleans' efforts after his death in 1864 to cooperate with the German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck caused big discussions.<sup>13</sup> Indeed, much more serious political work was carried out by August Bebel and Wilhelm Liebknecht in ADAV.<sup>14</sup> Even if they left the association with disillusion since the cooperation with state had evidently come out, they were the main figure on the unification of the SAPD and ADAV which differed substantially in their views on socialist theory. Members of both parties were however aware of that unity meant strength and eventually at the socialist congress held in Gotha in May 1875, the Lassallean and Marxist wings, Eisenachers, debated a new program and founded the Socialist Workers' Party of Germany [Sozialistische Arbeiterpartei Deutschlands, SARD].<sup>15</sup> The Gotha Program which had 8 articles, referenced the demands for universal suffrage and advancing of the rights of workers such as working hours. The Gotha Program constitutively reproduced the demand of non-marxist socialist parties except the minor points which referred to Marxism. It called for the creation of socialistic productive associations not for nationalization of the means of production.<sup>16</sup> That's the reason why Marx and Engels negatively commented on the draft of the Program which was sent by Eisenachers to Marx to make a critique immediately before the Gotha Program had been declared. Conversely, with the Erfurt Program which would be declared in 1891, the party would return Marxism calling for radical changes like nationalization of the economy and SAPD would be renamed as SPD. One of the

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<sup>13</sup> Peter Schwarz. (23 May 2013). The SPD Celebrates its 150<sup>th</sup> Anniversary.

<https://www5.wsws.org/development/en/articles/2013/05/23/spd-m23.html>. 08.07.14

<sup>14</sup> *Idem*.

<sup>15</sup> German History in Documents and Images. Volume 4. Forging an Empire: Bismarckian Germany, 1866-1890.

[http://www.archive.org/stream/GothaProgramme/726\\_socWrkrsParty\\_gothaProgram\\_231\\_djvu.txt](http://www.archive.org/stream/GothaProgramme/726_socWrkrsParty_gothaProgram_231_djvu.txt). 08.07.14

<sup>16</sup> Hanover Historical Texts Project. The Gotha and Erfurt Programs.

<http://history.hanover.edu/courses/excerpts/111gotha.html>. 08.07.2014

biggest dynamics which caused the Party to adopt more Marxist way in the program was the anti-socialist laws of Bismarck which disproved the Lassalle's assumptions about the state. However, this change did not mean that the SPD was a Marxist party.<sup>17</sup> It was a compromise of the factions under current circumstances, not a decision of an integrated group of people. Hence, it is necessary to express that there were actually different directions and perceptions trying to compromise inside the Party: Centrists (Kautsky, Bebel), Revisionists (Bernstein), Radicals (Rosa Luxemburg, Karl Liebknecht). The Erfurt Program which would be replaced with Gorlitz in 1921, had been written by the prominent theorists, Kautsky and Bernstein in consultation with Engels. The assumptions of Kautsky and in particular Bernstein had immense contributions to the Social Democracy and in fact, the ideology mainly shaped over the revisionist view of Bernstein during its development process.

Liberalism was a political and economic ideology which emerged at the right time or in other words 19<sup>th</sup> century was the most proper time for liberalism to spread across the Europe as capitalism and moreover, according to Berman, this new ideology had provided both an explanation of and a justification for the transformations the new system brought.<sup>18</sup> However, liberalism would bring many problems such as inequalities or social imbalances within itself due to the constitutive features. Under these circumstances, one of the most significant and powerful challenge came from left, Marxism as an alternative ideology, and Marxists had offered new ways which were completely different from existing system and created a choice for the people but on the other hand, as time passed and as long as the ideals and assumptions of the Marxism could not come true, it caused an unrest inside Marxist-Socialist world. For instance, according to Marxist doctrine, small businesses would disappear as a result of the concentration of capital accumulation on specific hands and the number of the capitalists would decrease. However, small

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<sup>17</sup> Susan Tegel. (1991). "Imparatorluk Almanyasi'nda SPD (1871-1914)". *Bati Avrupa'da Sosyal Demokrasi*. Istanbul: TUSES Yayinlari. pp. 16.

<sup>18</sup> Sheri Berman. (2009). "Understanding Social Democracy". New York: Columbia University, Barnard College . <http://www8.georgetown.edu/centers/cdacs/bermanpaper.pdf>. pp. 4. 08.07.2014

businesses did not disappear and the number of the capitalists increased in time.<sup>19</sup> This was a big failure which prompted the factions to look for alternative ways to reach the Marxist-Socialist targets. In this point, Bernstein appeared from the revisionist wing with a proposal to revise the Marxism by taking a democratic and evolutionary form.<sup>20</sup>

There were two preconditions of the realization of Socialism: Historical materialism and the dictatorship of the proletariat. Eduard Bernstein had exactly started his critiques from these points and moved on. Contrary to the claims and expectations of Marxism, capitalism did not divide the society into two parties as capitalists-bourgeoisie and proletariat<sup>21</sup> by eliminating the middle class and the conditions of working class did not worsen. Conversely, social welfare simultaneously with the number of middle classes increased (Table I).<sup>22</sup>

Assessed Incomes			Increase	
	£	1892	1907	Absolute
150 to 300	204,714	387,247	172,533	84.3
300 to 1525	103,730	151,574	47,847	46.1
1525 to 5000	6,665	17,109	10,444	156.7
5000 and over	1,780	3,561	1,781	100

Table I. The numbers of middle class and well-to-do Germans increase

Source: Eduard Bernstein. (1911). *Evolutionary Socialism*.

<sup>19</sup> Atakan Hatipoğlu. (2012). *CHP'nin İdeolojik Dönüşümü: Kemalizmden Sosyal Demokrasiye*. İstanbul: Kaynak Press. pp. 55.

<sup>20</sup> Sheri Berman. (2009). "Understanding Social Democracy". New York: Columbia University, Barnard College . <http://www8.georgetown.edu/centers/cdacs/bermanpaper.pdf>. pp. 10.07.2014

<sup>21</sup> "...Our epoch, the epoch of the bourgeoisie, possesses, however, this distinct feature: it has simplified class antagonisms. Society as a whole is more and more splitting up into two great hostile camps, into two great classes directly facing each other — Bourgeoisie and Proletariat." For more: Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. (1848). *Manifesto of the Communist Party*. Chapter 1. <https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1848/communist-manifesto/ch01.htm#007>. 12.07.14

<sup>22</sup> Eduard Bernstein. (1911). *Evolutionary Socialism*. New York: B. W. Huebsch. pp.168.

Under these circumstances, for Bernstein, waiting for the demise of the capitalism for socialism to emerge, was unrealistic and even unnecessary.<sup>23</sup> As he stressed, what had to be done for the seizure of political power by the proletariat could be thought of by the path of parliamentary struggle through exploitation of the franchise and the use of all other legal ways and means.<sup>24</sup> Indeed, Bernstein had proposed evolution versus revolution.

According to Marx and Engels, working class who includes everyone who is 'propertyless' and sold their labor power for a wage, was the most numerous and the most active social class and that's the reason why revolution was inevitable for Marxist ideology.<sup>25</sup> As Przeworski underlines, the Communist Manifesto had already defined the Socialism as the movement 'of the immense majority' and claimed that even 'the physician, the lawyer, the priest, the poet, the man of science' were being converted into proletarians.<sup>26</sup> In this point, Bernstein had asked a crucial question and took the issue to another level: What is the modern proletariat? He answered the question referring to 1789:

*"If it includes all those without property, all who derive no income from property or from a privileged position, then it does certainly constitute the absolute majority of the population of the advanced countries. But this proletariat is a mixture of extraordinarily varied elements, of social groups which are even more differentiated than was 'the people' of 1789. As long as present property relations persist, they do indeed have more common or, at least, similar interests than antagonistic ones; but they would quickly become aware of the different natures of their needs and interests as soon as the present propertied and ruling groups are*

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<sup>23</sup> *Idem.*

<sup>24</sup> Eduard Bernstein. (1993). *The Preconditions of Socialism*. UK: Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought. pp. 102.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 103.

<sup>26</sup> Adam Przeworski. (1980). "Social Democracy as a Historical Phenomenon". *New Left Review*. N. 122. pp. 34.



*removed or deprived of their position.”*<sup>27</sup>

Moving from this point of view, the members of a class which was not homogeneous, could not share the common interests to act together and in particular, in an advanced manufacturing industry which has required a deep and strong hierarchy to work properly, it was explicitly expected that the members of the working class could keep the solidarity among themselves with a very tenuous feeling.<sup>28</sup> From unskilled laborer to wage-earner manager, there has been large scale in infrastructure of working class and as long as capitalist production process extended, the system would require some groups of people in the working class who have skills and education as administration body. Because of the fact that the working class would create a mid-class which would be more ‘privileged group’ of the working class, this mid-class was actually sort of a labor aristocracy.<sup>29</sup> Perhaps, the most striking instance of labor aristocracy had been firstly indicated in SPD because the executive members of the party and the syndicate had become like bureaucrats and as Hatipoglu underlines, they were anymore acting not for the labor movement but over the labor movement.<sup>30</sup> They should have protected the status quo not to lose their position and for this reason they should have compromised everything which could even stand against labor movement. It was, indeed, explicitly the absolute sign of upcoming changes on the infrastructure of the class. Herein, the segmentationist approach of John Elliott Cairnes and John Stuart Mill which described the division of the labor market jobs as primary and secondary such as white collars and blue collars and additionally, Charles Wright Mills’ significant study, ‘*White Collar: the American Middle Classes*’, can be an eye-opening parenthesis to draw a parallelism which takes the critiques of Bernstein further with

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<sup>27</sup> Eduard Bernstein. (1993). *The Preconditions of Socialism*. UK: Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought. pp. 104.

<sup>28</sup> *Idem*.

<sup>29</sup> Atakan Hatipoğlu. (2012). *CHP'nin İdeolojik Dönüşümü: Kemalizmden Sosyal Demokrasiye*. İstanbul: Kaynak Press. pp. 53.

<sup>30</sup> *Idem*.

the view of economists.<sup>31</sup>

According to Bernstein's assumption, labor movement should have gradually improved with a deep structural transformation which would be done by democratic ways and tools and, eventually, this evolutionary period should have been successfully completed with establishment of the Socialism. In this process, as Bernstein, himself, expressed, the heart of the matter was democracy.

*"... We shall come much closer to the heart of the matter if we express ourselves negatively and define democracy as the absence of class government. This indicates a state of society in which no class has a political privilege which is opposed to the community as a whole. This also makes it immediately clear why a monopolistic corporation is anti-democratic. Furthermore, this negative definition has the advantage over the phrase 'government by the people' that it leaves less room for the idea of the oppression of the individual by the majority, which is absolutely repugnant to the modern mind. Nowadays we find the oppression of a minority by the majority 'undemocratic', although it was originally held to be quite consistent with government by the people. As we understand it today, the concept of democracy includes an idea of justice, that is, equality of rights for all members of the community, and this sets limits to the rule of the majority - which is what*

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<sup>31</sup> Primary labor market jobs are characterized by good earnings, job security, a reasonable probability of promotion, good benefits, and agreeable working conditions such as autonomy and a pleasant working environment. Many white-collar jobs match this description, and those jobs are plentiful and growing. Blue-collar jobs that are within the primary market appear in construction, mining, durable goods manufacturing, and transportation. In contrast, secondary labor market jobs have low earnings, few or no fringe benefits, high turnover, little job security, and few or no promotions. Therefore, by also considering today's conditions we can claim that the division inside the working class had naturally started in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century as a result of the capitalist system and as time passed and the capitalism has become developed or - wilder -, the competition has deeply escalated among the workers during 20<sup>th</sup> century."Blue Collar and White Collar." (2008). International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. <http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G2-3045300214.html>. 15.07.14 and Robert McNabb and Paul Ryan., Segmented Labor Markets. <http://kumlai.free.fr/RESEARCH/THESE/TEXTE/INEQUALITY/Segment/OK%20Segmented%20Labour%20Markets.pdf>. 16.07.14.

*government by the people amounts to, in any concrete case. The more democracy prevails and determines public opinion, the more it will come to mean the greatest possible degree of freedom for all.*<sup>32</sup>

In this framework, socialism could be just established as a result of free and rational decision and the development of personal freedom and equality with entity of a strong civil society could be the alternative of the class struggle.<sup>33</sup> Because in principle, democracy was the abolition of class government, although it was not yet the actual abolition of classes.<sup>34</sup> According to Bernstein, socialist movement should have determined to achieve a democracy which is oriented in accordance with the interests of workers and producing classes, as an ultimate purpose, instead of the goals such as classless society.<sup>35</sup> The constitutive point of this view was inter-class reconciliation. Bernstein had unquestionably objected to the absolutism or semi-absolutism of a class, group of people or a person and he supported the democracy for those parties or classes soon to learn to recognize the limits of their power and come to the point of compromise which was an indicator of higher civilization.

Democracy was both mean and the end for social democrats. Participation and representation were necessary as the democratic ways to reach the Socialist goals. So first of all universal suffrage should have been obtained, then socialist parties should have been entered to the elections -participation- to capture the government because according to socialist parties, the dominant classes could be beaten at their own game.<sup>36</sup> Przeworski explains that socialist parties put all of their hopes and their efforts into electoral competition because electoral victory was

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<sup>32</sup> Eduard Bernstein. (1993). *The Preconditions of Socialism*. UK: Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought. pp. 140-141.

<sup>33</sup> Chris J. Arthur. (1986). "Bernstein: Sosyal Demokrasinin Oncusu". *II. Tez*. N: 4. pp. 64.

<sup>34</sup> Eduard Bernstein. (1993). *The Preconditions of Socialism*. UK: Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought. pp. 143.

<sup>35</sup> Eduard Bernstein. (1911). *Evolutionary Socialism*. New York: B. W. Huebsch. pp. 20.

<sup>36</sup> Adam Przeworski. (1980). "Social Democracy as a Historical Phenomenon". *New Left Review*. N. 122. pp. 33.

within reach and revolution could be made at the ballot box.<sup>37</sup> The elections indicate the strength of a party or an ideology with the numbers and that is the reason socialist parties had needed more and more supporters which could be gained with universal suffrage. However, the proletariat which is the first target group of socialists, was not a numerical majority of voting members in any society. In this framework, cross-class cooperation was one of the most significant point to win the electoral battle as Bernstein and other revisionists underlined. Middle class was the natural ally of the working class<sup>38</sup> and so long as socialist parties could reach the people not just from the working class but also from the middle class, it would make them closer to reach the socialist victory. For them, soon or late, perhaps not immediately but certainly within the near future, socialist parties would come to government by the electoral victory. Robert Michels had explicitly stated the point about following strategy of the socialist parties:

*“For motives predominantly electoral, the party of the workers seeks support from the petty bourgeois elements of society, and this gives rise to more or less extensive reactions upon the party itself. The labor party becomes the party of the ‘people’. Its appeals are no longer addressed simply to the manual workers, but to all ‘producers’, to the ‘entire working population’, these phrases being applied to all the classes and all the strata of society except the idlers who live upon the income from investments.”*<sup>39</sup>

This was a compromise and indeed, as Bernstein underlined in ‘*The Preconditions of Socialism*’, democracy was the school of compromise.<sup>40</sup> Moving from this point of view, revisionists had already reached the point of Social Democracy with the emphasis of suffrage, electorate, participation, representation,

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<sup>37</sup> *Idem.*

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 40.

<sup>39</sup> Robert Michels. (1915). *Political Parties, A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy*. New York: Hearst’s International Library CO. pp. 268.

<sup>40</sup> Eduard Bernstein. (1993). *The Preconditions of Socialism*. UK: Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought. pp. 144.

equality which were the pillars of democracy. From now on, social democrats were in the scene of the history by differentiating themselves from socialists by rejecting two main preconditions. By the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the division inside the socialists was pretty visible and eventually, the most striking cleavage and certain disengagement of Social Democracy would be with the World War I. Indeed, the golden years of Social Democracy which would be known as the era of Welfare States, were coming soon.

Social Democracy had a deep past in Germany with SPD and the ideology, in a sense, had been formed and shaped under the roof of SPD but it does not mean that the rest of the Europe was far away from social democratic ideas and they did not have any contribution to the ideology. Conversely, Scandinavian social democrat parties were enough successful and in particular, the French social democrats were greatly powerful, almost as the Germans.<sup>41</sup> Great Britain and Russia had their own unique approaches on the way to the Social Democracy. For instance, Fabian Society which has and continues to be at the forefront of developing political ideas and public policy on the left as the oldest political think-tank -founded in 1884-, was really popular in Britain.<sup>42</sup> The early Fabians had adopted the motto of 'Educate, Agitate, Organise'.<sup>43</sup> For them, intellectuals should have played the main role to reach the socialism not the workers and overthrowing the current capitalist system was unnecessary since the Socialism would infiltrate the present institutions. Shortly, it was an anti-Marxist view of socialism. Contrary to the Fabians, Russian socialists were in a Marxist way which would turn into Bolshevism in the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. The working class was too weak in Italy and Spain and moreover there were serious organization problems on the level of syndication. Similar problems which generally occur as a result of divided trade-union movements, had been observed in

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<sup>41</sup> James Joll. (1974). *The Second International, 1889-1914*. UK: Routledge&K. Paul. pp. 23.

<sup>42</sup> Fabian Society Official Website. The Fabian Story. <http://www.fabians.org.uk/about/the-fabian-story/>. 20.07.14

<sup>43</sup> *Idem*.

France too even if the working class was powerful<sup>44</sup> and hence the social democrats in those countries, were not effective unlike the others. The umbrella organization of all those social democrat parties were the Second International which was founded in 1889. In every International, there was a party which took the leadership of the International as the dominant party and in the Second International, SPD was the prominent power.<sup>45</sup>

Until World War I, social democrat parties had come out and succeeded to enter the parliaments as main opposition parties in several countries. However, escalating colonialism between the European countries and economic difficulties which had forced many governments to take credits for war expenditures under the conditions of a potential war which was felt and expected by everyone had caused divisions and big discussions inside social democrat parties and thus the Second International could not act as a united body due to different actions of the social democrat parties. Indeed, those discussions within the parties, in particular in SPD as the prominent one, were the signs of the irremediable disengagement of the

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<sup>44</sup> “A good deal of the power of democratic socialism consists in Socialist control of trade-unions and other working-class organizations such as the consumers' co-operatives (particularly strong in Great Britain and Scandinavia), mutual insurance organizations (the "Mutualites" in Belgium and France), and a host of other working-class associations. Of all these the trade-unions are in our context by far the most important A good deal of the power of democratic socialism consists in Socialist control of trade-unions and other working-class organizations such as the consumers' co-operatives (particularly strong in Great Britain and Scandinavia), mutual insurance organizations (the "Mutualites" in Belgium and France), and a host of other working-class associations. Of all these the trade-unions are in our context by far the most important organizations such as the consumers' co-operatives (particularly strong in Great Britain and Scandinavia), mutual insurance organizations (the "Mutualites" in Belgium and France), and a host of other working-class associations. Of all these trade-unions are in our context by far the most important.” For more: Adolf Sturmthal. (1950). “Democratic Socialism in Europe”. *World Politics*. V. 3. N. 1. p. 92.

<sup>45</sup> The most important factor made the SPD prominent was the power of the working class besides the ideological discussions. While there were 269.000 workers in 1895, in 1909 it increased up to 3.000.000. For more: James Joll. (1974). *The Second International, 1889-1914*. UK: Routledge&K. Paul. pp. 24.

revisionists from radicals. Another crucial issue under discussion between the social democrats was the question of colonies. In the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, almost all European countries had colonies in various territories of the world and they were in a big competition to control more and more territories as imperialist powers. Considering the socialist goals and ideals, they should have stood against colonialism however as the main oppositions most of the social democrat parties in Europe had efforts to legitimate the colonialism because the working classes of the Western countries had welfare with advanced conditions due to imperial colonialism which takes the wealth of the colonies. Legitimization had been based on a favorable mission: The social democrats should have supported those ‘undeveloped societies’ for increasing the standards of living.<sup>46</sup> In other words, when the subject was about the national interest, social democrats could move away from the social democrat ideals and the goals and they could change rhetoric and even became nationalist. Firstly, this point is immensely essential to conceive the policies -especially foreign policies- of social democrat parties and secondly it was perhaps the most clear behavior of the European social democrats which made them different from Marxists because Marxism considers a unified working class which includes all the workers of the world but the social democrats conversely considers the national working class for both their political interests in internal politics and national interest of their countries. Indeed, when the discussions about colonialism had increasingly occupied the agenda, the SPD had opposed the revisionist view for revolution and adopted the Dresden Convention in 1903. The main reason to change the strategy had been stated with those words in the resolution: “The consequence of such revisionist tactics would be to turn a party striving for the most speedy possible transformation of bourgeois society into Socialist Society – a party, therefore, revolutionary in the best sense of the word – into a party satisfied with the reform of bourgeois society.”<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 116

<sup>47</sup>SPD. (1903). Dresden Resolution, National Convention of German Social Democracy. <http://www.marxists.org/history/international/social-democracy/1903/dresden-resolution.htm>. 21.07.14.

The SPD had once again approached to the Marxism. By the effect of this change, colonialism had been initially rejected even if it would be soon dominant view of the SPD and other social democrats. Colonialism had been also affirmed by Bernstein who supported the democracy for ‘undeveloped societies’ from an euro-centralist way of thinking and he stated that:

*“Not the whether but the how is here the decisive point. It is neither necessary that the occupation of tropical lands by Europeans should injure the natives in their enjoyment of life, nor has it hitherto usually been the case. Moreover, only a conditional right of savages to the land occupied by them can be recognised. The higher civilization ultimately can claim a higher right. Not the conquest, but the cultivation, of the land gives the historical legal title to its use. According to my judgment these are the essential points of view which should decide the position of social democracy as regards the question of colonial policy.”*<sup>48</sup>

While the European social democrats were acting with their governments before and during the World War I, the Marxists took a position against the war and they had intensely criticized the social democrats. Particularly Lenin had deep critiques about the World War I and European social democrats referring to Kautsky who started to be in the same point with Bernstein during the war years. For Lenin, the revisionists wing was acting with petty-bourgeois for the reforms they demanded renouncing revolution. Additionally, the social democrats had believed in defence of the fatherland however for Lenin it was a complete inability to dissociate oneself from the social-chauvinists and complete confusion on the question of the defence of the fatherland.<sup>49</sup>

The Great War had brought new questions to the Europe. There was a new camp, Bolshevism, emerged in Russia and an other new camp was being slowly formed in the middle of Europe with immense mobilizing power of nationalism with

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<sup>48</sup> Eduard Bernstein. (1911). *Evolutionary Socialism*. New York: B. W. Huebsch. pp. 135.

<sup>49</sup> V. I. Lenin. (1972). *The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky*. Peking: Foreign Language Press. pp. 73.



the power of populism.<sup>50</sup> The perceptions of solidarity, struggle and community had gained new meanings and in particular between the people who were in the fronts for many years. The destruction caused by the World War I had intensely appeared on the psychological and economic level, particularly, in Germany. Thus, inter-war years would be the era of resisting economic and social problems which could turn into a political crisis.

The Wall Street crash of 1929 and the following chain of events such as withdrawal of gold to France, raising bank rates, the German banking failure, decline of production and continuous fall in price levels had caused a great depression which had affected all industrialized Western countries.<sup>51</sup> The political results of the depression, indeed, would be much more destructive than the crisis itself. In this point, European social democrats who were actively involved in politics after the war, especially in Germany, had a big dilemma: Protecting the social rights without exceptions until the end or acting with the governments which would suppress the society for the interests of the state renouncing the social rights. Although they tried to find a middle way, they had finally acted with bourgeois governments because they had to consider the interest of an entire society and the state which was the arbiter between the classes. That's being said that the social democrats in Europe could not even act with all of their power inside or outside of the parliament against upcoming fascism unlike the expectations. This was an unsuccessful political choice of the European social democrats. They had loosen the parliamentarism and democracy for the sake of protection of parliamentarism and democracy. In fact, if they could prefer other ways outside the parliament to protect the parliamentary democracy when it was needed, they could be successful but of course, such a discussion that may be done now, can be just kind of an anachronism, too. Here, the

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<sup>50</sup> Sheri Berman. (2009). "Understanding Social Democracy". New York: Columbia University, Barnard College . <http://www8.georgetown.edu/centers/cdacs/bermanpaper.pdf> pp. 10. 08.07.2014

<sup>51</sup> Paul Einzig (Sep. 1931). Reviewed by J. Stafford. "The World Economic Crisis, 1929-1931". *The Economic Journal*. V.41. N. 163. pp. 475.

important point that shows the general characteristic of the social democrat parties, is absolute faithfulness of the social democrats to parliamentarism and democracy.

In response to the Great depression, Franklin D. Roosevelt had declared ‘the New Deal’ which limited competition in product markets and increased labor bargaining power.<sup>52</sup> The New Deal policies were aimed at relief the people, recovery of the collapsed economy and, of course reform of the system according the needs under the control of the state and the policies implemented with new approach had continued until 1937.<sup>53</sup> The new deal policies in USA were the first steps going to the formation of the Welfare State of the post war era.

Capitalist system had caused a great depression and immediately after depression, the World War II had occurred as the third destruction of the humanity in the second quarter of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Moreover, as soon as the war was over, signals of a new world order started to be taken by all the countries in the world but especially in Europe. Under the new circumstances, the states should have recovered their economy, relieved their citizens and transformed the system with necessary reforms. In 1936, British economist John Maynard Keynes’ book, ‘*The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money*’, had been published and Keynesian view which would be the ‘bible’ of the welfare system, had been formed with the following discussions. Keynesians’ belief in aggressive government action to stabilize the economy was based on value judgments and on the beliefs that firstly macroeconomic fluctuations significantly reduce economic well-being and secondly the government is knowledgeable and capable enough to improve on the free market.<sup>54</sup> States could regulate the apportionment of the goods and services via their

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<sup>52</sup> Harold L. Cole and Lee E. Ohanian. (2003). “New Deal Policies and the Persistence of the Great Depression: A General Equilibrium Analysis”. <http://hlcollections.ucla.edu/NewDeal/ucla.pdf>. 02.08.14.

<sup>53</sup> Carol Berkin, Christopher Miller, Robert Cherny, and James Gormly. (2012). *Making America: A History of the United States*. Edition. 6. V. 2. Boston: Wadsworth. pp. 629-630.

<sup>54</sup> Alan S. Blinder. (2008). “Keynesian Economics”. The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics. <http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/KeynesianEconomics.html>. 02.08.14.

own public institutions. Interventions of states on economy was not just beneficial for the economic development but also necessary in emergency conditions because a market economy in which everyone produces, could bring great crisis unless the working people had purchase power. In this framework, in the postwar era, social programs were transformed into more comprehensive systems of universal benefits, guaranteeing workers a basic standard of living by states.<sup>55</sup> Consequently, capitalist states of Europe began to obtain a social character and turned into social-welfare-states with the reforms such as developed housing programs, introducing minimum wage law, right of collective bargain and strike, social security institutions, old age pensions, income and inheritance taxes and more.<sup>56</sup> Most of those new implementations of states were the second generation of human rights which is known as social and economic rights. From this perspective, in the postwar period, Europe had already gained a social democrat form.

Przeworski wrote the fact that until 1930's social democrats had not had any kind of economic policy of their own and the economic theory of the Left was just to criticize the capitalism claiming the superiority of socialism.<sup>57</sup> Discovery of Keynes' ideas provided a new way for social democrats for the justification of their governmental role with distributive policies that favored the working class.<sup>58</sup> According to description of Przeworski, *"the structure of the capitalist systems built by social democrats turned out to be the following: 1) The state operates those activities which are unprofitable for private firms but necessary for the economy as a whole; 2) The state regulates, particularly by pursuing anti-cyclical policies, the operation of the private sector; 3) The state mitigates, through welfare measures, the*

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<sup>55</sup> Jill Quadagno. (1987). "Theories of the Welfare State". *Annual Review of Sociology*. V. 13. p. 111.

<sup>56</sup> Gencay Saylan. (2003). *Degisim, Kuresellesme ve Devletin Yeni Islevi*. Ankara: Imge Yayinlari. pp. 84.

<sup>57</sup> Adam Przeworski. (1980). "Social Democracy as a Historical Phenomenon". *New Left Review*. N. 122. p. 51.

<sup>58</sup> *Idem*.

*distributional effects of the operation of the market.*"<sup>59</sup> It was explicitly the regulation of the capitalism from the view of social democracy as a response to the needs of collapsed economies of European countries to reach the prosperity. It was a consensus emerged between the free market and the state and simultaneously it had indicated a kind of compromise both between the classes and between the states and peoples. Welfare State had, indeed, granted concessions to both capitalists and workers to enable the coexistence of capitalism and equality of citizenship. Quadagno expressed that workers should have accepted the legitimacy of the capitalist system for a sufficient level of profitability and an economic surplus which could be used for welfare benefits and similarly, capitalists, in turn, might accept the need for basic wage and welfare state expenditures for a healthy and complacent working class.<sup>60</sup> Thus welfare state was substantially the embodied form of sort of a win-win game which benefits everyone.

In the years between 1945 and 1973, Keynesian economic principles overrode the conservative view and the social democrat parties in cooperation with the trade-unions had faithfully supported and protected the welfare state. This was the golden age of the Social Democracy and the ideology had clearly defined its position in the political spectrum. The social democrats, now, definitely broke the connections with the Marxism and defined themselves as non-communist -under the Cold War condition, this definition was crucial-. For instance, SPD had adopted the Bad Godesberg Program which specified the frame of the European Social Democracy as not the party of workers but the party of peoples, in 1959. Social democrat parties had started to be mass parties with an expanded base milestones which indicated the ideological and structural transformation. Besides these, the social democrat parties of Europe had also positioned with USA against Soviet Union during the Cold War and this choice was become concrete in the Socialist International in 1951: "*Meanwhile, as Socialism advances throughout the world, new forces have arisen to threaten the movement towards freedom and social justice.*

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<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 54.

<sup>60</sup> Jill Quadagno. (1987). "Theories of the Welfare State". *Annual Review of Sociology*. V. 13. pp. 114.

*Since the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, Communism has split the International Labour Movement and has set back the realization of Socialism in many countries for decades.” “... International Communism is the instrument of a new imperialism.”*<sup>61</sup> In the beginning of the 1970's, Democratic Socialism had been already chosen as the way of the European social democrats. However, welfare state was gradually losing power. Too much public expenditures included unemployment compensations, welfare benefits, social security expenditures had brought the economy into a deadlock. Increasing level of demand with growing population pushed the welfare state into great trouble and eventually, in the mid 1970's, the massive inflation following the Vietnam war, OPEC price policies, the collapse of detente signaled the end of the Keynesian consensus.<sup>62</sup>

The end of the Welfare State was the beginning of the crisis for the Social Democracy. Even if prominent figures of the Socialist International such as Brandt and Palme proposed new views to spread the social democrat approaches to the world, the Social Democracy had faced a big ideological crisis during 1980's until the end of the 1990's. The balances of the world was once again under a transition period. The cold war conditions had given the signals of the change, production processes had turned into post-fordist from fordism which got used to work with Keynesian economics in harmony. Under the circumstances, a dilemma occurred for the social democrats: To implement neo-liberal policies with austerity measures include the policies as layoffs to stay as an alternative or to leave their seats for the neo-liberals. The golden age of the social democrats had come to end and eventually, neo-liberals took over the governments from the social democrats.

Besides all these, ideological crisis opened big debates between social democrats. To adopt a unique political attitude to make policies under the neo-liberal hegemony, has become the main problematic since 1980's and this is not a problem

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<sup>61</sup> Aims and Tasks of Democratic Socialism. (30 June-03 July 1951). Congress of the Socialist International. Frankfurt. <http://www.socialistinternational.org/viewArticle.cfm?ArticleID=39>. 05.08.14.

<sup>62</sup> Jill Quadagno. (1987). "Theories of the Welfare State". *Annual Review of Sociology*. V. 13. pp. 113.

which has been absolutely resolved even today. Perhaps, the most prominent and assertive debate was opened by Anthony Giddens who is the theorist of ‘Third Way’ politics. Giddens started his book “*The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy*” with an emphasis on the change in global order and the needs of new politics as a response to that change.<sup>63</sup> According to him political ideas seemed to have lost their capacity to inspire and political leaders their ability to lead.<sup>64</sup> Giddens had stated five dilemmas: First one was ‘globalisation’ which changes the meanings of nationhood, government and sovereignty; second was ‘individualism’ which means that social solidarity can no longer be imposed in a top-down way; third one was impossibility of categorization as left versus right due to new outcomes of the world system;<sup>65</sup> fourth was about the political agencies if the politics would be shifting away from orthodox mechanisms of democracy; finally the last and the fifth one was related to ecological problems which would be integrated into the social democratic politics soon.<sup>66</sup> Those dilemmas were the questions that the social democrats should have answered to find a new way to take necessary steps on the process of making policies to be an alternative for governments.

Moving from his point of view, accepting the entity of the state against the markets was not the solution because contrary to general perceptions which indicate the market as a reason of inequalities, the state, itself could cause inequalities too.<sup>67</sup> Similar critiques were also in the agenda of some other social democrats. For instance, Ismail Cem, Turkish social democrat and former minister of Foreign Affairs claimed that the notion of equality was idealized and exaggerated by the social democrats and this concern had decreased the productivity and restrained the

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<sup>63</sup> Anthony Giddens. (2008). *The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy*. UK: T. J. International. pp.1.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 2.

<sup>65</sup>The Economist. (September 17<sup>th</sup> 1998). “The Third Way Revealed”. <http://www.economist.com/node/165553>. 04.08.14.

<sup>66</sup> Kris McCracken. (2003). “The Third Way: Post-Ideology or Politics as Usual?”. *Presented at Australian Political Studies Association Conference*. pp. 2.

<sup>67</sup> Anthony Giddens. (2000). *The Third Way and Its Critics*. UK: T. J. International. pp. 31.

development of the quality, in other words, according to Cem, one of the major problems of the welfare states had been derived from the problems on the productivity-equality equilibrium.<sup>68</sup> In this framework, the welfare state had made the people more demanding than before. While expectations from states were increasing day by day, people consented less abnegation and started to forget the responsibilities within mutual obligations. A vital problem occurred in the habits of the people that the welfare state made the people lazier and more dependent than before because state was the one to give everything to them even if they did not demand. However, those demands which the states could not promote forever due to limited sources, dragged the welfare state to deadlocks, respectively economically, politically and socially. Herein, Giddens claimed that the markets could support the people to realize their responsibilities because in the capitalist market system, everyone - both as consumers or producers- was responsible for his own actions and should have faced the consequences of those actions.<sup>69</sup> Moreover, markets were the places of the competitions where the people are free to choose.<sup>70</sup> Within this framework, the Third Way had adopted the view of Reformist Left by developing it and it endorsed the dynamism of the market. However there was a contradiction: Despite all the positive sides of the market economy, Giddens had defined the market as a mechanism which does not have any limits and underlined the importance of the external interventions which are required to prevent a possible periodical crisis in the market.<sup>71</sup> According to this assumption, the Third Way should have answered a crucial question: What kind of external interventions, in which level, could be done and by who? It was not exactly an unanswered question because according to Giddens' point of view the answer was hidden in the notion of 'civil society' which was the strong and influential body of the democracy to control and limit the power

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<sup>68</sup> Ismail Cem. (1990). "Sosyal Demokrasi Acısından Verimlilik-Esitlelik İlişkisi ve Celiskisi". (ed.). *Sosyal Demokrat Ideoloji*. Istanbul: Anadolu Matbaa. pp. 47-55.

<sup>69</sup> Anthony Giddens. (2000). *The Third Way and Its Critics*. UK: T. J. International. pp. 33.

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.32.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 33.

of both the governments and the market.<sup>72</sup>

The Third Way can be called as a socialized liberalism and a certain compromise. Tony Blair who was the major proponent of the Third Way claimed :

*“ My vision of the 21st century is of a popular politics reconciling themes which in the past have wrongly been regarded as antagonistic -patriotism and internationalism; rights and responsibilities; and the promotion of enterprise and the attack on poverty and discrimination.”*<sup>73</sup>

The Third Way had faced many different critics and some of them were unfair or exaggerated comments which Giddens tried to answer in his book ‘*The Third Way and Its Critics*’. Among all those critics, perhaps, as Giddens also emphasized, the most important one was the critic of Stuart Hall in his article ‘*The Great Moving Nowhere Show*’ in the *Marxism Today*.<sup>74</sup> Hall developed a comparison between Thatcherism and the Third Way as the projects to define the political character of the Blair regime, the Third Way. According to him, while Thatcherism was extremely decisive and specified projects with its blacks and whites, the Third Way was a project which tried to be in the middle of everything. Moreover, Tony Blair had talked so much about ‘the project’ but nobody understood what it was precisely.<sup>75</sup> Hall had finished his article with these words:

*“At the global and domestic levels, the broad parameters of the ‘turn’ which Thatcherism made have not been radically modified or reversed. The project of renewal thus remains roughly where it did when Marxism Today published its final issue. Mr Blair seems to have learned some of the words. But, sadly, he has forgotten the music.”*<sup>76</sup>

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<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 59.

<sup>73</sup> Kris McCracken. (2003). “ The Third Way: Post-Ideology or Politics as Usual?”. *Presented at Australian Political Studies Association Conference*. pp. 5.

<sup>74</sup> Anthony Giddens. (2000). *The Third Way and Its Critics*. UK: T. J. International. pp. 10.

<sup>75</sup> Stuart Hall. (November 1998). “The Great Moving Nowhere Show”. *Marxism Today*. <https://docs.google.com/viewer?url=http://64.62.200.70/PERIODICAL/PDF/MarxismToday-1998nov/11-17/&chrome=true>. 08.08.14.

<sup>76</sup> *Idem.*



According to Giddens, the third way was seeking to provide a general framework for left-of-centre parties in Europe because social democrats needed a different approach to government.<sup>77</sup> He had defined this new status of the state with these words: “*The state should not row, but steer: not so much control, as challenge.*”<sup>78</sup> However, he underlined at every opportunity that all these did not mean that modernizing social democrats, are believers in *laissez-faire*<sup>79</sup> and he continued :

“...*Finally let me say my aim in responding to critiques of the third way from the traditional left is not to widen the rifts that already exist. I hope in fact that my analysis will contribute to healing them, or at a minimum promote a helpful dialogue.*”<sup>80</sup>

## **1.2. Political Parties**

In 1984, Ronald Reagan had defined that a political party is, “*A political party isn’t a fraternity. It isn’t something like the old school tie you wear. You band together in a political party because of certain beliefs of what government should be.*”<sup>81</sup> It was a definition of a politician which was done in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. There are various definitions that have been stated by many politicians or theorists. None of them could answer completely what a political party is but all of them could, at least, give an opinion what a political party can be.

Giovanni Sartori briefly explains the etymological derivation of the ‘Party’ which refers severance and partition in one hand and participation and partnership on

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<sup>77</sup> Anthony Giddens. (2000). *The Third Way and Its Critics*. UK: T. J. International. pp. 6.

<sup>78</sup> *Idem.*

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 7.

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 168.

<sup>81</sup> John Kenneth White. (2006). “What Is A Political Party?”. (ed.). Richard S. Katz and William Crotty. *Handbook of Party Politics*. London: SAGE Publications. pp. 6.

the other hand.<sup>82</sup> A division naturally creates its own parties and every party has its own followers who take part in the same camp by sharing common values, beliefs, targets. Within this view, we can reach one kind of a definition through the etymological derivation with emphasis of ideological roots such as Edmund Burke or Reagan. However, there is another view which concentrates on power and sees the parties as tools working as an organism to reach the governmental office. For instance, according to definition of Anthony Downs, a political party is ‘*a coalition of men seeking to control the governing apparatus by legal means.*’<sup>83</sup> Indeed, this controversy has been the result of two alternative approaches which adopt different methods towards political parties. In this framework the history of political parties can be divided into two parts as Pro-Duverger and Post-Duverger.

Duverger had brought systematic and a general theoretical frame to the researches about political parties and using a strong comparative method was one of the most important characteristic of his approach which was a new addition to the literature as Ozbudun also underlined in his article.<sup>84</sup> This was a new way to approach to political parties because before Duverger, researches on the issue had not been able to be more than political biography and political ideology<sup>85</sup>, in other words, previous theorists had preferred to emphasize ideological structures, actions or leaders of parties. For instance, it can be enough even to scan the contents of the Political Parties of Robert Michels to observe how the theorists had approached to political parties in the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Each of the studies which were researched before Duverger can give serious opportunities to conceive the party behaviors associated with their programs, doctrines and ideologies. Moreover they can provide a wide variety of sources to observe the transformation of the political

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<sup>82</sup> Giovanni Sartori. (2005). *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework For Analysis*. UK: ECPR Press. pp. 4.

<sup>83</sup> John Kenneth White. (2006). “What Is A Political Party?”. (ed.) Richard S. Katz and William Crotty. *Handbook of Party Politics*. London: SAGE Publications. pp. 6.

<sup>84</sup> Ergun Ozbudun. (1964). “ M. Duverger’in «Siyasal Partiler»i ve Siyasal Partilerin İncelenmesinde Bazı Metodolojik Problemler”. *Journal of Ankara University Law Faculty*. V. 21. N. 1-4. pp., 23.

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 24.

parties from a historical perspective. However when we consider party types, organizations and functions, we have to accept that Duverger has made our work easier to understand political parties as organizations with his systematic approach and method. In this point, although he did not base his study on a definition of party, perhaps one of the most broad definitions has, come from Duverger and he defined parties as “*having ‘their primary goal the conquest of power or a share in its exercise’*”, and “*drawing ‘their support from a broad base’ in contrast to pressure groups, which ‘represent a limited number with a particular or private interest.’*”<sup>86</sup> Another significant definition was the one that Giovanni Sartori stated in 1976 in the book of ‘*Parties and Party Systems*’. According to Sartori, a party was as “*any political group identified by an official label that presents it at elections, and is capable of placing through elections (free or nonfree), candidates for public office.*”<sup>87</sup> Sartori had clarified political parties in association with a political system. Duverger had indicated the conquest of power as primary goal of parties but he did not underline the way to reach that goal. Sartori showed the way and considered political parties as organizations competing for public office in an electoral process.

Despite all the conflicts about the definition, there is a common point that most of the theorists and politicians usually compromise: Necessity of political parties for a healthy political life. Today, we mostly suppose and expect that a healthy political life can be just with a strong and working democracy. It is widely accepted that the political parties created democracy and ‘that modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of the parties.’<sup>88</sup> For Bryce, ‘*parties were inevitable*’ and ‘*they brought order out of chaos to a multitude voters*’.<sup>89</sup> Sartori’s approach was not

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<sup>86</sup> Kenneth Janda., (1993). “Comparative Political Parties: Research and Theory”. (ed.). Ada W. Finifter. *Political Science: The State of Discipline II*. Washington D.C.: American Political Science Association. pp. 166.

<sup>87</sup> *Idem*.

<sup>88</sup> Richard S. Katz. (2006). “Party in Democratic Theory”. (ed.). Richard S. Katz and William Crotty. *Handbook of Party Politics*. London: SAGE Publications. pp. 34.

<sup>89</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.7.

different and he saw parties as ‘*the central intermediate structures between society and government.*’<sup>90</sup>

Besides the conflicts and compromises, the question had appeared about the classification of political parties. A party was an organization with its own notables which are the prominent people of the party and naturally had a mass of supporters. In this framework, political parties could be divided and classified according to their organizational structure, supporters, political behaviors, functions inside politics or ideology with historical heritage. Within this scope, Duverger propounded three criteria to classify political parties: Historical, Organizational and Functional.

The first criteria classifies parties according to historical transformation which we are not going to dwell on in this study. However it is important to underline that parties were among the first subjects of analysis at the very birth of modern political sciences and today there are countless studies related to political parties.<sup>91</sup> The anatomy of political parties or in other word, the organizational structure of them, herein, is the major subject that contributes in our study to keep in mind the organizational substructure of the social democrat parties during the following chapters.

In the literature, there are some commonly used models which were developed by prominent theorists such as Duverger, Gunther or Katz. Several different dimensions have been considered to propose a typology for political parties and target groups, social representation, organizational capacity, political behavior, ideological goals or structure of its cadre can be the reason to classify parties under an umbrella. That’s the reason why there are many proposed models indicate different clusters. For instance, it is possible to indicate those models under five categories inspiring from the clusters of Krouwel: 1) Elite, caucus and cadre parties - patronage and charismatic parties, parties of notables or elite parties- ; 2) Mass

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<sup>90</sup> Giovanni Sartori. (1976). *Parties and Party System: A Framework for Analysis*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. pp. ix.

<sup>91</sup> Jose Ramon Montero. (2003). “The Literature on Political Parties: A Critical Reassessment”. *Working Paper At The Institute of Political and Social Sciences*. Barcelona: ICPS. pp. 4.

parties -branch based mass parties, mass-bureaucratic party or fundamentalist parties-; 3) Catch-all, electoralist parties -professional electoral parties or rational efficient, professional machine mode-; 4) Cartel parties; 5) Business-firm parties - parties of professional politicians or entrepreneurial parties-<sup>92</sup> The typology of Diamond and Gunther, similarly divides the parties into five different categories: 1) Elite-based parties; 2) Mass-based parties; 3) Ethnicity-based parties; 4) Electoralist parties; 5) Movement parties.<sup>93</sup> Duverger's typology is also almost in the same direction with a less complicated distinction: Elite-based parties and mass-based parties.

Duverger's typology is an ideal starting point to consider the social democrat parties and to improve through sub-categories. According to Duverger, elite parties are dominated by a small cadre of individuals or a political elite groups- with high socioeconomic status, who have only weak links with their electorate.<sup>94</sup> Historically, this was the first model appeared in the political system in the 19<sup>th</sup> century in Europe and in America. Extensions of the suffrage includes workers and women would cause the mass-based parties emerged as new actors of the political system. This was a formation appeared out of the state and parliament and thus, political parties should have changed their structure under new circumstances to enable having new links with the electorate since the target is a unification of the thousands, even millions of followers. Indeed , it was the movement of various elements of civil societies to gain a voice to show their existence and eventually to take the power by a parliamentary struggle under an organism. Unlike elite-based parties, new model was representing the interests of a specific class in which Duverger generally uses masses as synonym

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<sup>92</sup> Andre Krouwel. (2006). "Party Models". (ed.). Richard S. Katz and William Crotty. *Handbook of Party Politics*. London: SAGE Publications. pp. 251.

<sup>93</sup> Larry Diamond and Richard Gunther. (2001). "Types and Functions of Parties". (ed.). L. Diamond and R. Gunther. *Political Parties and Democracy*. Maryland: The John Hopkins University Press. pp. 9.

<sup>94</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 254.

for working class<sup>95</sup> and the Duverger's major formulation of mass parties had just indicated the class parties, and for him middle class parties or bourgeois parties couldn't be mass parties however as Sartori also discussed this restriction or narrow perspective could not reflect the reality in every condition.<sup>96</sup> Another assumption of Duverger is about the nuclear structure of parties which he classified as 'the committee party', 'the branch party', 'the cell party' and 'the militia party' that the committee-based parties -mostly correspond to the middle class liberal-democrat parties- could not be considered as mass party.<sup>97</sup> In this case, according to his point of view, branch parties which corresponds to socialist and cell and militia-based parties that are structures of communist and fascist parties could be only mass parties. Sartori disagreed in this point and he indicated the Italian Christian Democratic Party as an example to show that Duverger's thesis has become less satisfied, anymore.<sup>98</sup>

After a brief discussion about distinction of parties, it is time to ask our main question: Which type can correspond to the social democrat parties? Social democrat parties have a particular group of people who belong to same class and social base. They also mobilize the electorate by local branches and their extra-parliamentary origin which combines with their extensive and centralized bureaucratic character, explicitly indicate that social democrat parties as the representatives of social democrat ideology are the mass-based parties. However to be too reductionist about party models, as Krouwel stressed, is not the right way to conceive the parties, their structures or behaviors.<sup>99</sup> For instance, a party which is classified as elite-based parties, can correspond to other kinds of dimensions that are not the part of specific characteristic of the elite-based model. Therefore, it is not always easy to classify the

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<sup>95</sup> Giovanni Sartori. (2005). "Party Types, Organization and Functions". *West European Politics*. 28:1. pp. 13.

<sup>96</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 14.

<sup>97</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 6.

<sup>98</sup> *Idem.*

<sup>99</sup> Andre Krouwel. (2006). "Party Models". (ed.). Richard S. Katz and William Crotty. *Handbook of Party Politics*. London: SAGE Publications. pp. 253.

parties and it should be avoided to emphasize a dominant characteristic and tag a party according to that single dimension. In this framework, classifying social democrat parties as mass-based parties is generally right classification but not always enough or clear enough. Moreover today, most of the social democrat parties have turned into catch-all or electoralist party type aiming to extent their party base and recruiting from different interest groups. In the literature, there are some studies defining those as catch-all mass parties too.

Democracy and parliamentarism are two major pillars of the Social Democracy and social democrat goals can be reached through democratic elections. According to this correlation, social democrat parties should maximize electoral appeal by affecting particular middle classes including small bourgeois. In this point, we should remember the deep transformation of Social Democracy since the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century till 1980's basing Bernstein's evolutionary socialism and Kautsky's parliamentarism to be able to observe the transformation of social democrat parties from mass-based party to catch-all party which intensively crystallized when social democrat parties started to lose power and fell from power to opposition by 1970's. Besides all these there are other examples of social democrat parties that indicate different characteristic such as Turkish Republican's People Party (CHP) which was established as a cadre-based party and transformed into first mass-based party and then catch-all party by gradually gaining a social democrat identity in time after the adoption of multi-party system in Turkey. In this study we are comprehensively going to discuss the CHP in our last chapter.

Political parties have some similar functions even if they have different types: Representation, participation, mobilization of the people, expression, aggregation or integration. Parties are the mediators to resolve the problems and manage conflicts in a system. To be in opposition or in government, all parties in a parliament are responsible for policy making and implementing them by considering national interest. Each of parties also works as an institution or organism which offers a new employment area for the people. All these functions should be observed in implementations of political parties or on their behavior. In this point, party

behaviors appear as a crucial issue because party behaviors usually vary. Rational choice theorists divide these behaviors into three models: Vote seeking parties; office seeking parties and policy seeking parties.<sup>100</sup>

According to this distinction, social democrat parties can be identified as vote seeking parties which seek to maximize their electorate with catch-all logic. However a social democrat party can be policy seeking party or office seeking party too due to concerns of its own effect on public policies in a coalition and desire to control over political office respectively.<sup>101</sup> Therefore considering party behaviors under such a division cannot fit with real cases every time and it is useful and even necessary to review the behaviors under current circumstances not ignoring institutional environment and political dynamics of that state. Because parties are not static formations and they are constantly under a transformation due to changing world system and relations. Indeed, after all the discussions we can certainly claim that political parties are sophisticated formations which are simplified by people.

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<sup>100</sup> Kaare Strom. (1990). "A Behavioral Theory of Competitive Political Parties". *American Journal of Political Science*. V. 34. N. 2. pp. 566.

<sup>101</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 567.



## CHAPTER 2

### SOCIAL DEMOCRATS OR SOCIALISTS: PAN-HELLENIC SOCIALIST MOVEMENT IN GREECE

#### 2.1. Reconstruction of Greek Democracy After the Fall of the Coup D'Etat in 1974

Official gazette of Greek State which promulgated in 24 July 1974, announced the return of Konstantine Karamanlis who had been in Paris since 1963, according to the article 43 of the present Constitution<sup>102</sup> four days after the Cyprus operation was started by Turkey. It was officially the declaration of the end of the Colonels who had already lost their support, power and ability to govern the country, particularly under the current circumstances that Greece and Turkey had been on the brink of a war. The end of the colonels was, however, the beginning of the Third Greek Republic which started with comprehensive restoration and reconstruction policies that are called as ‘metapolitefsi’ under the leaderships of Karamanlis and Papandreou respectively. As Voulgaris stressed, ‘metapolitefsi’ was an absolute turning point for political history of Greece because of having impacts upon every level of the society and state structures.<sup>103</sup>

Greece had to encounter chain of events since the first years of 20<sup>th</sup> century until mid-1970s. First of all Greece has transformed from Republic to Kingdom and from Kingdom to Republic three times in the history; become a party in five different wars including the World War I and II; experienced two dictatorships periods; faced the invasion of Germany; witnessed a destructive civil war which caused a big trauma in the society; struggled with political and economic depressions.

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<sup>102</sup>Εφημερίς της Κυβερνήσεως της Ελληνικής Δημοκρατίας. Προεδρικό Διάταγμα 517. Δημοσιεύθηκε στο ΦΕΚ 210 - 24.07.1974. <http://www.et.gr/index.php/2013-01-28-14-06-23/search-laws>. 15.08.14.

<sup>103</sup>Γιάννης Βούλγαρης. (2008). *Η Ελλάδα από τη Μεταπολίτευση στην Πανκοσμοποίηση*. Αθήνα: ΠΟΛΙΣ. pp. 12.

Indeed, the last one was the most chronic problem of the country that has not been able to be completely resolved even today. Based on all these structural problems, what Karamanlis found when he returned to Greece was a society which was extremely tired and a state which needed to be immediately and considerably transformed. There were two major internal issues and a vital external issue that had to be resolved by Karamanlis who was the assurance of survival of the state and restoration of governmental constitution: Considering the deep historical roots of Greek party system based on sharp divisions as ‘whites’ and ‘blacks’ or ‘we’ and ‘they’, the restoration of a full range of political parties was the first domestic issue and reestablishing the military as a positive force after the Coup D’état which caused a deep corruption inside the army, was the second one to be resolved.<sup>104</sup> The third and external problem that Karamanlis had to face was the Cyprus conflict and his mission was to avoid from a possible war with Turkey.

Karamanlis hastily formed a council of ministers from different wings of the political spectrum and in a few days and the Constitutional Act of August 1 (Καταστατική Συντακτική Πράξη) was declared. The Act aimed to restore the Constitution 1952 to create a democratic base as the following acts and resolutions (ψηφίσματα) which would be adopted until the new constitution could be ratified.<sup>105</sup> The point which was not specified in the first Act was the status of the Crown.

As soon as the restoration period started under the leadership of Karamanlis, Communist Party of Greece (ΚΚΕ) was legalized and this was one of the most significant change for Greek democracy which was paralyzed under the dictatorship. It was a symbolic but crucial step for reconstruction of the Greek party system to enable the participation of full range parties in political arena. Moreover, legalization of ΚΚΕ was the indicator of return to the traditional three-pole party system - left, right and centre- even if the competition would be usually between two central

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<sup>104</sup> Thomas W. Gallant. (2001). *Brief Histories, Modern Greece*. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 203.

<sup>105</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 204.

parties.<sup>106</sup>

The first parliamentary election was scheduled to take place in 17 November 1974 to immediately obtain a stable and chosen government to have a healthy step through the democracy. The most popular slogan of the electoral campaign was “Karamanlis or the tanks” and it clearly illustrated that Karamanlis was seen as an absolute guarantor of preservation of democratic Greece<sup>107</sup> As a result of this menacing campaign with immense prestige and charisma of the leader, Karamanlis’ New Democracy (ND) (Νέα Δημοκρατία) which was founded on October 1974, had obtained the 54.37% of the votes and thus 220 seats which meant an absolute dominance in the parliament.<sup>108</sup> The Center Union-New Forces (EKND) which would be overwhelmingly absorbed by PASOK in the end of the 1970’s could receive 60 seats with 20.42% and the third party of the election was surprisingly PanHellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) (Πανελλήνιο Σοσιαλιστικό Κίνημα) which had been just founded under the leadership of Andreas Papandreou, had 12 seats in the parliament with 13.58% of the votes (Table II).<sup>109</sup>

King Konstantine was still in London and he was ready to be called in any moment to return to the country as the leader of the Monarchy. However, prospects of the King Konstantine and the realities of Greek society and Greek political system were not in the same direction. The fate of the Monarchy was on the hands of the people and eventually, on December 1974, the Monarchy was abolished with a majority of Greek votes (70%) in favor of non-monarchical form of government.<sup>110</sup> In this point it has to be underlined that the 30% of the votes in favor of the monarchy demonstrated a new division in the political system. ND was the one

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<sup>106</sup> George Th. Mavrogordatos. (1999). “ The Emerging Party System”. (ed.). Richard Clogg. *Greece in the 1980’s*. UK: Antony Rowe Ltd. pp. 82.

<sup>107</sup> Christos Lyrintzis. (1984). “Political Parties in Post-Junta Greece: A Case of Bureaucratic Clientelism”. *West European Politics*. 7:2. pp. 107.

<sup>108</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 71.

<sup>109</sup> *Idem.*

<sup>110</sup> Ilias Nicolacopoulos. (2005). “Elections and Voters, 1974-2004: The Old Cleavages and New Issues”. *West European Politics*. 28:2. pp. 262.

opened the way to remove the monarchy for democracy and paradoxically, electoral base of ND which has been a conservative party, included the supporter of monarchy. As Nicolacopoulos indicated: “*Analysis of the results of the referendum clearly demonstrate that almost all the supporters of the monarchy came from those who had voted for ND three weeks earlier.*”<sup>111</sup>

Immediately after the election and the referendum, Karamanlis government was ready to draft a new constitution. In 9 June 1975, the Official Gazette would declare the new Constitution of Greece and the first article had defined the form of the government: “*The form of the government of Greece is that of presidential parliamentary republic.*”<sup>112</sup> As it can be understood from the statement of ‘presidential parliamentary republic’ which was amended in 1986 as ‘parliamentary republic’, the constitution had vested a considerably great power in the president of democracy elected by parliament.<sup>113</sup> The need of a strong president was considered necessary for extraordinary conditions of restoration period however neither the first president, Konstantine Tsatsos who was the prominent figure of previous political period, nor Karamanlis had preferred to use those powers such as vetoing bills, dissolving the parliament, dismissing the ministers or calling for a direct vote of no confidence which were withdrawn in 1986.<sup>114</sup> Individual liberties and social rights, include the right to strike, freedom of expression or freedom of religion, were protected. Special provisions for political parties include financial support by the state and free functioning, were adopted.<sup>115</sup> Indeed, the Constitution has substantially corresponded to the demands of liberal, democratic and welfare state. Today, the Constitution of 1975 is still in force with the amendments of three

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<sup>111</sup> *Idem.*

<sup>112</sup> Εφημερίς της Κυβερνήσεως της Ελληνικής Δημοκρατίας. (9 Ιουνίου 1975). *Συνταγμα της Ελλάδος*. άρθρον 1. τευχος πρωτον. αριθμος ψηλλου. 111. pp. 624.

<sup>113</sup> Thomas W. Gallant. (2001). *Brief Histories, Modern Greece*. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 205.

<sup>114</sup> *Idem.*

<sup>115</sup> Christos Lyrintzis and Elias Nikolakopoulos. (2004). “Political System and Elections in Greece”. *About Greece*. Special Volume. pp. 89.

different revisions.

Besides the transition from dictatorship to democracy, another mission of Karamanlis and his government was to reform the bureaucracy and to provide the social compromise. It needed more delicate operations because there was a division in the society: On the one hand, the government should have responded the demands for the punishment of the Colonels, in particular the ones who directed the Polytechniou events; however on the other hand, a sharp revenge could provoke a backlash on the part of junta sympathizers<sup>116</sup> which were still the part of the political and bureaucratic structure. In this framework, first defendants of Polytechniou events including Ioannidis, former head of the military police, received a seven-fold life sentence and immediately after those sentences, the Colonels, Papadopoulos, Makarezos and Pattakos were sentenced to death<sup>117</sup>, but considering the mistakes of past which caused serious troubles in the country, their sentences were commuted into life imprisonment. Indeed, this was a very rational decision because otherwise the Colonels could be heroized by the sympathizers. During the first years of metapolitefsi, junta sympathizers had been slowly purged from institutions of the state including universities.

Besides all these internal issues, Karamanlis immediately had to defuse the risk of war with Turkey<sup>118</sup> as a priority to concentrate on domestic issues and comfortably move inside the country. In this framework, it was the best solution to avoid armed conflict. Because, firstly, Greece was certainly unprepared for a possible war and it was not a rational choice to adopt aggressive policies due to the military imbalances between two countries. Secondly, from the Greek standpoint, the United States was also responsible for Turkish invasion in Cyprus and Greece was left alone in this conflict with its fate. Moreover this 'irresponsible silence' of the United States which intensified internal issues with 'Watergate' scandal, had caused Turkey extend the territories in Cyprus when Geneva negotiations had been

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<sup>116</sup> Richard Clogg. (1997). *A Concise History of Greece*. UK: Cambridge University Press. p p. 173.

<sup>117</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 174.

<sup>118</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 169.

remaining under ceasefire conditions.<sup>119</sup> According to Greek authorities, two NATO allies were on the brink of a war and NATO was unable to stop Turkey from invading Cyprus. Despite the suspension of the American military assistance to Ankara for a specific period<sup>120</sup>, Karamanlis' response was quick and clear, under these circumstances, it was unnecessary to be a part of military wing of NATO and Greece had been withdrawn. This was a result of the mistrust and resentment to the USA. According to Turkey, this was a peace operation which the guarantor states should have interfered to stop ongoing events which threatened sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Island. For this reason, it was not an invasion or an illegal action of Turkish State that had just used the rights within the scope of the Treaty of 1960.<sup>121</sup> The Cyprus conflict was deeply analyzed in the following chapter when the Turkish case was examined however it can be clearly said that the issue would remain to be a conflict between two states and affect the relations even if both Turkey and Greece have never seen Cyprus as a real problem for their relations unlike Aegean dispute which would be the major problem of late 1970's between Greece and Turkey in terms of the conflicts on continental shelves of the islands and the territorial waters which were internationalized.

Greek foreign policy could not be thought independently from Turkish foreign policy vice versa however metapolitefsi was a turning point for this traditional perception due to the revision of the Greek foreign policy under the leadership of Karamanlis who had asserted that 'Greece belongs to the West'. Indeed, this was a significant resolution and identification for the identity crisis of the Greek State which similarly Turkey still faces. After 1974, Greece made a decision to decrease high dependency on USA and turned its face to the Europe by supporting

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<sup>119</sup> Thomas W. Gallant. (2001). *Brief Histories, Modern Greece*. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 206.

<sup>120</sup> Barbara Jelavich. (2006). *History of the Balkans Twentieth Century*. V.2. UK: Cambridge University Press. pp. 439.

<sup>121</sup> Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. History of Cyprus. <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/kibris-tarihce.tr.mfa>. 20.08.14.

the membership of the European Economic Community which would be confirmed with Accession Treaty of May 1979.

Karamanlis had mostly concentrated on the issues of foreign policies more than domestic issues however a new election was around the corner and PASOK as a new party was running an intense campaign with the slogan of ‘Greece belongs to the Greeks’ as a backlash to Karamanlis’ policies with a nationalist rhetoric. Indeed, it was a historical moment in 1977 when Andreas Papandreou answered Karamanlis in a very populist way in the Greek Parliament.<sup>122</sup> Eventually in 20 November 1977, PASOK received an impressive success for a party founded just three years ago although New Democracy of Karamanlis was the first party.

## **2.2. PASOK's March to the Power**

*“The Greek people have chosen their journey. We will advance in our struggle for our national independence without conditions. We will advance without compromises, freed from every complex of fear, in the consolidation of unbound popular sovereignty and social liberation. This is the struggle, a difficult and uphill struggle that is envisioned for the Greek people. And in this struggle, I have come to contribute on their side”*<sup>123</sup> These were the first words of Andreas Papandreou when

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<sup>122</sup> Papandreou had underlined that they agreed with the government about one point that the decision about the admission of Greece to the European Community was the most critical decision ever made in Greek nation and he continued that this decision was made by sacrificing them. In that point, Karamanlis interfered and asked him that he could not understand what he exactly meant because according to Karamanlis Greece belonged to the West by tradition, by interest or by what they preferred to say but Greece belonged to the West as other nations were non-aligned, to the East or to the Africa. Andreas Papandreou answered with one sentence: “We prefer to belong to the Greeks!” See also: ΠΑΣΟΚ 1974-1981: Η Πορεία Προς την Αλλαγή. ΙΑΠ Αρχείο <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=28cjXSWmXQ8&list=PL9FEF7AF337F4A978&index=34>. 27.09.14.

<sup>123</sup> Theodore C. Kariotis. (1997). “Andreas G. Papandreou: The Economist”. Journal of the Hellenic

17 November 1974			20 November 1977		
<u>Political Parties</u>	% of Votes	Seats	<u>Political Parties</u>	% of Votes	Seats
National Democratic Union (EDE)	1.08	-	National Front (EP)	6.82	5
<b>New Democracy (ND)</b>	<b>54.37</b>	<b>220</b>	<b>New Democracy (ND)</b>	<b>41.84</b>	<b>171</b>
Center Union- New Forces (EKND)	20.42	60	New Liberals (KNPh)	1.08	2
Democratic Center Union (DEK)	0.19	-	Union of Democratic Center (EDIK)	11.95	16
<b>Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK)</b>	<b>13.58</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK)</b>	<b>25.34</b>	<b>93</b>
United Left	9.47	8	Alliance of Progressive and Leftist Forces	2.72	2
Extreme Left	0.03	-	Communist Party of Greece (KKE)	9.36	11
Independents	0.86	-	Extreme Left	0.46	-
			Independents	0.43	-

Table II. Election Results of 1974 and 1977

Source: [www.hellenicparliament.gr](http://www.hellenicparliament.gr)

he returned to his homeland from exile on August 1974. This was the second but the last return and, now he was ready for his struggle as he stressed in this short speech. Almost two weeks later, at the King George Hotel, Andreas Papandreou put his

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Diaspora. N. 114. p 46.



glasses on and started his historical speech with the white papers that he was holding. It was the proclamation of the foundation of Panhellenic Socialist Movement.

*“We are announcing today the inauguration of a new political movement, a movement which we believe represents the desires and needs of the average Greek: the farmer, the worker, the craftsman, the salaried worker, and our courageous and enlightened youth. The movement belongs to them, and we will call on every exploited Greek to strengthen our ranks, to form cadres and participate in the molding of the movement in order to promote our national independence (η εθνική ανεξαρτησία), popular sovereignty (η λαϊκή κυριαρχία), social liberation (η κοινωνική απελευθέρωση) and democracy in all phases of public life (η δημοκρατία σ’όλες τις φάσεις).”*<sup>124</sup>

### **2.2.1. The Coalition of Disparate Forces**

3<sup>rd</sup> of September was the beginning of the glorious days of PASOK but surely, it was not the beginning of the story. Within the framework of a deep and complicated but an overstated view, it is even possible to take this story back to the period of Eleftheros Venizelos stressing the ‘National Schism’ which may be considered as core of all divisions in the Greek political system. However the period of the Central Union (Ένωσης Κέντρου) (EK) when this name appeared in the scene of politics for the first time by the beginning of 1960’s under the leadership of George Papandreou, was the best guide for us to show the legacy which Andreas Papandreou carried in his shoulders for years and to analyze the base of PASOK.

Two crucial turning points had designated the political destiny of EK: The first one was the election of 1961 that brought a doubtful success for the National

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<sup>124</sup> Ιδρυμα Ανδρεα Γ. Παπανδρέου. (3 Σεπτεμβρίου 1974). Διακήρυξη Βασικών Στόχων ΠΑ.ΣΟ.Κ. <http://www.agp.gr/agp/content/Document.aspx?d=7&rd=5499005&f=1403&rf=1842884619&m=4731&rm=11896313&l=2>. 27.08.14.

Radical Union (Εθνική Ριζοσπαστική Ένωση) (EPE) of Karamanlis and the second turning point was the murder of the leftist politician Grigoris Lambrakis in 1963. Immediately after the election of 1961, EK and the United Democratic Left (EDA) (Ενιαία Δημοκρατική Αριστερά) (ΕΔΑ) submitted a comprehensively documented demurral for the cancellation of the election results, asking renewal of the election due to existing serious evidences indicating a rigged poll.<sup>125</sup> Even if the demurral was rejected, it had caused emerging a new strategy which was named by George Papandreou: “Unyielding Struggle” or “Ανένδοτος Αγώνας” which would gather the people in massive demonstrations aiming to question the legitimacy of the government. This crucial decision was both indicator of historical consensus between Left and Central Union and the beginning of the way to be a mass party for EK which had chosen to be more heterogeneous party to strengthen the position and legitimacy against the National Radical Union by representing new social classes. This was a game which elder Papandreou who was also against communism, would play. He had to be ready for everything including loss or disintegration of EK and he had to be ready, as Andreas would later put it, “*to play his hand to the very end*”.<sup>126</sup>

George Papandreou had chosen a pragmatist tactical way to reach the power. It was an absolutely catch-all party behavior by new openings out of its own social and political base and it had irreversible and deep effects on the base although he broke the consensus with the Left and preferred to act alone as soon as the EK gained 52,72% of the votes in the election of 1963.<sup>127</sup> Besides all these, perhaps, one of the most important thing was the first appearance of Andreas Papandreou in the stage of history as a minister. Most of the studies in the literature prefer to mention ASPIDA in association with Andreas Papandreou and from that point there is a direct passing to 1974 however ministry term of Andreas is a non-ignorable point to be able

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<sup>125</sup> Ηλίας Νικολακόπουλος. (2011). “Ελεγχόμενη Δημοκρατία από το Τέλος του Εμφυλίου έως τη Δικτατορία”. *Ελληνική Πολιτική Ιστορία 1950-2004*. β΄ έκδοση. Αθήνα: Θεμελιο. pp. 44.

<sup>126</sup> Stan Draenos. (2012). *Andreas Papandreou: The Making of a Greek Democrat and Political Maverick*. London: I.B. Tauris. pp. 58.

<sup>127</sup> *Ibid.*, p.48.

to conceive the structure of PASOK which has based on a coalition of disparate forces. Because even if PASOK had appeared with a socialist rhetoric in 1970's by growing out of the Pan-Hellenic Liberation Movement (PAK) (Π.Α.Κ.) which was established by Andreas Papandreou as radical left movement, in 6 January 1968 immediately nine months after the coup when he was in auto-exile, Papandreou did never totally break organic ties with the centre or specifically with the prominent figures of the Central Union.

PAK was the resistance movement which was active both inside and outside the country to overthrow the Colonels and basically the base of the movement consisted of two main elements: 1) Liberals 2) Independents or leftist intellectuals and students.<sup>128</sup> Most of the prominent figures of the liberal wing of the Movement were the former members of the central left, specifically from the Central Union which Andreas Papandreou kept in touch despite outstanding dissents. As long as the definition and the character of the 'struggle' crystallized, while the number of leftist members were increasing, PAK was losing the liberals who started to understand that the Junta would last more so it could be a longer struggle than they thought because pressures of foreign governments were not enough to ensure expected result.<sup>129</sup> PAK had a radical but an ambiguous eclecticism as main characteristic and, actually, evolutionary romanticism and idealistic voluntarism were the common ground of the members in the Movement.<sup>130</sup> Political tendency of PAK was in the direction of the Left and to use Marxist school of thought as a means for analysis.<sup>131</sup> Additionally, PAK had clearly refused social democracy. Indeed, the target of the Movement was to differentiate itself from traditional left of Greece which KKE was accepted as representative. The letter of Papandreou which he had sent to the Congress of EK in 1971 to explain his absence, referred some significant points indicating the

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<sup>128</sup> Μιχάλης Σπουρδαλάκης. (1988). *Π.Α.Σ.Ο.Κ Δομή Εσωκομματικές Κρίσεις Και Συγκέντρωση Εξουσίας*. Αθήνα: Εξάντας. pp. 69-70.

<sup>129</sup> *Idem*.

<sup>130</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 71.

<sup>131</sup> *Idem*.

ideological and political position of the Movement. First of all, the letter called for struggle to change Greece and the regime of the country; secondly for requirements of the struggle, the letter showed the Third World as an example; the third and the most crucial point was that the target of the struggle was to reach a socialist and democratic but not just a 'social democratic' Greece.<sup>132</sup> Moving from this point of view, it is possible to assert that PAK had adopted a socialist rhetoric which was supported with an anti-imperialist emphasis although those socialist discourses had mostly stayed as undefined and unclear approaches.

PAK was explicitly a product of its era and under the leadership of Papandreou it was more than a movement. Eventually, in 1974 by the fall of the Junta, political conditions would change and PAK would have to answer two vital questions: To be a party or to continue to be a movement? If it would be a party, would they continue in the politics under the roof of EK or would a new party be founded?

Immediately after Andreas Papandreou returned to Greece in 16 August 1974, a hundred representatives of the Central Union had proposed him to be the leader of the EK but this was a leadership which Papandreou had to share with other two prominent members of the party. As Melina Merkouri stated in 2002 for the documentary of public channel, the answer of Andreas was clear enough: A big no!<sup>133</sup> According to Gerassimos Arsenis, Andreas was much more leftist and progressive for the political platform of EK but moreover, Papandreou had high egoism and ambition and if he would be the leader, he had to be the only one without sharing the leadership.<sup>134</sup> Indeed, in the new political atmosphere, EK was ready to act together with PAK but PAK did not have this tendency since they considered themselves radical. Finally, foundation of PASOK in 1974 was a clear answer for

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<sup>132</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 70.

<sup>133</sup> ΠΑΣΟΚ 1974- 1981: Η Πορεία Προς την Αλλαγή. ΙΑΠ Αρχείο <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=28cjXSWmXQ8&list=PL9FEF7AF337F4A978&index=34>.

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<sup>134</sup> *Idem.*

those questions. Firstly, it was the concrete indicator of transformation from movement to party despite ongoing discussions on party/movement dilemma. Secondly, the Movement had rejected to be with EK and chosen a new way.

The strategy of ‘unyielding struggle’ for the victory under a consensus with the left in political arena was the legacy of EK which PAK had taken and moved further. After the fall of the Colonels in 1974, it was the time for a new formation to act as the main actor in metapolitefsi and thus Pan-Hellenic Liberation Movement that was the leading force against the Colonels during junta, should have completed its mission and given way to a well-structured organization for a new democratic Greece. Dissolution of PAK resulted in the foundation of Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement which would be widely disseminated by incorporating various different political and social actors in its own structure. PASOK had appeared as new dynamic of the Third Greek Republic by taking the political and ideological legacy of PAK. Particularly, the party ideology based on dependency theory of Papandreou which considered Greece as peripheral country unequally dependent on metropolitan centres of the US or Western Europe, was a direct legacy of PAK that was transferred to PASOK.<sup>135</sup> Moreover new party -not a movement anymore but unquestionably a party despite its name referred the movement- rejected both communism and social democracy like PAK because according to Papandreou social democracy was the ‘*noble face*’ or ‘*genteel mask of capitalism*’.<sup>136</sup>

PASOK was successful enough to differentiate itself from pre-junta parties on the level of political discourse and present the party as a new dynamic of ‘metapolitefsi’. However on the level of its electoral base and membership, it obviously had the similar characteristics with the EK<sup>137</sup>. As Featherstone underlined PASOK had embraced “leading figures of the Central Union which had a number of

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<sup>135</sup> Susannah Verney. (1996). “The Greek Socialists”. (ed.). John Gaffney. *Political Parties and European Union*. London: Routledge. pp. 174.

<sup>136</sup> *Idem*.

<sup>137</sup> Ilias Nicolacopoulos. (2005). “Elections and Voters, 1974-2004: Old Cleavages and New Issues”. *West European Politics*. 28:2. pp. 261.

liberal intellectuals, various groups of Trotskyists and leftists”.<sup>138</sup> When it is considered that the members of PAK had defined themselves much more radical than EK, and the members of the Democratic Defence which was another anti-Colonel resistance group were also parts of PASOK, it evidently indicates that the new movement was a ‘coalition of disparate forces’ -leftists, technocrats and conformists-. In this point, as it has been also mentioned before, Featherstone’s approach for the structure of PASOK’s cadre, is the most appropriate and realistic description. Andreas Papandreou who was a minister of EK government and then the leader of PAK, was himself a symbol representing both center and left and under his leadership, PASOK could not be anything else except being a synthesis of Center and the Left. It was a heterogeneous structure gathered and Andreas Papandreou was the bridge to keep them under the umbrella of PASOK with his strong leadership and ideological effect. In this framework, PASOK was condemned to be left-of-centre party or in other words, despite deep and determined socialist promises and discourses, to be able to be a mass party which appealed to everyone in the country, and keep the party integrated, PASOK should have been on the side of social democracy not socialism.

### **2.2.2. Declaration of Principles and 'Evolutionary' Rise of PASOK**

PASOK had entered to the Greek political scene with the ‘Declaration of Principles’ which was party’s founding document, in 3 September 1974. The Declaration comprehensively described both the requirements for democratic consolidation and targets of PASOK for a better and more democratic Greece after seven years of suppression under the dictatorship.

The first point that was stressed in the Declaration which was written by Andreas Papandreou, concentrated on the current urgent problems of the country

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<sup>138</sup> Kevin Featherstone. (1983). “The Greek Socialists in Power”. *West European Politics*. 6:3. pp. 237.

criticizing policies of Pentagon and the Colonels that dragged the country into a disaster and three prioritized issues for consolidation of Greek democracy were listed: 1) Punishment of those who dominated the country for seven years, 2) To stand an immediate trial for those who were responsible for the slaughter of Polytechniou events and Cyprus tragedy 3) Purge of supporters of the dictatorship from the political scene and restoration of the country with all the dynamics.<sup>139</sup> It required a well-organized program which would include full rehabilitation of victims of the dictatorship, immediate cancellation of all oppressive emergency measures, ensuring freedom for political refugees to return to Greece, elimination of para-state and party-state and etc. Respectively adjudication and punishment, purge and restoration should have been the main policies of the first years of metapolitefsi.

Dependency theory of Papandreou which had shaped the ideology of PAK, was stressed once again in the Declaration of Principles. Root of the calamity could be explained with this theory because last seven ‘medieval’ years under the dictatorship which was supported by the United States, had increased dependency of Greece to the USA and Papandreou was, thus, calling people to be more active in politics under new and dynamic Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement, to save the future of the country, securing popular sovereignty and national independence.<sup>140</sup> In this framework the Declaration pointed four constitutive principles which were the goals that PASOK would strive for: National independence (*η εθνική ανεξαρτησία*), popular sovereignty (*η λαϊκή κυριαρχία*), social liberation (*η κοινωνική απελευθέρωση*) and democracy in all phases of public life (*η δημοκρατία σ’όλες τις φάσεις*). National independence was the precondition for popular sovereignty which was the precondition for social liberation and social liberation was the precondition for democratization.<sup>141</sup> That is why these four principles should have been

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<sup>139</sup> Ίδρυμα Ανδρεα Γ. Παπανδρέου. (3 Σεπτεμβρίου 1974). Διακήρυξη Βασικών Στόχων ΠΑ.ΣΟ.Κ. <http://www.agp.gr/agp/content/Document.aspx?d=7&rd=5499005&f=1403&rf=1842884619&m=4731&rm=11896313&l=2>. 17.09.14.

<sup>140</sup> *Idem*.

<sup>141</sup> *Idem*.

considered all together as a road map which would be followed for an independent, socialist and democratic Greece. PASOK had aimed to embrace all segments of the society under the consideration of equality and democracy even if it seemed that PASOK was just a movement of the working and underprivileged people of Greece. From the beginning, actually, PASOK was on the way to be a mass party and it was clearly stated in the Declaration too by calling people to act all together for the future of Greece. The principles and ideology of new Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement was shaped according to ideological approach of Papandreou that he developed whilst in exile. When PAK members had decided to repeal PAK under the leadership of Papandreou, they had a specific view to establish much more organized and sophisticated political structure than PAK. Therefore, if PAK was a movement, PASOK should have been something more than a movement. PASOK should have been an entirely new party having no ties with past.

Despite strong anti-imperialist and even nationalist discourses in terms of national interest and socialist promises such as syndicalism, free and compulsory education, free medical and hospital services or decentralization<sup>142</sup> which aimed to strengthen the perception of social state on the way of socialist Greece, indeed, all these targets were basically the needs of the current circumstances of restoration period for a democratic republic and therefore, it was necessary to wait for the maturation of political tendencies and the conditions to be able to name PASOK as a socialist party. Conversely, it was not also an adequate account to consider PASOK as social democrat party in 1974 and following three years. First of all, Greek political system has not encountered with an absolute social democrat party or movement until 1970's and secondly, eclectic structure of PASOK and its electoral base would be the significant dynamics which would shape its ideological attitude. Indeed, the Green Sun had appeared with a unique identity which had a socialist label but a social democrat or a central left character and structure. Perhaps, what K. Skandalides stated was the clearest explanation of the perception of that period:

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<sup>142</sup> *Idem.*



“Each one of us, during this period, was defining ‘socialism’ according to his/her experiences.”<sup>143</sup>

First parliamentary election of metapolitefsi would be held in 17 November 1974. PASOK was just two-month-old party and to run a successful election campaign was pretty difficult for a new party, particularly, against New Democracy of Karamanlis which was supported by majority who considered Karamanlis as the only choice to rescue the country and guarantee of democracy.<sup>144</sup> Nevertheless, the Declaration of Principles was the bible of PASOK and it actually included all the points that PASOK could use during the election campaign. For instance, “the pursuit of social liberation of the Greek working people, the socialization of the financial system or the systematic and progressive closing of the gap between the lowest and highest incomes by region and by function”<sup>145</sup> were some of the goals that PASOK set and presented to the people in the declaration and the same points were the promises of the party for the campaign. Before the election PASOK immediately initiated to spread the organizational structure around the country to reach more and more people and in this framework the party made an open appeal to the Greek people for self-organization and in few times, grass root of organization appeared in all over the country from villages to student unions.<sup>146</sup> This was a crucial turning point for PASOK and pre-junta Greek party structure on the level of organization since the party structure was institutionalized based on society, not party-directed

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<sup>143</sup> Theodora Kotsaka. (June 2005). “The Human Geography of PASOK: 1974-1981”. *Paper presented to the 2<sup>nd</sup> LSE PhD Symposium on Modern Greece*. London. pp. 7.

<sup>144</sup> In this point, it should be underlined that Papandreou was already disappointed about the decision of the country for return of Karamanlis since it was the indicator of continuity of past. For more: ΠΑΣΟΚ. 1974- 1981: Η Πορεία Προς την Αλλαγή. ΙΑΠ Αρχείο <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=28cjXSWmXQ8&list=PL9FEF7AF337F4A978&index=34>. 27.09.14.

<sup>145</sup> Theodore C. Kariotis. (1997). “Andreas G. Papandreou: The Economist”. *Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora*. N. 114. pp. 47-48.

<sup>146</sup> Theodora Kotsaka. (June 2005). “The Human Geography of PASOK: 1974-1981”. *Paper presented to the 2<sup>nd</sup> LSE PhD Symposium on Modern Greece*. London. pp. 6.

and personalized clientelism - a distinct form of clientelism would appear in bureaucratic level by an organized expansion of public sector to maintain electoral base after 1981 and it would be called as bureaucratic clientelism by Lyrintzis- as Spourdalakis also underlined.<sup>147</sup>

The first election had resulted in the victory of New Democracy but seventy five days after its creation, PASOK led by Papandreou with 13.58% of the votes (Table II) proved to be the strongest candidate to govern the country although EK-ND was the second party of the election with 20.42% and the United Left Party which included KKE, KKE Interior and the United Democratic Left (EDA) had received 9.5% of the votes.<sup>148</sup> PASOK's proposal found the response from the electorates and the attempts of the party to have a new image distinguishing itself from the past were welcomed by the people despite the efforts of Karamanlis to show PASOK as communist threat which could cause another coup. Even if the percentage that the party received was more than many members of PASOK had expected and it was actually considered as a big success, Papandreou was dissatisfied and disappointed enough with the result of the election<sup>149</sup> and the Central Committee of PASOK would declare the reasons of low percent after the election that:

- “1) *The fake dilemma ‘Karamanlis or tank’*
- 2) *The sudden way that the elections took place and the electoral law*
- 3) *The slander rumors that created insecurity*
- 4) *The political mistake of those who by participating in this government*

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<sup>147</sup> Michalis Spourdalakis. (1996). “PASOK's Second Chance”. *Mediterranean Politics*. 1:3. pp. 330. See also: Christos Lyrintzis. (1984). “Political Parties in Post-Junta Greece: A Case of ‘Bureaucratic Clientelism’”. *West European Politics*. 7:2. pp. 103.

<sup>148</sup> Ilias Nicolacopoulos. (2005). “Elections and Voters, 1974-2004: The Old Cleavages and New Issues”. *West European Politics*. 28:2. pp. 261.

<sup>149</sup> Kotsaka noted an event enable us to observe the reaction of Papandreou after election and according to G. Notaras who was with Papandreou on election night had stated that: “A.Papandreou was so disappointed that he did not even want to make a public appearances on the election night. He could not believe that PASOK was not even the leading opposition. We almost forced him to appear on the T.V.” For more: *Ibid.*, pp. 7.

*legitimated it. (Here the functionaries of the Central Union are implied.)”*<sup>150</sup>

Gaining 12 seats in the parliament just two months after the creation was enough to be considered as a victory which prompted PASOK to seek for power at a much faster pace. Another dynamic which influenced PASOK to work harder to take power, was the ambition of Papandreou and his big expectations. Organizational expansion all over the country remained as a crucial strategy to reach more people and to establish itself as an alternative and big party of Greece. In this standpoint, party discipline was the other significant issue to follow a rapid and healthy process with a strong structure to capture the power. Party policies were designed by Papandreou and prominent members were in active roles during decision making processes. Indeed, Papandreou wanted to control every dynamic in the party for an immediate rise and he, thus, tended to establish an authoritarian-paternalistic structure under his own control.<sup>151</sup> Intra-party democracy which was an underlined positive and distinctive feature of PASOK would gradually fall into abeyance concurrently with the radical socialist promises which were the first indicators of Papandreou’s populism. The most concrete indicator was the dismissal of the party Central Committees few months after the establishment by purging many members who potentially had dissenting tendencies. If we remember the grass root of the party that it was a coalition of disparate forces, this kind of internal struggles were expected but despite all these internal implementations which damaged intra-party democracy, Papandreou was again the pillar that integrated those forces to each other and kept the party powerful. From another perspective all these efforts of Papandreou, besides his ambition and leadership spirit, was for the consolidation of the party. It was an intense evolution in PASOK started after the election in 1974 until 1981 when PASOK would come to power.

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<sup>150</sup> Theodora Kotsaka. (June 2005). “The Human Geography of PASOK: 1974-1981”. *Paper presented to the 2<sup>nd</sup> LSE PhD Symposium on Modern Greece*. London. pp. 6.

<sup>151</sup> Takis S. Pappas. (2010). “Macroeconomic Policy, Strategic Leadership and Vote Behavior: The Disparate Tales of Socialist Reformism in Greece and Spain During 1980’s”. *West European Politics*. 33:6. pp. 1247.

Karamanlis called for an early election in 1977 to obtain validation of his government's policies. This was an important chance for PASOK and eventually PASOK's message for change 'αλλαγή' found non-ignorable response in 1977 with 25,34% of the votes (Table II). PASOK had presented itself as a new Left from the beginning and the message that was given to the people was similar with 'either Karamanlis or tanks': 'Either PASOK or the Right'<sup>152</sup> Polarization between left and right was escalated by PASOK even if in the same period European social democrats had started to realize that left versus right was not possible in the new world order. However unique conditions of Greek political system responded to the demand of Papandreou and now, PASOK had achieved to be accepted by the people as representative of the Left and the Center. Moreover with 25,34%, it became the second largest party of the country being also main opposition of ND. In 21 November 1977, the *Eleftherotypia* wrote its headline as 'The Glory of PASOK' and right under the title there were the first statements of both Karamanlis and Papandreou: One saw the results as confirmation of his legitimacy but also a serious warning and announced to 'preserve the unity'; other thanked the people to vote for change.<sup>153</sup> The same newspaper had a caricature which depicted that a 'Green Sun' which was rising while it was raining and a man was welcoming the sun with a big smile, leaving his umbrella.<sup>154</sup>

Second election of the third Greek Republic was a real turning point for the party system. First of all re-existence of KKE after its legalization in 1974 in Greek politics was an important change and the party succeeded to take 9,36% of the votes in 1977. Secondly rapid rise of PASOK and its ability to be a challenge for ND as second party started to gradually polarize system. Before the election, Papandreou had stressed the demand as 'either PASOK or the Right' but in the beginning of 1980's the form of this polarization would change as "central left versus central

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<sup>152</sup> Christos Lyrintzis. (1987). "The Power of Populism: The Greek Case". *European Journal of Political Research*. N. 15. pp. 668.

<sup>153</sup> ΠΑΣΟΚ Θριαμβός. (1977, 21 Νοεμβρίου). *Ελευθεροτυπία*.

<sup>154</sup> *Idem*.

right” rather than “left versus right”.<sup>155</sup> Before the dictatorship, there was a deep division in the political system into left, right and centre which were represented respectively by the United Democratic Left (EDA), the National Radical Union (ERE) and the Central Union.<sup>156</sup> After 1974 and specifically 1977, as Mavrogordatos also underlined, the struggle in the Greek party system was mostly within each political group not among those three camps.<sup>157</sup> There were again three powerful dynamics in politics (ND, PASOK and KKE) which pointed a tripolar system but the competition was between two largest parties: ND and PASOK.

In this framework, a vital question appeared: How and when did PASOK become a central party? Or the question can be also, has PASOK ever been an entirely socialist party? Perhaps the best answer was again from Mavrogordatos:

*“... Left, right and centre in Greece should be conceived as three parataxis, that is to say historical political camps or groups. These are defined and preserved primarily by traditional identifications and loyalties rather than by ‘pure’ ideological or sociological factors, although these are by no means irrelevant. It may thus be shown that PASOK is a prodigal son of the centre, rather than an illegitimate offspring of the left.”*<sup>158</sup>

Besides this clear answer of the question, PASOK did not have got any other chance except softening the radical socialist speech as long as the party tried to capture the power with a catch-all method and moreover PASOK was not a class-based party despite the opposite claims by the scholars or members of the party because PASOK was a coalition of petty bourgeois and working class as its own cadre structure, its electoral base was also a coalition and this coalition could be preserved integrated just with a social democratic way. That is why, particularly with the election success of 1977, PASOK explicitly began to get a social democrat

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<sup>155</sup> George Th. Mavrogordatos. (1999). “The Emerging Party System”. (ed.). Richard Clogg. *Greece in the 1980's*. UK: Antony Rowe Ltd. pp. 82.

<sup>156</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 72.

<sup>157</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 82.

<sup>158</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 72.

character. Now it was the era of tie instead of roll-neck sweater.<sup>159</sup>

### **2.2.3.'Andreas': A Charismatic Leader**

Andreas or Papandreou or Andreas Papandreou? Andreas was a brilliant economist, a son and a father. Papandreou was a charismatic leader, a successful politician who played a key role in the contemporary Greek political history. Indeed, Andreas Papandreou was all of them because what shaped his ideas, his political view and his character was a mixture of all these roles that he played in his life and all experiences that he gained.

Papandreou had been born in a privileged world in 5 February 1919 in Chios where George Papandreou, his father, was sent as the general governor of the Aegean islands by Venizelos.<sup>160</sup> He was four years old, when they moved to Athens. Andreas would be in this city until he would leave Greece for 25 years after an imprisonment which he was subjected to torture.

The world that Andreas had found himself inside always kept him close to politics and despite the privileges, he had deeply felt the disadvantages of his life. He had to be acquainted with the prisons, exiles and heavy responsibilities of politics since his childhood because of the fact that his father was in active politics. Indeed the main reason that he could not avoid politics was rather about his inner self than the status or position of his father because even if he was just a young man during the years of American College, Andreas had been arrested for three days since the allegations had showed that he destroyed the Metaxas Regime's propaganda handouts and wall posters.<sup>161</sup> This was not the first time that Andreas Papandreou had met the authorities but it was the first direct contact of him and it would not be the last. Whilst in Law School of the University of Athens, he organized a resistance

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<sup>159</sup> Richard Clogg. (1997). *A Concise History of Greece*. UK: Cambridge University Press. pp. 180.

<sup>160</sup> Alexander Kitroeff. (1997). "Andreas G. Papandreou: A Brief Political Biography". *Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora*. 23:1. pp. 8.

<sup>161</sup> *Idem*.

group which worked with a Trotskyist consideration.<sup>162</sup> However in 1939, when he was in the second year of university, he was arrested again and imprisoned by Metaxas Special Security Services, for three months.<sup>163</sup> This was a turning point for his life and career because as soon as he was released by the efforts of his father, and with he took a three-month visa for the United States with his mother's connections. The World War II had just begun on September 1939 and Andreas Papandreou arrived in New York City in the spring of 1940.<sup>164</sup>

Andreas who had to leave the Law School of the University of Athens in the second year and went to the USA, would receive a Master's Degree in 1942 and then PhD in economics from Harvard University in 1943. Same year, he took US citizenship and joined the US Navy for two years of wartime service.<sup>165</sup> This was a point which would be used against Andreas by his opponents when he would be a politician since it will be considered as an indicator of 'unpatriotic motives'. In the reality, Andreas Papandreou's relation with the US, as Clogg explicitly defined, was sort of a love-hate relation and it can be concretely observed on his anti-imperialist and anti-NATO discourses that he would adopt at the end of the 1960's.

After two years in the Navy, he returned to his career and worked as lecturer and professor in several universities such as Harvard, Minnesota and Northwestern. Indeed, this period was academically the most productive period of Andreas. His publications in economics are significant to be able to conceive his ideological background. One of the prominent contributions of him to the science of economics was "Competition and its Regulation" which examines the role of government in the

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<sup>162</sup> Andreas G. Papandreou Full Biography. Andreas G. Papandreou Foundation. [http://agp.archeio.gr/ap.php?page=ap\\_cv&lang=en](http://agp.archeio.gr/ap.php?page=ap_cv&lang=en). 20.09.2014.

<sup>163</sup> Stan Draenos. (2012). *Andreas Papandreou: The Making of a Greek Democrat and Political Maverick*. London: I.B. Tauris. pp. 5.

<sup>164</sup> *Ibid.*, p.6.

<sup>165</sup> Marlise Simons. (June 24, 1996). "Andreas Papandreou, Greek Leftist Who Admired and Annoyed U.S.". Archives of the New York Times. <http://www.nytimes.com/1996/06/24/world/andreas-papandreou-greek-leftist-who-admired-and-annoyed-us-diesat-77.html>. 21.09.14.

capitalist system and it gave an important opinion about his perceptions of that period because even if he is known as the first socialist prime minister of Greece, in this publication, he analyzed the state solely ‘as a provider of the legal framework for the operation of the price system’.<sup>166</sup> Similarly in ‘Economics As a Science’ which was the peak of his profession, there was not any point related to socialism and even Keynesian perception and moreover the economists that he mentioned in the book was the most prominent theorists of neo-classical economics, Milton Friedman or Paul Samuelson not Marx or Keynes.<sup>167</sup> By the end of 1950’s Papandreou was now a mature orthodox economist or neo-classical economist. It was an outstanding change on the ideological view of Papandreou from a young Trotskyist into a neo-classical economist with a U-turn.<sup>168</sup> However Papandreou would make another turn in the beginning of 1970’s and come to the point close where he had started. He would officially state his breakup with orthodox economics with those words in the preface of his most known and important book, ‘*Paternalistic Capitalism*’: “*The basic themes of Paternalistic Capitalism evolved over a number of years as a result of an increasingly intense realization that my conceptual apparatus—as an economist—was woefully inadequate for giving me even a reasonable understanding of the realities of the power structure that dominate life in the contemporary society of the West.*”<sup>169</sup> His ideas had been shaping according to the unique conditions of the world conjuncture which had been changing with many dynamics including military and ideological wars. Moreover the chain of events that Greece in itself had experienced was a micro sample of what was happening all over the world. The country had to meet with dictatorships, civil wars, unstable governments, kingdoms, republics, political corruption, economic bankruptcy since the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century

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<sup>166</sup> Theodore C. Kariotis. (1997). “Andreas G. Papandreou: The Economist”. *Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora*. N. 114. pp. 34.

<sup>167</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 33.

<sup>168</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 36.

<sup>169</sup> Andreas G. Papandreou. (1972). *Paternalistic Capitalism*. Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press. pp. vii.



until 1970's and as a product of this society which carried the trauma of all those events, Andreas Papandreou and his ideas related to the continuities and changes cannot be also considered independently from Greek realities even if he spent more than twenty five years of his life abroad.

After a brief description pointing his economist identity, it is time to see Andreas as a politician. His political career would start with his first return to Greece in 1959. Indeed, he had an upcoming academic sabbatical and he was planning to go to Greece. In the same period, NSC's Operations Coordinating Board (OCB) took the NSC's Operating Plan for Greece in September 1958 and according to OCB, the USA might play a crucial role to rebuild the center and moderate left which would not be communist, in Greece, as an alternative against Karamanlis government but at the same time the USA might also continue to support Karamanlis.<sup>170</sup> This was an interesting anecdote to be underlined since it coincided with the first return of Papandreou. The conditions were getting much more mature than before in Greek politics but it was still early to destroy the hegemony of Right which would continue to dominate the country until PASOK arrives.

Andreas received Fulbright and Guggenheim grants and moved to Athens with his family to work as an economist however he would be soon in active politics. During his first years in Greece firstly, with the request of Karamanlis, in 1959, he opened the Center of Economic Research which would be named as the Center of Research and Planning (KEPE) in 1964<sup>171</sup> and then drew up a report for creation of a new school of economics within the University of Athens<sup>172</sup> Main target of all these attempts was to find solutions for the problems of the Greek economy and

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<sup>170</sup> Stan Draenos. (2012). *Andreas Papandreou: The Making of a Greek Democrat and Political Maverick*. London: I.B. Tauris. pp. 22.

<sup>171</sup> Alexander Kitroeff. (1997). "Andreas G. Papandreou: A Brief Political Biography". *Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora*. 23:1. pp. 11.

<sup>172</sup> Stan Draenos. (2012). *Andreas Papandreou: The Making of a Greek Democrat and Political Maverick*. London: I.B. Tauris. pp. 34.

carry out scientific studies on long term plans.<sup>173</sup> Eventually during this period. Papandreou had completed two publications to offer new economic strategies for Greece. In a short time, he was appointed as adviser of Bank of Greece. Whatever he made after he arrived Greece, he had to face troubles created by other people because Andreas was a person that people could not easily trust since he had lived for long years out of the country and it was possible for him to face with similar reactions from US side too. For instance, while George Papandreou was in a preparation on rallying the Centre against Karamanlis, both the Palace and the CIA had expected Andreas to convince his father to cooperate with Karamanlis however Andreas was in the side of his father with his wife Margaret and on the eve of the 1961 elections, both of them were positioned in the election campaign as followers of George Papandreou.<sup>174</sup> The election resulted in the victory of Karamanlis which George Papandreou defined as a product of ‘violence and fraud’.<sup>175</sup> Elder Papandreou had immediately declared a start for ‘unyielding struggle’ against Karamanlis government and son Papandreou was in a deep thinking by sharing his father’s anger which would cause him to react in a much more powerful way.<sup>176</sup> “*What did I tell you?*” he asked his wife Margaret and he continued, “*Don’t you see? There is no way they will let me get ahead in this country. They will just cut me down.*”<sup>177</sup> This intimate statement was an indicator of his ambition and passion with deep disappointment and anger that he carried in himself but this was also his secret power made him ‘Andreas’ for the people more than ‘Papandreou’ because from the

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<sup>173</sup> Theodore C. Kariotis. (1997). “Andreas G. Papandreou: The Economist”. *Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora*. N. 114. pp. 37. Similarly a story which Andreas Papandreou told in an English interview was interesting that Andreas Papandreou. [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=\\_DWwcZymo60&list=PL9FEF7AF337F4A978&index=21](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_DWwcZymo60&list=PL9FEF7AF337F4A978&index=21). 29.09.14.

<sup>174</sup> Stan Draenos. (2012). *Andreas Papandreou: The Making of a Greek Democrat and Political Maverick*. London: I.B. Tauris. pp. 36,39.

<sup>175</sup> *Idem*.

<sup>176</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 40.

<sup>177</sup> *Idem*.

beginning he had politicized enough. All of his life had shaped as a result or under the influence of a political action. When this secret power combined with his egoism unique to the scholars, he could be inexpugnable.

In 1960's, firstly, he would be minister in the cabinet of George Papandreou after the victory of EK in 1963 and the same year as soon as his father became the prime minister of Greece, he gave up his US citizenship. Short time later, his name would be mentioned with an organization called ASPIDA and his statement about the ASPIDA case which was already under a judicial investigation, was clear that: *“The deliberate involvement of my name in the “Aspida” case constitutes an aspect of the design intended to obscure the great political issue of the function of democratic institutions in our country”*<sup>178</sup> His first political experience in active Greek politics was cut down with coup and an exile would start. This exile was a chance for Andreas to be reborn from his ashes with PAK and grew up by the creation of PASOK. What he saw and experienced in his life was strong enough to control a movement and act as a strong leader. His first teacher was his father and then his secret power inside of him. Papandreou was an absolute pragmatist and populist leader and he knew his society as well enough as to say what they wanted to listen. He knew how to approach and make people believe and trust him even if he had been found by Greek society as unpatriotic for many years. Eventually by the establishment of PASOK, Papandreou would have just one main target: To capture the power! When he captured the power, the only aim would be to keep it!

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<sup>178</sup> Andreas G. Papandreou Full Biography. Andreas G. Papandreou Foundation. [http://agp.archeio.gr/ap.php?page=ap\\_cv&lang=en](http://agp.archeio.gr/ap.php?page=ap_cv&lang=en). 20.09.2014.

### 2.3.The End of Right-Wing Rule: PASOK in Power

*“With palm leaves thousands of people greeted Andreas like the Messiah”, Eleftherotypia, 12 October<sup>179</sup>*

*“‘The Right’ is finished”, Eleftherotypia, 16 October<sup>180</sup>*

*“Tomorrow the Holy Day dawns”, Ethnos, 17 October<sup>181</sup>*

*“The resurrection”, Eleftherotypia, 19 October<sup>182</sup>*

Pro-PASOK newspapers were declaring upcoming victory of ‘Change’ and pro-New Democracy newspapers such as *Vradyni* or *Akropolis* were running an anti-PASOK campaign defining PASOK as a disaster for the country.<sup>183</sup> Political system got polarized in the level of rhetoric enough by the early of 1980’s and the election campaigns of the parties had been performed under this atmosphere. Indeed, polarization instead of moderation was the choice of PASOK and this perception would be one of the main characteristic of the new decade in the Greek political system.

The motto of “Change or Conservation” or in other words “PASOK or the Right” in 1977 had found an undeniable response from the people and showed the power of PASOK as rapidly rising party and a serious alternative for the government. Under these circumstances, the only choice that PASOK had was not to lose this chance: To work hard and catch the support of more and more people to reach an absolute victory for ‘socialist Greece’. This point can remind the strategy of SPD in the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century and moreover it is the idea of the first social

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<sup>179</sup> Richard Clogg. (1987). *Parties and Elections in Greece: The Search of Legitimacy*. London: C. Hurst&Company. pp. 91.

<sup>180</sup> *Idem*.

<sup>181</sup> *Idem*.

<sup>182</sup> Ανάσταση. ( 19 Οκτωβρίου 1981). *Ελευθεροτυπία*.

<sup>183</sup> Richard Clogg. (1987). *Parties and Elections in Greece: The Search of Legitimacy*. London: C. Hurst&Company. pp. 91

democrats that they had chosen to act inside democratic process to reach the socialist ideals. Even if they defined themselves as socialist, they were the theorists of a different way which they needed time to realize. This crucial parenthesis should be kept in the mind to combine the Greek experience with the theoretical progress and perception of social democracy.

During the years between 1977 and 1981, PASOK consolidated the organizational structure and expanded the party grass root gathering people from the centre and the left under the party. In 1978 ‘National Popular Unity’ and ‘Open Democratic Action’ policies were discussed with the 2<sup>nd</sup> Conference of Central Committee and similar meetings continued to be held until 1981.<sup>184</sup> For instance, in 1979, 5<sup>th</sup> Conference of the Central Committee was held to create a road map for upcoming election to go further and to capture the power.<sup>185</sup> Papandreou as leader had already strengthened his position by purging possible separatist factions from the party and dominating the organization with an absolutism. Besides all these developments, PASOK was also in touch with the other European socialists. Papandreou had meetings with European socialist leaders to act together particularly about the policies of the European Community because in 28 May 1979, the Accession Treaty was officially signed and Greece became the 10<sup>th</sup> member of the Community however Papandreou was against this membership and he was expressing his view in every single opportunity. Simultaneously with the structural progress, PASOK was also in an ideological evolution period. As the sweater was replaced with tie, radical socialist rhetoric was gradually being replaced with a reconciliatory discourse. In 1981, the level of radicalism was softened and a much more populist way of socialist rhetoric was adopted. Karamanlis’ elevation to the Presidency on April 1981 was another turning point which was a benefit for PASOK.<sup>186</sup> The successor of Karamanlis was an experienced politician, George

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<sup>184</sup> Andreas G. Papandreou Full Biography. Andreas G. Papandreou Foundation. [http://agp.archeio.gr/ap.php?page=ap\\_cv&lang=en](http://agp.archeio.gr/ap.php?page=ap_cv&lang=en). 26.09.2014.

<sup>185</sup> *Idem*.

<sup>186</sup> Richard Clogg. (1997). *A Concise History of Greece*. UK: CambridgeUniversity Press. pp. 180.

Rallis however he was far away from being as charismatic leader as Karamanlis or Papandreou and this change had opened the door of the power slightly for PASOK.

Election campaign had been started and deep cleavage inside the political system and society could be observed more than before. Both PASOK and ND were in search of votes from the Center. It was a two-pronged way: One was searching the votes of both the center and the left, and the other was in effort to get the votes of Center and the Right. The main slogan of ND was ‘Democracy forever’ (Για πάντα Δημοκρατία-Gia panta Dimokratia) and the party had based the campaign on the stress of the previous achievements rather than on future promises.<sup>187</sup>

“‘People want, PASOK can bring the change.’

‘People want, PASOK can eradicate the bureaucracy.’

‘People want, PASOK can stop the expensiveness.’

‘People want, PASOK can guarantee our national independence.’”<sup>188</sup>

The banners of PASOK during the election campaign in 1981 had counted the needs and demands of the Greek society and PASOK was the only choice which would be able to answer the demands of the people because the ‘Change’ could be possible with PASOK and PASOK was the only choice for the ‘Change’. This was the main and the most outstanding slogan, besides all the others. Indeed, it was an offer of PASOK since 1977 however in 1981, this slogan became much more popular between the political parties which were against present government. For instance, EDIK (Ενωση Δημοκρατικού Κέντρου) (Union of Democratic Centre) had adopted the motto of ‘allagi me sigouria’ (change with assurance) and KKE defined itself as a guarantor of ‘Pragmatiki Allagi’ (Real Change).<sup>189</sup> Perhaps, it could be discussed

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<sup>187</sup> Richard Clogg. (1987). *Parties and Elections in Greece: The Search of Legitimacy*. London: C. Hurst&Company. pp. 87.

<sup>188</sup> Χριστίνας Κατσαντώνη. Η Ιστορία της Προεκλογικής Αφίσας. <http://www.thetoc.gr/magazine/i-istoria-tis-proeklogikis-afisas>. 26.09.14.

<sup>189</sup> Richard Clogg. (1987). *Parties and Elections in Greece: The Search of Legitimacy*. London: C.

which one was the real ‘Change’ but there was a reality that the Greek society had needed a ‘Change’.

Immediately before the 1981 Election, PASOK declared the electoral program which was issued by the PASOK Central Committee on July 1981 as ‘Contract with the People’ (Συμβόλαιο με το Λαό-Symvolaio me to Lao). Introduction of the Program started with another strong motto of PASOK: PASOK to the government, people to the power! (Το ΠΑΣΟΚ στην κυβέρνηση, ο λαός στην εξουσία).<sup>190</sup> With PASOK, people would be in power because PASOK had presented itself in the program as the party of everyone. 105-page Program had counted the Principles which were also declared in 1974 and PASOK had defined its way as the way of ‘Greek’ (ο δρόμος μας είναι δρόμος ‘Ελληνικός’). Main target and the guide that they would follow was that:

*“-National Independence and defense of the territorial integrity  
-The People’s Sovereignty and Democracy  
-Autonomous and balanced economic and social developments  
-The cultural and intellectual rebirth  
-Revival of rural  
-Superior Justice and an ultimate emancipation of workers, women and the non-privileged.”*<sup>191</sup>

Besides the political and social regulations that PASOK offered, a number of essential electoral proposals and promises were underlined in the Program such as reducing the voting age from twenty to eighteen or the right of vote for emigrants.<sup>192</sup> The populist rhetoric dominated the text and the proposals included the demands of

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Hurst&Company. pp. 85.

<sup>190</sup> ΠΑΣΟΚ. (04.07.1981). Διακηρυξη Κυβερνητικης: Πολιτικης. Συμβόλαιο με το Λαό. Αθήνα: Γραείο Εκδόσεων ΚΕ.ΜΕ.ΔΙΑ, ΠΑΣΟΚ. pp. 7. <http://e-archimedes.gr/latest/item/4049->. 02.10.14.

<sup>191</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 14. <http://e-archimedes.gr/latest/item/4049->. 02.10.14.

<sup>192</sup> Richard Clogg. (1983). “Greece”. (ed.). Vernon Bogdanor and David Butler. *Democracy and Elections: Electoral Systems and Their Political Consequences*. UK: Cambridge University Press. pp. 201.

the people. That is why, although the practicalities of those proposals included promises on social transformation were not explained enough, it was a successful beginning to run a well-organized election campaign and gain a victory.

18 October had brought a historical triumph to the PASOK which would be the phenomena determining and accelerating the changes and the dynamics of post-authoritarian Greece. The election gave PASOK 48,1% of the votes corresponding to 172 seats in the parliament. ND could take the 35,9% with 115 seats and KKE as the third party had gained 13 seats with the 10,9% of the votes (Table III).<sup>193</sup> This was a crucial test for young Greek Democracy and the presence of PASOK and additionally the percentage of KKE as the third party were strong evidences for the level of the democracy which rapidly developed last eight years of ‘metapolitefsi’. Now with the victory of the left and end of the Right hegemony, a new era would start in the Greek politics. In 1985, PASOK would ensure another four-year period despite loss of approximately 3% of its votes. In other words, It would be the decade of Papandreou and it would be the peak of the ‘metapolitefsi’.

Political Parties	18 October 1981		02 June 1985	
	%	Seats	%	Seats
New Democracy	35,9	115	40,8	126
PASOK	48,1	172	45,8	161
KKE	10,9	13	9,9	12
KKE (internal)	1,3	-	1,8	1
Others	1,7			
Total	100	300	100	300

Table III. Election Results of 1981 and 1985

Source: [www.hellenicparliament.gr](http://www.hellenicparliament.gr)

<sup>193</sup> Γιάννης Βούλγαρης. (2011). “Η Δημοκρατική Ελλάδα 1974-2004”. *Ελληνική Πολιτική Ιστορία 1950-2004*. β’ έκδοση. Αθήνα: Θεμελιο. pp. 121.



### **2.3.1. The Contradictions on the Economic Policies of Papandreou's Government**

The economic policy of PASOK which was declared in the Third September Declaration consisted of the radical targets for the Greek economy. The emphasis on the 'national independence' which was the constitutive principle of the Declaration had an organic tie with economic self-reliance. Greek economy had become highly dependent to the monopolistic states and this was the biggest obstacle that Greece has to eliminate. In this scope, PASOK had declared with an anti-imperialist emphasis in 3 September that the international contracts or agreements which dragged Greece into economic -political and military- dependence would be annulled.<sup>194</sup> Similarly PASOK's preference was the socialization and decentralization of the economy in a democratic way concurrently with redistribution of income for an economic justice. It meant an extending state control on the economy. However as long as the years passed and the votes of PASOK increased in both 1974 and 1977 elections, moderation on the rhetoric would be reflected to the policies.

Theoretical background of the economic policy of PASOK was based on the neo-Marxist dependence theory which Andreas Papandreou adopted whilst in exile. According to PASOK, Greece belonged to the camp of developing countries not developed countries and that is why Greece, as a peripheral country - Heinz Jurgen Axt's approach which defined Greece as semi-peripheral country, seemed much more proper- was a part of the South rather than North.<sup>195</sup> Even if the party still showed the characteristics of the traditional Greek parties<sup>196</sup>, this was a new identity

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<sup>194</sup> Theodore C. Kariotis. (1997). "Andreas G. Papandreou: The Economist". *Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora*. N. 114. pp. 47.

<sup>195</sup> Heinz Jurgen Axt. (1984). "On the Way to Self-Reliance? PASOK's Government Policy in Greece". *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*. V. 2. N. 2. pp. 191-192.

<sup>196</sup> Euclid Tsakalotos. (1998). "The Political Economy of Social Democratic Economic Policies: The

for the country proposed by the PASOK and it was presented as an alternative against the perception that ‘Greece belongs to the West’. Hostility of PASOK to the EEC, USA and NATO was also the results of this anti-imperialist perception.<sup>197</sup> In the early years economic policy of PASOK had benefited to mobilize the people around the party but the dependence theory could not be remained as the main dynamic of economic policies of PASOK.<sup>198</sup> As it has been underlined before, first discourses were moderated and then its reflections were observed in the level of policies. In 1974, immediately after the election PASOK had proposed a road map which included, respectively, modernization of the economy, the import of the foreign technology and the increase of the production.<sup>199</sup> For instance, with this consideration, “*PASOK had voted in favor of the expansion of the privileges of the foreign capital in 1975.*”<sup>200</sup> After the following election, both economic and political attitudes would be much more moderated since the party would be the main opposition. Particularly by the victory of 1981, PASOK would be on the way to be first mass party and then catch-all party and this structural and ideological evolution was the dynamic to designate the economy policies of new PASOK government. Indeed, it was a de-radicalization process and by 1981, PASOK would start to implement a kind of a Keynesian economic policies which they did not name it as Keynesian practice.<sup>201</sup> In this point, it is eye-opening to remember that Papandreou had appreciated the contribution of Keynes and given him his due in his prominent book ‘Paternalistic Capitalism’.<sup>202</sup>

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PASOK Experiment in Greece”. *Oxford Review of Economic Policy*. V. 14. N.1. pp. 116.

<sup>197</sup> *Idem.*

<sup>198</sup> *Idem.*

<sup>199</sup> Chrisanthos D. Tassis. (2003). “PASOK: From Protest to Hegemony”. *The First Hellenic Observatory PhD Symposium On Modern Greece*. pp. 2.

<sup>200</sup> *Idem.*

<sup>201</sup> Thanos Skouras. (2001). “The Greek Experiment with the Third Way”. (ed.). Philip Arestis and Malcolm C. Sawyer. *Economics of the Third Way: Experiences From Around the World*. UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited. pp. 172.

<sup>202</sup> Theodore C. Kariotis. (1997). “Andreas G. Papandreou: The Economist”. *Journal of the Hellenic*

PASOK's economic policy was based on responding the aggregate demand and to work for self-reliant economy. The intention of the Party was to cope up with the economic problems with a structural change and one of the most outstanding resolution was to increase the productivity of the internal sources and the domestic market should have been utilized. Moving from this standpoint, a special income policy would be adopted by the Papandreou Government to increase the affordability for the

people by redistributing the income in favor of them in terms of economic justice and this income policy would result in "*a general improvement of economic growth and investments.*"<sup>203</sup> Demand management policy of the PASOK Government was the resolution for both income inequalities and market inefficiency. In 22 November 1981 income policy was explained by Andreas Papandreou who was, now, the prime minister of the country, as an economic choice of the people: "*Our basic target is a self-sufficient economic and social development, using all the productive forces in combination with a fairer distribution of the national income and wealth among the various population groups and in border areas. We seek the gradual reform of the structures of the economy so that the basic economic choices are made by the society as a whole.*"<sup>204</sup>

The 'Contract with the People' had also included some other important points about the economy policy of the new government. For instance, private initiative would be supported by the state and directed the sector to serve for national development policy.<sup>205</sup> Besides the domestic policies, in 1981, foreign investments in Greece was also considered as an acceptable contribution by PASOK as long as it

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*Diaspora*. N. 114. pp. 42-43.

<sup>203</sup> Heinz Jurgén Axt. (1984). "On the Way to Self-Reliance? PASOK's Government Policy in Greece". *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*. V. 2. N. 2. pp. 193.

<sup>204</sup> ΠΑΣΟΚ. (04.07.1981). Διακήρυξη Κυβερνητικής; Πολιτικής. Συμβόλαιο με το Λαό. Αθήνα: Γραφείο Εκδόσεων ΚΕ.ΜΕ.ΔΙΑ, ΠΑΣΟΚ. pp. 62. <http://e-archimedes.gr/latest/item/4049-02.10.14>.

<sup>205</sup> Theodore C. Kariotis. (1997). "Andreas G. Papandreou: The Economist". *Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora*. N. 114. pp. 53.

would be in favor of the Greek economy and national control would be assured.<sup>206</sup> Socialization of the economy was still in the program but with a moderated form.

To sum up, the fundamental motivation of PASOK on economy which was shown with a diagram below, was to stimulate the economy with incentives and new income policies to strengthen the low and middle classes. Economic program of PASOK was in this character however the questions that have to be answered were more crucial: What was the result of this economic performance and how did it affect the Greek economy?




Figure I. Economic perception of PASOK

Since 1960's until the mid 1970's, growth was too rapid and Greece was one of the fastest-growing economies in the OECD. Annual inflation averaged less than 2,5% and unemployment rate was about 2%.<sup>207</sup> This growth was not sustainable and eventually by 1974, annual average of the growth would fall from 7,7% to 2,9%.<sup>208</sup> Increased oil prices had negatively affected the Greek economy as many other countries. Moreover social transformation and structural changes like the fall of the


<sup>206</sup> Heinz Jurgen Axt. (1984). "On the Way to Self-Reliance? PASOK's Government Policy in Greece". *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*. V. 2. N. 2. pp. 194.

<sup>207</sup> Theodore C. Kariotis. (2004). "The Economy: Growth without Equity". (ed.). Theodore A. Couloumbis, Fotini Bellou and Theodore C. Kariotis. *Greece in the Twentieth Century*. London: Frank Cass Publishers. pp. 249. See also. Akis Haralambopoulos. (1997). "Review of the Greek Economy". Hellenic Resources Institute. <http://www.hri.org/forum/econ/greece97.html>. 03.10.14.

<sup>208</sup> Dimitri Economou. (2004). "Macroeconomic Trends" (ed.). Dimitris Charalambis, Laura Maratou-Alipranti and Andromachi Hadjiyanni. *Recent Social Trends in Greece, 1960-2000*. Canada: McGill-Queen's University Press. pp. 35

Junta or new regime were the unique dynamics having effect on the Greek economy. While growth rate was decreasing, inflation rate had increased. In 1973, inflation had started to be higher and in the early 1980's it reached to average 15%. From 1979 to 1993 double digit inflation, averaging 18,9% would be indicated<sup>209</sup> and unemployment rate would reach to an average 8%.<sup>210</sup>

Figure II. Unemployment in Greece (1977-1989)




Source: Bank of Greece, Annual Reports

<sup>209</sup> Lucas D. Papademos. (2001). “The Greek Economy: Performance and Policy Challenges”. (ed.). Ralph C. Bryant, Nicholas C. Garganas and George S. Tavlas. *Greece’s Economic Performance and Prospects*. Athens:Bank of Greece, and Washington: The Brookings Institution. pp. xxxiii

<sup>210</sup> Theodore C. Kariotis. (2004). “The Economy: Growth without Equity”. (ed.). Theodore A. Couloumbis, Fotini Bellou and Theodore C. Kariotis. *Greece in the Twentieth Century*. London: Frank Cass Publishers. pp. 249.

Figure III: Inflation in Greece (1975-1989)



Source: World Wide Inflation Data, [www.inflation.eu](http://www.inflation.eu)

High inflation which decreased the profits and inefficiency of the market had been the major problem and that is why new PASOK Government had immediately established and implemented economic measures to overcome concurrently both the recession and inflation. First of all, as the party suggested in its program before the 1981 Election, income increases were immediately introduced both in public and private sectors in terms of a specific income policy, including increases on minimum pensions and minimum wages.<sup>211</sup> This was a resolution both for consolidation of social justice and stimulation of the economy. Secondly, PASOK started a struggle against wide-spread tax evasion which was one of the significant reasons of the deficit problem.<sup>212</sup> Thirdly, incentives policies and rationalization of companies in debt had appeared as the implementations for productive investment.<sup>213</sup> Other pre-election promise of PASOK was the socialization of the economy. In this point, Papandreou Government had been contented with the socialization of some of the weaker industrial sectors such as pharmaceutical industry.

Two years after PASOK came to power, economic depression was still a

<sup>211</sup> Euclid Tsakalotos. (1998). "The Political Economy of Social Democratic Economic Policies: The PASOK Experiment in Greece". *Oxford Review of Economic Policy*. V. 14. N.1 pp. 122.

<sup>212</sup> Mihalis Spourdalakis. (1985-1986). "The Greek Experience". *Socialist Register*. V.22. 251.

<sup>213</sup> *Idem*.

major problem of the country despite the measures and the policies of Papandreou Government and Papandreou, himself, had admitted that their policies could not bring the expected results.<sup>214</sup> Inflation was still in double digits even if it was decreased from 24,56% to 20,19% in two years (Figure. III). Increased wages and salaries forced the domestic producers to increase the prices due to entity of high inflation and furthermore, private sector investment was also badly affected by wage increases.<sup>215</sup> Indeed, boosting the public and private consumption for a jump on domestic production was a way chosen by the Government while ignoring investment and this policy had resulted in negative rate of growth of investment, particularly in private sector. The demand had increased but there was not any positive effect on productivity. Moreover debt had risen rapidly and budget deficit had appeared as a vital problem of the Greek economy. There was severe disequilibrium in the balance of payments and thus, eventually, in 1983, the Government was forced to devalue the Drachma by 15.5%.<sup>216</sup> Production costs were reduced through a wage freeze which would cause reduction in demand and increase on the rate of unemployment.<sup>217</sup>

Under these circumstances, the 1985 Election was held and PASOK had received 45,8% of the votes (Table. III). Despite the loss of its votes, PASOK was again powerful enough. However, inflation was lower than the previous years and there was a serious increase in exports but the current account deficit could not be recovered and the ratio of external governmental debt which was taken to finance the social policies of PASOK. GDP rose from averaging 4.5% in the late 1970's to 18%

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<sup>214</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 252.

<sup>215</sup> Euclid Tsakalotos. (1998). "The Political Economy of Social Democratic Economic Policies: The PASOK Experiment in Greece". *Oxford Review of Economic Policy*. V. 14. N.1. pp. 126.

<sup>216</sup> Vassilios G. Manessiotis nad Robert D. Reischauer. (2001). "Greek Fiscal and Budget Policy and EMU". (ed.). Ralph C. Bryant, Nicholas C. Garganas and George S. Tavlas. *Greece's Economic Performance and Prospects*. Athens:Bank of Greece, and Washington: The Brookings Institution. pp. 140.

<sup>217</sup> Mihalis Spourdalakis. (1985-1986). "The Greek Experience". *Socialist Register*. V.22. 253.

in 1985.<sup>218</sup> Public sector borrowing had also increased from 12,5% of the GDP in 1983 to 17.5%.<sup>219</sup> In 1985, it was clear that PASOK's socialist economic assumptions would not be able to fix the Greek economic problems. According to PASOK, it was a 'Third Way' which rejected both European social democracy and Soviet communism but indeed, 'third way' of PASOK was developed within a neo-Keynesian view or in other words it was a social democratic approach. Nevertheless, the efforts of PASOK Government to create a welfare state with a neo-Keynesian approach had been failed and now, Papandreou Government should have chosen a more realistic way, particularly during the period of Kostas Simitis who was the Minister of National Economy. As a result of a new economic view, a stabilization program which set forth another devaluation of drachma as a principle measure. On October 1985 immediately after the election, a 15% devaluation was applied. The stabilization plan of PASOK which aimed to restore a sustainable balance of payments and to reduce substantially the inflation, had pointed "*adaptation to a more orthodox set of economic policies*".<sup>220</sup>

Stabilization program was successful but not efficient enough. Economic performance had improved and inflation continued to fall and the deficit had narrowed. Moreover, Papandreou's approach to the EEC had been shifted and the discourse of interdependence with the EEC was adopted. It was sort of a moderation from dependency to inter-dependency and membership of the Union had positively

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<sup>218</sup> Ralph C. Bryant, Nicholas C. Garganas and George S. Tavlas. (2001). "Introduction". (ed.). Ralph C. Bryant, Nicholas C. Garganas and George S. Tavlas. *Greece's Economic Performance and Prospects*. Athens:Bank of Greece, and Washington: The Brookings Institution. pp. 16.

<sup>219</sup> Christos Lyrantzis. (1989). "PASOK in Power: The Loss of the Third Road to Socialism". (ed.). Tom Gallagher and Allan M. Williams. *Southern European Socialism: Parties, Elections and the Challenge of Government*. UK: Manchester University Press. pp. 41.

<sup>220</sup> Euclid Tsakalotos. (1998). "The Political Economy of Social Democratic Economic Policies: The PASOK Experiment in Greece". *Oxford Review of Economic Policy*. V. 14. N.1 pp. 132. See also: Ralph C. Bryant, Nicholas C. Garganas and George S. Tavlas. (2001). "Introduction". (ed.). Ralph C. Bryant, Nicholas C. Garganas and George S. Tavlas. *Greece's Economic Performance and Prospects*. Athens:Bank of Greece, and Washington: The Brookings Institution. pp. 16



affected the economy. It was considered as a relaxation period for economy but this improvement was short-lived and in 1989, economic problems would appear particularly on the question of general debts.

In 1989, people had called current minister of National Economy, Dimitris Tsovolas to respond to their demand and perhaps it became the most outstanding slogan of that period in association with the economic policies of the Papandreou Government: “Tsovola dws ta ola!” ( Τσοβόλα δώστα όλα ) (Tsovola give all!)

### **2.3.2. Discourses and Policies: Discrepancies of Foreign Policy**

According to Couloumbis, *“the foreign policy of Greece cannot be understood, explained and evaluated in isolation from the behavior of a plethora of variables which include quality of leadership, size and strategic location of a country, level of economic and political development, quality of life, societal cohesiveness as well as external variables which address the interests and objectives of regional actors and, needless to say, great power.”*<sup>221</sup> These distinctive factors, having direct or indirect effects on the foreign policy of Greece also indicate the difficulties of policy making processes. Greece was a peripheral country which was economically underdeveloped and politically polarized and unstable until the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century and that is why the Greek foreign policy was mostly determined by the influence of Great powers, respectively, Great Britain and the USA<sup>222</sup> However the dynamics of the Greek foreign affairs would change with the beginning of ‘metapolitefsi’ and perhaps, the most essential change would be controversially by both the membership of EEC and PASOK’s advent to the power.

Radical rhetoric of PASOK and Papandreou himself in the early years and particularly in its short period in opposition had an irreconcilable character

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<sup>221</sup>Theodore A. Couloumbis. (2004). “Greek Foreign Policy: Debates and Priorities”. (ed.). Theodore A. Couloumbis, Theodore Kariotis and Fotini Bellou. *Greece in the Twentieth Century*. London: Frank Cass Publishers. pp. 31-32.

<sup>222</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 32.

maintaining a stance against the previous government's attitudes and policies which were pro-American and pro-Western, in the foreign affairs. That was the reason why Papandreou had offered a new view and identity for Greece and defended that 'Greece belongs to the Greeks' versus 'Greece belongs to the West'. Similarly, that was the reason why PASOK under the leadership of Papandreou adopted an anti-American and anti-Western attitude charging them with being expansionist and imperialist. Within this view, as it was also underlined in the Declaration of Principles, Greece should have made a decision for a complete withdrawal from NATO and the country should have avoided full membership of the EEC because both of them were obstacles for an independent foreign policy.

This standpoint was formulated within the dependency theory. Particularly, the relations with US should have been redefined in favor of Greek independence and one of the initial goals was to get rid of the American military bases. Indeed, there were specific reasons of widespread anti-American atmosphere emerged in Greece in mid of the 1970's. Close relations between the dictatorship and American authorities were known. Similarly, John Louis underlined this impression in the Foreign Affairs in 1984: "*There was a widespread impression that the United States in particular, and NATO more generally, had tolerated, supported, and perhaps even conspired to bring to power the unpopular regime of the Greek Colonels*".<sup>223</sup> In other words, it seemed that USA had been represented by the Colonels in the Greek political system and it was irrefutable that American intervention concurrently with Greek dependency on USA highly increased in this period. Moreover, NATO had lost the trust of the Greek people due to its passive policies during Cyprus crisis and withdrawing Greece from the military branch of NATO was the protest of Greece against American policies within NATO even if after the normalization of internal situation, Karamanlis attempted to re-enter the military wing of NATO several times.<sup>224</sup> In fact, those attempts of Greece would be vetoed by Turkey until the

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<sup>223</sup> John C. Loulis. (Winter 1984/1985). "Papandreou's Foreign Policy". Foreign Affairs. <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/39389/john-c-loulis/papandreous-foreign-policy>. 15.10.14.

<sup>224</sup> John S. Koliopoulos and Thanos M. Veremis. (2002). *Greece, The Modern Sequel: From 1831 to*

military coup in Turkey in 1980.

The USA was the primary ally of Greece as it was also for Turkey which appeared as another significant actor for the Greek foreign affairs. For instance, US was the first with 16% among the major treaty partners of Greece according to data of treaty profiles which was made for the period prior to 1975.<sup>225</sup> Although Greece left the military wing of NATO in 1974, USA and Greece remained to be in close cooperation within NATO. The sector of defense spending and defense equipment imports were the most crucial issues which set the frame of the relations and made Greece much more dependent on USA<sup>226</sup> Herein, Turkey as a key actor should be taken into consideration. This was a triangle which could not be examined isolated from each other because most of the matters of the Greek foreign policies in association with USA or NATO usually involved Turkey which was another strategic member of NATO in the region as it was observed Turkey's veto on Greek attempts to return the military wing. Similarly, PASOK's party manifesto has stated in 1977 that: "*Following the US-sponsored seven year dictatorship, the partition of Cyprus, NATO's support to Turkey and the threats against our territorial integrity, it has become evident that our foreign policy orientation is wrong.*"<sup>227</sup>

The relations between Greece and Turkey was strained enough during 1970's due to the chronic and unresolved questions such as Cyprus and Aegean disputes and thus, a possible war or even escalation of the tension in the region between two NATO allies was apparently against the national interest of US and vital existence of NATO under the Cold War conditions. However, on the other hand, these conflicts which forced both Greece and Turkey to increase their defense expenditures to strengthen their military powers, made them much more dependent on the American

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*the Present*. London: C. Hurst & Co Publishers. pp. 309.

<sup>225</sup> Theodore A. Couloumbis. (1999). "The Structure of Greek Foreign Policy". (ed.). Richard Clogg. *Greece in the 1980's*. UK: Antony Rowe Ltd. pp. 101.

<sup>226</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 102.

<sup>227</sup> Kevin Featherstone. (1983). "The Greek Socialists in Power". *West European Politics*. 6:3. pp. 244.

military support. For instance, between 1975 and 1978, defense expenditures of both countries were over 5% of their respective GNPs -it is necessary to note that there was an embargo implemented against Turkey by USA due to the Cyprus crisis- (Table IV).<sup>228</sup> In fact, as long as the conflicts between Turkey and Greece persisted and as long as the USA played an essential role as both mediator and major supplier for sophisticated weapons, dependency of both Greece and Turkey on USA would increasingly remain.<sup>229</sup> Even if at the end of the 1970's Karamanlis government had been already aware of this reality which directed them to find 'alternatives' -this alternative was presented as the EEC by Karamanlis-, PASOK had voiced this problem loudly offering the most radical and definite resolutions.

Country	Defence Expenditure as % of GNP			
	1975	1976	1977	1978
Greece	6.9	5.0	5.0	4.7
Turkey	9.0	5.5	4.9	4.5

Table IV. Comparative defence expenditures of Greece and Turkey

PASOK's advent to the power in 1981 was the indication of upcoming efforts for an independent Greek foreign policy. According to Tannis Kapsis who was the former undersecretary of foreign affairs, "*PASOK's foreign policy was a response to the social maturity of Greece that replaced the earlier dependency on foreign centers of decision making.*"<sup>230</sup> Papandreou Government redefined major issues such as Greece's security or economic relations with other countries from a populist and nationalist perspective. In this point, for instance, Melakopides ideologically defined

<sup>228</sup> Theodore A. Couloumbis. (1999). "The Structure of Greek Foreign Policy". (ed.). Richard Clogg. *Greece in the 1980's*. UK: Antony Rowe Ltd. pp. 102.

<sup>229</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 105.

<sup>230</sup> Akis Kalaitzidis and Nikolaos Zahariadis. (1997). "Papandreou's NATO Policy: Continuity or Change?". *Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora*. 23:1. pp. 106.

Papandreou's foreign policy within 'nationalism, a democratic socialism akin to radical liberalism, adaptive realism and romantic moralism'.<sup>231</sup> However the question that has to be asked was whether Papandreou's new approach to the foreign affairs would involve real changes or policies would be just continuity of its predecessors.

Foreign policy parameters of PASOK Government in 1981 can be formulated with these main titles:

- 1- Anti-American and anti-NATO discourses
- 2- 'Greece belongs to the Greeks' or supporting a model of self-reliance in solidarity with other member states of the Third World. (Anti-Western view)<sup>232</sup>
- 3- An open-arms policy towards third world countries with an anti-imperialist view
- 4- A policy of rapprochement to Soviet Union -by dismissing the Soviet style state socialism-
- 5- The threat was not from North, in other words Russia, but from the East which means Turkey.

The first difficulty that Papandreou Government had to confront was making an agreement with USA to withdraw all the military bases located in Greece. This was an unrealistic demand of Papandreou since it was against the national interest of both Greece and USA<sup>233</sup> Such a new conjuncture which could be emerged in the region could be just in favor of Turkey increasing its value.<sup>234</sup> Greek military power was highly dependent on US for improving the level of the Greek army and getting the modern weapon systems which Greece needed to maintain the balance with Turkey. Eventually, PASOK would sign the Defense and Economic Cooperation

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<sup>231</sup> Constantine Melakopides. (1987). "The Logic of Papandreou's Foreign Policy". *International Journal*. V. 42. N. 3. pp. 576.

<sup>232</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 96.

<sup>233</sup> John C. Loulis. (Winter 1984/1985). "Papandreou's Foreign Policy". *Foreign Affairs*. <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/39389/john-c-loulis/papandreous-foreign-policy>. 15.10.14.

<sup>234</sup> *Idem.*

which confirmed both maintaining the military bases for possible operations for five-year period and 7/10 ratio which preserved the military balance in the region, in 8 September 1983.<sup>235</sup> Papandreou had signed this agreement however it was not easy to explain this attitude after long-years of radical discourses against the bases. He would justify the Agreement by pointing a termination plan which would be gradually withdrawn in five years, for the bases. In 1988, tortuous negotiations would start but not be completed until the 1989 Election which PASOK would lose.<sup>236</sup>

Greece had just rejected the military branch of NATO with Rodgers Agreement in 1980 and Turkey had lost this big opportunity to use against Greece.<sup>237</sup> Indeed, this was a gain for Greece but as soon as PASOK came to power, Papandreou declared that new government did not recognize the Rodgers Agreement and they would not be a part of any negotiation as long as Turkish army was in Cyprus.<sup>238</sup> Furthermore, the questions of continental shelf and territorial waters were in the agenda of Papandreou and according to him the only resolution for the continental shelf was to apply to the International Court of Justice. Territorial waters remained to be a serious and insoluble conflict because of Greek persistence on 12 miles and Turkish response, *casus belli*. Additionally, Lemnos crisis which started in 1983 and continued until the end of 1984 was the other conflict escalating the tension between two countries in the first period of Papandreou and it was not just a crisis occurred between Greece and Turkey, it was also a serious problem which affected the decision making processes and practices of NATO since Greece refused

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<sup>235</sup> The Defence and Economic Cooperation. (8 September 1983). United States Treaties and Other International Agreements. V. 35. [http://archive.org/stream/unitedstatestrea015934mbp/unitedstatestrea015934mbp\\_djvu.txt](http://archive.org/stream/unitedstatestrea015934mbp/unitedstatestrea015934mbp_djvu.txt). 15.10.2014

<sup>236</sup> Richard Clogg. (1997). *A Concise History of Greece*. UK: CambridgeUniversity Press. pp. 189.

<sup>237</sup> Melek Firat. (2008). "1980-1990 Yunanistan'la Iliskiler". (ed.). Baskin Oran. *Turk Dis Politikasi, Kurtulus Savasi'ndan Bugune Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar*. C. II. Istanbul: Iletisim Yayinlari. pp. 105.

<sup>238</sup> *Idem*.

to participate in the NATO exercises as a result of policy of NATO which did not include the defense of Lemnos in their operation plans.<sup>239</sup> Papandreou carried the conflicts between Turkey and Greece into NATO debates and this was a negative and undesirable behavior for NATO members. Besides all these, Papandreou asked NATO to protect Greece's borders from every kind of threat, implying that Turkey, as underlined many times before is the threat in the East and it was taken into consideration within NATO.<sup>240</sup> However, in 1982 there was a big shift on the policy of Papandreou and he, himself, would take the issue off the agenda claiming the power of Greek army.<sup>241</sup> Under the influence of strained relations, first on March 1982, a land conflict which would cause widespread protests occurred in Ksanthi (Iskece) after the Greek state seized the lands of almost 100 villagers who were Muslim-Turk minorities<sup>242</sup>. Turkey did not delay to respond and Turkish Government drawn up an act which would enable the state to seize the lands of the Greek minorities in Turkey. As Firat underlined, again, Turkish and Greek minorities had

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<sup>239</sup> Indeed, herein, the reservation of Turkey about militarization of Lemnos was the critical point. First of all, there was a similar reservation of Greece against Turkey and according to Greek reservation in 17 May 1984, the straits and Turkish naval bases could not be protected by Harpoon missile within NATO. That is why, when Greece asked NATO to militarize Lemnos within the scope of NATO operation plans, Turkey had declared a reservation which hindered Greece to militarize Crete and the surrounding islands within NATO. For more: John C. Loulis. (Winter 1984/1985). "Papandreou's Foreign Policy". Foreign Affairs. <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/39389/john-c-loulis/papandreous-foreign-policy>. 15.10.14. See also: Melek Firat. (2008). "1980-1990 Yunanistan'la Iliskiler". (ed.). Baskin Oran. *Turk Dis Politikasi, Kurtulus Savasi'ndan Bugune Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar*. C. II. Istanbul: Iletisim Yayinlari. p. 109.

<sup>240</sup> John C. Loulis. (Winter 1984/1985). "Papandreou's Foreign Policy". Foreign Affairs. <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/39389/john-c-loulis/papandreous-foreign-policy>. 15.10.14.

<sup>241</sup> *Idem*.

<sup>242</sup> Melek Firat. (2008). "1980-1990 Yunanistan'la Iliskiler". (ed.). Baskin Oran. *Turk Dis Politikasi, Kurtulus Savasi'ndan Bugune Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar*. C. II. Istanbul: Iletisim Yayinlari. p. 106.

the price of escalating the tension in both countries.<sup>243</sup>

In 13 December 1983, a new government under the leadership of Turgut Ozal, was elected in Turkey and he was determined to soften the relations with Greece. In 13 January 1984, the government program was read in the Turkish Parliament and the program had some crucial points, having effects in the relations with Greece such as offering a hand of friendship to Greece or long term common interests of both countries<sup>244</sup>. For instance, as one of the initial signals of new policy Turkey declared unilateral visa exemption for Greek citizens. However Papandreou preferred to insist on his uncompromising attitude. Indeed the most outstanding reason of this attitude was the populist discourses of the party which were pragmatically used within internal and external concerns to maintain the power. First of all Turkish threat made Greece unique in international area since Greece was the only NATO country which was threatened by another NATO ally.<sup>245</sup> Secondly, anti-Turkish discourses was the best way to take votes in the country as many governments used as a way before and particularly under the difficult economic situation that PASOK Government faced in 1984, it was much more conceivable that Papandreou continued his antagonist discourses against Turkey. There was an upcoming election and the party should have remained its power. Indeed, Ozal was aware of this concerns of Papandreou and thus, he left the door open for a compromise and cooperation with Greece. Eventually, two leaders would meet in the World Economic Forum in Davos in January 1988 and perhaps it did not resolve the conflicts but it was a step forward to reduce the tension between the countries. For Onis, Davos Process was the second major phase of rapprochement after 1930 Treaty of Friendship.<sup>246</sup>

According to Karamanlis, “*Greece belongs geographically to eastern Europe*

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<sup>243</sup> *Idem.*

<sup>244</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 109.

<sup>245</sup> Jennifer Noyon. (1982). “Greeks Bearing Rifts: Papandreou in Power”. *The Washington Quarterly*. 5:2. pp. 96.

<sup>246</sup> Ziya Onis and Suhnaz Yilmaz. (2008). “Greek-Turkish Rapprochement: Rhetoric or Reality?”. *Political Science Quarterly*. V. 123. N. 1. pp. 124.



*but psychologically to the West*<sup>247</sup> and within this perspective Greece had been in negotiations with EEC on the way to the membership. This was a main dynamic of Karamanlis' policies during the restoration period because EEC was crucial for consolidation of democracy and stability in Greece. Furthermore, positive effects on both development level of the country and social structure was expected as a result of a possible accession. Eventually in 28 May 1979 the Accession Treaty of Greece was signed in the Zappeion of Athens. It would enter into force in 1 January 1981. Greece became the tenth member of the EEC however there was also a considerable euroscepticism. Most strong critiques were from PASOK which had been opposing the membership since the beginning of the negotiations. Within the frame of PASOK's perspective, EEC was an organization which was serving imperialist interests and thus the party had been warning about the dangers such as abrogation of national sovereignty or increase of economic dependency as results of common economic programs which could be against Greek national interests.<sup>248</sup> In this standpoint, what PASOK suggested was to develop economic relations with all countries on a level but particularly a specific economic cooperation between Mediterranean countries was necessary: "*Greece must seek to create a non-capitalist Mediterranean Community which will constitute a sufficiently powerful entity to resist the pressures of the superpowers, and meet its basic needs by itself.*"<sup>249</sup>

Indeed, there were some interesting statements of Papandreou which he expressed in the 1960's whilst in KEPE in association with EEC. To have an economic growth and overcome the economic obstacles, accession to the Community was a vital choice. He stated in his book, *A Strategy for Greek Economic Development* that: "*Greece has recently concluded an association agreement with*

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<sup>247</sup> C. M. Woodhouse. (1999). "Greece and Europe". (ed.). Richard Clogg. *Greece in the 1980's*. London: Macmillan Press. pp. 6.

<sup>248</sup> Susannah Verney. (2011). "An Exceptional Case? Party and Popular Euroscepticism in Greece, 1959-2009". *South European Society and Politics*. 16:01. pp. 57.

<sup>249</sup> Kevin Featherstone. (1983). "The Greek Socialists in Power". *West European Politics*. 6:3. pp. 243.

*the European Common Market with the prospect of full membership some 22 years hence. It is fair to say that, given the terms of the association, Greece has a small margin of time in which to achieve the structural transformations needed for survival in the European Common Market.*"<sup>250</sup> It points out the radical turns of Papandreou but it also signals possible moderated approach to EEC after 1981. Firstly in 1981, PASOK softened its strong opposition to EEC in order to affect the centrist votes. Secondly, some months after the 1981 Election, Greek Government Memorandum of 1982, which would be unsuccessful, was declared to propose a new definition of membership of Greece in EEC.<sup>251</sup> PASOK was now in the power and as governing party, it was not as flexible as being in opposition due to increased duties and responsibilities. In this framework, PASOK had to participate in the debates of European Council actively and change the arguments. Eventually PASOK first accepted that defending Greek interests could be possible within EEC, then declared that Greece would stay as member of EEC and finally confirmed that EEC positively affected the Greek economy which was in trouble.

Discrepancies of Papandreou Government in the matters of foreign affairs was much more concrete and deeper than the contradictions of domestic affairs. As Veremis stressed, *"the deviation of Greece from its Western orientation was a war of words rather than deeds"*.<sup>252</sup> Papandreou's approach to the Qaddafi regime which depicted it as direct democracy and most revolutionary course of that time, his reservation to condemn Jeruzelski regime during Solidarity Movement resistance or PASOK's extreme anti-Israeli attitude had seemed as new, alternative foreign policy perception.<sup>253</sup> However, all of these attempts were the results of the road of PASOK

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<sup>250</sup> Theodore C. Kariotis. (1997). "Andreas G. Papandreou: The Economist". *Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora*. N. 114. pp. 38.

<sup>251</sup> Susannah Verney. (2011). "An Exceptional Case? Party and Popular Euroscepticism in Greece, 1959-2009". *South European Society and Politics*. 16:01. pp. 61.

<sup>252</sup> John S. Koliopoulos and Thanos M. Veremis. (2002). *Greece, The Modern Sequel: From 1831 to the Present*. London: C. Hurst & Co. Publishers. pp. 307.

<sup>253</sup> John C. Loulis. (Winter 1984/1985). "Papandreou's Foreign Policy". *Foreign Affairs*. <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/39389/john-c-loulis/papandreous-foreign-policy>. 15.10.14.

to socialism which used the populist discourses as the strongest means. In other words, PASOK tried to find a third way in foreign affairs as domestic affairs with a high populist perception but ideology and practices were not in the same directions since national interest of Greece always pointed the West within real-politics. Indeed, PASOK had showed that it was not socialist but social democrat and it was not a movement but a complete catch-all party.

### **2.3.3. Clientelism and Changes in Social Structure**

Elefanthis who has a unique and critical approach, underlined the bad relation of PASOK with socialism and similar to the other scholars who defined the ideology of PASOK as third way, according to him, PASOK's ideology was kind of a 'Pasokism'.<sup>254</sup> It can be explicitly said that PASOK has been a social democrat party since the 1977 Elections in which it became the second major party and even the 1974 Election can be taken into consideration as a turning point in PASOK's political ideology. Even if the party had rejected social democracy from the beginning, particularly on the level of economic and foreign policies, PASOK was a social democrat experiment of Greece. As it was underlined before, this opposition of the prominent members of PASOK and Andreas Papandreou, himself, to social democracy was similar with the opposition of the first social democrats who did not realize that they mentioned a new ideology. Papandreou wanted to reach socialist goals through democracy and parliamentarism and that is why, on the one hand he claimed that PASOK was a movement pointing a more revolutionary character rather than a party in the mid of 1970's, on the other hand PASOK was in efforts to get more and more votes affecting centrists and even petty bourgeois. It was a deep contradiction between the discourses and practices or wishes and realities. In this framework, it could be just an unrealistic hope to expect PASOK adopting socialist policies after it came to power. Moreover, PASOK's target group was the 'people' as

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<sup>254</sup> Άγγελος Ελεφάντης. (1991). *Στον Αστερισμό του Λαϊκισμού*. Αθήνα: Πολίτης. pp. 218.

it was stressed ‘underprivileged’ not a specific class like working class -socialist parties are class-based parties- and thus mobilization of the masses which individually have different interests was the main election strategy. The party could not defend the interest of a class because PASOK should have defended different class interests including even those of the dominant classes. Within this scope what PASOK needed was to use a hegemonic discourse and the means was populism which is ‘a way of perceiving and presenting social and political reality’.<sup>255</sup> PASOK’s populism was based on political division in the country and antagonism outside the country. Its polarizing discourse which was also preferred by ND was the constitutive strategy. The distance between two parties were big enough to highly mobilize their electorates who could be easily politicized and radicalized under current polarized atmosphere. Indeed, the reflections of this bitter division on the society crystallized with physical and even individual manifestations. Within this frame, perhaps, one of the most striking examples was the colors of the coffee shops which were painted ‘green’ or ‘blue’ -‘green’ for PASOK and ‘blue’ for ND- according to their owners’ political choice. Expansion in the use of party flags in most visible places was another significant indicator of polarized society.<sup>256</sup> Besides, there was a considerable growth in the membership of two major parties.<sup>257</sup> For instance, PASOK had claimed a membership of 27.000 members in 1977 and by 1980 the number of the party members were more than 60.000.<sup>258</sup> Similarly, the youth and student organizations of the parties which were acting as partisans were the other dynamics of this atmosphere. In fact, those followers of the parties were ready to be more than a voluntary follower to actively take part in the politics or state

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<sup>255</sup> Christos Lyrintzis. (1987). “The Power of Populism: The Greek Case”. *European Journal of Political Research*. V. 15. pp. 669, 671.

<sup>256</sup> Stathis N. Kalynas. (1997). “Polarization in Greek Politics: PASOK’s First Four Years, 1981-1985”. *Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora*. 23:1. pp. 90.

<sup>257</sup> *Idem*.

<sup>258</sup> Christos Lyrintzis. (1984). “Political Parties in Post-Junta Greece: A Case of Bureaucratic Clientelism”. *West European Politics*. 7:2. pp. 111.

machine and in this point another vital means appeared for PASOK: Clientelism

Clientelism which is based on the perception of patron-client relations,<sup>259</sup> was a well-known and widespread practice which was used by parties from different wings of the political spectrum in Greek politics, however the new PASOK Government in power would redefine the clientelistic approach and form a new kind of patron-client relation by developing and systematizing the traditional clientelism. What PASOK created was to transform the patron-client relations from individual level into collective level. In other words, there was a common and hegemonic patron and a collective client. PASOK as this hegemonic patron was such a machine which allocated favors to its own devotees in order to consolidate its power. This was also a way to attract the masses to gain support and expand its own grass-root. What was those favors that PASOK allocated? Perhaps, one of the most outstanding characteristics of PASOK period was the expansion in public sector. For instance, while there were more than 500.000 employees in 1981, the number of public sector employees reached more than 900.000 which was half of the total wage earners, in 1989.<sup>260</sup> Moreover according to a study that was cited by Verney, it was proved that “among PASOK members who joined the party since 1981, 89% were employed in the public sector.”<sup>261</sup> In fact, PASOK had a great success with its clientelistic approach to attract the people because the same study which was done in 1986, also indicated that 70% of the PASOK members joined the party after 1981.<sup>262</sup> However; clientelism, which can be mostly observed in semi-peripheral societies, as Mouzelis underlined<sup>263</sup>, includes deep moral problems in itself. It is expected from people to

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<sup>259</sup> George Th. Mavrogordatos. (1997). “From Traditional Clientelism to Machine Politics: The Impact of PASOK Populism in Greece”. *South European Society and Politics*. 2:3. pp. 2.

<sup>260</sup> Stathis N. Kalynas. (1997). “Polarization in Greek Politics: PASOK’s First Four Years, 1981-1985”. *Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora*. 23:1. pp. 100.

<sup>261</sup> *Idem*.

<sup>262</sup> *Idem*.

<sup>263</sup> Dimitris Sotiropoulos. (1995). “The Remains of Authoritarianism: Bureaucracy and Civil Society in Post-Authoritarian Greece”. *Cahiers D’etudes sur la Mediterranee Orientale et le Monde Turco- Iranien*. N. 20. pp. 3.

vote according to their ideology, belief or class interest but in a clientelistic system, the loyalty of the people is gained through favors within a win-win perception because the favor that the party guarantees for a person or a group of people results in a vote in favor of that party. It is a bargain which can cause a political corruption sooner or later and furthermore this market of the votes which are sold or bought can serve to all political parties seeking votes because if one party uses a clientelistic way, it forces the others to use the same tool<sup>264</sup> as it can be observed in the case of PASOK and ND. For instance, in the case of high school teachers in Greece, PASOK's organization in the teacher's union (PASKE) had been greatly occupied the cadres including also the administration level during 1980's however when ND returned in 1990, it recruited the teachers according to its own selection and PASOK's return in 1993 meant a new recruitment or returning of the PASOK's cadres to the schools.<sup>265</sup> That is why, clientelism was a chronic and contagious illness of the Greek political system.

Aggelos Elefanthis asked two clear questions which he also answered in his book: “*What did PASOK say about socialism?*” and “*What did PASOK do within socialism?*”<sup>266</sup> His answers were also as clear as the questions. “*Almost everything!*” was the best answer for the first question and for him there was an only choice to answer the second one: “*Absolutely nothing!*”<sup>267</sup> It is impossible not to agree with him about the results of socialist rhetoric considering huge gap between socialist promises and the adopted policies whilst in power. As it is underlined, Andreas Papandreou was not a socialist but a social democrat and his only goal after the 1974 Election was to reach more and more electorates to be in power. This was an absolute catch-all party behavior under a strong leadership and it can be identified just with a social democratic way. Perhaps PASOK failed in terms of socialist goals

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<sup>264</sup> Ayse Gunes Ayata. (2010). *CHP, Orgut ve Ideoloji*. Istanbul: Gundogan. pp. 44.

<sup>265</sup> George Th. Mavrogordatos. (1997). “From Traditional Clientelism to Machine Politics: The Impact of PASOK Populism in Greece”. *South European Society and Politics*. 2:3. pp. 7.

<sup>266</sup> Άγγελος Ελεφάντης. (1991). *Στον Αστερισμό του Λαϊκισμού*. Αθήνα: Πολίτης. pp. 206, 215.

<sup>267</sup> *Idem*.

but as a social democrat party, social policies of Papandreou Government did not result in absolute failures.

The effects of PASOK government during 1980's were deep enough to give a new shape to social structure on the levels of civil society, education, social movements, trade unions, women rights, media or political structure of the society. Many dynamics of today are the signs of that period and for this reason PASOK was not just a political party to govern the state for years but also a machine to create considerable reflections in every level of the society.

Civil society in Greece could not be as powerful as the civil societies of Western European countries since social structure was a reflection of a political structure which was mostly dominated by authoritarian governments until 1974. Metapolitefsi was the beginning of awakening of the civil society. This was a long-term process which has been still in progress however the relations between state and civil society were distinguishably modified with the transition to democracy. The number of trade unions and organizations increased within democratization even if most of the trade unions appeared as deep roots of clientelistic relations. Indeed, civil society in the 1980's was not too weak but the problem was the incursions of political or bureaucratic elites into unions or associations and this was a problem which continued during PASOK period, too.

Besides, as a governmental program PASOK, put forward a number of pro-labor laws. For instance, lockouts became illegal and legal 'prohibition' of strikes was eliminated.<sup>268</sup> Moreover, labor rights were protected and some significant rights were expanded and enhanced in favor of the laborers such as holidays, pensions, unemployment insurance and maternity leave.<sup>269</sup> Similarly, law reforms were also affected on the level of women rights. First of all, PASOK had women front organization EGE (the Union of Greek Women) which was headed by Andreas Papandreou's wife, Margaret Papandreou. This was an indication of PASOK's special concerns about women's rights and EGE claimed a membership of 15.000 in

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<sup>268</sup> Mihalis Spourdalakis. (1985-1986). "The Greek Experience". *Socialist Register*. V. 22. N. 255.

<sup>269</sup> *Idem*.

the early years of 1980's.<sup>270</sup> With a family law the status of women in society was enhanced. First of all civil marriage was introduced and women were freed by legal recognition of the right of women to be party of a contract without the consent of their husbands.<sup>271</sup> Bending of divorce law, the abolition of archaic laws on dowry and martial contract were the other significant reforms which PASOK introduced.<sup>272</sup> An official state agency which was responsible for promoting the issue of equality, General Secretariat for Equality was established in 1985 after equality commissions which were institutionalized in 1983.<sup>273</sup> Under these circumstances, women movements were strengthened and feminist demands started to be visible.

Other important reforms were observed in the education after PASOK came to power. PASOK defined education as the very foundation of change in the Program of 1981. Indeed, there was a clear U-turn in association of education programs of the party from 1977 to 1981 in favor of social democratic policies rather than socialist policies.<sup>274</sup> However, compulsory education was generalized and the examinations to enter Lyceum which was a selective barrier was abolished. School textbooks were renewed as being modernized in terms of European and democratic values.<sup>275</sup> One of the most democratic moves of PASOK in education was with the reform of high level education. With the Education Act of 1982, academic chairs in the universities

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<sup>270</sup> Dimitris Sotiropoulos. (1995). "The Remains of Authoritarianism: Bureaucracy and Civil Society in Post-Authoritarian Greece". *Cahiers D'etudes sur la Mediterranee Orientale et le Monde Turco- Iranien*. N. 20. pp. 21.

<sup>271</sup> Mihalis Spourdalakis. (1985-1986). "The Greek Experience". *Socialist Register*. V.22. 259.

<sup>272</sup> *Idem*.

<sup>273</sup> Anna Karamanou. (2004). "The Changing Role of Women in Greece". (ed.). Theodore A. Coulombis, Theodore Kariotis and Fotini Bellou. *Greece in the Twentieth Century*. London: Frank Cass Publishers. pp. 280.

<sup>274</sup> Georgios Grollios and Ioannis Kaskaris. (2003). "From Socialist-Democratic to Third Way Politics and Rhetoric in Greek Education, 1997-2002". *The Journal for Critical Education Policy Studies*. V. 1. pp. 154, 155.

<sup>275</sup> Anna Frangoudaki. (2004). "Greek Education in the Twentieth Century: A Long Process Towards a Democratic European Society". (ed.). Theodore A. Coulombis, Theodore Kariotis and Fotini Bellou. *Greece in the Twentieth Century*. London: Frank Cass Publishers. pp. 213.



were dispensed and schools and departments were introduced as new structures. Students' role was enhanced and their participation in decision making processes and election procedures of the academic administration were enabled.<sup>276</sup>

PASOK embraced all the people coming from the different parts of the Greek society. The electorate of the party was equally both from rural and urban. There was men as many as women to vote for PASOK. It was supported by farmers, businessmen, teachers, workers, managers and there was not any specific class on which the party was based, but there was an expanded middle class and upper middle class which emerged as a result of PASOK's policies - herein clientelism played an important role-. Karamanlis' ND was an open window for the society but PASOK was a deep breath which renewed the cells. In fact, what Karamanlis started, was completed by Papandreou within social democrat view. 1989 signaled the end of metapolitefsi because as Voulgaris also stated, 1990's would be the first decade of globalization.

#### **2.4.The Scandals and the End of the Glory**

Papandreou Government was strong enough to claim PASOK's third term in the first two years of the second period despite the ongoing economic problems which could not be completely fixed and decreased reformist policies. ND under the leadership of Mitsotakis was not a powerful convincing alternative while the charismatic leader Papandreou was still an attractive actor of the Greek politics for the electorate. However, unexpected chain of events would cause a dramatic change for the fate of both the party and Andreas Papandreou. There were three unexpected dynamics which dragged the party into opposition from power. The expected dynamics which could cause a possible defeat were both the domestic issues such as deteriorating economy or growing social unrest and international conjuncture which

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<sup>276</sup> Georgios Grollios and Ioannis Kaskaris. (2003). "From Socialist-Democratic to Third Way Politics and Rhetoric in Greek Education, 1997-2002". *The Journal for Critical Education Policy Studies*. V. 1. pp. 156.

rapidly changed and signaled the end of the Cold War in favor of Western world. However, health problems of Papandreou, his love affair with Dimitra Liani who was an old Olympic Airways stewardess and finally Koskotas Scandal were the three unexpected milestones for the future of the party with a deep impact on the last years of 1980's.

On September 1988, Andreas Papandreou suddenly went to London for medical treatment since he had to have an open-heart surgery. He had to stay in London for two months and during this period, there was Dimitra Liani next to him instead of his wife, Margaret. This was a love scandal or sex scandal that became public knowledge after his return from London. Margaret Papandreou was a known figure with her actions in EGE and her other contributions to the society as a wife of the Prime Minister. Now such a scandal created an emotional impact against Papandreou. Furthermore, widespread rumor about the influence of Liani on Papandreou's political decisions was another negative point. However, it was not as powerful as to affect the voters' preference since the Greek society highly considered it as personal/private issue rather than political. As Dimitras also underlined, "*Greece is a traditional but not puritan nation and it tolerates men's extra-marital affairs.*"<sup>277</sup> The main issue that Greek people criticized Papandreou, was not his personal affair with Liani, but people were rather against the issue becoming too public.<sup>278</sup>

Papandreou's personal affair was a surprise of him for the society but there was another and much more vital issue which made Papandreou surprised. \$ 210 million had disappeared from the Bank of Crete and charges of embezzlement and kickbacks indicated a comprehensive financial and political scandal.<sup>279</sup> While Papandreou was in London, chairman of the Bank of Crete, George Koskotas was

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<sup>277</sup> Betty A. Dobratz and Stephanie Whitfield. (1992). "Does Scandal Influence Voters' Party Preference? The Case of Greece during the Papandreou Era". *European Sociological Review*. V. 8. N. 2. pp. 171.

<sup>278</sup> *Idem*.

<sup>279</sup> Robert Ajemian. (June 24, 2001). "Scandals The Looting of Greece". Time. <http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,151390,00.html>. 20.10.2014.

arrested in the United States after his hasty escape from Greece. He was just 34 years old and he was a chairman of a bank with many branches which mushroomed in few years; he was the owner of two major newspapers, *Kathimerini* and *Vradyni* and a periodical ENA; he was the founder of a new daily *24 Hours* and a publishing company *Grammi* and finally he bought one of the biggest football teams of Greece, *Olympiakos F.C.*.<sup>280</sup> This rapid progress of Koskotas' wealth and conditions were mysterious enough to create a big question mark. Eventually in 1987 there were serious rumors about Koskotas' money connections and an investigation was inevitable. Koskotas, himself stated in his interview in the Times that Koutsogiorgas, current Minister of Justice, told him the investigation could not be stopped and similarly, Greek intelligence told him in 1988 that he would be arrested.<sup>281</sup> However Koskotas' threat that he made after the warning of Koutsogiorgas was clear enough: "*If I am destroyed, we will all be destroyed. You know what they will find at the bank.*"<sup>282</sup> It was alleged that state organizations deposited their funds in the Bank of Crete with low rates of interest and through this way, as long as the bank got profits and plus, this was transferred to the PASOK.<sup>283</sup> According to interview of Koskotas, he served for Papandreou and PASOK implementing the orders mainly coming from Papandreou such as Papandreou's requests for transferring money for party or his pressures on Koskotas to buy *Kathimerini* or *Olympiakos* to use them in favor of PASOK or Papandreou himself. However Koskotas had been already under indictment in the USA for fraud and this was not the first time that he was arrested after his arrival to the USA. Under these circumstances, Koskotas was already a

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<sup>280</sup> Kleomenis S. Koutsoukis. (2006). "Political Scandals and Crisis Management in Greece, 1821-2001". (ed.). John Garrard and James L. Newell. *Scandals in Past and Contemporary Politics*. UK: Manchester University Press. pp. 132.

<sup>281</sup> Robert Ajemian. (June 24, 2001). "Scandals The Looting of Greece". Time. <http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,151390,00.html>. 20.10.2014.

<sup>282</sup> *Idem*.

<sup>283</sup> Betty A. Dobratz and Stephanie Whitfield. (1992). "Does Scandal Influence Voters' Party Preference? The Case of Greece during the Papandreou Era". *European Sociological Review*. V. 8. N. 2. pp. 172.

sophisticated and distrustful character to analyze however the allegations which apparently pointed kind of a connection with PASOK, were serious enough to be taken under investigation.

Until Koskotas gave the popular interview to the Times in 1989, Andreas Papandreou defined the events as foreign centers' destabilization plan or in the other words it was a "*conspiracy aiming to hurt Greece.*"<sup>284</sup> He also refused to testify since testimony to more than one hundred witnesses was televised and the special tribunal was headed by the president of the Supreme Court.<sup>285</sup> All the allegations gave an opportunity for the opposition to call PASOK for an immediate early election. Some ministers were resigned, some others' positions were changed and in the parliament, PASOK asked vote of confidence which survived the position of the party until the general election on December 1988 however the party and Papandreou himself were still scorched. Koskotas Scandal had a serious effect in the voters' preferences or in other words, voters' concerns directed them to maintain their support for Papandreou who fell into the position of 'corrupt' politician. Voting behavior was most of time more about with the functionality rather than ideology. As it was stressed by Dobratz as a reference to Dimitras, "Greeks believe that political life and politicians are corrupt anyway, some more, others less".<sup>286</sup>

The 1989 Election was held on 18 June. PASOK received 39,1% of the votes and fell into opposition in the parliament. However, ND could not get the majority to have an absolute dominance as one party and ND-Synaspismos (Alliance) of Left and Progress coalition was formed. In September 1989, 'Greek Parliament voted Papandreou to have a special court for his alleged involvement in the \$ 230 million

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<sup>284</sup>Robert Ajemian. (June 24, 2001). "Scandals The Looting of Greece". Time. <http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,151390,00.html>. 20.10.2014. See also: Richard Clogg. (1997). *A Concise History of Greece*. UK: Cambridge University Press. pp. 198.

<sup>285</sup> Betty A. Dobratz and Stephanie Whitfield. (1992). "Does Scandal Influence Voters' Party Preference? The Case of Greece during the Papandreou Era". *European Sociological Review*. V. 8. N. 2. pp. 173.

<sup>286</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 172.

bank embezzlement scandal. This was an important point for the Greek democracy which opened a way to judge a prime minister for the first time. During the investigations, on November 1989, a new elections were called since the coalition was unsuccessful. The results were not too different than the previous one. PASOK could receive 40,7% of the votes and ND, again, could not gain an absolute dominance. In fact, PASOK's electoral program of 1989 (The Program for the Third Term) was not as strong as the previous ones however 40,7% was unexpected and non-ignorable success since it could keep the majority of its electorate in the party despite scandals and current circumstances in other words it was the glorious defeat of PASOK.

## CHAPTER 3

### LEFT OF CENTRE AND SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN TURKEY: SECOND TURKISH REPUBLICAN'S PEOPLE PARTY

#### 3.1.A Brief Story of CHP and Its Ideological Background

“...Once the peace is established, desiring to devote myself for the good of the motherland until the end of my life, I intend to found a political party which based on populism, with the name of ‘People’s Party’.”<sup>287</sup> For the first time, the name of the Republican People’s Party was explicitly stated by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in 6 December 1922 in an interview with the journalists of *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, *Yenigün* and *Öğüt* newspapers.<sup>288</sup> Armistice of Mudanya had just signed in 11 October 1922 and immediately after the ceasefire, the negotiations were just begun for a peace treaty which was determined to be held in Lausanne.

The Grand National Assembly which was founded in 23 April 1920 was constantly working in Ankara as the new representative of the country however the Assembly was not a united unit which could unanimously act during decision making processes. Contradictions between the deputies which were not the members of an organizational structure could usually cause a great waste of time under the emergency situations. Broad range of varied ideas and political ideologies limited the ability of Ankara-based Government to take rational and rapid decisions which played a vital role with regards to the success of the national movement. Even if the National Movement had an anti-imperialist and progressive character, social segments which supported the struggle and took part in it had socially conservative structure. The struggle was seen as a means for the return of Sultan by the majority

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<sup>287</sup> Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi. (2013). “CHP Tarihi”. p. 2. [http://www.chp.org.tr/?page\\_id=67](http://www.chp.org.tr/?page_id=67). 25.10.2014.

<sup>288</sup> Atakan Hatipoğlu. (2012). *CHP'nin İdeolojik Dönüşümü: Kemalizmden Sosyal Demokrasiye*. İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları. pp. 134.

of those forces. This was a widespread perception finding its reflection in the Assembly among the deputies. The revisionists -the members of the Defence of Rights Group- which would be subsequently called as the Kemalists were a minority in the Assembly when they began the political struggle in 1923<sup>289</sup> and thus the political struggle was actually much more difficult than the military one.

In the beginning of 1921, the first serious opposition had started to appear against the Kemalists, particularly Mustafa Kemal during the negotiations of the 1921 Constitution and following conflicts on specific major issues such as the special law regulating functions and responsibilities of the Council of Ministers, adopting the law of the Supreme Military Command or absolute authority of the Supreme Military Command over the Independence Courts which had exceptional power had highly heightened the tension.<sup>290</sup> Under these circumstances, a political schism seemed inevitable in the First Grand National Assembly and eventually in the Spring of 1921, the ‘first group’ was founded for the purpose of acting in a party discipline by the Defence of Rights Group under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal. A short time later, other members of the Assembly would gather with the name of the ‘second group’ which had a heterogeneous and conservative character.<sup>291</sup> This was a premature form of a party system that ipso facto emerged as a temporary resolution for chaotic structure of the First Assembly to work efficiently. However the crucial issues which came to the agenda such as the abolition of the Sultanate in 1922, the selection of the Lausanne Committee members by the Grand National Assembly and the 1923 Election discussions had showed flagrant necessity of a permanent resolution. Indeed, it was explicitly stated by the Defence of Rights Group that they had not been pleased with the entity of this opposition for those crucial days and

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<sup>289</sup> Feroz Ahmad. (2012). *Modern Türkiye'nin Oluşumu*. İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları. pp. 68.

<sup>290</sup> Ahmet Demirel. (23 February 2014). “İlk Meclis’te İktidar ve Muhalefet”. Taraf. <http://www.taraf.com.tr/yazilar/ahmet-demirel/ilk-mecliste-iktidar-ve-muhalefet/28953/>. 28.10.2014.

<sup>291</sup> Atakan Hatipoğlu. (2012). *CHP'nin İdeolojik Dönüşümü: Kemalizmden Sosyal Demokrasiye*. İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları. pp. 132.

Pasha himself underlined in 1923 that he had not wanted an opposition at all.<sup>292</sup> Immediately after this statement of Mustafa Kemal, Kazim Karabekir who was the prominent General of the War of Independence, had maintained a stance against the authoritarian attitude of Mustafa Kemal stressing the Ghazi's unwillingness to have an opposition in the First Assembly and according to Karabekir's memories the selection method of the candidates in 1923 before the election was an indication of this authoritarian structure because the candidate deputies were chosen among those who were relied more than the others obeying the decisions of the 'First Group' without exception.<sup>293</sup> By 1923, the sides in the political system had crystallized and the friends of war time had chosen different ways.

Mustafa Kemal proclaimed a nine-article manifesto as the election bulletin in 8 April 1923. In fact, it was an offer for a new political party which would abolish the Defence of Rights Group because if people could appreciate the manifesto, it would have meant the confirmation for the foundation of the 'People's Party'.<sup>294</sup> The manifesto which was also considered as the first party program of CHP included many reformist points which were the signs of upcoming radical reforms such as foundation of medical and social service institutions, unification of education within a secular and national view, subventions to the farmers and a taxation reform.<sup>295</sup> After the elections in 28 June 1923, the 'second group' was removed from the Assembly. National struggle was not just a military struggle against the occupying powers but also a struggle for economic, political and social revolution which would completely create new institutions and traditions of a new nation rather than

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<sup>292</sup>Dunden Yarina. CHP Belgeseli. Kanal A. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IZ7ZY19-7to>. 28.10.14.

<sup>293</sup>*Idem.*

<sup>294</sup>CHP Programi. (1961). "CHP Mevzuati". I. Bolum. <http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/eyayin/GAZETELER/WEB/KUTUPHANEDE%20BULUNAN%20DIJITAL%20KAYNAKLAR/KITAPLAR/SIYASI%20PARTI%20YAYINLARI/197605741%20CHP%20SECIM%20MEVZUATI/197605741%20CHP%20SECIM%20MEVZUATI%20BOLUM%201.pdf>. 28.10.14.

<sup>295</sup> Atakan Hatipoğlu. (2012). *CHP'nin İdeolojik Dönüşümü: Kemalizmden Sosyal Demokrasiye*. İstanbul: Kaynak Press. pp. 135.



remaining Ottoman institutions and its traditional social structure. That is why the People's Party would be the leading force of this revolution as the focus of all political activities for the next 27 years. Mustafa Kemal proclaimed the foundation of the party de jure in 9 September 1923 and submitted the official letter of the application to the Minister of Internal Affairs in 23 October 1923 just before the proclamation of the Turkish Republic.<sup>296</sup>

On 29 October, Turkey became a republic with an amendment in the first article of the Constitution and new Assembly elected Mustafa Kemal as the first president of the Republic and Ismet Inonu as its first prime minister. Kemalists gradually consolidated their power but the opposition would continue the political struggle out of the Assembly. Firstly, party as an idea seemed antipathetic for many people and created big questions in the minds from every segments of the society because the latest party experience that those people witnessed was with the Community of Union and Progress (CUP) which caused the end of the Empire according to view of the majority of the society dragging the country into the World War I. For instance, Rauf Orbay who was one of the important figures of the War of Independence would underline his anxious and opposition referring to period of the CUP which “*had started with a revolution in 1908 but transformed into a one-party despotism in 1913.*”<sup>297</sup> Secondly, there were serious discussions on the name of the Party inside and outside the Assembly because the word of ‘People’ was too leftist and thus it could be a better choice to name it as ‘national’ party.<sup>298</sup> In this standpoint, what prominent journalist Mehmet Emin Yalman wrote in his column in 18 January 1923 was important to be underlined: “*His Excellency Mustafa Kemal*

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<sup>296</sup> CHP Programi. (1961). “CHP Mevzuati”. I. Bolum. <http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/eyayin/GAZETELER/WEB/KUTUPHANEDE%20BULUNAN%20DIJITAL%20OKAYNAKLAR/KITAPLAR/SIYASI%20PARTI%20YAYINLARI/197605741%20CHP%20SECIM%20MEVZUATI/197605741%20CHP%20SECIM%20MEVZUATI%20BOLUM%201.pdf>. 28.10.14.

<sup>297</sup> Dunden Yarina. CHP Belgeseli. Kanal A. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IZ7ZY19-7to>. 28.10.14.

<sup>298</sup> Ayse Gunes Ayata. (2010). *CHP: Orgut ve Ideoloji*. Istanbul: Gundogan Yayinlari. pp. 64.

*Pasha is the greatest force capable of preparing the future. However, this force, instead of leading a national effort, is showing a willingness to turn to class struggle by founding the People's Party*"<sup>299</sup> Mustafa Kemal had already stated the new party would be a party of all segments of the society and the society with its existing segments should have been in a harmony and solidarity rather than a class struggle.<sup>300</sup> Moreover, the Kemalists did not believe there were different classes or social groups in the country or in other word, Turkey did not have classes in the European sense. That was the reason why the People's Party presented itself as a great unifier which protects the interests of all segments of the society. This was the main structure of the principle of the 'populism'. Another issue that caused a great discussions and divisions was the abolition of the Caliphate. Caliphate was an institution which the conservatives continued to use against Mustafa Kemal and new regime. Many people were still emotionally attached to the dynasty as Zurcher underlined particularly in Istanbul where the Government was highly unpopular.<sup>301</sup> After the Sultanate had been removed, the Caliph was the last symbol of the previous regime and it became the center of the anti-republican movements. However, proclamation of the Republic which accepted the Turkish nation as the absolute master in its house was de facto the abolition of the Caliphate and this de facto change of the Caliph's status increased the concerns of the opposition for the future of the Caliph. In this point, Rauf Orbay stated his loyalty by conscience and sentiment to the Sultanate and Caliphate and continued: "*I am obligated to remain loyal to the sovereign. My devotion to the Caliphate is imposed on me by my upbringing.*" "*It is hard for us to control the general situation. This can only be secured by an authority that everyone is accustomed to regard as unapproachably*

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<sup>299</sup> Feroz Ahmad. (2012). *Modern Türkiye'nin Oluşumu*. Istanbul: Kaynak Yayinlari. pp. 92.

<sup>300</sup> Touraj Atabaki and Erik J. Zurcher. (2004). *Men of Order: Authoritarian Modernization Under Atatürk and Reza Shah*. London: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd. p. 104. See also: Atakan Hatipoğlu. (2012). *CHP'nin İdeolojik Dönüşümü: Kemalizmden Sosyal Demokrasiye*. İstanbul: Kaynak Yayinlari. pp. 134.

<sup>301</sup> Erik J. Zurcher. (2004). *Turkey, A Modern History*. London: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd. pp. 167.

*high. Such is the office of Sultanate and Caliphate. To abolish this office and to try to set up an entity of a different character in its place, would lead to failure and disaster. It is quite inadmissible.*”<sup>302</sup> Despite the strong opposition which mainly maintained by some important political figures and the Generals, the Government abolished the Caliphate and banished the Caliph in 24 March 1924.

Religion was placed under the control of the state and secularism became one of the most crucial pillars of the state.<sup>303</sup> The Law for the Unification of Education as linchpin of the cultural program of new Turkey and the law which obliged army officers who wanted to be in active politics to resign from the military were the first examples of a range of radical reforms.<sup>304</sup> While People’s Party were carrying out the reforms concurrently with keeping the opposition under pressure, the opposition started to be organized under the umbrella of a political party which would be officially founded in 17 November 1924 by Rauf Orbay with the name of the Progressive Republican Party (Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası). Even if it was not much different from the People’s Party in terms of its program, the Progressive Republican Party attracted the people more than the Kemalists had expected and in short time it became the focus of the people in the opposition. The meetings of Rauf Orbay in Anatolia had turned into shows with crowds and this new conditions could threaten the power and legitimacy of the People’s Party which was eminently disturbed. The Kurdish rebellion emerged on February 1925 and the Maintenance of Order Law (Tahrir-i Sukun) which declared the emergency rules would adopt in March by Inonu Government. In June, the first short experience of multi-party system in Turkey would be ended with the decision of closure of the Progressive Republican Party.

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<sup>302</sup> Feroz Ahmad. (2012). *Modern Türkiye'nin Oluşumu*. Istanbul: Kaynak Yayinlari. pp. 73.

<sup>303</sup> 1924 Anayasasi. (20.04.2014). Birinci Fasil. <http://www.anayasa.gov.tr/Mevzuat/Anayasa1924/>. 29.10,14.

<sup>304</sup> Hasan Kayali. (2008). “The Struggle for Independence”. (ed.). Resat Kasaba. *The Cambridge History of Modern Turkey, Turkey in the Modern World*. V. 4. London: Cambridge University Press. pp. 144. See also: Feroz Ahmad. (2012). *Modern Türkiye'nin Oluşumu*. Istanbul: Kaynak Yayinlari. pp. 74.

The People's Party was again the only and absolute power.

The 'People's Party' was changed as the Republican People's Party (CHP) in 10 November 1924 adding the 'republican' emphasis to its name.<sup>305</sup> Indeed, the name of CHP involving republicanism and populism was not just a coincidence but also the product of a conscious process which would be completed with the birth of a new ideology, Kemalism in 1935. In the beginning, ideological frame of CHP was ambiguous enough. Mustafa Kemal and his generation were the members of the constitutionalist tradition who had grown up under the great influence of the thought system of French Revolution and the values system of the Young Turks.<sup>306</sup> As Hatipoglu correctly noted the thoughts of the generation of the National Struggle and particularly its leader cadre were a combination of all from Namik Kemal's 'motherland' (vatan) and 'freedom' to Mehmet Emin Yurdakul's 'Turkism' and 'national identity'; from Tevfik Fikret's 'humanism' to Ali Suavi's 'prestigious nation' perception or from Rousseau to Montesquieu.<sup>307</sup> Besides all these, in this unstable but ideologically productive political atmosphere of the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, colonialism by the Western powers and emerged communist and socialist ideals in the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century were the other dynamics which shaped the Kemalist ideology. Indeed, CHP which meant the state itself, had a political approach which came closer to socialism dividing the world into two different camps as oppressed people and capitalists.<sup>308</sup> That's why the Kemalists had used socialist discourses in terms of their anti-imperialist stance however neither Mustafa Kemal nor the leader cadre of the National Movement were socialist or had socialist ideals. For instance, Sefik Husnu who was the founder of official magazine of the

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<sup>305</sup> Atakan Hatipoğlu. (2012). *CHP'nin İdeolojik Dönüşümü: Kemalizmden Sosyal Demokrasiye*. İstanbul: Kaynak Yayinlari. pp. 135.

<sup>306</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 124.

<sup>307</sup> *Idem*.

<sup>308</sup> Similar division can be observed in Lenin's theory of imperialism as oppressors and oppressed people. Indeed, the relations between the Soviet Union and Turkey should be also taken into consideration within this common perspective besides the pragmatism goals and policies. For more: *Ibid.*, p. 130, 131.

Communist Party of Turkey, Aydinlik, noted in the Journal of Communist International in 1926: “*Today’s political tendency of the People’s Party explicitly indicates that the Movement of National Independence fundamentally had petit bourgeois character and it remains its policies in the capitalist direction.*”<sup>309</sup> Despite their critiques to the Kemalism and the certain rejection of the Communism by the Kemalists, the communists of 1920’s had also supported the Kemalism in its anti-imperialist struggle and stood against the opposition -second group- since the communists believed the Kemalism was a progressive movement which also worked in favor of the communist ideals. According to Mustafa Kemal, the Turkish National Struggle of Independence was both a revolution which followed the way of the French Revolution and the first national struggle of the 20<sup>th</sup> century which became a sample for other stateless nations.<sup>310</sup> For the Kemalists, anti-imperialist struggle was against the imperialist perception of the Western powers however, to be a part of the Western world within a process of westernization -westernization and modernization are generally used and accepted as the same things- was the only goal of the Kemalists. On the way of westernization, the discourse was to reach the level of current civilization creating a unique model.

Republicanism, nationalism, populism and secularism were officially accepted as the principles of CHP in the Congress of 1927 and socio-political transformation process which had started with the foundation of new nation state in the beginning of 1920’s became concrete within a frame of these four principles of the party. Between 1926 and 1931, a chain of revolutionary reforms were made such as the hat act, adoption of the new Latin alphabet, adoption of Gregorian calendar, the closure of dervish lodges and zawiya, adoption of code of civil procedure and code of penal procedure. Additionally, new civil code, code of obligations and penalty code were adopted. All these were the cornerstones of the socio-cultural transformation to reach the level of contemporary civilization. Turkey’s efforts to

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<sup>309</sup> Sefik Husnu. (1997). *Yazi ve Konusmalar*. Istanbul: Kaynak Yayinlari. p. 36.

<sup>310</sup> Atakan Hatipoğlu. (2012). *CHP'nin İdeolojik Dönüşümü: Kemalizmden Sosyal Demokrasiye*. İstanbul: Kaynak Yayinlari. pp. 125, 127.

create an independent national economy accelerated concurrently with the reforms. Young state should have been adopted an economic policy which could enable it to continue to make reforms, have an independent national economy and survive the country under the conditions of the post-war crisis which swept the Europe by the end of the 1920's. In fact, ongoing reforms and efforts to develop the economy were the signs of the upcoming last two principles, Statism and Revolutionism which were added to the party program in 1931. CHP was a progressive force which determinedly aimed to reshape a backward society for carrying onward. It was the central actor of the modernization project as a state centric organization and this leading position made it less pluralist and negotiant but more monist and authoritarian since the party did not want to share its power and world view. Perhaps, this positioning of CHP was the negative side of it in terms of the democracy and the targets for modernization but it was also a positive character to make it action-oriented party. Independency was not the only goal but was the prerequisite for socio-economical and socio-cultural development which were the primary goals.<sup>311</sup> In this framework, while statism was the ideological base of the socio-economical transformation, revolutionism would be the name of the changes in socio-cultural structure.

In spite of all the efforts to develop the state and the society, reforms of the Kemalists could not be interiorized by the people and moreover those changes could not be reflected to the people in every square meter of the country. Even the elites of the state involving some deputies of CHP were not exactly aware of the meaning of the reforms and the principles of the party. Particularly after the second effort for multi-party system with the foundation of the Free Party in 1930 under the leadership of Fethi Okyar and mobilization of anti-republican opposition around new party, CHP realized the entity of great opposition against government. The party obliged to define its world view to be able to express itself in an explicit way. Turkey was in the process of revolution however the thought system of the revolution could not be

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<sup>311</sup> Baskin Oran. (1999). *Ataturk Milliyetçiligi, Resmi İdeoloji Disi Bir İnceleme*. Ankara: Bilgi Yayinlari. pp. 180.

produced.<sup>312</sup> Indeed what CHP had to do is to resolve the trouble arising from the ideological ambiguity. In this framework, in 1932, Kadro (Cadre) Group was formed by prominent intellectuals like Sevket Sureyya and Yakup Kadri as an attempt to advocate to party policies and clarify the principles of CHP.<sup>313</sup> Ex-Marxist intellectuals who were in Kadro Movement tried to draw an ideological frame for the regime criticizing both the liberals and extreme statist such as Recep Peker who was the secretary general of CHP in the beginning of the 1930's. While the discussions on the principles of statism and populism were going on between the deputies, with the effects of rising fascist tendencies in Europe, fascism was practically seen attractive by particularly statist wing of the party. In this period, Italian authorities had also claimed that new regime in Turkey was a copy of Italian fascism.<sup>314</sup> That's why after socialism and its effect within anti-imperialist view, now CHP and fascism were mentioned together. Anti-communist attitude and unifying the party with the state were the common points with fascism however the Kemalists had never adopted fascism as an ideology since the real power and progressive force of CHP was the liberal wing of the party which had democratic goals. For instance before its closure, Kadro had also underlined the anti-imperialist character of the Turkish Movement contrary to Italian colonialist dreams in order to indicate that the regime of Turkey could not be a fascist regime.<sup>315</sup> Indeed, Mustafa Kemal who supported democracy as a liberalist would begin to take measures to remove the totalitarian

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<sup>312</sup> Feroz Ahmad. (2012). *Modern Türkiye'nin Oluşumu*. İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları. pp. 84.

<sup>313</sup> Alparslan Nas. (July 2008). "Kadro ve Kadrocular: Marksizmden Kemalizme". Birikim. <http://www.birikimdergisi.com/guncel/kadro-ve-kadrocular-marksizmden-kemalizme>. 04.11.2014.

<sup>314</sup> Feroz Ahmad. (2012). *Modern Türkiye'nin Oluşumu*. İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları. pp. 84.

<sup>315</sup> Alparslan Nas. (July 2008). "Kadro ve Kadrocular: Marksizmden Kemalizme". Birikim. <http://www.birikimdergisi.com/guncel/kadro-ve-kadrocular-marksizmden-kemalizme>. 04.11.2014.

Similarly, Duverger saw CHP as pragmatic and even democratic in orientation and according to him the main goal of the party was to create a political elite which would govern the country. Duverger stressed that CHP was not a totalitarian party since it had not gotten obligatory membership system and new ideas could be produced and suggested in the party. For more: Ayşe Gunes Ayata. (2010). *CHP, Örgüt ve İdeoloji*. İstanbul: Gündoğan. pp. 74.

sides of the regime despite the one-party domination in 1936. CHP was the one which would create the ideology of the regime and the pillars of it had been already declared. Eventually, firstly, the thought system which was formed within the framework of six principles was defined as ‘Kemalism’ or ‘Ataturkism’ (Atatürkçülük) in the Fourth Congress of CHP in 1935 and then in 1937 six principles (six arrows) were incorporated into the Turkish constitution. The ideology of the revolution was named as Kemalism and now its values system should have penetrated into society. Because CHP could not penetrate into masses contrary to what is believed. Economic recession of 1930’s which dominated the Europe also affected the people in Turkey and this was clearly realized when Mustafa Kemal himself saw the reality in Anatolia during his three-week nationwide tour in the beginning of the 1930’s. He had received many complaint letters from the people and listened the problems face to face. He would then tell to his personal secretary Hasan Rıza that: *“I am exasperated in a great pain. Wherever we have been, we listen to problems. Everyone is in a deep financial poverty and misery. Unfortunately, this is the actual situation of the country.”*<sup>316</sup> For consolidation of the regime and restoration of Anatolia, the party should have socialized the revolution touching every segments of the society. Moving from this point of view, People’s Houses for public education and spreading Kemalism were formed in 1931 and intense literacy campaigns were increasingly maintained during 1930’s. The most crucial areas for social and cultural development were the villages where the ratio of literacy and education level were too low. Within the goal of spreading Kemalism and the values of new regime, village institutes as cornerstone of the rural development project were established in 1940 after a five-year preparation process. Kemalism was an ideology which embedded itself in the foundation of Turkey however it was not a codified and universal ideology such as socialism, communism or liberalism.<sup>317</sup> That was the

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<sup>316</sup> Can Dunder. (2008). Mustafa Belgesel Film. NTV. <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5p2cl5ZE5NA>. 03.11.2014.

<sup>317</sup> Sinan Ciddi. (2009). *Kemalism in Turkish Politics: The Republican People’s Party, Secularism and Nationalism*. New York: Routledge. pp. 28.



reason why the people who defined themselves as Kemalist could be from the right or the left of the political spectrum. Mustafa Kemal in his last speech in the Assembly stated that: *“Our constitutive program for state administration was the program of CHP. The principles of CHP Program were the major enlightening roads in both administration and politics. These principles should be never considered as same as dogmas of those books which were accepted as they came down from the sky. We directly inspire from the life not from the sky or an invisible world.”*<sup>318</sup> Kemalist movement and in general Turkish revolution was a top-down revolution which all regulations were imposed to the people by a political elite. According to Mardin, *“the Kemalists had a fine understanding of regulation, but they missed the revolutionary-mobilizational aspect.”*<sup>319</sup> As a result of this weak side of the ideology, rural areas which were not close to the center and acted as periphery had stayed far from the Kemalist ideology and CHP. In fact this would be a chronic problem of the party which would not be resolved even in the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

After Mustafa Kemal died in 1938, the period of Inonu began as national chief and permanent leader of CHP however the years with Inonu could not start in wealth and peace due to taken economical and political measures under the threat of upcoming war. Inonu himself clearly summarized main concerns which determined the policies of that period: *“After I was elected to the presidency in November, 1938, I considered these the important issues confronting me: I definitely believed the outside world was going into conflict. How to pass safely the harsh storm becoming clear on the horizon was occupying my mind the most. Our foreign relations were indecisive and without foundation. Our relations with the Soviets were in shadows, our relations with the Nazis were suspicious and our relations with the Western world were without a strong base... In domestic politics we needed calm and order. Placing the state’s domestic and foreign affairs on a trustworthy foundation was the*

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<sup>318</sup> Can Dundar. (2008). Mustafa Belgesel Film. NTV. <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5p2cl5ZE5NA>. 03.11.2014.

<sup>319</sup> Serif Mardin. (1973). “Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics”. *Daedalus*. V. 102. N. 1. pp. 184.

*first duty.*<sup>320</sup> Until the end of the World War II, CHP would proceed strict and even totalitarian and nationalist policies which would make Inonu bad man of the one-party period. Discriminatory Wealth Tax (Varlik Vergisi) which was one of the black chapter of Turkish history, rationing as soon as the war and poverty would be remembered however successful policies of Inonu could safely keep the country out of the war. Indeed as soon as the war was over, Ismet Inonu would signal the transition period from one-party system to multi-party system stressing lack of an opposition as main imperfection of Turkey in 1 November 1945.<sup>321</sup> Eventually with the foundation of the Democrat Party (DP) by CHP members who were dissatisfied with the current governing style of CHP but who otherwise supported the Kemalism and its principles in 7 January 1946, Turkish political system met with multi-party structure. Even if CHP gained the early Elections in 1946 which had strong evidences indicating rigged poll with the open ballot-secret counting system, discourses and promises of DP which had not been ready for a victory in 1946, showed CHP that DP would not be a auditing party for CHP but it would be the focus of the people who were in the opposition. In this standpoint CHP took decision to change its own structure with serious amendments on its charter. The process of democratization of the country was at the same time the process of democratization of CHP. Party and state were gradually separated and concessive and populist policies and discourses began to be observed. Election system was changed as secret ballot-open counting however winner-take-all method of voting was remained. Despite the efforts of CHP, DP, with the slogan “Enough! Now the people have their say’ won 52,68% of the vote with 408 seats against CHP’s 39,45% with 61 seats and twenty-seven-year one-party domination of the Turkish Republican People’s Party ended.<sup>322</sup>

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<sup>320</sup> John M. VanderLippe. (2005). *The Politics of Turkish Democracy: Ismet Inonu and the Formation of the Multi-Party System. 1938-1950*. New York: State University of New York Press. pp. 34.

<sup>321</sup> Feroz Ahmad. (2012). *Modern Türkiye'nin Oluşumu*. Istanbul: Kaynak Yayınları. pp. 125.

<sup>322</sup> Erik J. Zürcher. (2004). *Turkey: A Modern History*. London: I. B. Tauris. pp. 217.

### 3.2. 1960's and Changes in the Party: From Kemalism to Social Democracy

The process of restoration had started for the Turkish Republican People's Party by 1950. The confusion of state, government, party and bureaucracy which became apparent in the last years of the one-party system given way to a democratic structure with the change of power. CHP was surprised and deeply disappointed with the result of the election. Nobody had expected this result in the party because according to CHP, the party, as the founder of the country, had always worked for the people's good developing the country and the people should have appreciated these efforts otherwise this was nothing but ingratitude. CHP was unaccustomed to be in opposition and now what it had to do is to adopt the new situation. That is why, while the Democratic Party was acting with deliberation during policy making processes as government in order to consolidate its power against CHP in the first four years, CHP started the changes inside the party to improve the intra-party democracy which did not almost exist.<sup>323</sup> For instance, Inonu's leadership was criticized by the other members which named themselves as the 'democrats of 15 May' for the first time in CHP's history in the 8<sup>th</sup> Congress of the party in 1950 and principle of the separation of powers was adopted contrary to the base of the 1924 Constitution which recognized the unity of power when it needed.<sup>324</sup> Similarly, local organizations of the party were strengthened and their authorities were increased in the 1951 Congress.<sup>325</sup> Many deputies and members of CHP had already left the party to be member of DP and severe rifts within party had crystallized with the new status of the party in opposition. Some members like Nihat Erim were the important figures of intra-party opposition movements.<sup>326</sup> Sirri Atalay, deputy of Kars, would

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<sup>323</sup> Ayse Gunes Ayata. (2010). *CHP, Orgut ve Ideoloji*. Istanbul: Gundogan. pp. 79.

<sup>324</sup> Atakan Hatipoğlu. (2012). *CHP'nin İdeolojik Dönüşümü: Kemalizmden Sosyal Demokrasiye*. İstanbul: Kaynak Yayinlari. pp. 224, 225.

<sup>325</sup> Ayse Gunes Ayata. (2010). *CHP, Orgut ve Ideoloji*. Istanbul: Gundogan. pp. 79.

<sup>326</sup> Hikmet Bila. (2008). *CHP, 1919-2009*. Istanbul: Dogan Yayinlari. pp. 139.

underline the duty of CHP: “*An opposition can not be opposition by going to cocktail parties; being in opposition is suffering and pain.*”<sup>327</sup>

After the golden years of DP which characterized by the political and military integration of Turkey into Western alliance and liberal economic policies which resulted rapid grow in 1954, DP won an absolute victory with 57,61% and reached the peak however this point was the beginning of the end since DP steadily became less tolerant but more authoritarian.<sup>328</sup> Conversely, CHP was gradually abandoning its authoritarian stance focusing on the issues such as superiority of law, social justice, proportional representation and democratic legal regulations which would limit the power of the governments.<sup>329</sup> In 1954, crucial amendments which increased the authorities of the Party Assembly and the secretary general were adopted in the Charter of the party as the results of the 11<sup>th</sup> Congress:

*“-General president of the party and secretary general will be chosen by the members of the Congress*

*-A thirty-member-Party Assembly will be founded*

*-A Central Executive Committee was formed with five members of the Party Assembly and two vice secretary general which will be chosen by the secretary general”*<sup>330</sup>

Moreover, particularly during the election campaign in 1957, CHP used much more different rhetoric from before which was too close to social democracy and new party program of CHP involved the right of strike, union rights for civil servants, autonomy for universities, protection of civil rights, foundation of a supreme council of judges and a constitutional court.<sup>331</sup> In the election bulletin, CHP which gave opportunity to the young people in its cadres as candidate deputies had counted the

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<sup>327</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 144.

<sup>328</sup> Erik J. Zürcher. (2004). *Turkey, A Modern History*. London: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd. pp. 5.

<sup>329</sup> Ayse Gunes Ayata. (2010). *CHP, Orgut ve Ideoloji*. Istanbul: Gundogan. pp. 80.

<sup>330</sup> Hikmet Bila. (2008). *CHP, 1919-2009*. Istanbul: Dogan Yayinlari. pp. 139.

<sup>331</sup> Atakan Hatipoğlu. (2012). *CHP'nin İdeolojik Dönüşümü: Kemalizmden Sosyal Demokrasiye*. İstanbul: Kaynak Yayinlari. pp. 233.

promises which were underlined in everywhere by the candidates:

*“-State of law will be founded based on the human rights.*

*-Independence of courts and legal judicial processes will be provided and supreme council of judges will be founded.*

*-Freedom of speech, freedom of press and freedom of assembly will be provided.*

*-Proportional representation will be adopted as election system.*

*-Radio and university autonomy will be provided.*

*-Corruptions will be avoided and the right of evidence will be recognized.*

*-Bicameral system will be formed.*

*-Constitutional Court which will control the laws.*

*-Number of the deputies will be decreased.*

*-Impartiality of the president of republic will be provided.*

*-Right of collective bargain and right of strike will be recognized.*

*-Union right will be recognized for the civil servants.*

*-Economy will be regulated within specific plan and program.*

*-Debts of the villagers will be mitigated.*

*-Cattle tax will be withdrawn.*

*-Social insurance implementations will be enhanced.*

*-Right to paid leave will be recognized.*

*-Workers will have a say in the public economic enterprises.”<sup>332</sup>*

As long as DP lost power and its support, it increased political pressure on the society through its policies and discourses within an authoritarian view. One of the most outstanding problem of the period was the high tension between the government and the army which DP wanted the army to trivialize. 6-7 September events were the other factor which weakened the government and made it unpopular nationwide. After Menderes stated that if they had wanted, they could bring the Caliphate back, Inonu realized the fearful end and warned the prime minister, Adnan

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<sup>332</sup> Hikmet Bila. (2008). *CHP, 1919-2009*. Istanbul: Dogan Yayinlari. pp. 149, 150.

Menderes. “If you prefer to continue in this way, even I can not survive you”.<sup>333</sup> Eventually, in 27 May 1960 Turkey woke up with a military coup despite the belated efforts of DP.

Besides all these, ten years in opposition were ideologically the years of transition for the Republican People’s Party. Seeking for an identity and adjusting being in opposition adopting the democracy with all the dynamics were the major issues of these ten years. Kemalism was the fundamental ideology however CHP was on the way to adopt a view more than Kemalism but preserving Kemalism. First time in its history CHP started to use discourses to work for ‘the people with the people’ not ‘for the people despite the people’ even if it remained its bureaucratic elite structure. It was a door opening to social democracy.

	<b>14 May 1950</b>		<b>2 May 1954</b>		<b>27 October 1957</b>	
<b>Political Parties</b>	<b>Votes</b>	<b>Seats</b>	<b>Votes</b>	<b>Seats</b>	<b>Votes</b>	<b>Seats</b>
	<b>%</b>		<b>%</b>		<b>%</b>	
<b>Democrat Party</b>	52,68	408	57,61	502	47,88	424
<b>Republican People’s Party</b>	39,45	69	35,36	31	41,09	178

Table. V. Election Results of the Years Between 1950 and 1957

Source: State Institute of Statistics

<sup>333</sup> Yalcin Bayer. (7 May 2010). “Sizi Ben Bile Kurtaramam”. Hurriyet. <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/14647203.asp>. 06.11.14.

### 3.2.1. Political Conjuncture and Politicization of the Society

*“Having enjoyed freedom, and fought for her rights and liberties throughout her history, and having achieved the Revolution of May 27, 1960 by exercising her right to resist the oppression of a political power which had deteriorated into a state of illegitimacy through behavior and actions...”<sup>334</sup>*

The military coup of May 1960 which was pioneered by young officers had broken the thread of legality overthrowing the Menderes Government. The purpose and the aim of the coup was to bring the country with all speed to a fair, clean and solid democracy as Cemal Gursel who was the commander of the Turkish land forces underlined in 1960 and the power and administration should have been urgently transferred to the people from army. The cabinet was appointed under the name of the National Unity Committee (NUC) which defined its legal status with the ‘Temporary Law No. 1’ which was published in the Official Gazette on 14 June.<sup>335</sup> According to the temporary law general elections would be held within the shortest possible time accepting a new constitution which would be formed with democratic principles.<sup>336</sup> Eventually, the army returned to barracks assigning the administration to the civil politicians. The coup had left a black mark for Turkish democracy behind since DP subsequently was dissolved and the first freely elected Prime Minister of Turkish Republic Adnan Menderes, Minister of Foreign Affairs Fatin Rüştü Zorlu and Minister of Finance Hasan Polatkan were tragically executed. However contradictorily the same coup would name as revolution by many scholars because it brought the most democratic constitution and political environment to Turkey.

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<sup>334</sup> Sadik Balkan, Ahmet E. Uysal and Kemal H. Karpat. (trans.). (1961). Constitution of the Turkish Republic. Ankara. <http://www.anayasa.gen.tr/1961constitution-text.pdf>. 12.11.14.

<sup>335</sup> Article 1 declared that: “ the National Unity Committee exercises the right to sovereignty in the name of the Turkish nation, until such date as power shall be transferred to a new Turkish Grand National Assembly.” For more: William Hale. (2003). *Turkish Politics and the Military*. London: Routledge. pp. 123.

<sup>336</sup> *Idem*.

The attitude of the National Unity Committee towards the political parties was not positive at all and contrary to popular opinion, CHP did not welcome to the army. Ismet Inonu himself with the effect of his historical character was a serious factor which made the Committee uneasy.<sup>337</sup> For instance, Inonu constantly and strongly pressed the NUC for an immediate return to democracy<sup>338</sup> and he also tried to influence the Committee during the Yassiada Trials to survive Adnan Menderes and other two ministers. That is why the Committee did not trust CHP as it did not trust DP. Even if CHP was the only alternative choice for the power in the upcoming elections due to the dissolution of the Democratic Party by the NUC, general elections had been delayed until October 1961 to wait the foundations of new parties, the Justice Party and the New Turkey Party by the NUC which wanted to preserve its neutrality towards political parties.<sup>339</sup> Indeed, the Committee did not want to transfer its power to CHP with an easy victory. In this framework, as Kongar correctly underlined, it is impossible to consider the coup as a favor of the army for CHP.<sup>340</sup>

New constitution of the Second Turkish Republic which was accepted in a referendum in 9 July 1961 replacing the 1924 Constitution had declared Turkey to be a ‘social state’ involving many regulations which were also promised in the election bulletin of CHP in 1957.<sup>341</sup> The 1961 Constitution was a too long and detailed text which regulated many points in order to prevent an authoritarian administration like DP.<sup>342</sup> Among the 179 articles, the most outstanding part was the second one which regulated the fundamental rights and duties within a new perspective and started with the nature of the fundamental rights: “*Every individual is entitled, in virtue of his existence as a human being to fundamental rights and freedoms, which can not be*

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<sup>337</sup> Emre Kongar. (2003). *21. Yuzyilda Turkiye, 2000’li Yillarda Turkiye’nin Toplumsal Yapisi*. Istanbul: Remzi Yayinlari. pp. 159.

<sup>338</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 160.

<sup>339</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 159.

<sup>340</sup> *Idem.*

<sup>341</sup> Erik J. Zürcher. (2004). *Turkey, A Modern History*. London: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd. pp. 273.

<sup>342</sup> Cem Eroglu. (2007). *Anatuzeye Giris*. Ankara: Imaj Yayinlari. pp. 287.



*usurped, transferred or relinquished.*”<sup>343</sup> Political diversity was the momentous opportunity that the new constitution provided within its libertarian and democratic frame and previously unstated freedoms have been added to the list strengthening the guarantees dealing with the human rights to prevent possible future violations.<sup>344</sup> Similarly, social and economic rights and duties under the same part were the other crucial regulations such as the freedom of work and contract, provision of equity in wages, the right to establish trade unions, the right to bargain collectively and to strike, social security, the right to medical care, protection of agriculture and farmers.<sup>345</sup> Political parties were recognized as indispensable institutions of a democratic political life and they would be under the supervision of the Supreme Court which was also founded by the 1961 Constitution.<sup>346</sup> Bicameral system which was offered by CHP in 1957 was adopted and this sophisticated dual structure would work in harmony as the legislature. Power of the president of the republic was decreased and its connection with the Assembly was broken increasing the term of office as seven years. Besides all these constitutional democratic steps, regularizing the National Security Council appeared the undemocratic implementation of the

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<sup>343</sup> Sadik Balkan, Ahmet E. Uysal and Kemal H. Karpat. (trans.). (1961). Constitution of the Turkish Republic. Ankara. <http://www.anayasa.gen.tr/1961constitution-text.pdf>. 12.11.14.

<sup>344</sup> “Every Turk now has the right of equality before the law (Art. 12), immunity from unusual punishment (Art. 14), the inviolability of the person (Art. 15), the privacy of the domicile (Art. 16), freedom of communication (Art. 17), freedom of travel and residence (Art. 18), freedom of thought and faith (Art. 19-20), freedom of science and arts (Art. 21), freedom of press (Art. 22), the right to congregate and march in demonstration (Art. 28), the right to form associations (Art. 29), the freedom to seekone’s right (Art. 31), the right to prove the truth of an allegation (Art. 34)” For more: Joseph S. Szyliowicz. (1963). “The 1961 Turkish Constitution: An Analysis”. *Islamic Studies*. V. 2. N. 3. p. 366, 367. See also: Sadik Balkan, Ahmet E. Uysal and Kemal H. Karpat. (trans.). (1961). Constitution of the Turkish Republic. Ankara. <http://www.anayasa.gen.tr/1961constitution-text.pdf>. 12.11.14.

<sup>345</sup> Sadik Balkan, Ahmet E. Uysal and Kemal H. Karpat. (trans.). (1961). Constitution of the Turkish Republic. Ankara. <http://www.anayasa.gen.tr/1961constitution-text.pdf>. 12.11.14.

<sup>346</sup> Cem Eroglu. (2007). *Anatuzeye Giris*. Ankara: Imaj Yayinlari. pp. 291.

1961 Constitution.<sup>347</sup>

After the transfer of the administration and power to the civil government and with the normalization of the conditions with the effects of the new liberal constitution, under the most democratic atmosphere of Turkish political life, new parties which were from every scale of the political spectrum started to be founded and in few times many parties, trade unions, student organizations mushroomed. Freedom of association opened the doors of the streets and political platforms for the workers, civil servants and students. Agricultural mechanization which had led to rural-urban migration by 1950's and economic developments as a result of the industrialization had changed the profile of the cities.<sup>348</sup> Both the number of workers and political awareness of them were steadily increasing. New publications and translations of the books of prominent foreign philosopher, theorists and politicians deeply penetrated the people, in particular, students and workers. One of the most important developments of the 1960's was the awakening of the Left and leftist movements particularly with foundation of the Workers Party of Turkey (Turkiye Isci Partisi-TIP) in 1961 by a Marxist lawyer, Mehmet Ali Aybar and the Yön Movement which created the substructure of Kemalist and nationalist leftist tradition in Turkey. During the process of social and political awakening, TIP offered to increase popular participation in economic and social life as organized units and determined its program as favoring non-capitalist path of development and nationalization of various branches of the economy.<sup>349</sup> As a unitarian socialist party, it articulated trade union demands for land reforms or embracing the aspirations of the unsaid and ignored demands of the Kurdish minority.<sup>350</sup> It was absolutely new way to conceive the world for the people in Turkey however socialism of TIP had parallelism with the

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<sup>347</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 293.

<sup>348</sup> Atakan Hatipoğlu. (2012). *CHP'nin İdeolojik Dönüşümü: Kemalizmden Sosyal Demokrasiye*. İstanbul: Kaynak Yayinlari. pp. 238.

<sup>349</sup> Amy Austin Holmes. (2014). *Social Unrest and American Military Bases in Turkey and Germany since 1945*. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 63.

<sup>350</sup> Ahmet Samim. (1981). "The Tragedy of the Turkish Left". *New Left Review*. N. 126. pp. 68.

Kemalism within the frame of the modernization project and that is why by 1960's a new and socialist interpretation of Kemalism started to appear in the approaches of the Turkish left which wanted to attribute a leftist character to Kemalism. In this standpoint, weekly published Journal Yön (Direction) which was founded on December 1961 by Dogan Avcioglu had created a frame of the leftist approach of Kemalism or as Samim expressed a left-Kemalist substitutionalism which named as 'national democratic revolution'.<sup>351</sup> The aim of Yön was to establish the social justice in Turkey since they believed that social justice was the priority of socialism. Yön did not have an ideological unity even if there was a parallelism between the journal and TIP.<sup>352</sup> In this scope, the relations between Yön and left wing of CHP was also another crucial factor of the period and for the process of social democratization of CHP, Yön became a locomotive. For instance, according to Gerassimos, Yön had hoped to see its own socialist principles to be implemented in active politics via CHP and pragmatically for the left wing of CHP, the Journal could be the base of the party on the way of social democracy.<sup>353</sup> A unique socialist ideology which could be named as socialist nationalism or leftist-Kemalism was formed as result of new liberal atmosphere.

In the same years a group of rightist conservative academicians, journalists and writers also organized under an umbrella and convoked a Congress of the Nationalists in order to struggle against the Leftist ideology and prevent its expansion.<sup>354</sup> The major aim was to unite the Turkish right. All these were the first

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<sup>351</sup> *Idem.*

<sup>352</sup> Gülsüm Tütüncü Esmer. (2006). *CHP: 1965-1980 Türk Siyasal Yaşamında Ortanın Solu*. Antalya Yeniden Anadolu ve Rumeli Müdafaa-i Hukuk Yayınları. pp. 52.

<sup>353</sup> *Idem.*

<sup>354</sup> The principles which were adopted by TIP in the party program were in the same direction with the Declaration of Primary Targets of CHP in 1959 and moreover TIP's program referred the Kemalist principles that is why this new socialist party which was gradually growing and gaining legitimacy appeared as a threat for CHP and directed the party to take a more leftist position. For more: Gülsüm Tütüncü Esmer. (2006). *CHP: 1965-1980 Türk Siyasal Yaşamında Ortanın Solu*. Antalya Yeniden Anadolu ve Rumeli Müdafaa-i Hukuk Yayınları. pp. 58. See also: Tuncay Celen.

signals of upcoming left-right struggle and political and social crisis. Indeed, everyone from every scale of the political spectrum identified themselves as Kemalists however first time in Turkish history Mustafa Kemal and Kemalism were started to be criticized and interpreted. Moreover, all these new dynamics especially TIP's legitimacy which the masses recognized made CHP to criticize its own ideology and policies to save its strong status and that was the reason why the route of the party would be directed to left of centre from centre.<sup>355</sup>

### **3.2.2.The Era of Inonu Governments**

The first election after the coup had been held in 15 October 1961 with the participation of four political parties: The Republican People's Party, the Justice Party (Adalet Partisi - AP), the Republican Peasants Nationalist Party (Cumhuriyetçi Koylu Millet Partisi - CKMP) and the New Turkey Party (Yeni Türkiye Partisi - YTP). The results indicated an absolute defeat for CHP even if it was the first party of the election. There were at least one million more electorates and CHP was the most experience party of the system after the coup however it could receive just 36,7% of the votes with 173 seats against new party AP which gained 34,8% with 158 seats.<sup>356</sup> Within these results, a coalition should have been formed however CHP which was expected to be a part of the coalition was in trouble with internal conflicts. Most of the members of the party agreed for a serious change in the party due to unsuccessful result of the election and majority in the organization preferred the party to stay in opposition since a coalition which would be formed with AP naming 'national coalition' was not a good option for the party.<sup>357</sup> Despite the pressures by the members and decision which was taken by the Party Assembly to maintain its position in opposition if an opportunity could be found, Inonu would accept the

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(2011). *Denizler'den Terzi Fikri'ye Türkiye*. Ankara: Imge Yayinlari. pp. 65.

<sup>355</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 64.

<sup>356</sup> Hikmet Bila. (2008). *CHP, 1919-2009*. Istanbul: Dogan Yayinlari. pp. 166.

<sup>357</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 167.

request of Cemal Gursel who became the president of the Republic to form government as prime minister and CHP-AP coalition in 10 November 1961 came into power.

First Inonu coalition government had to confront with a counter-coup attempt which was planned by Colonel Talat Aydemir and his group demanding the continuation of the military intervention. As soon as the uprising in the army was suppressed, preparation which would pave the way for an amnesty for the democrats who were sentenced had been begun by the Government.<sup>358</sup> The program of the Government involved an expression which got negative reaction from the members of CHP that the expression of 'Ataturk's reforms' (Ataturk Islahatlari) was used rather than 'Ataturk's revolutions' (Ataturk devrimleri).<sup>359</sup> Moreover despite comprehensive promises which were asserted since 1957, just the issues on collective bargaining and right of strike had planned to be opened for the discussions in the Grand Assembly.<sup>360</sup> CHP members were deeply disturbed by concessive policies and attitudes of Inonu in the coalition against AP. Growing opposition inside the party against Inonu due to the policies of the coalition, heightened tension about the political amnesty -which particularly involved the prisoners of Yassiada Trials- and the conflicts between CHP and AP brought the end of the first Inonu government in 30 May 1962 despite the efforts of Inonu.

While the demands to stay in the opposition were voiced by many members included Bulent Ecevit, CHP became the part of a second coalition under the leadership of Ismet Inonu on June. Vote of confidence was taken in the party by Inonu however thirty one deputies who objected the coalition government in CHP appeared as an indication of a serious struggle. Moreover this deep conflict which would result with discharges or dissents of some members of the party had crystallized when seven deputies such as Kasim Gulek did not attend to the National

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<sup>358</sup> Emre Kongar. (2003). *21. Yuzyilda Turkiye, 2000'li Yillarda Turkiye'nin Toplumsal Yapisi*. Istanbul: Remzi Yayinlari. pp. 163.

<sup>359</sup> Hikmet Bila. (2008). *CHP, 1919-2009*. Istanbul: Dogan Yayinlari. pp. 168.

<sup>360</sup> *Idem*.

Grand Assembly for the vote of confidence of the new coalition.<sup>361</sup> Eventually just some days before the sixteenth Congress of CHP which would be held in 14 December 1962 Nihat Erim, Kasim Gulek, Avni Dogan and Turgut Gole were discharged from the party as a result of the investigation of the Discipline Council. The investigation in association with Turgut Gole was left in the process of investigation, however according to decision, other three members were not able to participate any meetings and Congress of CHP for a year. That was the reason why the struggle between three different factions -the supporters of Kasim Gulek and Nihat Erim, Third-Worldists and the followers of the Central Office of the Party.<sup>362</sup>- was apparently come out in the sixteenth Congress. Indeed, the factions and the rifts within CHP organization would not stop but increase and the 17<sup>th</sup> Congress would be held under a similar atmosphere. Eventually Inonu, himself would stress the necessity of a great purge in the party and expressed his opinion: “I do not have to work with those who caused breakdown of the solidarity.”<sup>363</sup> Besides all these left wing of the party had started to have a voice in the organization more than before and the party was in an ideological transformation process which became concrete in the rifts within the party. However CHP still had a trouble to express itself in front of the people. It became sort of a party of intellectuals and moved with a perception of ‘going down to the level of the people’. However this view was the reason of a great change which was seen an urgent need by the leftist factions of the party since the historical character of Inonu and this elite structure of CHP could never bring the power. It would not be a rejection of the past or the values of the past but it would be the critiques of the past reviewing it.<sup>364</sup>

The first Five Year Plan which called for a rapid industrialization based on model of import substitution and the rights<sup>365</sup> of workers were adopted in 1963 by

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<sup>361</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 170.

<sup>362</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 174.

<sup>363</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 177.

<sup>364</sup> İsmail Cem. (1970). *Türkiye Üzerine Araştırmalar*. İstanbul: Cem Yayinlari. pp. 83.

<sup>365</sup> Feroz Ahmad. (2012). *Modern Türkiye'nin Oluşumu*. İstanbul: Kaynak Yayinlari. pp. 160.

the second coalition government of Inonu. In the same term, Talat Aydemir had tried an other counter-coup attempt which was suppressed by the government. Second coalition which lost its efficiency ended after the victory of AP in by-election of 16 November 1963 with resignation of Ismet Inonu.

Third government after the 1961 Election was once more formed by Inonu who took the absolute support of CHP organization with the Independents. However this new coalition was formed under the shadow of the Cyprus crisis which would create an anti-American atmosphere in Turkey due to the reaction of US through the letter of the President Johnson. Despite unstable political conditions of Turkey, Turkey attempted an operation in Cyprus as a guarantor state basing the Guarantee Agreement of 1960 to stop violence and crisis in Cyprus however, Johnson warned Turkey by a menacing letter which briefly warned Turkey not to act without consulting with the United States and reminded the responsibilities of the Turks within NATO and UN.<sup>366</sup> This was a turning point in Turkish-American relations which had affected the public opinion and damaged trustfulness of US in the eyes of Turkey and Inonu stated that: “*The United States prevented the Turkish operation in Cyprus. I had believed in the leadership of US in the Western Alliance but now I am suffering as a result of their attitude.*”<sup>367</sup> Inonu would continued to give another answer to the letter in his interview to the Time even if it would not any effect on the US policy: “*If our allies do not change their attitude, the Western alliance will break up and then a new kind of world order will be established under new conditions, and in this world Turkey will find itself a place.*”<sup>368</sup> In 1964 another turning point of the Turkish political history was with the rise of a new political figure, Suleyman Demirel who became the leader of AP in 29 November 1964. Demirel would be a

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<sup>366</sup> Jacob M. Landau. (1974). “Johnson’s 1964 Letter to Inonu and the Greek Lobbying At the White House”. *The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations*. Ankara University Press. V. 14. pp. 46.

<sup>367</sup> Hikmet Bila. (2008). *CHP, 1919-2009*. Istanbul: Dogan Yayinlari. pp. 179.

<sup>368</sup> Turgut Akgul. (2004). “An Analysis of the 1964 Johnson Letter: Lessons for the 2003 Iraq Crisis, Turkish-American Relations and Global Power /regional Partner Interactions”. *Master Thesis in Naval Postgraduate School*. California. pp. 75, 80.

unifier for the democrats and make the Grand Assembly to trust him for bringing a stability to the country.<sup>369</sup> When the results of the vote of the budget declared with 225 negative votes in 13 February 1965, the third Inonu government had come to an end and indeed this was the last term of Ismet Inonu as prime minister.

### **3.2.3.A New Ideology: The Concept of 'Left of Centre'**

The critiques for the ambiguity of economical and political perceptions and ideological stance of CHP were frequently voiced by both internal and external dynamics and furthermore giving a new direction to the party was the major severe issue which were maintained to be discussed by the administrative cadres of CHP since the beginning of the 1960's.<sup>370</sup> Entity of AP and TIP had forced CHP to define itself within new ideological frame. First of all, six arrows were confirmed and adopted by almost every parties and secondly, Kemalism had become an inclusive ideology which both leftists and rightists could give a meaning according to their views and define themselves Kemalists within their own approach to it. That was the reason why there was an ambiguity about the political stance of CHP which was also defined itself as Kemalist. While the party was looking for a solution, just some months before the Election of 1965, Ismet Inonu identified both his political stance and CHP's place in the political spectrum in 'the left of the centre' and the name of the new approach of CHP which indicated an evolution in the ideological level of the party -but it was not taken into consideration as a complete or revolutionary change in the ideology for CHP, as Ayse Gunes Ayata correctly underlined, it was an effort to redefine of Kemalist approach within new concepts of liberal Constitution of 1961-<sup>371</sup> was finally named and voiced. According to Inonu, CHP should have struggled

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<sup>369</sup> Emre Kongar. (2003). *21. Yuzyilda Turkiye, 2000'li Yillarda Turkiye'nin Toplumsal Yapisi*. Istanbul: Remzi Yayinlari. pp. 164.

<sup>370</sup> Atakan Hatipoğlu. (2012). *CHP'nin İdeolojik Dönüşümü: Kemalizmden Sosyal Demokrasiye*. İstanbul: Kaynak Yayinlari. pp. 246.

<sup>371</sup> Ayse Gunes Ayata. (1995). "Turkiye'nin Demokratikleşme Sürecinde Ortanın Solu Hareketi". *SBF*



with the people who stood against the reforms of the Republic and conservatism as a concept but at the same time CHP should have been also in a struggle with the left. In other words, the party would give up being a radical centrist which tried to be effective in both left and right and it would approach to the left of the center.<sup>372</sup> Indeed, in addition to its efforts to be ideologically against rightist AP, expanding new working classes of the cities and strong support to TIP by the intellectuals and young people which were crucial segments as electorates for CHP were the other significant features which directed CHP to use a new rhetoric.<sup>373</sup> A reformist party which was the locomotive of the Turkish Revolution should not have fallen behind the times being conservative. Therefore re-reading of Kemalism through leftist perceptions under the influence of the current leftist political wave and defining the party ideology within the scope of the new liberal concepts were the steps brought CHP to the left of the center. In this framework, Inonu pointed that statism, secularism and populism which were the three principles of the six arrows meant nothing but the left of the center and therefore CHP's stance in the political spectrum had been actually in the left of the center since 1920's when the principles emerged: *"Indeed we have been in the left of the center since we declared that we have been secularists. If you are populist, you are in the left of the center."*<sup>374</sup> It was kind of a third way which Inonu showed as the most appropriate choice for the stability of the political system since it would be the only political perception to keep the country far away from extreme ends such as communism and fascism. CHP was the guarantee of Turkey as being in the left of the center of the political spectrum.<sup>375</sup>

The left of the center was adopted as the major character of the Turkish state by the party. Exactly in this point etatist perception had once more appeared in its

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*Journal*. V. 50. N. 3. pp. 82.

<sup>372</sup> Hikmet Bila. (2008). *CHP, 1919-2009*. Istanbul: Dogan Yayinlari. pp. 182.

<sup>373</sup> Toktamis Ates. (2012). "Kapikulu Kavraminin Dunu ve Bugunu". *DergiPark*. Istanbul: Istanbul University. <http://www.journals.istanbul.edu.tr/iuifm/article/view/1023012579>. pp. 94.

<sup>374</sup> Hikmet Bila. (2008). *CHP, 1919-2009*. Istanbul: Dogan Yayinlari. pp. 184.

<sup>375</sup> *Idem*.

discourses because CHP still tried to show itself as a reflection of state stressing this new approach which would turn into an ideology not just a character of CHP but also of the state. The major reason of this approach usually became concrete on the personality of Inonu deriving from his historical perception and political tradition which he adopted.<sup>376</sup> Besides all these, the historical mission of CHP was being gradually transformed from ‘surviving the state’ into ‘surviving the democracy’ by 1960’s. It was the process of gaining a social democratic identity even if the party maintained to keep its etatist character which is actually the distinctive feature of the centrist parties in Turkey.

The Election bulletin in 1965 was the first text which created a frame for the left of the center that now became the election slogan. CHP had promised the people to improve living and working conditions making many significant reforms from land reform and village and villagers development to elimination of the inter-regional imbalances which included a program of economic development to benefit all classes particularly expressing for the East of the country giving priority to the East among the others.<sup>377</sup> All these would be done within a democratic system. Three different brochures which were respectively named as “*What did CHP do for public service?*”, “*Major Principles of CHP: Statism and Populism*” and “*Populist Policy of CHP in the Field of Social Security*” were published and handed out in addition to the election bulletin.<sup>378</sup> While CHP was trying to catch the leftist votes presenting itself progressive, AP remained an anti-communist propaganda during the election campaign. The main slogan of the AP under the leadership of Süleyman Demirel was “We are in the right of the center and on the path of the God” (Ortanın

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<sup>376</sup> For instance, Inonu himself expressed that both state and constitution were in the direction of the left of the centre as well as CHP. For more: *Idem*.

<sup>377</sup> Gülsüm Tütüncü Esmer. (2006). *CHP: 1965-1980 Türk Siyasal Yaşamında Ortanın Solu*. Antalya Yeniden Anadolu ve Rumeli Müdafaa-i Hukuk Yayinlari. pp. 66. See also: Hikmet Bila. (2008). *CHP, 1919-2009*. Istanbul: Dogan Yayinlari. pp. 185; Clement Henry Dodd. (1969). *Politics and Government in Turkey*. California: University of California Press. pp. 139.

<sup>378</sup> *Idem*.

Sağındayız, Allah'ın Yolundayız) taking a position against CHP with the slogan of the left of the centre.<sup>379</sup> Moreover AP had accused CHP of standing close to communism and launched a counter attack with the slogan of “ Left of the centre is the road to Moscow” (Ortanın Solu, Moskova Yolu).<sup>380</sup> In 10 October 1965, the Election which was one of the most democratic election of Turkish political history resulted with a defeat for CHP with 28,7% of the votes and 134 seats and unarguable great victory of AP with 52,9% and 240 seats.<sup>381</sup> TIP also succeeded to be in the Assembly with its 14 deputies gaining 3%. The main and most concrete reason of the defeat for CHP arose from bad experiences of previous unstable coalitions which CHP played the main role.<sup>382</sup> People in Turkey had voted with the desire of stability in the political system and furthermore, it was also a reaction of the people which could be showed in the first opportunity to protest undemocratic and unfair actions of the Coup -particularly referring the executions-. Perhaps, as Bila underlined, it was kind of a ‘coup of the vote’ which was made by the people bringing AP, the successor of DP, to the power.<sup>383</sup>

The Election of 1965 was the beginning of big debates inside CHP. According to many members and some prominent figures of the leader cadre, the slogan of the left of center was the reason of the defeat in the election and according to some others, new strategy should have been supported but in the election period, it could not be explained to the people well.<sup>384</sup> In this framework, the main opposition had

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<sup>379</sup> Banu Eligür. (2010). *The Mobilization of Political Islam in Turkey*. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 63.

<sup>380</sup> *Idem*.

<sup>381</sup> Ayşe Gunes Ayata. (2010). *CHP, Orgut ve Ideoloji*. Istanbul: Gundogan. pp. 92.

<sup>382</sup> Toktamis Ates. (2012). “Kapikulu Kavraminin Dunu ve Bugunu”. *DergiPark*. Istanbul: Istanbul University. <http://www.journals.istanbul.edu.tr/iuifm/article/view/1023012579>. pp. 95.

<sup>383</sup> Hikmet Bila. (2008). *CHP, 1919-2009*. Istanbul: Dogan Yayinlari. pp. 185.

<sup>384</sup> For instance, Mumtaz Soysal had written in 16 October 1965 in *Akis* that the thing which caused a defeat for CHP in the election was the concept of the ‘left’ of the centre conversely this concept should have been used in an earlier date to gain a victory. Similarly Sadun Tanju showed his support to the left of the centre in *Yön* that CHP had defended the modern state and its

arisen from Turhan Feyzioglu who was one of the major figure of right wing of the party and his group which was called as ‘Sekizler’ (Eights). Despite his tendency to the Right, he was not against new strategy in the beginning conversely he defined the left of the center as a new approach to the statism which should have been supported. Indeed, before the election, Feyzioglu was offered to be responsible for running the campaign of new strategy, left of center however he rejected this offer because ‘left’ as a concept was the thing which Feyzioglu tried to avoid using it even while he was speaking in favor of the left of the center.<sup>385</sup> Under these circumstances, rising young figure, Bulent Ecevit who had been already in the left wing of the party would take the responsibility for the leadership of the campaign.<sup>386</sup> In this point, it should be underlined that Turhan Feyzioglu and Bulent Ecevit who worked together in many specific issues inside the party were competitors for the position of the leadership of CHP after Inonu and as Ciddi noted, Feyzioglu’s opposition which became concrete as a result of the rise of Ecevit in the 18<sup>th</sup> Congress of the party in 1966 was personal rather than ideological.<sup>387</sup> Similarly, both Uluc Gurkan, former deputy of the Democratic Left Party (DSP-Demokratik Sol Parti) and Hakki Suha Okay, former deputy of CHP underlined Feyzioglu saw Ecevit as a rival.<sup>388</sup>

Inonu was a strong supporter of the left of the center however as long as the discussions were intensified on this issue and the conflict deepened, the decision of Ismet Inonu as a distinctive factor gained importance. Ecevit’s efforts to explain the strategy and create an ideological frame to make the concept much more clear to be

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responsibilities towards the people with the slogan of the left of the centre in this election. For more Gurkan Bozkir. (2005). “Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi’nde Bulent Ecevit ve Orta’nin Solu Dusuncesi”. *Cagdas Turkiye Tarihi Arastirmalari Dergisi*. Dokuz Eylul Universitesi Atatürk İlkeleri ve Inkilap Tarihi Enstitusu. V. 4. N. 11. pp. 233.

<sup>385</sup> Gülsüm Tütüncü Esmir. (2006). *CHP: 1965-1980 Türk Siyasal Yaşamında Ortanın Solu*. Antalya Yeniden Anadolu ve Rumeli Müdafaa-i Hukuk Yayinlari. pp. 91.

<sup>386</sup> *Idem*.

<sup>387</sup> Sinan Ciddi. (2009). *Kemalism in Turkish Politics: The Republican People’s Party, Secularism and Nationalism*. New York: Routledge. pp. 61.

<sup>388</sup> Interview with Uluc Gurkan and Hakki Suha Okay. Spring 2008.

conceived made him come to the fore inside the party. He was attending almost every meetings and congresses in various cities of the country acting such a secretary general. The supporters of the left of the center tried to direct CHP to be a Western style social democratic party which was aware of the reality of Turkey and according to Ecevit, the left of the center was a constitutional movement and democracy in Turkey should have been social democracy since the state was a social state.<sup>389</sup> Ecevit and his group believed in the power of this discourse and thus despite the attacks which intensified in his political stance, Ecevit as the leader of this movement continued to speak about the left of the center when everyone preferred to stay silent. Feyzioglu and the opponents of the left of center which were also ready to compromise with the AP Government accused Ecevit of dragging the party into socialism. In this framework, Inonu stressed that CHP was not a socialist party just as Kasim Gulek stated in the same period and Inonu added: *“I initially expressed the left of the center and I specified the limits of it. The program and the principles of CHP determine its place in the political spectrum. The left of the center can not be interpreted apart from the six arrows and implemented as a new ideology.”*<sup>390</sup> Besides these, Inonu also opened the door for social democracy comparing CHP with the social democratic parties.<sup>391</sup> Indeed, all the efforts of Inonu was for defending the left of the center because he decided to stand behind his word adopting the left of the center as the ideological stance of CHP. Herein the problem occurred in the point of ideology that while the left of center was taken into consideration as re-reading of Kemalism within new leftist concepts and Inonu was insistingly rejecting to indicate it as a new ideology, the way that they presented it pointed nothing but something new. This was the dilemma of this period for CHP and it would be resolved after Ecevit took the power with the discourse of ‘democratic left’ which will be discussed

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<sup>389</sup> Hikmet Bila. (2008). *CHP, 1919-2009*. Istanbul: Dogan Yayinlari. pp. 190.

<sup>390</sup> Gülsüm Tütüncü Esmel. (2006). *CHP: 1965-1980 Türk Siyasal Yaşamında Ortanın Solu*. Antalya Yeniden Anadolu ve Rumeli Müdafaa-i Hukuk Yayinlari. pp. 79.

<sup>391</sup> Inonu referred the anti-communist character of social democratic parties which enable to make a comparison with CHP. For more: *Ibid.*, pp. 78.

in the next title. Under these conditions, just some days before the 18<sup>th</sup> Congress, Ismet Inonu would speak harshly against the opponents referring to Feyzioglu and his group: “*Although they understand well, they will not want to understand since they stand against obligatory social and economic reforms in our program and election bulletin and that is why they will lose their positions and roles inside the party.*”<sup>392</sup> In 18 October 1966 the 18<sup>th</sup> Congress had started in a strained atmosphere and rifts within the party transformed into a war between the factions. While the opponents were just successful to persuade the others to adopt and record that CHP was not a socialist party, the left of the center had gained its first victory in this Congress. The booklet of ‘The left of the Center’ which was written by Bulent Ecevit was handed out in the beginning of the Congress and the delegates could find opportunity to read it and conceive what the left of the center exactly meant and referred. Indeed, this booklet was another successful effort of Bulent Ecevit which made his star shining. The left of the center was accepted as the official ideology of CHP and Ecevit was elected as the secretary general proving his potential to be a strong candidate for the leadership of CHP by the delegates. It was an absolute victory of Ecevit in the competition between Ecevit and Feyzioglu who would resign with other 33 deputies despite Inonu’s efforts to keep the party united and integrated in 28 April 1967 in the 4<sup>th</sup> Extraordinary Congress.

The framework of the ideology was drawn up by Bulent Ecevit in the booklet of ‘*the Left of the Center*’. In the preface of the booklet, Bulent Ecevit expressed his goal as an effort to explain a philosophy of humanity and a new political behavior but not to create a scientific study.<sup>393</sup> The first question Ecevit’s booklet set out to answer was why CHP should have been in the left of the center of the political spectrum. For the parties in the extreme right, democracy was just a tool which they prefer to use when they needed otherwise democracy which could raise awareness of the people for freedom, equality, social justice was one of the most dangerous

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<sup>392</sup> Hikmet Bila. (2008). *CHP, 1919-2009*. Istanbul: Dogan Yayinlari. pp. 190.

<sup>393</sup> Bulent Ecevit. (1966). *Ortanin Solu*. Ankara: Tekin Yayinlari. pp. 7.

thing.<sup>394</sup> Those who were in the right of the center were the conservatives of the political spectrum and they abstained the changes and reforms which could affect the social structure. Furthermore, according to their view, social justice and state's intervention in the economic and social life were major obstacles for development of the country.<sup>395</sup> While central parties adopted more passive character even if they supported the change and democracy, the extreme leftists of the political spectrum preferred to use democracy as long as they needed just like the extreme rightists and they supported nationalization of the entire economic life which would create a powerful state.<sup>396</sup> Within this scope, besides the others, those who were in the left of the center had distinctive features:

*“-They were humanists focusing on the equality of opportunity.*

*-They were populists considering the interest of the people as whole rather than protecting the interests and rights of a specific class.*

*-They were progressive, revolutionists and reformists.*

*-They were statist which assumed the state for the people's service not the opposite and they did not adopt an absolute nationalization of means of production and reject private enterprise. However, state should have controlled the economic activities and private enterprise should have been responsible for regulation and running economic activities for the good of the people within the framework of social justice.*

*-They supported the social justice and social security.*

*-They were great planner in order to direct economic activities for the benefit of the society considering the social justice.*

*-They deeply believed in freedom.*

*-They were in the side of social democracy.”<sup>397</sup>*


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<sup>394</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 20.

<sup>395</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 22.

<sup>396</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 27.

<sup>397</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 24-26.



It is essential to regard published manifestos as of the 13<sup>th</sup> Congress for the emergence of the left of the center. Particularly, the Declaration of First Targets which constitute the political substructure in 1959, the Declaration of Primary Targets which included the economic frame of the ideology in 1961 and finally the Ideal of Progressive Turkey which set a new social substructure and relations in 1964 were the pillars of the left of the center.<sup>398</sup>

The left of the center was a constitutional movement which would have to be reflected to the people for social and economic development. It was a new approach but also a new ideology contrary to the general perception of Inonu and some other members of CHP. Because first of all, the left of the center offered an economic program which Kemalism could not completely and successfully draw up. Secondly, the populism in the left of the center was different from the one in Kemalism due to its approaches to the class perception. Moreover, while ideologies have international character which can influence many people in various places of the world and unite them under a thought system, Kemalism is an ideology having influence on Turkish society. That is why Kemalism can be taken into consideration as a thought system

<sup>398</sup> Gülsüm Tütüncü Esmer. (2006). *CHP: 1965-1980 Türk Siyasal Yaşamında Ortanın Solu*. Antalya Yeniden Anadolu ve Rumeli Müdafaa-i Hukuk Yayinlari. pp. 62-63.



but it can not involve all the characteristic to be an ideology. In this point the left of center which pointed social democracy, appeared as an ideology that CHP was adopted under unique conditions of Turkey combining the Kemalist principles with social democracy. Thirdly, Kemalism had an elitist structure as superstructural revolution but the left of the center which would be transformed to democratic left adopted the substructural revolution as its conceptual means. For instance according to Ecevit, during one-party period, CHP had internal dilemmas which prevented a substructural revolution and thus even if Mustafa Kemal tended to make a land reform, it was blocked by some groups of the party involving bureaucrats and propertied classes which wanted to conserve their privileged positions.<sup>399</sup> That is why Ecevit found the development in the early period very superficial.<sup>400</sup> For him, revolutionism of the period of Ataturk was very formalist and it could not be anything more than being patron of the people which looked down on the people.<sup>401</sup> Besides these critiques, those who were in the left of the center conceived Kemalism as an ever-changing ideology and made a new interpretation compromising with social democracy. Mustafa Kemal Ataturk had completed the concrete side of the revolution with superstructural revolutions and it was a permanent revolution and it was the time to perform substructural revolution.<sup>402</sup> Moving from this point of view, CHP with the left of the center and then the democratic left, gave up to go down to the level of the people and adopted to go to the people to destroy its old unpopular image and the perception of cold face of the state. However as Ecevit underlined, “*when CHP went to the people, it would have to have not just the hand to thrust out but also a word to tell*”.<sup>403</sup>

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<sup>399</sup> Bulent Ecevit. (1968). *Bu Duzen Degismelidir*. Ankara:Tekin Yayıncılık. pp. 215.

<sup>400</sup> Bulent Ecevit. (1970). *Ataturk ve Devrimcilik*. Istanbul: Tekin Yayıncılık. pp. 61.

<sup>401</sup> Atakan Hatipoğlu. (2012). *CHP'nin İdeolojik Dönüşümü: Kemalizmden Sosyal Demokrasiye*. İstanbul: Kaynak Press. pp. 261.

<sup>402</sup> Bulent Ecevit. (1970). *Ataturk ve Devrimcilik*. Istanbul: Tekin Yayıncılık. pp. 17. See also: Bulent Ecevit. (December 1962). “Ataturk ve Doktrin”. *Forum*. N. 237.

<sup>403</sup> Bulent Ecevit. (1966). *Ortanin Solu*. Ankara: Tekin Yayinlari. pp. 101.

### **3.3.From 'Left-of-Centre' to the 'Democratic Left': New CHP Under the Leadership of Ecevit**

The new ideology, left-of-center, was a beginning of fundamental transformation from CHP's elitist character into a populist organization which would act as catch-all party to expand its grass-root in order to increase its chances to reach the power through democratic means.<sup>404</sup> In this framework, upcoming general election which would be held in 1969 was very crucial. The Government under the leadership of Demirel drew up a budget in February 1968 for the second period of the legislative year and it was taken to the Assembly for vote of the budget. On the behalf of CHP, Bulent Ecevit made a speech in the Assembly in order to specify the view and critiques of the party in association with the budget and afterwards this speech was published into the book of '*Bu Duzen Degismelidir (This order should change)*' by Bulent Ecevit. Primary problems of the country were also analyzed within the frame of left-of-center attitude of the party considering for the resolutions as an additional part of the book. Indeed, it was a document which would also include fundamental dynamics of CHP's program and bulletin for upcoming election.

According to Ecevit, AP could realize the realities and conceive main problems of the country after it came to power and that was the reason why the second five-year plan was prepared. However conservative character of the Justice Party was the biggest obstacle to run radical policies to transform the social and economic structure and it could be explicitly observed in various implementations of AP Government. Herein, Ecevit comprehensively indicated those problems and the policies of AP with different examples involving issues such as regulation of fishery, land regulation, impoverishment of the villagers and etc. in his book of '*Bu Duzen Degismelidir*'<sup>405</sup> This ruined order should have been changed but this change did not mean the change of the constitution as AP claimed conversely the Constitution

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<sup>404</sup> Frank Tachau. (2002). "Bulent Ecevit: From Idealist to Pragmatist". (ed.). Metin Heper and Sabri Sayari. *Political Leaders and Democracy in Turkey*. US: Lexington Books. pp. 110.

<sup>405</sup> Bulent Ecevit. (1968). *Bu Duzen Degismelidir*. Ankara:Tekin Yayincilik. pp. 14.

included some significant points like the Article 37 (referring land reform) or the Article 41 (private enterprise as duty of the state) which had not been implemented yet and CHP wanted the change of the order to reach the Constitutional targets. Current economic and social order was something different from what the Constitution necessitated and from CHP's point of view, this gap should have been closed.<sup>406</sup> In this point, CHP saw and presented itself as the only choice which could change the order with its consolidated organizational structure and internal consistency after it completed its own internal structural transformation with the left of the center.<sup>407</sup> However rifts within the party still continued and the party organization was really needed to be consolidated purging the separatist factions from the party. Although Ecevit was re-elected as the Secretary General and the left of the center could be once again taken confirmation by the party in 19<sup>th</sup> Congress in October 1968, Kemal Satir and Nihat Erim who became the group deputy chairmen after Feyzioglu and Incesulu were forced to resign in the 4<sup>th</sup> Extraordinary Congress appeared as the focus of the opposition against Ecevit and the left of the center. Inonu preferred to maintain a balance policy placing the former prominent figures in the Central Executive Committee however at the end of the Congress, even if the fixed list which was drawn up by Inonu and Ecevit was elected for the Party Assembly, the result was far away from Inonu's expectation since elected members of the Central Executive Committee were mostly from the Ecevit's group.<sup>408</sup> It was a serious indication that Inonu lost his significance as a factor which could direct the organization. At the same time it was the indication of development of intra-party democracy.

Left-of-center now had a serious support of the Youth branches and the

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<sup>406</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 84.

<sup>407</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 216.

<sup>408</sup> Hikmet Bila. (2008). *CHP, 1919-2009*. Istanbul: Dogan Yayinlari. pp. 200. See also: Gurcan Bozkir. (2005). "Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi'nde Bulent Ecevit ve Orta'nin Solu Dusuncesi". *Cagdas Turkiye Tarihi Arastirmalari Dergisi*. Dokuz Eylul Universitesi Ataturk Ilkeleri ve Inkilap Tarihi Enstitusu. V. 4. N. 11. pp. 243.

Women's branch of the party. For instance, the Youth branches actively joined the discussions in the 19<sup>th</sup> Congress and became vigorous advocate of new ideology with their bulletin which was published during the Congress in order to show determination not to give an inch from supporting the left of the center which had anti-imperialist, anti-feudal and anti-bureaucrat characters.<sup>409</sup> In fact, CHP should have determined a way to go ahead in order to solve its internal problems and this way was the way of the people or in other word, it was the way of the left of the center which aimed to act '*for the people with the people*' formulating pro-underprivileged people perception which gave concrete meaning to the slogan of left-of-center -Ergil noted it as pro-working class ideology rather than pro-underprivileged people perception. However CHP was not a class based party and the actual emphasis of Ecevit and the left of the center was on the underprivileged people not working class just like PASOK which was discussed in the previous chapter. Working class was just a part of the underprivileged people and it was used as discourse within a populist view. That is the reason why Ergil also underlined in the following sentence pro-working class discourse could not be put into political action by CHP-.<sup>410</sup>

Polarization of the Turkish society dragged the country into an undeclared civil war which AP Government policies also induced. Particularly, from 1968 to 1971 clashes between ideologically opposing groups such as left-right; left-radical islamists or intra-organizational struggles in the left and right due to the splits heightened the tension and disturbances became wider, frequent and more violent.<sup>411</sup> Under these conditions, the Sixth Fleet of the United States which visited Istanbul became the target of the Turkish student and youth demonstrators. Anti-US attitude of the society which emerged particularly after the Johnson Letter and Cyprus issue

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<sup>409</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 199.

<sup>410</sup> Dogu Ergil. (1975). "Class Conflict and Turkish Transformation (1950-1975)". *Studia Islamica*. N. 41. pp. 151.

<sup>411</sup> Jacob M. Landau. (1974). *Radical Politics in Modern Turkey*. Leiden: Brill, Jerusalem Academic Press. pp. 36.

resulted in the attacks to the Sixth Fleet which started in 1967 and continued until 1969. Demonstrators were interacting with the soldiers by stealing their caps, throwing red color to their uniforms in the streets and even driving them into the sea by force with the slogan of ‘Yankee, go home!’.<sup>412</sup> Furthermore, the attitude of Turkish Government towards the Sixth Fleet events had been shaped in favor of USA. Suleyman Demirel warned: “*Adopting a hostile attitude towards our friend is nothing but a big shame. Turkey can not stay alone isolating itself from rest of the world*”.<sup>413</sup> Similarly Cevdet Sunay, the president of the Republic and former Chief of the General Staff, went further and defined the visit of the Fleet to its ally, Turkey, as a need and obligation for USA.<sup>414</sup> All these speeches caused a steady increase in the number of the demonstrations and organizations. In 16 February 1969, a tragic event which would be remembered as ‘Bloody Sunday’ emerged in Istanbul between leftist group which were protesting the sixth Fleet and rightist National Turkish Student Union which also had islamist character. When the members of the National Turkish Student Union attacked the demonstrators who were protesting the sixth Fleet with knives and other fatal objects, police was silent and reluctant to interfere the events. Bloody Sunday was the end of the protests of the sixth Fleet however it was not the end of the demonstrations and disturbances. As Ahmad emphasized it was an example of organized and fascist violence.<sup>415</sup> ANT gave a headline in 25 February 1969 calling the end of the ‘bloody’ Government and underlined the difference of this tragic event from other accustomed left-right conflicts pointing its connection with the Wall Street, Pentagon, Saudi Arabia and Ankara.<sup>416</sup> In the same volume, Yasar Kemal who was the prominent writer wrote a column with the title of

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<sup>412</sup> Amy Austin Holmes. (2014). *Social Unrest and American Military Bases in Turkey and Germany since 1945*. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 70.

<sup>413</sup> ANT. “Mustafa Kemal’e Ihanet”. (3 September 1968).. pp 4

<sup>414</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 5.

<sup>415</sup> Feroz Ahmad. (1977). *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy: 1940-1975*. USA: Westview Press. pp. 381.

<sup>416</sup> ANT. “Yeter Artik Bu Kanli Iktidar”. (25 February 1969). pp. 4.

'Mosques became military barracks'.<sup>417</sup> Under this atmosphere, the Federation of the Revolutionary Youth of Turkey (*Türkiye Devrimci Gençlik Federasyonu-Dev-Genc*) which was a political youth organization with a Marxist ideology would be established in the Autumn of 1969 and it would serve as a sort of roof-organization for several revolutionary youth group. Despite its brief existence, this locomotive Federation of the leftist movement indicated a kind of unity of the left which increased organized and large marches and protests.<sup>418</sup>

While Demirel was losing power and his legitimacy, CHP was discussing the amnesty for the members of the Democratic Party which were banned from the politics. Before the election, the messages of Bulent Ecevit to the people did not just concentrate on the land reform and consolidation of social justice but also the amnesty stressing the protection of the rights and freedom. Therefore, he run the campaign for restitution of political rights of the members of DP. Inonu and Ecevit had supported the amnesty. While Inonu stated he would survive the man in the well, Ecevit saw the issue crucial for democracy: "*If we want to save our future, we should forget the past... Perhaps, we will lose in the election because we suggest to heal the wounds of the past but no matter what happens, we will do it*".<sup>419</sup> CHP had asked the people for authorization with the slogan of '*land belongs to those who till it; water to those who use it*'. This order should have been changed and that was the reason why the election bulletin in 1969 was for a 'change' of current order. CHP promised many significant reforms to develop the conditions of underprivileged people underlining social justice, redistribution of income, land reform which could transform the rural, development of the villages and villagers, comprehensive education reform, elimination of inter-regional imbalances and etc.<sup>420</sup> The Election of 1969 was held in

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<sup>417</sup> Yasar Kemal. (25 February 1969). "Camiler Kislâ Oldu". ANT. pp. 5.

<sup>418</sup> Jacob M. Landau. (1974). *Radical Politics in Modern Turkey*. Leiden: Brill, Jerusalem Academic Press. pp. 40.

<sup>419</sup> Orhan Kologlu. (2001). *Kim Bu Ecevit?*. Istanbul: Boyut Yayıncılık. pp. 327.

<sup>420</sup> CHP Düzen Değişikliği Programı. (1969). Ankara: Ulusal Basımevi. See also: Milliyet. (21 August 1969). p. 4.; Milliyet. (10 September 1969). pp. 4. Milliyet. (14 September 1969). pp. 4.

12 October 1969 and it was once again a fiasco for CHP with its 27,4% of the votes and 143 of the seats. AP gained another victory with 46,6% and 256 seats. Feyzioglu's new party, the Republican Reliance Party (Cumhuriyetçi Güven Partisi-CGP) gained 6,6%. The election of 1969 had re-opened the debates for the left of the center in CHP and Kemal Satir was playing the main role in the opposition against Ecevit but in this time, there was an important dynamic which differentiated the discussions: Inonu-Ecevit conflict and Inonu's opposition.

	15 October 1961		10 October 1965		12 October 1969	
Political Parties	Votes %	Seats	Votes %	Seats	Votes %	Seats
Justice Party	34.8	158	52.9	240	46.5	256
Republican People's Party	36.7	173	28.7	134	27.4	143

Table. VII. Election Results of Years Between 1961 and 1969

Source: State Institute of Statistics

Anti-Ecevit campaign under the leadership of Kemal Satir began immediately after the Election of 1969. In the same period Kasim Gulek who was discharged from the party requested to return CHP and Satir supported his return signing his application. Indeed, this was the part of Satir's strategy to dismiss Ecevit: Kemal Satir, Nihat Erim and Kasim Gulek, three prominent and experienced figures would gather and followers of these three names would cause the fall of Ecevit in the next party Congress. During this anti-Ecevit campaign, they criticized Bulent Ecevit through his speeches about Mustafa Kemal.<sup>421</sup> According to Erim, the Secretary General of CHP could not criticize Ataturk and nobody could reject the past which Ataturk and Inonu existed. Moreover Nihat Erim showed the character of the competition which was more personal than ideological such as the case of

<sup>421</sup> Hikmet Bila. (2008). *CHP, 1919-2009*. Istanbul: Dogan Yayinlari. pp. 203.

Feyzioglu: “*The words that you said like a third man do not magnify you but disgrace.*”<sup>422</sup> In the end of the 1969, Inonu still kept maintaining his balance policy protecting Ecevit and the left of the center but also not criticizing the intra-party opposition. However Ecevit insisted in his stance: “*I agree with what I have said until today. Ataturk should not be considered like a god. If he was alive today, he could go further than his reforms. He could not reach the substructural revolutions and now we will do it.*”<sup>423</sup>

The 20<sup>th</sup> Congress started with the rifts in 3 July 1970. While the opponents were expecting the end of Ecevit as the Secretary General because of unsuccessful result in the election, it resulted in the victory of the left of the center. There were two lists for the Party Assembly: The list of Ecevit and the list of Satir. At the end of the Congress, Kemal Satir and Kemal Demir who would resign some days later due to their failure were the only names who were elected. Ecevit and his group now had an absolute power in the party. Intra-party democracy found its meaning in CHP however it was just a beginning.

Capitalism which was in the peak of its history during 1960’s, would have to face a structural crisis by 1970’s and economic developments would automatically reflect the political system. It had not been known which segments of societies would be adversely affected by the depression yet and this could lead to a class struggle which the states would not enable to act with a supra-classes statist perception.<sup>424</sup> Within this framework, social and economic changes, ideological clashes, student and working class militancy, growing nationalist movement under Turkes’s neo-fascist Nationalist Movement Party and increasing number of demonstrations concurrently with unyielding and oppressive attitude of AP were dragging the country into a deep political depression and chaos<sup>425</sup> which Ecevit

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<sup>422</sup> *Idem.*

<sup>423</sup> *Idem*

<sup>424</sup> Faruk Alpkaya. (2001). “Bir 20. Yuzyil Akimi: ‘Sol Kemalizm’.”. (ed.). Ahmet Insel. *Modern Turkiye’de Siyasi Dusunce, Kemalizm*. V. 2. Istanbul: Iletisim Yayinlari. pp. 501.

<sup>425</sup> Feroz Ahmad. (2014). *Turkey: The Quest for Identity*. London: Oneworld Publications. pp. 1966.



realized and warned: “*There is threat and danger of a coup in Turkey and it can just come from the Army. For instance, it can be a game of external powers as it happened in Greece. Today it seems that a military coup which can be just for the benefit of the privileged classes is possible*”.<sup>426</sup> Eventually, in 12 March 1971, the army forced elected government to resign but made no move to take over actual rule keeping the Grand Assembly open. The priority was given to ‘the restoration of law and order’ by the military commanders because as the Memorandum noted, the Government and the Assembly were responsible for anarchy, fraternal fighting, social and economic unrest which emerged in the country as results of their attitude, view and policies; moreover, according to coup-makers the Government had jeopardized the future of the country.<sup>427</sup> Herein, intervention was legitimized on the grounds that not the present state of Turkey but its future had been threatened.<sup>428</sup> Within this view, Demirel was resigned with his cabinet and TIP was proscribed since its leaders accused of carrying out communist propaganda and supporting Kurdish separatism.<sup>429</sup> The 12 March was a rightist military coup however in the beginning, a deep confusion occurred about ideological character of the military intervention because the coup was seen and reflected as a revolutionist movement against Americanophile AP Government by some unions and organizations including Confederation of Revolutionary Trade Unions of Turkey (Turkiye Devrimci Isci Sendikalari Konfederasyonu-DISK) and Turkish Revolutionary Youth Federation (Turkiye Devrimci Genclik Federasyonu -Dev-Genc).<sup>430</sup>

Bulent Ecevit opposed the 12 March Memorandum and harshly criticized. Particularly, when Nihat Erim who was neutralized with his resignation from CHP was appointed as prime minister for the transition government by the commanders,

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<sup>426</sup> Hikmet Bila. (2008). *CHP, 1919-2009*. Istanbul: Dogan Press. pp. 208.

<sup>427</sup> Cumhuriyet. (13 March 1971).

<sup>428</sup> Mehmet Dosemeci. (2013). *Debating Turkish Modernity: Civilization, Nationalism and the EEC*. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 159.

<sup>429</sup> Feroz Ahmad. (2014). *Turkey: The Quest for Identity*. London: Oneworld Publications. pp. 1967.

<sup>430</sup> Hikmet Bila. (2008). *CHP, 1919-2009*. Istanbul: Dogan Press. pp. 209.

Ecevit voiced fierce criticism of this new formation and despite political pressures on him under the martial law conditions, he stated new regime with this government would be nothing but a fascist power.<sup>431</sup> According to Ecevit, military intervention in Turkey was parallel with the intervention in Greece in terms of the results<sup>432</sup> and it could be the end of democracy. This strong stance of Ecevit disturbed both the commanders and Ismet Inonu because Inonu had declared his support to the Erim Government and he was in efforts to have a consensus in the party for vote for confidence to the government. Moreover, commanders had asked CHP and AP to join the government by giving ministers. Ecevit was definitely against to give minister to this appointed-cabinet and for him CHP should have stayed out of this game since one of the target of this military intervention was the left of the center. Nevertheless, Inonu preferred to join the government in order to open the doors of the power for CHP. This was a great division and the conflict between Ecevit and Inonu would be revealed with the resignation letter of Ecevit which was sent in 22 March 1971.<sup>433</sup> Now, Ecevit was not Secretary General and he was not in the Central Executive Committee however Ankara, Adana, Istanbul and Izmir provincial organizations of the party had declared their support to Ecevit and the Party Assembly was still under the domination of his group despite strong Inonu factor.<sup>434</sup> There was a serious support coming from the root and this became concrete when Seref Baksik who became the Secretary General after resignation of Ecevit also resigned stating '*It is a pain to sit the place of Ecevit for me*'.<sup>435</sup> That is why it was

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<sup>431</sup> Nedret Ugur. (1974). *Yeni Bir Turkiye ve CHP*. Istanbul: Ozgur Yayinlari. pp. 22.

<sup>432</sup> *Idem*.

<sup>433</sup> Ulus. (22 March 1971). Afterwards, Ecevit would clarify the reason of his resignation. The President of the Republic had sent a letter to the party leaders and he ordered the to support the government without reservation and this undemocratic attitude was in contradiction with the democratic concerns of the Memorandum and it indicated undemocratic character of the coup which he could not support. For more: Hikmet Bila. (2008). *CHP, 1919-2009*. Istanbul: Dogan Yayinlari. pp. 214.

<sup>434</sup> Ayse Gunes Ayata. (2010). *CHP, Orgut ve Ideoloji*. Istanbul: Gundogan. pp. 85.

<sup>435</sup> Hikmet Bila. (2008). *CHP, 1919-2009*. Istanbul: Dogan Yayinlari. pp. 216.

the beginning of the road for the charismatic former secretary general and he decided to join to the party meetings in various cities of the country to build his organizational base. When he went to Nazilli, someone in the crowd came and asked him whilst in his speech: “*Give all these words up and tell us! Can you temp to struggle for democracy with also Inonu or not?*” Ecevit answered after some seconds: “*I will temp to do everything for you!*”<sup>436</sup>

### **3.3.1. The Myth of Karaoglan and the Victory of 'Democratic Left'**

Ecevit's stance against the coup in the name of democracy was a crucial step to destroy common negative view towards CHP which was considered as supporter of the Army and coups even if Inonu, with his etatist perception, still agreed to cooperate with coup-makers. This attitude of Ecevit increased his popularity on the organizational level and his social democratic concerns which he underlined in the meetings and press releases began to be adopted by the delegates and members. The Congresses in Izmir, Antalya and Ankara had resulted in the victory of the candidates who were supporters of Ecevit. Inonu stated with a U-turn he had already known that he could not reach his target with Ecevit but he did not have any other choice. According to him, now Ecevit was just a factionist who tried to divide the party with irresponsible moves.<sup>437</sup> Indeed, the critiques of Inonu towards Ecevit would increasingly continue during 1972 as long as Ecevit was gaining the power with his success in provincial Congresses. Despite all these, in few times, it would be realized that the opposition against Ecevit gradually turned into the opposition against the group of Satir and Inonu. There were many deputies and members who abstained and even scared to oppose Inonu however he was too old and he did not have power even to visit other cities for an election campaign. That is the reason why many

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<sup>436</sup> Can Dundar ve Ridvan Akar. (2004). *Bir Ecevit Belgeseli: Karaoglan*. 3. Bolum, Daglara Adi Yazilan Adam. CNNTurk. [http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x1o1n7g\\_bir-ecevit-belgeseli-karaoglan-bolum-3-daglara-adi-yazilan-adam\\_creation](http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x1o1n7g_bir-ecevit-belgeseli-karaoglan-bolum-3-daglara-adi-yazilan-adam_creation). 29. 11.2014.

<sup>437</sup> Orhan Kologlu. (2001). *Kim Bu Ecevit?*. Istanbul: Boyut Yayıncılık. pp. 350.

people respected him but openly or secretly supported Ecevit and left-of-center.

Meanwhile, there was a big and vital discussion in agenda of Turkey: The decision of the Court about three university students, Dev-Genc leaders, Deniz Gezmiş, Hüseyin İnönü and Yusuf Aslan. The Court had decided for sentence of death without showing concrete reasons and nationwide signature campaigns, demonstrations and a judicial struggle had begun. CHP took a decision to apply the Supreme Court to prevent the executions and İnönü called Ecevit to act together with a unity in this struggle.<sup>438</sup> This was the last cooperation of them however they would not be able to survive Gezmiş, İnönü and Aslan. While İnönü and Ecevit was competing in the Extraordinary Congress, they would be hanged and this would be another black page of Turkish history.

Kirikoglu who was the current Secretary General was in contradictions with İnönü and eventually as a result of all these rifts within the party, the 5<sup>th</sup> Extraordinary Congress was gathered under the influence of terrifying and worrisome agenda of the country in 5 May 1972. İnönü's question was clear enough: "Me or Him?". İnönü created a fear on the delegates stressing the danger of disappearance of CHP from the political scene with a possible success of Ecevit. However distinctive speech was the speech of Ecevit: "*Will this party be a legal entity which works in terms of democracy and legal norms or will it be a private property which does not work according to law? I will be clearer, what you will decide is that: Will we be free and law-abiding members of a democratic party or sultan's household troops? The decision is yours!*"<sup>439</sup> An era was closed for the Republican People's Party with the decisive victory of Ecevit in 7 May 1972. 33 years, 4 months and 11 days after<sup>440</sup>, İnönü was writing his resignation letter and indeed, it was the end of the first CHP which was founder of the Republic. Ecevit became the leader of the party gaining 709 votes from the delegates and he was

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<sup>438</sup> Hikmet Bila. (2008). *CHP, 1919-2009*. İstanbul: Dogan Yayınları. pp. 220.

<sup>439</sup> Gülsüm Tütüncü Esmer. (2006). *CHP: 1965-1980 Türk Siyasal Yaşamında Ortanın Solu*. Antalya Yeniden Anadolu ve Rumeli Müdafaa-i Hukuk Yayınları. pp. 135.

<sup>440</sup> Hikmet Bila. (2008). *CHP, 1919-2009*. İstanbul: Dogan Yayınları. pp. 228.

ready to make his speech. First he presented his respect to Inonu stating Inonu's superiority in the hearts. Then he emphasized the significance of organization and being organized and finally, at the end of his speech, he gave a clear meaning to the left-of-center identifying it as '*Democratic Left*'.<sup>441</sup>

The left-of-center was the unique form of social democracy which was framed within the boundaries of Kemalist principles however left-of-center was not a worldwide ideological trend. Social democratic character of the left-of-center was based on the principle of 'democratic and social state' of the Constitution however social democracy was a foreign ideology which had not been experienced before in Turkish politics. Furthermore Turkish society was a right-leaning society and it was not easy to clarify and give a concrete meaning to a concept which referred socialism in a sense, particularly under the Cold War conditions. These were the days which just the word of 'left' could be perceived as anarchism or communism in Turkey. In fact, it was the result of a deep nationwide confusion in association with the concepts. The efforts of CHP to explain what the left of center exactly meant and the difficulties which the party had faced inside and outside the organization should be taken into consideration within this dimension of widespread political confusion. The concepts of social democracy, democratic left and left-of-center were pragmatically used to mean the same thing with the similar concerns. The left of the center was the place where CHP saw itself in the political spectrum and the name of this place was nothing but social democracy however social democracy had a Marxist background and ideological background of CHP was not Marxist.<sup>442</sup> That was the reason why Ecevit preferred to use a new concept and defined left-of-center as 'Democratic Left' which was perceived as a broad concept which involved both social democracy and democratic socialism as well as left-of-center.<sup>443</sup> CHP was in an ideological transition period from Kemalism to social democracy with a populist discourse

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<sup>441</sup> Orhan Kologlu. (2001). *Kim Bu Ecevit?*. Istanbul: Boyut Yayıncılık. pp. 354.

<sup>442</sup> Bulent Ecevit. (1975). *Demokratik solda Temel Kavramlar ve Sorunlar*. Ankara: Ajans-Turk Matbaacılık. pp. 52

<sup>443</sup> Ahmet Taner Kislali. (July 1974). "Demokratik Sol Nedir?". *Yanki*. pp. 8-14.

(halkcilik soylemi- which can be considered as solidarism of Durkheim) during 1970's because as Baykal underlined ideological principles were constantly in an evolution process according to changing conjuncture and first Kemalist principles lost their function then principles of democracy started not to be enough to explain the social, economic and political system.<sup>444</sup> Therefore, finally, Kemalism and democracy which had been already combined gained a social character which appeared as a need of the era and unique ideology left-of-center but with its last form democratic left occurred. According to CHP of 1970's, this was the best way for CHP to define itself and introduce its ideology to the people.<sup>445</sup>

While Ecevit had declared the beginning of a new era for both CHP and Turkey and the newspapers were noting this historical turning point as 'from the party of Chef to party of the people', a resignation wave started inside the party and many members of the Party Assembly declared their resignations.<sup>446</sup> Some others who were mostly from the group of Kemal Satir preferred to stay in the party and maintained their struggle however Ecevit would gather the Congress in 30 June 1972 and gained the confidence of the Party Assembly being elected as the leader of the Party. The manifesto of the Congress was the sign of upcoming election bulletin which would be drawn up with democratic left perspective: "*Those who believe in making a revolution based on progressive intellectual cadres which are above the people cannot be with us. Of course, intellectuals of the country have duties to lead the revolution. However this duty can be carried out forming and making a revolution with the people rather than making it for the people despite the people.*"<sup>447</sup>

Revolution and populism were two major emphasis of new CHP which succeeded to have a process of self-criticism attacking elitist and patronizing approaches of the party. According to Ecevit, CHP was a revolutionist party not

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<sup>444</sup> Deniz Baykal. (1970). *Siyasal Katilma*. Ankara: Ankara Universitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakultesi Yayinlari. pp. 117-119.

<sup>445</sup> Ismail Cem. (1984). *Sosyal Demokrasi Nedir Ne Degildir?*. Istanbul: Cem Yayinlari. pp. 13.

<sup>446</sup> Hikmet Bila. (2008). *CHP, 1919-2009*. Istanbul: Dogan Yayinlari. pp. 232.

<sup>447</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 255, 256.

evolutionist because in Turkish language, revolution meant reform (inkilap) or a change which happens in a very short time and thus it was the opposite of evolution.<sup>448</sup> Herein, the problem occurs on the level of language because in the reality what Ecevit aimed to reach was a European style social democracy which he also indicated in the book of the '*Left of the Center*'. For him, there were four leftist pressures which could affect Turkey: 1)The pressure coming from the North: the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries under the domination of communist regimes 2)The pressure coming from the South: Leftist movements which emerged in some Arabic countries, particularly in Egypt and Syria. 3)The pressure coming from the West: Social Democratic movements in Europe such as SPD 4)The pressure coming from the Far East: Communist China.<sup>449</sup> Within this framework, according to Ecevit, left-of-center emerged as a part of the leftist pressure coming from the West which was the democratic, humanist, respectful to the freedom of thought, peaceful and the most reliable one.<sup>450</sup> The perception of the principle of populism had been also changed in the 21<sup>st</sup> Congress. Traditional approach to the populism had been based on the aim of creating a classless society and Kemalist CHP did not recognize the classes however now CHP accepted the entity of classes and furthermore according to new democratic left CHP, social injustice was inherent in the inequality between social classes. Indeed, this new view became concrete in the definition of people (halk) which was made by Bulent Ecevit: "*People include all those who expend either mental or physical labor to earn a living and the others who can not find opportunity to have an influence on the society and the government.*"<sup>451</sup> This definition pointed two target groups: Working class and underprivileged people -particularly first part of the definition can be observed in various dictionaries or texts as the definition of the working class-. Populism of CHP

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<sup>448</sup> Bulent Ecevit. (1968). *Bu Duzen Degismelidir*. Ankara: Tekin Yayınevi. pp. 223.

<sup>449</sup> Bulent Ecevit. (1966). *Ortanin Solu*. Ankara: Tekin Yayınevi. pp. 35.

<sup>450</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 42.

<sup>451</sup> Bulent Ecevit. (1975). *Demokratik solda Temel Kavramlar ve Sorunlar*. Ankara: Ajans-Turk Matbaacılık. pp. 9.

meant a struggle for rights and interests of underprivileged people and the party aimed to unite the powers of those people in order them to have a say in social, political and economic areas. It was also a reference to the participatory democracy and civil-societism. This change in the party was also a reaction of party's traditional elitist approaches.

Immediately after the Congress in 30 June 1972, a comprehensive and well-organized election campaign started in CHP with its all provincial organizations and the slogan of the campaign was '*Ak Gunlere*' (To the White Days) which was drawn up with a more leftist tone. According to *Ak Gunlere* program, CHP would establish a democratic, populist, free and fair order which would protect the rights and interests of the people. Real democracy which the people would be sovereign could be just provided by improving the economic conditions of the people because monopolization of the economic power caused the monopolization of the political power, usually, in favor of privileged segments of the society. That was the reason why the people should have been organized to play a significant role in the economy as a crucial partner of the state in order to divide political power into different segments-classes.<sup>452</sup> Indeed, this would be the way to create an economic base for a pluralistic democracy. *Ak Gunlere* indicated the cooperative system as a crucial target for transformation of rural and the project of the Koy-Kentler (Village-Towns) which would be the central villages as economic units was the dream of Ecevit. For him, it was the plan to start development from the village as continuity of uncompleted project of the Village Institutes which were closed by DP Government during 1950's.<sup>453</sup> Besides all these, nationalization of underground sources,

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<sup>452</sup> CHP 1973 Secim Bildirgesi. (1973). *Akgunlere*. Ankara: Ajans-Turk Matbaacilik Sanayii. See also: Bulent Ecevit. (1975). *Demokratik Sol Bildirisi*; Suna Kili. (1976). *1960-1975 Doneminde Cumhuriyet Halk Partisinde Gelismeler Siyaset Bilimi Acisindan Bir Inceleme*. Istanbul: Bogazici Universitesi Yayinlari. pp. 431; Atakan Hatipoğlu. (2012). *CHP'nin İdeolojik Dönüşümü: Kemalizmden Sosyal Demokrasiye*. İstanbul: Kaynak Press. pp. 292; Ayse Gunes Ayata. (2010). *CHP, Orgut ve Ideoloji*. Istanbul: Gundogan. pp. 89.

<sup>453</sup> Glsm Ttnc Esmer. (2006). *CHP: 1965-1980 Trk Siyasal Yaşamında Ortanın Solu*. Antalya Yeniden Anadolu ve Rumeli Mdafaa-i Hukuk Yayinlari. pp. 164.



reallocation of sources, providing both unemployment compensations and retirement-old age pensions as well as social insurances and securities for all the citizens were the other promises of *Ak Gunler* bulletin.<sup>454</sup> The bulletin was strong enough on the political level however on the economical level in association with the industrial and agricultural issues it counted the problems of existing system however it did not present comprehensive and programmed solutions.

While election campaigns were maintained by the parties, term of office of Cevdet Sunay, the President of the Republic, would be expired in March and the Grand Assembly would go to meet to elect the 6<sup>th</sup> President of the Republic in 13 March 1973. The Commanders wanted General Faruk Gurler who was the Ground Forces Commander to be elected and thus in the election day the Assembly was blockaded by the army to press the civilians. Indeed, it created a civilian-military conflict because neither Demirel nor Ecevit favored the candidacy of Gurler since they found the attitude of the Commanders undemocratic intervention to the politics and both of them presented very strong stances acting together against this militarism. Eventually Fahri Koruturk who was a navy officer and a diplomat would be elected by the Assembly eliminating the military pressure. Attitude of Ecevit in this event was essential since he succeeded to pass his first democracy exam.<sup>455</sup>

The leader of CHP had started his long nationwide propaganda trip as Bulent Ecevit but when he returned Ankara, now, he was a heroic and charismatic leader or as the people began to call him, '*Karaoglan*' who was the hopes of the people. Ecevit was welcomed everywhere with the slogans '*Halkci Ecevit*' (Populist Ecevit), '*Umudumuz Ecevit*' (Ecevit is our hope), '*Umudumuz Karaoglan*' (Karaoglan is our hope) and fabled the heroic image of Karacaoglan which was attached to him.<sup>456</sup>

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<sup>454</sup> Ayse Gunes Ayata. (2010). *CHP, Orgut ve Ideoloji*. Istanbul: Gundogan. pp. 89, 90.

<sup>455</sup> Can Dundar ve Ridvan Akar. (2004). *Bir Ecevit Belgeseli: Karaoglan*. 3. Bolum, Daglara Adi Yazilan Adam. CNNTurk. [http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x1o1n7g\\_bir-ecevit-belgeseli-karaoglan-bolum-3-daglara-adi-yazilan-adam\\_creation](http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x1o1n7g_bir-ecevit-belgeseli-karaoglan-bolum-3-daglara-adi-yazilan-adam_creation). 29. 11.2014.

<sup>456</sup> Frank Tachau. (2002). "An Overwiev of Electoral Behavior". (ed.). Sabri Sayari and Yilmaz R. Esmer. *Politics, Parties and Elections in Turkey*. US: Lynne Rienner Publishers. pp. 53. See also:

Karaoglan became another slogan of the campaign which was created by the people changing the folk songs: ‘Bizim sadik dostumuz Karaoglandir’ (Our loyal friend is Karaoglan). The myth of Karaoglan was spreading around and the question which people asked to each other was clear: Who was really this Karaoglan coming into prominence in Turkish politics?

In 28 May 1925, current deputy of the People’s Party Prof. Dr. Fahri Ecevit and painter Fatma Nazli welcomed their son, Mustafa Bulent into the world. Bulent was borned as a privileged child of educated parents in the early years of the Republic. During his years in the Robert College, the American high school in Istanbul, he was calm and introverted young man. He had a rich inner world which he reflected to his poems and he was usually known with this side of his personality. Particularly his poem of ‘Robot’ which he wrote in 1940 and his writings in the College Journal ‘izlerimiz’ (our signs) were the ones which made him popular in the College where he also met with the love his life, Rahsan who would be always his closest friend and supporter.<sup>457</sup> After his graduation, Bulent started the Law Faculty in Ankara University however in a short time he would leave the faculty and register the Literature department of the Faculty of Language, History and Geography in the same university. Nevertheless, he would not also complete this department. Perhaps it was the major mistake of him which would prevent his accession to Cankaya in the last years of his political life.<sup>458</sup> He enjoyed an exceptionally marriage with Rahsan Ecevit but he was unemployment and he should have found job. His English was perfect and eventually he would start to work as a translator in the General Directorate of Press. He always stood far away from politics however he should have followed the political issues to be a good translator. Indeed,

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Gülsüm Tütüncü Esmer. (2008). “Propaganda, Soylem ve Sloganlarla Ortanın Solu”. *Dokuz Eylul Universitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi*. V. 10. N. 3. pp. 79-81.

<sup>457</sup> Can Dundar ve Ridvan Akar. (2004). Bir Ecevit Belgeseli: Karaoglan. 3. Bolum, Daglara Adi Yazilan Adam. CNNTurk. [http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x1o1n7g\\_bir-ecevit-belgeseli-karaoglan-bolum-3-daglara-adi-yazilan-adam\\_creation](http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x1o1n7g_bir-ecevit-belgeseli-karaoglan-bolum-3-daglara-adi-yazilan-adam_creation). 29. 11.2014.

<sup>458</sup> *Idem*.

this was his first touch with the politics. In 1946, he was on the way to go to London in order to work as an assistant at the Press Office of the Turkish Embassy. It was the beginning of the poorest and the most difficult days for Ecevit. They had developed a habit of living which was exceptionally frugal.<sup>459</sup> Indeed, any spare money they had went only on books however the difficulties that they faced forced them to sell their rings of marriage and even their collection of the Encyclopedia Britannica.<sup>460</sup> After some years now they had better conditions and Bulent had started the University of London to learn Sanscrit. Immediately before they returned Turkey in 1950, he left the university because he learnt Sanscrit and he did not have to continue just for a diploma. He was ambitious to learn not to show. His next destination would be the United States with a grant which provides special education in Harvard for two years after the events of 6-7 September which Ecevit was also taken into custody since their Art Gallery Helikon was considered as a Greek foundation by DP Government. In USA, Ecevit would find chance to take the courses from the prominent figures like Kissinger in Harvard. He also continued to write in the *Ulus* which was the newspaper of CHP however in 1957 a decision was taken for an immediate election in Turkey and Inonu was calling Ecevit. He would once again return to Ankara by the request of Inonu and started his active political life as a politician. He was 32 and he was a deputy of CHP being always close to Inonu as his translator. As journalist, politician, poet, translator or a husband, he was always very modest as Guardian correctly noted with a memory: *“In the early years Ecevit seemed more likely to be remembered as a poet, and throughout his life he remained a man of letters. There can be few other ministers anywhere who, coming out of a press conference and noticing that a journalist was holding a new book on*

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<sup>459</sup> David Barchard. (7 November 2006). Bulent Ecevit. <http://www.theguardian.com/news/2006/nov/07/guardianobituaries.turkey>. 24.11.2014.

<sup>460</sup> Can Dundar ve Ridvan Akar. (2004). Bir Ecevit Belgeseli: Karaoglan. 3. Bolum, Daglara Adi Yazilan Adam. CNNTurk. [http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x1o1n7g\\_bir-ecevit-belgeseli-karaoglan-bohum-3-daglara-adi-yazilan-adam\\_creation](http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x1o1n7g_bir-ecevit-belgeseli-karaoglan-bohum-3-daglara-adi-yazilan-adam_creation). 29. 11.2014.

*the 17<sup>th</sup> century English poet John Donne, would have asked to borrow it.*"<sup>461</sup> Perhaps, his modesty was the only reason why he became Karaoglan of the people.

It was the year that the 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Republic would be celebrated in Turkey and the folk songs were calling populist Ecevit for the power. As the marches of the election campaign underlined, the democratic left was coming!: "*We are revolutionist and populist young people/ we defeat the imperialism/ Get out of our way/ Democratic Left is coming.*"<sup>462</sup> The magazines of *Ozgur Insan* and *Calisan Adam* which were under the control of the group of left-of-center had been also running a serious propaganda in favor of CHP just like TRT (Turkish Radio and Television Corporation) since 1972. Ecevit met with favorable receptions wherever the Committee of CHP had visited however, for the first time, this deep and unusual interest of the people for the campaign was clearly observed with his mass rally in Taksim Square immediately before the election. The Taksim Square and the streets around the Square were filled with an enthusiastic crowd. Bulent Ecevit was on the bus with his blue shirt and the white doves which became a symbol of democratic left were flying just up of his head. Now, the man of the people (Halkin adami) with his charisma was in the front of the name of the party. CHP under the leadership of Ecevit was not the traditional CHP. Eventually, in 14 October 1973, CHP was the first party of the election with 33.3% and 185 seats. AP had 29.8% with 149 seats and conservative-religion National Salvation Party under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan (Milli Selamet Partisi-MSP) succeeded to take 11.8% of the votes and 47 of the seats. Within these conditions, CHP would have to form a coalition. Indeed, right wing of the political spectrum in Turkey was divided into different parties before the election. For instance, newly established rightist party in the name of the Democratic Party could get the votes from AP and became the fourth party of the election gaining 45 seats. In fact, this was another dynamic which increased the chances of CHP in the election. However, despite all these, first of all, the result was a concrete

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<sup>461</sup> *Idem.*

<sup>462</sup> Gülsüm Tütüncü Esmer. (2008). "Propaganda, Soylem ve Sloganlarla Ortanın Solu". *Dokuz Eylul Universitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi*. V. 10. N. 3. pp. 79.

evident that left-of-center which was accused of causing failures in the previous elections was not the actual reason of the failures. Second, CHP's desire for a 'change' was also the desire of the people and thus long years after, CHP was seen as a strong alternative which could respond the need of the people. Third, the result was an essential indication of consolidated and well-organized structure of CHP organization despite the resignations of the former, prominent members. Fourth, CHP's populist policy was adopted by two specific groups which CHP also pointed as target group: Working class and the poor segments of the cities and well-off villagers.<sup>463</sup> That is why, it was a victory. Furthermore, the victory of Ecevit was the victory of left-of-center and the victory of left-of-center was the victory of social democracy or democratic left in Turkish politics. It would be the first but unlucky social democratic experience of Turkey.

### **3.3.2. Economic Policies of 'Democratic Left'**

The perception of a statist and protectionist economy was the constitutive character of the Turkish economy between 1950 and 1980. Indeed, there were attempts to reverse the protectionist character of the economy with a liberal turn during the period of the Democratic Party in 1950's. However the funds would not be transferred from the agricultural sector to industry sector and those attempts of DP would fail because by the mid-1950s there has been a serious decline in agricultural production in Turkey. When the decline in world market demand for raw materials also affected to the Turkish economy, a foreign exchange crisis had occurred.<sup>464</sup> Even if the 1958 Stabilization Program imposed by Western creditor countries, the military coup in 1960 would delay the economic development.<sup>465</sup>

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<sup>463</sup> Ayşe Gunes Ayata. (1995). "Türkiye'nin Demokratikleşme Sürecinde Ortanın Solu Hareketi". *SBF Journal*. V. 50. N. 3. p. 84.

<sup>464</sup> Sevket Pamuk. (1981). "Political Economy of Industrialization in Turkey". Merip Reports. N. 93. pp. 27.

<sup>465</sup> *Idem*.

New phase of the economy would be based on national developmentalism and import-substitute industrialization (ISI) which ‘generated an economy highly dependent on imports and foreign borrowing but with limited capacity to export’.<sup>466</sup> According to the National Unity Committee, a central planning strategy should have been developed to consolidate the economy because the primary reason of the economic problems in Turkey was the absence of a planned economy. Moving from this standpoint, with a regulation in the Constitution of 1961, the period of planned economy which would be prepared as five-year plans and annual programs by newly established State Planning Organization (Devlet Planlama Teskilati-DPT) began.<sup>467</sup> The *First Five Year Development Plan* (1963-1967) was drawn up and put into effect in 1963. This Plan was compulsory for the public sector and indicative for the private. It was not sort of a Soviet style centralist planning but a democratic planning which was also a guarantee for the private sector.<sup>468</sup> The *Second Five Year Development Plan* (1968-1972) which was prepared by the Inonu Coalition Government would aim at 40.3% increase in the Gross National Product (GNP) and predict an economic growth at the rate of 7%.<sup>469</sup> The strategy of the second plan was again closed economy, import-substitute industrialization with fixed exchange rates, overvalued currency practices, quantitative import restrictions and high customs taxes for

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<sup>466</sup> Ziya Onis and Steven B. Webb. (1992). *Political Economy of Policy Reform in Turkey in the 1980's*. The World Bank Country Economic Department. pp. 4.

<sup>467</sup>“In the formal sense, the planning techniques emphasized the consolidated treatment of government accounts, balanced macroeconomic projections, sector-level consistency studies, and improved methods of project selection. While providing compulsory guidelines for the public sector, the plans have been indicative for the private sector, relying on continually modified mixtures of specific incentives.” For more: Merih Celasun and Dani Rodrik. (1989). “Turkish Economic Development: An Overview”. (ed.). Jeffrey D. Sachs and Susan M. Collins. *Developing Country Debt and Economic Performance, Country Studies-Indonesia, Korea, Philippines, Turkey*. Volume. 3. University of Chicago Press. pp. 621.

<sup>468</sup> Emre Kongar. (2003). *21. Yuzyilda Turkiye, 2000'li Yillarda Turkiye'nin Toplumsal Yapisi*. Istanbul: Remzi Yayinlari. p. 363.

<sup>469</sup> Devlet Planlama Teskilati. (1967). *Ikinci Bes Yillik Kalkinma Plani*. Ankara: DPT.

consolidation of the domestic market under heavy protectionism.<sup>470</sup> However this strategy was highly dependent on exchange rates in association with the level of the import capacity and thus any difficulty or possibility which could cause a crisis on exchange rates could directly drag Turkish economy into a depression. Eventually, by the beginning of the 1970's, interventionist and protectionist closed economy perception of Turkey would start not to work successfully due to the great recession which dominated the world economy. Moreover, a petroleum crisis which would cause a sharp increase in petroleum prices was at the door. These two major problems of the world economy, recession and upcoming petroleum crisis, would cause a rapid deterioration in the Turkish economy which was an oil-importing middle-income economy and a deep balance of payment crisis would occur.

After the election of 1973, Turkey faced with a three-month cabinet crisis since neither Ecevit nor Demirel could form a coalition government compromising with each other or the other parties in the Assembly. The job of forming a government was then given to Naim Talu, former prime minister of transition period in 1973, who also failed. Despite CHP's election victories which were gained first in the general elections in October and then in the local election in December, Ecevit was still in a struggle for the power. Moreover, these days in which Ecevit was negotiating with Necmettin Erbakan, the leader of the Islamist, conservative MSP, for the coalition were marked by a worldwide Petroleum crisis which caught Turkey with a considerably diminished domestic production versus increased consumption requirements.<sup>471</sup>

During 1960's and 1970's over one million workers emigrated from Turkey to Germany and elsewhere in Europe and regular remittances sent by those workers to their family provided serious rise in foreign exchange reserves.<sup>472</sup> For instance,

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<sup>470</sup> Mukerrem Hic and Aysen Hic Gencer. (2009). *Turkish Economy and Politics, From 1923, the Foundation of the Republic until 2002*. Istanbul: Beykent University Press. pp. 53.

<sup>471</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 54.

<sup>472</sup> Sevket Pamuk. (1981). "Political Economy of Industrialization in Turkey". Merip Reports. N. 93. pp. 28.

154% of the foreign trade deficit was narrowed with this accumulation of foreign exchange in 1973.<sup>473</sup> Similarly, while the rate of inflow of foreign exchange was 2% of total export revenues in 1964, it reached 90% of total export revenues in 1973.<sup>474</sup> However, remittances substantially decreased with the increases in petroleum prices which highly affected Western developed countries and the amount of petroleum bills reached almost half of total export revenues by the end of 1973. When Ecevit compromised with Erbakan and formed the Coalition on January 1974, Turkish economy had a deep inflation problem which double digit inflation was indicated since 1971. Ecevit and Erbakan had to manage an economy with an inflation, averaging 20.5% and foreign debt, averaging \$3.5 million.<sup>475</sup> Under these economic conditions, CHP-MSP Government should have decreased the inflation in order to increase the purchasing power of the people as a primary target. Moreover, the Third Plan which was adopted by AP Government in 1973 was in force and it required implementing a mixed economy with a greater role assigned to the state as the previous two plans -compulsory for the public sector and indicative for the private-<sup>476</sup> The Plan aimed at 7.9% increase in GNP and 8% increase in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Similarly, an investment of up to 291 Billion TL should have been

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<sup>473</sup> Caglar Keyder. (1990). *Turkiye'de Devlet ve Siniflar*. Istanbul: Iletisim Yayinlari. pp. 152.

<sup>474</sup> Attila Sonmez. (1999). *Turkiye'de 1950 Sonrasi Sanayilesme Politikasi Uzerine Gozlemler, Bilanco 1923-1998*. Istanbul: Tarih Vakfi Yayinlari. pp. 60,70.

<sup>475</sup> Ziya Onis and Suleyman Ozmucur. (1991). *Capital Flows and the External Financing of Turkey's Imports*. For Research Programme on: Financial Policies for the Global Dissemination of Economic Growth. OECD Development Center Working Paper N. 36. pp. 22. See also: Devlet Istatistik Enstitusu. Istatistik Gostergeleri, 1923-2011; Baskin Oran. (2008). "Goreli Ozerklik-3". (ed.). Baskin Oran. *Turk Dis Politikasi, Kurtulus Savasi'ndan Bugune Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar*. C. I. Istanbul: Iletisim Yayinlari. pp. 662.

<sup>476</sup> Merih Celasun and Dani Rodrik. (1989). "Turkish Economic Development: An Overview". (ed.). Jeffrey D. Sachs and Susan M. Collins. *Developing Country Debt and Economic Performance, Country Studies-Indonesia, Korea, Philippines, Turkey*. Volume. 3. University of Chicago Press. pp. 626; Ziya Onis and Suleyman Ozmucur. (1991). *Capital Flows and the External Financing of Turkey's Imports*. For Research Programme on: Financial Policies for the Global Dissemination of Economic Growth. OECD Development Center Working Paper N. 36. pp. 17.



expected between 1973 and 1977 by increasing the domestic austerity measures.<sup>477</sup> Newly formed Coalition was responsible to implement this economic plan under difficult political and economic conditions.

Despite the ideological differences between two parties, they had common points on the economic level. For instance, both CHP and MSP were very sceptical about USA, EEC or NATO and within this scope they adopted an anti-imperialist rhetoric with an emphasis of independence on the economic level. Secondly, MSP favored nationalization of the underground sources just like CHP and for Erbakan the small industrialists in Anatolia should have been supported over the big international business.<sup>478</sup> Herein, difference between two parties appeared because while MSP also relied on Anatolian industrialists as well as public sector, CHP just concentrated on the public sector for industrialization however according to CHP, everyone who wanted to change current corrupted order with a substructural revolution, no matter what religious belief they had, was progressive.<sup>479</sup> It seemed that MSP and CHP compromised in the point of the perception of substructural revolution. It was a historical coalition which could not be easily formed again and indeed, as Ayata correctly noted, it was actually based on more practical reasons involving political interests and targets than ideological or social approaches.<sup>480</sup> That was the reason why immediately after the Cyprus Operation, it would become concrete that the partnership of a progressive, secular party and a conservative Islamist party could not be maintained.

During ten-month term of Ecevit's CHP-MSP Coalition, growth performance of the economy was very poor and high inflation rate could not be decreased. Indeed, there was not any attempt to decrease the inflation. Promises of cheapness was one

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<sup>477</sup> Devlet Planlama Teskilati. (1973a). *Ucuncu Bes Yillik Kalkinma Plani*. Ankara: DPT.

<sup>478</sup> Mukerrem Hic and Aysen Hic Gencer. (2009). *Turkish Economy and Politics, From 1923, the Foundation of the Republic until 2002*. Istanbul: Beykent University Press. pp. 76.

<sup>479</sup> Atakan Hatipoğlu. (2012). *CHP'nin İdeolojik Dönüşümü: Kemalizmden Sosyal Demokrasiye*. İstanbul: Kaynak Yayinlari. pp. 297.

<sup>480</sup> Ayşe Gunes Ayata. (2010). *CHP, Orgut ve İdeoloji*. Istanbul: Gundogan. pp. 93.

of the most outstanding promises of CHP during the election campaign however with the increase in the prices of supply of provisions made the poor underprivileged people poorer increasing their financial difficulties.<sup>481</sup> Another plan of CHP was to start the economic and social development of the country from the villages through the Koy-Kentler (Village-Towns) Project and cooperatives but during ten months, Ecevit could not be interested in the problems of the peasants and farmers moreover because of high inflation and exchange crisis in the world, farmers started to buy intermediate goods more expensive than before.<sup>482</sup> Both CHP and MSP favored nationalization of underground sources but in 1974 Ecevit changed the pronationalization stance of the party with a statement in Grand National Assembly and this was another promise of Ecevit which did not come into the force.<sup>483</sup> Similarly, the investments stopped and the delay of vital 113 projects at an estimated cost 76 billion TL could bring along other financial problems. Ecevit could not develop the economy to reach the targets of the Third Plan.

Besides all these, even if significant part of the exchange reserves of Turkey was depleted for the petroleum bills which quadrupled, CHP could leave \$1.400,0 billion net exchange reserve in the National Treasury when Ecevit declared the resignation of the Coalition on November 1974.<sup>484</sup> Similarly, according to Ecevit's declaration, he admitted that the economic policy of CHP in which the party increased the prices as a response to the Petroleum crisis and other changing dynamics of the economy, was based on the prices of the raw materials and industrial goods however at the same time he also underlined CHP's efforts to support the workers and public servants within an income policy increasing their wages.<sup>485</sup> Ecevit Government had also provided a serious increase in the income of the

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<sup>481</sup> Nedret Ugur. (1974). *Yeni Bir Türkiye ve CHP*. Istanbul: Ozgur Yayinlari. pp. 136.

<sup>482</sup> *Idem*.

<sup>483</sup> Atakan Hatipoğlu. (2012). *CHP'nin İdeolojik Dönüşümü: Kemalizmden Sosyal Demokrasiye*. İstanbul: Kaynak Yayinlari. pp. 316.

<sup>484</sup> Bulent Ecevit. (1976). *Ecevit'in Aciklamalari 1976*. Istanbul: Turkiye Is Bankasi Kultur Yayinlari. pp. 46

<sup>485</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.36.

peasants through support purchases of the state.<sup>486</sup> Indeed, the petroleum prices and the urgent issues of Turkish foreign policy on which Ecevit mostly concentrated on were the actual reasons of economic failure of his government in 1974. Particularly Cyprus Operation and Opium Crisis which were discussed below concurrently with deep conflicts inside the Coalition would occupy his agenda until the end of 1974.

After the dissolution of CHP-MSP Government, Demirel became the prime minister of the National Front Coalition (I. Milliyetci Cephe-MC) which was formed with the participation of all rightist parties of the Assembly, AP, CGP, MSP and the National Movement Party (Milliyetci Hareket Partisi-MHP). MC Government would start to pursue center-right economic policies in favor of private sector. Between 1975 and 1977 Turkish economy relied on subprime short-term foreign borrowings which could cause a 8.9% growth in GDP.<sup>487</sup> However, this borrowing strategy of MC which also included the method of ‘convertible deposit’ was too risky because it could cause a sharp increase in imports without having effect on exports. Moreover it could make the economy more dependent on foreign dynamics. As Rodrik underlined: *“To attract capital inflows, the authorities depended disproportionately on the so-called convertible Turkish lira deposit scheme, whose key feature was that it protected domestic borrowers from all exchange risk. This exchange guarantee acted as a subsidy on foreign borrowing by the private sector, as the domestic currency was already perceived to be overvalued by the beginning of 1975. More importantly, it rendered the implicit subsidy an increasing function of the expected depreciation of the Turkish lira...”*

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<sup>486</sup> *Idem.*

<sup>487</sup> Merih Celasun and Dani Rodrik. (1989). “Turkish Experience with Debt: Macroeconomic Policy and Performance”. (ed.). Jeffrey D. Sachs and Susan M. Collins. *Developing Country Debt and Economic Performance, Country Studies-Indonesia, Korea, Philippines, Turkey*. Volume. 3. University of Chicago Press. pp. 196.

	Real GDP Growth (%)	Inflation Rate (WPI) (%)	Current Account Balance (\$ mill.)
1972	6.0	18.0	47
1973	4.1	20.5	534
1974	8.8	29.9	-662
1975	8.9	10.1	-1.889
1976	8.9	15.6	-2.289
1977	4.9	24.1	-3.431
1978	4.3	52.6	-1.595
1979	-0.6	63.9	-1.203
1980	-1.0	107.2	-3.304

Table VIII. Macroeconomic Performance of Turkey During 1970's

Source: State Institute of Statistics, State Planning Organizations and the Central Bank

“...Consequently, even though the counterpart to the current deficits of the period was, in an accounting sense, an investment boom by the public sector. The boom was sustainable only to the extent that foreign banks were willing to increase their exposure to Turkey at an ever-increasing pace. Once foreign banks slowed their lending, the edifice collapsed.”<sup>488</sup> Eventually, in 1977, ‘Turkey needed even 70 cents’ as Demirel stated.<sup>489</sup>

CHP with its Karaoglan gained another victory in the Election of 1977 with

<sup>488</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 197.

<sup>489</sup> Baskin Oran. (2008). “Goreli Ozerklik-3”. (ed.). Baskin Oran. *Turk Dis Politikasi, Kurtulus Savasi'ndan Bugune Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar*. C. I. Istanbul: Iletisim Yayinlari. pp. 668.

41.4% of the votes and 213 of the seats however the government which was formed by Ecevit could not take vote for confidence in the Assembly and Demirel once more came to the power in the second coalition of MC. In the budget discussions in 1977, Ecevit harshly criticized the MC Coalition through its economic policies. According to planned budget of MC, Turkey would have to get \$2.020,00 foreign borrowings just in 1977 and it was aimed at an inflation, averaging 20%.<sup>490</sup> However, all these were not realistic for Ecevit. Turkey was already trapped in debt due to the foreign borrowings and investments could not be based on this policy.<sup>491</sup> Moreover the policies of MC until the budget caused a deep increase in inequalities in income distribution ignoring the peasants and underprivileged because for instance 65% of the population were still peasants in 1976 and any policy which ignored the development of rural, could be successful.<sup>492</sup> That is why Turkey needed to develop radical transformation program for rural areas. Additionally adopting social security measures which were mostly in association with the people in cities was not enough to decrease the imbalances. Herein, in addition to Koy-Kentler, Ecevit suggested Halk Sektoru (People's Sector) which aimed to construct, cultivate and support a sector composed of public and cooperative-owned industries, agricultural cooperatives and small business. Indeed, it was an effort to give an economic meaning to the principle of populism combining it with statism in order to install a balance between private and public sector with the investments of individuals.<sup>493</sup>

Ecevit called the year of 1977 as the year of hope however great crisis which would adversely affect the Turkish economy would destroy the hopes. When Ecevit came to the power on January 1978, the inflation due to second oil price rises in 1977 reached to considerable levels and the Lira became overvalued. Between 1975

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<sup>490</sup> Bulent Ecevit. (1977). *Umut Yili 1977*. Istanbul: Turkiye Is Bankasi Kultur Yayinlari. pp. 12-13.

<sup>491</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 13-16.

<sup>492</sup> Bulent Ecevit. (1976). *Ecevit'in Aciklamalari 1976*. Istanbul: Turkiye Is Bankasi Kultur Yayinlari. pp. 42-43.

<sup>493</sup> Atakan Hatipoğlu. (2012). *CHP'nin İdeolojik Dönüşümü: Kemalizmden Sosyal Demokrasiye*. İstanbul: Kaynak Press. pp. 309.

and 1978, the amount of the debt of Turkey reached \$3.6 billion. Moreover American embargo which started after the Cyprus Operation had negative effects on the growth and balance of payment.<sup>494</sup> Indeed, Ecevit wanted to run a multi-dimensional relations in macroeconomic level as well as foreign policy because the main reason of the economic depression was the American embargo and negative attitude of European creditor countries which started after the Operation and what Turkey should have done was to look for other options. That is why, in the beginning Ecevit would resist the requisitions of IMF (International Monetary Fund) and try to run independent policies but when the situation worsened, he would have to gain an agreement with IMF despite its populist social democratic rhetoric.<sup>495</sup> In 1978, Ecevit was in negotiations with IMF, the World Bank and OECD (Organization for European Economic Cooperation); however requirements such as market transition or absolute control of IMF over the economy were the points which were difficult to accept for Ecevit as a social democrat. He asked support of European social democrats in the Socialist International of which CHP became a member in 1978 and his main proposal was '*first fresh money and then IMF Program*' but his pressures could not result in how he expected.<sup>496</sup> Despite his success in delaying existing debts and making agreement for new borrowings, Ecevit was squeezed because of shortages, highly increased black market, price rises which gained a widespread character. Moreover business interest groups such as TUSIAD (Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association) were against Ecevit's statist, protectionist perception which created no effect on the economy even if they preferred a social democrat government than a right wing government which increased violence in the country.

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<sup>494</sup> Mukerrem Hic and Aysen Hic Gencer. (2009). *Turkish Economy and Politics, From 1923, the Foundation of the Republic until 2002*. Istanbul: Beykent University Press. pp. 53.

<sup>495</sup> Gokhan Erdem. (2002). *Türkiye'de Askeri Darbeler ve Yönetimlerin Türk Dis Politikasına Etkileri*. Yüksek Lisans Tezi. Ankara Üniversitesi: Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Uluslararası İlişkiler Anabilim Dalı. pp. 92

<sup>496</sup> Korkut Boratav. (1997). *Türkiye'de Sosyal Sınıflar ve Bölüşüm*. İstanbul: Gerçek. pp. 8

Besides the economic instability, there was a serious social crisis which developed under the political polarization and due to the increasing number of strikes which were supported by trade unions and student organizations caused a significant amount of workday losses. In 1979, inflation reached 63.9% and despite all of his efforts for democratic and fair economic system, Ecevit who could not satisfy the expectations of the masses would resign in 21 July 1979.

### 3.3.3. Crucial Decisions in Foreign Affairs

*“Abroad, homesick, you come to know the Greek is your brother;  
You find this out before long;  
Just watch that young man from Istanbul  
Ah he listens to a Greek song  
Having cursed with all zest of our hearts and tongues,  
We brandished bloody knives like sworn enemies  
Yet a deep love always lay hidden  
For days of peace like these.  
There’s a blue magic between us  
A warm sea  
On whose shores stand our two nations  
Poised in equal beauty.”*

*B. Ecevit, Turkish-Greek Poem, 194*

The leftist-Kemalist foreign policy which crystallized in 1960’s particularly with the emergence of the socialist and social democratic movements in Turkey was based on an anti-imperialist perception and within this scope, Western countries were the imperialist powers which could colonise Turkey and other developing or underdeveloped countries -the Third World-. That was the reason why Turkey should have pursued an independent and anti-imperial foreign policy having also friendly relations with the Soviet Union and the Third World as well as USA and European countries. Last 10 years of Turkish political history indicated the difficulties of having unidimensional foreign policy and thus what Turkey needed was to adopt multidimensional foreign policy. First of all, since the year which the President Johnson’s letter was received by Inonu, USA gradually lost the trust of the Turkish people and a serious American scepticism occurred in Turkey -It was very tragic that

Greek people also had a deep mistrust to USA with the same concerns in the same period-. Bulent Ecevit was one of the most prominent figure whose foreign policy understanding also had an anti-American character. According to Ecevit USA had direct or indirect negative effects on political destabilization of other countries as it happened in the case of the Greek Dictatorship. In this standpoint, he would accuse USA of interfering other countries' domestic affairs in 1966 as Laciner also noted in his article: *"In America it has been disclosed with that 'dirty game' the CIA is involved affecting domestic politics in friendly and allied countries. It pours money into elections in order to bring those who it wants into power and unseat it does not want; in some countries it even stuffs polling boxes with false ballots. In order to prepare a pretext for smashing legal and domestic opposition, it has claimed that there was a great communist danger."*<sup>497</sup> Indeed, even this single speech of Ecevit was enough to show his foreign policy perception which he would finally find opportunity to pursue in 1974 when he came to the power.

Bulent Ecevit became prime minister of the country when he was in the 20<sup>th</sup> year of his political life. He promised the people for job, money and a welfare life however when he came to the power as the hope of the people, what he found was just a crisis which had economic, social and political dimensions.<sup>498</sup> One of the most outstanding promise of *Ak Gunlere* Program was the development of the rural areas and peasants' living conditions providing job opportunities. Under these difficult conditions, the coalition adopted a national policy which required opening the lands for opium production which had been banned since June 1971.

By the beginning of 1960's the number of drug users in the United States had

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<sup>497</sup> Sedat Laciner. (2010). "Turkish Foreign Policy Between 1960-1971: Neo-Kemalism vs. Neo-Democrats?". *USAK Yearbook*. V. 3. pp. 186.

<sup>498</sup> Moreover, his coalition partner seemed in an unrealistic dream since he could promise to have 100.000 tanks and planes in his governmental term For more: Can Dundar ve Ridvan Akar. (2004). *Bir Ecevit Belgeseli: Karaoglan*. 3. Bolum, Daglara Adi Yazilan Adam. CNNTurk. [http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x1o1n7g\\_bir-ecevit-belgeseli-karaoglan-bolum-3-daglara-adi-yazilan-adam\\_creation](http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x1o1n7g_bir-ecevit-belgeseli-karaoglan-bolum-3-daglara-adi-yazilan-adam_creation). 29. 11.2014.



gradually increased and it forced the American governments to adopt a series of measures. Within this framework, particularly Nixon focused on stopping illegal inflow of drugs into the country as a method of drug enforcement and the Drug Enforcement Agency of USA (DEA) shifted its attention to the countries which had opium, the raw material of the drug. In this point, Turkey as a opium producer country, had a new issue with USA because opium production was a traditional agricultural practice of the peasants in Anatolia particularly in the province of Afyon which took its name from opium and it was a vital source of living for those people however according to American sources, Turkish peasants who had low incomes were tempted to sell opium gum to illegal buyers to earn more.<sup>499</sup> After an intense campaign of USA including threats to cut the American aid or decrease the cooperations between two countries, Erim government stopped opium cultivation in order to 'serve humanity' and 'save the prestige of Turkey in the eyes of international community'.<sup>500</sup> Nevertheless, Ecevit government, after a five-month debates which were made to look for effective ways to satisfy the worldwide humanist concerns, would allow the opium production in 1 July 1974. First of all, the peasants could not find any other product to cultivate in those provinces. It was the only source of living for considerable part of the farmers and abandonment of this agricultural practice negatively affected those farmer's and country's economic conditions. Secondly, it was proved in last years that the Turkish ban was an inadequate solution to the American drug abuse problem.<sup>501</sup> Furthermore, according to Ecevit, Turkish peasants who produced the opium were the poorest ones and if they really had an illegal touch to earn more, they had to be economically in a better situation.<sup>502</sup> Thirdly, opium production was also important for international pharmaceutical

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<sup>499</sup> Nasuh Uslu. (2003). *The Turkish-American Relationship Between 1947and 2003: The History of a Distinctive Alliance*. New York: Nova Publishers. pp. 223.

<sup>500</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 237.

<sup>501</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 243.

<sup>502</sup> From Ecevit's speech in the Assembly on July 1974. Fore more: Nedret Ugur. (1974). *Yeni Bir Turkiye ve CHP*. Istanbul: Ozgur Yayinlari. pp. 43.

industry and after cultivation was stopped in Turkey, it also created problem in this sector.<sup>503</sup> Last but not the least, it was about the interest of Turkish people and it could not be even negotiated with anyone.<sup>504</sup> This was an absolute nationalist action of social democrat Ecevit within the concept of national interest. All legal measures and tightened controls over the production would be provided by Turkey. The government was also open for the suggestions of other countries to increase the controls or take other measures but the decision of the government would not change and the production would start. Next day, the American Senate would decide to suspend all economic and military aid to Turkey. Indeed, it was a decision of embargo which would be officially adopted and implemented after the second operation of Turkey in Cyprus.<sup>505</sup> Additionally, USA would also recall its ambassador to Turkey for consultations in order to display its displeasure in 7 July 1974 because for the American authorities opium ban in Turkey had contributed the reduction of the number of heroin addicts and now with new decision of Turkish government, there would be an increase in heroin supply in USA.<sup>506</sup> It could be even taken into consideration as an attack upon the people of the United States.<sup>507</sup> Inside the country, the opposition was also against the decision of Ecevit. For both Demirel and Turkes who was the leader of nationalist MHP, Ecevit's decision was not related with the national interest and it was just a populist and anti-American attitude which destroyed friendly relations with USA.<sup>508</sup> Ecevit was determined to maintain his attitude despite all the critiques and in fact, he did not even have time to take any

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<sup>503</sup> From Ecevit's speech in the Assembly on July 1974. Fore more: Ibid., pp. 44.

<sup>504</sup> Bulent Ecevit. (1976). *Dis Politika*. Ankara: Ajans-Turk Matbaacilik Sanayii. pp. 78.

<sup>505</sup> Ecevit insistingly underlined that the embargo was not for Cyprus since it was prepared and declared in a sense immediately after the Opium Crisis but in the literature it was mostly considered as a result of Cyprus. Fore more: Mehmet Ali Birand. (1989). *Kibris Belgeseli*. [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0LjzWsXV7\\_Y](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0LjzWsXV7_Y). 25.11.2014

<sup>506</sup> Nasuh Uslu. (2003). *The Turkish-American Relationship Between 1947 and 2003: The History of a Distinctive Alliance*. New York: Nova Publishers. pp. 247.

<sup>507</sup> *Idem*.

<sup>508</sup> Bulent Ecevit. (1976). *Dis Politika*. Ankara: Ajans-Turk Matbaacilik Sanayii. pp. 78-79.

other decision. In 15 July 1974 while Ecevit was in Afyon to display his determination about opium decision, Makarios was deposed by the coup which was made by Nikos Sampson who was a member of EOKA (Εθνική Οργάνωσις Κυπρίων Αγωνιστών-National Organization of Cypriot Fighters) and a strong supporter of *enosis* (union).

Cyprus issue was an unresolved chronic problem of the geography which could be even taken back to the 19<sup>th</sup> century, erupted by the beginning of the 1960's. The triangle of Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom as guarantor countries according to the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee was the main dynamic of the conflict but in time it had transformed into a multidimensional and multiactor conflict involving USA, the Soviet Union, EEC, UN (the United Nations) and NATO. It became concrete when Greece and Turkey came to the brink of a war in 1964 and 1967 because USA and UN made efforts to defuse the tension between two countries. Indeed, the mediation of USA particularly in 1964 and the negotiations between the representatives of both Turkish and Greek Cypriots under auspices of the Good Offices of the UN Secretary-General could bring a relative calm in those days and Cyprus continued to be united and 'independent'.<sup>509</sup> However besides ongoing inter-communal problems, this time, the real conflict developed among Greek Cypriots. The relations between The Greek Junta which had serious legitimacy crisis and Archbishop Makarios, the leader of Cyprus, who acted independently from Greece were based on an enmity which escalated when original Greek Junta was replaced by a more radical one headed by the former military police Ioannides in 1973. Makarios was against the Junta in the name of democracy and he was rejected the *enosis* due to his belief in principle of self-determination. This was enough to disturb the Greek authorities in Athens. Moreover USA's attitude towards Makarios who became the Castro of Cyprus was not also positive.<sup>510</sup> Immediately after the government was

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<sup>509</sup> James Ker-Lindsay. (2011). *The Cyprus Problem, What Everyone Needs to Know*. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 41.

<sup>510</sup> Melek Firat. (2008). "1960-1980 Yunanistan'la İlişkiler". (ed.). Baskin Oran. *Türk Dis Politikasi, Kurtulus Savasi'ndan Bugune Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar*. C. I. Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları.pp.

formed, Ecevit who had no doubt that what the Island needed was a federation started to seek ways to meet with Greek authorities to discuss about current problems involving both Cyprus and Aegean dispute between the countries however the Junta preferred to reject these applications of the Turkish government in 1974. Only exception was the negotiations which were held in Brussels. In May, both Turkey and Greece had counted the conflicts by an exchange of diplomatic notes and then the foreign ministers of the countries met in Ottawa and Turkey suggested to start negotiations with the major problems because the minor ones would be easily discussed if the major conflicts could be solved however Greece favored to start with the minor issues which could defuse the tension and make the sides more mature to discuss the major conflicts.<sup>511</sup> When two ministers could not compromise, a higher level meeting which would be held in Brussels between Bulent Ecevit and Adamantios Androustopoulos was scheduled. Indeed, this was a NATO Summit and two leaders finally met in 23 June 1974. According to the declaration lately made by Bulent Ecevit, even if Turkey displayed to the world its peaceful efforts and willingness to resolve the conflicts, Greece had avoided even to use the word of 'negotiation'.<sup>512</sup> Similarly, according to the report of Mehmet Ali Birand in *Milliyet*, Ecevit displayed the willingness of Turkey for resolution contrary to unwillingness of Greece in every opportunity through the interviews made by international press.<sup>513</sup>

Immediately a day after Makarios ousted by the coup which was supported by Greece, Ecevit met with the party leaders in Ankara and the Grand Assembly was called for an extraordinary meeting which would be in 18 July 1974. At the same day, Greece had declared the general mobilization in the country. While Makarios who escaped to Malta was calling UN to censure the Greek intervention, the clashes in

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<sup>511</sup> Declaration of Ecevit about the meeting in Brussels in 1974. For More: Nedret Ugur. (1974). *Yeni Bir Turkiye ve CHP*. Istanbul: Ozgur Yayinlari. pp. 59-60..

<sup>512</sup> Idem. See also: Bulent Ecevit. (1976). *Ecevit'in Aciklamalari 1976*. Istanbul: Turkiye Is Bankasi Kultur Yayinlari. pp. 75.

<sup>513</sup> *Milliyet*. (24 June 1974). Ecevit 5 Onemli Toplantı. pp. 10.

Cyprus increased and Ecevit was on the way to London with his Delegation in order to find a resolution based on the article 4 of the Treaty of Guarantee with UK which was the other guarantor state. Indeed, Kissinger had just sent a message which he proposed to try all the peaceful ways for a resolution. American authorities concentrated on the possibility of a Greco-Turkish war which was not preferred. The telegram from the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State as a response was clear enough. "Coup completely engineered by Greek Government." and "deterioration of position of Turks on island is inevitable, if new regime stays in power."<sup>514</sup> Telegram also included the view of Ecevit: "*New regime on Cyprus completely unacceptable to GOT (Government of Turkey). GOT hopes status quo ante can be restored without Turkish military intervention. If this is not done, GOT prepared carry out military intervention. It believes latter would be better done within a few days rather than waiting weeks or months. If new regime retains control of island, GOT might be willing hold off military intervention if a corridor to the sea guaranteed to Turkish residents of island. This, combined with clear Turkish military superiority in area, would give GOT assurance that it could rescue Turkish population if that were needed. PriMin wishes to stay in close touch with USG and would be very grateful to have Secretary Kissinger's comments on foregoing. He expressed hope that these could be conveyed to him while he was still in London.*"<sup>515</sup> Ecevit would explore all peaceful solutions before considering others but he no longer recognized Greece as a guarantor state and thus he would consult and discuss about the issue just with the United Kingdom. Next day foreign minister of USA, Sisco came to Turkey. He could not convince Greece and he would try compromise with Turkey but anymore it was too late because the military ships of the Turkish

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<sup>514</sup> Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State. (17 July 1974). National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1312, Saunders Chron File, NSC Secretariat, Richard M. Nixon Cables/Contingency Plans 1974, Cyprus and Greek-Turkish Contingency Plans. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v30/d90>. 27.11.2014

<sup>515</sup> *Idem.*

Navy had already left Mersin. In 20 July 1974, the operation had started. In the first declaration of Ecevit, he underlined the operation as a last option of the Turkish State which they decided after all the peaceful solutions were tried and he added that: “*We are going to the Island not for a war but a peace which will be not just for Turks but also Greeks.*”<sup>516</sup>

Three days after the Turkish Operation, the Greek Junta would fall. Karamanlis would come as the leader of new Greek Republic and Sampson would be replaced with Clerides. A new conjuncture occurred and after decision (354) of UN, the ceasefire came into force on 22 July. During the Geneva Conferences which was started in the same day with the ceasefire, there was a growing belief that the conference would end in deadlock. The first conference was actually completed with the UK mediation efforts and it was a diplomatic victory for Turkey since almost every proposals of Turkish side were adopted.<sup>517</sup> However, in the second Conference when Turkey suggested an autonomous Northern Turkish region involving six cantons, Clerides and Mavros would ask 36 hours to consult their countries and Turan Gunes, Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, would leave the conference. Indeed, ‘*Ayşe had just gone to the vacation*’<sup>518</sup> and Turkey once again, was in the Island to advance. The main target of Turkey was based on the foundation of an Independent State of Cyprus which had federal structure with its two autonomous member states and within this view, security of the Turks in the Island should have been provided advancing the land.

Ecevit was the conqueror of Cyprus in the eyes of Turkish people however the second intervention would isolate Turkey from rest of the world about the Cyprus

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<sup>516</sup> Basbakan Bulent Ecevit’in Kıbrıs Barış Harekati ile İlgili İlk Demeci. For more: Bulent Ecevit. (1976). *Dis Politika*. Ankara: Ajans-Türk Matbaacılık Sanayii. pp. 37.

<sup>517</sup> Melek Fırat. (2008). “1960-1980 Yunanistan’la İlişkiler”. (ed.). Baskın Oran. *Türk Dis Politikası, Kurtuluş Savaşı’ndan Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar*. C. I. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları. pp. 744.

<sup>518</sup> Ayşe was the daughter of Turan Gunes, Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs and this was the password of the intervention. For more: Mehmet Ali Birand. (1990). *30 Sıcak Gün*. İstanbul: Milliyet Yayın A.S. pp. 372.

issue. In other words, the fair success of legitimate operation in July would be shadowed by the second intervention in August in international area. This was also a break in traditional foreign policy which was based on *Misak-i Milli* (National Pact) not irredentism. Moreover, Cyprus Operation was one of the most striking indication of both populist approach of Ecevit and weak point of social democratic government within national interest. As a concrete sample, how the European social democrats could not reject the imperialist actions of their countries in the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century due to their concerns of national interest, Ecevit had acted with similar concerns in 1974.

After 1974, the Aegean dispute would be the main issue of the agenda. Indeed, this was the primary conflict between two countries and it was much more significant than any issue. Particularly, the Continental Shelf crisis of 1976 would heighten the tension and CHP as the main opposition, accused the MC Government of not implementing adequate and urgent policies and Ecevit was calling Demirel to attempt for a meeting with Karamanlis to negotiate about the dispute.<sup>519</sup> According to CHP, Aegean dispute was directly in association with the rights of national sovereignty.<sup>520</sup>

Meanwhile, immediately after the Operation, American embargo which would adversely affect the relations between two countries started to be implemented. American scepticism would force Ecevit and following MC governments to shift to multidimensional foreign policy but particularly with CHP's advent to the power in 1978, this new foreign policy understanding would crystallize. After the mid-1970s, nationwide perception was 'the threat was not from North but from the West which means Greece' just like Greece adopted the opposite with PASOK. Within this perspective, CHP under the leadership of Ecevit first, approached the Soviet Union and the Third world. In 1978, Ecevit went to Moscow and *the Treaty of Good Neighbourhood and Friendly Cooperation* was signed with the Soviet Union at the

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<sup>519</sup> Bulent Ecevit. (1976). *Ecevit'in Aciklamalari 1976*. Istanbul: Turkiye Is Bankasi Kultur Yayinlari. pp. 71.

<sup>520</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 69

end of his visit. Similarly, Turkey developed its relations with nonaligned nations such as Namibia and Zimbabwe supporting the national liberation movements.<sup>521</sup> In fact, CHP-MSP Government had also supported the Eritrean Independence Movement in 1974.<sup>522</sup> CHP which officially adopted the democratic left as its ideology in 1975 had also become a member of the Socialist International in 1978. The target of CHP was to approach to the European social democrats -keeping its own uniqueness- because from the beginning this was the main motivation. Particularly, Scandinavian style social democracy was the one which inspired Bulent Ecevit as it can be observed in his books and now the membership of the Socialist International which legitimated the ideological stance of CHP, was a good opportunity to be a part of this world.

As a result of new threat definition and new perspectives of foreign policy, CHP adopted a new National Defence and Foreign Policy Doctrine in 1978 and three points which were already started to be implemented, were codified:

*“-The threat is from the West not from the East*

*-Turkey should lessen its dependence on NATO and the United States*

*-Expand the relations with Third World, the Soviet Union and the Arab nations”<sup>523</sup>*

Scepticism of Ecevit was not just for USA but also EEC. According to Ecevit, EEC was a threat for development of industry as well as agriculture because firstly Turkey should have made its structural transformation inside the country.<sup>524</sup> Moreover some policies of EEC which were drawn up in the Annexed Protocol, could work to Turkey’s disadvantage. Eventually, when Turkey bothered about fulfilling the custom taxes obligation, EEC was, in turn, intent on changing the terms

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<sup>521</sup> Baskin Oran. (2008). “Goreli Ozerklik-3”. (ed.). Baskin Oran. *Turk Dis Politikasi, Kurtulus Savasi’ndan Bugune Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar*. C. I. Istanbul: Iletisim Yayinlari. pp. 677.

<sup>522</sup> *Idem*.

<sup>523</sup> Bernard Reich. (1990). *Political Leaders of the Contemporary Middle East and North Africa*. US: Greenwood Press. pp. 165

<sup>524</sup> Bulent Ecevit. (1977). *Umut Yili 1977*. Istanbul: Turkiye Is Bankasi Kultur Yayinlari. pp. 40-44.



set about free circulation of Turkish workers.<sup>525</sup> However it could not be acceptable and Ecevit Government froze EEC-Turkey relations in 1978.

Foreign policy of CHP governments during 1970's was usually shaped within the national interest of the country due to the extraordinary conditions of the decade. Even if particularly in the second period of Ecevit's government, social democratic character of the party became visible, intense populist discourses in foreign policy were the most distinctive side of the Ecevit governments.

#### **3.3.4. Resignation of Bulent Ecevit and the End of Second CHP**

CHP of Ataturk and Inonu was not the same CHP with CHP of Ecevit, furthermore, CHP of Baykal would not be the same CHP with the Ecevit's one but CHP has been always the party of Congresses and factions since its foundation until today. Ecevit who came to the leadership of the party with a great victory against his great opposition in the 5<sup>th</sup> Extraordinary Congress in 1972, would again meet a great opposition in 1974. MSP-CHP Coalition was not a strong government because first of all, Erbakan usually preferred to act independently from Ecevit and made some speeches including unrealistic promises in order to satisfy his own grassroot's expectations. However this was against the governmental protocol which was drawn up according to mutual concerns.<sup>526</sup> Moreover after Cyprus Operation, MSP wanted to show it as their, MSP's, success rather than CHP and it caused another conflict. Finally, first coalition that Ecevit formed with MSP, dissolved at the end of the 1974. CHP as the first party of the Election of 1974 was now in opposition until 1977 and increasing rifts within the party came to the fore and the primary question was why and how CHP could not be in the power even if it gained the Election. New factions occurred but in 1976, the main opposition became visible with the resignation of Deniz Baykal, the Vice Secretary General, the members of the Central Executive

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<sup>525</sup> Mukerrem Hic and Aysen Hic Gencer. (2009). *Turkish Economy and Politics, From 1923, the Foundation of the Republic until 2002*. Istanbul: Beykent University Press. pp. 82.

<sup>526</sup> Hikmet Bila. (2008). *CHP, 1919-2009*. Istanbul: Dogan Press. pp. 244.

Committee Haluk Ulman, Erol Cevikce, Adil Ali Cinel and Tankut Akalin.<sup>527</sup> Indeed, these resignations were also the signs of a sharp division of CHP and social democratic movement in Turkey. Despite the factions and opposition, first time in the history of CHP, there was not any discussion about disenrollment and purge. Ecevit and his democracy understanding could consolidate the intra-party democracy in CHP and this was a milestone for the party. The division inside the party was on the level of ideology just as it happened during 1960's but this time the questions concentrated on who was more leftist.

Under all these discussions Ecevit declared 1977 as the year of the hopes for Turkey where political polarization in the society reached a radical level under the fascist implementations of MC Government in domestic affairs and where the economic crisis caused a social depression.

CHP gained 41.4% of the votes in 1977 and this was the maximum vote rate CHP had ever got but the problem was the number of deputies because again it was not enough to form a government -indeed, since 1977 CHP has not reached this level yet until today-. After many efforts to stabilize the political system, Ecevit formed a minority-government (*azinlik hukumeti*) but despite the campaigns to support this government, Ecevit could not take the vote for confidence from the Assembly and Demirel and his National Front came to the power. Again CHP had a victory and again it was in opposition. This was unacceptable and Ecevit started secret negotiations with some deputies from AP. This event would be written in the history as the event of Gunes Motel (*Gunes Motel Olayi*) because 11 deputies of AP and Ecevit would meet in this Motel and finally Ecevit would be successful to convince them to resign from AP. Ecevit would make them miniters.<sup>528</sup> Eventually, CHP once again came to the power transferring deputies from AP and second term of Ecevit started.

Economic crisis was now much more destructive than 1974 and as long as the

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<sup>527</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 254.

<sup>528</sup> Milliyet. (14 April 1986). Bakan Koltugundan Cezaevine. pp. 11. See also: Milliyet. (28 January 2001). Gunes Yine Doguyor. pp. 4

austerity measures were taken, queues which were for basic needs of the people started to appear in the streets. Karaoglan of the people was criticized being the leader of the ‘government of the queues’. Political conditions were worse than the economy. Besides the polarization between left and right, murders by unknown assailants and moreover sectarian, religion-based events had appeared. Ecevit Government was first shocked with the murder of prominent journalist Abdi Ipekci in 1 February 1978; then attacks to Alevi community in Malatya (April), Sivas (September) and Bingol (October) caused a serious threat. Ecevit had great efforts to control this violence however when the events which started in Maras in December turned into a Alevi pogrom, CHP Government declared martial law 13 Anatolian provinces.<sup>529</sup> There were many death and considerable number of people were wounded. Meanwhile, some deputies and ministers had given their resignation letters and government was in a big handicap.<sup>530</sup> In the by-election of 1979, CHP’s vote declined. Ecevit had lost and now he had to resign because democracy exactly meant it. Demirel formed the new government. Ecevit was ready to listen the critiques which would be directed inside and outside the party but Turkey was not ready to see the tanks in the streets.

	<b>14 October 1973</b>		<b>5 June 1977</b>	
<b>Political Parties</b>	<b>Votes %</b>	<b>Seats</b>	<b>Votes %</b>	<b>Seats</b>
<b>Justice Party</b>	29.8	149	36.9	189
<b>Republican People’s Party</b>	33.3	185	41.4	213

Table IX. Election Results of 1973 and 1977

Source: State Institute of Statistics

<sup>529</sup> Feroz Ahmad. (2014). *Turkey: The Quest for Identity*. London: Oneworld Publications. pp. 1977.

<sup>530</sup> Orhan Kologlu. (2001). *Kim Bu Ecevit?*. Istanbul: Boyut Yayıncılık. pp. 543-544.

## CONCLUSION

The first and major concern of the analysis has been to indicate the similar discourses and policies of two social democratic parties, PASOK and CHP within the context of social democracy. This analysis has been considered as a chance both to compare the first social democratic experiences of two different countries which have right-leaning societies and to read the contemporary political history of Turkey and Greece through political parties.

Greece and Turkey are two countries which have striking similarities concurrently with deep differences and thus, similar dynamics which are indicated, in themselves, include the differences but this is the significant side of a comparative analysis which gives a meaning to comparison. Moving from this point of view, the fundamental similarity between PASOK and CHP is that both have developed their unique approach to the social democracy adopting their own third way according to political legacy in which they have carried, in countries such as Greece and Turkey where there have never been a social democratic experience. The third way of CHP with Ecevit was re-reading of Kemalism through socialist and social democratic concepts. This social democratic form of Kemalism, once named left-of-center then democratic left, was a combination of the principles of social democracy and Kemalist six arrows. For PASOK, the third way was the ‘socialism of PASOK’ -Pasokism as Elefanthis stated- based on the Dependency Theory of Papandreou which becomes concrete in the Principles of National independence (*η εθνική ανεξαρτησία*), popular sovereignty (*η λαϊκή κυριαρχία*), social liberation (*η κοινωνική απελευθέρωση*) and democracy in all phases of public life (*η δημοκρατία σ’όλες τις φάσεις*). This democratic form of Socialism which has insistingly defined as socialism by PASOK is actually nothing but social democracy.

Within this standpoint, neither PASOK nor CHP can be obtained as European-style social democratic parties because ideological origins of both CHP and PASOK have been the Centralism, not Marxism or Socialism. Kemalism, as a

starting point, was not Socialist or Marxist movement either and CHP has never aimed to reach socialism even during the era of the Second CHP under the leadership of Ecevit. That is why the concept of 'democratic left' has been adopted to distinguish the party's stance from European social democracy which is based on a Marxist origin. This approach can be also observed in the speeches of Ecevit but in fact, 'democratic left' is the unique form of social democracy which has been developed according to perceptions and ideological needs of the Turkish society because at the end what Ecevit paradoxically aimed was to join the family of European social democratic parties as he succeeded with the membership of the Socialist International in 1978. The case of PASOK, indeed, seems much closer to the European model because PASOK has aimed to reach socialism, at least on the level of discourses and this is one of the most outstanding difference between PASOK and CHP, however PASOK's origin was based on the Venizelist-Centralist Central Union (EK) and it has been just a coalition of the dynamics of both EK and PAK which means the coalition of the center and the left. Moreover, Papandreou was a pragmatist and populist more than a socialist and this was the reason why PASOK gained a concrete social democratic identity softening the radical socialist speech in 1977 when it became the main opposition. In other word, PASOK as a coalition of the left and the center or working class and the petty bourgeois could not adopt anything else except social democracy which has shaped with 'Pasokist' perception. PASOK had a socialist label but a social democrat or a central left character and structure. Consequently, the political stances of both PASOK and CHP during the periods of Papandreou and Ecevit, independently from how they tried to define themselves, have been social democracy and in fact, their social democratic identities have been hidden in their discourses and policies which have been mostly analysed based on their terms in the government.

'Change' was the main motivation for both PASOK and CHP. Although Papandreou meant to change the regime for a socialist and democratic Greece during the first three years of the party, the end of right-wing rule would be the real change in Greece. As soon as the conditions matured in Greek politics and PASOK gained

power in existing system, it gradually became a system-party. Indeed, PASOK has never been a revolutionary movement conversely it has been a evolutionary movement which had willingness to regulate the system through democracy and parliamentarism. Eventually, in 1981, the 'change' would start being performed through the means of social democracy for creating a welfare state in an evolutionary process by PASOK. In 1968, CHP called the people for a change in the order and this change was not a change in the regime or constitution but what CHP wanted was an implementation of the Constitution with all the articles. What does it mean? The Constitution of 1961 includes many articles which require implementation of a land reform and state control over private enterprises in addition to the series of articles for political and social rights. According to CHP, this ruined and corrupted order could be changed in favor of underprivileged people just by implementing the Constitution of 1961 which is the most democratic constitution of Turkish history.

The emphasis of underprivileged people is one of the most important discourse which can be explicitly observed in the speeches, programs and bulletins of both PASOK and CHP whose target group was the people not a specific class. The statement of Robert Michels which has been noted in the first chapter is crucial to remember the electoral strategy of social democrats in Europe in the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century that "*The labor party becomes the party of the 'people'. Its appeals are no longer addressed simply to the manual workers, but to all 'producers', to the 'entire working population'.*" Moving from the point of social democratic consideration, the emphasis of 'underprivileged' was an absolute social democratic party behavior. Furthermore, for both of them the primary target was to consolidate the social justice because imbalances and inequalities were the actual problems of Greece and Turkey and the words of underprivileged people, social justice and democracy were used during every election campaigns or in every speeches, declarations and bulletins of PASOK and CHP almost without an exception. While the discourse of PASOK was developed through underprivileged and working class, CHP added another category which were the majority of the country: The peasant. Indeed this was the nuance which was emerged according to the countries' condition

in which the parties developed their policies.

Both of them used populism as the best method of a social democratic party to expand the grassroots. In fact, particularly Andreas Papandreou became popular with populism worldwide in this period. Populism was the means of Papandreou to construct a hegemonic discourse and under the conditions of current Greek political system, the most adequate way to run a populist campaign was to escalate the polarization in the society. Within this view, Papandreou asked to the people: “*Either PASOK or the Right*” PASOK’s contribution to polarize the country as left versus right was successful enough moreover it took PASOK to the power at the end. However, the struggle between left and right became meaningless by 1970’s according to the discussions made by the European social democrats in the same period. Indeed, Turkey was not very different from Greece and a sharp polarization between left and right was also the outstanding characteristic of Turkey. Bulent Ecevit was the other populist leader of those decades but while Papandreou purposely contributed to increase the level of the polarization, Ecevit was in efforts to decrease it in Turkey because under the current conditions Ecevit needed stability, at least, in the society. Perhaps starting points were different from each other but the method to reach their target was the same because they were mass parties which have been in a transformation process to get a ‘catch-all’ party character. This is also good example for the discussion between Duverger and Sartori. Duverger’s thesis which indicates the mass parties as class-based parties referring working class can be disproved through the examples of PASOK and CHP and just like Sartori, Duverger’s restriction or narrow perspective can be rejected since PASOK and CHP, themselves, have rejected to be class-based parties stressing the underprivileged. After this parenthesis, it should be indicated that election campaigns and the issues of foreign policy are two significant areas which similar populist discourses of Papandreou and Ecevit are intensively observed.

The most important elections were the 1973 for CHP and 1981 for PASOK and the campaigns which run by the parties had common points. First of all both of them started to strengthen the provincial, youth and women organizations of the

party which were crucial to penetrate more and more people from different segments of the society in order to increase the number of their electorates. Secondly, they removed the rifts within the party for a powerful organization which would be act in a unity. However, while the attitude of Papandreou was an absolutism, Ecevit who had already gained a victory against Inonu preferred to use more democratic ways. The third similarity was about the slogans and promises because both PASOK and CHP promised for a better country. 'Change' was the primary slogan as it has been just mentioned but the promises such as stopping expensiveness, nationalization of the sources, increase in incomes, providing social security and insurances etc., were the other significant common points. CHP called the people to reach together 'to the White Days (Ak Gunlere)' in 1973 and in 1981 PASOK would say its motto: 'PASOK to the government, people to the power'. As social democratic parties, both of them had called the people to join the government because they believed in democracy and particularly, participatory democracy as the other social democrats of the world.

The most striking similarity was their reaction to the issues of foreign policy within the concern of national interest. In this standpoint, both Papandreou and Ecevit had parameters in their foreign policies and those parameters are almost same. According to Papandreou, the issues of foreign policy were formulated with these titles:

*-Anti-American and anti-NATO discourses*

*- 'Greece belongs to the Greeks' or supporting a model of self-reliance in solidarity with other member states of the Third World. (Anti-Western view)<sup>531</sup>*

*-An open-arms policy towards third world countries with an anti-imperialist view*

*-A policy of rapprochement to Soviet Union -by dismissing the Soviet style state socialism-*

*-The threat was not from North, in other words Russia, but from the East which means Turkey.*

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<sup>531</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 96.



Ecevit drew up the parameters of the foreign policy within the frame of a new defence strategy plan:

*-The threat is from the West not from the East*

*-Turkey should lessen its dependence on NATO and the United States*

*-Expand the relations with Third World, the Soviet Union and the Arab nations*

First of all, Greece and Turkey are two countries which their foreign policy usually shape according to each other. In these parameters, it is possible to observe this dynamic. For instance, when CHP defined the threat which was from the West not from East, referring Greece, the definition of PASOK was exactly the opposite and threat was from the East not from the North, referring Turkey (Here, East and North mean the same thing, Soviet Union). These are populist approaches of both leaders but it was also the reactions of two social democratic parties towards the issues in association with the national interest. This is one of the most striking characteristic of the social democratic parties which can be even considered as a weak point. That is why foreign policies and policy making processes of PASOK and CHP have been analysed within this framework.

In the case of CHP, the opium crisis and the Cyprus Operation are the best examples in order to indicate the social democratic party behavior towards national issues. When Ecevit allowed the production of the opium, he had underlined the relation between the opium cultivation and the interest of Turkish people which could not be even negotiated with any country and he would preserve the same attitude during Cyprus crisis. Indeed his speech which he made after the Cyprus Crisis was notable: *“CHP wrote the name of the nationalism in the fields of opium in Afyon and in the seabed of the Aegean. CHP do not learn the nationalism from Demirel or Turkes because CHP wrote the name of the nationalism in the lands of Cyprus”* This nationalist rhetoric was the result of an absolute populism however this was also nationalist action of a social democrat when the issue was about the national interest of his country. The decisions of foreign policy during terms of CHP were very populist but mostly realistic except the second intervention of Cyprus. Even if an extraordinary condition such as Cyprus issue did not emerge during the

period of Papandreou, it is possible to see similar reactions. For instance, when PASOK came to power, the first demand of the party was to withdraw all the American military bases located in Greece because there was a nationwide mistrust towards to USA in Greece and entity of the bases was a threat for national independence of the country. Similarly, one of the most popular promise of PASOK was to leave NATO and EEC. Firstly, Greece had become highly dependent on the military and economic aid of NATO and USA. Secondly, EEC was also an organization which was serving imperialist interests and economic programs of EEC could be against Greek national interests. According to the Dependency Theory, national independence was the precondition for everything and the main dynamic was again the national interest. However, most of the decision, particularly related to NATO and EEC were not realistic and in short time radical discourses were softened by PASOK.

Within the dynamics of foreign policies, other characteristic of PASOK and CHP was their anti-imperialist perception and scepticism towards USA, NATO and EEC. Even if Turkey and Greece were the countries which have acted with the West under the Cold War conditions, both PASOK and CHP succeeded to shift the foreign policy of their countries approaching the Soviet Union and the Third World because as the leaders of the countries which had deep economic and military dependency to the foreign powers, they should have looked for exits to be able to act independently. This was again a result of the concern of national interest and multidimensional foreign policy was a realistic decision for both of them.

In the case of the economic policies, PASOK pursued a successful program within the understanding of social democracy however CHP could not stabilize the Turkish economy. Exactly in this point a deep difference between PASOK and CHP appears: Absence of a codified economic policy of CHP. The first term of Ecevit was just a year and CHP had to focus on the foreign policy due to the crisis and the second term of CHP which started in 1978 coincided with the collapse of the economy due to the second Petroleum crisis and high level foreign debts. Indeed both PASOK and CHP had the similar problems such as balance of payment

problems, inflation or deficit but besides the unluck of Ecevit Government, one of the main reason of the economic failure of social democratic experience in Turkey was the absence of a well-planned economic program which was drawn up within the context of social democracy. That's why despite the incentives to the peasants and increase in incomes, Ecevit Government could not reach the welfare state. PASOK with well-organized income policy which was prepared with a Keynesian approach would bring the welfare to the country even if this new situation caused another problem: The welfare state made the people more demanding than before and the expectations from state increased.

Finally, CHP had Bulent Ecevit and PASOK had Andreas Papandreou. Both of these names were strong and charismatic actors of the political scene. Papandreou meant PASOK and a PASOK could not be considered without him. Bulent Ecevit was the young man who defeated Ismet Inonu and he was the ideolog of new/second CHP. Perhaps a CHP without Ecevit could be possible but democratic left in Turkey could not be perceived without Ecevit. Papandreou was the Andreas of the people who had roll-neck sweater and Ecevit was the Karaoglan whose name was written in the mountains. Both of them were warmly welcomed by their people and their existing was a crucial point in the success of their parties.

As it has been stressed, even though their starting points were different, the methods were the same and the points that they reached were different. Because the conditions and the actors of their own systems were different. In this frame, the first social democratic experience of Turkey was a big earning for Turkish democracy and its contributions to the politics and academy were very crucial however the first experience was defeated in the impasse of the country. It was an experience and as an experience it was successful to create the pillar and frames of social democratic consideration in Turkey but CHP could not bring the stability to the country which was already unstable. It was an unlucky but hopeful chapter of the Turkish political history. CHP would not be able to come to power again but democratic left would continue its way under the umbrella of Democratic Left Party (DSP) under the leadership of Ecevit until 2002.

The first social democratic experience of Greece with PASOK was a story of success despite the radical problems which lately appeared on the level of economy and society. PASOK could transform the social structure and recover the society. Indeed, long and tiring years after, the Greek people could finally breathe. PASOK was the designer of new Greece and just because of this reason, today, if someone asks what PASOK is, you can answer: PASOK is the last 40 years of the Greek people. By the beginning of 1990's the transition period or in other word metapolitefsi has been completed.

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
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## APPENDICES

### PASOK



3 September 1974 -Foundation of PASOK, Andreas Papandreu



3 September 1974 -Foundation of PASOK, Andreas Papandreu





A Banner For the Election of 1974




Banners For the Election 1981



Banner For the Election of 1981



Banner For the Election of 1981



Banners For the Election of 1981



Banner For the Election of 1985



Eleftheotyia -19 October 1981, The Result of the Election of 1981



Banner For the Election of 1981



Andreas Papandreou with the new PA.SO.K. administration.



Andreas Papandreou with President Christos Sartzetakis.




## «ΠΑΚ» και «Δημοκρατική Αμυνα» ένοποιήθησαν εις τὸ «ΠΑΣΟΚ»

Οἱ κ.κ. Παπανδρέου καὶ Καραγιωργας ἀνέπτυξαν εἰς συγκέντρωσιν τούτους σκοπούς καὶ τὰς ἐπιδιώξεις




## CHP




Bulent Ecevit and Six Arrows of Kemalism

Ecevit'i Atatürk ve Altıok'tan kopmuş olmakla suçlayanlara karşılık halk kitleleri onu CHP ve Altıok'a tam bağlılık içinde saydı ve bu partinin propaganda malzemelerinde de kullandı.





Ismet Inonu and Bulent Ecevit




Even if CHP was the first party of the Election, it could not foram a government.



Suleyman Demirel, Bulent Ecevit, Alparslan Turkes and Necmettin Erbakan




Multidimensional Foreign Policy... Ecevit is with the Imperialist and Anti-imperialis States



Caricatures After Cyprus Operation





“We will change the ruined order!”  
CHP

*Ecevit, yıldönümü dolayısıyla bir demec verdi*

## Değişen dünyanın yeni düzeni ülkede CHP. nin tutumuyla kurulacaktır

*bağımsızlık savaşının doğurduğu C.H.P., bu tutumuyla, değişen dünya koşulları içinde de Türk bağımsızlığının teminatı olacaktır*

CHP'nin kırkbeşinci yıldönümü dolayısıyla dün bir demec veren CHP Genel Sekreteri Bulent Ecevit, "değişen dünyanın düzenini Türkiye'de CHP'nin tutumuyla kuracaktır. Bağımsızlık savaşının doğurduğu bu tutumuyla, değişen dünya koşulları içinde de Türk bağımsızlığının teminatı olacaktır."

Ecevit'in demeci şöyle:

Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, tekel ve özlendeki illkelerle olarak kendi kendini yenilemiş bir devrimci parti yapısında ve tutumunda bir yer alan değişiklikler, bir kendi kendini yenilemenin sonucudur. Ayrıca birlikte Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi'nin büyük devrimci bir partideki bu yeni niteliğinin emniyetini, Türk milletine teslim etmiştir.

MUT İŞÇİLERİNİZİ, çıkarılardan, peden bakanlardan arın. İstisna ve kullum...



**Satır : C.H.P. / yeni bir şahlanma devrine girmiştir**

İSTANBUL (ÖZEL) CHP'nin 45 nci kuruluş yıldönümü dolayısıyla, CHP grup başkanı vekili Dr. Kemal Satır aşağıda ki beyanını vermiştir: «Partimiz bugün 45 nci yılın son gününü yaşamıyor. Yarın peride milletimiz, mazlum milletlere yol gösteren şerefli his-metlerle dolu 45 yıl ba-

“New order of changing world will be establish in Turkey with CHP”  
Bulent Ecevit



To the White Days !

10 Temmuz 1974 Pazartesi

# Hürriyet

TÜRKİYE TÜRKLERİNDİR SİTE : 27 - No: 9427  
TALPUNLAR, 25.00 TL (1974)  
GÜNÜMLÜK: 20.00 TL (1974)  
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GÜNLÜK MUSTAKİL SİYASİ GAZETE  
MİLLİYET EKİMLERİ (1909-1980)  
FİYAT: 100.00 TL  
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## Ecevit.bugün Haşhaş bölgesinde

**Onbinlerce üretici Afyon'da toplanıyor**

Üreticiler: «Amerika neden bizi anlamıyor. Haşhaş yağıyla, küspesiyle, tohumuyla insanlığa hizmet eden bir bitkidir. Kaçakçıya göz yummasınlar. Kursunlar fabrikaya, bir gram bile afyon kaçakçıya satılmaz. Türk halkı omurludur» diyorlar


**Selām olsun Amerika'ya**

Ulku Arman

Hashas üreticisinin dört isteği var

- 1 Tazminatlar hemen ödenmeli
- 2 Haşhaş ekim şartları açıklansın
- 3 Afyon'a alkoloit fabrikası kurulsun
- 4 Atölye sahipleri kredi almalı

“Ecevit is, today, in the opium area”



The end of the hope!