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*To my Family*

## **ACRONYMS**

CFSP: Common Foreign and Security Policy

CSDP: Common Security and Defense Policy

EC: European Commission

EDA: European Defense Agency

EDF: European Defense Fund

EEAS: European External Action Service

EP: European Parliament

EU: European Union

HR/VP: High Representative/Vice-President

HR: High Representative

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization

PESCO: Permanent Structured Cooperation

QMV: Qualified Majority Vote

TEU: Treaty of the European Union

UK: United Kingdom

UN: United Nations

UNGA: United Nations General Assembly

UNSC: United Nations Security Council

USA: United States of America

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## Abstract

The Lisbon Treaty, which was activated at the end of 2009, is a milestone in European Union's (EU) development with a significant impact on the critical sector of European foreign and security policy. Two of the main innovations of this reform treaty, aiming at strengthening the EU in the area of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), are firstly, the enhanced role of the High Representative (HR), who became at the same time the Vice-President of the European Commission (EC), and secondly, the European External Action Service (EEAS) with duties similar to those of national ministries of foreign affairs.

On the other hand, the institutional changes brought about by the Lisbon Treaty caused intense concerns about the status of EU representation in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) as it had been since 1974. However, with the United Nations (UN) Resolution 65/276 (2011), the representation problem was overcome. As the studies have shown so far, the above changes seem to have had a positive effect, at least in matters of coherence between EU member-states. However, there was no particular improvement concerning the EU's visibility compared to the *pro* Lisbon period. The above terms are considered particularly important for the EU's influence, due to the fact that the UN is the largest transnational forum where binding decisions are taken by its members.

In the case of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the Lisbon Treaty did not appear to have a direct influence, as the presence of the EU institutions was roughly at the same levels it was in the pre-Lisbon era. Due to the limited participation within the UNSC, the presence of the EU member-states, even with some reservations, could be evaluated with other indicators such as the internal coordination, voting divergence and co-sponsor initiative in resolutions.

Finally, concerning the EU's involvement in crisis management situations, diachronically its role remains complementary to the actions of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the UN. If the EU wants to undertake initiatives of strategic autonomy, which will strengthen it within its existing alliances, it should have to overcome internal institutional weaknesses as well as make a common and clear conceptualization of the external strategy it wants to follow.

**Keywords:** European Union, Lisbon Treaty, Common Foreign and Security Policy, United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Crisis Management

## Introduction

Undoubtedly, signing the Lisbon Treaty (or the Reform Treaty) is an intersection point in the evolution of the architecture of the European institutional structure. It essentially emerged out of the ferment resulting from the Convention and the Intergovernmental Conference that followed in the aftermath of the failure to ratify the Constitutional Treaty in 2005. As Puetter (2012, p. 23), points out: *“This is all the more important as the Convention was charged with reflecting on both the scope of EU policy competences and the appropriateness of governance mechanisms”*.

Concerning the EU’s foreign policy and security, which is the subject of this study, it has always been a particular issue due to its highly intergovernmental nature and the principle of unanimity in the decision-making process, which has often created obstacles to new initiatives and the process of EU integration in general. Nevertheless, it has never ceased to be inspired by liberal democratic values, which is a characteristic and fundamental feature of the entire EU dynamic. In this context, through a series of institutional changes and innovations under the Lisbon Treaty, the EU has sought to strengthen its international role and presence. The enhanced role of the HR for CFSP and the functioning of the EEAS, play an important role in this restructuring.

One of the most important venues for the EU’s external presence is the UN, as it is the longest-running and largest transnational decision-making forum in the world. It has been in existence since 1945, in the aftermath of the Second World War, with two decision-making bodies: The General Assembly, in which all recognized sovereign states can participate on an equal footing, each with the right to one vote in the decision-making process, and the Security Council, responsible for international peace-keeping. In the latter, excluding the ten non-permanent members, since its inception, the United States of America (USA) and Russia (former Soviet Union) have been permanent members, while Britain, France and China joined the permanent members club because of their capabilities at the time (military and otherwise) and because of their general historical achievements. All the above five major powers were given the power of veto (Kissinger, 2014).

Thus, and in line with existing research, the way in which the EU’s presence in the UNGA evolved during the first years of the Lisbon Treaty will be studied and in conjunction with the UN Resolution 65/276 (2011). In order to do this, reference will be made to the institutional framework of the EU representation, and how the above

institutional innovations affected the coherence and visibility of the EU and its member-states. Additionally, the European presence in the UNSC for the period 2010-2019 will be analyzed, with reference to variables such as institutional representation, as well as internal coordination, voting divergence and the co-sponsor initiative in resolutions by the EU member-states. In this case, this period was methodologically chosen, as the Lisbon Treaty was put into force at the end of 2009, while it is also a period equivalent to two full terms of office of the new position of the High Representative/Vice President (HR/VP), Baroness Catherine Ashton and Federica Mogherini. Although, the EU invests in multilateralism, in the UN it is often difficult to achieve, as it requires high coordination between the EU member-states and the EU institutions. If there is no high alignment, there is risk of being undermined from within as it has been done in the past (Bourantonis, 2019, p. 116).

Furthermore, the security architecture of the EU will be examined through the institutional framework and the strengths of the CFSP/Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) in matters of crisis management. An important part in this analysis will be its interaction and cooperation with the initiatives of other international partners in crisis management situations, such as the UN and NATO. In parallel, it will be examined whether the dynamics of Lisbon or other initiatives such as the document of *Global Strategy*, helped to overcome obstacles which acted as a brake on this sector and whether the EU is at a ripe stage to discuss for its strategic autonomy and if so in which direction it should move.

Primarily, however, it was considered appropriate to make an effort to comprehensively approach the concept around which the EU's foreign and security policy is based, as well as its dimensions. Finally, two important innovations brought about by the Lisbon Treaty with a significant impact on the effectiveness of the CFSP will be analyzed: the institution of the HR/VP as well as its executive arm, the EEAS.

## **Chapter 1**

### **The Imprint of the Lisbon Treaty on the CFSP**

#### **1.1 Approaching the EU's Foreign Policy and Security**

Although the EU's first attempts to pursue a common line in foreign policy and security had already begun in the 1950s, the first formal steps were taken in the early 1990s. All intermediate efforts, such as the proposal for the creation of a European Defense Community with supranational character in 1954 or the Foucet plan in the 1960s, failed with the result that the primacy of defense of Western Europe remained in the hands of NATO throughout the Cold War (Juncos, 2022, p. 301).

The creation of the European Political Cooperation in the late 60s, was the first serious attempt of dialogue development in foreign and security policy issues, as it managed to bring member-states around the negotiating table on a regular basis in search for common ground. It had an informal and voluntary character. Such discussions were formalized in 1986, with the Single European Act (Sjursen, 2015, p. 891). However, the dysfunctional structure of European Political Cooperation, which tried to strike a balance between its strongly intergovernmental and less supranational character, combined with its inability to respond to international crises in Balkan Peninsula in early 1990s (dissolution of Yugoslavia, Bosnian war), led to the initiative for the creation of the CFSP, as defined in the Maastricht Treaty in 1993. The CFSP was the second "intergovernmental" pillar, within the three-pillar system of Maastricht (the first pillar dealt with Community issues such as trade and internal policies and the third with Justice and Home Affairs), and since then it has not lost its intergovernmental character, as mention below (Juncos, 2022, p. 302).

Fundamentally, EU foreign policy and security is a policy domain that cannot be analyzed in a one-dimensional way. This can also be understood institutionally through the EU treaties, with the CFSP together with the CSDP as its integral part at the one pole and "external action" and "external dimension of internal policies" at the other.

Through the ever-strengthening institution of the CFSP, the EU is shaping its external diplomatic strategy. Additionally, it enhances the EU's foreign policy arsenal, by taking mediation initiatives in dealing with the challenges of international matters and more generally, it promotes the interests on the Union's foreign policy agenda. The CFSP initiatives on crisis management issues are implemented through the equally

intergovernmental institution of the CSDP. The CSDP was introduced in early 2000s, while its official hypostasis was given by the Lisbon Treaty in 2009.<sup>1</sup> It deals with and participates in military operations and civilian missions especially, in the wider “neighborhood” of Europe and in Africa, however, it does not act autonomously but the EU members-states choose to contribute voluntarily and complementary to NATO or other coalitions (actions especially on the military side).

As for the other pole that complements the EU’s diplomatic quiver, the “external actions”, it includes policies, mainly of an economic nature with third partners such as economic and trade cooperation, humanitarian aid, sanctions and other agreements. Such policies-actions are considered among the oldest within the European structure, having started to develop in the late 1950s under the European Economic Community. Concerning the “external dimension of internal policies”, which are essentially policy choices on issues such as migration, the environment or energy, although they are internal policies, they also have an impact outside the EU, such policies began to mature more systematically in the 1990s.

Another additional variable that does not belong purely to the above categorization but arises from the Treaties and influences the formulation of European foreign policy, is the “foreign policies of the member-states”. This dimension was developed around the idea that cooperation between national foreign policies is an equally important factor in promoting a horizontal European foreign policy (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2014, pp. 11-13)

On an ideological level, the EU’s foreign and security policy is surrounded by a system, which essentially reflects its identity as an institution. This system is composed with a set of principles and values which includes the respect to democratic ideals as well as to the rule of law and human rights, while adopting the normative framework of international law and the rules of the UN Charter. Diachronically, however, the identification and delimitation of a specific objective around which European foreign policy should be oriented has been neglected, while any initiative is limited to bilateral cooperation schemes (Puetter, 2012, pp. 23-24). This was also reaffirmed in the Lisbon Treaty. Despite any institutional will, there was no transfer of national competences to the European level (Koppa, 2022, p. 51).

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<sup>1</sup> The Treaty was signed in December 2007 and entered into force in December 2009.

This particularity surrounding the EU's foreign policy and security has also been reflected in the decision-making process. Though, compared to its predecessors, the Lisbon Treaty places particular emphasis on the production of joint and binding decisions with the methods of co-decision and qualified majority voting (QMV), the sector of the CFSP continued to deviate entirely. As mentioned in Article 24.1 of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU), the decisions are taken by unanimity while, decisions through legislative acts are prohibited. In this intergovernmental system, the European Council (Heads of State and Government) and the Council (Foreign Ministers), are the competent institutions that draw up policies and make decisions (Puetter, 2012, p. 25). On the other hand, exceptionally, the QMV may be used in the following cases: Firstly, in the procedure of the appointment of EU special representatives by the Council, secondly, when implementing an existing decision adopted by the Council acting unanimously or/and in a European Council decision on the prioritization of EU strategic options, also on a proposal from the High Representative (HR), for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy at the specific request of the European Council, and lastly, a further specialized procedure, is in the case of the clause of *passarelle*, where the European Council, by unanimity, may extend the cases where the Council could decide with QMV (Smith, 2020, p. 239).

Concerning the role of other EU institutions in the CFSP issues is largely limited, albeit, many times problems arise at the boundaries of competences. For instance, the European Court of Justice has no jurisdiction, so the EC cannot appeal in cases of non-compliance. Furthermore, the EC cannot control/determine agenda items. The Council, for its part, does not cooperate with the European Parliament (EP) in decision-making issues (Riddervold, Trondal & Newsome, 2021, p. 546). However, already since the Maastricht Treaty, the latter has the right to consult on foreign and security policy issues, mainly at an introductory level, and to submit questions and recommendations to the Council. Additionally, the EC has a constant presence in all institutions of the CFSP and enjoys -not exclusive- initiative rights. Nonetheless, a key problem to the EU's external relations is that the scope of competences is not always clearly predefined, and as a result the institutions are crossed over. In particular, foreign policy and/or security issues cannot be easily split from development issues, which are the responsibility of the EC, resulting in the phenomenon of "mixed competence" with the Council. Corresponding phenomena are also created during the execution of CFSP decisions, as they require resources from the European budget and other

implementation tools which are under the auspices of the EC. An equally important intrusion of supranational institutions into the intergovernmental structure of the CFSP, occurs in cases where the EP with the Council conclude in foreign policy and security inter-institutional agreements or in the EC's legislations in defense supplies which have a direct impact on the intergovernmental body of European Defense Agency (EDA) (Sjursen, 2015, pp. 894-895).

Unquestionably, the CFSP is a major internal dare for the European structure. As it touches and directly affects the national core, its member-states do not look favorably on horizontal cooperation initiatives, especially in the defense sector. Nevertheless, the emergence of external crises requiring a collective response, could have a positive effect on CFSP integration, making this institution potentially acquire distinctive supranational characteristics and less intergovernmental (Riddervold *et al*, 2021, p. 546).

## **1.2 Upgrading the role of High Representative**

The position of the HR was institutionally provided for by the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999 and according to Article J (8)3 of the Treaty, the position had a purely subsidiary role in the Council's Presidency. In particular, the HR was the Secretary-General of the Council. Their responsibilities were limited to the area of political decisions in foreign policy and security issues, as it assisted both to their preparation and formulation and to their implementation while, it could only "build" communication networks with third partners at the request of the Presidency (Article J (16) (Di Vita, 2020, pp. 139-140). Javier Solana was appointed as the first HR and for ten consecutive years, a key figure in Euro-Atlantic relations, as he had served as NATO Secretary General (Koppa, 2022, p. 38).

With the Lisbon Treaty, the HR position was upgraded, with a direct impact on the architecture of the CFSP. The HR became *ex officio* both HR for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Vice-President of the EC. With its dual capacity, as HR is the head in the works of the EU Foreign Affairs Council with the right to submit proposals, presiding over the talks of the CFSP and is the lead authority of the EDA. Alongside, as EC's Vice President, is mainly responsible for the EU's external coordination and coherence. The work of the High Representative/Vice President (HR/VP), is supported by the EEAS, which he/she also leads, and through the EU

Delegations, the EU its policies and priorities are represented in third countries and international organizations. In addition, all CFSP related to initiatives of the EC should be taken with the agreement and cooperation of the HR/VP (Junkos, 2022, pp. 309-310). Furthermore, the HR/VP presiding at the informal meetings of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Development and Defense which are carried out in the country which holds the six-month Rotating Council Presidency whilst, he/she also participates in the European Council meetings. The officials of the EEAS on behalf of the HR/VP, preside in the meetings of the Political and Security Committee and in the working groups of CFSP in the Council. On the other hand, EEAS officials, have no authority in the Committee of Permanent Representatives-Coreper (Di Vita, 2020, pp. 140-141).

Additionally, the HR/VP as head of the EU's Foreign Affairs Council, has the right to call extra meetings and he/she is obliged to monitor the implementation of the European Council's and the Council's decisions. Equally important is its mediation role in the event that a member-state raises a disagreement on CFSP decision. In the pre-Lisbon period such problems were brought to the European Council for resolution, but as an option it still exists under the Lisbon Treaty. Thus, under the revised framework, automatically, the Rotating Council Presidency influence remains only in the other Council's formations while in CFSP matters are almost annihilated and passes into the hands of the HR/VP, with a key position in the whole spectrum of the political process (Puetter, 2012, p. 27).

On the opposite side, this merger *de facto* creates a hybrid position that straddles the line between intergovernmentalism and supranationalism, that is, between the mandates of the Council and the independence of the EC. At the end of the day, however, the Council's logic prevails over the EC's when it comes to decision-making process, with the result that the HR/VP, EC's official, has less freedom of action than his/her colleagues in the EC, who also manage external relations issues. Additionally, the HR/VP cannot undertake its "external action" with third partners, if the Council has not previously developed priorities and agreed on a single line of implementation. Equally importantly, the implementation of the HR/VP activities depends on the resources that the EU can release (financial, military), which the latter has no authority to manage.

Another variable that could undermine the effectiveness of the HR/VP work, is that in cases of overlapping with other institutional bodies that can influence the EU's foreign policy. Such phenomena can be observed in cases of the six-months Rotating

Council's Presidency, the Presidents of the European Council or/and the EC, commissioners who run foreign policy issues but also at a national level and specifically, the heads of states and governments and their ministers.

Nevertheless, the above merger of positions consists a valuable tool for the effective development of European foreign policy, as the HR/VP has the ability to supervise and oversee all stages of the policy-making (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2014, pp. 79-80). Formulating a common strategy on the foreign and security policy agenda is always a difficult task, especially when sensitive national issues collide with other (in this case EU's), priorities. However, coherence in foreign policy will always be a challenge.

### **1.3 The EEAS: An Executive Arm of Foreign and Security Policy**

An equally important breakthrough of the Lisbon Treaty with an immediate impact on EU's CFSP, was the creation of the EEAS, a diplomatic service, which as mentioned in the previous section, is intended to assist the work of the HR/VP which is the head. Although, it has similar characteristics to the respective national Foreign Ministries, a key difference is that it also deals with crisis management issues, a subject which is normally the responsibility of Defense Ministries (Juncos, 2022, pp. 309-310).

The only reference to its establishment, is made in a rather vague manner in Article 27(3) of the TEU while the principle of creating such a service was initiated in the European Convention during the discussions of the Working Group on External Action. In march 2010, the first HR/VP, Baroness Catherine Ashton, submitted to the Council a request for approval to make the EEAS body operational, and since then this proposal has been the bone of contention for the member-states and especially for the European Parliament. However, the HR/VP managed to bridge any gaps, objections and disagreements and on July 26, 2010, the Council adopted a Decision of constituent. In just six months all the necessary legislative acts (financial regulation, staff regulation, initial budget) were completed, with the EEAS being inaugurated on 1 December 2010. Notwithstanding, it became operational exactly one month later, when officials who had previously served on the Council and the EC, were transferred to this newly created body (Blockmans & Laatsit, 2012, pp. 140-141). A further percentage of the order of one third, shall be made up of seconded officials from EU member-states serving in equivalent diplomatic services (Juncos, 2022, p. 310). The philosophy of

staffing the EEAS with officials with foreign policy experience but coming from different professional backgrounds (the Council Secretariat, EC and the services from the EU member-states), is based on the concept of merging expertise.

At the same time, the Delegations, which until then had been operating on behalf of the EC, were denatured in an organic part of EEAS. The approximately 140 Delegations represents the EU abroad, replacing the Rotating Council Presidency, while in its responsibilities is included the EU representation not only in Community matters (such as trade), but in political as well. Moreover, in their obligations was also included the representation of joint CFSP decisions, the delivering of diplomatic demarches upon decision of EU Foreign Affairs Council which headed by the HR/VP. Lastly, their cooperation with the diplomatic services of the EU member-states is a given and essential (Maurer, 2021, p. 359).

The Council Decision identifies the EEAS as autonomous service and not subject to the General Secretariat of the Council and the EC. However, it does not have the right to produce decisions addressed to third parties with individual and binding content. Additionally, the Article 2(2) of the Council's Decision states that the EEAS, in the exercise of its sectoral tasks, should act in an ancillary capacity both to the President of the European Council and to the President of the EC and to the EC in total. Therefore, the EEAS, in addition to the HR/VP, is subject to other political superiors (Blockmans & Laatsit, 2012, p. 142).

Regarding the whole range of EEAS actions, the EEAS Council Decision recognizes the close cooperation between the HR/VP and the EEAS with the EC during the planning and preparing of decisions while, all proposals must follow the EC's procedural framework and be submitted to the EC for approval (Blockmans & Laatsit, 2012, p. 150). More specifically, the EEAS deals primarily with the financial part of the projects, in planning and programming issues, while, the EC focuses on preparation and implementation. Possibly, this separation of arrangements, create the perception to the EC, that it could become an executive agency of the EEAS, so it sought to retain control of the procedures. A similar phenomenon can be also observed in the EU Delegations. Although, the manpower of both EEAS and the EC operate under the guidance of the Head of Delegations, the Financial and Staff Regulations shows why EC employees are primarily accountable in Brussels and specifically to their Directorates-General. This has often led EEAS staff, to appear "weaker" in their effectiveness and in the performance of their foreign policy tasks in general. Their

officials in charge of CSFP/CSDP is understaffed in correlation with the employees which are connected with the EC, as they constitute the majority in EU Delegations, with mainly responsibilities dealing with trade, development, operational budgets and other financial issues (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2014, pp. 84-85).

Thus, a main objective of the EEAS is coherence both horizontally and vertically. In the case of horizontal coherence, the EEAS should essentially act as an effective link for cooperation between the EU institutions, while vertical coherence concerns cooperation between the EU and its member-states (Smith, 2020, p. 240). The initiative to hold regular meetings between the Heads of the European Delegations and the ambassadors of the EU member-states is an initiative in this direction (Di Vita, 2020, pp. 142-143).

Apart from the EEAS, another body directly linked to the HR/VP, and consequently, the external profile, activeness and effectiveness of the EU, is the Special Representatives. Their agenda of responsibilities is set by the HR/VP and they usually serving in third regions facing crises on their territory (such as Kosovo, the Sahel Region, the Middle East peace process, Afghanistan, Central Asia etc.), while one EU Special Representative is responsible for Human Rights issues. Their relationship with the EU Delegations and more generally with the rest of the EEAS crisis management system, does not always operate within predefined frameworks, resulting in confusion in the execution of activities (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2014, p. 83).

By the time Baroness Catherine Ashton handed over to the new HR/VP, Federica Mogherini, in 2014, and despite the structural problems that arose from the outset, the EEAS has become an effective institutional representative of the EU, capable of promoting its interests and values. Nonetheless, the area of foreign policy is still an area of conflicting interests between national governments and the EU, and within EU (mainly between the European Council and the General Affairs Council), which complicates the work of the HR/VP and the EEAS (Westlake, 2020, pp. 256-258). Notwithstanding, it is quite encouraging that EU member-states have consciously chosen to balance national and European diplomatic representation and cooperate accordingly (Juncos, 2022, p. 310).

Finally, it is worth noting that the EEAS was launched in a period of global economic recession, with EU member-states adopting contractionary economic policies, a situation which directly affected its funding and thus its effectiveness. Respectively, a series of other external and internal crises during the first years of its

existence (see table 1), marked the EU's strategic thinking on foreign policy and security perception, and therefore, the course and evolution of the EEAS.

**Table 1**  
EEAS and European Crises (2009-2018)

	<b>European Crises</b>		<b>EEAS Milestones</b>
<b>2009</b>			Catherine Ashton appointed as HR/VP
<b>2010</b>	European debt crisis	From Arab spring to instability in Mediterranean (especially Syria)	Council Decision establishing the organization and functioning of the EEAS
<b>2011</b>			
<b>2012</b>			
<b>2013</b>			EEAS Review
<b>2014</b>	Migration crisis	Euromaidan, Russian annexation of Crimea	Federica Mogherini appointed as HR/VP
<b>2015</b>			
<b>2016</b>		Populist rise	EU Global Strategy
<b>2017</b>			
<b>2018</b>			

Adapted from the book *The Palgrave Handbook of EUCrises*, in M. Riddervold, J. Trondal & A. Newsome (eds.), 2021, Table 19.1, p. 361. © Springer Nature.

## **Chapter 2**

### **Lisbon Innovations in International Fora: The Case of the United Nations**

#### **2.1 The EU Status at the UN: The UNGA and Resolution 65/276**

The presence of the European Community/EU in the UNGA with an observer status, dates back to 1974. The UNGA, is the UN's largest consultative body, with an agenda that covers a wide range of social challenges/issues such as human rights, the environment, international law, etc., which need immediate attention and long-term strategic planning. Given that both the UN and the EU fundamentally share the same principles and values, cooperation between them came as a natural consequence (Paasivirta & Ramopoulos, 2019, pp. 59-60).

Until 2011, the EU was represented by the EC in the UNGA, however without voting right, while the EU representative could take the floor after all participating states had completed their speeches (Pirozzi, 2012, p. 95). Concerning, the member-state which held the six-months Rotating Council Presidency, was the voice of the EU member-states, as it was responsible for representing their views in the UNGA formal meetings, on issues that were mainly of political character or regarding foreign and security policy (Bourantonis, 2019, p. 117). With the introduction of the Lisbon Treaty, apart from the fact that the EU gained legal personality, the international representation of the Union, has changed radically. The country holding the six-months Rotating Council Presidency, ceased to speak on behalf of the EU in international fora, and this responsibility was entrusted to the newly established institution of the HR/VP as well as to the President of the European Council. These institutional changes within the EU, raised concerns about its representation in the UNGA. The EU Delegation in New York, did not mean that with the Lisbon Treaty changes it would automatically have an observer status in the UNGA with the same rights, as was the case with the EC and the six-months Rotating Council Presidency, from which it arose after the merger of the latter two (Blavoukos, Bourantonis, Galariotis & Gianniou, 2016, pp. 35-36).

In order to overcome this ambiguity, the EU after consultations both intra with its member-states and with the UN officials and other countries, decided to make a first attempt in September 2010, to upgrade its presence, coherence and effectiveness in UNGA. This was expressed by selecting a draft entitled *Participation of the European Union in the Work of the United Nations*, which provided an “enhanced observer

status”, as in the case of Palestine, which is not recognized as a state entity, and the Holy See, which is a nonmember-state (Blavoukos, Bourantonis & Galariotis, 2017, p. 457).

Notwithstanding, this attempt did not bear fruit. On the one hand, the United Kingdom (UK), expressed its objections to the extended EU representation prerogatives. On the other hand, a group of countries from the Caribbean Community and the Common Market Group-CARICOM, African states, Pacific and Latin American governments, as well as India and China felt that such a prospect would open the floodgates to the position and rights of regional organizations within the UN in relation to states (Pirozzi, 2012, p. 95). Given that in several of the above-mentioned states, the EU has made significant contributions through development programs, their attitude has also shown that these tools in the EU’s foreign policy toolbox do not always increase its influence in the desired direction (Keukeleire & Delreux 2014, p. 309). Additionally, the over-optimism created within the EU after the Lisbon Treaty made European officials underestimate the situation and take the EU’s upgrade in the UNGA for granted as well.

In parallel, the EU’s draft has failed, for another two reasons: Firstly, due to the transitional institutional framework resulting from the Lisbon Treaty, the way in which the EU’s external policy was conducted was not crystallized. The HR/VP Catherine Ashton, took office in December 2009, while the assist body of the EEAS was established in July 2010 and became operational in January 2011. As a result, there was no central core strategic planning to drive the resolution forward and the efforts that were made were unorganized by the EU member-state, from the still active Rotating Council Presidency and the EU Delegation in New York. Secondly, the time of the submission of the draft resolution. The draft, was submitted for distribution in late July 2010, when the General Assembly was not fully active and officially in late August. Although, it was temporally convenient for the EU, as an acceptance of the draft would find it strengthened by the next regular session starting in September, in practice it did not help as it could neither negotiate with as many members of the UNGA as possible (states and regional organizations), nor the latter have sufficient time to work on the draft (Blavoukos *et al.*, 2017, pp. 457-459).

In order to reverse the negative climate created at the General Assembly on September 2010, on 3 May 2011, the EU taking into account the concerns of small and medium-sized states in UN, submitted an amended draft resolution which was voted

through, achieving strong legitimacy, as it was passed with 180 votes in favor, 0 against and 2 abstentions, and was adopted as Resolution 65/276 (Bourantonis, 2019, p. 119). According to the Resolution 65/276 (2011), the EU representatives are:

- *“Allowed to be inscribed on the list of speakers among representatives of major groups, in order to make interventions;*
- *Invited to participate in the general debate of the General Assembly, in accordance with the order of precedence as established in the practice for participating observers and the level of participation;*
- *Permitted to have its communications relating to the sessions and work of the General Assembly and to the sessions and work of all international meetings and conferences convened under the auspices of the Assembly and of United Nations conferences, circulated directly, and without intermediary, as documents of the Assembly, meeting or conference;*
- *Also permitted to present proposals and amendments orally as agreed by the States members of the European Union; such proposals and amendments shall be put to a vote only at the request of a Member State;*
- *Allowed to exercise the right of reply regarding positions of the European Union as decided by the presiding officer; such right of reply shall be restricted to one intervention per item”.*

On the other hand, Resolution 65/276 included some limitations. In particular, the above rights are not applicable to other UN (subsidiary) organs whilst, the EU cannot co-sponsoring draft resolutions, to vote, to propose officials in the UN or to raise points of order (Paasivirta & Ramopoulos, 2019, p. 65).<sup>2</sup> Alongside, it is worth noting that, an important innovation of Resolution 65/276 compared to the previous EU draft, was that even if there is not a high degree of integration, regional organizations, and not exclusively the EU, can have single representation with the respective observer rights, if this is agreed among states (Blavoukos & Bourantonis, 2017, pp. 47-53· Blavoukos *et al.*, 2017, p. 461).

Thus, and in combination with the Lisbon Treaty provisions, the EU is represented in UNGA, by the EU Delegation in the UN (New York). Key responsibilities of the EU Delegation are the internal coordination of the EU member-states and consultation between them, so that the EU presents itself in UNGA through

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<sup>2</sup> For the full text, see A/RES/65/276, available in: <https://undocs.org/A/RES/65/276>.

common positions. A corresponding supporting and bridging role, which is also shown, during the UNGA's voting procedure. Lastly, the President of the European Council, once a year, in general debate of UNGA, appears and gives a speech, presenting the EU's general positions and priorities in UNGA for the current year (Hosli, 2022, p. 85).

In all this necessary crescendo of institutional changes in EU representation it is necessary to clarify, that the specific EU representation regime applies, only to the UNGA and not to all UN bodies (or to other international organizations) (Bourantonis, 2019, p. 120).

## **2.2 Lisbon Treaty and Resolution 65/276 in Practice: Visibility and Coherence**

Although, the adoption of Resolution 65/276 in May 2011, was not in full alignment with the EU's original intentions, in any case the new institutional framework facilitated its ambitions for a continuous and stronger presence in the overall framework after the Lisbon Treaty (Gianniou, Galariotis & Asimakopoulos, 2015, p. 90). Given that UNGA, is the most important international forum for policy and decision making with global influence, the extent to which visibility and coherence is achieved between the EU and its member-states is particularly important in terms of the EU's presence as a single political entity capable of influencing international developments (Blavoukos *et al.*, 2016, p. 37).

Until December 2009, a period which the Lisbon Treaty came into force and corresponding to the work of the UNGA 64<sup>th</sup> session, the number of oral interventions of the Rotating Presidency were 132 and during the 69<sup>th</sup> session (11/2014-11/2015), this number was reduced to 32. On the other hand, the number of interventions made by the EU Delegation in 64<sup>th</sup> session was just 3 and in the 69<sup>th</sup> session this number increased to 82. Though, it is not easy to separate the degree of influence, both the Lisbon Treaty and the Resolution 65/276 have had a catalytic effect on this contrasting relationship.

Concerning the EU's visibility at the UNGA (i.e., the sum of the oral interventions of all the EU institutions of representation and the EU member-states), since December 2009, when the Lisbon Treaty was activated, the EU interventions in the UNGA have continued to remain at the same levels. This proves that the changes brought about by Lisbon within the EU did not affect its representation in the Assembly (Blavoukos *et al.*, 2016, pp. 38-40). The European institutions seem to have been

properly prepared for the change of representation from the Rotating Presidency to the EU Delegation (Gianniou *et al.*, 2015, p. 94). However, this stability demonstrates that the Lisbon changes have not given a positive boost to the EU's visibility in terms of its representation in the UNGA in the short-term level. This may be due to the fact that the EEAS had not fully assumed its tasks.

In addition, since the adoption of Resolution 65/276, there has been a decrease in the EU's interventions in the UNGA, which lasted throughout the 66<sup>th</sup> session (11/2011-11/2012), despite the fact that it has ensured that its participation will be in the first positions of the list speakers and could present the common European position from the outset. This downward trend has arisen as a result of disagreement among EU member-states, particularly on the part of the UK over the overall status of their representation by the EU in international organizations and as it follows from Resolution 65/276. More specifically, the UK considered that foreign policy issues belong to national core and that member-states cannot be represented of the EU institutions. Nevertheless, this obstacle was overcome as the UK and the other EU member-states adopted a text of "general agreements", clarifying the EU's representation in international organizations.

This downward trend in EU's visibility reappeared at the 69<sup>th</sup> session while, in the intervening period (67<sup>th</sup> and 68<sup>th</sup> session) interventions were on the rise. In essence, the decrease that reappeared at the 69<sup>th</sup> session is due to the respective reduced interventions of the EU member-states (whether they are formally aligned with the latter's positions or not). Certainly, such a reduction, if continued in the future, will result in a different picture of the EU's positive overall representation in the UNGA.

Lastly, as regards EU's coherence, it was one of the main objectives of Resolution 65/276. Until the 66<sup>th</sup> session, it has been observed that, there is an increase in national positions that do not align themselves with EU positions. This came as a result of internal conflicts within the EU regarding the EU's external representation regime as mentioned above. However, from 67<sup>th</sup> session, and in a period closely associated with the Resolution 65/276, this trend began to reverse. In this change, the European Delegation played an important role. Through its enhanced role under the Lisbon Treaty and together with the favorable framework created by the Resolution, the European Delegation had the right background to coordinate member-states in a common direction, reducing divergences and increasing European coherence as a whole (Blavoukos *et al.*, 2016, pp. 41-42).

### 2.3 The UNSC and EU's Institutional (Re)Presentation

The Security Council is the competent body of the UN, in matters relating to the maintenance, preservation and restoration of peace at a world level. As an institution, it has the power to demand from its member the appropriate political and military mechanisms to enforce its decisions. Its effectiveness is therefore inextricably linked to its degree of legitimacy. Unlike the UNGA, the seats on the UNSC shall be distributed among fifteen members, five of which, China, France, Russia, UK and the USA, form the core as permanent members. The remaining ten non-permanent members are elected by the UNGA for a two-year term of office on the basis of geographical representation resulting from a specific categorization of five “regions” (=Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin America, Western Europe and others) (Hurd, 2007, pp. 12-13).

In the voting process, every UNSC member has one vote, albeit only the five permanent members have also the veto right. Each resolution needs nine votes to be adopted (unless it is blocked by the veto even if it has got that number). Decisions on procedural matters are excluded from the veto. No special observer status is provided, nevertheless according to the UNSC Procedure Rules, third speakers have the right to be invited to the floor and may contribute to the works of the Council (Paasivirta & Ramopoulos, 2019, p. 69).

Thus, the European participation in the UNSC, is *de facto* more limited. Before the British withdraw, France and the UK were the two EU member-states with permanent seats in UNSC. The non-permanent members and according to the geographical representation, up to two EU member-states may participate from the category “Western Europe and others” and one from the category of “Eastern Europe”. This means, three to five EU member-states could participate in the Council the same period of time. This possibility gave a significant asset to the influence of the EU that could exert on policy-making within UNSC, especially when five EU member-states participated simultaneously (Bourantonis, 2019, p. 124). However, with the British exit from EU, the EU'S CFSP toolbox and participation weakened, as it lost a permanent UNSC state with the possibility of a veto in its quiver (Hosli, 2022, p. 86).


Regarding the EU presence through its institutional bodies in UNSC meetings, researches so far shows that representation rates remain roughly the same both in *ante* and *post* Lisbon era. In particular, before the Lisbon Treaty, the EU participated in UNSC meetings either through the state holding the six-month Rotating Council

Presidency or through the HR. In the first case, the European common position was heard by the country which held the six-month Rotating Council Presidency, only if all the EU member-states had the same line on an agenda item on matters of international concern. These interventions are estimated at around 35 per year and were more formal than substantive. With regard, the presence of the HR was even rarer as it appeared four times between 2000 and 2006, and its presence was determined by the absolute consensus of all UNSC members.

On the other hand, despite the favorable framework provided by the Lisbon Treaty and the upgraded role of HR/VP in terms of stronger and better structured representation generally in international fora and organizations, the number of European interventions in UNSC, remains nine years after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, roughly in the same levels (Bourantonis, 2019, pp. 124-125).

From 2010 until 2019, as diagram 1 depicts, the EU interventions ranges from 29 to 35 without seeming to be affected by variations in the number of UNSC meetings.

**Diagram 1**  
EU Interventions in UNSC (2010-2019)



*Note:* Data collection from the Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence “*The Multilateral Diplomacy of the EU*”

<http://eudiplomacy.eu/>

The lion’s share of the EU representation is naturally held by the European Delegation in New York, which from 2010 replaced the sixth-month Rotating Council Presidency as a consequence of the Lisbon Treaty reforms. The presence of the HR/VP on the UNSC this period, takes place where the agenda item concerns the cooperation between

EU and UN and it is more common in the *post*-Lisbon era. Albeit, it does not exceed the number of 1 per year whilst, in 2012 and 2018, that institution shall, did not make any intervention. With the except of the year 2015, when the HR/VP Federica Mogherini, in her first year in office gave three speeches in UNSC. Concerning the EEAS, although as an institution it became fully operational in January 2011, the first time it received the floor, was in 2012 and until 2019 carried out 28 interventions, about 3 to 4 per year, except in 2019 when they amounted to 7. Additionally, for specific agenda items EU Special Representatives have occasionally taken the podium, while once in 2014 the President of the European Council and one time in 2016 the EU Anti-Trafficking Coordinator took the floor.<sup>3</sup>

On this point it is worth mentioning that, as set out in Article 34 of TEU, the EU member-states that are participate in the UNSC, have the right to request that the HR/VP be invited to present the European position, as long as the EU has a crystallized position, on a subject included in Council's agenda item (Bourantonis, 2019, pp. 124-125; Pirozzi, 2012, p. 97), while an official of the EU Delegation or from the EEAS, can take the floor and speak on behalf of the HR/VP (Paasivirta & Ramopoulos, 2019, p. 73).

## **2.4 The Alignment (!) of EU Member-States in UNSC**

The EU presence in the UNSC, cannot be assessed solely by the frequency of participation of its institutions. There are another three important indicators that affect the overall external picture of the EU in the UNSC; the internal coordination, the voting divergence and the co-sponsor initiative in (draft) resolutions.

The internal coordination, concerns the information sharing among EU member-states serving on the UNSC (permanent and non-permanent) and the extent in which they are in line and promote common EU's foreign policy objectives without divergence in the decision-making process (Bourantonis, 2019, p. 126). However, this criterion is not particularly indicative, at least compared to UNGA. In one version, this is due to the specific structure of the body, as well as the high degree of commitment to its decisions, making member-states more cautious (Hosli, 2022, p. 86). Concerning, the part of EU, on the one hand, it foresees and encourages through the Article 34 of

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<sup>3</sup> The data for the quantitative analysis are retrieved from the Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence "*The Multilateral Diplomacy of the EU*", <http://eudiplomacy.eu/>

the TEU, its member-states serving in the UNSC to follow a common “European line” and to defend the EU positions, as well as to keep the HR/VP and the other member-states informed of developments (Hosli, 2022, p. 87· Paasivirta & Ramopoulos, 2019, p. 69). On the other hand, it does not have an active coordination mechanism responsible for promoting the EU positions in the UNSC, even though there were provisions for the creation of such a mechanism as early as the Maastricht Treaty.

This inertia is to some extent due to the stance of France and the UK (before British withdrawal). As permanent members in the UNSC, they consider (mainly the UK), that their seat and obligations in the body stem from their national substance and not from their status as EU member-states.<sup>4</sup> This position was explicitly reflected in a provision of the Lisbon Treaty (Article 34 TEU), as well as earlier in Maastricht after their insistence and according to which it is at their discretion whether to express a national or European position within the UNSC (Bourantonis, 2019, p. 127). Moreover, in the rare event of a “conflict of interest”, the responsibilities of the UN Charter override those of the CFSP.

Nonetheless, through informal mechanisms, efforts have been made to make it easier for the European member-states serving on the UNSC to coordinate positions in order to create communication channels and to strengthen the EU’s coherence, continuity, effectiveness and visibility in this body. This is achieved through the EU Delegation that seeks to inform the UNSC participating EU member-states in writing, by reminding them of previous EU positions on the agenda item and forwarding new ones. Additionally, it organizes quarterly meetings with the EU member-states Permanent Representatives in UNSC. Lastly, at least once a month, the EU Delegation official discuss with the political counsellors of EU member-states which participated in UNSC (Paasivirta & Ramopoulos, 2019, pp. 70-72).

Furthermore, a series of other initiatives are signs that could potentially lead to the formal operation of a coordination mechanism, enhancing with this way the EU’s CFSP in the UNSC. In particular, the division in the non-permanent seat in UNSC between Italy and the Netherlands in period 2017-2018 (one year each), a joint working document by the non-permanent members Sweden, the Netherlands and Poland in December 2018, related with the EU coordination best practices in the UNSC, as well

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<sup>4</sup> Which is why they never accepting the creation of a permanent European seat in the UNSC despite the efforts and initiatives taken by the other member-states (see further Pirozzi, 2012, pp. 97-98).

as the twin UNSC presidency among France and Germany in March and April of 2019, are examples in this direction. The above also includes the informal weekly information and exchange meetings between the EU member-states serving on the UNSC with other EU member-states (Hosli, 2022, p. 87).

Regarding co-sponsor initiative from EU member-states in (draft) resolutions, that may be a safer indicator of the EU's presence in the UNSC, compared to the voting procedure, despite the fact that several of these drafts are co-signed by EU member-states on invitation *a posteriori*. This means that the latter, although they increase the legalization of the draft's resolutions, they are not considered as active co-designers. Despite all this, there are examples such as the 2011 UNSC resolution 1970 and 1973 of 2011 on the de-escalation of violence regime in Libya and the imposition of sanctions, where the EU initiative was the main shaper of these draft resolutions. Thus, the period 2010-2019, as table 2 shows, all EU member-states participated in the submission of 16 draft resolution (and in particular for the four-year period 2014-2018), 13 of which were adopted. For the most part, these plans mostly dealt with issues related to peacekeeping (such as threats from terrorist attacks, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction) as well as a resolution on the situation in North Korea. On the opposite side, those that were not adopted concerned the situation in Syria and Ukraine. Certainly, this number is not encouraging for the overall European engagement, as there are cases of EU member-states, either individually or more systematically that break the European line.

**Table 2**  
EU Member-States Draft Resolutions in UNSC (2010-2019)

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
<b>USNC Resolutions</b>	59	68	55	48	66	66	81	68	61	58
<b>All EU Member-States</b>	0	0	0	0	4	3	7	1	1	0
<b>25-28 Member-States</b>	0	1	0	1	7	6	8	7	2	3

*Note:* Data collection from the Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence “*The Multilateral Diplomacy of the EU*”,  
<http://eudiplomacy.eu/>

In order to avoid phenomena of systematic differentiation, methodologically observing the drafts resolution submitted by 25 to 28 EU member-states, the results are

clearly more improved. The EU, through its member-states, is emerging as a more coherent international player with an active role in addressing and co-shaping international developments, as the number of draft resolution initiative more than doubles (in total 36).

Concerning the voting part in UNSC, we cannot produce the same conducive assessment of the EU's presence comparatively again with the UNGA. A significant part of the discussions leading to the maturation of political decisions is produced in informal meetings before the votes and, *de facto*, not all EU member-states participate in them. Nonetheless, over the period 2010-2019, only 7 voting divergence have been noted, most of which concerned the situation in the Middle East -including the Palestinian question- (2014, 2018 and 2019), and individually the rest, the situation in Iraq (2010), Libya (2011), and Liberia (2016).<sup>5</sup> The encouraging thing in these divergencies, is that the vote of EU member-states which participate in UNSC, is not moving in opposite directions as the choice to abstain creates a positive neutrality (in favor-abstain or against-abstain) and not a complete rupture of cohesion (in favor-against) (Bourantonis, 2019, pp. 127-129).

If efforts for a combined EU seat in the UNSC, as early as the 1990s, had been successful, the cohesion of EU member-states within the body would have been more discernible and stable. However, from the outset, there were many objections to such an eventuality both within the EU and other UN states. France's obvious refusal to Germany's unofficial proposal in 2018 to convert its permanent position into a rolling EU one, is a typical example of internal reactions while, the general philosophy that traditionally prevails within the UN, is in favor of the participation of the state entities in the framework of "one state, one vote", and not opening to transnational institutions (Hosli, 2022, pp. 87-88).

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<sup>5</sup> The quantitative data are also retrieved from the Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence "*The Multilateral Diplomacy of the EU*", <http://eudiplomacy.eu/>

### Chapter 3

#### The EU and Security Strategy: Between Complementarity and Autonomy

#### 3.1 The EU in Crisis Management: CSDP, NATO, UN and Peacebuilding

The concept of crisis management, i.e., intervention in countries or regions surrounded by a regime of instability that may cause a general imbalance in the international system, began to appear as a practice mainly during the Cold War period. Given that such interventions require the appropriate means to be effective (such as economic, military), it also began to appear as a dogma for the “Great Powers”. In the case of the EU, crisis management issues began to be of major concern in the 1970s, albeit, in the last 20 years it has developed the skills to handle this kind of situation.

Indeed, the Yom Kippur war in the Middle East, in October 1973, gave an important impetus to the then European Community to take initiatives for the establishment of mechanisms either at EU level or through member-states coordination. This desire began to become institutionally visible with the Maastricht Treaty in the early 1990s and the CFSP pillar, developing mechanisms of power, mainly of an economic and diplomatic nature. Furthermore, with the introduction and gradual development of the CSDP (until the Lisbon Treaty was called European Security and Defense Policy-ESDP), almost a decade later, the EU began to lay the foundations for being able to play an interventionist role in crisis situations requiring resolution in the international arena (Smith, 2021, pp. 711-712).

In particular, with the Nice Treaty in 2001, the Council began to set the appropriate background for the EU to be able to manage security and crisis management issues. Subsequently, the EU’s toolbox for crisis management issues was strengthened by the creation of the *Political Security Committee*, which brings together the national diplomats of EU member-states serving in Brussels in order to ensure that EU foreign policy is coherent, consistent and evolving, and the *EU Military Committee*. The latter is the EU’s highest military body and is composed of the heads of the armed forces of the member-states (Koppa, 2022, p. 76). Thus, the CSDP, as an operational crisis management body, was equipped around a system of permanent military and civilian structure, which acts through the EEAS. For instance, the *EU Military Staff*, is dealing with the strategic planning of military operations and employs about 200 seconded military staff from the EU member-states. Alongside, it is assisted by a permanent

headquarters, responsible for non-executive military operations, the so-called Military Planning and Conduct Capability. Correspondingly, the *Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability*, takes on the part of managing crises missions of a civilian nature such as rule of law, justice, police. Another service which is under the umbrella of HR/VP is the EU *Intelligence Analysis Centre*. The main weakness of the latter, is that its operation depends on the information it receives from the member-states intelligent analysis services and EU Delegations (Juncos, 2022, p. 311). Lastly, the *Crisis Management and Planning Directorate*, is responsible for the political and/or strategic planning of CSDP civilian missions and military operations (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2014, p. 82).

With the Lisbon Treaty, and in accordance with Article 20 TEU, the road for the enhanced cooperation in all policy areas opened, provided that at least 9 member-states participate. In addition, apart from the upgraded role of the HR/VP and the introduction of the EEAS, as mentioned in the first chapter, provision was made for solidarity and mutual assistance clauses. The assistance clauses, essentially reflect the guarantees as defined in Article V of NATO. At the same time, a very important provision of the Treaty, and it remains to be seen to what extent it will be used, is the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), which facilitates defense cooperation between member-states. In this case, unanimity is not an obstacle, as such initiatives can proceed by qualified majority. Furthermore, under Lisbon provision, EDA became also officially a EU agency, having as a priority the development of joint defense systems, while in the Petersberg tasks,<sup>6</sup> crisis management and peacemaking elements were added (Koppa, 2022, pp. 91-92). In the same vein, the *Global Strategy* was moved, a document under the auspices of the HR/VP Federica Mogherini, which set out many of the EU's foreign strategies goals and was published in June 2016, just a few days after the British referendum that voted in favor of the UK leaving the EU.

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<sup>6</sup> The Petersberg tasks involve a wide range of military capabilities. Having NATO's green light, these tasks were defined in 1992 at the Council meeting of the Western European Union, in order for the EU to build a defense component that could also support the Atlantic alliance. With the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997, the Petersberg task joined into the CFSP (and more particularly to CSDP). About the next two years, both the EU and the Western European Union could determine the Petersberg tasks. However, in 1999 most of the responsibilities, were transferred to the EU. More generally, from 1999 the organization of the Western European Union began to follow a downward existential path. By 2011 the organization ceased to exist (Yaniz, 2020, pp. 220-222).

The main purpose of the *Global Strategy* was to attempt to bridge the gap between institutions and states, so that it would be possible to agree on a common foreign strategy. For this reason, it promotes more investments in EU's foreign policy through a unified agenda, without rifts and in all diplomatic fields (energy, culture, economy, security, human rights, racial equality). In parallel the *Global Strategy*, having as a priority to boost the European defense capabilities, managed in a short period of time since its publication establishing a Coordinated Annual Review of Defense-CARD, to facilitate the exchange of information and cooperation between member-states. Additionally, it adopted a binding framework within PESCO to develop member-states' cooperation on specific tasks. Regarding the financial part of the development of defense capabilities, the European Defense Fund (EDF), was introduced, recommending the establishment of the European Peace Facility in order to cover common costs of CSDP missions (Smith, 2020, p. 242). Finally, the EU recognizes (as a doctrine) that any initiative it takes on security and defense policy issues cannot be achieved in isolation. For this reason, cooperation with other partners and international organizations is a prerequisite, as reflected in both the *Global Strategy* and its predecessor Security Strategy in 2003 (Serrano de Haro, 2020, p. 78).

On the other hand, despite these efforts and any willingness to do so, the EU cannot be considered as an effective player in international crisis management for three reasons. Firstly, there is a weakness between the institutions in terms of information, evaluation and, more generally, a co-perception of when a situation is critical and requires intervention. This situation is accompanied by the institutional inability to make decisions due to the need for unanimity on security issues. Secondly, there is also a question of resources. The systems for the release and use of resources (financial, logistical, human resources) are not decided by a central core, but are dispersed at various levels within the European structure, while an important role in their activation is played by the national factor and contractual commitments of the treaties. Thirdly, there is the political polarization on issues of legitimacy and operational effectiveness created during the consultations in crisis management issues (Smith, 2021, p.712).

In view of the above, it is not a coincidence that although, the EU, has shouldered in over 30 operations albeit, most of them are civilian, small-scale, and mainly take place in the context of NATO and in the UN crisis management and peacebuilding operations or through ad hoc formations or exclusively by an initiative of an EU member-state (Cottey, 2018, p. 131). In particular, from 2003 to the end of

2022, there is a presence in three continents with 37 operations and missions, 18 of which are still active. From the active part, 11 are civilian and the rest 7 are military while, the personnel working in them amounts to about 4.000 staff (European External Action Service, 2022). But comparing this number with the number of personnel employed by the UN and NATO in such initiatives, it is clear that the EU's contribution can only be complementary. For instance, the UN in 2016-2017, employed about 100.000 troops in peacekeeping missions. Correspondingly, NATO deployed a similar number of troops in Afghanistan between 2000 and 2010. Additionally, the EU military operations have mainly been expressed through promoting and supporting agreements and other peacekeeping instruments for conflict resolution as well as, providing humanitarian aid and protection to the civilian population. The case of Bosnia-Herzegovina is a prime example of EU support for peace processes. The EU's military operation to the region has been in place since 2004, when it took over from NATO after the latter's withdrawal.<sup>7</sup> Respectively, the EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo consist the largest, civilian mission. It has existed since 2008 and developed in parallel with NATO's Kosovo Force and the UN mission in Kosovo. The EU's contributions grew in the context of ensuring justice both executive and by supporting the Kosovo's internal justice system and rule of law.

Generally, the EU's CSDP most important contribution and specialization appears in the area of Security Sector Reform support missions. These missions are of an educational and advisory nature on matters relating to the establishment or reconstitution of institutions such as the army, the police and judiciary. The vast majority of these missions are civilian and employ a small number of staff. Indicatively, such missions have been carried out in South Sudan, Mali, Georgia, Iraq etc. In the same wavelength, there are the EU border assistance missions which support/educate the local authorities to manage their border lines. Such missions have been activated in Moldova, in Ukraine, in Libya and in the State of Palestine (Cottey, 2018, pp. 132-133).

Through the above-mentioned actions, which as referred are complementary or are in small-scale in nature, have led the EU during the last decades to develop an operator-provider relationship with the UN. Apart from the fact that a cooperation with the UN is beneficial from the point of view of legitimacy, for the EU, the UN is as an

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<sup>7</sup> About a year earlier, had begun to develop (with the UN support), the EU Police Mission, replacing the UN Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina as well as the International Police Task Force (Novosselof, 2012, p. 152).

effective operator in crisis management-peacebuilding situations, while the UN consider the EU as an important capacity provider in matters of financial and logistics resources (Tardy, 2012, p. 205). In a few cases to date, the two institutions have developed in the same region with little or no collaboration between them. Indicatively, this phenomenon had been observed in missions/operations in Afghanistan, in the Democratic Republic of Congo, in Somalia and in Georgia (Novosselof, 2012, p. 156).

Concerning the EU's relations with NATO, it has been observed that in military operations requiring "decisive" intervention such as air and land forces, due to the high risk, the EU has decided to be involved in the Euro-Atlantic alliance/cooperation context. For instance, in the case of Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and Libya, the EU decided to be engaged under the leadership of NATO whilst, from 2014 in the cases of Syria and Iraq (against the Islamic State) the participation of the EU member-states was through *ad hoc* coalitions under the USA primacy. These facts indicates that in many cases the EU's member-states prefers a security strategy in crises management issues, in which the NATO and the USA have the first say, in which they voluntarily transfer responsibility for military command and coordination (Cottey, 2018, p. 134).

In the light of the above, it is no coincidence that the CSDP has actually followed a different course from its initial ambitions. In essence, it evolved more to a stabilizing power through training programs, policing and generally as a supporter on issues of rule of law development than as a active crisis management modulator (Howorth, 2020, p. 318).

### **3.2 Is Their Room for Strategic Autonomy in the EU?**

Strategic autonomy i.e., the operational development of the EU's capacity to act independently in crisis situations, appeared within the EU in 1998 and specifically from the Franco-British Saint-Malo Declaration. Until 2016 and in the document of the *Global Strategy* where the term made its reappearance, this concept was for the EU more a controversial idea for discussion both internally and in the context of its relationship with NATO and the USA than a political act. Even after the *Global Strategy* any initiatives for the adoption of a common defense culture, have not succeeded in making a clear implementation content for the EU's strategic autonomy (see further Howorth, 2020, pp. 313-323).

However, a series of events that have already started to unfold since the early years of the Lisbon Treaty, such as the deployment of Russian forces in Syria or the unfolding crisis in Ukraine, show that the EU must take initiatives on security issues even when there is no political consensus. The British withdrawal, which usually blocked defensive first attempts, gave the chance to the EU to activate collective security institutions. Alongside, any initiative to develop a European Defense Union must be accompanied by a common strategic concept and a common defense capability. But a key obstacle for the EU, is the difficulty in clarifying the objective of this autonomy. Even the Franco-German side, which generally encourages European integration in this area as well, seems to define it in different contexts (Koppa, 2022, pp. 187-189). On the other hand, in the Security Conference of Munich, on July 13th, 2017, both France and Germany called on the other member states to develop the EU's strategic autonomy by improving its defense capabilities, but without such a move implying an automatic disengagement from NATO. It is perhaps no coincidence that this Franco-German initiative gave a significant impetus to the establishment of PESCO, given that a few months later its operation was approved (Zamarripa, 2020, p. 90).

Although, there is no common perceptions on the concept of strategic autonomy, there are three variables on which EU member-states seem to agree, albeit quietly, on how it can be expressed in the context of its defence capabilities. These are a) capacity of decision and means of assessing situations, b) development of defence capabilities and c) operational capacity.

Concerning the first variable, the EU certainly has decision-making mechanisms, but the key difference that places it among international actors is its autonomy in the decision-making process. In addition, it has the appropriate means to be able to evaluate situations rationally. Typical examples that contribute to this information sharing, are the EU Delegations around the world, the *Satellite Centre* in Spain or from the EU member states intelligence through the *Single Intelligence Analysis Capability* which gathers analyses from the EEAS *Intelligence Centre* and the *EU Military Staff Intelligence Directorate*.

Nevertheless, and moving on to the second variable, the defence capabilities developed within the EU are, and will continue to be, essentially the capabilities of its member-states. The TEU does not provide for the development of defence capabilities under a single European umbrella and even the development of crisis management

operations will be based on the capabilities that each member-state can offer. In addition, these operational capabilities of EU member-states will also be available within NATO, provided that they also serve as members of the Alliance. Concerning the cooperation part, it is of great importance that mechanisms such as PESCO and the EDF, give the possibility for both intra EU collaboration with non-EU countries as well, provided that the latter are interested in the project and not pose a security risk. More generally, any defence upgrade effort will have dual benefits: Apart from enhancing the defence industrial and technological capabilities of EU member-states, it will also help to improve burden-sharing within NATO.

Regarding the variable of operational capacity, the EU's capabilities so far do not allow the CSDP to manage crisis situations at the expeditionary-warfare level. Yet even at this level they contribute to the EU's power projection while, the defined cooperation with NATO in crisis management situations during the last several years, reinforces even more its international position (Serrano de Haro, 2020, p. 83-85).

From 2014 onwards, the general instability and insecurity that began to emerge, especially in Europe's wider eastern and southern neighborhood, showed the need to further strengthen EU-NATO relations. This need for a stronger Alliance was formally demonstrated at the 2014 and 2016 NATO Summits in Wales and Warsaw respectively. Until July 2018, three other official initiatives followed which further deepened the defense cooperation of the two institutions in various security sectors (Dokos, 2019, p. 161-164).

In any case, the substance of strategic autonomy cannot survive under a regime of tacit consent. Since the Lisbon Treaty, the EU has invested in building a security architecture, albeit a hybrid one, which is developed in its own system of values and concepts. To be effective, however, a clear definition of the European external strategy of the EU in foreign and security policy matters is needed, which in turn can facilitate the debate on autonomy. At the same time, the external strategy must be not only clear, but also defined with long-term objectives of common consensus, while autonomy should not be understood as a concept or tendency to isolationism but as a step that will bring it alongside the capabilities of its strategic allies, such as NATO.

## Conclusions

Foreign and security policy, as an area of sensitive national importance, has always been a controversial point in the development of European integration. The strongly intergovernmental nature of the CFSP, with the principle of unanimity dominating the decision-making process, acts inhibitory on the further deepening of the EU. The interaction of the CFSP organs with the supranational institutions of the EU is quite limited, although there are some areas of overlapping responsibilities.

In order to bridge this gap but also to strengthen the EU's external presence, cohesion and visibility, the Lisbon Treaty upgraded the post of HR, while giving him/her the position of Vice-President of the EC. Thus, the HR/VP, has a hybrid position with responsibilities stemming from both institutional features around which the EU is generally composed. The ability of the HR/VP, to balance this dual role and the effective functioning of the newly established EEAS, as the diplomatic service of the EU, is considered particularly important in the promotion of European policies, especially in the multilateral crisis environment that began to take shape shortly after the activation of the Treaty.

There is no doubt that the EU's presence within the UN, is an important factor in shaping foreign policy, as the UN is a forum with an international impact. This is evidenced by the observer status it has enjoyed since 1974. Although, initially, the institutional changes of the Lisbon Treaty created uncertainty regarding the EU's representation in the UNGA, as the representation status of the EC and the six-month Rotating Presidency enjoyed until then ceased to apply, with the UN Resolution 65/276 the transition was successful. From 2011 onwards, it was the EU Delegation that was primarily responsible for representing the EU positions in the UNGA. The Lisbon Treaty together with the UN Resolution 65/276 had a positive impact in terms of coherence between EU members- states. On the other hand, in terms of visibility, there was no particular progress in relation to the previous period, at least in the first years after Lisbon whilst, the presence of some fluctuations was also noticeable.

As regards the EU's institutional presence in the UNSC, there has been no particular increase. The rates after the Lisbon Treaty remain roughly the same each year. Possibly this stability is due to the fact that the EU member-states have a limited number of participants in this institution, unlike the UNGA in which all of them participate. However, in order to better assess the EU's image in the Security Council,

variables such as voting divergence and the number of draft resolutions that co-sponsored by the most EU member-states play, even indirectly, an important role. At the same time, the creation and active functioning of a formal mechanism responsible for the internal coordination of EU member-states serving in the UNSC, as well as for the promotion of European positions, may not be indicative of an increase in the EU's overall presence in the body, due to its specific composition, but it will have a significant impact on its coherence and influence. Since efforts to create a combined European seat on the UNSC are minimal, the establishment of an internal coordination mechanism, with a view to increasing European cohesion, is a one-way street.

As far as the EU's participation in crisis management situations is concerned, its complementary role to the actions of NATO and the UN is evident. Despite the facilitations that emerged from the Lisbon Treaty onwards for increased defense cooperation between the EU member-states, internal institutional weaknesses and the lack of adoption of a common strategic defense culture hinder such a prospect. The EU has the capabilities that can lead it to strategic autonomy, if it so desires. However, a necessary condition for this, is a clear and common definition of its strategic objectives in the long-term plan and an autonomy that will enhance its dynamics by creating balanced partnerships with its strategic partners such as NATO and the UN.

It is worth noting that, the EU is an institution with an international presence and partnerships at all levels. Its political decisions and initiatives have global reach, influence and impact, making it a major player on the international stage. For this very reason, cohesion and a common perception within the EU is considered particularly important, both for the stability and the further development of the institution, given its dynamic nature, and for its credibility in its external partnerships.

Finally, the Russian invasion at the beginning of 2022 on Ukrainian territory, acted as a battering ram against international balance of power and the security architecture, the ruptures of which created the need to redefine alliances. In this emerging context, the role, reaction and relations between the EU and its partners are central to the possible new emerging international system. After all, in times of crisis, the European construction has proven that it has strong foundations and can cover its weaknesses in order to emerge stronger.

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