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The Influencing Capability of Unofficial Diplomacy on Intercommunal Stereotypes:
the Case of the Cyprus Conflict

(Η Δυνατότητα Επιρροής της Ανεπίσημης Διπλωματίας στα Διακοινοτικά
Στερεότυπα: η Περίπτωση της Κυπριακής Διένεξης)

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Περίληψη

Ο ρόλος των μη κρατικών, μη κυβερνητικών δρώντων στον μετασχηματισμό των διενέξεων αποτελεί ανοιχτό θέμα συζήτησης στη μελέτη των συγκρούσεων. Από τη μία μεριά, οι παραδοσιακές προσεγγίσεις παραβλέπουν τον ρόλο τους και τον θεωρούν ασήμαντο σε έναν κόσμο όπου επικρατούν οι πολιτικές των κρατών. Από την άλλη, οι σύγχρονες, ενθουσιώδεις προσεγγίσεις κλίνουν προς την κανονιστική μεροληψία και μεγαλοποιούν το ρόλο των μη κρατικών δρώντων. Στην παρούσα διατριβή, μελετώ την δυνατότητα επιρροής των ανεπίσημων διπλωματικών επαφών στην κατάρριψη των στερεοτύπων και στον μετασχηματισμό της κυπριακής διένεξης. Στην περίπτωση της Κύπρου η έντονη, μη κυβερνητική εμπλοκή διεθνών και εγχώριων δρώντων δημιουργεί ένα μωσαϊκό δραστηριοτήτων αφιερωμένο στην κατάρριψη των στερεοτύπων και στον ασαφή και υπέρμετρα προβεβλημένο στόχο της συμφιλίωσης. Στην έρευνα αυτή, εξετάζω το βαθμό επιρροής (είτε θετικό, είτε αρνητικό) τριών παραμέτρων: 1. Τη δραστηριότητα των Οργανώσεων της Κοινωνίας των Πολιτών και των Μη Κυβερνητικών Οργανώσεων, 2. Την Οικονομική Αλληλεξάρτηση, αλληλεπίδραση και δραστηριότητα και 3. Την πολιτιστική και αθλητική δραστηριότητα, στην κατάρριψη των στερεοτύπων και στον μετασχηματισμό της διένεξης μεταξύ των δύο Κυπριακών κοινοτήτων. Οι θεωρητικές βάσεις της διατριβής βρίσκονται στις προσεγγίσεις των διπλωματικών οδών, την Θεωρία της Εικόνας και τις προσεγγίσεις στα στερεότυπα. Χρησιμοποιώ τα θεωρητικά εργαλεία της Αλληλεξάρτησης και των Κοινωνιολογικών Προσεγγίσεων στις Αιτίες των Συγκρούσεων. Μέσω μιας υποκειμενικής προσέγγισης των συγκρούσεων, επιχειρώ να εξάγω αποτελέσματα από την περίπτωση της Κύπρου, που θα ενέχουν τη δυνατότητα γενίκευσης σε άλλες περιπτώσεις διακοινοτικών διενέξεων. Χρησιμοποιώ ανάλυση Εμπειρικά Θεμελιωμένης Θεωρίας ώστε να εξετάσω την επιρροή της επαφής στα στερεότυπα και τον μετασχηματισμό στις διακοινοτικές διενέξεις. Γι' αυτό το σκοπό, εξετάζω συγκεκριμένους δείκτες για τις παραμέτρους μέσα από την χρήση ποιοτικών και ποσοτικών δεδομένων. Αντλώ τα ποιοτικά δεδομένα από ακαδημαϊκά άρθρα, βιβλία, αναφορές Οργανώσεων της Κοινωνίας των Πολιτών, Μη Κυβερνητικών Οργανώσεων και Διακυβερνητικών Οργανισμών, επίσημα κρατικά έγγραφα, και ηλεκτρονικά και αναλογικά δημοσιογραφικά άρθρα. Επιπλέον, συγκεντρώνω τα ποσοτικά μου δεδομένα από αναφορές Μη Κυβερνητικών Οργανώσεων, Διακυβερνητικών Οργανισμών και κρατικές αναφορές και βάσεις δεδομένων. Τα αποτελέσματα της έρευνας δείχνουν ότι ενώ όλες οι παράμετροι της διατριβής φέρουν τη δυνατότητα να επηρεάσουν και υπάρχει

μια θετική τάση κατάρριψης των στερεοτύπων απέναντι στον «άλλο», τα διακοινοτικά στερεότυπα παραμένουν και επανέρχονται στην επιφάνεια σε δύσκολες πολιτικές συγκυρίες. Αναφορικά με το μετασχηματισμό της διένεξης, η ύπαρξη θετικών τάσεων επαφής δεν αρκεί να αναστρέψει την μακρόχρονη κοινωνικοποίηση στην διαίρεση. Δομικές και λειτουργικές ανεπάρκειες των δρώντων και των δραστηριοτήτων τους επιβαρύνουν τον θετικό αντίκτυπο της μη κρατικής επαφής. Πέρα από αυτό, τα αποτελέσματα δείχνουν ότι η επιρροή στον μετασχηματισμό της διένεξης είναι δευτερεύουσας σημασίας στην Κύπρο καθώς η επίσημη διπλωματία και η υψηλή πολιτική που ασκείται από τους κύριους δρώντες της διένεξης, διαμορφώνουν το μέλλον της Κύπρου. Συνολικά, δεν υπάρχουν ευθείες ενδείξεις ότι η επαφή σχετίζεται ευθέως με τον μετασχηματισμό της διένεξης στην περίπτωση της Κύπρου. Τέλος, τα αποτελέσματα της διατριβής δείχνουν ότι υπάρχουν γενικεύσιμα στοιχεία που θα μπορούσαν να τροφοδοτήσουν μελλοντικές έρευνες: η εντατική εμπλοκή Οργανώσεων της Κοινωνίας των Πολιτών και Μη Κυβερνητικών Οργανώσεων σε συνθήκες διένεξης συχνά οδηγούν σε κανονιστικά συμπεράσματα σχετικά με την αποτελεσματικότητά τους. Η εξωτερική εμπλοκή συχνά είναι ανεπιτυχής και η εγχώρια κυριότητα των λύσεων σημαντική για τον μετασχηματισμό των διενέξεων. Σε πολλές περιπτώσεις, η παγίδα της «επαγγελματικοποίησης» μετατρέπει τις οργανώσεις από μέρος της λύσης σε μέρος του προβλήματος. Η οικονομική ευημερία δεν μπορεί να οδηγήσει από μόνη της στον μετασχηματισμό των διενέξεων και οι κοινωνικές ανάγκες και οι ανάγκες ασφαλείας των πολιτών πρέπει επίσης να υπολογίζονται. Η πολιτιστική συνεργασία μπορεί να επηρεάσει τις ταυτότητες και να μειώσει τον ανταγωνισμό καθώς η χρήση του πολιτισμού και της πολιτιστικής κληρονομιάς εξαρτάται από τις τρέχουσες ανάγκες των ομάδων. Η ειρηνευτική ικανότητα του αθλητισμού εξαρτάται από το πως οι κρατικοί και μη κρατικοί δρώντες την χρησιμοποιούν. Η Θεωρία της Επαφής ή οποιαδήποτε άλλη θεωρία δεν αποτελεί την φιλοσοφική λίθο για τον μετασχηματισμό των διενέξεων παρά μόνο εργαλείο πλοήγησης σε μια περίπλοκη διεθνή πραγματικότητα.

Λέξεις Κλειδιά: Ανεπίσημη Διπλωματία, Στερεότυπα, Μετασχηματισμός Διενέξεων, Κύπρος, Κοινωνία των Πολιτών, Οικονομική Αλληλεξάρτηση, Πολιτισμός, Αθλητισμός

Abstract

The role of non-state, non-governmental actors in conflict transformation is an issue of debate in the study of conflict; on the one hand, traditionalist approaches disregard their role as insignificant in a world of state politics. On the other, contemporary, enthusiastic approaches tend to fall into a normative bias and exaggerate the role of non-governmental actors. In the present thesis, I study the influencing capability of unofficial diplomatic contact on stereotype-breaking and conflict transformation in Cyprus. In the case of Cyprus, heavy, non-governmental engagement by international and domestic actors creates a mosaic of activities dedicated to the breaking of stereotypes and the vague, overused aim of reconciliation. In the research, I examine the degree of influence (be it positive or negative) of three parameters; 1. CSO and NGO activity, 2. Economic interdependence, interaction and activity, and 3. Cultural and sports activity, on stereotype-breaking and conflict transformation between the two Cypriot communities. The theoretical foundations of the thesis lie in diplomatic tracks' approaches, Image Theory and stereotypes' approaches. I employ theoretical tools of Interdependence and sociological approaches to the causes of conflict. Through a subjectivist approach to conflict, I try to extract results on Cyprus that bear a degree of generalisability in other intercommunal conflict cases. I use Grounded Theory Analysis in order to examine the influence of contact over stereotypes and transformation in intercommunal conflict. To that end, I examine specific indicators of the parameters through qualitative and quantitative data. I draw qualitative data from academic articles, books, IGO, CSO and NGO reports, interviews, official state documents, online and print press journalistic articles. In addition, I collect quantitative data from IGO, NGO and state reports and institutions' databases. Research results show that, while all parameters of the thesis seem to have a potential influencing capability, and there is a positive stereotype-breaking trend towards the "other", intercommunal stereotypes are persistent and resurface in difficult political occasions. As regards conflict transformation, the existence of positive contact trends is not enough to reverse the long-established socialisation in division. Structural and functional deficiencies of the actors and their activities encumber positive impact of non-state contact. Over and above, results show that influence towards conflict transformation is of secondary significance in Cyprus, as official diplomacy and high politics, exercised by the main actors of the conflict, shape the future of Cyprus.

Overall, there are no outright indications that contact directly relates to conflict transformation in the case of Cyprus. Finally, thesis results show that there are generalisable outcomes that can feed further research; Heavy CSO and NGO involvement in conflictual conditions often leads to normative conclusions about its effectiveness. External involvement is often unsuccessful and domestic ownership of solutions is very important for conflict transformation. On many occasions, the professionalization trap turns organisations from part of the solution to part of the problem. Economic prosperity cannot lead to conflict transformation on its own and safety and social needs of people should be taken into account as well. Cultural cooperation can influence identities and reduce antagonism as use of culture and heritage depends on present-day group needs. The peace-making capacity of sports depends on what state and non-state actors make of it. Contact Theory, or any other theory, is not the philosopher's stone for transforming conflict but solely a guiding tool for a complex international reality.

Keywords: Unofficial Diplomacy, Stereotypes, Conflict Transformation, Cyprus, Civil Society, Economic Interdependence, Culture, Sports

I. Introduction

1. Non-Official Actors and Conflict Transformation

International studies research the role of non-state, unofficial diplomacy actors in intercommunal conflict from different perspectives. In the complex, Post-Cold War environment, the existence and activity of non-governmental actors pursuing party rapprochement and conflict transformation perplexes global realities.

There is a debate between traditions in international politics and approaches to international conflict on the influencing capability of non-state actors in intercommunal conflict. Different traditions with different theoretical and practical backgrounds, appoint different degree of significance to them. Liberal, Pluralist and Constructivist approaches argue that non-state actors are significant in confronting intercommunal stereotypes through the (re)establishment of contact, communication, trust and cooperation between the parties. Realist and Positivist approaches hold that their significance is low and that they are subject to the coercive power of official and state actors. In any case, the increasing role and heavy engagement of non-state actors exercising unofficial diplomacy in conflict, post-conflict and frozen conflict zones necessitates their inclusion in the research and analysis of intercommunal cases.

The activity of non-state, non-governmental actors is more and more significant in the present day. Although we still live in a world where the state is the dominant and most salient actor in international politics, the role of non-state actors is increasingly important from the fall of communist authoritarianism up to nowadays. The high complexity of intrastate realities and the intertwining nature of interstate with intrastate relations, render non-state actors influential in shaping international realities. These actors vary in nature and function and include from insurgent groups, terrorists and peaceful resistance parties, to businesses, non-profit organisations and cultural clubs. Furthermore, increased hybridity and constant transformation, appearance and disappearance of such actors render them difficult to identify, categorise, and study. Their driving force and motives are also highly diverse and often obscure. Although for some, their involvement in conflict transformation may be indirect and secondary (businesses and enterprises) preceded by profit-making motives, for others, humanitarian and social missions mix up with professionalised non-governmental

management. Domestic realities get even more complex when foreign and international financing further complicates overt and covert goals of non-state actors.

Given the fact that most armed conflicts nowadays are intra-state and that the United Nations Charter prohibits UN intervention in conflicts within national boundaries (McDonald, 1991, p. 201), the role of non-state, non-intergovernmental actors is increasingly important. In addition, unofficial diplomacy facilitates the continuation of the peace efforts in times where the parties of the conflict do not engage in official contact. One could also argue that unofficial diplomacy constitutes a means of external intervention of powerful states in a post-colonial world. In any case, the outbreak of a series of intrastate conflicts in the Balkans and the Near East region in the late 20th and the early 21st century attracted the heavy engagement of unofficial diplomatic activity with doubtful peacebuilding results.

The emergence of the modern concepts of civil society and the public sphere in the 1980s and the 1990s, opened new ways for conflict analysis, conflict resolution and conflict transformation theorists and practitioners. However, current experience shows that practical applications and political desires of a civil society supplementing the fallacies of state foreign policy on the one hand, and constraining non-popular government decisions on the other, have doubtful results. Be it the western intervention and state-building in Kosovo, the Arab Spring uprisings or, in our case, the frozen conflict in Cyprus, civil society has not managed to significantly shape political realities for several, particular reasons.

Howbeit, Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) are not the only non-state actors considered capable of influencing relations between states or self-governing groups. Activities that traced back to the dawn of civilisation, like trade and economic interaction, are also capable of influencing dominant international relations actors. From Montesquieu's commerce peace to classical liberalism and from pluralism to complex interdependence, trade activity and economic interaction are important in consolidating and sustaining peace. Then again, in several conflicts, either commerce is a pipe dream, or economic actors just exercise their activities regardless of war or peace. In any case, commerce and economic interdependence seem less vague than civil society, as a means to promote peace.

Another parameter is cultural activity. The vast domain of culture has certain expressions of potential peace building, connected to cultural cooperation, cultural

meeting and acquaintance. Another branch of the wide cultural context is athletic activities and cooperation. For some, both culture and sports can bring people closer through soft means that soothe political tensions. Nevertheless, one can even more easily claim that real or perceived cultural differences can deepen conflict. Likewise, sports are often a field of expression for raw instincts of rivalry and violence.

In the present thesis, I research the influencing capability of unofficial diplomacy on confronting intercommunal stereotypes and facilitating conflict transformation in the case of Cyprus. In Cyprus, during at least the last four decades there is a continuous boom of civil society, economic cooperation and cultural rapprochement programmes. All of them come with the underlying aims to build interpersonal and intergroup contact, boost cooperation and re-establish cultural communication. Of course, the long-term goal of such activities is to promote peacebuilding, reconciliation, and resolution of the island's division. Even before the 1974 Turkish invasion in the island, conflict resolution pioneers were organising bicommunal workshops in Cyprus and abroad.

Unofficial diplomacy is the activity of actors with non-official authority attempting to transform a conflict through confronting stereotypes, prejudice and hostility mainly by (re)establishing intergroup contact.

According to subjectivist approaches to conflict, stereotypes and prejudice stem from negative perceptions of rival groups and established images of the "other" among the peoples of rival communities. In conflictual conditions, stereotypical images often contribute in feeding and preserving conflicts.

In the present thesis, I explore the capability of unofficial diplomacy contacts to influence established perceptions and stereotypes. Consequently, I research the influencing capability of unofficial diplomacy on conflict transformation. In order to research the influence of contact, I examine the activity of selected non-state actors in the case of Cyprus (1. CSOs and NGOs, 2. Economic Activity, 3. Culture and Sports). In order to approach the thesis problem I follow a research philosophy based on the subjectivist, pluralist approaches to conflict. I base the research on the theoretical foundations of diplomatic tracks, images, perceptions and stereotypes and sociological theories on the causes of conflict. I examine set parameters through specific indicators and through both qualitative and quantitative data. I draw qualitative data from academic articles and books, reports of IGOs, CSOs and NGOs, interviews, official state documents, online and print press journalistic articles. Additionally, I draw

quantitative data from IGO, NGO and state reports and official institutions' databases. I use Grounded Theory Analysis in order to examine the influence of contact over stereotypes and transformation in intercommunal conflict. Results show that in the case of confronting stereotype and conflict transformation, all parameters of the thesis seem to have a potentially positive and negative influence. Although there is an increasingly positive trend towards the "other" and the (re)empowerment of a joint Cypriot identity, stereotypes seem to be firm and ready to resurface in difficult political occasions. Regarding conflict transformation, positive contact trends do not seem able to reverse the long-established Cypriot realities of division. Although all the parameters I examine in the thesis bear some positive impact on conflict transformation, this influence is hampered by inherent deficiencies of the actors and activities. Above all, influence towards conflict transformation, be it positive or negative, is of secondary significance for the Cypriot social and political reality. Official diplomacy and high politics, exercised by the main actors of the Cyprus conflict, are the ones that shape the future of Cyprus. The secondary, influencing capability of non-governmental actors and activities diminishes further by their structural and functional deficiencies. In total, in the case of Cyprus, there are no outright indications that contact directly relates to conflict transformation.

2. Research Structure

In this chapter, I present the structure of the thesis, which contains six parts: I. Introduction, II. Theoretical Framework, III. Research Design, IV. Case Study Research: Cyprus, V. Discussion, and VI. Conclusions. I divide each part in two to four chapters.

In the first section (Part II.), I present the theoretical framework of the research. In Chapter 3, I introduce and explore the term unofficial diplomacy and its different definitions. I explore the categorisations of diplomatic tracks (Track 1, 1 ½, 2 and 3) and the multi-track diplomacy approach.

In Chapter 4, I introduce the theoretical foundations of images and stereotypes, drawn from the fields of sociology, politics and psychology. In addition, I connect these concepts to diplomatic tracks. In this chapter, I also set out the relation between images and stereotypes and the creation and preservation of intergroup conflict.

In Chapter 5, I go into the sociological theories on the causes of conflict between groups. I present and analyse the dominant theories of conflict (Contact Hypothesis, Realistic Conflict Theory, Social Identity Theory, Social Categorisation Theory and the Self-Aspect Model of Identity Theory) and reflect on their claims that concern intercommunal conflicts. The debate of conflict theories revolves around the causes of conflict, intergroup behaviour, and the conditions under which inter-group relations can be or change to non-conflictual.

In Chapter 6, I present the ontological and philosophical foundations of the research. The core of my research is the presuppositions a) that human nature is equally capable for peaceful and violent behaviour and b) that conflict is usually based on perceptions and misperceptions that determine behaviour. My starting point is the acceptance of conflict as a subjective, ubiquitous phenomenon that sources from to the incompatibility of actors' decisions. Perceptions are closely related to the subjective nature of conflict; solidified images and perceptions of the decision-makers and the communities shape and dictate behaviours perceived by the in-group and the "self" as objective.

In the second section (Part III.), I present the research design of the thesis. In Chapter 7, I describe the approach, methods and data collection. Firstly, I present, in an analytical way, the research problem as seen through the prism of the contact-perception correlation. Secondly, I introduce the thesis as an interpretive research examining the case of Cyprus and present the data collection sources and data analysis.

In Chapter 8, I introduce and analyse the aim and objectives of the thesis. I also present the operationalisation of the theoretical tools used in order to reach the objectives set.

In Chapter 9, I offer an overview of the theoretical background on a) Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), b) economic interdependence and c) cultural and athletic interaction and contact. I also present the theoretical tools I use for the analysis of each one of the abovementioned categories of activities; I use the Contact Hypothesis for all three sets of activities. Furthermore, I utilise: 1) complex interdependence and the Social Liberalist philosophy for analysing CSOs and NGOs, 2) pluralism and economic interdependence for analysing economic transactions and 3) peace-building through culture and sports approach for analysing cultural and sports activities.

In the third section (Part IV.), I present the case study research of the thesis namely, the data collected for the case of Cyprus. In Chapter 10, I include the data collected on the presence, role and activity of the Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) and the Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in the island of Cyprus. In specific, firstly, I chapter offer general information on the civil society in the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot Communities, the level of the citizens' participation and trust in the CSOs and NGOs as well as their social impact and their activity for holding the authorities accountable. Secondly, I present data on the role, activity and impact of civil society actors concerning specific aspects of the conflict in the post-Annan Plan era, directly related to the main indicators of the research. Particularly, I include their role as a stereotype-breaking and peace-making force, their contribution in bicomunal contact and interaction, tolerance and trust, cooperation between organisations from the two communities, and citizens' participation in bicomunal activities and events. Furthermore, I include a list of the most important bicomunal events. Lastly, I present data on the value of bicomunal activities for peace and conflict transformation, as well as on the dissuasive factors on the effectiveness of stereotype-fighting activities.

In Chapter 11, I present the data concerning economic interdependence in Cyprus. In particular the chapter contains data on; economic transactions between the Cypriot communities, doing business, mixed enterprises and working together, employing and being employed by the "other", the field of tourism, intra-island trade and spending on the other side.

In Chapter 12, I include data on Cultural and Athletic Activity. I examine data on cultural heritage activities and joint culture and cultural heritage, their influence as a means to bicomunal contact but also as a factor of antagonism, as well as data on visiting heritage sites on the other side. In addition, in the field of athletic activity and sports, I examines sports' activities, the issue of recognition as regards sports, data on individual athletes' impediments to mobility to the other side, the role of football fans concerning contact and antagonism with the "other" and bicomunal sports activities. Lastly, I include the data regarding sports and sports activities as promoters for both discord and contact.

In the fourth section (Part V), I introduce the analysis of the data collected on the case of Cyprus, in relation to the selected theoretical tools for each one of sets of activities/parameters of the research.

In Chapter 13, I analyse the data on the Cypriot civil society, CSOs and NGOs. I present a general analysis on the situation of the civil society in Cyprus, the organisations' stance towards stereotype-breaking and conflict transformation, their contribution in bicomunal contact and interaction, tolerance and trust and cooperation, and organisations' and citizens' participation in bicomunal activities. Additionally, I analyse the importance of bicomunal events and the value of bicomunal activities for peace and conflict transformation. Moreover, I analyse CSO and NGO activity through the prism of interdependence and the Contact Hypothesis. Lastly, I distinguish the difference between contact – stereotypes and the contact – conflict transformation relations and analyse the contribution of CSOs and NGOs in these relations.

In Chapter 14, I interpret the data on economic interdependence. I offer a general analysis on the bicomunal economic and trade interdependence situation in Cyprus as shaped by the existent circumstances (island division, acquis suspension, recognition issue). After that, I analyse the data on doing business and working together, the field of tourism, intra-island trade and spending on the other side. Moreover, I examine the business and trade interaction on the economic theoretical interdependence approach and on the Contact Hypothesis. Finally, I discuss the potential contribution of economic interdependence to conflict transformation in Cyprus.

In Chapter 15, I go through the data on culture, cultural activities and sports. I analyse the role of culture in bicomunal contact, intercultural understanding, cultural bicomunal contacts, activities and events. I also examine culture as regards the Contact Hypothesis, and culture and conflict transformation. In the field of sports, I analyse their role in bicomunal contact as a promoter of discord, in comparison to the recognition issue, the negative role of Greek Cypriot football fan clubs and the impediments to individual athletes. Then I examine sports as a promoter of contact through individual and group actions and bicomunal sports activities. Lastly I chapter study sports as a promoter of values, sports in relation to the Contact Hypothesis and the role of sports in conflict transformation.

In Chapter 16, I gather the findings of the data analysis and presents the results of the thesis on the three non-governmental activity, contact categories. Results show that although there is equal capability of positive and negative influence in the Cyprus conflict, the overall contribution of CSOs and NGOs, economic activity and culture and sports on confronting stereotypes is not significant despite positive trends. Research

also does not reveal any direct influencing patterns between contact through non-governmental activity and conflict transformation.

Lastly, in the final part of this research (Chapter VI), I present the conclusions and summarise the results of the research. In the concluding chapter, I offer a wrap up of the thesis including a retrospective look on theory, structure, methods, theoretical tools, data use and analysis and generalisability of results on the Cyprus case.

II. Theoretical Framework

3. Unofficial Diplomacy

In order to explore the influencing capability of unofficial diplomacy on confronting intercommunal stereotypes and facilitating conflict transformation in the case of Cyprus, it is important to define the term unofficial diplomacy. In its wide use, it is usually a synonym to Track 2 diplomacy. However, there are different approaches, terminologies and categorisations of the activities that fall outside the official diplomatic conduct.

The Instrument of Diplomacy. Diplomacy is the main instrument employed by the state in order to exercise its foreign policy. It is “*a system of structured communication between two or more parties.*” (McGlinchey , 2017, p. 20), and has probably existed for as long as civilisation has. From the ancient Greek *proxeny* institution to the special emissaries of the Italian city states of the 13th century, and from the customary permanent missions of the 16th century to the modern era diplomacy, international treaties are negotiated by officially appointed diplomats, and diplomacy has been the main means of communication between state (as well as non-state) actors. The main function of diplomacy is negotiation, which means discussions designed to identify common interests and areas of conflict between the parties (Evans & Newnham, 1998, p. 129).

Nowadays, the conduct of international relations has, in a sense, expanded beyond the milieu of the state heads and the *charges d' affaires*. Although treaties and agreements are still negotiated and signed on the high-political and military level, the growth in importance of non-state actors has expanded the conduct of diplomacy beyond the official, state context. In the post-Cold War era, there is a sharp increase in the number and activity of global, non-state actors and as a result, diplomacy involves many participants who are experts in matters other than diplomacy and hold positions outside foreign ministries (Langhorne, 2005, p. 331).

The case of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction is an example of a successful mixed diplomatic effort and illustrates the blurring of the limits between official and unofficial diplomacy. The Convention, also known as the 1997

Ottawa Mine Ban Treaty is the most rapidly negotiated international agreement than any other major agreement in history and is praised as an innovative way of conducting international diplomacy, with governments and civil society working together (Goose, 2000). However, despite the variety and flexibility of the unofficial diplomacy tools and the consolidation of the non-state actors in the context of diplomacy, their role needs not to be exaggerated since states remain the major diplomatic players.

Categorization of Diplomatic Tracks: The Levels of Diplomatic Conduct.

As diplomacy becomes more and more complex and the limits of official and unofficial actors and activity become blurry, the study of the diplomatic phenomena become increasingly systematised. The most noted taxonomy is the one that distinguishes Track 1 and Track 2 diplomacy where Track 1 stands for official government diplomacy and Track 2 for unofficial interaction and intervention of non-state actors (Diamond & McDonald, 1996).

Track 1 is the activity between official representatives of states (or internationally recognised quasi-state or state-like authorities) that exercise their diplomatic efforts directly or through Intergovernmental Organisations (IGOs). Track 1 diplomacy may be conducted in a persuasive or in a coercive manner. It may be used for the accomplishment of bilateral and multilateral agreements or for the adjustment and tightening of interstate relations. Track 1 diplomacy is the exclusive tool for the signing of treaties and agreements. A state may participate in Track 1 procedures as a direct participant, as a supporter or as a third-party mediator. Track 1 may be exercised by any state official, from the head of state to the lower diplomatic officers (Nan, Track I Diplomacy, 2003). Vamik Volkan characterises official diplomacy as an art in which the professional diplomats blend personal style with government policies and international protocol (Fisher, 1997, p. 105).

Track 2 diplomacy refers to interactions among individuals or groups that take place outside the official negotiation processes. Therefore, Track 2 describes all other activities that occur outside official government channels. Initially, Joseph Montville defined Track 2 as the unofficial non-structured interaction between members of adversarial groups directed towards conflict resolution (Fisher, 1997, p. 117). According to Joseph Montville, Track 2 diplomacy is the:

“Unofficial, informal interaction between members of adversarial groups or nations with the goals of developing strategies, influencing public opinions and organizing human and material resources in ways that might help resolve the conflict.” (Montville, 1991, p. 262)

Participants in Track 2 initiatives are influential members of the parties. Track 2 diplomacy is not a substitute for the official one. It rather looks at assisting official leaders by counterbalancing the constraints imposed upon them by their need to appear strong in official negotiations. In addition, Track 2 diplomacy seeks political formulas that might satisfy the basic security and esteem needs of the parties to a particular dispute (Botcharova, 2001, p. 284). Track 2 diplomacy consists only of non-official actors. According to Diana Chigas (2003) Track 2 diplomacy is the intervention that brings together non-official, but influential members of the parties for direct, private interaction with joint analysis of the conflict and joint problem-solving. The intermediaries are typically knowledgeable and skilled scholars/practitioners who are impartial and whose training and expertise enable them to facilitate productive dialogue and problem solving between the parties.


Between Track 1 and Track 2, lies Track 1 and a Half diplomacy, which is the intermediation that involves unofficial actors (such as former government officials, religious or social organizations) who intervene between official government representatives in order to promote a peaceful resolution (Chigas, 2003). Susan Allen Nan (2005, p. 165) defines Track 1 and a Half Diplomacy as *“initiatives that are facilitated by unofficial bodies, but directly involve officials from the conflict in question”*. For Jeffrey Mapendere (2005, p. 70) the main feature that distinguishes Track 1 and a Half from Track 1 is that the third-party mediator is not a representative of a political institution.

Track 3 diplomacy is the people-to-people diplomacy undertaken by individuals and private groups to encourage interaction and understanding between hostile communities, involving awareness-raising and empowerment by focusing at the grassroots level. Track 3 refers to the grassroots promotion of peace by working with people from any sector of the society and works from the bottom up attempting to rebuild relationships between ordinary citizens (Chigas, 2003). It is commonly referred to as *“grassroots initiatives”* engaging amateurs in the exploration and promotion of cooperation and dialogue as a precursor to peace. Amira Schiff (2010, p. 95) defines Track

3 as “*the unofficial activities of conflicting parties at the grass-roots level aimed at bringing people together across conflict lines*”. Keck and Sikkink (1999, p. 89) link Track 3 to transnational advocacy networks that is, non-governmental groups organised to promote causes, principled ideas, and norms that often involve individuals advocating policy changes that cannot be easily linked to a rationalist understanding of interests. Track 3 activity is not strictly diplomatic, but may also focus on social issues involving strategies, which include dialogue and co-operative activities. Their aim is to lay the building blocks for future co-operation between individuals in different societies (Laster, Molot, & Zilni, 2006, p. 340).

Louise Diamond and John McDonald (1996) introduced the term Multi-Track diplomacy and the respective sophisticated typology (Institute of Multi-Track Diplomacy, 2013) in order to capture the complexity and breadth of official and unofficial diplomacy and incorporate all aspects of mediation from the ground-level work of private citizens to the top-level meetings of state heads. According to the typology (Figure 1), we can distinguish nine tracks, each one representing a different dimension of activity that might influence, directly or indirectly, the diplomatic process.

Figure 1: The Diplomatic Tracks



Republication from “Institute of Multitrack Diplomacy Website” (Institute of Multi-Track Diplomacy, 2013)

Defining Unofficial Diplomacy. As mentioned earlier, unofficial diplomacy is not a substitute for the official one but it rather (directly or indirectly, intentionally or unintentionally) assists or obstructs official leaders by counterbalancing or enforcing the constraints imposed upon them through its activity. When functioning towards rapprochement, unofficial diplomacy aims at promoting social peace-building which

“is about addressing the hate, anger, fear, lies, trauma and loss a people has experienced during years of devastating war” and “to prevent the cycle of violence from re-creating itself” (MacDonald, 2002, p. 56). Thus, Track 2 and citizens’ diplomacy attempt to address psychological factors of conflict through unofficial, non-constructed interaction between the members of adversarial groups (Fisher, 1997, p. 117). Unofficial diplomacy brings on the table the consideration of human relations between the parties, by addressing mistrust and hostility as it considers that it is often the subjective factors that render the conflict more difficult to resolve, without neglecting at the same time central issues like territory and control (Zuckerman, 2005, p. 5). As Olga Botcharova (2001, p. 284) puts it, it is the attempt to face people in the regions of conflict as active resources to its transformation. Many unofficial diplomacy approaches either stem from psychological concepts and insights, or try to address human needs and fears. Herbert Kelman, used the group therapy approach of psychiatrists Jerome Frank and Eduard Ascher when he unofficially brought together representatives of opposing large groups, especially Cypriot Turks and Cypriot Greeks (Kelman, 1991). Conflict Resolution pioneer John Burton claimed that human participants in conflict situations are *“compulsively struggling in their respective institutional environments at all social levels to satisfy primordial and universal needs—needs such as security, identity, recognition and development”* (Burton J. , 1991, pp. 83, 87). Burton’s needs approach is based on the works of Erich Fromm and Abraham Maslow. Needs theory supports that humans share a drift to fulfil a set of needs from the most fundamental to the higher ones. According to Fromm, it is the existential needs that offer a meaning to the life of individuals¹ while for Maslow, human needs are divided in five consecutive levels (Figure 2) where they *“arrange themselves in hierarchies of pre-potency. That is to say, the appearance of one need usually rests on the prior satisfaction of another, more pre-potent need.”* (Maslow, 1943)

¹ Erich Fromm, in his 1942 work “The Fear of Freedom” pinpoints eight human needs: 1. Frame of orientation and object of devotion, 2. Relatedness, 3. Transcendence, 4. Rootedness, 5. Sense of Identity, 6. Excitation and Stimulation, 7. Unity and 8. Effectiveness

Figure 2: The Pyramid of Human Needs



Republication from the “BBC News Website” (Kremer & Hammond, 2013)

Human needs approaches stress social interaction (Sites, 1990, p. 136) and consider the suppression of basic human needs as a fundamental cause of conflict (Burton J. W., 1997, p. 2), (Groom A. , 1988, p. 107). Johan Galtung refers to unmet needs², unequal power and unequal life chances, uneven distribution of resources and uneven distribution of the power to distribute these resources (1969, p. 114). Needs approaches have been criticised for overlooking the significance of the social context and for discounting the importance of nurture and civilisation and as such, they can hardly constitute navigation points for governance (Groom A. , 2007, p. 12)

All the aforementioned diplomatic tracks and classifications fall under the unofficial diplomacy category in juxtaposition to official, state diplomacy. Prominent Turkish Cypriot psychiatrist Vamik Volkan (1999, p. 145) holds that there is no one definition of unofficial diplomacy but rather many individual approaches to it. Others use the term on non-official third-party interventions, some on contacts of officials in unofficial capacity and others on unofficial meetings of elites and influential people. Multi-Track approach attempts to categorise all these types of contact.

Although categorisations and typologies are useful for comprehending diplomatic practice, the present research uses the bulk distinction between official and unofficial diplomacy and a holistic approach to unofficial diplomatic conduct. The dissertation is rooted in the realisation of an interdependent world where interstate and inter-communal relations are multidimensional and involve all sectors of the society

² Galtung (1990, p. 292) connects violence and needs by defining violence as “*avoidable insults to basic human needs.*”

(Kaufman, 2002, p. 4). Thus, in this research, unofficial diplomacy is the contacts of non-state and non-official actors that attempt to influence the reality of a frozen conflict according to their agenda. In specific, based on the logic of the Multi-Track approach, the term unofficial diplomacy refers to the unofficial cohesive social intercourse, activities and factors (1) that attempt to influence the official diplomatic procedures, (2) that can work as a complementary or as a subverting tool to the official diplomacy and (3) do not necessarily have the form of direct negotiations. Lastly, the research focuses exclusively on the activity of a) CSOs, NGOs, associations, clubs and other collective forms of non-partisan civic participation organisations, b) Economic and Trade, for-profit actors and c) cultural and sports actors. In that sense, the approach is closer to what literature calls Track 3 diplomacy.

The Capabilities of Unofficial Diplomacy. As mentioned above, unofficial diplomacy is not a substitute for the official one but it rather assists or obstructs official leaders by counterbalancing or enforcing the constraints imposed upon them. When functioning towards rapprochement, unofficial diplomacy aims at promoting social peace-building which “*is about addressing the hate, anger, fear, lies, trauma and loss a people has experienced during years of devastating war*” and “*to prevent the cycle of violence from re-creating itself*” (MacDonald, 2002, p. 56). According to Ronald Fisher, the consideration of the human relations between the parties is necessary for addressing deeper causes of the conflict:

“We must open up communications, look at issues like mistrust, hostility and the effects of trauma if you want to actually resolve the conflict as opposed to just getting a peace agreement. Not that they’re not important: things like territory, control, these are central issues. But often, it’s the subjective factors that render the conflict more difficult to resolve.” (Zuckerman, 2005)

Moreover, although treaties and agreements are negotiated and signed on the official level, official diplomacy often fails to deal with the wounds, feelings, and deeply rooted perceptions of the victimised sides. In its attempt to fill the gap, unofficial diplomacy aims to address the basic security and esteem needs of the parties. As Olga Botcharova notes (2001, p. 284), the international community often disregards the people in the regions of conflict and faces them as passive recipients. Unofficial, non-

constructed interaction between the members of adversarial groups such as Track 2 and citizen diplomacy attempts to address psychological factors (Fisher, 1997, p. 117).

The above-mentioned typology of multi-track diplomacy stresses the pluralism of the tracks involved in a peace process and at the same time, the complex and interweaving nature of a diplomatic process. The work of Louise Diamond and John McDonald has a normative nuance, in the sense that it stresses the potentially positive impact of the various tracks on the resolution of conflicts. In addition, it refers to the necessity for the incorporation of many aspects and the cross-fertilisation of the official and non-government sectors of the society into the mediation process (Invention of Multi-Track Diplomacy, n.d.). In the present research, I do not examine only the positive but also the negative potential of unofficial diplomacy in influencing stereotypes and conflict transformation.

Thus, unofficial diplomacy and unofficial contacts might not be a substitute for official diplomatic efforts, but given the contemporary, complex international reality of non-official diplomatic conduct, they do not deserve to be completely ignored. The degree in which they influence the outcome of interstate and intercommunal relations is under debate. The same stands for their influencing capability on stereotypes of the in-group towards the out-group. In any case, both confronting stereotypes and transforming the conflict are usually high in the agenda of the non-state actors.

In this chapter, I explored the categorisations and tracks of diplomacy, the definitions of unofficial diplomacy, and the sociological and psychological roots of unofficial approaches. In addition, I delimited the capabilities of unofficial diplomacy in confronting stereotypes and influencing conflict. All the theoretical and practical approaches of unofficial diplomacy bear specific subjectivist conceptual presuppositions. Specifically, theoreticians and practitioners of unofficial diplomacy hold, to a greater or lesser extent, that images define behaviour and consequently may lead to conflict and that stereotypes may cause, preserve or aggravate conflict. These presuppositions lead them to attempt to study or resolve images and stereotypes as important factors of conflict.

4. Images and Stereotypes

Actors exercising unofficial diplomacy aspire to transform conflict through the confrontation of established stereotypes. Their approach stems from the theoretical

assumption that in a conflictual condition intergroup contact can bring rapprochement, and thus facilitate the process of transformation. This kind of unofficial diplomatic activity lies on specific theoretical foundations that 1) stress the importance of actors' perceptions in shaping realities, and 2) accentuate the positive impact of contact on prejudice and stereotypes.

The Linkage between Unofficial Diplomacy, Image Theory and Stereotypes. These approaches assume that conflict is mainly based on and fed by perceptions and misperceptions that determine individual and group behaviour. The lack of contact leads to simplified and symbolic images and consequently to stereotypical perceptions and behaviours. Images' and stereotypes' theories are interconnected to unofficial diplomacy in the sense that both claim that high politics agreements need to be accompanied by a process of transformation of relations, interests, discourse, even identities for the solutions to be sustainable. Unofficial diplomacy shares common grounds with Conflict Resolution as they both promote non-coercive, long-term solutions (Burton J. W., 1972, pp. 7-10) through contact, social rapprochement and the waiving of stereotypes, and accentuate the significance of social and identity needs of the rival groups beyond the mere shift of conflictual positions. Hence, unofficial diplomacy turns against stereotypes, based on the acceptance that sustainable solutions to conflict lie in the change of conflictual viewpoints and stereotypical perceptions of the "other".

Stereotypes, Images and Stereotypical Images. According to Heidi Burgess (2003b), stereotypes are generalisations or assumptions about the characteristics of all members of a group, based on an image, which is often wrong. Subjectivist theories of conflict highlight that conflictual conditions exist as far as the disputants perceive them as such (Tidwell, 1998, p. 35). Kenneth Boulding (1959, p. 130) urges that conflicts occur due to incompatibility of images. This incompatibility may be real or illusory. Both kinds of incompatibility are perceptions of the conflicting parties rather than physical facts. Thus, an approach would make the disputants realise that the perceived incompatibility was based on false assumptions and misperceptions of the intentions and generally the attributes of the other. This set of assumptions and misperceptions is the image one holds for another. Even in the case of a zero-sum conflict with a realistic

incompatibility of interests, negative images and stereotypes play an important role in boosting, feeding and re-feeding the conflict.

In both peaceful and conflictual conditions, the potential or actual disputants create and maintain images of the other and of oneself. These images exist on the individual as well as on the group level (Pasamitros N. G., 2010). The Image is what one believes to be true, his subjective knowledge. This knowledge structure largely affects behaviour. If there is a change in the perceived information, it may consequently follow a change of the image. *“This Image is built up as a result of all past experience of the possessor of the image. Part of the image is the history of the image itself”*. (Boulding K. E., 1973, pp. 5-6)

In psychology, the image is a mental representation of something previously perceived, in the absence of the original stimulus. As Gordon Allport stresses in *The Nature of Prejudice*, the human mind performs categorisations and simplifications and thus prejudice is identified as a concernment of normal human functioning: *“The human mind must think with the aid of categories... Once formed, categories are the basis for normal prejudgment. We cannot possibly avoid this process. Orderly living depends upon it.”*³ (1954, 1979, 2007, p. 20)

Symbolic images play a major role in international relations. *“The symbolic image of one’s own nation is tinged with ideas of security or insecurity depending on one’s image of other nations”*. (Boulding K. E., 1973, pp. 111-113) Based on Boulding’s hypothesis a group that feels threatened by others, in its attempt to increase its own security, generates insecurity to other groups that perceive its behaviour to be aggressive. This “action-counteraction” phenomenon is a result of the practice of rival groups to think of their security in absolute terms.

When in conflict, opposed parties create and maintain enemy images of the other that trap individuals and groups in certain functions; inflows that threaten the image are being rejected ignored or perverted, while these that serve its preservation are being accepted as perfectly consistent with the desired outcome (Jervis, 1976, pp. 154, 181). Bryant Wedge (1990, p. 105) calls this phenomenon, selective inattention. For example, a concession made by the other side towards a peaceful approach may be

³ Walter Lippmann in *Public Opinion* presents a quite similar notion concerning simplified images: *“For the attempt to see all things freshly and in detail, rather than as types and generalities, is exhausting, and among busy affairs practically out of the question.”* In addition *“But there are uniformities sufficiently accurate, and the need of economizing attention is so inevitable, that the abandonment of all stereotypes for a wholly innocent approach to experience would impoverish human life.”* (1922: 49, 50)

explained as a weakness that gives the opportunity to get the upper hand or as a misleading conspirational trick (Jervis, 1976, p. 120) (Alexander, Brewer, & Herrmann, 1999, p. 79). This example reveals the crucial role the image plays in the configuration of behaviour. As Kenneth Boulding points out (1959, p. 120), “*it is always the image not the truth that immediately determines behaviour. We act according to the way the world appears to us, not necessarily according to the way it “is”*”. The Thucydidean concept of perception (“δόξα”) signifies the irrational element of actions and decisions based on uncertainty, subjectivity and an apprehension that does not always offer the image of reality. This apprehension is often closer to wishful thinking and leads to delusions that bring out the segregation from reality and even its intentional distortion in order to fit facts into imaginations and desires. Thucydidean perception as an action stimulus may set out from a leader, a leading group or even from a broad group of the people (Θεοδωρόπουλος, 2000, pp. 46, 48). Thus, the actions of the parties and their members do not correspond to some objective facts given by objective reality but they rather derive from the image decision-makers hold for the situation. If this image does not keep up with the expectations, it may be revised while if it is close to what is considered the truth, then the image remains unchanged.

Up to a certain point, the images are self-justifying. One that is suspicious and believes everybody is hostile will eventually confirm his suspicions. Reversely, one that believes everyone is friendly and acts likewise it is likely to prove his self to be right. On the contrary, images, under certain circumstances, may be self-defeating. According to Boulding (1973, pp. 124-125) the way images are reversed from self-justifying to self-defeating is unsolved.⁴

Contact between the parties on the social and the political level may lead to the direction of turning self-justifying images to self-defeating ones. Of course, this is an extremely difficult task because the individuals and the parties tend to infiltrate the inflows in such a way that the present image will stay firm. In addition, the images of

⁴ Lippmann, regarding the personal level, holds that: “*If the experience contradicts the stereotype, one of two things happens. If the man is no longer plastic, or if some powerful interest makes it highly inconvenient to rearrange his stereotypes, he pooh-poohs the contradiction as an exception that proves the rule, discredits the witness, finds a flaw somewhere, and manages to forget it. However, if he is still curious and open-minded, the novelty is taken into the picture, and allowed to modify it. Sometimes, if the incident is striking enough, and if he has felt a general discomfort with his established Figure, he may be shaken to such an extent as to distrust all accepted ways of looking at life, and to expect that normally a thing will not be what it is generally supposed to be. In the extreme case, especially if he is literary, he may develop a passion for inverting the moral canon by making Judas, Benedict Arnold, or Caesar Borgia the hero of his tale.*” (1922, pp. 54-55)

the parties are self-justifying because they serve certain needs and purposes. In-Groups⁵ need enemy images to constitute themselves as such. Enemy images serve in-group completion and integrity purposes and are skilfully used by decision-makers for domestic consumption (Pasamitros N. G., 2010).

In-Groups and Out-Groups, Stereotypical and Enemy Images. An individual considers oneself part of several groups at the same time. As for all social creatures, the group is the unit of survival for humans. Groups provide physical protection from hostile environments and external enemies, as well as psychological security (Frank & Melville, 1988, p. 2). The primary group in which one determines himself to be mainly part of, can be any salient identity group such as the national, ethnic, racial or religious (Burgess, 2003a). On the contrary, "out-group" refers to anyone who is not in part of the kin group and is perceived as belonging to an alien totality. The stereotype is a positive or negative perception of an individual or a group and is built on superficial images so that the respective positive or negative behaviour against the receiver is justified (Lenk, 1982, p. 187).

Enemy images have always been rooted in the human need to define a sense of identity with reference to a particular group. Those that we perceive as different from our group can easily be seen as threatening. Under such circumstances, the natural human need to belong, transforms into a reactive hardening of boundaries, which insulates and defends the in-group against what appears to be an overwhelmingly complex and threatening world (Fabick, p. 8).

In cases where a group is in contact with another group with which there is a possible conflict of interests, social distance is established through a process of invidious comparison. The in-group is seen as superior while the out-group is seen as having negative traits and elements. When engaged in competition, the invidious images are stereotyped (Wedge, 1990, p. 103).

In a conflictual condition, this differentiation is crucial since it defines the threshold between "us" (in-group), and "them" (out-group). This differentiation is stereotypical in nature. The function of stereotypes is to create images of the out-group

⁵ The terms in-group or we-group and out-group were introduced by William G. Sumner (1906, 2008, pp. 12-13): "A group of groups may have some relation to each other (kin, neighborhood, alliance, connubium and commercium) which draws them together and differentiates them from others. Thus a differentiation arises between ourselves, the we-group, or in-group, and everybody else, or the others-groups, out-groups."

and the in-group that “explain, rationalise and justify” the intergroup relationship and behaviour. In most of the cases, the holders of the stereotypes are told about before they see, and they have imagined before experiencing. Such inflows distinguish certain objects as familiar or strange, emphasising the difference. In this way, the slightly familiar is seen as very familiar, and the somewhat strange as sharply alien. Those preconceptions govern the process of perception and, along with defence mechanisms that try to maintain the foundations of our perceived reality, favour the preservation of stereotypes (Lippmann, 1922, pp. 49-50).

Enemy images have been treated in political science in terms analogous to how psychologists conceive stereotypes. A stereotype is any common public belief about a certain social group or a type of individual. The enemy is seen as motivated by a very few self-serving interests all of which are judged to be evil and immoral. Moreover, the enemy is considered as conspiratorial and led by monolithic heads. The adversary may act in order to intimidate others by using constant threats but actually, he is overweening, hollow and weak. In fact, the enemy is clever and coward at the same time. He takes advantage of the circumstances and acts when the other seems weak and retreats when he senses the other to be stronger and decisive to retaliate (Alexander, Brewer, & Herrmann, 1999, pp. 78, 79), (Wedge, 1990, pp. 104-105). This extreme enemy image is often referred to as a “paper tiger”, meaning that the “other” is “*powerful but weak internally [and] if confronted with resolution and strength will quickly fold.*” (Herrmann, Voss, Schooler, & Ciarrochi, 1997, p. 10) Each party of the conflict believes that the enemy is expansive, aggressive insincere and untrustworthy and capable of great brutality and evil-doing, (Gladstone, 1959, p. 132).

When engaged in conflict, one side projects its negative traits as being the basic traits of the other, ignoring its own shortcomings and misdeeds, while emphasising the same in the other⁶ (Burgess, 2003a). Projection emancipates the holder of the stereotype from the feeling of guilt for his aggressive feelings and deeds (Lenk, 1982, p. 186). Frank, Jerome D. and Andrei Y. Melville (1988, pp. 2, 3) note that the perceptions of the enemy, very often, tend to mirror each other. That is, each side attributes the same virtues to itself and the same vices to the enemy. This phenomenon is known as the mirror images. When the parties have mirror images, it is not easy for their relationships

⁶ According to Robert W. Rieber and Robert J. Kelly (1991, pp. 11-12) the enmification on the individual level is a psychological process. The individual wants to know only his virtues and projects his vices onto the image of the enemy.

to be defused. As conflicts escalate, opposing groups become increasingly polarised through in-group discourse and out-group hostilities (Coleman, 2006, p. 538). The result is the development of oppositional identities constructed around the negation and disparagement of the out-group.

The extreme form of stereotyping leads to dehumanisation in which members of the opposing group are considered less than human.⁷ To trigger violent behaviours, it is necessary to dehumanise the opponent in order to go to war against him (Burgess, 2003a). Thus, the dehumanised “other” hardly deserves respect or consideration. This conception of the enemy becomes the moral duty of every citizen, and those who question it are denounced. The conception of the enemy can be understood through the defence mechanism of projection. Projection is the ascription to others of impulses, feelings and other characteristics, which exist in an individual but which he cannot admit to oneself (Gladstone, 1959, pp. 132, 133), (Wedge, 1990, p. 104). The next step in the negative stereotypical images process is scapegoating, that is, to pin the “other” for all the problems that you have. It is common for each side to decide that it is the “other” that is the source of all their problems and that only if the enemy could be vanquished or eliminated then these problems would go away (Gladstone, 1959, p. 133), (Burgess, 2003a).

Images, Levels and Tracks. The importance of the image for official and unofficial diplomacy lies on two different levels: a) the image of the decision-makers and b) the image of the society / community.

a) The image of the decision-makers defines the determinative decisions concerning the governing of a state. Decision-makers shape official diplomacy and therefore they decide for the creation or the breaking of agreements, treaties and alliances, for the use or non-use of force, for war or for peace. These decisions, led by the images of the powerful elites, define the major events of international reality.

b) The image of the society/community seems less important since common people have no direct access to decision-making procedures. The truth is that the elites need the support of the society/community in order to legitimise their authority. Especially in democratic regimes, the elites cannot diverge too much from the image of

⁷ Katerina Stenou (1998, p. 16) claims that ancient and modern myths confirm the notion that the “other”, the creature that does not follow “our” rules, is not a human being.

the society/community because such a move is costly in support and power (Boulding K. E., 1959, pp. 121, 122).

As stated above, opposed parties reject the inflows that threaten the image and accept the ones that confirm it. This tendency to focus on and preserve the memories of the negative aspects of the enemy can be reinforced through intentional misleading by political leaders and the media (Fabick, p. 13). In many cases, as Irvin Janis (1972, pp. 8-9) formulated in his work “*Victims of Groupthink*”, decision-making groups tend to preserve distorted perceptions and act according to them, due to excessive desire for unanimity and conformity, and due to minimal motivation for constructive deviation (Hart, 1991, pp. 247-254). Even in the cases where decision-makers are under obligation to represent the society/community, they have also the ability to manipulate the images by imposing the ones they wish to them. In long-established nations, the elites share the images with the society / community rather than impose them, since the stereotypical images are long-established as well (Boulding K. E., 1959, pp. 121, 122). For that reason, sometimes the image of identity of the leaders causes a consequent change in the image of identity of the ruled (Boulding K. E., 1990, p. 44). In total, the images held by the society / community affect the decision-makers by demarcating their options. As Don Smith urges (1973, p. 116):

“The images the people of one nation have of the people and governments of other nations are obvious variables in the issue of war or peace. The images the citizens of any nation hold about some other nation clearly affect the options open to their own government in political, economic, and social relationships with that other nation.”

While Smith’s work refers to nations, I claim that this approach is also valid for inter-communal conflicts since, the mechanisms of image creation, and image change function in the same manner for all humans.

The *habitus* largely shapes the self-image and the image of the other. The *habitus* is the familiar environment in which we move inside, get educated by and form our persuasions that we take as intrinsic and we never question (Μήλλας, 2001, p. 315). These agents of socialisation (the family, the school, the peer group, and the media) provide the basic knowledge and the cognitive maps that allow us to locate, perceive,

identify, and label a seemingly infinite number of concrete occurrences (Rieber & Kelly, 1991, p. 18).

Informally, images are transmitted through the family. They have the form of traditions and oral heritage. The family group shapes the images that appear as the “reality” since they pass from generation to generation as objective truth (Hesse & Mack, 1991, p. 132). These informal images are usually traumatic group experiences of the hostile out-groups and hymns to the virtue of the in-group.

Formally, images are built through schooling and the written word. History and its learning in formal education are of great importance as they form the image of the individual as well as that of the group. This image is essentially a historical image – that is, an image that extends through time, backward into a supposedly recorded or perhaps mythological past and forward into an imagined future (Anderson, 2006 (Rev. Ed.), pp. 11-12). The function of the history textbooks of this kind is to teach history from a certain distorted perspective that favours the image of the receiver (Boulding K. E., 1959, p. 122).

As mentioned earlier, as far as conflict is concerned, according to image theory the limited capacity of humans and the in-group environment stimuli create and solidify perceptions, images and stereotypes. Images influence all groups, from peoples to decision-makers, and shape, restraint or emancipate their behaviours. These images may drive to friendly or antagonistic perceptions and related behaviours that, under specific circumstances, may be used to justify hostile and violent actions.

The work and aims of unofficial diplomacy actors relate closely to the mechanisms of images and stereotypes as they attempt to reach the deeper causes of conflict and serve the psychological and social needs of the parties in an effort to produce sustainable, long-term solutions. Unofficial diplomacy stresses contact as the element for confronting stereotypes. Activities that bring together individuals or groups from rival parties can help in confronting stereotypes. Allegedly, contact brings cooperation, tolerance, trust and can lead to the reduction of prejudice and stereotypes for the out-group. Consequently, reducing stereotypes can assist in conflict transformation as the societies of the rival groups would be pressuring or at least would be more willing to accept a peaceful solution. Some sociological approaches to conflict base their analyses on the ontological and behavioural hypotheses of images, perceptions, stereotypes and subjectivist interpretive forms, while others focus on the realistic aspects of conflict, the group categorisations and behaviour, or the discrepancy

between the individual and group level of analysis. In any case, most of them can contribute in understanding and analysing the role of contact and group dynamics in conflictual situations.

5. Sociological Theories on the Causes of Conflict

As seen in previous chapters, unofficial diplomacy, meaning the efforts of non-official actors to influence a conflict, attempts to serve the needs of the people in conflict zones in order to achieve deep-rooted solutions. To that end, they confront negative images and stereotypical perceptions in order to render a peaceful solution possible. Their main tool for confronting stereotypes is contact.

Contact is a central element for many sociological theories on the causes of conflict. Several approaches accentuate the lack of contact as the main factor for the existence and persistence of stereotypes and prejudice. Thus, for many sociological approaches to conflict, contact, its lack and (re)establishment, lie in the core of understanding and resolving inter-group conflict, and in fighting stereotypes. For other theories, contact is not important and thus they stress other factors such as competition and in-group favouritism as the most crucial for the creation of conflict. For the purposes of the research, I present and analyse the Sociological Theories on the Causes of Conflict. This is an important part of the theoretical background of the dissertation because I use these sociological approaches to conflict as interpretive tools for unofficial diplomatic activity in Cyprus.

Contact as an Influencing Factor. Out-group stereotypes are built through simplified images of the “other” that arise from long-established viewpoints. These stereotypical images, according to several theorists, are preserved by the lack of contact (or by the negatively infiltrated contact) with the “other”. In many intractable conflicts, the relations between the parties develop in environments where exclusive social structures limit intergroup contact and isolate the in-groups across a limited domain (Coleman, 2006, p. 538). The consequent lack of contact facilitates the development of abstract, stereotypical images of the other, autistic hostilities and intergroup violence. According to Coleman (2006, p. 543) human contact and interaction between members of various communities are important for both maintaining and transforming protracted conflict. Burgess (2003b) states that the key to reversing negative stereotypes is to

contradict them; (1) in direct interactions between people, (2) in the media, and (3) through education.

According to this approach, just as stereotypes are preserved through the lack of contact, their rejection can be achieved through processes of humanisation. For that purpose, there is the need for both sides to experience one another in everyday contexts, which enable them to see one another as human beings who are more like themselves than not (Deutsch, 2006, p. 65). The establishment of direct human contact between members of rival groups is essential for conflict transformation. According to Muzafer Sherif et al (Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, & Sherif, 1954/1961), (Wedge, 1990, p. 107) direct contact under non-competitive circumstances combined with cooperation towards common goals leads to a decrease in intergroup tension⁸. Cooperation on the governmental and the private level on issues such as entrepreneurship, trade, science, and culture, create self-sustaining systems that establish and maintain intergroup connections that can contribute in the establishment of greater and high-political connections.

Contact Hypothesis and Intergroup Contact Theories. The majority of the aforementioned conflict resolution practices, that concern individual or group contact, draw from the Contact Hypothesis / Intergroup Contact Theory, initially elaborated by sociologists Robin M. Williams (1947) and Goodwin Watson⁹ (1947) and later systematised by psychologist Gordon Allport (1954, 1979, 2007)¹⁰. The main point of the hypothesis is that intergroup contact can improve intergroup relations (Hodson & Hewstone, 2012, p. 3). In specific, Contact theory states that interpersonal contact is an effective way to reduce prejudice between majority and minority group members and sets certain preconditions for contact to be effective (Allport, 1954, 1979, 2007, pp. 261-281) (Pettigrew, 1998, pp. 66-67):

- a) Equal status, meaning that it is important that both groups expect and perceive equal status in the situation.

⁸ Sherif's conclusion is based on his famous experiment on eleven and twelve-year-old boys in an Oklahoma summer camp that constitutes a fundamental supporting research of the Realistic Conflict Theory referred later on in this chapter.

⁹ Goodwin Watson, in his book "Action for Unity" (Watson, 1947) examines the basic assumptions and approaches for combating prejudice (Freeman, 1949, p. 229)

¹⁰ According to Stephen C. Wright, Salena M. Brody and Art Aron (1997, p. 74), "*Allport was certainly not the originator of many of the ideas that underlie the contact hypothesis (e.g. Brody, 1946; Horowitz, 1936; Stouffer, 1949; Williams, 1947), his formulation would prove to be key in focusing research and theorizing, and today he is often cited as the originator of hypothesis.*"

- b) Common goals, that is prejudice reduction through contact facilitated by an active goal-oriented effort. Groups coming together and working on a superordinate goal may overcome prejudice.
- c) Intergroup cooperation. Groups need to work cooperatively without competition.
- d) Personal interaction. Informal, personal interaction between in-group and out-group members. Such personal contact leads to inter-group friendships.
- e) Support of authorities, law or custom. A sort of authority or normative sanction should support intergroup contact, supporting equal attitude and discouraging in-group - out-group comparisons.

Since then, there have been great developments and numerous updates of the *Contact Theory*. The theory has expanded to the study of extended and indirect contact. The Extended Contact Hypothesis holds that “*knowledge that an in-group member has a close relationship with an outgroup member can lead to more positive intergroup attitudes.*” (Wright, Aron, McLaughlin-Volpe, & Ropp, 1997, p. 74) In addition, extended contact is considered to be reducing intergroup anxiety, cultivating positive ingroup norms about the outgroup and outgroup norms about the ingroup, and including the outgroup in the self (Turner, Hewstone, Voci, & Vonofakou, 2008, pp. 844-845). Other approaches suggest that indirect intergroup contact such as vicarious, imagined and para-social contact can improve intergroup relations. Vicarious contact asserts that vicarious learning resulting from the observation of in-group members having successful contact with the out-group may reduce prejudice and increase the willingness to engage in direct intergroup contact (Mazziotta, Mummendey, & Wright, 2011, p. 256), (Baker, 2012, p. 3). Furthermore, electronic contact, namely contact between in-group and an out-group members through the internet, is considered a successful means of individual contact for people that otherwise would not have had the opportunity, nor the inclination, to meet (Amichai-Hamburger & McKenna, 2006, p. 826), (White, Harvey, & Abu-Rayya, 2015, p. 131), (White & Abu-Rayya, 2012, p. 598).

Modern psychological and sociological research also stress the negative effects of contact an element overlooked in the vigorous search and exclusive focus on the positive ones. As people tend to generalise positive experiences with a member of an out-group to the group as a whole, there is also a reverse effect concerning negative experience (Barlow, et al., 2012, p. 1629), (Graf, Paolini, & Rubin, 2014, p. 536). According to Paolini, Harwood and Rubin (2010, p. 1724), people having a negative

encounter with someone from a different social group, are more likely to think about the person's group memberships than if they had a positive encounter with them.

Moreover, many scholars have investigated and tested the validity of the contact, theory-based approaches. Many sophisticated contact theory models have been produced, focusing on different aspects of the contact - stereotypes / prejudice relation. Among the factors pointed out are; in-group – out-group interaction anxiety and discomfort, interpersonal and intergroup interaction distinction, and external dimensions that fuel or reduce stereotypes / prejudice / discrimination (emotional, social, economic, and historic). In addition, different researchers have urged different mechanisms that promote contact effects, such as in-group and out-group exemplars, and inclusion of other in self (Wright, Aron, McLaughlin-Volpe, & Ropp, 1997, pp. 74-76), de-categorisation, in-group identity barriers, generalisation effect and long-term contact (Filippou, 2010, pp. 2-5).

However, despite the developments of the contact theory, there are serious controversies concerning its validity. Thomas Pettigrew (1998, p. 69) stresses the risk for the contact theory to become an “*open-ended laundry list of conditions - ever expandable and thus eluding falsification.*” As he remarks, researchers keep adding new factors for optimal contact. Thomas Wilson (1996, pp. 44-45) notes that the effect contact has on prejudice is unclear. Wilson explains that this happens because; (1) the research results have been mixed, (2) many experiments do not offer generalisable results and (3) contact studies may show a correlation between contact and prejudice but do not show that contact actually affects prejudice. Experimental approaches have set the theory in a contact – threat axis that, in a way, helps to overcome the impasse between advocates and opponents of the hypothesis’ effectiveness. However, experimental approaches have their own strengths and weaknesses. Namely, although they demonstrate internal validity, they lack external validity. The controlled environment of an experiment admittedly differs from real life. On the contrary, observational studies face the opposite problem. They may have little external validity problems but they cannot distinguish correlation from causation. Quasi-experimental studies may have provided important evidence on the issue but they are also bound to the normative effect of the authority conducting the experiment (Forbes, 1997, pp. 62, 63, 112).

From Allport’s Contact Hypothesis up to nowadays, social scientists argue on the capability of contact to reduce or aggravate prejudice, stereotypes and consequently,

conflict. Researchers reach conclusions that support or reject these positions. In numerous cases, the problem stems from the level of analysis. As Forbes urges (1997, p. 132), “*contact theorists such as Gordon Allport explain intergroup conflict in terms of individual psychological processes.*” What contact theorists do is that they move from individual to group psychology, thus generalising on group behaviour by drawing from individual behaviour. Hence, in order to utilise individual psychological approaches on groups, they arbitrarily shift from one level of analysis to the other. This is the main critique exercised by contesting theories that do not draw from the inversely proportional contact-prejudice relation. Modern social science distinguishes interpersonal behaviour, namely the way people interact with one another, from intergroup behaviour, which refers to interactions of people in groups. This is why approaches that fall in the category of contact theory are judged as “*“individual” in the sense that they employ constructs and sets of empirical relationships which can be conceived as being external and preliminary to any social context.*” (Tajfel, 1974, p. 65) Advocates of the contrarious *Realistic Conflict* and *Social Identity* theories charge *Contact Theorists* for not focusing on “*the complex interweaving of individual or interpersonal behavior with the contextual social processes of intergroup conflict and their psychological effects*” (Tajfel & Turner, 1986, p. 7).

Realistic Conflict Theory. Realistic Conflict Theory denies that the lack of contact is the main source of prejudice and thus of conflict, and accentuates the central role of competition for the rise of intergroup conflict. According to this approach, real conflict of interests produces competition or hostility towards the out-group, favouritism of the in-group and intragroup solidarity (Baumeister & Vohs, 2007, p. 484). On the other hand, when the groups need each other to accomplish a superordinate goal, hostility reduces and intergroup friendship and harmony are promoted (Valentim, 2010, p. 587). Social psychologist John Duckitt, in his book *The Social Psychology of Prejudice* furthers the realistic theory to unequal status groups. Duckitt (1994, pp. 157-178) alleges that if a higher status group dominates a subordinate group, the subordinate group may either respond by accepting the higher status group behaviour to avoid conflict or by judging the behaviour of the dominant group as oppressive and not acceptable. In the latter case, the dominant group may judge the contestation as justified or unjustified. If it judges it as unjustified, the top dog will respond in a hostile manner. If it judges the uprising of the subordinate group as justified, then its claim for change

is accepted (Whitley & Kite, 2010, pp. 327-329). As Forbes points out (1997, p. 31), when it comes to prejudice or discrimination, within a society where the structure is not clearly built for competition as in the interstate level, the explanatory power of Realistic Conflict Theory is significantly reduced.

Social Identity & Social Categorisation Theory. On the one hand, the *Social Identity Theory* does not support the realistic conflict hypothesis that a conflict of interests between groups is necessary for intergroup antagonism to rise (Forbes, 1997, pp. 32, 33). On the other, it functions as a supplement to the Realistic Conflict Theory by trying to enrich it with “*an appropriate analysis of the social psychology of social conflict.*” (Tajfel & Turner, 1986, p. 8)

Social Identity Theory is based on the essential hypothesis that social categorisation of people into distinct groups can produce favouritism towards the in-group over out-group members. Based on observation, the theory asserts that the awareness of belonging to a group is, under certain conditions, sufficient to foster discrimination and competition (Greene, 2004, p. 137), (Huddy, 2001, p. 133), (Stets & Burke, 2000, p. 225). That is because as people perceive social identification as part of their existence, they demonstrate the need to achieve a positive self-evaluation of the in-group through comparison (Turner J. C., 1999, p. 8). In specific, concerning low status or disadvantaged groups or minorities, Social Identity Theory predicates that the disadvantaged position of the low status group will bring to the surface a group identity problem. The reaction of the group members will either be social mobility, if the society permits individual mobility or social change where the group attempts to change its status through collective effort. (Tajfel & Turner, 1986, pp. 9-10)

Social behaviour varies along a continuum from interpersonal, where interaction is determined by personal relations between individuals and individual characteristics, to intergroup where behaviour is determined by membership in social groups or social categories. This continuum is shaped by the interaction between social and psychological factors (Turner J. C., 1999, pp. 9-10). In the example of mobility of disadvantaged groups mentioned above, a group closer to the interpersonal end would demonstrate individual mobility, while a group closer to the intergroup end of the continuum would pursue social change.

In short, what Social Identity Theory claims is that, the hypothesis that contact reduces prejudice is erroneous because it arbitrarily projects the interpersonal

effectiveness of contact to the group level. Social Identity Theory asserts that intergroup behaviour functions in a completely different way and its dynamics cannot be reduced to derivative simplifications that attribute interpersonal traits to intergroup ones. As for the Realistic Conflict approach, Social Identity Theory does not discard it at all. Social Identity theorists place themselves beside the objective type of conflict by trying to introduce social-psychological variables in the research on the causes of intergroup conflict. Moreover, as Tajfel and Turner put it (1986, p. 23):

“It is nearly impossible in most natural social situations to distinguish between discriminatory intergroup behavior based on real or perceived conflict of objective interests between the groups and discrimination based on attempts to establish a positively-valued distinctiveness for one's own group.”

The kindred Self-Categorisation Theory maintains, that where people hold a self-perception based on a social category, they tend to exaggerate intragroup similarities and intergroup differences. Thus, people stereotype themselves as kin to the in-group and distinct from the out-group (Turner J. C., 1999, pp. 10-11). In fact, Self-Categorisation Theory is built on Tajfel's earliest cognitive formulations to further develop the cognitive factors that promote categorization of oneself as a group member (Huddy, 2001, p. 132). As Berndt Simon illustrates (2004, p. 37):

“The Self-categorisation approach is based on the distinction between personal identity and social identity. Personal identity means self-definition as a unique individual in terms of interpersonal or intragroup differentiations, whereas social identity means self-definition as a group member in terms of ingroup – outgroup differentiations.”

Seen as a multilevel self-perception Figure rather than as a bipolar continuum, depending on different situations, the relative salience of these different self-categorisation levels determines behaviour as based on the personal (personalisation) or on the social (depersonalisation) identity. As Tajfel et al (1971, pp. 172-174) show in their manipulative matrices experiments, contrary to realistic theory claims, norms not based on utilitarian or rational norms drive individuals towards intragroup favouritism.

An interesting aspect of the Social Categorisation Theory is the manner in which it approaches stereotypes. Turner (1999, p. 26) underlines that stereotypes are neither rigid and fixed, nor irrational. On the contrary, they are perceptions through the prism of group membership. Their psychological validity relates to perception and interaction and as such, they are fluid, variable and context-dependent. Turner though, clarifies that “*social and political conflict over stereotypes is not evidence of underlying psychological deficit, but of the political dimension of stereotype validity*” (1999, p. 27) and thereby integrates the social aspect in the psychological analysis of stereotyping.

The Self-Aspect Model of Identity. Forbes successfully identified that there is a level of analysis issue when trying to explain psychological processes and behaviours. While sociologically oriented approaches focus on the macro-analytical level of the social structure, psychologically oriented ones turn their attention to the individual.

At the same time, regardless of the theoretical focalisation, the actor that executes psychological processes and behaviours is undoubtedly the individual. Theories drawing from the tradition of Gustave Le Bon and his concepts of “*the crowd*” and “*group mind*” (Blanchet & Trognon, 1997, p. 17), though they managed to surpass the view of “*the crowd*” as an irrational, non-social phenomenon, they failed at assigning such social entities their own psyche and have therefore been rejected as metaphysical speculations (Simon, 2004, p. 43).

The Self-Aspect Model of Identity presented by Bernd Simon focuses on the psychological aspect, having the individual as its basic unit of analysis. At the same time, it incorporates the social cognition perspective. Thus, it offers a meso-level analysis that attempts to demonstrate that the group/collective and individual/personal traits are falsely presented as based on opposite self-aspects. In that way, it attempts to bridge the discontinuity between analyses focusing of individual and group behaviour. Namely, it tries to utilise knowledge drawn from both the traditions of “North American” psychology focusing on the individual and “European” social psychology that pays more attention to the group level.

Simon (2004, pp. 45, 46), argues that as people seek to give coherence and meaning to their experiences, they develop self-aspects which are cognitive categories of self-interpretation. The experiences are the empirical examples, interpreted and formalised through the self-aspects. Self-aspects are dynamic and may be changed or solidified through experience. According to the Self-Aspect Model of Identity theory,

collective/group identity is constructed when self-interpretation is primarily based on a socially shared self-aspect and inter-individual differences on other self-aspects are marginalised. On the contrary, individual identity is constructed when self-interpretation is based on a complex set of self-aspects (Simon, 2004, pp. 49, 50).

Simon (2004, pp. 52-53), through his approach, claims that the image of opposite self-aspects that are either collective or personal, seems to be weak when studied closely, since all of them can be a basis of collective identity under the appropriate social conditions. Different cases render self-aspects collective or individual. Likewise, various researchers use different cases that lean to their approaches in order to support their theoretical claims.

To sum up, different approaches to intergroup conflict and the role of contact underline different aspects of reality, in order to interpret conflictual conditions, seek their roots, and examine different ways to tackle them. In all approaches, there are useful elements for examining intercommunal conflict in general and the case of Cyprus in particular. In this research, I use specific theoretical insights of the different sociological theories, in order to conduct an informed analysis. However, it is evident that in the highly demanding contemporary international politics' environment, the sociological approaches to conflict cannot constitute a complete analytical tool when used individually. International politics bear a high degree of complexity while sociological theories focus on specific aspects and different levels of conflict. Nevertheless, when used jointly as analytical tools they can offer multiple insights. Thus, like different diplomatic tracks focus and analyse different unofficial activities, different sociological theories can offer multiple explanatory frameworks for diverse aspects of a conflict.

6. The Foundations of the Research Approach

The use of insights from unofficial diplomacy, images, perceptions and stereotypes theories presuppose a subjectivist approach to conflict where conflictual conditions exists as far as the disputants perceive them as such. Specifically, I base the present research on the Conflict Research approach as described by A. J. R. Groom (1988, pp. 106-109). Unlike the scholars following the Realist and the Marxist tradition that understand conflict as an objective reality, Conflict Research is primarily based on the pluralist tradition of international relations. Hence, it perceives conflict as a subjective situation that can be resolved if the parties understand that is more profitable

to search for common benefits, than to stay in a conflictual condition that is mutually costly as conflicts occur due to “real” or “illusory” incompatibility of interests. Thus, in this dissertation I balance between the views of pioneers and advocates of non-official diplomatic activity that evaluate it as important for the peace-building process and the scholars and practitioners that express significant scepticism for the achievements of unofficial diplomacy (Rouhana, 1999, p. 111), (Balmaks, 1999, p. 15). The former approach is consistent with the Constructivist understanding of international relations where norms and concepts shape interests and identities, thus influencing the normative context of state behaviour. The latter, either draws from the Realist tradition where power politics and interstate relations define international realities or from those that, regardless of their point of view, doubt about the potentiality to evaluate unofficial diplomacy activity (De Vries & Maoz, 2013, p. 67), (Jones, 2008, p. 10).

Research Philosophy and Ontological Assumptions. The research is based on the ontological hypothesis of a mixed human nature and the assumption that conflict is based on perceptions and misperceptions that determine individual and group behaviour. Humans are considered to have essentially equal capacities for good and evil. Human nature is considered neither as inherently conflictual as in the realist tradition, nor as innately good as the liberal theoretical perspective supports.

The realist approach of international relations sees states as billiard balls and considers them internally well-integrated (Hobson, 2000, pp. 2-3) pursuing goals associated with the general interest of the societies (Krasner, 1978, p. 33) and regards non-state actors of low significance. Contrary to this view, I base the thesis on a pluralist approach. Indeed, states are the central actors of international politics and the gatekeepers of non-state transactions but this does not mean that state boundaries imply total intra-state consensus. Pluralism rather sees world politics as a domain overwhelmed by interactions between non-governmental actors where cobweb relationships cut across formal state boundaries (Mitchell, 1984, p. 60). Consequently, it considers conflict as ubiquitous due to incompatibility of decisions, rather than due to the instinctive drive to dominate or to a dramatic search for security. In that sense, conflicts are subjective since various decision-making centres may produce outputs that are incompatible in an international environment. Schematically, when the decisions of one actor get in the way of the decisions of another, there exists a clash of policies. In

that instance, when an actor attempts to impose change due to his unwillingness to respond to negative feedback from other actors or due to misinterpretation, conflict arises (Groom A. , 1988, p. 107).

According to this approach, conflict is a subjective phenomenon, apart from exceptional cases where conflicts may be objective due to monolithic aims and firm positions. In all other cases, pursued values are subject to reassessment and goals prone to change. In many cases, conflicts may seem objective to the participants that consequently act according to this perceived objectiveness. These perceptions of the parties are subject to change. Thus, beyond non-war that is based on threat or coercion systems, there exists the possibility of the introduction of self-sustaining peace elements. Therefore, although settlements have a short-term effectiveness, self-sustaining resolution is, ideally, the only long-term resolution of a conflict¹¹. That is because non-war based on coercion may regress to strife, while resolution reaches a point where the parties of the conflict are satisfied in terms of gains and needs.¹²

Correlation between Conflict Research and Image Theory. As mentioned in the theoretical section, we can study images in a more integrated way, if we focus on two different levels; a) the image of the decision-makers and b) the image of the society/community. The image of the decision-makers is directly linked to the perceived objectiveness mentioned above. According to the conflict research approach, the decision-making of the parties in a dispute is assumed to be a rational process. Rationality in this case means that:

“Actors behave in a purposeful way and that their actions are neither random nor pre-destined. However, this is in no way intended to suggest that actors always make the right decisions to achieve their ends: They may choose to follow self-defeating policies, although they do so unwittingly.”
(Groom A. , 1988, p. 110)

¹¹ This notion is directly connected to Conflict Transformation as introduced by John Paul Lederach (1998), (2003)

¹² In Conflict Research parlance, a *settlement* is an imposed solution mainly based on coercive activity while the *resolution* of a conflict is a self-sustaining and non-coercive solution, accepted by all the parties involved (Groom A. , 1998, pp. vii, viii).

In this research, I consider rational decision-making as driven by solidified images and perceptions of the actors. In conflictual conditions, the perceived objectiveness and the actions that derive from it, indicate a stereotypical apprehension of the rival parties and of the conflict.

As mentioned above, the perceptions and images are created and maintained in the *habitus* and transmitted through the informal (family) and formal (schooling, written word) channels. The elites involved in the decision-making procedure have the ability to manipulate the images and perceptions, but at the same time are bearers of these same images, especially in long-established nations. The society/community, on the other hand, is a lesser, indirect source of decision-making since while manipulated in some cases, imposed images are fragile and, particularly in democratic regimes, a wide divergence of the rulers from the image of the society/community is often costly in support and power.

Consequently, the decision-making activity can be divided in two broad categories; 1. Unconstrained and 2. Constrained, based on the limitations set on the decision-makers by the society/community. Unconstrained are those actions of the decision-makers that are not (or are only minimally) directly dictated by the society/community. Examples of unconstrained actions are decisions based on one's own interpretation of the national interest or politics that aim to manipulate the society/community. Constrained actions are the ones delimited by the pressure exercised by the in-group. Decision-making based on the fear of betrayal, populist politics and conformation to or bandwagoning¹³ with the crowd or the people are some types of constrained actions.

Thus, in many instances, decision-makers facilitate, promote, dictate or even impose trends of inter-communal contact and reconciliation to the people of the conflicting communities by offering directions, through propaganda or through official settlements, or reversely discourage such attitudes. Moreover, there are direct and indirect efforts and other factors that attempt to promote inter-communal contact and reconciliation. These efforts and factors fall into the broad category of unofficial diplomacy.

¹³ In International Relations, the term refers to the calculated decision of the weak states to stand with the powerful ones when the cost of opposing is deemed that exceeds the benefits. In this essay, bandwagoning refers to the alignment of a group, a pressure group, an elite or an individual to the general will on the intrastate level.

Using the multi-track diplomacy Figure to delimit the research, in the present dissertation I examine activities that fall into tracks two (Professional Conflict Resolution), three (business), four (Private Citizen) and five (research, training, education) (Institute of Multi-Track Diplomacy, 2013). As mentioned earlier, in this research the term unofficial diplomacy refers to the unofficial cohesive social intercourse, activities and factors (1) that attempt to influence the official diplomatic procedures, (2) that can work as a complementary or as a subverting tool to the official diplomacy and (3) do not necessarily have the form of direct negotiations.

In this chapter, I set the foundations of the research that draw from the subjectivist approach of Conflict Research and are related to image theory and the study of perceptions and stereotypes in conflict.

In total, in part II presented the theoretical part of the thesis. In particular, I analysed the categorisations and tracks of diplomacy, the theory on images, perceptions and stereotypes, the sociological theories on the causes of conflict, and the foundations of the research approach. Having offered the theoretical framework, in part III I proceed to the Research Design of the thesis.

III. Research Design

In the previous part, I offered the theoretical background and set the theoretical orientation of the thesis. Based on theory on images, perceptions and stereotypes, I examine activities that fall under unofficial diplomacy. Following a subjectivist approach, I study the significance of the establishment of negative images and stereotypes. In specific, using sociological theories on conflict, I examine the significance of contact in confronting stereotypes and transforming conflict.


In order to research the role of unofficial diplomacy in confronting stereotypes and consequently influencing the process of conflict transformation in the case of Cyprus, I follow a research design based on grounded documentary analysis of the data, on specific aspects of unofficial diplomatic activity. Based on the theoretical assumption that images and stereotypes influence and sustain conflict and using the theoretical tools of the sociological approaches to conflict, I proceed to a theoretically informed analysis of the influencing capability of unofficial diplomacy on intercommunal contact, stereotypes and consequently conflict transformation. Through the research design of the present thesis, I try to serve the research purposes in the most exhaustive way without ignoring secondary, external and alternative factors. At the same time, I attempt an informed analysis of the data by utilising the theoretical foundations and theoretical tools.

7. Approach, Methods and Data Collection

In this chapter, I present the research problem, the approach and methods, the research design and the thesis operationalisation.

Research Problem. In the present study, I attempt to determine whether contact, in the frame of unofficial diplomacy, affects stereotypes and their dynamics (preservation, growth or reduction) in frozen, intercommunal conflicts. As Figure 3 demonstrates, this research has an open hypothesis. In this Figure, stereotypes are replaced by the perception axis that may indicate a positive (fall of stereotypes or establishment of positive stereotypes) or negative (increase of stereotypes) effect of contact. In other words, in the thesis I explore whether contact affects perception and, if it does, the way that it affects it.

Figure 3: The Contact – Perception Correlation




Consequently, as stereotypes' dynamics might affect conflict transformation, I also try to draw conclusions on whether unofficial diplomatic contacts affect conflict transformation in intercommunal cases. Thus, in this dissertation I primarily explore the causal relation between contact and stereotypes and consequently the effect of this correlation on conflict transformation. Given the complex nature of the social world, I try to take into the bidirectional relations between a) contact and perceptions and b) contact and conflict transformation.

Research Approach and Methods. The present study is an interpretive research. It follows an inductive approach that tries to extract theoretical conclusions from the contact – stereotype relation phenomena. To that end, I apply a case research design on Cyprus as a characteristic and well-documented example of a frozen, intercommunal conflict. The data I use are both qualitative and quantitative. I draw qualitative data from academic articles and books, IGO and NGO reports, interviews, official state documents, online and print press journalistic articles. I collect quantitative data from IGO, NGO and state reports and official institutions' databases. The thesis is a Grounded Documentary Analysis. Data analysis is qualitative. The nature of the research, concerning time, is retrospective and analyses data collected after the 2004 Annan Plan referendums onwards. Its unit of analysis is the ethnic group (Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots).

Thesis Validity and Research Limitations. I base the validity of the research design on the systematic and tight aetiology between a) observation and existing theory and b) observation and results. I measure the parameters and their indicators for testing change in perceptions and stereotypes vis-à-vis contact. Likewise, I test stereotype theories upon the findings from the data analysis. The case study research serves in testing the relation between contact and stereotypes/perceptions in the specific case of


Cyprus and in drawing results on theory of the relationship between contact and perceptions/stereotypes (Figure 4).

Figure 4: The Operationalisation of the Thesis



I selected the parameters of the thesis (from three different fields) on a basis of diversity, for offering a manifold and thorough perspective on unofficial diplomatic activity. The exhaustive research of each parameter and indicator enhances credibility. Like in most social research, a huge challenge in researching the contact – stereotypes/perceptions relation, is the plurality of factors affecting the object of observation (Figure 5).


Figure 5: The Plurality of Research Factors



Since international reality does not function in a vacuum, ignoring alternative factors may lead to fallacies. In the study, I attempt to accommodate this issue by considering several important factors. Firstly, I acknowledge the dominating role and capability of official diplomacy to alter international reality, compared to the, soft to thin, power of unofficial tracks. Correspondingly, official diplomacy bears a great potential in altering stereotypes/perceptions through radical change in international reality. Secondly, I consider coercion and military power (Turkish military in the case of Cyprus) that bear the potential to alter local and regional realities in a swift and


radical way. Finally, I consider bidirectional relations that complicate causal inference (Figure 6).

Figure 6: Factors Taken into Account in the Thesis



I test the generalisability of the thesis upon several criteria that cover different facets of the phenomena under research. I attempt generalisation of conclusions on several directions; 1) other frozen conflict cases, 2) conflicts with unequal power balance rival groups, 3) other conflicts in the eastern Mediterranean region, 4) conflicts erupting and developing in the same era and 5) criteria of the Contact Theory met (Figure 7).

Figure 7: Generalisability Testing



Some of the generalisability criteria of the thesis cannot stand alone and be evaluated separately as analytical tools for the research of conflicts. For example, the criteria of time and region cannot constitute prerequisites enough to lead to generalisations. However, when combined with other parameters they can narrow down the context and offer generalisations that are more credible.

In this present chapter, I analysed the research design and operationalisation of the thesis. Having a clear image of the backbone of the research, the following step is to define its aims and objectives.

8. Aim and Objectives of the Thesis

In the previous chapter, I defined the theoretical framework, the potentials and the limitations of the concepts and approaches, and the philosophical foundations. I also framed the research design of the thesis. In this chapter, I state the aim and objectives of the thesis. In particular, in the present chapter I present the research aim in a structured way. In order to examine the basic factor (contact within unofficial diplomacy) I set three study parameters that ensure diversity and multiplicity in the study of unofficial diplomacy. For each parameter, I examine defined indicators that ensure a thorough examination in the case of the intergroup conflict of Cyprus.

My overarching goal is to explore the effect of unofficial diplomatic contacts on stereotypes in intercommunal, frozen conflicts and its potential for conflict transformation. To that end, I examine three sets of activities/parameters, of unofficial diplomatic activity/contact. Thus, I examine the effect of the contact “variable” on stereotypes through the specific parameters of; (1) the activity of CSOs and NGOs, (2) Economic interdependence and joint economic activities and (3) Cultural and sports activities.

Analytically, in the present thesis I examine;

(1) The function and activities of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) that undermine or enhance negative images, stereotypes and respective behaviour that might influence the Cyprus conflict. I divide the indicators for the activity of CSOs and NGOs in two different categories: a) Those that show impact inside the in-group (domestic impact) and b) Those that indicate contact and interaction with the out-group (intercommunal impact).


(2) The contribution of economic interdependence and joint economic activities in the direct or indirect weakening or reinforcement of negative images, stereotypes and respective behaviour that might influence the Cyprus conflict. For economic interdependence and joint activity, I use the indicators of mixed

entrepreneurship, employment on the “other” side, intercommunal trade, cooperation on tourism and spending on the other side.

(3) The role of a) cultural interaction and activities and, b) sports and athletic activities in promoting contact and negative image change or consolidating stereotypical depictions of the “other”. For the cultural and sports activity, the indicators are joint cultural activities, cultural visits on the “other” side, recognition in sports, intercommunal sports activities, individual mobility of athletes and sports fans.

The operationalisation of the theoretical tools explained above, is schematically pictured in Figure 8

Figure 8: Operationalisation of Theoretical Tools



In order to reach the objectives above I will examine the case of intercommunal conflict in Cyprus.

Having set the aims and objectives and the variable, parameters and indicators to be examined under a specific prism, in the next chapter I set and clarify the tools that will be used for operationalisation.

9. Theoretical Tools of the Research

In the present research, I use specific theoretical tools in order to analyse the three categories of parameters/activities set in the previous chapter. I utilise the theoretical tools for the thorough analysis of the indicators' data of each of the three categories of activity.

Civil Society Organisations and Non-Governmental Organisations activities: Theoretical Tools. In order to analyse the activities of CSOs and NGOs that potentially influence intrastate stereotypes, I base my approach on 1) the theoretical underpinnings of Joseph Nye (2007, pp. 210-215), Robert Axelrod and Robert Keohane (1985, pp. 238-239), and Joseph Grieco (1988, pp. 492-495) of a complex world where interstate relations are not always the only important ones and various non-state actors play significant role in international reality. In addition, I draw from the world society approach where multiple sets of primary actors (Banks, 1984, p. 19) shape a cobweb international reality of interactions and interlocking systems (Burton J. W., 1972), and on the Social Liberalist philosophy. Finally, I also base my approach and analysis 2) on the Contact Hypothesis as formulated by Gordon Allport (1954, 1979, 2007) and developed by succeeding contact theorists.

Interdependence. For analysing CSO and NGO activity, I utilise particular aspects of the pluralist tradition of interdependence. In specific; a) the assumption of Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye (1977, 1989, pp. 33-35) of multiple channels of access between societies, non-state actors included, and b) the notion that force does not always play the central role in (Brown & Ainley, 2005, p. 35) in contemporary international reality, since relations grow on many levels and between various actors (Jackson & Sørensen, 2003, p. 177). Additionally, I use the cobweb model of world society where direct communications of non-state actors across the globe form a mass cobweb that penetrate state boundaries (Burton J. W., 1972, p. 43).

Contact Hypothesis and Contact Theories. The second theoretical tool I use is Gordon Allport's Contact Hypothesis and its updated versions by other contact theorists. In specific, I examine if the data drawn from the case of Cyprus fulfil the Contact Hypothesis conditions of; equal group status, common goals, intergroup

cooperation, personal interaction, and the support of authorities, law, or custom. In addition, I take into consideration the assumptions of the indirect contact additions of the theory such as extended, vicarious and electronic contact. I also examine the negative effects of contact. Finally, I use insights from the Realistic Conflict Theory, the Social Identity and Self-categorisation Theories and the Self-Aspect Model as explanatory and supplementary tools for analysing data.

Economic Interdependence: Theoretical Tools. For the analysis of the economic transactions and economic interdependence data, I use a) the theories of economic interdependence and b) the Contact Hypothesis by Allport's and his successors, like in the chapter on CSO and NGO activity.

Economic Interdependence and Joint Economic Activities. Firstly, for the analysis of the interdependent and joint economic activity in Cyprus I use the approach that the pursuit of economic gains could supersede military antagonism and contact through commerce can soothe prejudice. Such notions are based on the Kantian claim that decision-makers and states may give up military might and accept the certainty of peaceful labour and industrial progress instead (Smith C. M., 1917, p. 97), (Schmitter, 2005, p. 256), and Montesquieu's assertion that commerce can cure destructive prejudices and tame manners (Howse, 2006, p. 2). In the present thesis, I do not use the positivist terms of sensitivity and vulnerability. I mostly base my analysis on two fundamental liberal principles; a) an interdependent world where transnational economic interactions are easier to be conducted by non-state actors (Nye Jr. & Keohane, 1971, p. 332), and b) an international reality where commerce promotes societal peace through the exchange of ideas between traders, the emersion of scepticism on one's own customs, the creation of networks beyond borders, the cultivation of a spirit of careful consideration of own interest and the creation and establishment of regulatory rules (Forbes, 1997, p. 3). As such, economic cooperation and interdependence may tie conflicting parties, through mutual or interweaving interests in promoting and sustaining peace in a "positive entrapment"¹⁴. Such liberal theories are often criticised for arbitrary correlation (Weede, 2015, pp. 2-3), eclecticism

¹⁴ This hypothesis also roots back to the Kantian argument that economic transactions and commerce among nations (conflicting parties in our case) render war unprofitable.

(Schmitter, 2005, pp. 257-258), rediscovery of failed theories (Jackson & Sørensen, 2003, pp. 192-193), modelling the rich man's world (Brown & Ainley, 2005, p. 37), misreading of phenomena (Polachek & Seiglie, 2006, p. 15) and renaming economic dependence to economic interdependence (Ηρακλείδης, 2000, p. 97). However, in the framework of interstate relations, the concepts of peace assisted by trade links, technocratic cooperation and economic interdependence are useful in analysing intrastate phenomena.

Cultural Interaction and Contact: Theoretical Tools.

Culture: Theoretical Tools. In order to examine the cultural aspects, I use a) the Contact Hypothesis, like in the chapters on CSO and NGO activity and Economic Activity and b) the approach that claims peace-building, conflict transformation and conflict resolution can be achieved through intercultural understanding, protection of heritage (UNESCO, n.d.), and arts-based approaches.

Intercultural Understanding and Arts'-Based Approaches. Firstly, I use the intercultural understanding notions, which considers peace as an essential factor for sustainable development (Emerson, 2013, p. 2). Specifically, intercultural dialogue through support for cultural diversity and protection of heritage is regarded as important for coexistence and sustainable solutions. In addition, I utilise arts-based approaches to conflict that claim the contribution of arts in peace-building strategies is unique and often underestimated (Seidl-Fox & Sidhar, 2014, p. 6). In such approaches, peacebuilders, individual artists and cultural groups put to use all forms of arts in order to transform societal conflict, support communities in creating opportunities for building bridges across differences and address past violence legacies. Arts-based approaches stress that artistic participatory tools push forward culture as an integral element of peacebuilding (Peace Direct, n.d.), and promote specific goals that boost tolerance, understanding and sustainable coexistence (Fukushima, p. 5).

On the opposite side, culture is also considered a source of conflict. The Huntingtonian approach identifies culture as the dominating source of conflict in the post-Cold War era (Huntington, 1993, p. 22). There is a debate on whether culture constitutes a source of conflict or a source of peace. On the one hand, certain scholars point out that peaceful coexistence in diverse societies proves that attributing conflicts to differences in culture is far-fetched (Ogoura, 2009, p. 80). The Dialogue Among

Civilizations approach (Kochler, Koechler Letter UNESCO 26 Septemeber 1972: Internationals Progress Organisation, 1972) calls for a search for shared solutions by different cultures and civilisations (Kochler, 1973), (Foundation for Dialogue among Civilizations, 1999). On the other hand, research and observation often shows that culture intensifies conflict when ethnic or cultural differences coincide with economic or political interests. Johan Galtung (1990, p. 291) puts it under the term cultural violence defining it as “*any aspect of a culture that can be used to legitimize violence in its direct or structural form*”.

Athletic Interaction and Contact: Theoretical Tools.

Sports. For the analysis of sports activities, I use a) the Contact Hypothesis as presented above and b) Olympism, which claims that sports promote human justice, equality and social change and are a tool for peace, non-violence and tolerance.

Sports for Peace and Tolerance. Athletic activity and sports, beyond letting people express their competitive urges in a non-violent manner, are considered promoters of peace and cooperation. Olympism all its symbolisms, along with a culture of peace, non-discrimination and anti-racism promoted by professional athletes and associations, establish sports as a “force” of contact and rapprochement.

Based on the ancient Greek Olympic Truce, modern Olympism accentuates the role of the Olympic Movement and sports in promoting peace (Arnold, 1996, p. 93) (McFee, 2012, p. 214) (Teetzal, 2012, p. 317) (International Olympic Committee, 2015, pp. 17, 18). For the UN, sport is recognised and used as a low-cost and high-impact tool in development and peace-building efforts. Sports is also used as a peace tool by, NGOs, governments, development agencies, sports federations, armed forces and the media (United Nations, 2014). Sport is also considered a means of teaching the values of cooperation and respect and a significant economic force for contributing to local development. In addition, it is supposed to bring individuals and communities together by bridging cultural and ethnic divides (UN Inter-Agency Task Force on Sport for Development and Peace, 2003, p. 2). Sport federations, like the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), adopt this notion. Furthermore, these associations along with the UN, NGOs, sport federations and the private sector have endorsed a strategy called Sport for

Development and Peace (SDP) supporting the idea that sport is valuable when addressing issues of human justice, social development and social change (Cárdenas, 2013, p. 24). UNESCO identifies sport as a powerful tool to promote ideals of peace, non-violence, tolerance and justice (UNESCO, 2016).

In practice though, sports are competitive in nature and involve, beyond athletes, significant economic stakes and direct and indirect spectators that socially express themselves. They bear the capacity to awaken exaggerated nationalistic sentiments, intolerance and (ideological) violence (Cárdenas, 2013, p. 24). Oftentimes, involved actors act in negative ways as sportswomen, sportsmen, fans and fan clubs are in many cases connected to national or political ideologies.

Based on all the above premises, I examine both positive and negative capabilities of sport activities and interactions and their effect on contact, tolerance, stereotypes and prejudice.

Summarily, in this chapter I present the theoretical tools I will use in order to examine each category of activities/parameters and analyse the findings from the data of the specific indicators for each category. Firstly, for the parameter of CSO and NGO activity I use interdependence theory and the contact hypothesis. Secondly, for the parameter of economic interdependence and joint economic activity I use economic interdependence theory and the contact hypothesis. Lastly, for cultural and sports activities I use the contact hypothesis and the approaches claiming that culture and sports influence peace (Cultural approaches, arts-based approaches, Olympism). Apart from these tools, I also incorporate the theoretical insights from all the sociological approaches to conflict as well as the ones from image and stereotypes and perceptions theories in the discussion and analysis of the findings.

To sum up, in Part III I set the approach, methods and data collection and categorisation, as well as the operationalisation of the research. Then, I present the aims and objectives of the thesis. Consequently, I present the theoretical tools used for the analysis of the data. Having set the theoretical background and the methods and tools of the thesis, in the next part I present the data from the case of Cyprus.

IV. Case Study Research: Cyprus

Based on the viewpoint that diverse unofficial diplomatic activities bear the potential to influence stereotypes between the parties and consequently transform an intercommunal conflict, in this part I present the data on the three different unofficial diplomatic activity parameters; CSO and NGO activity, Economic and trade activity, and cultural and sport activity.

I selected Cyprus as an adequate case for the examination of unofficial diplomatic activity and its influence on stereotypes and conflict transformation. The fact that the Cyprus issue is a frozen conflict that persists and attracts international attention for over forty years, offers a series of advantages. Firstly, there is an abundance of data sources to use, as numerous actors on all fields I cover in the thesis have been active for many years in the island. Regarding the CSO and NGO activity, there is a significant and continuous presence of local, national, and international organisations. In the fields of trade and economic activity, culture and sports, there is an important mobility, with its difficulties, that is worth researching. Secondly, Cyprus is a conflict case that is long-lasting and has passed through several transformation phases. Thus, scientific observation can be safer than in the case of conflicts that have recently erupted and their dynamics and whereabouts are hazier, and for that reason trickier for researchers. Lastly, the aspect of subjectivity cannot be eradicated from research preferences. The Cyprus Dispute, apart from being one of the most challenging, historical and complex cases for students of conflicts, is also an issue that concerns over time researchers, practitioners and amateur observers of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Greek cultural context.

10. Civil Society, Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs)


The first parameter for examining the effect of contact on stereotypes is the activities of CSOs and NGOs. In brief, in the chapter I firstly offer an overview of the civil society sector in both the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot communities; I present general data and numbers, data on citizens' participation and trust and on social impact and state accountability of CSOs and NGOs in the two communities. The data of this part cover the impact of CSOs and NGOs and their activity inside the in-group (domestic impact). I further categorise the data of this first section (domestic impact) in 1)

citizens' participation and trust, and 2) social impact and state accountability. Secondly, I present the data on the activities that could render civil society a stereotype-breaking and peace-making force in Cyprus. Thirdly, I present data on the specific indicators of contact, interaction, cooperation and participation in bicomunal activities. After that, I present a set of notable bicomunal events on various fields. Lastly, I present a series of actors that act towards stereotypes preservation and stereotype building and the data on the value of bicomunal activities for peace and conflict transformation. Data show the width, depth and effectiveness of contact and interaction of CSOs and NGOs with the out-group (intercommunal impact). I categorise the data of this second section (intercommunal impact) in 1) interaction, 2) trust, tolerance and discrimination, 3) cooperation, and 4) participation in joint activities.

General Data on CSOs and NGOs in Cyprus. In the case of the island of Cyprus, the development of civil society and CSOs has been constrained and distorted in essence by dominant nationalism (Anastasiou, 2008b, p. 41). Marchetti and Tocci (2009, p. 203) point out, that in case where there is a recognised state but lacks sovereignty or independence, civil society is disempowered by the absence of a state level, sovereign interlocutor. In Cyprus, there are several CSOs and NGOs that follow the division applied for the public and the private sector, meaning the divide between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot ones. In the Greek Cypriot community, CSOs and NGOs do not bear a separate organisational form. They are divided into different forms (associations, clubs, non-profit companies and foundations) and they have the common features of being not-for-profit in purpose and set up voluntarily. In the Turkish Cypriot community, associations use the Turkish Parliamentary Assembly Units and Association Act and the 1991 related amendment. (Fröström, 2008, pp. 12-17). Civil society appears to be divided into NGOs on the one hand, and trade and professional organisations on the other. The latter are closely related to the state and thus enjoy privileges and economic benefits. NGOs lack funding that would ensure them financial stability (The Management Centre of the Mediterranean, NGO Support Centre, 2005, pp. 117, 118). On that matter, it is worth noting that trade, public sector unions and private sector chambers are protected by special laws, while NGOs do not enjoy such legal protection and benefits (The Management Centre of the Mediterranean & Intercollege, 2005, p. 18).

In general, CSOs and NGOs in Cyprus follows the global trend¹⁵. This means that there is a constant rise in the number of organisations each year. According to the Civil Society Organisations Directory data, in 2012 the total number of documented Cypriot CSOs and NGOs was 392, with 252 of them being Greek Cypriot and 140 Turkish Cypriot (Figure 9). Linda Fröström’s extensive research for the Umeå University (2008, p. 12), records “*about 150 active NGOs in the Turkish Cypriot Community and 450 active NGOs in the Greek Cypriot Community.*”

Figure 9: Number of CSOs and NGOs




Data drawn from <http://www.csodirectory-cyprus.eu/>, <http://www.ngosincyprus.org/>

A look at the purpose - what is called “*mission and vision*” - of CSOs and NGOs in Cyprus shows that there is a significant number of organisations that either set as their primary goal or as a supplementary target, rapprochement and resolution of the Cyprus conflict. In specific, the same source of data shows that 12 Greek Cypriot and 16 Turkish Cypriot CSOs and NGOs contain in their mission rapprochement and resolution of the conflict (Figure 10). In terms of civic action, about 40 organisations in the north and 100 in the south work directly or indirectly with peacebuilding (Fröström, 2008, p. 12).

¹⁵ According to the World Bank, “*the number of international NGOs was reported to have increased from 6,000 in 1990 to more than 50,000 in 2006. Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) have also become significant players in global development assistance, with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) estimating that, as of 2006, CSOs provided approximately US\$15 billion in international assistance.*” (The World Bank, 2013)

Figure 10: Number of NGOs that Include in their Mission Rapprochement and Resolution of the Cyprus Conflict




Data drawn from <http://www.csodirectory-cyprus.eu/>, <http://www.ngosincyprus.org/>

The end of the bipolar world signalled an era of new types of conflicts and new intrastate challenges. For Cyprus, this change set up the exploration and application of new approaches concerning the resolution of conflict. Citizens' peacebuilding efforts that fall into this category introduce the participation of citizens in conflict resolution and reframe the state – citizen, and the in-group - out-group relationships. (Hadjipavlou, 2004, p. 198). However, as we will see in this chapter, research shows that the civil society in Cyprus is weak, bicomunal cooperation is limited, and trust among the Cypriot society is low (Gillespie, Γεωργίου, & Insay, 2011, p. 6).

Civil Society in the Greek Cypriot Community.

Citizens' Participation and Trust in the Greek Cypriot CSOs and NGOs. The biggest challenge for CSOs and NGOs in the southern part of Cyprus is to overcome the mistrust of the society. Over time, the levels of trust of different institutions in the society have been low. This has expanded to the CSOs (Gillespie, Γεωργίου, & Insay, 2011, p. 20). Flash Eurobarometer 373 shows, that the Greek Cypriots are in the top five EU countries that believe European citizens do not need non-governmental organisations and associations in influencing political decisions (Figure 11).

Figure 11: Citizens' Need for CSOs and NGOs




Republication from “Flash Eurobarometer 373: Cyprus Sheet” (European Commission, 2012, p. 7)

Low trust correlates to the notoriety of the organisations concerning their source of funding (The Management Centre of the Mediterranean, NGO Support Centre, 2005, p. 13), the limited coverage of their activities by the media, and the scorning of people that engage in CSO activities, that include the Turkish Cypriot community (Broome, 2005, p. 39). Consequently, low trust leads to limited participation in CSOs both in terms of volunteerism to organisations and of participation in their activities (The Management Centre of the Mediterranean & Intercollege, 2005, p. 12). According to the 2005 CIVICUS survey, a significant number of the respondents had participated in a non-partisan civic action (59% participated in a demonstration, 46% signed a petition, 35% took part in strikes and 16% have written a letter to a newspaper). In addition, 43% of the population were members of at least one CSO, and 51% had either assisted an organisation without pay or provided support to members of the community during the previous twelve months (The Management Centre of the Mediterranean, NGO Support Centre, 2005, pp. 41, 42).

However, the 2005 Eurobarometer data showed that active involvement in groups dealing with political issues in southern Cyprus is slightly higher than the EU average (Figure 12).

Figure 12: Role in Political Groups




Republication from “Special Eurobarometer 223: Social Capital” (European Commission, 2005, p. 77)

The 2011 CIVICUS research for the 2005-2011 period (The Management Centre of the Mediterranean & NGO Support Centre, 2011, p. 33), showed that 80.4% of the population does not belong to any social organisation. 14.0% are active members of at least one such organisation, whilst 5.6% are inactive members. This means that membership is reducing in a fast pace.

The 2005 Special Eurobarometer data support the findings of the CIVICUS 2005 report. Greek Cypriots, at that time, showed a significantly higher support to political parties than the EU25 average (Figure 13). This feeling of closeness implies that partisanship may be an aversive factor for non-partisan civic action. Furthermore, as regards Cypriot youth, involvement with political parties can occur in indirect ways. For example, sports clubs, trade unions and youth associations relate to political parties and respective ideologies. Thus, supporting or participating in one of the above bears a political inclination (Cyprus Human Development Report, 2009, p. 88).


Figure 13: Partisanship



Republication from “Special Eurobarometer 223: Social Capital” (European Commission, 2005, p. 75)

Still, the answers to the question, “*would you take an active role in a group involved with political issues*”, do not vary from the EU25 average (Figure 14).


Figure 14: Active Partisanship



Republication from “Special Eurobarometer 223: Social Capital” (European Commission, 2005, p. 77)

Regarding membership in NGOs and associations, 2012 data showed that Greek Cypriots are significantly above EU average (Figure 15). However, in many instances membership means being part of a trade union or professional association, which is common in southern Cyprus and does not necessarily mean active involvement. Table 1 confirms this trend with the exception of membership in organisations of specific interest.

Figure 15: Influencing Decision-Making; Membership in NGOs



Republication from “Flash Eurobarometer 373: Cyprus Sheet” (European Commission, 2012, p. 25)

Table 1: Membership in CSOs and NGOs


Q4 Are you a member of any of the following types of non-governmental organisations or associations?

	Organisation with a specific economic, social, environmental, cultural or sporting interest	Any other organisation or association that has a specific interest and is officially registered	Trade Union	Professional association (for example, doctors, teachers, farmers, etc.)	Chamber of Commerce/ Industry/ Agriculture	Employers' organisation	None of these (DO NOT READ OUT)
EU27	20%	17%	16%	11%	5%	4%	58%
CY	12%	11%	21%	13%	2%	3%	59%

Republication from “Flash Eurobarometer 373: Europeans’ Engagement in Participatory Democracy” (European Commission, 2013, p. 33)


The fact that a great number of organisations is related to political parties reveals more about the function, image and reputation of CSOs in Southern Cyprus. These connections often limit the autonomy of the organisations and determine the relations between CSOs and the state (The Management Centre of the Mediterranean, NGO Support Centre, 2005, p. 13). In addition, these known relations affect the levels of citizens' trust and participation towards CSOs. Moreover, southern Cyprus also bears a particularity concerning CSO dependency; many organisations are associated with the Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus (Cyprus Human Development Report, 2009, p. 86), creating similar action and trust impediments as political dependency does. However, according to the 2005 CIVICUS report, overall CSOs and NGOs enjoyed a certain level of trust compared to other institutions (Figure 16). On the other hand, the 2011 CIVICUS report did not include the NGOs among the trusted institutions, while the Greek Cypriot Church had significantly reinforced its trustworthiness and political parties appear to have lost the trust of the society (Figure 17).

Figure 16: Trust in Institutions



Republication from “An Assessment of Civil Society in Cyprus” by The Management Centre of the Mediterranean, NGO Support Centre (2005, p. 97)


Figure 17: Trust in Institutions



Republication from “An Assessment of Civil Society in Cyprus: A Map for the Future” by The Management Centre of the Mediterranean & NGO Support Centre (2011, p. 61)

According to the Youth in Cyprus Report (2009, p. 87), 55% of the Greek Cypriots answering the survey on the degree of youth participation, did not participate in any kind of organisation, association, group, club, party or union (Figure 18). When asked to justify non-participation, Greek Cypriot youth stated that they have no interest or that they do not have spare time. Moreover, 14% of the respondents did not want to participate in CSO activities because “*nearly all of them are influenced by political parties.*” (Cyprus Human Development Report, 2009, p. 88)

Figure 18: Participation of young people in organisations




Socio-political Participation among Cypriot Youth

Republication from “Youth in Cyprus: Aspirations, Lifestyles and Empowerment” by the CYPRUS HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT (2009, p. 87)

Eurobarometer data from 2012 showed that participation in organisations’ activities was low compared to the EU average, with the exception of political parties and organisations’ activities (Figure 19). These data confirm the low levels of participation and the strength of the Greek Cypriot political parties.

Figure 19: Participation in Organisations




Republication from “Flash Eurobarometer 375: Cyprus Factsheet” (European Commission, 2013, p. 1)

Social Impact and State Accountability: Greek Cypriot Community. A

way to estimate the strength of CSOs is to evaluate their ability to hold the state accountable. This means the ability of organisations and citizens to scrutinise, challenge and criticise public policy, request answers to queries from the state and mobilise public opinion in favour or against state actions. Data from the 2005 CIVICUS survey on stakeholders showed that the CSOs are not judged to be active in holding the state accountable. 48% of the respondents stated that civil society is “somewhat active”, 18% that it was “inactive” and 32% that the civil society was “active” in holding the state accountable. Concerning the extent to which civil society is successful in holding the state accountable, 53% replied that it is “somewhat successful”, 27% that it is “unsuccessful” and 18% that it is “successful”. The respective 2011 report showed that only a few CSOs focus on trying to hold the state accountable to its responsibilities, or in informing and trying to mobilise the public to do so. In many cases, accountability is exercised in an indirect way, in order to avoid confrontation with authorities. A new tool for CSOs in this direction is the internet, helping them to mobilise people through emails, websites and blogs (The Management Centre of the Mediterranean & NGO Support Centre, 2011, p. 58). In the same report, internal stakeholders judged the general policy impact of the CSOs as very limited or moderate by an 82% and as high by a 12% (Figure 20). Likewise, 14.3% of the external stakeholders believed that civil


society has no impact on Cyprus’ policy-making, 45.7% that its impact was limited and 31.4% that it had some tangible impact. Only four out of ten organisations were active in advocating for new policies or for reformation of existing policies in the 2010-2011 period (The Management Centre of the Mediterranean & NGO Support Centre, 2011, pp. 53-57) (Figure 21).

Figure 20: Impact of Civil Society on Policy-Making (Internal Perceptions)



Republication from “An Assessment of Civil Society in Cyprus: A Map for the Future” by The Management Centre of the Mediterranean & NGO Support Centre: (2011, p. 54)


Figure 21: Impact of Civil Society on Policy-Making (External Perceptions)



Republication from “An Assessment of Civil Society in Cyprus: A Map for the Future” by The Management Centre of the Mediterranean & NGO Support Centre: (2011, p. 57)

Contrarily, 2012 Flash Eurobarometer data indicated that the Greek Cypriots trust NGOs in influencing political decisions. In particular, Greek Cypriots were slightly above the EU average (Figure 22).


Figure 22: Trust in Organisations Influencing Decision-Making



Republication from “Flash Eurobarometer 373: Cyprus Sheet” (European Commission, 2012, p. 9)


Concerning influence, Greek Cypriots believed that NGOs and associations have a significant capacity to influence decisions on a local level but on the contrary have limited influencing capability on the national level (Figures 23 and 24).

Figure 23: Influence of Organisations in Decision-Making (Local Level)



Replication from "Flash Eurobarometer 373: Cyprus Sheet" (European Commission, 2012, p. 11)


Figure 24: Influence of Organisations in Decision-Making (National Level)



Republication from “Flash Eurobarometer 373: Cyprus Sheet” (European Commission, 2012, p. 13)

In addition, CSOs’ strength can be measured by their capacity to generate positive social norms for the society. On that sector, again, Greek Cypriot CSOs score low in promoting trust, tolerance and building social capital (The Management Centre of the Mediterranean, NGO Support Centre, 2005, pp. 13, 90, 92, 93, 100). According to the 2011 CSI Organisational Survey, 64.7% of external stakeholders felt that civil society has had some tangible impact on the social context, 32.4% limited impact and 2.9% that the impact was high (The Management Centre of the Mediterranean & NGO Support Centre, 2011, p. 55). (Figure 25)

Figure 25: Impact of Civil Society on the Social Context (External Perceptions)



Republication from “An Assessment of Civil Society in Cyprus: A Map for the Future” by The Management Centre of the Mediterranean & NGO Support Centre: (2011, p. 56)

In general, the Greek Cypriot civil society is not considered very effective neither in holding the state accountable, nor in generating positive social norms, such as trust or tolerance.

Civil Society in the Turkish Cypriot Community.

Citizens’ Participation and Trust in the Turkish Cypriot CSOs and NGOs. For the northern part of Cyprus, the 1974 division signals the establishment of a new and autonomous (in ethnic terms) civil society and respective organisations. The 1990s is the time of growth of the NGOs. The early 2000s mark the substantial mobilisation of the Turkish Cypriot civil society (Tocci & Kovziridze, 2004, p. 62), with the 2004 Annan Plan being its highlight.

On the one hand, civil society in the north functions as a means of political opposition and opposition to a paternalistic “state” over time. On the other, generous economic support from Turkey has established a relationship of dependency of the Turkish Cypriot “state” and political parties to the “motherland”. This dependency spreads to CSOs and NGOs in the degree in which they are themselves related or dependent from the state and the political parties. This lack of autonomy on Turkish-funded projects constitutes a serious deficiency for the civil society environment. The attempts of the Turkish Cypriot authorities to control the CSOs by amending existing


and instituting new, strict laws on organisations further boost deficiency (Gillespie, Γεωργίου, & Insay, 2011, p. 9). Furthermore, freedom of expression is sometimes curtailed and relations between the civil society and the “state” or the private sector debilitate its autonomy of action (The Management Centre of the Mediterranean, NGO Support Centre, 2005, pp. 17, 113-114). In particular, the 2000 “This Country is Ours” civic platform against austerity measures, proposed by Turkey and implemented by the “government”, was directly associated to the Turkish Republican Party – CTP (The Management Centre of the Mediterranean, NGO Support Centre, 2005, p. 115).

Concerning participation, the 2005 CIVICUS report remarks that,

“Apart from the huge mass demonstrations for and against the Annan Plan — civic participation in civil society remains limited. Whereas a significant proportion of Turkish Cypriots belong to a CSO or may have undertaken some form of non-partisan political action, volunteerism, especially within civil society organizations (CSOs), is fairly low.” (The Management Centre of the Mediterranean, NGO Support Centre, 2005, p. 17)


The 2005 survey of the Management Centre of the Mediterranean and the EKart Danismanlik ve Bilgi Pazarlama Ltd. showed that overall 35% of the citizens of Northern Cyprus have participated in some form of non-partisan political activity (Figure 26). The respective 2011 research showed that there is a drop in all kinds of political action and participation (Figure 27).

Figure 26: Non-Partisan Political Action



Republication from Republication from “An Assessment of Civil Society in Cyprus” by The Management Centre of the Mediterranean & NGO Support Centre: (2005, p. 121)

Figure 27: Individual Activism




Republication from “An Assessment of Civil Society in Cyprus: A Map for the Future” by The Management Centre of the Mediterranean & NGO Support Centre (2011, p. 79)

The Annan Plan mentioned above, was the heyday of participation where estimates suggest that 30,000 to 70,000 participated in the largest rally (The Management Centre of the Mediterranean, NGO Support Centre, 2005, p. 121). Concerning membership, about half of the respondents of the CIVICUS survey

answered that they are members in at least one CSO (Figure 28). The 2011 research showed that active participation remains limited in Northern Cyprus (Tables 2 and 3).

Figure 28: CSO Membership



Source: Civil Society Survey of Northern Cyprus 2005

Republication from “An Assessment of Civil Society in Cyprus” by The Management Centre of the Mediterranean & NGO Support Centre: (2005, p. 122)

Table 2: Active Membership (Social CSOs)

Active membership in social CSOs

CSO type	% of respondents
Sports	7.2
Cultural	6.0
Education	5.2
Hobby	4.2
Youth	3.0
Neighbourhood/village committee	2.7
Burial	2.2
Religious/spiritual group	2.0

Republication from “An Assessment of Civil Society in Cyprus: A Map for the Future” by The Management Centre of the Mediterranean & NGO Support Centre (2011, pp. 77-78)

Table 3: Active Membership (Political CSOs)

Active membership in political CSOs		
CSO Type		% of respondents
Membership-based interest groups	Farmer/fisherman group or coop	5.7
	Trader or business association	5.0
	Professional association	5.7
	Trade union	6.0
	Cooperative, credit or savings group	6.0
Rights-based advocacy organisations	Health group/social service association	4.5
	Women's group	4.0
	NGO/civic group/human rights	2.7
	Ethnic based community group	2.0
	Environmental or conservation organisation	5.7
	Human rights	4.2

Republication from “An Assessment of Civil Society in Cyprus: A Map for the Future” by The Management Centre of the Mediterranean & NGO Support Centre (2011, pp. 77-78)

Regarding volunteerism, the 2005 CIVICUS survey showed that 21% of citizens did voluntary work in an organisation. When including volunteerism outside organisations the statistic goes up to 72% (The Management Centre of the Mediterranean, NGO Support Centre, 2005, p. 123).

Concerning youth participation, Figure 10.10 shows that Turkish Cypriot youths demonstrated a lower degree of abstention from organisations, associations and groups (48%). Moreover, Turkish Cypriots’ degree of participation was higher than that of the Greek Cypriots in all categories, except the case of the political parties. Degree of participation in youth organisations was the same as that of the Greek Cypriots. The influence of the political parties reaches various parts of society like in the case of the Greek Cypriot community. Turkish Cypriot youths reported the same aversive factors as the Greek Cypriots for non-participation. Yet, as demonstrated by poll answers (14%) (Cyprus Human Development Report, 2009, pp. 87,88), the influence of political parties on CSOs was more common in the Turkish Cypriot community.


Social Impact and State Accountability: Turkish Cypriot Community.

The Turkish Cypriot community does not demonstrate a better performance than the Greek Cypriot community does when it comes to state accountability. The 2005 Regional Stakeholder Survey suggested that civil society is not very active in holding the “state” accountable. 78% of the respondents believed that civil society was either inactive or somewhat inactive. As for the success of civil society in actually holding the “state” accountable, the survey showed that the majority (84%) judged civil society as

either unsuccessful or as somewhat successful (The Management Centre of the Mediterranean, NGO Support Centre, 2005, pp. 161-162).

Concerning social impact, the 2011 CSI assessed civil society’s efforts to influence policy as relatively insignificant. Once again, the pro-Annan Plan campaign is the point of reference but beyond that, impact in other areas remains limited. As for the promotion of positive values, the impact of CSOs was assessed as moderate. The values mostly promoted were nonviolence, tolerance and inclusion, elements that are critical for fostering peace and understanding in a divided Cyprus. (The Management Centre of the Mediterranean & NGO Support Centre, 2011, p. 18). The CSI survey showed that both internal and external stakeholders (Figure 29) mostly judged the impact of the CSOs on policy-making as limited.

Figure 29: Civil Society’s Perceived Impact on Policy-Making




Republication from “An Assessment of Civil Society in Cyprus: A Map for the Future” by The Management Centre of the Mediterranean & NGO Support Centre (2011, p. 94)

Cypriot Civil Society: Stereotype-breaking and Peace-making. Civic Participation, impact of CSOs and state accountability examined above, can offer a degree of understanding on the strengths and weaknesses of civil society in Cyprus and its capability to change stereotypical images. As I mentioned in the theoretical part,

unofficial diplomacy can only be supplementary to official negotiations. Still, its input, influence, and assistance maybe useful to the official procedure, in specific instances. United Nations Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon, in his 2011 estimates on Cyprus peace talks, recognised the role of the civil society in the peace process. He even encouraged the leaders of the two communities, to involve civil society in the search for a viable solution and to take into consideration its contribution to the peace process. This was the first time that an intergovernmental organisation recognised the role of the civil society in a peace negotiation process (Civil Society Wants Bigger Say, 2011, p. 2). As Jarraud et al note (2013, pp. 45-46), Cyprus is not only an example of democratic and participatory deficit, as decision-makers fail to gain legitimacy and reflect dynamic preferences of constituents. It is also a case where, while the power of conflict-resolving, bottom-up approaches has been identified early in the conflict, it remains one of the only untried methods towards resolution. Actually, some projects aimed at involving civil society in the decision-making by offering the leaders public opinion insights on a settlement. The *Cyprus 2015* project showed that the peace process is detached from the concerns of the public and that Cypriots believe that the leaders have ignored their opinions, when it comes to important political decisions (Louise & Morgan, 2013, p. 47). (Figures 30 and 31)

Figure 30: Voice of Citizens in Negotiations


Extent to which the voice of citizens is heard by the leaders in the negotiation process - Source: *Cyprus 2015, 2012*⁴⁵



Republication from “Citizen Peacemaking in Cyprus: The Story of Co-operation and Trust across the Green Line” by Louise C. and Morgan T. (2013, p. 48)

Figure 31: Citizens' Voice; Major Policy Decisions

Opinion on whether citizens should be consulted on major policy decisions - Source: Cyprus 2015, 2012⁴⁶



Republication from “Citizen Peacemaking in Cyprus: The Story of Co-operation and Trust across the Green Line” by Louise C. and Morgan T. (2013, p. 48)

Supporters of civil society empowerment often justify the failure of the 1959 London-Zurich Agreements by stressing that the people of Cyprus were not asked to participate or voice their opinion on the Zurich constitution (Hadjipavlou, 2007, p. 358). Yet, a lot have changed since the 1959-1960. Nowadays, civil society leaders are able to sit and discuss ways for participating and transforming the Cyprus peace process together with decision-makers. All parties involved in the high-politics process (Cypriot communities and guaranteeing powers) are aware of the willingness of the Cypriot CSOs and the Cypriot citizens to get actively involved in a collaborative peace process (Louise & Morgan, 2013, p. 68).

Given the fact that Cypriot community leaders are often dependent on the “motherlands” (Greece and Turkey), citizens often accuse the elites of their own and the “other” community, not only for showing mutual mistrust, but also for serving the interests of the “motherlands”. For example, the Greek Cypriots, in the past, considered the Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktaş as an intransigent, serving the interests of Turkey. In addition, in a 2002 survey, 87.1% of the Greek Cypriots believed that the mistakes of their own leadership have influenced the creation and perpetuation of the conflict. The respective Turkish Cypriot percentage who believed their own leadership has made mistakes was 65%. Likewise, the Turkish Cypriots criticised both their own leaders as well as the Greek-Cypriot leadership. The former was accused for its

handling of the peace talks before the Annan Plan referendum and the latter for not wanting a solution. Overall, survey findings in Maria Hadjipavlou's (2007, pp. 355-357) research showed that people in both communities were discontent, both with their own leadership and with that of the others, whom they viewed as responsible for the intractability of the conflict.

Given the mistrust among decision-makers and elites, that spreads to and influences the Cypriot communities, the desire of the people to achieve individual contact (facilitated by the Green Line opening) and the willingness of the civil society to build grassroots trust are opportunities that could assist official negotiations. However, this unofficial level opportunity "*has not been used politically either to legitimate or to institutionalize this societal desire to break down psychological borders.*" (Hadjipavlou, 2007, p. 360) The fact that many Cypriots believe that the lack of contact, communication and trust are important factors in the perpetuation of the conflict, opens the road to decision-makers to take notice of the peoples' fears and needs and to socialise their communities in some kind of a resolution culture. Still, the Green Line opening was not taken advantage of on a policy level and the gap between the community leaderships' policies and societal needs remains unfilled. This detachment between the decision-makers and the civil society leads to the unofficial contact efforts that aspire to function as a stereotype-breaking mechanism.

Contact and Interaction. The key factor accentuated, under conditions, to be the catalyst towards stereotype-breaking and conflict-resolving in the island of Cyprus is contact. Firstly, the de facto division of the island in terms of physical barriers is a big impediment to bicomunal contact (Broome, 2004, pp. 191-192). The lack of communication and contact between the two communities was a reality from the 1974 division and prevailed until the 1990s and up to 2002 (Hadjipavlou, 2007, p. 350), where the prospects of a resolution and the EU accession led to hesitant contact. Even though physical partition has loosened over the years, Cyprus remains a divided island. The *acquis communautaire* suspension for the north part of the island is an everyday reality for the Cypriots.

Physical division is complemented by psychological division, which is deeply rooted in two separate national narratives of the past. The nationalist-oriented ethnic groups, as shaped in contemporary Cyprus, resist contact and communication with the "other". Socialisation in ethnocentrism through ethnocentric narratives and national

history, and memories of suffering and pain, breed and sustain stereotypes that dominate the perception of reality by creating, through alienation, a “*dialectic of noncommunication*”. In this case, communication comes through official positions and the media and non-communication through the interactions of the two sides, that could not understand each other since they have configured their viewpoints in antithetical frameworks (Anastasiou, 2008a, pp. 153-155). Both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots identify the lack of communication as an influencing factor for the creation of the conflict and then again, intercommunal communication and trust-building as a piece-building factor (Table 4).

Table 4: Lack of Communication between Communities

E43.14 The lack of communication between the two communities (%)

Very	37.1	38.7
Somewhat	33.4	34.7
Not very	17.4	8.1
Not at all	9.2	10.6
Don't know	2.8	7.9
Total	100.0	100.0
	N = 1,066	N = 1,039

Republication from “The Cyprus Conflict: Root Causes and Implications for Peacebuilding” by Hadjipavlou, M. (2007, p. 359)

The language and culture of the conflict consolidate the dominant socio-political positions of the communities. The media, in both communities, follow the dominant narrative of mistrust (Louise & Morgan, 2013, pp. 52-53) and sustain and revive the stereotypes of traditional nationalism through the up-to-date systems of mass communication (Anastasiou, 2008a, p. 165). Socialisation in mistrust is firmly based on mutual non-recognition.


Given these facts, and despite the existence of seven crossing points along the Green Line and a steady stream of Cypriots crossing from one side to the other since 2003 (over 20 million crossings have been recorded), the level of trust between the two communities remains low, while quality of people-to-people contact has improved little over the years. The 2013 UNDP *Citizen Peacemaking in Cyprus* report recorded 17% of the Greek Cypriots that had personal contact with Turkish Cypriots while 32% of the Turkish Cypriots had personal contact with Greek Cypriots. Moreover, just over half of Greek Cypriots surveyed, would accept having neighbours or colleagues from the other

community and would allow their children to attend mixed schools. As for mixed marriages, for close relatives, such a prospect was out of the question for both communities¹⁶ (Louise & Morgan, 2013, p. 52). Figure 32 below demonstrates the fact that intercommunal contact remains low.

Figure 32: Contact with the Other Community

Types of contact with people from the other community

Source: UNDP-ACT 2013 Trust Surveys




Republication from “Citizen Peacemaking in Cyprus: The Story of Co-operation and Trust across the Green Line” by Louise C. and Morgan T. (2013, p. 53)

2008 Survey data presented by Akçalı and Antonsich (2009, p. 943) showed that 86% of the Greek Cypriots and 80% percent of the Turkish Cypriots declared that they did not have daily contacts with a member of the other community.

The work of Ioannou et al (2015, p. 123) on quantity and quality of contact in Cyprus, showed that intergroup contact between the two communities in 2014 and 2015 was low (Figure 33 and 34).

¹⁶ According to Akçalı & Antonsich (2009, p. 943), “both communities equally refuse (1.6 out of 4 where 4 stands for “totally acceptable”) the possibility of intermarriage for their children.” Connecting intermarriage with coexistence is arbitrary in the case of Cyprus since there were not many cross-marriages in the past prior to geographic partitioning (Beyatlı, Papadopoulou, & Kaymak, 2011, p. 69).


Figure 33: Intergroup Contact (Quantity)



Quantity of intergroup contact with other groups for Greek and Turkish Cypriots, SCORE 2014

Republication from “The Cyprus SCORE: Finding New Ways to Resolve a Frozen Conflict” by Ioannou M., Filippou G. & Lordos A. (2015, p. 123)

Figure 34: Direct and Online Contact




Quantity of direct and online contact with other groups for each community, SCORE 2015.

Republication from “The Cyprus SCORE: Finding New Ways to Resolve a Frozen Conflict” by Ioannou M., Filippou G. & Lordos A. (2015, p. 125)

As regards quality of direct contact for the year 2014, Turkish Cypriots reported contact with Greek Cypriots as negative, whereas Greek Cypriots reported theirs with

Turkish Cypriots as positive (Figure 35). In 2015, Greek Cypriots who reported having contact with Turkish Cypriots, rated it as very positive, while Turkish Cypriots rated theirs with Greek Cypriots as somewhat positive (Figure 36).

Figure 35: Intergroup Contact (Quality)



Quality of contact with other groups for Greek and Turkish Cypriots, SCORE 2014

Republication from “The Cyprus SCORE: Finding New Ways to Resolve a Frozen Conflict” by Ioannou M., Filippou G. & Lordos A. (2015, p. 124)

Figure 36: Contact between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots (Quality)



Quality of contact with other groups for each community, SCORE 2015.

Republication from “The Cyprus SCORE: Finding New Ways to Resolve a Frozen Conflict” by Ioannou M., Filippou G. & Lordos A. (2015, p. 125)

In 2008, daily border crossings amounted to 5,000 - 6,000 (average) which equal to 0.6% of the total population¹⁷ in Cyprus (Akçalı & Antonsich, 2009, p. 943). In specific, 2008-2009 data on the Ledra/Lokmaci street crossing show that the number of Cypriots crossing to the other side was declining (Table 5).

Table 5: Number of Crossings: Ledra/Lokmaci Street

		Lokmaci/Ledra Street crossings				
		Turkish Cypriots	Greek Cypriots	Non-Cypriots	Total	
2008	April	32,116	40,684	33,263	106,063	
	May	25,753	25,866	37,175	88,794	
	June	19,923	15,345	28,562	63,830	
	July	21,759	13,706	29,763	65,228	
	August	20,298	14,776	33,059	68,133	
	September	21,324	11,445	31,312	64,081	
	October	22,981	15,107	38,393	76,481	
	November	21,189	14,729	31,527	67,445	
	December	27,659	18,970	26,845	73,474	
	2009	January	19,285	15,647	22,252	57,184
		February	17,412	11,736	21,517	50,665
		March	17,923	14,515	30,311	62,749
Annual total		267,622	212,526	363,979	844,127	

Source: Department of Immigration, Ministry of Interior, General Directory of Police, Nicosia.


Republication from “Cross-Border Trade Liberalization: The Case of Lokmaci/Ledra Gate in Divided Nicosia, Cyprus” by Yorucu V., Ozay M., Resmiye A. & Ulucay P. (2010, p. 1757).

On the contrary, according to the September 17, 2003 edition of the Cyprus Mail, quoting the Justice Ministry of the Republic of Cyprus, over 50% of Cypriots had crossed the Buffer Zone at least once since the partial lifting of restrictions. There were 795,740 Greek Cypriot visits to the north and 664,564 Turkish Cypriot visits to the south from June to August 2003 (Broome, 2005, p. 9). 2004 UN data reported 3.7 million crossings by both communities to the other side (Anastasiou, 2008b, p. 97). The CIVICUS data on the crossing of the Green Line, confirmed that the main trend for both communities was not to visit the other side at all (50% for Greek Cypriots and above 40% for Turkish Cypriots). In their research, Flynn et al (Flynn K. M., King, Braddon, & Dadomo, 2012, p. 4) confirmed the reluctance of the communities to interact even with the checkpoints open and stressed that most Cypriots do not cross the Green Line or have done so once or twice. The Interdependence in Cyprus Report

¹⁷ The real amount of border crossings for Cypriots is actually even lower since the 0.6% data includes tourists crossing the Green Line.

(2011, p. 11), demonstrated that there was a decline in the visits of Greek Cypriots to the north from 2006 to 2007, but in the following years there was a small but stable increase. As for the visits of Turkish Cypriots to the south, there was a significant decline from 2005 to 2006 and from 2008 to 2009 (Figure 37).


Figure 37: Green Line Movement 2003-2009



Republication from “Economic Interdependence: Assessment of Current Economic Interdependence between the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot Communities and Recommendations for Reinforced Economic Convergence” (2011, p. 11)

According to the European Commission, in 2014 there were 589.906 recorded crossings by Greek Cypriots with the numbers for 2013 being 520,410. As for Turkish Cypriots, 877.759 crossed in 2013 and 927,141 in 2014 (European Commission, 2015, p. 3). In general, the declining trend of previous years seems to stabilise with an upward drift (Figure 38 and Table 6).

Figure 38: Crossings 2003-2014 *Figure 10.30: Crossings 2003-2014*



Data drawn from the “Report from the Commission to the Council: Eleventh Report on the Implementation of Council Regulation (EC) No 866/2004 of 29 April 2004 and the Situation Resulting from its Application Covering the Period 1 January 2003 until 31 December 2014”

Table 6: Crossings 2003-2014 *Table 10.6: Crossings 2003-2014*

Year	GC Crossings	TC Crossings
2003	1,123,720	1,371,099
2004	1,173,825	2,159,541
2005	1,319,899	2,222,199
2006	916,500	1,690,850
2007	661,486	2,142,971
2008	779,520	2,085,802
2009	798,800	1,462,150
2010	415,155	738,337
2011	621,406	937,789
2012	481,732	850,362
2013	520,410	877,759
2014	589,906	927,141

Data drawn from the “Report from the Commission to the Council: Eleventh Report on the Implementation of Council Regulation (EC) No 866/2004 of 29 April 2004 and the Situation Resulting from its Application Covering the Period 1 January 2003 until 31 December 2014”

As Kanol and Kanol note (2013, p. 42),

“Although a substantial number of people still do not cross the checkpoints, and therefore are not exposed to contact with the other community, there is a growing number of people who – willingly or unwillingly – have had contact since the opening of the borders in 2003”.


As Harry Anastasiou notes (2008b, p. 81), at the time of the opening of the border, both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots relaunched interaction after forty years without conforming to the culture of animosity and mistrust. In addition, while the motivation to cross was different for each community (Greek Cypriots desired to revisit their old houses, villages and towns while Turkish Cypriots wanted to meet old Greek Cypriot friends), this occasion shows the capability of direct contact in fighting solidified stereotypes.

Hadjipavlou (2007, p. 54) claims that it is not only statistics that show that reconciliation on a grassroots level is achieved, since no violence has occurred, but also the fact that crossing to the other side leads to leaving the past behind by creating new attachments and human connections through person-to-person encounter. Whether grassroots rapprochement is achieved or not, the number of crossings is significantly higher for the Turkish Cypriots than for the Greek Cypriots (Figure 39). This may be partly because the economic and work incentives are stronger for the Turkish Cypriots¹⁸ to cross to the south than the other way around and partly because there is a question of appropriateness of crossing to the north for the Greek Cypriots.¹⁹ Thus, either Greek Cypriots have their reasons for not crossing (Figure 40), or they withhold it fearing stigmatisation. A 2004 public opinion survey showed that 57% of the Greek Cypriots questioned, believe that it is inappropriate to cross the Green Line and 41% think that it is appropriate (Figure 41).

¹⁸ According to the CIVICUS 2011 report (2011, pp. 109, 113, 114), the top two reasons for the Turkish Cypriots to visit the Greek Cypriot community are leisure and shopping. On the other hand, Greek Cypriots cross the Green Line mainly in order to visit their birth places, for pilgrimage to sacred sites and for visiting friends or relatives.


¹⁹ For many Greek Cypriots, crossing to the north is considered an act of symbolically recognising and legitimising the Turkish invasion. In many cases however, hesitation to visit the other side is connected to the huge emotional and psychological load that comes with visiting a former hometown and house.

Figure 39: Visits to the Other Side (Comparative) *Figure 10.31: Visits to the Other Side (Comparative)*



Republication from “An Assessment of Civil Society in Cyprus: A Map for the Future” by The Management Centre of the Mediterranean & NGO Support Centre (2011, p. 110)


Figure 40: Reasons for not visiting the North *Figure 10.32: Reasons for not visiting the North*



Reasons for not visiting the north (autumn 2004; multiple responses possible).

Republication from “Travelling to the ‘Other Side’: the Occupied Zone and Greek” by Webster, C. and Dallen, T. J. (2006, p. 174)

Figure 41: Appropriateness of Crossing (Greek Cypriot Perceptions) Figure 10.33: Appropriateness of Crossing (Greek Cypriot Perceptions)




Public opinion regarding the appropriateness of Greek Cypriots crossing the Green Line (autumn 2004).

Republication from “Travelling to the ‘Other Side’: the Occupied Zone and Greek” by Webster, C. and Dallen, T. J. (2006, p. 174)


Data show that most Greek Cypriots pay from null to minimal visits to the northern part of the island (Figure 42 and 43). However, there is a timid trend against the zero visits, which shows that, steadily, more people are less hesitant to cross to the north (Figure 44).

Figure 42: Frequency of Visits of Greek Cypriots in the Turkish Cypriot Community
Figure 10.34: Frequency of Visits of Greek Cypriots in the Turkish Cypriot Community



Republication from “An Assessment of Civil Society in Cyprus: A Map for the Future” by The Management Centre of the Mediterranean & NGO Support Centre (2011, p. 113)


Figure 43: Frequency of Visits to the North



Frequency of visits to the north (reported autumn 2004).

Republication from “Travelling to the ‘Other Side’: the Occupied Zone and Greek” by Webster, C. and Dallen, T. J. (2006, p. 172)

Figure 44: Not Visiting the North Figure 10.36: Not Visiting the North




Republication from “Travelling to the ‘Other Side’: the Occupied Zone and Greek” by Webster, C. and Dallen, T. J. (2006, p. 173)

Regarding contact among young Cypriots, data are equally low. 93% of the young Cypriots surveyed for the Youth in Cyprus report, had never had a classmate who was a member of the other community. 9% of Greek-Cypriots and 5% of Turkish-Cypriots stated they had interacted with classmates from the other community. 25% of these interactions took place in primary school, 26% in secondary school and 49% at college or university. The data refer to interaction both in Cyprus and abroad. Despite the fact that such contact is low, both Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot youths believe that school contact and communication can contribute to the promotion of understanding and trust between the communities (Cyprus Human Development Report, 2009, pp. 45-46). Regarding interaction and friendship among youths, 15% of the young Greek Cypriots responded that they had experienced some kind of interaction with young Turkish Cypriots while 19% of the Turkish Cypriots stated that had interacted with Greek Cypriot youths. One step further, 6% of the Greek Cypriots said that have friends from the other community. The respective percentage for the Turkish Cypriots was significantly higher reaching 25% (Figure 45).

Figure 45: Friends on the Other Community

Do you have friends from the other community?



Republication from the “Youth in Cyprus: Aspirations, Lifestyles and Empowerment” by the CYPRUS HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT (2009, p. 121)

Youth that stated that they would like to have friends from the other community were 32% in the Greek Cypriot and 43% on the Turkish Cypriot community. Of those that do not wish to befriend people from the other community (a total of 68% of the Greek Cypriots and 57% of the Turkish Cypriots), 42% of the Greek Cypriots and 29% of the Turkish Cypriots said they do not care to make friends from the other community. 24% of the Greek Cypriots and 11% of the Turkish Cypriots stated that they dislike or hate the people of the other community (Cyprus Human Development Report, 2009, pp. 121-122). For those that wish to befriend people from the other community, the main barrier is the lack of opportunities to meet with the “other”. Social stigmatisation, fear and effort needed follow (Table 7).

Table 7: Reasons for not Befriending the Other


Those who want to befriend people from the other community, what prevents you from having friends from the other community?	Greek-Cypriots (%)	Turkish-Cypriots (%)
Lack of opportunities to meet Turkish/Greek-Cypriots	21	21
Worry about the social criticism/stigma of my own community	4	7
Fear of possible dangers coming from the other community	6	4
Amount of effort involved	6	6

Barriers to Befriending Members of the Other Community

Republication from the “Youth in Cyprus: Aspirations, Lifestyles and Empowerment” by the CYPRUS HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT (2009, p. 122)

The way young Cypriots choose to interact is mainly meeting in person (57% for the Greek Cypriots and 49% for the Turkish Cypriots) while exchanging e-mails and engaging in internet chat are popular means too (Cyprus Human Development Report, 2009, p. 121). Telephone or postal services are not popular telecommunication choices since there are no direct connections between the north and the south of the island (Laouris, 2004, p. 68), meaning that international charges apply for both. While indirect communication may not seem as effective as direct contact, communication via information technology means offers a couple of advantages; it breaks the Green-Line and in general the physical distance barrier, it solidifies and ensures continuity to bicomunal contact and breaks communication obstacles in instances where direct contact is impossible or difficult. Lastly, the internet social media give the opportunity to organise actions and events. Even the most superficial search on Facebook shows the variety and plenitude of peace activist Cypriot groups and pages. Yet, in terms of quantity of online communication Ioannou, Filippou and Lordos (2015, p. 125), recorded that while Turkish Cypriots had a degree of online contact close to the direct one, Greek Cypriots reported very low online contact (Figure 46).

Figure 46: Direct and Online Contact (Quantity)



Republication from “The Cyprus SCORE: Finding New Ways to Resolve a Frozen Conflict” by Ioannou M., Filippou G. & Lordos A. (2015, p. 127)


As Charis Psaltis argues (as cited in CYPRUS HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT, 2009, p. 123) direct contact is a very effective tool for reducing negative attitudes towards the “other”. According to Benjamin Broome (2005, pp. 58, 60) one of the potential benefits of bicomunal contact is the change it can bring in the negative and distorted images that each side holds for the other, hopefully replacing them with more sophisticated viewpoints. However, what is very important is the fact that one, or a few encounters are not enough to change perceptions. Back home, established images are omnipresent, every day. One may regress to his original image; other may think that there are always exceptions to confirm the rule. Empathy can occur through numerous encounters, with different people, in different environments, discussing different issues. Even in situations where participants have a personal commitment to peace and a strong desire to promote conflict transformation, personal contact alone is not sufficient to help overcome barriers, because the situation is confounded by the complexity of factors such as identity and emotional concerns that are embedded in the conflict’s past (Broome, 2004, p. 206).

Tolerance and Trust. A positive element in establishing contact and facilitating interaction in the case of the Cypriots is that on the mindset level, the ground seems to be fertile. When people express their tolerance levels for different groups, being from the other community, from a different religious group or of a different race, people from both sides appear relatively tolerant against them. The CIVICUS Report

set the tolerance issue in the specific question; which group of people would you like to have and to have not as a neighbour. For the Greek Cypriots, 68.8% of the respondents said that they would not mind having Turkish Cypriots, 86.5% people of a different religion and 77% people of a different race as their neighbours. Turkish Cypriots tolerate people of different race and religion in similar levels. When it comes to Greek Cypriots though, the intolerance level reached 50%. Still, this group was not the last among those tolerated for being the Turkish Cypriots' neighbours (Figure 47).

Figure 47: Levels of Tolerance (Comparative) Figure 10.39: Levels of Tolerance (Comparative)

Comparing levels of tolerance




Republication from “An Assessment of Civil Society in Cyprus: A Map for the Future” by The Management Centre of the Mediterranean & NGO Support Centre (2011, p. 109)

The 2008 Special Eurobarometer offers similar indications. When answering the same question, respondents were feeling comfortable having as neighbours, people belonging to a different ethnic group or religion in a high degree and above the EU average (Figure 48).

Figure 48: Tolerance on the Neighbour

QA6: For each of the following situations, please tell me using this scale from 1 to 10 how you would personally feel about it. On this scale, '1' means that you would be "very uncomfortable" and '10' means that you would be "totally comfortable" with this situation.


"Average score out of 10"



Republication from "Special Eurobarometer 296 Discrimination in the European Union: Cyprus Sheet" (European Commission, 2008, p. 2)


On the one hand, 2006 Eurobarometer data on friendship and acquaintance showed that the percentage of Cypriots that associated with people of different religion coincided with the EU average and the respective percentage that associated with people of different ethnic origin were high above the EU average (Figure 10.40). The respective 2008 and 2009 data showed the same trend with slightly higher results. As for ethnic origin, the percentage was higher for younger age groups and decreased for older ones (Figures 49 and 50).

Figure 49: Friends from Other Groups



Republication from “Special Eurobarometer 263, Country Sheet Cyprus” (European Commission, 2006, p. 1)


Figure 50: Friends from Other Groups 2



When it comes to the diversity of one's social circle, Cypriot results are mixed. On the one hand, they are less likely than the average European to have a friend or acquaintance who is a Roma or who is homosexual. On the other hand they are much more likely to have one who has a different ethnic origin than their own. Sociodemographic factors are a key influence on diversity in social life, as shown by the example of ethnic origin: in both Cyprus and the EU, a respondent is more likely to have friends of a different ethnic origin if they are male, not in the oldest age group or spent a long period of time in education.

Republication from “Special Eurobarometer 296 Discrimination in the European Union: Cyprus Sheet” (European Commission, 2008, p. 4)


Figure 51: Friends from Other Groups 3



Republication from “Special Eurobarometer 317: Discrimination in the EU” (European Commission, 2009, p. 1)


On the other hand, data from the same research on discrimination based on ethnic origin showed that discrimination based on ethnicity was widespread in Cyprus (71%), (Figure 51). The 2008 Special Eurobarometer showed that discrimination based on ethnic origin was still widespread (61%) but not in the extent of the 2006 survey and closer to the EU average (Figure 52).

Figure 52: Discrimination



Republication from “Special Eurobarometer 263, Country Sheet Cyprus” (European Commission, 2006, p. 2)

Figure 53: Discrimination 2




Republication from “Special Eurobarometer 296 Discrimination in the European Union: Cyprus Sheet” (European Commission, 2008, p. 1)

The same question, answered in the 2012 survey, showed a recursion to the 2006 data and even higher (75%), concerning discrimination based on ethnic origin (Figure 53).

Figure 54: Discrimination 3


QC1. For each of the following types of discrimination, could you please tell me whether, in your opinion, it is very widespread, fairly widespread, fairly rare or very rare in (OUR COUNTRY)? Discrimination on the basis of...



Republication from “Special Eurobarometer 393, Discrimination in the European Union: Cyprus Sheet” (European Commission, 2012, p. 1)

The 2006 research showed that when asked to compare discrimination situation compared to five years ago, respondents said that ethnic discrimination is 43% increased which on the one hand is lower than the EU 25 average but on the other shows a significant rise of discrimination (Figure 54).


Figure 55: Discrimination (Time Comparative)



Republication from “Special Eurobarometer 263, Country Sheet Cyprus” (European Commission, 2006, p. 2)

Another question that offers important information on the issue of tolerance is the one that asked the interviewees to state what is needed more in Cyprus in respect to overcoming discrimination. 17% percent answered that there is a need for more members of parliament of a different ethnic origin than the rest of the population compared to a 44% that answered the same in average in the EU (Figure 56). This may indicate that the Greek Cypriot society is not ready to trust people of different ethnic origin in political positions in general. It is also possible that this answer relates in specific to the trust deficit towards the Turkish Cypriots. The same stands for the answer to the question how comfortable would you feel about having a person from a different ethnic origin than the majority of the population in the highest elected political position (Figure 56, 57 and 58). Greek Cypriots were less open than their EU counterparts to such an eventuality were, since different ethnic origin may mean a person from the other community.


Figure 56: Need for Perceived Socio-political Change



Replication from "Special Eurobarometer 263, Country Sheet Cyprus": (European Commission, 2006, p. 4)

Figure 57: Diverse Group Members in Highest Elect Political Position


QA8: And using a scale from 1 to 10, please tell me how you would feel about having someone from each of the following categories in the highest elected political position in (OUR COUNTRY)? On this scale, '1' means that you would be "very uncomfortable" and '10' means that you would be "totally comfortable" with this situation.



Republication from “Special Eurobarometer 296 Discrimination in the European Union: Cyprus Sheet” (European Commission, 2008, p. 2)

Figure 58: Diverse Group Members in Highest Elect Political Position 2


QC5. And using a scale from 1 to 10, please tell me how you would feel about having someone from each of the following categories in the highest elected political position in (OUR COUNTRY)? '1' means that you would feel "totally uncomfortable" and '10' that you would feel "totally comfortable".



Republication from “Special Eurobarometer 393, Discrimination in the European Union: Cyprus Sheet” (European Commission, 2012, p. 1)

Finally, the 2006 special Eurobarometer revealed the very limited role of the NGOs and the associations in combating discrimination (Figure 59). Such organisations had the lowest score in the related question with an almost insignificant 1% (while the EU25 average is 7%)

Figure 59: Combating Discrimination



Republication from “Special Eurobarometer 263, Country Sheet Cyprus” (European Commission, 2006, p. 5)

In the case of the Greek Cypriots, data comparing CSO members’ and non-members’ tolerance showed that people participating in such organisations demonstrated a higher level of tolerance towards people of different race and of the other community (Table 8). These findings imply that CSO action and CSO life in general can boost tolerance and lead up the community and society to engage in more productive contact and interaction.

Table 8: Tolerance (CSO and non-CSO Comparative)**Difference in tolerance between CSO members and non-members**

#	Group of people	Would not mind to have as neighbours (%)		Would not like to have as neighbours (%)	
		Members	Non-members	Members	Non-members
1	Drug addicts	20.3	21	79.7	79
2	People of different race	82.2	75.4	17.8	24.6
3	People who have HIV/AIDS	59.2	59.5	40.8	40.5
4	Immigrants/foreign workers	75.8	69.4	24.2	30.6
5	Homosexuals	56.6	58.9	43.4	41.1
6	People of a different religion	86.2	86.6	13.8	13.4
7	Heavy drinkers	33.1	26.7	66.9	73.3
8	Unmarried couples living together	95.4	93.6	4.6	6.4
9	People who speak a different language	95.4	93	4.6	7
10	Turkish Cypriots	73.8	67.3	26.2	32.7

Republication from “An Assessment of Civil Society in Cyprus: A Map for the Future” by The Management Centre of the Mediterranean & NGO Support Centre (2011, p. 59)

On trust, the indications are not very promising. As Flynn and King note (2012, p. 421) trust between the two sides remains low, and there is no impetus to increase contact and cooperation across the Green Line. Data from a survey conducted by the University of the West of England demonstrate that Trust between the communities is very low with about two thirds of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots both responding they do not trust the other community (INTRAC, 2011, p. 5). In any case, tolerance and trust are interconnected to contact. Akcali and Antonsich (2009, p. 943) stress that those who contact members of the “other” community tend to become more trusting. Like the tolerance indicators above, Turkish Cypriots are more sceptical in trusting than the Greek Cypriots. In total, one should remember that reciprocal mistrust is the main trend (Greek Cypriots 66% and Turkish Cypriots 78%). The lack of trust is a source of concern for stakeholders on both communities as it is perceived as a factor that may lead to the failure of a future settlement (Beyatlı, Papadopoulou, & Kaymak, 2011, p. 21). However, contact-building-trust activity is a sign that there is some room for joint initiatives. Especially for the organisations and groups that address common, overarching issues beyond the Cyprus Issue. Contact, interaction, tolerance and trust are concepts that refer to the respective needs of the Cypriot people in an approach including unofficial and citizens’ diplomacy. Supposing such needs can boost conflict

transformation, there are specific organised, cooperative actions linked to these concepts that need to be implemented in order to promote such an approach. The potential for continuing the existing and widening future collaboration is present. 2008 data showed that 66% of the Greek Cypriots and 42% of the Turkish Cypriots affirmed that there are common elements, whereas 3% of the Greek Cypriots and 11 % of the Turkish Cypriots felt that there are no common elements between the two communities (Akçalı & Antonsich, 2009, p. 943).

Cooperation. Cooperation can be considered to be one step further from contact and interaction since it refers to organised and joint work in order to reach common goals or goals perceived as such. On that basis, cooperation instances between CSOs of the two communities are few but seem to be growing as time goes by. In the pre-1974 era, bicomunal cooperation was limited and mostly found to the left of the political spectrum. For many years, the Cyprus public sphere could be described as a place in a constant state of mobilisation where slogans and fanaticism prevailed (The Management Centre of the Mediterranean, NGO Support Centre, 2005, p. 36). Contemporary reality boosted by instances like the Annan Plan referendum and the EU accession, as well as by less prominent ones (casual re-engagement of high politics bicomunal talks, betterment of community leaders' relations etc.) leads to a new cooperation reality where working with the “other” is more and more socially and politically accepted by the in-group. Yet, one should not forget that this cooperation is restrained.

In the Greek Cypriot side, the 2005 CIVICUS survey showed that more than half of the respondents described the level of cooperation as “limited”, while another 16% considered it “non-existent.” One fifth of the respondents described it as either “moderate” or “significant” (Table 9).

Table 9: Cooperation with the Other Side

Level of cooperation between CSOs and communities from the other side of the Green Line

Level of Cooperation	No.	%
Non-Existent	9	16
Limited	30	54
Moderate	8	14
Significant	4	7
Don't Know	5	9
TOTAL	56	100

Source: *Regional Stakeholders' Survey*

Republication from “An Assessment of Civil Society in Cyprus” by The Management Centre of the Mediterranean & NGO Support Centre (2005, p. 54).

Some participants referred to the specific problem that cooperation with CSOs across the Green Line is difficult, due to the presence of the Turkish army in the northern part. Cooperation concerns mostly sports and culture. Apart from these, it concentrates in areas such as exhibitions, discussions, research, research seminars, humanitarian issues and business. This limited cooperation however, apart from bicomunal barriers is negatively affected by the overall lack of synergies, federations, networks and cooperatives in the island. (The Management Centre of the Mediterranean, NGO Support Centre, 2005, pp. 14, 55). A positive step towards stabilising cooperation channels is the fact that some CSOs are established in the buffer zone bearing the symbolic and substantial advantage that they are grounded in a Cypriot rather than in a Greek Cypriot or a Turkish Cypriot identity (Louise & Morgan, 2013, p. 46). In fact, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) through the Action for Cooperation Trust Programme (ACT) for Cyprus, since its launch in 2005, has often used the convergent spaces along the Green Line to bring the two communities together around a variety of people-to-people contact events. In specific, Direnç Kanol (2010, p. 34) refers to the Association for Historical Dialogue and Research that is located in the Green Line area and attempts to pressure for change in the school curricula from the ethnocentric to a more pan-Cypriot direction. Furthermore, the House for Cooperation (H4C), established by the Association for Historical Dialogue and Research is the first shared space for all Cypriots to engage in research, education, exhibitions, youth work, studying and NGO work (History of the H4C, 2011). The H4C is a good example of facilitating and engaging in cooperation. Lambros Lambrou

(2015), manager of the H4C café, stresses the importance of the space for the ambitious plans of the organisation for future music festivals, as well as for the breeding of joint business ideas in the biological agriculture sector by young farmers.

Of course, all the above-mentioned parameters (tolerance, trust and cooperation), according to the unofficial diplomacy approach, are built through contact and interaction. The heyday of such contact is the organisation and implementation of bicomunal activities.

Participation in Bicomunal Activities. According to Benjamin Broome (2005, p. 15) bicomunal activities can be organised under six broad categories: Political Contacts, Business and Professional Meetings/Projects, Citizen Gatherings and Exchanges, Conflict Resolution Activities, Ongoing Bicomunal Groups and Special Projects.

In the 1990s, unofficial citizens' contacts and Conflict Resolution training workshops were used in Cyprus as tools to challenge prejudice and misperceptions and to introduce a more complex depiction of reality, beyond the in-group/out-group bipolar antithesis. Moreover, since the real impact of these trainings is difficult to evaluate, the lack of such communication and trust-building activities seems to be an element that fed the conflict. As Hadjipavlou points out (2007, p. 360), over 70% of both the Greek and the Turkish Cypriots believe that the lack of communication has influenced the creation of the conflict. Participating in these activities however, comes with a price; individuals involved in contacts across the Buffer Zone were criticised in both communities for meeting with the “other”. In the best case, they were blamed for being idealistic and naïve, while in other instances they were accused for traitorous and unpatriotic behaviour and for being friends of the enemy. The media have a big share in the creation of such viewpoints since they either used to ignore bicomunal activities or were viciously attacking them for “betraying their country” and “selling out” to the “other” (Broome, 2005, pp. 39-40).

Outside the ethical and ideological dimension, there is another big barrier in bicomunal contact and cooperation and this is the recognition issue. The two communities, and especially the Greek Cypriot one, do not want to allow sustained working partnerships because of the fear that such actions would imply the legitimisation of either the “illegal invasion and occupation of the Turkish army” or the “exclusively Greek Cypriot state”.

As Constantinou & Papadakis point out (2001, pp. 125-126),

“On the one hand, intransigent nationalists and confident technocrats commonly employ the recognition argument to disseminate ethico-political rationales that tie reconciliation initiatives to unpatriotic, treacherous, and destructive activity. On the other hand, many Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot citizens have come to endorse the view that these unofficial meetings irrevocably damage the interests of their respective communities. To that extent, individuals or groups of people seeking to meet outside the officially designated channels of communication have been frequently charged with offering legitimation to the legal and political claims of the other side.”

In that way, civil society members from the Greek Cypriot community fear that any collaboration may somehow lead to the international recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Pressure is exercised on the Greek Cypriot civil society through accusations to those who cooperate for allegedly facilitating recognition. Thus, since no one is willing to be the black sheep, people shy away from actively collaborating and working with the “other” (Kanol & Kanol, 2013, p. 41).

Turkish Cypriot authorities obstruct bicomunal events because they fear that such activities promote the Greek Cypriot international status. On the Greek Cypriot side, the Republic of Cyprus officially and typically supports bicomunal events but unofficially it only supports meetings of people acting as part of an organisation or in their individual capacity. Anything that may be linked to official state capacity is considered to entail the danger of unintentional recognition of the other side. Specifically, in the southern part, the official criteria concerning unofficial contacts are arbitrary and consulting by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs may vary according to the current pronouncement, the particular bureaucrat consulting, or the current political and international conditions. Furthermore, the discourse of recognition has been locally popularised for domestic political gains, especially for party politics (Constantinou & Papadakis, 2001, p. 130). Both regimes use it as a means of prohibiting restraining and regulating cross-ethnic contact. (Constantinou & Papadakis, 2001, p. 145) (The Management Centre of the Mediterranean & NGO Support Centre, 2011, p. 55). Contrarily, immediate collaboration in crisis instances demonstrates a more optimistic


facet of bicomunal cooperation. The energy crisis caused by the Florakis Naval Base explosion incident in 2011 shows that, while there is a complete absence of shared resources governance and crisis management mechanisms, the parties managed to collaborate effectively and face the electrical energy crisis. Sammer Abboud et al (2012, p. 449) bear that it is these types of crises that ripen the conflict and move the actors closer to a solution. Moreover, by moving toward cooperative, bilateral procedures of shared resources management, civil society will be able to increase its engagement in bicomunal projects across the island.

According to Gillespie et al (2013, p. 1081) the Cypriot civil society is facing a definite challenge in ensuring participation in organised events and activities. A striking example of the disability to mobilise participants is the Promotion of Youth Exchanges and other people-to-people contacts. The EU allocated to the programme the amount of €3 million and was discontinued due to low levels of take-up and participation (Flynn K. M., 2016, p. 83). Especially, the lack of potential for an imminent political solution renders the organisation of bicomunal events even more challenging.

What is more, citizen participation in bicomunal events seems to be very limited, with 82% of the CIVICUS 2005 survey respondents saying that they had not participated in any kind of bicomunal activity during the year 2004 (Table10). Beyond the obstacles mentioned above, low participation is also related to poor promotion and visibility of the events. According to UNDP-ACT data, in 2008 only 12% of the Turkish Cypriots and 28% of the Greek Cypriots had heard about, and only 14% of Turkish Cypriots and 12 percent of Greek Cypriots had participated in bicomunal events (Akçalı & Antonsich, 2009). The relative paucity of co-sponsored or organised events may be also a contributing factor for low participation. Moreover, 57% of Greek Cypriot civil society stakeholders said that less than 20% of CSOs have participated in an activity jointly organised with a Turkish Cypriot organisation. The same stakeholders' survey showed that 73% of the respondents considered it very rare that CSOs from the two communities cooperated in common activities. However, 7% evaluate such activities as significant and numerous (The Management Centre of the Mediterranean & Intercollege, 2005, pp. 14, 17, 129, 130). The 2011 CIVICUS report estimated that the attitude of Northern Cyprus CSOs in participating in bicomunal activities after 2004 has been more positive. However, this is mainly explained by the influx of external funding opportunities, which, in most cases, come with conditions of

bicommunity (such as UNDP-ACT funds). Likewise, participation of Greek Cypriot CSOs in bicommunal activities is more than double (Figure 60).

Figure 60: CSO Participation in Bicommunal Activities (Time-Comparative)



Republication from “An Assessment of Civil Society in Cyprus: A Map for the Future” by The Management Centre of the Mediterranean & NGO Support Centre (2011, p. 110)

Table 10: Greek Cypriot Participation in Turkish Cypriot-Organised Bicommunal Activities

Share of civil society organisations that have participated and/or have taken part in an event organised together with the Turkish Cypriot community

% of CSOs that have participated in an event with the TC community	%
<20	57
21-40	18
41-60	2
Over 60	3
Don't Know	20
TOTAL	100

Source: *Regional Stakeholders' Survey*

Republication from “An Assessment of Civil Society in Cyprus” by The Management Centre of the Mediterranean & NGO Support Centre (2005, p. 54)

Definitely, 2004 is a turning point in the relations between the two communities. Before the Annan Plan, resolution seemed close. The failure of the Plan resulted in great disappointment, particularly for the Turkish Cypriots that voted for the Plan and for that reason lost their enthusiasm for getting involved in bicommunal activities. The opposite happened in the Greek Cypriot community where more people started participating in

such activities in the aftermath of the referendum. Nevertheless, the percentage of population participating in bicomunal events has been larger in the Turkish Cypriot community both before and after 2004 (The Management Centre of the Mediterranean & NGO Support Centre, 2011, p. 109).

For the Greek Cypriots, a number of factors can explain the overall low participation. There are physical barriers (the division of the island, the displacement of persons, the presence of the Turkish army in the northern part of the island, the existence of a buffer zone) and there are political, ethical, ideological and deontological barriers (the unwillingness of many Greek Cypriots to provide legitimacy to the 1974 status quo, intolerance, fear of intimidation) that make them unable or unwilling to participate in bicomunal activities, or to organise joint activities with Turkish Cypriot organisations. For instance, many Greek Cypriots do not want to fill in a visa in their own country (Christodoulou, 2013).

In the northern part, the 2005 stakeholders' survey revealed that 25% of those surveyed had taken part in at least one bicomunal event over the past year. Before the opening of the Green Line to crossings in April 2003, bicomunal contacts were subject to restrictions. Relatively few people could participate in activities mostly in buffer zone venues (i.e. Ledra Palace Hotel). After 2003, crossings are more or less free, although there are formalities like the insistence of the Turkish Cypriot authorities that anyone leaving or entering Northern Cyprus should fill in a visa. Overall, given the momentum towards reunification in the Turkish Cypriot community during the Annan Plan period, one might anticipate greater degrees of citizen participation in bicomunal events (The Management Centre of the Mediterranean, NGO Support Centre, 2005, p. 123).

A common element in both communities is that the concept of bicomunalism has been stigmatised to some extent, as it is associated with an imposed solution to the Cyprus problem. Some prevailing historiographies maintain that communal antagonism on the island was imported, thus there is no need to hold bicomunal events as they are themselves externally imposed (The Management Centre of the Mediterranean, NGO Support Centre, 2005, p. 124). The fact that the large majority of the Greek Cypriots

has a negative opinion of the role of the UN in achieving a solution to the Cyprus problem (Flynn & King, 2013)²⁰ reflects the aforementioned viewpoints.

Important Bicomunal Activity and Events. Bicomunal events are the most important activities when it comes to the effort to confront stereotypes and promote conflict transformation. In Cyprus, the two largest donors for such activity are EuropeAid that funded the Cypriot Civil Society in Action Programme (Gillespie, Georgiou, & Insay, 2013, p. 1079) and the United Nations Development Programme - Action for Cooperation and Trust (UNDP-ACT). In addition, there is funding coming from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) for the Bicomunal Support Program and Cyprus Partnership for Economic Growth project, and from Norway (Norway and EEA Grants) that has a Peace Research Institute Oslo office in Cyprus. Moreover, additional support comes from intermittent financiers such as the Council of Europe, the Open Society Foundation, Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Foreign and Commonwealth Office - UK, Australia's Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and Friedrich Naumann Foundation (Flynn K. M., 2016, p. 81).

As mentioned before, bicomunal events cover a wide spectrum of activities such as bicomunal youth camps, bicomunal festivals, gathering of people from both communities who once lived in the same village or town, musical performances by the bicomunal Chorus, and bicomunal academic professional workshops and conferences (The Management Centre of the Mediterranean, NGO Support Centre, 2005, p. 124). Bicomunal activities, beyond covering a wide range of subjects, aim at involving more citizens and in deepening contact among them. In this research, I do not present a full list of all bicomunal activities realised by CSOs and citizens' initiatives, but rather a selection of the most important ones that aimed at confronting stereotypes.

In the 1990s, diplomatic missions, be it the UN or state embassies, sponsored the biggest bicomunal meetings,. In arts and culture, in 1996, the European Union sponsored a political cartoon expo by both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, the American Center sponsored an exhibition of photos taken on both sides of the Buffer

²⁰ Flynn and King (2013) note that there is a negative view on the UN although it has overseen multiple rounds of negotiations, maintained a peacekeeping mission for decades and funded numerous infrastructural, civil society and reconciliation initiatives. In addition, they notice that Greek Cypriots had also a poor opinion of the role of the UK (76%) and the USA (68%) in the conflict.

Zone and in the Greek-Cypriot Community, the Peace Centre organised a recitation of Turkish-Cypriot poetry. In 1997, a pop concert with singers from both communities was organised. Greek Cypriots organised pilgrimages to the Apostolos Andreas monastery in Karpas and Turkish Cypriots pilgrims visited the Hala Sultan Tekke in Larnaca (2005, pp. 20-21). These activities bear no more than symbolic significance since there was no systematic contact between communities but only occasional, one-time meetings. Beyond symbolism and their value as gestures of good will, these activities constitute the roots of bicomunal events that followed.

In the conflict resolution field, efforts had started early, even before the division of the island. Needs theorist John Burton, in 1966 offered a problem-solving workshop in London and in 1973, held an informal seminar for political leaders in Rome. More workshops were realised by unofficial diplomacy pioneers Herbert Kelman and Ronald Fisher in the late 1970s and the early 1980s (Broome, 2004, p. 192). Inspired by the above, in 1989 a local initiative on intercommunal contact started under the name “*The Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot Citizens’ Movement for Democracy and Federation in Cyprus.*” In the 1990s, the Peace Centre, the Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy (IMTD), the Cyprus Fulbright Commission (CFC), the Harvard University Conflict Management Group (CMG) and the Virginia National Training Laboratory (NTL) led by Louise Diamond and Diana Chigas and under the name of The Cyprus Consortium and the Interactive Management (IM) initiative organised and realised several conflict-resolving workshops. (Broome, 2005, pp. 23-28). In addition, Fulbright Scholars Marco Turk and John Ungerleider organised mediation training programs. Furthermore, the World Peace Foundation sponsored a seminar for Cypriot academics and international experts in Boston to explore ways to boost the peace process in Cyprus and the School for International Training in Vermont held the Youth Camps, Seeds of Peace trainings to Cypriot students (Ungerleider, 2001, pp. 583-584). The contribution of conflict resolution activities is also ambiguous and their impact on the Cyprus issue hard to measure. In any case, these workshops offered space for dialogue on a new basis and beyond the ethnocentric, dichotomous rhetoric. In addition, they offered participants skills for building contact, interaction and trust in contrast with the conflictual habitus of in-group socialisation. Scientists that organise such meetings underline the potential for constructive dialogue and the willingness of the sides to do so (Ηρακλείδης, 2002, p. 341). However, these activities carry a burden and a negative connotation that is difficult to throw off. All the initiatives are introduced by external

actors and have the disadvantage of often being perceived as imposed, external solutions or even as neo-colonialism (Richmond, 2004, p. 211). Furthermore, initiatives starting from actors who are outsiders in the conflict are often characterised as acultural and insensitive to local needs.

Furthermore, there are numerous projects covering various fields of action; the Youth Encounters for Peace, which brought together groups of young people from 16 to 19 years old in order to provide the younger generation the opportunity to get to know the people with whom they might probably share Cyprus in the future. The co-villagers' meetings, which brought together Cypriots who had lived in the same village before the 1974 division (Broome, 2005, p. 33). The Nature Knows No Boundaries project aiming at utilising bicomunal partnerships on environmental protection as a way to promote intercommunal tolerance (Akçali & Antonsich, 2009, p. 940). The Youth Promoting Peace (Y2P), which was established to promote close cooperation between the young people in the two communities The Technology for Peace (TFP) project that utilised the Internet to bring people across the Buffer Zone together and introduce those involved in bicomunal work to the use of the Internet. And the short-lived, English, Greek and Turkish-written bicomunal magazine Hade that covered stories of bicomunal groups and experiences of individuals on the other side along with poetry and book reviews (Broome, 2005, pp. 33-35), (Anastasiou, 2008a, p. 38).

A good deal of bicomunal cooperation initiatives, both official and unofficial, has taken place in the Ledra Hotel Palace situated in the Green Line. According to Anastasiou (2008b, p. 97), until 2004, the UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) had facilitated 138 bicomunal events at Ledra Palace. A fine example is the Masterplan for the development of Nicosia initiated by the two mayors of divided Nicosia, Mustafa Akinci (now elected leader of the Turkish Cypriot community) and Lellos Demetriades (Constantinou & Papadakis, 2001, p. 142).

Benjamin Broome also lists several bicomunal groups considered pioneering; the group of young political leaders and the group of young business leader. The bicomunal trainers group formed through the conflict resolution workshops aiming to transmit conflict-resolving skills to more Cypriots. The bicomunal educators group consisting of higher-level educators. The bicomunal women's group focusing on factors that create pain and suffering in Cyprus, as seen through the eyes of women. The bicomunal student group, consisting of students studying in public and private universities. The Mediation Centres (Management Centre in the north and the NGO

Resource Centre in the south) created with Bicomunal Development Programme funding and the guidance of Marco Turk (Broome, 2005, pp. 29-30), (Anastasiou, 2008a, p. 39). The All Cyprus Union Forum created to address trade and labour issues. The Brussels Business Group consisting of prominent business leaders aiming to promote high level peace initiatives The Citizens Movement for Reunification and Coexistence that promotes civil society and broad-based rapprochement between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. Lastly, the EU Federation Study Group that aims utilise dialogue on interethnic federation and the EU as the basis for peace in Cyprus (Anastasiou, 2008a, pp. 38-39).

Concerning established cooperation between organisations and interest groups from the two sides there is again activity in various fields. Culture and sports are two fields where cooperation is constant. Apart from these, cooperation concentrates in areas such as future prospects for settlement of the Cyprus Issue, research (i.e. the Mediation Centres cooperation mentioned above), humanitarian issues (such as the Lions Clubs from both communities cooperation on cancer research) and business associations' regular meetings to discuss issue of common concern (such as the Ledra street shopkeepers) (The Management Centre of the Mediterranean, NGO Support Centre, 2005, p. 54). Finally, important mono-communal groups, like the Turkish Cypriot This Country is Ours and the Cyprus Peace Center significantly contributed to the growth and proliferation of bicomunal activities and groups (Anastasiou, 2008a, p. 39).

Value of Bicomunal Activities for Peace and Conflict Transformation.

There is disagreement on whether unofficial diplomatic tracks can contribute to a peace process. Likewise, different viewpoints exist on whether bicomunal activities in the case of Cyprus can assist the rapprochement process.

On the one hand, as Broome (2005, p. 96) notes tangible results of bicomunal activities are difficult to measure. Supporters and funding parties of bicomunal events admit that impact of activities is hard to evaluate. Furthermore, implementing organisations often evaluate bicomunal projects as lacking sustainability, efficiency and effectiveness despite their successfulness.²¹ This means that there is a

²¹ EuropeAid assessed its Academy of Political Studies/European Forum Cyprus programme as having poor performance on these aspects (EuropeAid, 2013). Likewise, UNDP-ACT evaluation reported similar problems concerning sustainability and impact (Kinghorn & McGarty, 2013)

problematism among implementers and funders on the long-term results of the projects.

On the other hand, bicomunal activities, until April 2003, provided the only corridor through the Buffer Zone physical barrier. Without these activities, practically no contact would have occurred across community lines over a thirty-year period. Moreover, the bicomunal character of civil society mobilisation bears two important elements; first, the peace movements initiated in the 1990s gained historical justification and increased legitimisation and second, civil society was instituted as a catalyst of conflict transformation (Anastasiou, 2008b, pp. 93-94).

What is positive for the future contribution of civil society to the Cyprus Issue is that popular perception on both communities tends to be for the bicomunal activities. Both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots somewhat agree on the level of impact of the activities. The majority of those surveyed for the 2011 CIVICUS Report in the Greek Cypriot community, agreed that bicomunal activities contribute positively to the efforts of peace and reconciliation. This positive perception increases the impact within society for the promotion of the values of peace and reconciliation. After the early post-Annan Plan years, the trend seems to be towards lower public participation in terms of the wider society and deeper involvement of the CSOs in bicomunal activities (The Management Centre of the Mediterranean & NGO Support Centre, 2011, p. 17). In the Turkish Cypriot community, after the 2004 Annan Plan failure, participation in bicomunal activities has slightly dropped. The Population Survey showed that 16% of the respondents had participated in pre-2004 bicomunal activities while 14.7% said they participated after 2004. For the Turkish Cypriots, the 2004 referendum result surpassed the potential advantages of the 2003 border opening and the abundance of external funding for bicomunal activities ever since. In the post-2004 era, there is a significant deviation concerning attitudes towards bicomunal activities and the reconciliation process between the civil society and the external stakeholders on the one hand, and the society on the other; while participation of the wider public dropped, the involvement of CSOs increased substantially. The percentage of CSOs that have participated in bicomunal activities went up from 40% to 70% after 2004. In addition, while external donors give CSOs incentives to organise and participate in bicomunal events, citizens do not seem to share the same enthusiasm (The Management Centre of the Mediterranean & NGO Support Centre, 2011, p. 114).


Despite the (perceived as) positive effects of activities and the deepening of bicomunalism, there is a need to engage more participants in bicomunal activities in order to reach out more people who are not aware of the potential benefits of working across the border. To put it simply, there is a need for bicomunal activities to take place with greater engagement from the part of the citizens (The Management Centre of the Mediterranean & NGO Support Centre, 2011, p. 112).

Several 2007 UNDP-ACT-funded initiatives went some way to expunge negative associations linked to bicomunal activities and to promote the role of civil society as a partner to the public and private sectors. Intercommunal dialogue is becoming more widely accepted and many people from both communities tend to perceive it as important for trust-building. Furthermore, 74% of Greek Cypriots and 69% of Turkish Cypriots credit bicomunal activities with having helped the two communities come closer together (Louise & Morgan, 2013, p. 54).

The impact of bicomunal activities on youths is also highly significant for building contact. As Christopher Louise and Tabitha Morgan note (2013, p. 56), surveys show that, of the 1,600 active participants in the ACT-supported youth peer-learning programme for the years 2006-2008, 90% of them made friends and exchanged contacts with someone from the other community. Out of these youth, over 80% maintained that contact after the end of the project, through internet chat, phone or social meetings. Nevertheless, according to the Youth in Cyprus Report, young Cypriots face the specific problem of not knowing how to initiate such activities. The majority of those surveyed in both communities agree that young Cypriots do not know how to initiate activities that would support co-existence and piece-building (Figure 61).

Figure 61: Young Cypriots' Know-How on Peacebuilding and Coexistence

Young Cypriots do not know how to initiate activities which would support inter-communal co-existence and peace building



Cypriot Youth on Their Ability to Influence the Peace Process and Initiate Peace Building Activities


Republication from “Youth in Cyprus: Aspirations, Lifestyles and Empowerment” by the CYPRUS HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT (2009, p. 165)

Like in most civil society projects, in many instances fresh ideas and new initiatives are born through bicomunal activities. For example, citizens of both communities endorse the idea of a series of town-hall meetings involving the negotiating teams to enable the peace process to be discussed directly with the public (Figure 62). Likewise, both communities support the use of technology as a means of informing the public on progress in the peace process and of establishing a mechanism for public participation (Figure 63).

Figure 62: Need for Local Level-Inclusive Peace Process

Those who participate in the actual negotiations should spend time visiting municipalities and villages, in order to discuss the peace process with the citizens directly

Source: Cyprus 2015, 2012




Republication from "Citizen Peacemaking in Cyprus: The Story of Co-operation and Trust across the Green Line" by Louise, C. & Morgan T. (2013, p. 64)

Figure 63: Technology for Peace

The leadership should set up a system, using technology such as the internet and social media, to inform the public directly about the peace process and seek its opinion


Source: Cyprus 2015, 2012



Republication from "Citizen Peacemaking in Cyprus: The Story of Co-operation and Trust across the Green Line" by Louise, C. & Morgan T. (2013, p. 65)


Like perceptions on the general impact of civil society on the Cyprus conflict, the 2011 CIVICUS shows that perceptions of the public, civil society and external stakeholders on the impact of bicomunal activities on rapprochement are more for their positive contribution than against it. Popular Perception is more positive among the Greek Cypriots than among the Turkish Cypriots. As regards civil society's perception, while for the Greek Cypriots data are similarly high, the Turkish Cypriots appear to be more sceptical to the impact of the activities on reconciliation (Figure 64 and 65).

Figure 64: Contribution of Bi-Communal Activities in Reconciliation (Popular Perception)



Republication from “An Assessment of Civil Society in Cyprus: A Map for the Future” by The Management Centre of the Mediterranean & NGO Support Centre (2011, p. 111)


Figure 65: Contribution of Bi-Communal Activities in Reconciliation (Civil Society Perception)



Republication from “An Assessment of Civil Society in Cyprus: A Map for the Future” by The Management Centre of the Mediterranean & NGO Support Centre (2011, p. 111)

As for the external stakeholders, the findings are different; Greek Cypriots are less optimistic to the extent that the percentage of those who believe in the positive contribution of the activities is slightly higher than that of the ones that do not accept it. Contrarily, for the Turkish Cypriots the percentage of the positive answers is significantly high (Figure 66).


Figure 66: Value of Bi-Communal Activities in Reconciliation (External Perception)



Republication from “An Assessment of Civil Society in Cyprus: A Map for the Future” by The Management Centre of the Mediterranean & NGO Support Centre (2011, p. 112)

The 2011 Population Survey showed that 45% of people in the south believed that bicomunal activities promoting understanding and reunification make a positive contribution to the reconciliation process, 30% responded negatively and 25% answered that they do not know (Figure 67).

Figure 67: People in Greek Cypriot Community Who Believe that Bicomunal Activities that Promote Understanding and Reunification Make a Positive Contribution to the Reconciliation Process




Republication from “An Assessment of Civil Society in Cyprus: A Map for the Future” by The Management Centre of the Mediterranean & NGO Support Centre (2011, p. 113)

When answering the same question to CSO representatives, 65% of the respondents agreed that bicomunal activities make a positive contribution to the reconciliation process, 28% disagreed and 7% could not say what the impact is. 48% of the respondents in the external perceptions survey stated that they believe that these activities make a positive contribution and 46% believe otherwise (The Management Centre of the Mediterranean & NGO Support Centre, 2011, p. 113).

Concerning the north, the majority of the population is either negative or ambivalent on the contribution of the civil society-led bicomunal activities to the reconciliation process. (The Management Centre of the Mediterranean & NGO Support Centre, 2011, p. 114).

Comparative examination of the data on the perceptions of bicomunal activities' contribution show that while civil society and external stakeholders believe in their positive impact on the peace process, the wider population is more sceptical (Figure 68). This fact partially explains the people's lack of interest in bicomunal events and the consequent low participation.

Figure 68: Contribution of Bicomunal Activities in the Peace Process



Republication from “An Assessment of Civil Society in Cyprus: A Map for the Future” by The Management Centre of the Mediterranean & NGO Support Centre (2011, p. 114)

The alleged impact of bicomunal activities and cooperation to the rapprochement process can be considered a grassroots contribution to the Cyprus Issue that tries to entrap the population and various stakeholders such as CSOs and NGOs

into a positive climate of contact, cooperation and stereotypes-free perceptions of the “other”. This can be characterised as an indirect way to influence the Cyprus problem. However, there is another, imminent manner in which bicomunal activities may affect the Cyprus Issue. That is, to influence public policy and to attempt to hold accountable decision-makers in the two communities through joint communal action, specifically on the Cyprus Issue.

The 2005 stakeholders’ survey in the Greek Cypriot community showed that 18% believed that the civil society has been inactive, 30% somewhat active, 32% active and 16% very active in influencing public policy on the Cyprus Issue (Table 11). Reported activities included conferences, public discussions, annual gatherings of displaced persons, exhibitions, concerts, demonstrations, vigils, public announcements and petitions.

Table 11: Influence of Civil Society on Public Policy (the Cyprus Issue)

**Percentage distribution of responses to the question:
‘How active has civil society been in
influencing public policy regarding the Cyprus problem?’**

Response	%
Inactive	18
Somewhat Active	30
Active	32
Very Active	16
Don’t Know	4
TOTAL	100

Source: *Regional Stakeholders’ Survey*

Republication from “An Assessment of Civil Society in Cyprus” by The Management Centre of the Mediterranean & NGO Support Centre (2005, p. 104)

When asked how successful CSOs were in influencing public policy on the Cyprus problem, 30% of respondents said that civil society has been ‘unsuccessful’ and 36% described it as either ‘very successful’ or ‘successful’. However, it is not clear how ‘success’ is perceived by the respondents. An interesting example is that, according to the 2005 CIVICUS Report, some people perceived the rejection of the Annan Plan by

the majority of Greek Cypriots as an indication of the success of the CSOs that opposed it (The Management Centre of the Mediterranean & Intercollege, 2005, p. 104).

The 2011 CIVICUS Report asked the CSO members to point out two fields in which they thought their organisation had the most impact on and self-evaluate it. The results showed that the Greek civil society had higher impact on social issues than on policies. Regarding the Cyprus Problem, 44.4% of the respondents thought that there was very limited impact, 32.1% some tangible and 19.8% high level of impact by their organisations (Table 12).

Table 12: Civil Society Impact (Internal Perceptions)

Impact on most important social concerns (internal perceptions)

	Social concern	No impact	Very limited impact	Some tangible impact	High level of impact
1	The Cyprus problem	3.7%	44.4%	32.1%	19.8%
2	Financial crisis in Cyprus	10.0%	38.8%	32.5%	18.8%

Republication from “An Assessment of Civil Society in Cyprus: A Map for the Future” by The Management Centre of the Mediterranean & NGO Support Centre (2011, p. 52)

The respective External Perceptions Survey showed that 57.2% of expert external stakeholders stated that there is none or very limited impact on the Cyprus problem, 31.4% that the impact is moderate and 11.4% that there is a very high level of impact (Table 13).

Table 13: Civil Society Impact (External Perceptions)

Impact on most important social concerns (external perceptions)

#	Social concern	No impact	Very limited impact	Some tangible impact	High level of impact
1	The Cyprus problem	2.9%	54.3%	31.4%	11.4%
2	Financial crisis in Cyprus	15.2%	36.4%	39.4%	9.1%

Republication from “An Assessment of Civil Society in Cyprus: A Map for the Future” by The Management Centre of the Mediterranean & NGO Support Centre (2011, p. 55)

In the Turkish Cypriot community, the people perceived the Cyprus Issue as the most important problem their community was facing despite the professedly serious

everyday problems of economic stagnation and unemployment (Table 14). However, the 2012 Eurobarometer survey showed that probably the loosening of the Green Line mobility obstacles along with the economic crisis rendered the Cyprus Problem less important on the communal (15%) and the personal level (9-11%) for the inhabitants of the northern part of the island (Figure 69).


Table 14: Importance of Issues (Turkish Cypriot Perceptions)

TCs think the Cyprus Problem (37%) as well as the economic situation (30%) and unemployment (30%) are the most important issues facing the TCC.

	EB 68.1	EB 69.2
Cyprus Problem	44%	37%
Economic Situation	32%	30%
Unemployment	32%	30%
Inflation	14%	28%
Crime	21%	19%
Taxation	10%	10%
Education	8%	8%
Immigration	7%	7%
Health	6%	6%
Terrorism	3%	4%
Pensions	2%	3%
Housing	2%	3%
Protection of the Environment	3%	2%
Energy Issues	4%	1%

Republication from “Standard Eurobarometer 69: National Report Turkish Cypriot Community Executive Summary” (European Commission, 2008, p. 5)

Figure 69: Importance of Issues Perception (Societal and Personal)




Republication from “Standard Eurobarometer 80: Cyprus (TCC)” (European Commission, 2013, p. 2)

In any case, civil society attempts to influence the Cyprus Issue on a regular basis. 64% of the Regional Stakeholders Survey respondents thought that the civil society has been successful or very successful in influencing the Cyprus Problem and related policies. CSOs were seen as especially active with respect to policy regarding the Cyprus problem (56% rated CSOs as ‘very active’ and 42% as ‘active’). In specific, CSOs were judged as influential in building support for the Annan Plan and in exercising pressure on their politicians to follow this direction.

Civil society in Northern Cyprus started to exert informal influence and pressure on the political authorities and the community since the publication of the Annan Plan in November 2002. More than fifty organisations, including trade unions, political parties, youth and women organisations, chambers of commerce and artisans, clubs and cultural associations, organised several demonstrations in Nicosia in 2002 and 2003 to declare their support for the plan. The demonstrators were asking for the resignation of the government and the community leader Rauf Denktaş. In addition, leaflets were distributed and several journalists, academics and CSO representatives appeared on the media to support the plan. As a result, the authorities were pressured to open some crossing points along the Green Line. The crossing points’ opening was further assisted by the pressure of a variety of bicomunal groups demanding contact and the presence of a strong Turkish Cypriot opposition actively participating in bicomunal activities (Broome, 2005, p. 96). After parts of the Green Line opened, people from both communities began to line up at the crossing points to visit the other side. The official doctrine of the nationalist Denktaş authority that the two communities cannot live together was challenged by the people, the CSOs and their actions (The Management Centre of the Mediterranean & Intercollege, 2005, p. 161). The referendum result in the north (65% voted for the Plan) can be seen as demonstrative of the impact of the CSOs’ activities. Furthermore, a close examination of the Annan Plan reveals another indication of the influence of bicomunal activities; the Plan included several ideas initially developed in bicomunal seminars and workshops (Broome, 2005, p. 96). Such examples may shape the impression that the civil society, when organised and active, can significantly influence the Cyprus Issue. Although, all research indications on Cyprus show that the impact of the civil society on the Cyprus Issue is limited.

The Stakeholders’ Survey on the Turkish Cypriot community showed that most of the CSO respondents perceived the organisations’ impact as very limited while 21.1% believed that they had a high level of impact on the Cyprus conflict (Figure 70).


Figure 70: Civil Society Responsiveness (Turkish Cypriot Perceptions)



Republication from “An Assessment of Civil Society in Cyprus: A Map for the Future” by The Management Centre of the Mediterranean & NGO Support Centre (2011, p. 90)

Comparative examination of the CSOs’ and the external stakeholders’ responses showed that external stakeholders are more pessimistic about the impact of the civil society on the Cyprus Conflict. However, the ‘some tangible impact’ response was higher for the external stakeholders than for the CSOs (Figure 71).

Figure 71: Impact of Civil Society on Cyprus Issue (External Perceptions)




Republication from “An Assessment of Civil Society in Cyprus: A Map for the Future” by The Management Centre of the Mediterranean & NGO Support Centre (2011, p. 91)

Moreover, contradistinction of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities' perceptions showed that the CSO internal perceptions scores on civil society's impact on the Cyprus conflict were somewhat close for the two communities. Overall, the Greek Cypriot community was a bit more pessimistic than the Turkish Cypriot one (Figure 72). The same stands for the external stakeholders (Figure 73).

Figure 72: Impact of Civil Society on Cyprus Issue (Internal Perceptions)


Comparing internal perceptions on civil society's impact on the Cyprus conflict



Republication from “An Assessment of Civil Society in Cyprus: A Map for the Future” by The Management Centre of the Mediterranean & NGO Support Centre (2011, p. 107)

Figure 73: Impact of Civil Society on Cyprus Issue (Comparative)

Comparing external perceptions on civil society's impact on the Cyprus conflict



Republication from “An Assessment of Civil Society in Cyprus: A Map for the Future” by The Management Centre of the Mediterranean & NGO Support Centre (2011, p. 107)

Dissuasive Factors: Negative Activity and Obstacles in Stereotype-fighting.

Considering civil society and the CSOs as an exclusively positive factor towards contact, interaction and tolerance with its only rivals the limited influence to the decision-makers and the lack of citizens' involvement, would be a one-sided examination of the Cyprus case. As Kanol notes (2010, pp. 38-39) there are good and there are bad CSOs as civil society formation in Cyprus ran parallel with nation-state building and nationalism.

The 2005 CIVICUS included reports of intolerant and racist behaviour within the civil society in the southern part of the island. These examples included the behaviour of members of football fan clubs and the Orthodox Church. However, there were no specific examples or cases given regarding the exact type of intolerant or racist behaviour demonstrated. Greek Cypriot Stakeholders, when asked to describe how they perceived the relationship of the intolerant or racist forces within civil society, 49% of the respondents described them as either 'marginal' or 'isolated' but a significant 36% considered them 'significant' or 'dominating'. The remaining 15% of the respondents that stated that they did not know may indicate that these forces are marginal and thus people are not aware of their activities or they did not fall in their attention (The Management Centre of the Mediterranean & Intercollege, 2005, p. 82). (Table 15)

Table 15: Intolerance in Civil Society

Relation of racist or intolerant forces to civil society at large	
Response	%
They Dominate Civil Society	6
They are a Significant Actor Within Civil Society	36
They are a Marginal Actor Within Civil Society	45
They are Isolated and Strongly Denounced by Civil Society	13
TOTAL	100

Source: *Regional Stakeholders' Survey*

Republication from "An Assessment of Civil Society in Cyprus" by The Management Centre of the Mediterranean & NGO Support Centre (2011, p. 83)

Nationalism and ethnocentrism are very strong elements and important factors that still influences contact and interaction in the island. There are examples of CSOs that contribute to a culture of division and ethnic tension. Marchetti and Tocci

accentuate the effect of the nature of democracy of a state on civil society. As they claim, in democratic but still nationalistic states, civil society is more likely to include “uncivil” actors pursuing racial or xenophobic agendas. One such example according to Kanol (2010, p. 39), is the Cypriot Orthodox Church. Another example is the Turkish Cypriot branch of the Grey Wolves. This organisation not only promotes nationalist positions but also engages in direct violent acts; there are several cases of threatening behaviour, violent attacks and killings of Turkish Cypriot journalists and Greek Cypriot citizens from the mid-90s to the Annan plan period. The Turkish Cypriot newspaper *Afrika* reported the presence and activity of the Grey Wolves organisation in Northern Cyprus in November 2013, referring to the opening of their new headquarters in Nicosia (Republic of Cyprus, Ministry of Interior, 2013).

Moreover, there are factors that indirectly undermine the reconciliation culture due to solidified narratives that preserve dividing lines. Such an example is the ethnicization of cultural heritage. As Constantinou and Hatay note (2010, pp. 1601-1602), ethnic communities monopolise heritage discourse at the expense of other heritage communities that may have associations with the sites claimed as ethnic. Thus, in many instances cultural heritage is strictly contextualised according to ethnic divisions while in others people may negatively evaluate heritage perceived as their own as a cultural load in their effort to develop socially “progressive” identities. As a result, cultural activities may promote ethnic positions or in other cases may restrict citizens’ reconciliation attempts. The issue of cultural heritage use will be further analysed in the Culture and Sports Chapter.

The independency of CSOs and NGOs is another parameter that impedes the effectiveness of the civil society and its activities. State interference in organisations may either hamper their work or render them promoters of state and party politics. The 2005 CIVICUS report data for the Greek Cypriot community showed that the political parties dominated the civil society. The majority of CSOs were funded and controlled by political parties and consequently the practices and viewpoints of the CSOs were usually in line with the political party they were linked to. As a result, the relationships of political parties to governments determined the attitude of CSOs towards the state (The Management Centre of the Mediterranean & Intercollege, 2005, pp. 71-72). The 2011 CIVICUS report showed that the influence and impact of political parties over civil society is still very strong and that the political environment of the 2004-2007 period had a negative impact on organisations, especially on bicomunal and

reconciliation groups. Yet, since 2008 the political environment has become more enabling since the political personnel recognises more and more the role of CSOs in society (The Management Centre of the Mediterranean & NGO Support Centre, 2011, p. 58). For the Turkish Cypriot community opinions were divided with 49% of the respondents claiming that the state sometimes interferes in civil society activities while another 49% considered interference as rare to non-existent. Howbeit, financial dependency from Turkey and linkage to political parties decreases the CSOs' influence. (The Management Centre of the Mediterranean & Intercollege, 2005, pp. 144, 172). According to the 2011 report, on the one hand, financial transparency is in favour of the Turkish Cypriot organisations and on the other hand, high corruption as perceived by the civil society itself is obstructive to their effectiveness (The Management Centre of the Mediterranean & NGO Support Centre, 2011, p. 102).

Beyond independency from the state and parties, independence from international players is also a major issue for Cypriot organisations and their activities. In general, conflict resolution, which is indissolubly connected to civil society dynamics and bicomunal activities, is often accused of social engineering, interventionism and partiality. In addition, conflict resolution approaches are mainly based on needs approaches that are believed to ignore cultural particularities. In sum, in many cases conflict resolution and the role of civil society in it are considered western-centred in conception, neo-liberal (Marchetti & Tocci, 2009, p. 204) and neo-colonialist (Richmond, 2004, p. 211). However, as the years go by and the Cypriot civil society ripens, the grassroots resolution movement tends to move closer to more Cypriot-owned solutions and thus to more culturally sensitive and less interventionist approaches. Nevertheless, one cannot deny that supporting institutions, states and organisations function under the normative, liberal internationalist notion²² where traditional actors and institutions are expected to stick to the rules of the liberal order. The example of the Occupy Buffer Zone Movement that was successful in engaging locals but did not gain any financial or political backing, shows that radical or ideologically divergent groups are excluded from any kind of EU and UN support (Lidén, Mikhelidze, Stavrevska, & Vogel, 2016, p. 10).


²² liberal internationalism and Democratic Peace Theory based on the Kantian notion of Perpetual Peace (Kant, 1795) stress that the combination of democracy, trade and international cooperation creates peace within and among nations (Russett & Oneal, 2001), (Jahn, 2013), (Jahn, 2018).

Another major issue going hand in hand with the blooming of the CSOs and the NGOs in Cyprus is the professionalization hazard. As mentioned earlier, many civic peacebuilding activities including bicommunal ones have been realised through donor funding. However, through this process, social movements transformed into NGOs, volunteerism retreated, social roots of the movements weakened and peacebuilding initiatives turned from grassroots cooperation to fundraising efforts. These NGOs are considered to be run by an urban, educated middle-class, which causes problems of social capital, ownership and legitimacy (Kanol & Kanol, 2013, p. 41).

Of course, one should not ignore the possibility that contact and bicommunal activities may simply not work. As Broome points out (2005, p. 7), for some individuals, meeting with the other side has served only to reinforce their previously held negative images.


Conclusions on Contact and Conflict Transformation. In the 2014 and 2015 SCORE data, Greek Cypriots were, in general, positive in all the political compromise indicators of the research, except for the support for a federal solution (Figure 74 and 75). On the contrary, Turkish Cypriots showed their support for a federal state solution but they also demonstrated lower scores in all compromise indicators.

Figure 74: Political Compromise Indicators 2014



Republication from “Predicting Peace: The Social Cohesion and Reconciliation Index as a Tool of Conflict Transformation (2nd ed.)” by Ioannou M., Filippou G., & Lordos A. (2015, p. 126)

Figure 75: Political Compromise Indicators 2015




Scores for political compromise and its indicators in the two communities, SCORE 2015

Republication from “Predicting Peace: The Social Cohesion and Reconciliation Index as a Tool of Conflict Transformation (2nd ed.)” by Ioannou M., Filippou G., & Lordos A. (2015, p. 127)

Concerning reconciliation indicators, Greek Cypriots seemed to demonstrate extremely low scores in the active discrimination indicator and a decreasing trend in negative stereotypes (Figure 76). On the contrary, Turkish Cypriots followed an upward trend in all indicators (Figure 77).


Figure 76: Reconciliation Indicators 2013, 2014, 2015 for Greek Cypriots



Scores on the reconciliation indicators across SCORE 2013, 2014, and 2015 for Greek Cypriots

Republication from “Predicting Peace: The Social Cohesion and Reconciliation Index as a Tool of Conflict Transformation (2nd ed.)” by Ioannou M., Filippou G., & Lordos A. (2015, p. 120)


Figure 77: Reconciliation Indicators 2013, 2014, 2015 for Turkish Cypriots



Scores on the reconciliation indicators across SCORE 2013, 2014, and 2015 for Turkish Cypriots

Republication from “Predicting Peace: The Social Cohesion and Reconciliation Index as a Tool of Conflict Transformation (2nd ed.)” by Ioannou M., Filippou G., & Lordos A. (2015, p. 120)

Figure 78: Reconciliation Attitudes



Differences between SCORE 2013, SCORE 2014, and SCORE 2015 in attitudes towards reconciliation with the other community.

Republication from “Predicting Peace: The Social Cohesion and Reconciliation Index as a Tool of Conflict Transformation (2nd ed.)” by Ioannou M., Filippou G., & Lordos A. (2015, p. 120)

The reconciliation attitudes as depicted in Figure 78 show that Greek Cypriots were more positive towards reconciliation in the course of time while Turkish Cypriots’ opinions moved the opposite direction. Thus, there is no uniform tendency that would show that the quantity or quality of contact leads to increased or decreased reconciliation propensity. For Greek Cypriots increase in quality contact keeps up with

reconciliation willingness and for Turkish Cypriots decrease in quantity goes with lower will for reconciliation, but this does not mean that there is a direct relation between contact and reconciliation deriving from the data. Contrarily, stereotypes and discrimination follow reconciliation trends for both communities with each one of them going a different way.

Even if the data do not offer a direct relation between contact and conflict transformation, the role of civil society cannot be characterised as insignificant. Face-to-face as well as indirect contacts could accommodate a resolution under certain circumstances. Civil society activities could function as an important element of conflict transformation in two different, not mutually exclusive, manners: 1) create a positive entrapment that would drag decision-makers to the negotiation table and 2) facilitate the decision-makers in “selling” an agreement more easily to their people. The first constitutes a bottom-up, while the second is a top-down contribution to a conflict transformation process. The Greek Cypriot President Nicos Anastasiades in a 2015 interview in the Greek public television (Anastasiades, 2015) acknowledged the significance of the civil society towards resolution. Anastasiades stated that instead of the unsuccessful strategy of all the previous Cypriot presidents to internationalise, and thus open to the world, the Cyprus Issue, it would be more fruitful to open the Issue to the civil society and the Cypriot society. Even if this acknowledgement is superficial or driven by occasional political motives, such a statement is important for the discourse of the conflict and the perceived importance of the civil society in it.

In this chapter, I provided the data of the function and activity of the CSOs and NGOs in Cyprus. I grouped the data in two main blocks; those that indicate the domestic impact and the ones that show the intercommunal impact of the organisations. I further categorised data of the first block in these that indicate 1) citizens’ participation and trust, and 2) social impact and state accountability, and the data of the second block in those that indicate 1) interaction, 2) trust, tolerance and discrimination, 3) cooperation, and 4) participation in joint activities.

The study of the data shows that, although one cannot claim the existence of a direct relation between contact and conflict transformation and contact and stereotypes, CSO and NGO activity is an active part of the reality of the Cyprus Issue that exercises at least some minimal, positive or negative, influence to the course of the conflict. The parameter of the activity of CSOs and NGOs oftentimes seem intricate and their impact

or potential impact, vague. However, data indicate a main trend of significant capabilities but at the same time low impact of the organisations and their activities on stereotypes and conflict transformation.

In the following chapter, I explore and analyse the second parameter of the thesis that is economic interdependence. Peace-through-economic activity is more traditional, deep-rooted, and widely accepted among researchers and practitioners as it constitutes a means of peaceful conduct since the dawn of civilisation. In addition, it also bears the potentiality to influence conflict based on mutual self-interest on the individual and group level.

11. Economic Interdependence

In the present chapter, I examine the second parameter of the thesis for exploring the effect of unofficial diplomatic contacts on stereotypes in the intercommunal conflict case of Cyprus. In specific, I initially offer an introduction on the economic situation in Cyprus and its importance for the dispute. Subsequently, like in the previous chapter where I grouped CSO and NGO data in two major blocks (domestic and intercommunal impact) I present 1) the economic transactions between the communities, and 2) the intra-island trade and spending on the other side activities in Cyprus. Data of these two blocks are further categorised in; a) doing business and working together, b) mixed entrepreneurial activity, c) employing and being employed by the other and d) activity in the field of tourism for the former, and a) trade activity, conditions and obstacles, across the Green Line and b) expenditure across the dividing line, meaning spending of groups of the one community, on the other side for the latter. Finally, I conclude on the impact of the economic interdependence activity and its contribution on confronting stereotypes and transforming the conflict.

Economic Transactions between the Cypriot Communities.

General Data. The physical and psychological partition of the two Cypriot communities naturally has a huge impact on the economic activities of entrepreneurs and traders. Like in the case of civil society activities, the 2003 opening of the crossings and the 2004 accession to the EU (followed by the EC No 866/2004

Green Line Regulation)²³ favoured bicomunal economic interaction. However, it is clear that, in a place of not violent but persistent conflict, bicomunal economic cooperation is far from normalised. Following abnormality, the overall economic life of the communities of the island drew completely different paths after the 1974 division. In general, the separate lives of the two communities led to the establishment of a vibrant and growing economy in the south, which despite the 2012 financial crisis and the bailout programme remains solid, on one hand, and a non-recognised by the international community, problematic, embargoed and completely dependent on Turkey, economy in the north, on the other. People on both communities identify bicomunal socioeconomic inequality as an influencing factor for the creation and perpetuation of conflict (Table 16).

Table 16: Social and Economic Inequality

E43.9 The social and economic inequality between G/Cs and T/Cs (%)

Very	21.9	36.3
Somewhat	36.3	30.9
Not very	20.8	11.4
Not at all	15.5	11.8
Don't know	5.5	9.7
Total	100.0	100.0
	N = 1,070	N = 1,038

Republication from “The Cyprus Conflict: Root Causes and Implications for Peacebuilding” by Hadjipavlou M. (2007, p. 359)

Furthermore, the Turkish Cypriot economy does not only demonstrate a great gap compared to the Greek Cypriot one but also a striking disparity within itself among those closely associated with the ruling regime and the rest of the community (Anastasiou, 2008b, p. 74). This is why the EU is highly related to economic welfare for the Turkish Cypriots (Table 17), since membership is a privilege that already enjoyed by the Greek Cypriot community but is not put in effect for the Turkish Cypriots due to the *acquis communautaire* suspension in the north.

²³ Due to the particular conditions of the Cyprus accession, the European Council applied the No 866/2004 regulation (EUR-Lex, 2004) and the 2005 improvements to provide the applications of provisions in areas not under the effective control of the Republic of Cyprus.

Table 17: EU in the Eyes of Turkish Cypriots

The EU has more of an economic meaning for the Turkish Cypriots.

	EB 68.1	EB 69.2	EB 68.1	EB 69.2
	EU 27	EU 27	TCC	TCC
Economic welfare	20%	17%	38%	40%
Social Security	10%	9%	34%	34%
Peace	33%	26%	34%	30%
Democracy	22%	21%	32%	29%
Freedom to travel or study anywhere in the EU	52%	49%	18%	24%
Cultural Diversity	27%	22%	21%	21%
Stronger say in the world	26%	22%	16%	17%
Loss of cultural identity	12%	11%	17%	12%
Unemployment	14%	11%	13%	8%
Waste of money	20%	19%	5%	8%
Euro	39%	35%	14%	7%
Bureaucracy	21%	18%	7%	6%
More crime	17%	15%	8%	5%
Not enough control at external frontiers	18%	18%	5%	4%

Republication from “Eurobarometer 69: National Report, Executive Summary, Cyprus, Turkish Cypriot Community” (European Commission, 2008, p. 7)

Like the civil society, the recognition issue equally haunts the sector of entrepreneurship and trade (mostly in the south). Economic and trade interaction with the other is principally considered as offering recognition and consequently is a non-acceptable, even traitorous behaviour.

In addition, in the Greek Cypriot community, the cost of a prospective unification or resolution of the Cyprus problem is a major discussion issue. Given the fact that the Turkish Cypriot economy is underdeveloped, compared to the prosperous and Modern Greek Cypriot one, there is a fear that the Greek Cypriots will be called to pay the high cost of the economic unification or integration of the island (Beyatli, Papadopoulou, & Kaymak, 2011, p. 15). However, over time, those that suffer the most by the situation in Cyprus are the residents of the north. It is not by chance that, according to the 2008 Eurobarometer data, the economic situation was the second most important issue preoccupying the Turkish Cypriots, after the overwhelming, Cyprus Problem (Table 18). What is more, there is not a unanimous agreement that a resolution would economically burden the island. A 2014 Peace Research Institute Oslo report proposed that if the island were reunited, there would be a “peace dividend” of around € 20 billion, an amount roughly equivalent to the existing Gross Domestic Product

(GDP) of the Republic of Cyprus (Gorvett, 2015). In a more pragmatic report, in 2010-2011, the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot Chambers of Commerce²⁴ undertook a joint research exercise to explore the condition of the Cypriot economy under two scenarios: an immediate settlement and a delayed settlement. The report concluded that a Cyprus settlement would remove many of the existing constraints to economic development. In addition, it showed that the level of economic exchange between the communities was more financially significant than indicated by official Green Line trade statistics. Furthermore, it recommended that even in the absence of a formal settlement, trade between the two communities should be actively encouraged through the opening of more crossing points, further convergence of the Turkish Cypriot community to the EU *acquis communautaire* and the co-operation of professional associations (Louise & Morgan, 2013, pp. 19-20). Apostolides, Apostolides & Güray (2012, p. 434) assert that “*unlike the largely known costs of a settlement that are essentially static (cost of resettlement of people) the benefits from greater economic interdependence are dynamic.*”

Table 18: Importance of Issues (Turkish Cypriot Perceptions)

TCs think the Cyprus Problem (37%) as well as the economic situation (30%) and unemployment (30%) are the most important issues facing the TCC.

	EB 68.1	EB 69.2
Cyprus Problem	44%	37%
Economic Situation	32%	30%
Unemployment	32%	30%
Inflation	14%	28%
Crime	21%	19%
Taxation	10%	10%
Education	8%	8%
Immigration	7%	7%
Health	6%	6%
Terrorism	3%	4%
Pensions	2%	3%
Housing	2%	3%
Protection of the Environment	3%	2%
Energy Issues	4%	1%

Republication from “Standard Eurobarometer 69: National Report Turkish Cypriot Community Executive Summary” (European Commission, 2008, p. 5)

The opening of crossings has resulted to a change in economic behaviour of the Cyprus communities. This behaviour initiated a process of recalibration of economic


²⁴ The Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce contrary to many organisations and institutions of the north holds a special status of the since it was established prior to 1974, and thus it is internationally recognised (The Management Centre of the Mediterranean, NGO Support Centre, 2005, p. 114).

forces in Cyprus through growing economic interdependence namely, “*the increasing economic interaction and reliance of each community on the other through transactions across the Green Line.*” (Apostolides, Apostolides, & Güryay, 2012, p. 430) These transactions include goods, services, intra-island trade, employment opportunities, social insurance, and health services. In any case, various stakeholders agree that building interdependence between the two communities is a way to walk towards the solution. In that way, inducing economic interdependence could be an element of cohesion towards a functioning bicomunal or federal system (Beyatlı, Papadopoulou, & Kaymak, 2011, p. 28). Over and above, the benefits could also work reversely. And while it was clear to many that economic interdependence has been growing since 2004, there were neither any systematic efforts to measure and understand the phenomenon nor any policies or strategies to ensure that such interdependence would continue and lead to a virtuous cycle of greater desire for a solution.” (Apostolides, Apostolides, & Güryay, 2012, pp. 430-431)

The 2013 elected, right-wing Greek Cypriot President Nicos Anastasiades and the 2015 elected, left-wing Turkish Cypriot Leader Mustafa Akıncı have stressed the advantages a resolution of the issue will bring as a means to “sell” such an eventuality to people and stakeholders. During a joint meeting of the Chambers of Commerce in July 2015, President Anastasiades stated that a settlement could double the all-island GDP in 20 years’ time (Gorvett, 2015). Concerning the correlation between economy and conflict, economic inequalities could constitute a cause of conflict and conflict preservation. As Hadjipavlou (2007, p. 360) accentuates economic inequality between the two communities has not been given the proper attention. Hadjipavlou stresses the fact that during many intercommunal workshops during the 1990s, Turkish Cypriots were constantly bringing up the issue. Turkish Cypriots often feel that the great economic prosperity achieved in the south does not make the Greek Cypriots eager to search for a solution for the Cyprus issue. On the other hand, the continuing economic stagnancy of the north, feeds negative stereotypes among Greek Cypriots on their fellow Turkish Cypriots as lazy and backward. This economic backwardness, either in its factual or in its psychological dimension, is reflected on the lack of economic incentives for the Greek Cypriots to cross the Green Line contrary to the Turkish Cypriots that in many instances cross to the south for employment reasons (The Management Centre of the Mediterranean, NGO Support Centre, 2005, p. 124). However, the 2011 Solving the Cyprus Problem, reports that according to polling data,

most Cypriots were viewing economic benefits as a factor motivating them to find a solution (Figure 79). Interestingly, and contrarily to the Turkish Cypriots' fear, Greek Cypriots claimed to be even more motivated by the potential economic benefits of a settlement than the Turkish Cypriots (Beyatlı, Papadopoulou, & Kaymak, 2011, p. 54).

Figure 79: Motivating Factors in Economy




Republication from “Solving the Cyprus Problem: Hopes and Fears” by Beyatlı D., Papadopoulou K., & Kaymak E. (2011, p. 55).

One having stereotypes on Greek Cypriots would ascribe this motivation to their stinginess. All in all, it seems that the alleged unwillingness of the Greek Cypriots for a solution to the Cyprus Issue, either it is a psychological or a factual barrier, it constitutes an issue to be addressed in trust-building activities regardless their form. Similarly, the Greek Cypriot fear of paying a tremendous cost for the solution could be balanced through trust-building and promotion of the prospective benefits that would occur through a potential resolution. The Greek Cypriots' fear of paying a high cost is pictured in the abovementioned, Solving the Cyprus Problem Report (Figure 80). The Report notes that such potential distributional consequences are not just a matter of economics. They also relate to a sense of equity for the Greek Cypriots that consider unjust the fact that their community may have to shoulder the cost of reunification and an existential concern of being economically dominated by the Greek Cypriots, for the Turkish Cypriots²⁵ (Beyatlı, Papadopoulou, & Kaymak, 2011, p. 56).

²⁵ In the same report, Greek Cypriot participants express their fear of being dominated by Turkey's capital in the future.

Figure 80: Constraining Factors in Economy

Constraining Factors – Economics and Distributional Consequences



Republication from “Solving the Cyprus Problem: Hopes and Fears” by Beyatlı D., Papadopoulou K., & Kaymak E. (2011, p. 56)

In any case, the goals of entrepreneurs, traders and the respective associations are profit-making ones and differ in essence compared to the goals of CSOs and NGOs. This means that in order for them to be actively engaged in some kind of resolution process, there have to be profit or profit-related incentives for their involvement. Thus, in order to involve enterprises and trading companies as actors for peace or as stakeholders, one has to stress the current loss and the potential benefits of a resolution. The Economic Interdependence Project, that was launched in 2009 by the UNDP Cyprus and involves the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot Chambers of Commerce, works in this direction by attempting to boost bicomunal, business partnerships, close the gap between businesses in each community and raise businessmen and public awareness of the benefits of economic cooperation (UN, Economic Interdependence: UNDP Cyprus, 2013). In the long run, the programme aspires to contribute to the reunification of Cyprus through increase in intra-island trade and business cooperation and the enhancement of economic interdependence, by encouraging cooperative planning to benefit the economy island-wide, by creating more opportunities for partnerships, and by helping the businessmen in the two communities to identify and understand new and existing interdependent economic relationships (CPN Cyprus Producers Network, 2015). The Economic Interdependence Project offered tangible

benefits to Cyprus through the significant cooperative mechanisms that were built between the two Chambers of Commerce and proved extremely useful on two crisis instances; the 2011 electricity crisis caused by the Florakis Naval Base²⁶ explosion and the 2013 tanker oil-spill, polluting coasts in Northern Cyprus. (Louise & Morgan, 2013, pp. 17-18). The kindred UNDP Engage project attempted to bring together CSO and business agents in the “Federation and Economy” conference. This attempt, though it was not that successful in terms of attendance, managed to attract non-CSO and NGO agents for addressing a targeted issue (Gillespie, Γεωργίου, & Insay, 2011, pp. 19-20).

Except for the timid tangible steps towards increased bicomunal, economic cooperation (opening of crossings, Increased Chambers of Commerce cooperation, crisis management cooperation, Direct Trade Regulation²⁷), there are equally small but important perceptual developments. Stakeholders in both communities perceive a settlement as a potential, economically beneficial development. In particular, Turkish Cypriots tend to view the current state of the economy in Northern Cyprus as being in a fundamental structural crisis. Young Turkish Cypriots hope that a settlement would deliver more job opportunities. Stable economic cooperation through reunification is seen as a source of certainty that would attract investors, which would in turn bring capital and job opportunities. Furthermore, a unified Cyprus would be able to attract more tourists, boost and offer assurance to domestic investments, free human capital currently occupied in the production of propaganda to pursue more productive activities, open the vast, developing Turkish market to Cyprus to act as a bridge between Turkey and the EU, and free potential reserves of natural gas and oil to a reunified Cyprus that, according to seismologists, are in abundance in the island’s Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) (Beyatlı, Papadopoulou, & Kaymak, 2011, pp. 57-59). To sum up, certainty and stability would increase life standards and prosperity.

Another factor that favours economic interdependence and cooperation is the proliferation of contemporary globalising trends. Economic and technological interdependence contributes to the “shrinking” of the world. Perceptual barriers created by ethnic and nationalist approaches tend to fall back in front of the increasing

²⁶ It is important to note that a precedent of cooperation in the electricity sector existed before the Florakis accident. Apostolides, Apostolides & Güray (2012, p. 434), note that, despite political objections, in 2006 when the Turkish Cypriot community was in need for supply of electricity, it was provided by the Greek Cypriot community “through a formula that did not involve mutual political recognition”.

²⁷ The Direct Trade Regulation is analysed in the following chapter on trade.

economic challenges and opportunities created by globalisation. Such assumptions have been growing in strength and clarity for both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots (Anastasiou, 2008b, p. 50). Moreover, while one may challenge the degree of influence of these perceptions, contemporary economic challenges and occasions do not leave much space to entrepreneurs, businesspersons and traders for the luxury of self-constraint through ethno-nationalism.

However, one cannot claim the same about consumers' behaviour since, while Turkish Cypriots do not hesitate to shop in the south, Greek Cypriots are reluctant to do likewise in the north. Beyatli, Papadopoulou & Kaymak (2011, p. 60) record the stakeholders' fear that, although people conduct economic transactions based on their interests and economic value rather than on the ethnic background of their consumers or suppliers, Greek Cypriots, even in a reunited Cyprus, would refrain from conducting business with Turkish Cypriots and their businesses would fall to the wayside. However, the ethical barriers Greek Cypriots face, would probably collapse along with a future settlement of the Cyprus Problem. On that regard, despite the Republic of Cyprus official stance of the embargo under the fear of recognition, the first indications of the 2003 opening of crossings were encouraging with 2.5 million Cyprus pounds (approximately \$5 million) spent in the first two weeks of the opening by Greek Cypriots in the north (Anastasiou, 2008b, p. 103). Apostolides, Apostolides & Güray (2012, p. 430) report that often Cypriots cross to the north for casino entertainment, an industry which is not that developed in the south.

Similarly, Greek Cypriots have their own fears concerning the economic status of a future settlement. They fear that Turkish companies and financial institutions will come to Cyprus, take over everything, dominate the market and push out of the "game" all Cypriots regardless their ethnic origin (Beyatli, Papadopoulou, & Kaymak, 2011, pp. 60-61).

Concerning short-term benefits, economic interdependence is currently making a major contribution in changing the attitudes of the two communities, despite substantial legal, physical, and psychological barriers. This increasing interdependence is changing the lives of people, demonstrating that cooperation between the two communities facilitates the development of confidence-building, helping transform the political environment through beneficial and substantive economic cooperation (Apostolides, Apostolides, & Güray, 2012, p. 432).

On the whole, as Apostolides, Apostolides, & Güray (2012, p. 434) accentuate,

“Economic activity may facilitate a Cyprus settlement because both communities, acting mainly out of self-interest and with minimal encouragement, have been mutually benefiting through interaction across the Green Line, despite significant psychological, practical, and sometimes legal barriers. A solution of the Cyprus problem would remove the majority of such barriers, allowing for a rapid increase of economic interdependence to mutual advantage. Thus, increased interdependence that will take place in a solution will improve the welfare for all communities in Cyprus. The bonding generated will facilitate implementation of a settlement and strengthen mutual interest.”

Beyatli, Papadopoulou & Kaymak (2011, p. 61) stress the need for the decision-makers to take into account the distributional concerns for macroeconomic convergence, vis-à-vis a prospective settlement of the Cyprus Issue. While the economic dimension may seem to be a factor that may boost resolution, transition to EU norms of liberal economics may complicate the political dimension where potential losers of economic exchange could push for protectionist policies citing ethnicity as a factor. Apostolides, Apostolides, & Güryay (2012, p. 435) estimate that an increase in bicomunal economic activity can ensure that a solution of Cyprus can be implemented, with international support needed only during the beginning of the process when high investment expenditures for resettlement are necessary.

For the purposes of this study, economic interdependence in Cyprus, is summarised in 3 main domains; 1) Business (mixed enterprises, employing and being employed by the other), 2) Trade and 3) Tourism industry.

Business: Working together: Mixed Enterprises, Employing and Being Employed by the “Other”. As presented above, there are various constraints for economic cooperation due to the political situation in Cyprus. The Cyprus Problem casts its heavy shadow on the business sector concerning bicomunal cooperation in all forms. The opening of crossings has contributed to the improvement of the business environment but still there is a long way towards entrepreneurial normality. Benjamin Broome (2005, p. 96), referring to bicomunal activities, stresses that they have not led to large-scale joint business ventures, integrated schools, island-wide projects, or

exchange programs for professionals all of which could contribute to the strengthening of bicomunal partnership at the state level. This is partly because, when talking about joint business ventures, the recognition issue pops up once again. This fear, that is mainly a Greek Cypriot problem, stems from the recognition of a Turkish Cypriot state and spreads to all spheres including social, institutional and business relations. Broome (2005, pp. 46-47) points out several examples; in one case the Greek Cypriots, after learning of a Turkish-Cypriot request to become part of the international association of a worldwide business-oriented group, they formed their own branch of that organisation and applied for membership in the name of Cyprus, fearing that the Turkish Cypriots branch might be given membership because it was the only one on the island. In another instance, the bicomunal group of young business leaders stopped meeting regularly after two years of discussions, even during the period when bicomunal contacts were blooming, because they were not able to establish joint business projects and practice business and thus they were lacking motivation to carry on. Similarly, a group of senior business leaders abandoned their plans for joint projects. Hatay, Mullen & Kalimeri (2008, pp. 55-57, 64-65) set out two cases of bicomunal business ventures: The first, commercial in nature, failed soon after its establishment because of the withdrawal of potential customers, due to the negative political climate of the Papadopoulos administration period. The second, that is a trilingual newspaper, struggles to survive due to advertising, distribution and funding obstacles posed by political and psychological barriers.

The, already mentioned above, ACT programme supported the efforts of business leaders from across the island in encouraging initiatives that would revitalise economic relations between the Cypriot communities. The Chambers of Commerce of the two communities acknowledged the significance of inter-communal cooperation. When the EU Green Line Trade Regulation was activated in 2004, business leaders from these organisations decided to turn the regulation into tangible commercial benefits by working through the ACT programme. Through the kindred Economic Interdependence project, the chambers undertook the task to establish mechanisms for closing the gap between businesses in each community. Among these mechanisms were the island-wide business directory and an associated mobile phone application, allowing businesses to identify potential partners in the other community. As Louise and Morgan note:

“The Economic Interdependence project helped to transform the relationship between the chambers, instituting organizational and attitudinal changes which were grounded in a genuine realization that business-to-business co-operation was a pragmatic form of trust-building with potential for mutual economic benefit.” (Louise & Morgan, 2013, pp. 16-17)

However, what the two chambers identified as an important trust-building measure remains to be reflected in the perceptual and attitudinal reality of Cypriots and would be even more important to be transfused to youngsters across the island. When asked on how they would feel if they had a person from the other community as a business partner, Cypriot youths expressed in a great extent their uncertainty, with the Turkish Cypriots having a more positive than negative attitude and the Greek Cypriot positive and negative responses almost equally split. In perspective, young people in the Turkish Cypriot community are more positive and less negative than their fellow Greek Cypriots in partnering with a person from the other community (Figure 81).

Figure 81: Bicommunal Social and Economic Relations Perceptions



Attitudes towards Significant Ethnic Others

Republication from “Youth in Cyprus: Aspirations, Lifestyles and Empowerment” by CYPRUS HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT (2009, p. 116)

According to interviews conducted by Hatay, Mullen and Kalimeri (2008, p. 39) less than half of the respondents had done business across the divide. Out of those

interviewed in the south, 36% of enterprises had conducted business at least once over the Green Line, compared with 49% in the north.

In the direction of consolidating a mentality of building mutual trust through joint business ventures, the Stelios Philanthropic Foundation, of the British with a Greek Cypriot origin, businessman Stelios Haji-Ioannou, awards every year since 2009 the Stelios Bicomunal Prize and a respective funding to bicomunal businesses in Cyprus (Award Criteria: Stelios Philanthropic Foundation, 2011). In that way, the award attempts to encourage bicomunal cooperation and interdependence and at the same time boost joint enterprises through funding. In 2015, the Stelios Foundation received 4 times more applications than in previous years while Stelios Haji-Ioannou announced a raising of the stakes of the donations for 2016 to €500,000 for 50 bicomunal teams. Total grants in 2015 have reached €2 million (Incyprus, 2015).

The case of the Greek Cypriot Lambros Lambrou and his Turkish Cypriot future associate is a prominent example of a bicomunal business effort. Each one of the prospective partners owns a field on each side of the divide. Lambrou and his future associate aim at creating a mixed crate of seasonal agricultural products from both their fields labelled as “product of Cyprus”. The idea, based on the service of seasonal products offered all together that exists in many European capitals, bears a message of rapprochement and cooperation. According to Lambrou (2015) legal and bureaucratic obstacles have hampered this particular business idea to be realised so far.

As seen in the previous chapter, the most common reason for Greek Cypriots to visit the north are to see a place of birth, for pilgrimage and for visiting friends or relatives. On the contrary, the least common reasons are business, health, education and employment (The Management Centre of the Mediterranean & NGO Support Centre, 2011, pp. 113-114). While Greek Cypriots seem to lack the economic incentives to cross to the north, by contrast, for the Turkish Cypriots²⁸ crossing to the south is often due to the economic incentive of finding employment. According to the Economic Interdependence in Cyprus Report (2011, p. 11) in 2008 there were 2.800 Turkish Cypriots registered in the Republic of Cyprus social insurance system and in 2009, 2.460 respectively. Furthermore, the findings of the report indicate that the number of Turkish Cypriots employed in the south was even higher given the finding that 22% of the Turkish Cypriots crossing the Green Line for employment were not registered

²⁸ It is forbidden to Turkish settlers to cross the Green Line.

(Apostolides, Apostolides, & Güryay, 2012, p. 433). Data of the Ministry of Labour and Social Insurance of the Republic of Cyprus showed that while there was a great increase in Turkish Cypriots insured in the south from the beginning of 2003 to 2004, after this point numbers stayed relatively unchanged (Table 19).

Table 19: Turkish Cypriots with Social Insurance

Turkish Cypriots with Social Insurance	Jan-Apr 2003*	Apr-Dec 2003	2004	2005	2006	prov 2007
Total insured	598	2,410	3,639	3,772	3,470	3,510

* The first crossing point was opened on 23 April 2003.

* The authors estimate that around 2,000 persons registered as Turkish Cypriots live in the south, of which around 1,000 are Roma/Gurbet.

Source: Ministry of Labour and Social Insurance.

Republication from “Intra-island Trade in Cyprus: Obstacles, Oppositions and Psychological Barriers” by Hatay M., Mullen F., & Kalimeri J. (2008, p. 24)

According to the Economic Interdependence in Cyprus Report, the labour income of the Turkish Cypriot community from workers employed in the south was constantly rising with the exception of 2009 where there was a slight drop from € 45.4 to € 41.3 million (Table 20).

Table 20: Estimated Expenditure across the Green Line 2003-2009 (Labour Income)

ECONOMIC INTERDEPEDNENCE: ESTIMATED EXPENDITURE ACROSS GREEN LINE BY YEAR (€mln)							
BENEFITS TO TCC	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
MOVEMENT							
Labour Income	13.2	31.1	39.7	39.7	42.9	45.4	41.3

Republication from “Economic Interdependence: Assessment of Current Economic Interdependence between the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot Communities and Recommendations for Reinforced Economic Convergence” (2011, p. 14)

In the spirit of building trust and cooperation through business, the Cyprus Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce launched an EU funded programme of bicommunal internships. Twelve Turkish Cypriot interns were appointed to twelve Greek Cypriot hosting companies and nine Greek Cypriot interns to six Turkish Cypriot ones.²⁹ The aim of the “Leading by

²⁹ At the time of the writing of the research there were 3 more Greek Cypriots to be appointed to Turkish Cypriot companies in 2016

Example” programme is to offer work experience and at the same time a grasp of the cultural environment in the other community (Cyprus News Agency, 2015).

According to Hatay, Mullen and Kalimeri (2008, p. 1), while in terms of value the flow of money is in favour of Greek Cypriots, it tips in favour of Turkish Cypriots when estimated remittances of those working in the south are included. Given this, the total value of intra-island business, including salaries in 2007, was estimated at € 85.3 million. According to Apostolides et al (2012, p. 433), in 2008 economic transactions across the Green Line were € 311 million³⁰ and in 2009 dropped to €300.9 million due to the economic recession.

Ideally, a prospective political agreement would pave the way for opportunities for business and institutional partnerships. The success of these partnerships will be critical for the full implementation of the agreement. Some cooperation in the business sector will be driven by perceived potential for profit. However, most of the efforts to develop relationships across community lines will require determined initiative by individuals who understand their importance, who are aware of the potential difficulties, and who are committed to their success. (Broome, 2005, pp. 102-103)

The Field of Tourism. Small countries and in particular small islands are more dependent on tourism and trade than larger ones, since their economies are based on only a few sectors (Katircioglu, 2009, p. 2741). Given the geographic location of the island of Cyprus, tourism is an important sector of the economy for both the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot community (Gunsoy & Hannam, 2012, p. 309). Tourism is the main source of the Greek Cypriot economy and is an important growth sector in the Turkish Cypriot north (Şafakli, 2003, pp. 72-73). The tourism industry significantly contributed to the transformation of the Republic of Cyprus from a poor society based on agriculture to a prosperous EU member state. Tourism accounts directly for 13 to 15% percent of the total GDP of the south and indirectly for at least another 20% through ancillary industries, according to the Cyprus Tourism Organisation. The tourism sector is less developed in the Turkish Cypriot community like its overall economy but still constitutes a key sector. Hotels and restaurants count for 4% percent of north’s GDP. Turkish Cypriot statistics show that over 650,000

³⁰ In 2008 €185 million were in favour of the Turkish Cypriots and € 126 million to the benefit of the Greek Cypriots and in 2009 €191.9 million benefited the Turkish Cypriots and €109 million the Greek Cypriots

people visited the north in 2005³¹ (Schlicher, 2006). Therefore, given the mono-communal success in the field, tourism is another parameter that could be highly exploited by businesspersons on both the north and the south. Research by Musyck et al (2010, p. 216) shows that tourism professionals in the south identified as their main obstacles the high cost and low frequency of flights and holidays in Cyprus. In addition, low training and high cost of personnel, international competition and environmental degradation were among the answers. Competition from the Turkish Cypriot tourism industry was not among the major obstacles. In the north, isolation was the number one issue followed by expensive and low frequency flights, expensive holidays and low training and high cost of personnel. It is obvious that the problems the two communities face are either the same or supplementary in their solutions. For example, international competition, high flight and vacation costs and personnel issues could be better faced in a joint strategy for tourism. Furthermore, isolation of the north could be overcome in some agreement as well as the issue of environmental degradation in the massive tourism-style south, could be solved through “sustainable” tourist proposals in the unspoiled north.³² An example of a potential “sustainable” tourist initiative is the Famagusta eco-city project (Famagusta Ecocity Project Team; 2015). Bianchi and Stephenson (2014, p. 213) stress the transformative potentials of such projects and note the attempt to create a village tourism experience on both sides of the Green Line and its partial failure.³³ Nevertheless, the unexploited by big hotel chains and agencies north, could also attract Greek Cypriots that “*seek for quiet vacation places far from massive touristic destinations*” (Tsangari, 2013). Beyond concrete obstacles, Greek Cypriot tourism professionals are averse to cooperation with the Turkish Cypriots due to three main perceptual and psychological barriers. Firstly, the political issue of providing legitimacy to the regime in the north. Secondly, the property issue, given the fact that most of the tourist businesses in the north are set on property owned by displaced Greek Cypriots. Lastly, the competitive perception of tourism as a zero-sum game rather than as a resource that could increase tourism island-wide. Former

³¹ The isolation of the north is also evident in tourism with 75% of tourists being from Turkey and 20% from the UK.

³² Gunsoy and Hannam (2012, pp. 317-318) point out the significance of the relation between the perceived identity of Cypriotness and the touristic growth visions. Turkish Cypriots are in a striking disagreement with mainland Turkey settlers regarding the future of touristic development of the Karpaz peninsula. The former want small-scale tourism development and the latter rapid mass tourism development.

³³ The project was partially successful since an eco-village was created in the north (Komi/Buyukkonuk) but the project failed to include a village from the south.

American Ambassador in Cyprus, Ronald Schlicher, in a 2006 confidential report claimed that the Republic of Cyprus is mostly preoccupied with the task to undermine the Turkish Cypriot community's efforts to market itself abroad as a tourist destination:

“The GoC [Government of Cyprus] and [the Cyprus Tourism Organization] CTO have become adept at offering a combination of sticks (threats of legal action) or carrots (financial incentives) to discourage foreign tour operators/travel agents from including Turkish Cypriot destinations in their tour packages or advertising. Most major European tour operators are heavily invested in tourism in the south and have little to gain (and potentially a lot to lose) by getting involved in the less developed north.” (Schlicher, 2006)

Hatay, Mullen & Kalimeri (2008, p. 64) also confirm the attempt of the Greek Cypriot authorities to undermine hotel businesses by issuing blacklists of hotels in the north due to both fair and unfair property cases.

Bicommunal tourist initiatives potentially bear multiple benefits for the Cypriot communities; they can create joint profit ventures that increase cooperation, they may present an integrated tourist experience that could shift external perceptions and self-perceptions from a divided island viewpoint to a new common Cypriot image and they can potentially empower Cypriots through increased contact. As Sonmez & Apostolopoulos (2000, p. 36) point out, *“contact between foreign visitors and hosts of diverse and even conflicting groups may provide opportunities in which perceived notions and stereotypes are broken down and ultimately replaced with mutually positive perceptions of one another.”*

According to the 2009 research findings of Webster et al (2009, p. 1485) there is clear evidence that Greek Cypriot hotel managers were, at that time, not willing to cooperate with their Turkish Cypriot counterparts while on the other hand, Greek Cypriot tour operators and tourist agencies were willing to collaborate with the other side. Data from the same research show that, at that point, only a 11% of tourism professionals were currently cooperating across the Green Line (Table 21) and a 19% was willing to cooperate for such a venture (Table 22).

Table 21: Tourist Cooperation

Currently cooperating on joint tourism activities

	Frequency	%	Valid %
Valid			
No	81	89.0	89.0
Yes	10	11.0	11.0
Total	91	100.0	100.0

Republication from “Working on the Other Side. Cooperative Tour Organizers and Uncooperative Hoteliers: Evidence from Greek Cypriot Tourism Professionals” by Webster C. et al (2009, p. 1494)

Table 22: Willingness for Tourist Cooperation

Willingness to cooperate on joint tourism activities

	Frequency	%	Valid %
Valid			
No	69	75.8	78.4
Yes	19	20.9	21.6
Total	88	96.7	100.0
Missing	3	3.3	
Total	91	100.0	

Republication from “Working on the Other Side. Cooperative Tour Organizers and Uncooperative Hoteliers: Evidence from Greek Cypriot Tourism Professionals” by Webster C. et al (2009, p. 1494)

Data presented by Musyck et al (2010, pp. 217-218) on the existing divided status of the island and its impact on the tourism industry, the majority of the Greek Cypriots regarded that it will be damaging for both the communities and a considerable percentage believed that the Turkish Cypriots will profit more than themselves in the future (Table 23). In the north, respondents largely thought that the continuation of the current situation would benefit the Greek Cypriots and harm the Turkish Cypriots (74.3%) followed by a significant 25.7% that believed that it would harm both the communities (Table 24). As for the opportunities for bicomunal cooperation, just over 20% of the Greek Cypriots believed in it, while a 39% of the Turkish Cypriots had faith in such a possibility. Possible cooperation was perceived in various activities such as joint marketing, joint tourism fairs’ participation and reciprocal visits.

Table 23: Perception on Continuation of the Current Situation in Cyprus (Greek Cypriots)

Impact of the continuation of the existing situation (south).		
Likely impact	Frequency	Percentage
Win-win for both sides	11	12
Win for GCs and loss for TCs	7	7.6
Win for TCs and loss for GCs	25	27.2
Loss for TCs and loss for GCs	41	44.6
N/A	8	8.7
Total	92	100.0

GC, Greek Cypriots; TC, Turkish Cypriots.

Republication from Divided or reunited? Prospects for the Cyprus tourism industry by Musyck B. et al (2010, p. 218)

Table 24: Perception on Continuation of the Current Situation in Cyprus (Turkish Cypriots)

Impact of the continuation of the existing situation (north).		
Likely impact	Frequency	Percentage
Win for GCs and loss for TCs	52	74.3
Loss for GCs and loss for TCs	18	25.7
Win for TCs and loss for GCs	0	0
Win-win for both sides	0	0
Total	70	100.0

Republication from “Divided or reunited? Prospects for the Cyprus tourism industry” by Musyck B. et al (2010, p. 218)

A vast majority in the south (79.3%) and almost all respondents in the north (98.6%) believe that, in the case of a possible settlement, the outcome will be a win-win situation. The Turkish Cypriot optimistic answers may be partially based on the fact that the north has significantly benefited by the opening of the Green Line in terms of tourism by using as an entrance point Larnaca International Airport and crossing to the north (Table 25).

Table 25: Estimated Expenditure across the Green Line 2003-2009 (Tourism)

ECONOMIC INTERDEPEDNENCE: ESTIMATED EXPENDITURE ACROSS GREEN LINE BY YEAR (€mIn)							
BENEFITS TO TCC	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
MOVEMENT							
Tourists	n.a.	36.4	44.8	36.0	32.5	43.1	45.6

Republication from “Economic Interdependence: Assessment of Current Economic Interdependence between the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot Communities and Recommendations for Reinforced Economic Convergence” (2011, p. 14)

A 10.9% of the Greek Cypriots predicted that a future settlement would lead to profit for the Turkish Cypriots and loss for the Greek Cypriots (Table 26). As Jacobson et al (2015, p. 29) accurately point out referring to the future settlement opportunities, *“the long-term successful outcome for a community’s tourism policy would depend on its determination to implement a long-term development policy and on its ability to avoid the temptation of short-term opportunistic practices.”*

Table 26: Impact of a Settlement

The impact of a settlement (south).		
Likely impact	Frequency	Percentage
Win–win for both sides	73	79.3
Win for GCs and loss for TCs	0	0
Win for TCs and loss for GCs	10	10.9
Loss for TCs and loss for GCs	3	3.3
N/A	6	6.4
Total	92	100.0

The impact of a settlement (north).		
Likely impact	Frequency	Percentage
Win–win for both sides	69	98.6
Win for TCs and loss for GCs	1	1.4
Win for GCs and loss for TCs	0	0
Lose–lose for both sides	0	0
Total	70	100.0

Republication from “Divided or reunited? Prospects for the Cyprus tourism industry” by Musyck B. et al (2010, p. 219)

Furthermore, according to Webster et al (2009, p. 1495) research the Contact Hypothesis was tested in the everyday professional life by investigating Greek Cypriot businesses that reported having Turkish Cypriots on their staff. The data did not confirm this hypothesis, since those currently having Turkish Cypriot employees were less willing to cooperate with tourist businesspersons from the other community in the future. In this case, the data not only suggest that contact does not breed cooperation but even more, they indicate the opposite direction. Several explanations are given for this tendency: Greek Cypriot companies that employ Turkish Cypriots may have developed a predominantly boss-worker relationship, which has fostered a spirit of contempt for the “other”. In addition, the timing of the research may record a negative momentum for bicomunal cooperation. Alternatively, it may simply be that Greek Cypriot entrepreneurs hire Turkish Cypriot staff because they are the cheapest legal and

qualified source of labour, indicating that they were employed because of economic necessity rather than ideological preference and no such preference was, in the meantime, cultivated. Contrarily, the Contact Hypothesis seems to be more relevant in the case of businesses in Nicosia that are more willing to cooperate across the Green Line than businesses in other parts of the country. It may be that Nicosia is qualitatively different from the rest of the country (landlocked, cosmopolitan and divided) making residents more willing to interact across the ethnic and political divide. Nicosia has also traditionally been the hosting place of many bicomunal projects and events. What is more, this greater willingness among the Greek Cypriot tourism professionals of Nicosia to collaborate with their counterparts in the north may exist due to proximity and increased interaction with Turkish Cypriots. Again, a pragmatic approach would take into account the greater possibility of commercial exploitation of cross-Green Line activity in Nicosia than elsewhere in the island (Webster, Musyck, Orphanides, & Jacobson, 2009, pp. 1495, 1498, 1499).

Among tourism professionals, hoteliers do not cooperate and are the less willing to cooperate with the Turkish Cypriots than the other businesspersons are. The negative reaction that differentiates them from tourism companies seems to be property ownership, which is a hot issue in Cyprus. Hoteliers profit from selling bed-nights in a physical location, in contrast to travel agencies that make revenue from providing tourist services. Due to this fact, they are likely to have responded in a defensive way since many of them may view their competitors on the north as making profit from stolen property taken from the Greek Cypriots after the 1974 Turkish army invasion, with even some of them being dispossessed owners themselves. A more pragmatic and business-centred explanation might be that selling hotel bed-nights is a zero-sum game (Webster, Musyck, Orphanides, & Jacobson, 2009, pp. 1495, 1499).

Several travel agents and tour operators from the two communities have cooperated to provide day trips to Kyrenia, Famagusta and north Nicosia from tourist hotels in the south. During high season, around 2,000 tourists a week participated in these excursions. In addition, some Turkish Cypriot travel agents cooperated with Greek Cypriot bus companies to transport visitors from the Larnaca airport³⁴ to hotels in the north. Some Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot travel agents have succeeded in

³⁴ Larnaca International Airport is the main gateway to Cyprus since the Ercan International Airport in the north does not receive direct flights

organising package tours that stay overnight in both communities³⁵. However, professionals involved in such projects claim that the profit made was not worth the time and effort required (Schlicher, 2006).

The case of the tour operator AEOLOS³⁶ is an interesting example of the benefits a cross-border business venture could offer and the constraints the current political situation poses to businesspersons. AEOLOS was the first company from the south that organised and realised excursions on a regular basis to the north soon after the opening of Green Line crossings. The company operates about 20–30 buses crossing the Green Line from the south to Kyrenia, Famagusta and northern Nicosia every week when other companies together account for no more than 6 coaches per week. The fact that the Green-Line regulation restricts visitors coming from Turkey to cross to the south, there are no excursions organised from the north to the south because the majority of tourists enter the north from Turkey. AEOLOS was planning to develop its products by including bed-nights in the north but liability issues did not let them realise it. Issues of safety, legality and cost-effectiveness³⁷ rather than a lack of commercial interest kept AEOLOS from expanding its business to Northern Cyprus. In addition, excursions to Kyrenia and Famagusta have reached a stage of product maturity and are no longer growing. The lack of initial enthusiasm and novelty, the change in fashion, the decreased media interest, the change in demand and the decline of tourism business in the south have all affected the tourist business.

Harvard-trained economist and former officer at the Cypriot Planning Bureau Costas Apostolides may argue that Varosha in Famagusta is one of the best beaches in Mediterranean³⁸“and that it could by itself rejuvenate the entire island’s economy (Gorvett, 2015), but under the current circumstances such a touristic planning is a distant reality. The AEOLOS operator is now offering the “Nicosia Mix ’n Match” excursion (10–20 buses per week depending on the season), which brings tourists to the capital and guides them in a walk on both sides of the dividing line through the Ledra street checkpoint. This allows tourists to get a “feel” for the two sides and gain a unique

³⁵ Including a package tour that follows the steps of St. Peter during his stay on Cyprus

³⁶ AEOLOS is owned by the Greek Cypriot Frangoudi & Stephanou investor’s group and is part of the British TUI Travel Plc company (AEOLOS, 2018). The Cyprus branch accounts for 25% of the island’s market of incoming tourists (over half a million tourists per year).

³⁷ The excursion cost is increased because official regulation on both sides of the Green Line dictates that each coach be accompanied by an accredited local tour guide which means that every coach always carries two official guides, at least while operating in the northern part of the island.

³⁸ Gorvett in his New York Times article records Apostolides’ quote that “*Varosha is like Copacabana*”

experience of the diversity that Cyprus can offer (Webster, Musyck, Orphanides, & Jacobson, 2009, pp. 1500-1502). Lisle (as cited in Webster, Musyck, Orphanides, & Jacobson, 2009, p. 1501), notes that in the context of the Ledra Street opening,

“Political tourism is significant because it forces divided societies to confront the difficult issue of “where” and “how” to represent their dissonant heritage in a way that satisfies both local communities and international visitors. This process—as well as political tourism’s participation in it—is crucial to any context of peace and reconciliation.”

In September 2015, the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities in Deryneia and Famagusta started creating the RENEWAL project for tourism development that can link the greater Famagusta region and provide bicomunal business opportunities. Local businesses on both sides of the Green Line are joining to create tourist excursions, which include Deryneia, Famagusta and the surroundings, in order to attract foreign visitors and domestic tourists. RENEWAL provides business mentoring, trainings and workshops to artisans, CSOs, small businesses, local stakeholders, guides and tour operators, in order to support the development process (UN, 2015).

Another important business activity is the casino services offered in the Pyla village³⁹. According to the Turkish Cypriot newspaper Afrika cited in Cyprus Mail, in Pyla a bicomunal casino has been set up in the end of 2013, jointly operated by Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots and attracting mainly Greek Cypriot customers (Evrupidou, 2014).

One may argue, that pioneering entrepreneurs, not only are not constrained by political problems when it comes to seizing commercial opportunities, but they even promote rapprochement through collaboration by pursuing their commercial interests. Musyck et al (2010, p. 215) in their research on tourism in Cyprus, presuppose that foreign tourists, that are rational decision-makers and carefully choose where to spend their holidays, would prefer a united rather than a divided destination. The example of the cost gap between the entrance fees of museum and archaeological sites where in the

³⁹ Pyla, in the Cypriot district of Larnaca is one of four mixed villages located within the United Nations Buffer Zone.

north are huge compared to the south, confirms the existence of a divided touristic product (Maric, 2009, p. 18).⁴⁰

Realistically, it seems that unless the political situation changes, not much may change in the tourist business. In specific, in the northern part, the impediments to touristic growth are not linked to economic or commercial issues but are dependent on a series of institutional and legal factors. For tourism to expand, issues of liability, safety, hygiene, legality and accountability need to be addressed (Webster, Musyck, Orphanides, & Jacobson, 2009, pp. 1501-1502). The Schlicher report (2006) indicates that flashy initiatives generally fail to generate results, while more modest and quiet initiatives prove more successful over time.

Intra-Island Trade and Spending on the Other Side.

Trade. Admittedly, the Green Line constitutes a peculiarity for the EU free movement reality with a special regulation distinguishing areas over which the Republic of Cyprus exercises effective control and areas where the *acquis communautaire* is suspended. Although, the opening of crossings and the European Union's Green Line Regulation⁴¹ have facilitated economic activity, trade in goods across the Green Line is limited in practice since numerous legal, political and psychological barriers prevail. Concerning legal barriers, the Intra-Island Trade in Cyprus Report shows that 40.45% of traders had faced problems with Green Line trade. However, among those who felt they were sufficiently informed, only 34.8% had faced problems. This might imply that either information of Green Line Trade Regulation is not well disseminated, or traders lack the bureaucratic skills and enterprising mood to overcome obstacles. However, the restrictive framework of conduct, in the legal, political and psychological sense, may be considered to be reflected in the fact that the majority of both Greek Cypriots (82%) and Turkish Cypriots (81%) use cash for transactions. (Hatay, Mullen, & Kalimeri, 2008, p. 39)

However, despite the given difficulties, trade across the divide demonstrates an upward trend: sales of goods have risen from under € 475,000 in 2004 to € 4.9 million in 2007, while according to estimations total transactions across the Green Line

⁴⁰ Access to museums and archeological sites in the south never exceeds € 2.50 while in the north the average museum fee is from 5 to 12 YTL (€ 1.64 to 3.94).

⁴¹ The full text of the European Union's Green Line Regulation is available here: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2004:0466:FIN:EN:PDF>

including shopping and casino spending reached € 31.7 million in 2007 (Hatay, Mullen, & Kalimeri, 2008, p. 1). According to Gokcekus et al (2012, p. 864), since the opening, trade has grown at an average annual rate of 35.9%.

For those who had conducted trade with the other community, the number of customers is small. The majority of both Greek Cypriots (67%) and Turkish Cypriots (64%) have three customers from the other community or less. For more than 70% of each community, intra-island trade accounts for less than 5% of total trade (Hatay, Mullen, & Kalimeri, 2008, p. 39). As Kanol notes (2011, p. 166), European Commission reports show that the amount of intra-trade remains marginal, mainly due to the refusal of Greek Cypriots to buy Turkish Cypriot products and likewise intra-trade continues to decrease along with crossings. In 2007, intra-island trade in goods equalled only 0.1% of Greek Cypriot and 7% of Turkish Cypriot trade with the rest of the world. (Hatay, Mullen, & Kalimeri, 2008, p. 3). Like in the case of other forms of economic and business cooperation, there exist serious psychological barriers in both communities. Hatay, Mullen & Kalimeri, (2008, pp. 1-2) underline the fact that different psychological barriers constraint people in both communities:

“The main psychological approach among Greek Cypriots was denial. The main psychological approach among Turkish Cypriots was a fear of being treated as inferior. The interaction of these psychological trends leads to a strong resistance to trade among Greek Cypriots and a strong resentment about trading among Turkish Cypriots.”

Turkish Cypriot stakeholders report that although the Green Line Regulation that sets the rules for trading Turkish Cypriot products over the Green Line is officially in effect, the psychological barrier discourages the Greek Cypriots to promote and sell the products of the north. Back in 2013, the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce Vice President Salahi Serakıncı was stating in an interview that there are no Turkish Cypriot products on the Greek Cypriot shelves while Greek Cypriot newspapers refuse to print Turkish Cypriot ads promoting goods (Arslan, 2013).

However, data by the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce show that there was a significant and steady rise in the sales of products from the north to the south of the island in the 2004-2007 period (Table 27).

Table 27: Green Line Sales from North to South

Green line sales north to south (CYP)	2004* Year	2005 Year	2006 Year	2007 Year	Aug 04 to Dec-07
Aluminium/PVC products	7,765	49,268	149,183	59,408	265,624
Building stone/articles of stone	22,121	121,289	164,833	335,779	644,022
Ceramic products/refractory goods	0	0	0	10,700	10,700
Charcoal	1,796	1,794	700	0	4,290
Chemical products	15,880	26,618	55,050	156,388	253,936
Clothing	9,114	16,498	3,428	5,898	34,938
Earth/stone	13,207	3,614	29,207	2,946	48,974
Electrical products	0	27,012	141,333	1,500	169,845
Electronic equipment	0	8,198	0	0	8,198
Food/drink	405	1,622	1,324	0	3,351
Fruit	4,310	0	0	0	4,310
Glass and glassware	0	0	0	7,549	7,549
Handicraft products	3,786	13,837	29,446	21,505	68,574
Industrial kitchen equipment	0	0	9,750	0	9,750
Iron/steel	4,755	23,469	3,035	13,354	44,613
Paper products	43,417	138,319	81,054	92,621	355,412
Plastering machine and material	0	0	1,000	5,430	6,430
Plastic products	3,082	102,049	194,991	224,753	524,874
Pre-fabricated buildings	0	35,966	0	23,000	58,966
Printed books/newspapers	0	6,860	0	0	6,860
Raw metal	16,432	55,508	148,633	318,122	538,695
Saddlery and harness	0	1,342	357	1,431	3,130
Sanitation products	0	0	0	5,499	5,499
Textiles	0	0	0	0	0
Vegetables	103,003	165,293	545,414	694,253	1,507,964
Water storage/heating	0	1,300	2,808	1,597	5,705
Wooden products/furniture	26,486	179,575	327,920	433,623	967,604
Total	275,559	979,432	1,889,465	2,414,576	5,559,033
% change	n/a	255.4	92.9	27.8	n/a

Republication from “Intra-island Trade in Cyprus: Obstacles, Oppositions and Psychological Barriers” by Hatay M. et al (2008, p. 15)

The importance of the role of the Chambers of Commerce is manifest in conducting bicomunal trade. While, the vast majority of Turkish Cypriots (95.5%) and a great majority of Greek Cypriots (76%) reached their buyers through personal contact or through the initiative of the buyer, traders of both communities rely on the Chambers of Commerce for information (76% of Turkish Cypriots and 53% of Greek Cypriots). (Hatay, Mullen, & Kalimeri, 2008, p. 39).

According to Yorucu et al (2010, p. 1759) north-to-south trade through the Green Line Regulation demonstrated a great increase from 2007 to 2008 and a significant amount of around € 5million in the 10 months of 2009 (Table 28).

Table 28: Green Line Trade from North to South

Trade Through GLR			
From North Cyprus to South Cyprus	2007	2008	2009 ^a
Exports (EURO)	2,414,575	7,170,816	5,323,081

^aThe figures cover the period from 1 January 2009 to 31 October 2009.

Source: Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce (2009).

Republication from “Cross-Border Trade Liberalization: The Case of Lokmaci/Ledra Gate in Divided Nicosia, Cyprus” by Yorucu V., Ozay M., Resmiye A., & Ulucay P. (2010, p. 1759)

As for the south-to-north sales, there was an increase from 2005 to 2006 and a drop from 2006 to 2007 (Table 29).

Table 29: Green Line Sales from South to North

Green line sales south to north	2005 Year	2006 Year	2007 Year	May 05 to Dec 2007 ^a
Total in CYP	146,055	597,011	415,075	1,158,141
Total in EUR	253,216	1,035,814	712,435	2,001,644
Memorandum item				
Domestically produced exports from south to rest of world (CYP m)	238	261	296	795
Green Line sales as % of domestic exports	0.06	0.23	0.14	0.14

Source: Cyprus Chamber of Commerce and Industry (KEVE).

Republication from “Intra-island Trade in Cyprus: Obstacles, Oppositions and Psychological Barriers” by Hatay M. et al (2008, p. 19)

The total number of products traded from the south to the north in the May 2004 to December 2007 period was CYP 1.166.140 (€ 1.987.638) (Table 30).

Table 30: Trade from South to North

Products traded south to north (CYP)	Total May 2004 to Dec 2007
Building materials	475,048
Machinery	246,224
Animal fodder	166,980
Agricultural products	78,465
Wines and spirits	75,568
Industrial products	34,178
Toiletries/cosmetics	33,211
Foodstuffs	17,346
Plastic products	13,172
Newspapers	12,833
Furniture	7,979
Manufactured products	3,979
Charcoal	1,157
Total	1,166,140

Source: Cyprus Chamber of Commerce and Industry (KEVE).


Republication from “Intra-island Trade in Cyprus: Obstacles, Oppositions and Psychological Barriers” by Hatay M. et al (2008, p. 20)

Apostolides, Apostolides & Gryay (2012, pp. 432, 433) confirm that the Green Line trade from the Turkish Cypriot to the Greek Cypriot community follows a growing trend (from €1.6 million in 2005 rose to €6 million in 2009) while trade following the opposite direction remained at very low levels, growing from €0.2 to €0.8 million respectively. In both communities, the wholesale and retail sales along with hotel and restaurant industries benefited the most in 2009.⁴² As shown in the graph below, in 2009 there was a decline in trade for both products moving from north to south and vice versa (Figure 82). According to Yorucu et al (2010, p. 1759) Green Line trade in 2008, demonstrated a three-fold growth rising to € 7,170,816 from € 2,414,575 in 2007 and during the 10 months of 2009, the trade volume was € 5,323,081. The Economic Interdependence in Cyprus Report (2011, p. 11) indicates that Turkish Cypriot trade to the south has increased from August 2004 by an average of 37% per year. In 2009, the Greek Cypriot market was the second largest trade market with 12% of all outgoing trade. In 2010, Green Line trade to the south remained stable (around € 6million). On

⁴² According to the Economic Interdependence in Cyprus Report (2011, p. 12), benefits for the Turkish Cypriot wholesale/retail coming from the south sector were € 63 million.

the contrary, Greek Cypriot sales to the north have progressed less due to VAT regulations. In 2010, sales to the north increased by 34% (over € 1 million).

Figure 82: Development of Green Line Trade 2004-2009



Republication from “Economic Interdependence: Assessment of Current Economic Interdependence between the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot Communities and Recommendations for Reinforced Economic Convergence” (2011, p. 12)

Another important parameter is smuggling. While smuggling is extremely difficult to measure, unofficial reports suggest that the value of smuggled goods across the Green Line could be from double to four times the value of the recorded trade (Hatay, Mullen, & Kalimeri, 2008, p. 20).⁴³

Beyond trade of goods, there is also trade of utilities. Electricity is a sector where there is a positive precedent of trade as mentioned above. There has been excellent cooperation between the two communities in this field, despite political objections. Transaction began in 2006 when a power station in the north was damaged by an accident, and the Turkish Cypriot community requested electricity from the Greek Cypriots. This was provided through a procedure that surpassed political recognition


⁴³ The key products reportedly traded are honey and fish (banned until recently under the Green Line regulation), paper, dairy products and live animals. Items reportedly smuggled from south to north, include spare car parts, machinery and electronic parts. It is also alleged by some that a substantial amount of the frozen seafood and specialty items offered in restaurants in the north are smuggled from the south.

issues. The Florakis Base incident that reduced the Greek Cypriot capacity for electricity supply by 50%, based on the 2006 agreement, has established a trade channel built by the private sector and, in this case, officially backed by the Green Line regulation, which defines electricity as a tradable good. Greek Cypriots have purchased over €31 million from July 2011 and March 2012 (Apostolides, Apostolides, & Güryay, 2012, p. 434) (Figure 83). During this time, a system for channelling funds and for the physical reconnection of the island-wide electricity grid was created. Abboud et al (2012, p. 449), claim that such crises may lead to cooperative governance of shared resources that contribute to the resolution of conflictual conditions.

Figure 83: Development of Green Line Electricity Trade 2011-2012

Trade in Electricity across the divide

Source: EDGE/USAID September 2012 Green Line trade analysis¹²



Republication from “Citizen Peacemaking in Cyprus: The Story of Co-operation and Trust across the Green Line” by Louise C. & Morgan T. (2013, p. 19)

As reported in Arslan (2013), Kanol (2011, p. 167) and Apostolides, Apostolides & Güryay (2012, p. 432) the lack of rapid development of Green Line trade arises from the regulations for intra-island trade, which impose limitations. Psychological obstacles along with several bureaucratic impediments and intra-island anomalies worsen the situation in many instances. the International Crisis Group (2009, p. 27) citing a European official, reported Greek Cypriot customs delays that caused fish to perish. Greek Cypriot media and business broadcasted an attack on a potato merchant from the north who tried to export through Greek Cypriot channels and a case of Greek Cypriot demands for Turkish Cypriot tomatoes and cucumbers to be labelled as coming from areas of the north. Turkish Cypriot products also lack marketing since,

only a few Greek Cypriot media accept to air or publish advertisements for Turkish Cypriot products and services (Gokcekus, Henson, Nottebaum, & Wanis-St John, 2012, p. 869). Kanol (2011, p. 166) also points out that Greek Cypriots refuse to buy Turkish Cypriot goods. Research data do not confirm Kanol's claim. When asked if Green Line trade was inappropriate because there was not yet a solution to the Cyprus problem the majority on both sides offered a negative answer. What is more, the percentage of Turkish Cypriots who thought it was inappropriate (41.6%) was significantly higher than that of the Greek Cypriots (28%). Traders that have not engaged in bicomunal trade have not even attempted to do so (62% of Turkish Cypriots and 77% of Greek Cypriots). When asked why, Greek Cypriots answered there were not enough information on procedural and legal issues, and that they believed that the Turkish Cypriot authorities held a negative attitude to Green Line trade. Only a 10% stated that they did not want to trade with Turkish Cypriots. Most of the Turkish Cypriots answered that they did not trade mainly due to complicated procedures and their belief they do not have anything they could sell in the south. When asked if they believe their own authorities support Green Line trade, the majority of the Greek Cypriots expressed mixed feelings, 25% disagreed and 34% were neutral on the matter. Among those who had traded across the Green Line, 58% of Greek Cypriots strongly agreed that they were supported by their own authorities and 18% somewhat agreed. A majority of 50.6% Turkish Cypriots felt their own authorities supported Green Line trade in words but not in practice. Among those who had actually traded, the figure was only slightly higher at 51.7%. 69% of all respondents and 71.9% of those who had traded from the Turkish Cypriot community thought that the Greek Cypriot leadership was opposed to Green Line trade. Respectively, in the south, 53% of all respondents but only 37% of those who had actually traded thought the leadership of the other community did not support trade (Hatay, Mullen, & Kalimeri, 2008, pp. 39-40).

What is more, several restrictions in trade prohibit categories of products (citrus fruit, dairies and live animals) to reach the other side and in addition, there are significant transportation costs and delays that impede trade conduct (Gokcekus, Henson, Nottebaum, & Wanis-St John, 2012, p. 867). An important finding is that each community faces a difficulty to locate the consumption needs of the other side. Less than half of Turkish Cypriots interviewed by Hatay, Mullen and Kalimeri (2008, p. 40) knew what products they might sell or buy from the other community. More than half of Greek Cypriots said they were aware of what the other community might sell to the

south but just under a half knew what Greek Cypriot products there might be demand for. Nevertheless, there is a great interest in Green Line trade by companies that have not been engaged to such activities in the past and an interest in cooperation between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot firms (Economic Interdependence in Cyprus, 2011, p. 11). In addition, at least in the north, 48.9% of the Turkish Cypriots who had ever traded across the divide continue to do so. In total, an overwhelming majority of those who had traded were supportive of further measures to facilitate trade.⁴⁴

While Turkish Cypriots seek a way to boost the problematic economy of the north through the Green Line, Greek Cypriot attitudes on Green Line trade seem to be significantly negative. For the Turkish Cypriot community, Green Line Trade seems to be a vital trade corridor. In the 2004-2009 period, export revenues from goods crossing the Green Line constituted 65% of the total export revenues of the northern Cypriot community to the rest of the world. In the south, an 81% of the Greek Cypriots oppose direct trade or commercial flights between TCs and the EU, indicating further mistrust towards Turkish Cypriot products and traders (Gokcekus, Henson, Nottebaum, & Wanis-St John, 2012, pp. 867, 869, 870).

The Republic of Cyprus government, in an attempt to promote intra-island trade, announced in May 2007 the launching of a programme in which it would subsidize joint ventures between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots with € 30 million, run by the Ministry of Finance. The call officially ended at the end of September 2008, by which time the ministry had received four applications. The call was extended until the end of the year since there were another five to six applications and if the € 30 million had not been spent by the end of the year, it could be extended into 2009 (Hatay, Mullen, & Kalimeri, 2008, p. 14). The consecutive extensions of the call and the limited number of applications show the limited successfulness of the Cypriot state to boost bicomunal entrepreneurship and trade. What is for sure is the fact that experts and stakeholders pinpoint a sizable gap between potential and actual volumes of trade. Gokcekus et al (2012, p. 863) note that actual trade has only reached around 10% of its

⁴⁴ The measures respondents said would be most important were: a) Information on interested companies to do business with (78% of Turkish Cypriots; 71% of Greek Cypriots), b) A strong signal from the authorities in support of Green Line trade (74% of Turkish Cypriots; 66% of Greek Cypriots), c) Expansion of the range of products that can be traded (66% of Turkish Cypriots; 54% of Greek Cypriots), d) Integrated transport/logistics services for transport and paperwork (76% of Turkish Cypriots; 59% of Greek Cypriots) and e) For Greek Cypriots: removal of double taxation and clearer tax rules (90%) (Hatay, Mullen, & Kalimeri, 2008, p. 41)

potential. Legal constraints account for 35% of the missing trade, extra transportation costs for about 5%, and unmeasurable and social-psychological barriers for a significant amount of between 48% and 60%, depending on the year.


There is significant evidence that both communities see trade as a zero-sum game. This fact impedes the growth of intercommunal trade and trade cooperation. This mentality derives from the respective zero-sum perception of the Cyprus Issue in total and while important steps have been made, there is a long distance to be covered for trade activity to reach a substantial part of its potential and thus facilitate conflict transformation.

Spending on the Other Side. Trade, in the strict sense of the term, is just a small part of what could be regarded as activities that build economic interdependence. However, an important aspect of the economic interdependence is the direct spending of the members of each community on the other side of the divide. Movement across the Green Line, along with the Green Line Regulations activation since 2003, have both resulted in the growth of consumer expenditure beyond the increase in trade and Turkish Cypriot employment (Guryay & Apostolides, 2012). Such spending seems to be more important in immediate terms of creating contacts with the “other”. There are mutual benefits from movement across the Green Line. Beyond spending in shopping for goods and services, both communities benefit from using car insurance. Turkish Cypriots earn from tourists and EU citizens that arrive to the south and cross to the north and, as mentioned before, from wages and pensions from the Greek Cypriot economy as well as from public health services. Correspondingly, the Greek Cypriots benefit from the demand of the Turkish Cypriots for private education in the south (Apostolides, Apostolides, & Guryay, 2012, p. 433).

The average expenditure of tourists that crossed from the south to the north in 2007 was estimated at €162 per visit on average (Apostolides, Apostolides, & Guryay, 2012, p. 432). In the period from April 2008 to March 2009, the average spending per tourist in north Nicosia was € 75.1 with Greek Cypriots having the highest amount of spending with € 131.1 (Yorucu, Ozay, Resmiye, & Ulucay, 2010, p. 1757) (Figure 84). In late 2009, Greek Cypriots going to the north were spending in average € 50 per visit (Apostolides, Apostolides, & Guryay, 2012, p. 433).

Figure 84: Spending in North Nicosia

Total amount of spending (€) in the Walled City of North Nicosia



Average spending per tourist: €75.1

Republication from “Cross-Border Trade Liberalization: The Case of Lokmaci/Ledra Gate in Divided Nicosia, Cyprus” by Yorucu V. et al (2010, p. 1758).

Turkish Cypriots crossing the Green Line in late 2009 spent on average € 70 per person, per visit (Apostolides, Apostolides, & Güray, 2012, p. 432). In total, benefits in the north from Greek Cypriots’ spending followed an augmentative trend from 2003 to 2006 with a slight decline in 2007 and 2008 and signs of recovery in 2009. As for benefits of Greek Cypriots by Turkish Cypriot expenditure, there was a steady increase from 2003 to 2008 and a decrease in 2009 (Table 31).

Table 31: Estimated Green Line Expenditure 2003-2009

ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE: ESTIMATED EXPENDITURE ACROSS GREEN LINE BY YEAR (€mIn)							
BENEFITS TO TCC	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
MOVEMENT							
GCS	18.9	31.2	47.9	36.3	28.5	37.1	39.4
TOTAL	52.4	124.1	156.6	137.9	151.5	184.8	191.9
BENEFITS TO GCC	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
MOVEMENT							
TCs	17.3	36.5	47.1	56.5	97.7	120.6	102.4
TOTAL	17.9	38.6	49.6	60.1	101.3	126.2	109.0

Republication from “Economic Interdependence: Assessment of Current Economic Interdependence between the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot Communities and Recommendations for Reinforced Economic Convergence” (2011, p. 14)

As a result, from the time of the opening of the Green Line, the retail market in the south has received a significant boost at a time of weak Greek Cypriot demand,

while Turkish Cypriot consumers benefited from lower prices that arise in both sides on the Green Line due to the increased competition. (Apostolides, Apostolides, & Güryay, 2012, p. 433)

The opening of the Ledra/Lokmaci crossing in Nicosia in April 2008, beyond the objective benefits it bears for the enterprises of the historic centre of Nicosia, is a highly symbolic event since Ledra street had been the main shopping location of the capital and had been divided since the 1960s (Webster, Musyck, Orphanides, & Jacobson, 2009, p. 1501). According to Evripidou (2009) the opening of the Ledra Street has led to a win-win situation with more Cypriots crossing to the other side and more business for shopkeepers on both sides. Yorucu et al (2010, p. 1752) claim that the opening of the crossing was directly related to the succession of the anti-settlement Greek Cypriot President Tassos Papadopoulos by the pro-settlement Dimitris Christofias. The opening of the crossing along with micro-level trade liberalisation and civil society exchange projects operating as a bottom-up dynamic, bridging the two communities across the Nicosia divide, fostered the optimistic political climate cultivated by Christofias and the Turkish Cypriot leader Derviş Eroğlu by that time. Trade liberalisation revitalised the main shopping avenue of the Ledra Street in the Greek sector of the Walled City and the Lokmaci/Arasta commercial district in the Turkish part, extending all the way to the Kyrenia Avenue in the heart of old Nicosia. A public opinion survey conducted at the time of the opening, showed that nearly 60% of Greek Cypriot consumers believed that the opening had a positive impact on their lives and on Cyprus in general, while around 20% said it had a neutral impact and another 20% answered it was negative. Turkish Cypriot respondents, showed great support for the opening, with 90% stating it had a positive impact on a personal level, and 82% saw it as a positive impact for Cyprus. The four researchers involved in the research mentioned by Hatay, Mullen and Kalimeri spoke to both consumers and shopkeepers on both sides of the divide as part of their research. Shopkeepers claimed that the opening, overall, led to more business on both sides.⁴⁵ As a result, the majority of shopkeepers on both sides regarded the opening as a positive development for business with both sides benefiting from increased customers and tourists. In addition, more jobs were created in the old town and a process of revitalisation of the area was

⁴⁵ Greek Cypriots were mainly shopping cheap clothing and brand imitation while Turkish Cypriots original international brands and food. Hatay, Mullen and Kalimeri note (2008, p. 39), 78% of the Greek Cypriots trade branded products while only a 33.3% of Turkish Cypriots sell branded products.

initiated. Greek Cypriot shopkeepers were more reluctant on the impact for Cyprus, despite being positive about the business impact of the opening. The immediate impact on bicomunal contact is pictured in the fact that seven out of ten Turkish Cypriots and less than half of the Greek Cypriot shopkeepers, did not hesitate in using the language of the “other” (Evripidou, 2009).

Webster et al (2009, p. 1499) consider very important the “air of normality” created by the comings and goings of Turkish Cypriots across the Green Line. The view of registered cars seen everywhere in Nicosia, and the hearing of Turkish Cypriot in shops and other retail establishments around the capital by the large number of Turkish Cypriot consumers who visit the Nicosia hypermarkets, furniture centres, toy stores and shopping malls, on a regular basis.

Concluding Remarks on Trade. In the case of Cyprus, economic interaction on various sectors could favour resolution in two main ways: 1. by creating economic interdependence and thus leading the communities to a positive entrapment where cooperation leads to significant absolute gains. In this case, people would need from decision-makers to resolve the conflict so that they can unfold their full potentials. This aspect of economic interaction has a bottom-up connotation and, 2. by enhancing and solidifying contact between citizens of the two communities, and in that way making it easier for decision-makers on both communities to “sell” a political agreement. This side of economic interaction is more about cultivating the ground for the application of a top-down solution.

The pragmatism of commerce is indeed a way to approach the issue. As Abboud et al (2012, p. 449) note there is a strong relationship between access to resources and the perpetuation of conflict. Economic transactions and the profit that derives from them can promote non-zero-sum solutions.

However, the psychological barriers for the people are persistent and hard to overcome. On the one hand, in the south, Greek Cypriots face the Cyprus Issue through denial, which is a defence mechanism by which humans protect themselves from threat or perceived threat by blocking knowledge of it from their consciousness. Denial is the distortion of reality in various ways in order to ignore or render the problem perceptually insignificant. In that way, Greek Cypriots continue their lives by acting as if the divide does not exist. In the case of economic interaction, Greek Cypriot behaviour reflects the fear, that any interaction with Turkish Cypriots is not legitimate

and could somehow help in some form of recognition of the “pseudo-state”. (Hatay, Mullen, & Kalimeri, 2008, p. 68).

On the other hand, Turkish Cypriots act driven by the fear of inferiority. Inferiority may refer to population size, isolation from the outside world or economic stagnation. This leads to self-victimisation and denial of the suffering of the Greek Cypriots. In economic transactions Hatay, Mullen and Kalimeri (2008, p. 69) note that Turkish Cypriots often find Green Line trade to be a humiliating experience. Apostolides, Apostolides and Güray (2012, pp. 433-434) point out that psychological constraints restrict business people and consumers from participation in Green Line crossings and trade. These psychological factors are based on perceptions of the modern history of Cyprus and on confusion about the official policy of the leaderships of both communities on Green Line economic interdependence. As mentioned in the introduction as well as throughout the chapter, there are serious concerns in the communities connected to practical issues such as the fear of being overrun by the wealthier community for the Turkish Cypriots or mainland Turkey for the Greek Cypriots. The fear of increased competition can be categorised in-between practical and psychological barriers as a partly real and partly perceived threat, if engaged in intercommunal economic activity.

The most important aspect of economic interdependence in Cyprus, like in the case of civil society interaction, is the opportunity and ability of people to cross the Green Line for recreation, religious visits, visits to a home village or hometown, for personal reasons, employment, or shopping as well as to benefit from employment and services. The majority of economic interdependence benefits derive from Green Line movement of people rather than by official Green Line trade between businesses. According to Apostolides, Apostolides and Güray (2012, p. 432) the visits and spending of individuals across the divide is not captured by Green Line trade statistics⁴⁶ and the increase of movement takes place despite substantial costs of crossing which negatively affects intercommunal purchases. Reduction of costs of movement across the Green Line would solidify and increase economic interdependence of the communities.

⁴⁶ Apostolides, Apostolides and Güray (2012, p. 432) refer to more than three million crossings over the Green Line, when the combined population of Cyprus was just over one million in 2008

Contrary to civil society interaction, which requires investment in intangible social and political profit, economic interaction offers mutual benefits to the interdependent parties. In Cyprus, economic interaction in the form of people's crossings and spending bear two assets for future resolution: 1) they have substantially multiplied in a relatively short period and 2) they are taking place with minimal encouragement. This kind of interaction defies the negative perceptions of each other and the limited progress of the official negotiations. These facts along with the indicators on economic interdependence show that, although the political aspect remained relatively unchanged for more than three decades, from 2003 and beyond, Cyprus has entered a dynamic trajectory in terms of social and economic interaction that could render a settlement easier to negotiate and implement. (Apostolides, Apostolides, & Güray, 2012, pp. 433, 435).

In the present chapter, I examined economic interdependence by grouping the data in two major blocks (economic transactions between the communities, and intra-island trade and spending on the other side), and further categorising these blocks (doing business and working together, mixed entrepreneurial activity, employing and being employed by the other, and tourist activity for the former, and trade activity and spending on the other side for the latter). Through the analysis, I demonstrated that profit through economic cooperation could be a factor influencing the transformation of the Cyprus Issue. I also showed that the present situation in the island poses serious obstacles to individuals and groups that aim at profiting or spending through contact with the "other". This is because current conditions and channels constraint existing activity and prevent more opportunities to occur. On the one hand, economic interdependence data show an increasing trend in all the indicators examined. On the other hand, there is a potential economic benefit for both communities that is not possible for them to take advantage of if there is no political solution in the island. As in many other occasions, political conditions cannot stop entrepreneurial inventiveness and trade pervasiveness. However, we cannot take for granted claims that rational choice rules the human drive to profit, as emotional actions and reactions are prone to the omnipresent behavioural context dictated by culture.

In the following chapter, I examine the data on the third parameter of the thesis, which is activity in the field of culture and sports.

12. Culture and Sports

In this chapter, I study the third parameter of the thesis, which is culture and sports activity. In particular, for the parameter of culture I analyse the data grouped under the categories of 1) culture and bicomunal contact, 2) cultural heritage activities, and 3) visiting heritage sites on the other side. For the parameter of sport, I analyse data in categories indicating influence towards exacerbating stereotypes (recognition and sports, impediments to individual athletes, and Greek Cypriot sports' fans behaviour), and categories indicating influence towards reducing confronting stereotypes (sports bicomunal contact and bicomunal sports activities)

Culture is an extremely abstract term and could cover under its wing almost every activity one can think of. No action or reaction of an individual or a group is devoid from cultural context. In this sense, cultural activities can be vague to define and thus very laborious to study. The present research, considers as cultural activities specific sets of activities that is, intercultural events, cultural heritage activity and visiting heritage sites on the other side. Regarding sports, the activity examined is bicomunal sports events, individual athletes' working on the other side, sports federations and recognition issues and sports fans' political behaviour.

Cultural and Athletic Events.

Culture and Bicomunal Contact. The field of culture is a vast domain that includes knowledge and habits obtained by an individual inside society. Concerning human action, culture affects viewpoints, political behaviour, decision-making and prioritisation. The social habitus, namely the field of self-placement of an individual in the social reality as a result of external inflows, determines individual and group behaviour in the pursuit of perceived self-interest in a way beyond rationality. As Rieber and Kelly maintain (1991, p. 18):

“The agents of socialization – the family, the school, the peer group, and the media – “provide the basic knowledge and the “cognitive maps that allow us to locate, perceive, identify, and label a seemingly infinite number of concrete occurrences.”

In the case of Cyprus, two different cultural realities prevail for each community: 1. a Cypriot and a Greek for the Greek Cypriots and 2. a Cypriot and a Turkish for the Turkish Cypriots. In relation to the Cyprus Problem, for many years the dominant narratives have been the Greek and the Turkish ones, with the Cypriot cultural identity steadily existent in the background with only momentary presence in the foreground. Until 1974, the Greek and Turkish cultural identities were correspondingly, directly linked to the notions of “*enosis*” and “*taksim*”. After the division of the island, the most fervent promoters of the “motherland” identities are the hardliners on each side. In recent years, there are systematic and non-systematic efforts to stress the vital priority of the Cypriot culture, which has been pushed in shadows by the cultural and ethnic identities of the “motherlands”. The experience of post-modernity has demonstrated that, not only the possession of multiple identities is possible, but also it is the dominant reality for individuals and groups, with each of these multiple identities coming to the surface according to the external environment and stimuli. Furthermore, certain theoretical approaches consider hybridity and transculturation as the ongoing condition of all human cultures (Rosaldo, 2005, p. xv) and perceive cultural structure not a perceived point of departure but rather the result of prior hybridisation (Mac Ginty, 2011, pp. 51, 72).

Hadjipavlou (2007, p. 359) points out that interviewees of a bicomunal survey seem to be sceptical about the influence of the ethnic, religious, and cultural differences on the creation and perpetuation of the conflict. Only 28% of Greek Cypriots and 33% of Turkish Cypriots were convinced of the Huntingtonian causal explanation that differences in cultures and civilizations become causes of conflict (Table 32).

Table 32: Bicommunal Ethnic, Religious and Cultural Differences

Contextual Factors		
	<i>Greek Cypriots</i>	<i>Turkish Cypriots</i>
<i>E43.8 The ethnic-religious-cultural differences between Greek and Turkish Cypriots (%)</i>		
Very	28.0	32.5
Somewhat	34.1	31.8
Not very	20.1	14.8
Not at all	13.6	12.7
Don't know	4.1	8.2
Total	100.0	100.0
	N = 1,070	N = 1,039

Republication from “The Cyprus Conflict: Root Causes and Implications for Peacebuilding” by Hadjipavlou M. (2007, p. 359)

This finding challenges the position that Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots cannot live together because they are ethnically different and opposes the notion that cultural differences are inherent and fixed and cannot change, thus judging attempts for pushing forward common culture and change as futile.


In recent years, under domestic political developments and the Europeanisation process, there have been changes of the school curricula on both sides towards a more reconciliatory stance (Hajisoteriou, Neophytou, & Angelides, 2015, p. 121). In specific, the Cypriot educational system adopted changes concerning history textbooks, in an effort to move away from the motherlands’ conflictual national narratives to a more Cypriot-centric approach of a common heritage. This change marks the attempt to shift from the culture of ethnocentrism towards a common Cypriot cultural narrative, in order to promote peaceful coexistence through peace education (Charalambous, Charalambous, & Zembylas, 2013, p. 67), (Gillespie, Γεωργίου, & Insay, 2011, p. 7), (Hajisoteriou, Neophytou, & Angelides, 2012, p. 387), (Philippou, 2007, p. 249), (Vural & Ozuyanik, 2008, p. 133). There are different contexts in peace education that could boost rapprochement. For example, Zembylas (2008, p. 263) argues that the rehabilitation of the political and ethical value of shame could be achieved through intercultural education and thus challenge the “self” versus the “other” dichotomy. However, this educational policy change attempt may prove to be ineffective or even counterproductive in a process of conflict transformation, if not applied appropriately. This is because the educational policy starts from the consolidated assumption that there

are two conflicting and immutable ethnic identities. This assumption preserves and perpetuates ethnic estrangement (Zembylas, 2011, pp. 53-54).

In practice, while there are cultural differences, like language⁴⁷ and religion, there are also striking cultural similarities, like family structure, societal significance of the neighbourhood, localism as self-determination, gossip habits, non-verbal expression, culinary habits and traditional dances (Broome, 2005, p. 75). In this framework, cultural activities may, according to the cultural identities stressed, promote or undermine rapprochement through respective positive or negative contact.

Cultural Heritage Activities. Eurobarometer data from 2008 showed that Cypriots, in general, demonstrated a high interest in intercultural events (Figure 85) which was way above the EU average.

Figure 85: Interest in Intercultural Events 2008



Republication from “Flash Eurobarometer 217 - Intercultural Dialogue in Europe” (European Commission, 2007, p. 36)

Fortunately, for the Cypriots, the culture of their island is among the oldest in the world. The first signs of civilization date back to the seventh millennium BC while the island’s rich cultural landscape includes hundreds of archaeological sites (Louise &

⁴⁷ Despite the linguistic differences between the two communities, there are also significant similarities. The “Joint Dictionary of the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot Dialect” by Iakovos Hajipieris and Orhan Kapatas contains 3.425 common words between the two dialects (Bérgou, 2018).

Morgan, 2013, p. 24). Given these facts, cultural heritage is a fertile ground for the communities to interact, cooperate, promote conflict transformation, and at the same time, gain mutual benefit. In Cyprus, the interconnection of conflict and cultural heritage is fraught with tension over cultural violation, heritage destruction and communal obliteration but at the same time, the restoration of particular sites of cultural heritage has become a tool for rapprochement efforts at the local authority and civil society levels (Constantinou, Demetriou, & Hatay, 2012, p. 177).

The main body that substantiates bicomunal cooperation in the field of cultural activities is the Technical Committee on Cultural Heritage. The Committee consists of archaeologists, architects, art historians and town planners from both communities and is dedicated to the recognition, promotion and protection of the cultural heritage of the island (The Technical Committee on Cultural Heritage in Cyprus, 2012, p. 1) (The Technical Committee on Cultural Heritage in Cyprus, 2015, p. 3). The Committee was formed in 2009 and is supported by the European Commission and the UNDP-ACT programme. The work of the Committee, not only preserves the cultural sites of Byzantines, Greeks, Lusignans, Ottomans, Phoenicians and Venetians inherited to the island, but also stresses the pan-Cypriot nature of such a heritage. In addition, it promotes bicomunal cooperation through the successful work of the Committee's bicomunal team of experts.

Beyond the Technical Committee on Cultural Heritage, the ACT programme has invested in planning, implementing and facilitating other projects that aim to ensure the integrity and protection of culturally important sites and to bring the two communities together through collaboration simultaneously (Louise & Morgan, 2013, p. 24) (Table 33).

Table 33: Cultural Heritage Sites Restored

Cultural heritage sites restored through support from UNDP-ACT, 2006-2012

Name	Description
Grand Turkish Bath.	Built on the ruins of a Latin Church by the Ottomans between 1571 and 1590, this building has historically been of great symbolic importance in Cypriot cultural life.
Prophet Elias Church and Monastery.	The Holy Maronite/Catholic Church of Prophet Elias is both a major religious monument for many Cypriots and a spiritual and educational centre. Basic repairs and fencing of the site were carried out.
Ayios Neophytos Chapel.	Located in the buffer zone, this listed monument was restored to its former state by the Department of Antiquities. In co-ordination with local residents and the UN access was made possible for occasional visits and for maintenance.
Favierou Day Care Centre.	The restored Favierou Day Care Centre provides rehabilitation and educational facilities for people with a range of disabilities. Located near Paphos Gate, the centre serves both communities. Its operational philosophy is based on understanding, respect, friendship and mutual acceptance, making it unique in the field of specialised care.
Multi-purpose Community Centre.	This traditional mudbrick building was built in the early part of the last century. Since its restoration it has been used as a cultural and environmental centre.
Cultural Heritage Preservation Circle project.	The project included the construction of a peace park and the restoration of a village courtyard. The project continues to provide opportunities for many inter-communal gatherings and to inspire other villages.
Armenian Church and Monastery.	Located in the Arabahmet neighbourhood, this 14th century Gothic monument was restored to its former glory. The project involved the Armenian Cypriot community and experts from the local community in Cyprus and overseas.
Centre for Visual Arts and Research.	This old flour mill will be restored as an arts and research centre, and will provide a space for the <i>Sharing History, Art, Research and Education</i> project (SHARE).

Republication from “Citizen Peacemaking in Cyprus: The Story of Co-operation and Trust across the Green Line” by Louise C. & Morgan T. (2013, p. 25)

The Cultural Heritage Preservation Circle in Kontea project is an example of cooperation of both experts and local people. The 6-year project (2007-2013) was implemented by the Kontea Heritage Foundation and the Union of the Chambers of Cyprus Turkish Engineers and Architects and managed to bring together the old Greek Cypriot and the current Turkish Cypriot residents of the Kontea village in order to revitalise and rehabilitate it through grassroots activities, community engagement and dialogue. During the project, a peace park and a courtyard were restored and the village church was repaired. The project offered the opportunity for numerous inter-communal meetings (Mahallae, 2013).

Through the project, important cultural heritage sites were restored. However, the scope of Cultural Heritage Preservation Circle was broader than preserving cultural sites: the project experimented with an inclusive approach to public consultation with

town meetings, exhibitions, information and feedback networks, and was structured around joint decision-making by parallel Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot management committees. Pioneering, participatory, locally-owned decision-making model planned to foster conflict transformation. As Louise and Morgan point out:

“The project demonstrated how combining reconciliation and citizen participation in decision-making around tangible assets of common significance can transform the conflict dynamic into one of mutual respect and shared values.” (2013, p. 26)

Another joint project, which dates back to an era very close to the division (1979), is the Nicosia Master Plan. The Nicosia Master Plan along with the Nicosia Sewerage Project were bicomunal projects led by the two mayors of Nicosia at that time (Lellos Demetriades in the south and Mustafa Akinci in the north), and formed, planned and implemented by Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot professionals. In its context, several urban and infrastructure upgrading have been realised in both sides of the walled city of Nicosia through the collaboration between technical teams from both communities (UNDP, 2013). The Nicosia Master Plan consists of planning and development policies for the wider area of Nicosia, as well as for specific projects that promote the revitalization of the walled city. The project constitutes a framework for the overall planning strategy for Nicosia. The aim of the project is to bring the two communities of Nicosia together to work for an improved city for all. The Master Plan achieved several goals: to conduct a detailed assessment of the structure of the city and offer a long-term development plan for its future development, to define the preservation and rehabilitation policy for the walled city, which is considered a precious part of Nicosia, to run investment programme for special projects within the walled city, to strengthen the administrative and service functions of the area, to participate in the creation of a visually identifiable centre for the city, to perform restoration of historic buildings and upgrading of existing public spaces and to realise construction activities to improve housing conditions in two residential areas next to the buffer zone, the Chrysaliniotissa area in the south and the Arabahmet area in the north (Watson-Northcyprus, n.d.). In total, the Nicosia Master Plan is an important heritage project that attempted, to revitalise the historical centre of Nicosia by focusing on abandoned areas from the time of the division, to preserve and exhibit the cultural heritage of all

the residents of Nicosia and to get experts from both communities to work together for an extended time.

The objective of the cultural heritage restoration projects was to give the communities on the island a chance to appreciate their diverse cultural heritage while gaining direct experience of how bicomunal cooperation can build interpersonal trust. Local communities, through the tangible restoration and reconstruction projects, got the opportunity to re-imagine the physical spaces around them. Participants were offered a meaningful context to pursue contact with members of the other communities. Starting from professional journeys as experts and through collaborating on projects, individuals built trust with their counterparts in the other community, first as fellow professionals and later as friends. Direct interaction with the other community often compelled people to reflect on their own prejudices and in cases, individual attitudes were changed (Louise & Morgan, 2013, p. 24). In terms of tangible results on the sites, Yorucu et al (2010, p. 1757) offer an impressive list of projects accomplished in northern Nicosia with funding from the USAID and the UNDP. Their overall cost was € 9.66 million and there was a total of € 50 million spent on similar revitalisation projects in South Nicosia during 1987-2009 and an additional amount of € 256 million on the restoration the Venetian Moat around Nicosia.

Along with remarkable and successful cases of bicomunal cooperation in the field of culture, there are also efforts that failed. One example of failure is the attempt to make the Kyrenia ship project, bicomunal. The Kyrenia ship is a wreck of a 4th-century BC merchant ship and is exhibited in the Ancient Shipwreck Museum in Kyrenia Castle in the city of Kyrenia in Northern Cyprus. Three full-size replicas of the ship have been constructed so far (Kyrenia II, Kyrenia III and Kyrenia Liberty). The replicas occasionally travel around the world as a floating ambassador of Cypriot culture. The shipwreck is of ancient Greek origin and the replicas were constructed under Greek Cypriot initiatives. There have been efforts, to rebrand the Kyrenia project in civic rather than ethnic terms but there was little success in this since the only achievement up to now is the inclusion of a Turkish Cypriot in the crew-team of a replica ship. (Constantinou, Demetriou, & Hatay, 2012, p. 189).

Culture and Cultural Heritage as a Factor of Antagonism. Beyond the positive or positive-intended side of contact, interaction and cooperation on cultural projects, a dimension of culture and heritage creates and preserves negative perceptions

and sentiments for both the Cypriot communities. While there is no in-depth approach through which the Cyprus case could be characterised a cultural or religious conflict, these two elements, as in many other conflicts, occasionally fuel the strife and enrich ethnocentric and nationalistic narratives. It is very common, in both communities, to hear voices claiming the in-group protects the cultural heritage of the island, while the “others” destroy it by straightforwardly targeting or deliberately neglecting the heritage of the rival group in an effort to perform ethno-cultural cleansing. While preserved heritage of the “other” is used to manifest in-group tolerance, “own” lost heritage is used to produce and reproduce ethnic identity in similar and often more intense ways than the actual possession, access and enjoyment of heritage. (Constantinou & Hatay, 2010, pp. 1600, 1614).

Both sides instrumentalise heritage to legitimise their claims and support their policies concerning the Cyprus problem. In each side, one’s own preservation of selected heritage is opposed to the other side’s destruction of heritage. The Greek-Cypriot side that has been comparatively more diligent than the Turkish-Cypriot side in protecting and reconstructing the ethno-religious heritage of the Turkish Cypriots, has often highlighted this preservation in its own official propaganda in order to emphasize the destruction of Greek Cypriot heritage in the north. Respectively, Turkish Cypriots emphasise the multicultural character of the island and downplay its Greek heritage. This means that while ancient Greek sites and a few historically significant Byzantine churches are preserved, churches and monasteries that are more recent have been either neglected or vandalised. The reconstruction of such sites has tended to occur only under negative international publicity and pressure. Turkish Cypriots appear to fear that site restoration will open the gates for the return of Greek Cypriots. Furthermore, in both sides, tourism is also an important factor for heritage preservation, as each side emphasises a European-oriented multiculturalism representative of Cypriot modernity. (Constantinou & Hatay, 2010, pp. 1614-1615).

When facing inflows that oppose the perception that the “other” respects ingroup heritage, the rival is often accused of demonstrating only symbolic tolerance of the religious culture of the other (Constantinou, Demetriou, & Hatay, 2012, pp. 183-184). Instances where the in-group participates in a reconstruction project in cooperation with the “other”, while one would expect them to oppose consolidated perceptions, sometimes work in a reverse manner, confirming the image of a civilised and tolerant “self” vis-à-vis a rarely enlightened “other” (Constantinou & Hatay, 2010,

p. 1601). In these instances, cooperation cases function as the exceptions that prove the rule.

Another case of strife preserved and refed through heritage sites is “ethnicization”. The in-group attempts to monopolise heritage discourse at the expense of other heritage communities associated with the site. Constantinou and Hatay (2010, p. 1601) use as examples the site of Kirkklar/Ayioi Saranta and the churches found within Turkish-Cypriot villages, that are commonly defined as Islamic heritage by the Turkish Cypriot community.

Issues concerning cultural heritage are often used to back the official, ethnocentric positions and confirm established images of the “other”. Both sides invariably exploit the lost heritage of the ethnic conflict. The official discourse of the Greek Cypriot authorities is directed towards the lost heritage of Greek Cypriots in the north that will be fully reconstructed following potential reunification. The official discourse of the Turkish Cypriot authorities is based on the notion that the lost heritage of Turkish Cypriots in the south is best redeemed not through return, but through its reconstruction in the abandoned villages of Greek Cypriots in the north, which in turn legitimises their “ethnicization”. (Constantinou & Hatay, 2010, p. 1614)

Contact, as a social means of promoting stereotype-breaking and ultimately resolution, is often stressed in the conflict analysis and conflict resolution-related sources. However, there are instances where contact, or at least unconditional contact, may function as a negative, stereotype-enhancing factor. This fact justifies the rich scholarly debate between the supporters and the opponents of Gordon Allport’s Contact Hypothesis.

Visiting Heritage Sites on the Other Side. The 2003 opening of the Green Line crossings allowed thousands of displaced persons from both sides to visit their former villages, houses and properties. Religious heritage sites were also important destinations of private and spiritual visits. As Constantinou, Demetriou & Hatay (2012, p. 178) cite, these visits were emotionally and at the same time politically loaded. Visual media depictions of religious heritage sites on the other side of the divide in poor condition, stressed the in-group victimisation while directly or indirectly contradicting these images with the care taken by their own community for the preservation of the cultural heritage sites of the “others”. Anyway, oftentimes “enemy” heritage reconstruction is rhetorically employed to morally elevate one side over the other

(Constantinou & Hatay, 2010, p. 1601). Constantinou, Demetriou & Hatay (2012, p. 179) point out the weight of the social context for the realisation of the importance of cultural heritage:

“In the physical absence of those persons for whom these sites were important, a damaged church or mosque or a ruined cemetery could fade into the background, occupying a minimal place in the landscape of everyday life. However, with the opening of the checkpoints and the visits of these sites’ original owners or spiritual inheritors, the vandalized cemeteries or ruined religious sites became noticed again, as devotees lit candles in the shells of churches or rummaged through broken tombstones looking for the names of relatives.”

What is more, one of the first visits that Greek-Cypriot refugees paid was to their villages’ churches. The experience was most of the times disappointing. Many found that, while the buildings were intact or well maintained all the icons and other artefacts that gave it meaning had disappeared (Constantinou, Demetriou, & Hatay, 2012, p. 180). The abovementioned incidents further demonstrate the fundamental role of the social context in signifying cultural sites. Individuals and societies are not passive recipients of heritage but rather active producers and consumers of it (Constantinou & Hatay, 2010, p. 1602). For the Turkish Cypriot community, the cases where the other community visited the churches may in fact be a contributing factor in building empathy and tolerance. According to Constantinou, Demetriou & Hatay (2012, p. 181) the Turkish Cypriot mukhtar of a former Greek-Cypriot village populated by Turkish-Cypriot refugees from the south, reported that the villagers stopped going to the mosque, which in fact was the converted former village church, because they kept finding lit candles and small icons at the entrance of the mosque, left by the visiting Greek Cypriots’. As a consequence, villagers began pressuring their local authorities to build mosques to replace the converted churches. This prompted Turkish authorities to pay attention to such sites and find ways to calm population anxiety.

In the case of the Turkish Cypriot community, the loss of heritage was not always experienced negatively, as it fed the case for partition that required forgetting life and sites in the south. The opening of crossings though, intensified the sense of loss in unexpected ways. Constantinou & Hatay (2010, p. 1614) mention the case of the

Alihodes village where the returning Turkish Cypriots encountered the total annihilation of the village and landscape, making them realise that the recovery of their heritage was practically impossible.

Disappointment rising from reencountering familiar cultural sites also occurs in cases of environmental heritage. The case of the Dematona ancient olive grove, part of the Natura 2000 protection areas, though it has been preserved, can only be enjoyed as a tourist site by its Greek-Cypriot owners and not as a family and village inheritance. Sense of loss, deriving from the current Cyprus Issue situation, is also intensified by the post-peasant culture of the urbanised society that it either devalues the tangible site as one lacking development, or approaches it as ecological fetish and an exoticized consumable (Constantinou & Hatay, 2010, p. 1613).

Tangible heritage does not only function as either evidence of ethnocentric notions on one hand, or real example of Cypriotness on the other. Tangible heritage also privileges manifestations of cultural wealth of Western, metropolitan or economically developed societies and groups in the expense of other, more “ephemeral” and “mutable” cultures. This perception creates an ideological bias in favour of the heritage of the two dominant communities and is primarily used to construct and enhance the ethno-cultural identity of ‘each side’ and account for “bicomunalism”. Such understanding presents cultural hybridity in Cyprus as anomalous. In addition, it also marginalises the cultural heritage of smaller, subaltern or provincial communities, like the linguistic heritage of the Maronites or the Cyprus Roma travelling traditions (Constantinou & Hatay, 2010, p. 1603). This viewpoint, focusing exclusively on the two major communities, preserves the established Figure of bicomunalism in expense of greater approaches of cultural understanding. Selective cultural tolerance by official authorities may create insecurity to the other side that may fear that intolerance may rise again in the future under certain conditions. Furthermore, marginalisation and closing the eyes to hybrid and minor cultural groups by the two major communities does not appoint long-term, resolution-oriented cultural tolerance but circumstantial, hollow toleration. This ephemeral toleration, based on the dichotomising bicomunal Figure, may either regress, or be manipulated by decision-makers in the future.

Beyond contested, preserved or neglected cultural places, heritage extends beyond tangible sites and includes the intangible practices, traditions and the ways individuals and communities give meaning to them. Intangible cultural heritage is often more important to people than the materiality of a heritage site. As the example of the

mukhtar shows, it is not so much the church or the mosque that matters to the faithful, but going there, the cultures and spiritual insights associated with such visitations. For Constantinou and Hatay (2010, p. 1602) the real challenge is the extent in which this intangible heritage gets acknowledgement in parallel to the tangible one, as in cases of protracted ethnic conflict like Cyprus where, along with heritage sites, also heritage practices can provide a stage for ethnic competition.

As demonstrated by the cases provided in this thesis, bicommunal contact and activity on a cultural heritage basis can be either a supportive, or dissuasive to conflict transformation, according to the framework and conditions present.

On the one hand, bicommunal activities aiming to preserve and restore cultural heritage create contact, interaction and cooperation that can challenge established images and cultivate attitudes of tolerance. Additionally, revised educational curricula can create an alternative cultural perception basis to the traditional motherlands' narratives. Scott (2002, p. 114) claims that turning culture orientation from the notion of heritage to the one of patrimony can shift cultural reference from past-oriented to future-oriented. This means that the concept of the heir can be replaced with the one of patrimony:

“In Cyprus, with its tradition of bilateral inheritance [...] the idea of a patrimony, with its focus on the potential fruit of a future understanding between Greek and Turkish Cypriot parts of the island, may provide a useful corrective to the backward-looking emphasis on ancestry implicit in the notion of heritage.” (Scott, 2002, p. 114)

On the other hand, cases of sites neglected or destroyed by the “other”, or even preservation of a cultural site by “us” in contrast to the behaviour of the “other”, serve the conflictual rhetoric as they are used as proof of the in-group cultural respect and the out-group contrary to the barbarism of the “other”. What is more, non-ethnic or cross-ethnic heritage, including natural heritage, is downplayed or underestimated, since it is usually non-exploitable by supporters of ethnocentric narratives. Only peace activists are concerned with natural heritage exactly because it is not an easy resource for ethno-cultural identity construction and promotion and thus could be utilised for the construction of a common Cypriot national identity (Constantinou & Hatay, 2010, p. 1601).

These heritage protection and destruction claims, used to support the public information campaigns of one side or the other, make them miss how heritage discourse, which is full of diversity and controversy, is itself conflicted. Contextualised heritage is more diverse than commonly presented and can be reevaluated positively as well as negatively because of, or despite conflict. From case to case, heritage is surprisingly protected by those supposed to destroy it, or destroyed by those meant to preserve it. Ethnic groups and individuals may come to evaluate their “own” heritage negatively, facing it as an inconvenient cultural load, when trying to develop ideologically specific or socially progressive identities. (Constantinou & Hatay, 2010, pp. 1601-1602).

Conclusions on Cultural Activity. Data on cultural activity show that there are both a stereotype-preserving and a stereotype-fighting, as well as a conflictual and a reconciliatory trend that rely on heritage use. Given that heritage is (connected to) identity, there are two competing concepts in the island of Cyprus; the one that accentuates the existence of two different identities and the other that points out Cypriotness, above the Greek and Turk subcategories. Significant projects show that culture is a field of contact, cooperation and trust-building while other data signify the antagonistic use of heritage and the dividing perception of culture. Data show that contact can be both positive leading to cooperation, and negative leading to the perpetuation of the existing images for the other.

Sports and Bicomunal Contact.

Sports Activities. The domain of athletic activity and sports is often considered to be cultivating the values of cooperation, team spirit, friendship, fair play, and noble competition, modesty in victory and gracefulness in defeat. These values, also connected to the Olympic spirit of Ancient Greece, are promoted in modern times by the Olympic Movement as well as by all sports federations and bodies. In addition, contemporary Olympic values evangelise peace, international friendship and understanding, based on the spirit of the ancient holy armistice notion. Of course, all of the above stand on the theoretical level. In practice, sports are competitive activities that involve, beyond the athletes engaging in physical activity and those directly connected to such individuals or groups, significant economic stakes and direct and indirect spectators that socially express themselves through them. Sports fans and fan

clubs are, according to each case, loosely or closely connected to ideologies and political parties. Organised football fan clubs and football fans but also basketball and volleyball supporters are connected to political positions.⁴⁸ In many cases, sports fans not only express themselves verbally and symbolically but in some cases, use physical violence against team members and fans of opposing political affiliation clubs. Thus, nationalistic or anti-systemic and anarchical violence often occur inside and outside sports venues.

Sports in the Greek Cypriot Community. The 2004 Special Eurobarometer on sports shows that the citizens of Cyprus tend to value team spirit and respect for others as very important ideals promoted through sports (Table 34).

Table 34: Values Promoted through Sports


Q52 In your opinion, which of the following values does sport promote the most?											
	EU25	CY	CZ	EE	HU	LV	LT	MT	PL	SK	SI
Team spirit	52%	61%	29%	42%	51%	38%	38%	44%	29%	33%	45%
Tolerance	23%	21%	21%	20%	20%	24%	22%	34%	21%	19%	28%
Respect for others	32%	45%	21%	27%	26%	26%	27%	43%	24%	17%	35%
Fair play	32%	56%	40%	28%	20%	26%	25%	40%	34%	40%	48%
Self-control	33%	53%	31%	52%	38%	39%	44%	36%	22%	29%	36%
Sticking to the rules	31%	29%	37%	24%	33%	22%	31%	32%	25%	35%	36%
Discipline	46%	44%	47%	54%	57%	57%	50%	71%	52%	51%	60%
Mutual understanding	15%	19%	17%	18%	12%	23%	23%	22%	13%	16%	32%
Solidarity	18%	21%	15%	16%	9%	18%	18%	31%	15%	10%	31%
Friendship	38%	34%	46%	26%	34%	30%	40%	46%	26%	43%	57%
Equality among men & women	15%	25%	16%	12%	9%	13%	16%	23%	14%	14%	31%
Effort	36%	41%	37%	47%	26%	33%	27%	32%	38%	33%	54%
Other (SPONTANEOUS)	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	0%	1%	1%	0%	0%	3%
None of these (SPONTANEOUS)	1%	0%	1%	0%	0%	1%	2%	0%	1%	2%	1%
DK / NA	3%	2%	1%	4%	3%	0%	7%	3%	3%	1%	2%

Republication from “Special Eurobarometer 213: Citizens of the European Union and Sport” (European Commission, 2004, p. 7)

⁴⁸ There are many football clubs connected to political ideologies and parties. S.S. Lazio’s connection to the extreme-right and A.S. Livorno Calcio’s connection to the Communist Party in Italy, Celtic F.C.’s catholic affiliation and Glasgow Rangers’ protestant one in Scotland and Real Madrid’s attachment to Francisco Franco in contrast to the expression of Catalan nationalism through Barcelona Athletic Club are just some examples. In Cyprus, APOEL FC is connected to the Greek Cypriot right while AC Omonia to the Greek Cypriot left.

In the Greek Cypriot community, sports associations and clubs play a significant role in the athletic, social and political life and therefore have a strong support among the people. (The Management Centre of the Mediterranean & NGO Support Centre, 2011, p. 33). According to the 2005 Civicus report, sports were the second largest category among Greek Cypriot CSOs (Figure 86).


Figure 86: CSO Categories



Republication from “An Assessment of Civil Society in Cyprus” by The Management Centre of the Mediterranean & NGO Support Centre (2005, p. 42)

As shown in the Figure below (Figure 87), sports association were third among the most popular types of organisations.

Figure 87: Popularity of CSOs by Type



Republication from “An Assessment of Civil Society in Cyprus: A Map for the Future” by The Management Centre of the Mediterranean & NGO Support Centre (2011, p. 34)

In addition, concerning reformation advocated in the field of sports in the years 2009-2011, sports organisations were among the most successful in pushing their policy proposals for approval (Table 35).

Table 35: Demand Pressure for Approval by CSO Type

Fields of policy in which organisations have pushed for approval

Ranking	Field	% of total policies pushed for approval
1	Education	20.0
2	Human rights/immigrant issues	15.0
3	Sports	12.5
4	Health	10.0
5	Labour Issues	10.0
6	Women issues	7.5
7	Legal	7.5
8	Social Issues	5.0
9	Environment	5.0
10	Culture	5.0
11	Other	2.5

Republication from “An Assessment of Civil Society in Cyprus: A Map for the Future” by The Management Centre of the Mediterranean & NGO Support Centre (The Management Centre of the Mediterranean & NGO Support Centre, 2011, p. 54)

Sports in the Turkish Cypriot Community. Sports associations are also popular among the Turkish Cypriots. In the north, sports clubs have the largest volume of active members (Table 36). Sports clubs are also a significant space for socialisation since Turkish Cypriots socialise on a weekly basis with people attending sports in the same degree (around 15%) they attend and socialise in the mosque.

Table 36: Active Membership in CSOs by Type


Active membership in social CSOs

CSO type	% of respondents
Sports	7.2
Cultural	6.0
Education	5.2
Hobby	4.2
Youth	3.0
Neighbourhood/village committee	2.7

Republication from “An Assessment of Civil Society in Cyprus: A Map for the Future” by The Management Centre of the Mediterranean & NGO Support Centre (The Management Centre of the Mediterranean & NGO Support Centre, 2011, p. 77)

Although 2005 (Figure 88) and 2011 CIVICUS data comparison shows a significant drop in sports memberships (from 9% to 7.2%), membership in sports association ascended to the first place among Turkish Cypriot preferences. Additionally, sports clubs are probably the only CSO type in the north, which is well represented in all regions (The Management Centre of the Mediterranean, NGO Support Centre, 2005, p. 127).

Figure 88: CSO Membership by Type



Source: Civil Society Survey of Northern Cyprus 2005

Republication from “An Assessment of Civil Society in Cyprus” by The Management Centre of the Mediterranean & NGO Support Centre (2005, p. 122)

The 2011 CIVICUS report showed that people in both communities, favour sports associations and cultural groups that are the most popular social organisations. This may occur because of their longevity, since these organisations existed even before the establishment of the independent Republic of Cyprus (The Management Centre of the Mediterranean & NGO Support Centre, 2011, pp. 78, 106).

Sports as a Promoter of Discord. When examining the factors that render sports an arena of discord, the persistent issue of recognition appears again as an impediment in the field of sports and athletic activities like in many other sectors. Recognition, an issue tormenting mostly the Greek Cypriots as it appears in politics, business and academia extends to sports teams and associations. Kanol (2011, p. 168) refers to the need to waive the cultural and sports embargo as a measure of trust-building, not only between the two Cypriot communities, but also among the EU and the Turkish Cypriots. The current embargo hampers young Turkish Cypriots from participating in international sporting events. Smith (2015) offers the example of the London 2012 Games Olympic torch that arrived in Cyprus and Turkish Cypriot youths did not have the opportunity to see it because no insurance company would cover its passage through an area considered to be governed by an illegal regime. What is more, Greek Cypriots have banned Turkish Cypriot sports teams under the fear of accidentally

implying political recognition while citizens and sportsmen have, for a long time, hesitated to act and participate under the fear that they could indirectly boost recognition. Broome (2005, p. 49) notes that the Turkish Cypriots perceive the refusal of the Greek Cypriots to allow their sports teams access to full participation in international affairs as a sign of disinterest in building a substantial partnership.

Recognition and Sports. The complicated affair of the Cypriot football federations is a perfect example of strategies driven by the fear of recognition. The Britons brought football to Cyprus in 1900. Football itself was caught up in the emerging Greek and Turkish nationalisms and was played along ethnic lines with no mixed, bicomunal run clubs in the top division of the island (Shaw, 2014, p. 268). The first Greek Cypriot team was established in 1911 (Anorthosis Famagusta) and the first Turkish Cypriot in 1932 (Cetinkaya). These two clubs along with six more Greek Cypriot teams formed the Cyprus Football Federation (CFA) that became a member of the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) in 1948. Turkish Cypriot clubs were marginalised by being excluded from using sporting facilities when the EOKA, Greek Cypriot anti-colonial struggle started, with the excuse that the restriction would help in maintaining the good relations between the Greek Cypriots and the other communities of the island (Kartakoullis & Loizou, 2009, p. 1656). Howbeit, the fact that the Armenian Young Men's Association (AYMA), a club representing the Armenian community, kept on using sporting facilities demonstrates an inconsistency in the prohibition (Shaw, 2014, p. 268) and implies discrimination. In 1955, the Turkish Cypriots decided to form their own federation, the Turkish Cypriot Football Federation (CTFA) and championship. The 1960 independence of the island not only did not manage to unify football between the two communities, but it rather aggravated relations. In the post 1974 period, the CTFA has unsuccessfully attempted to become a member of FIFA and Union des Associations Européennes de Football (UEFA), as the two federations only accept as a member only a single national federation from each state. Even friendly matches with foreign teams, allowed by a special regime, were banned after the 1983 declaration of the internationally unrecognised Turkish Cypriot state, leading Turkish Cypriot football to isolation. Following its fixed strategy, the Republic of Cyprus does not recognise the CTFA under the fear of recognition of the political regime of the north. In a meeting with FIFA in 2006, CTFA representatives accepted to recognise the official authority of the CFA and become its member.

Ironically, Turkish Cypriot decision-makers, that seem desperate for any kind of recognition, opposed and averted this attempt (Kartakoullis & Loizou, 2009, pp. 1656-1658). A new initiative in 2008 by CFA officials, including a clear statement that provisional cooperation between federations does not constitute a precedent for the Cyprus political issue, supported by CTFA and FIFA was rejected by the Turkish Cypriot leader as unacceptable (Kartakoullis & Loizou, 2009, pp. 1660-1664). As demonstrated in the case of the federations, sport can be used for building up national identity, especially in the case of opposing regimes on the grounds of ethnicity (Menary, 2010, p. 253), (Kartakoullis & Loizou, 2009, p. 1664). Despite the efforts to unify the football authorities of the island, the stance of the Turkish Cypriot decision-makers, render federations prone to national and ethnic differentiation that remind and underscore the “us” versus “them” dichotomy.

Furthermore, the absence of a professional league in Northern Cyprus, due to the circumstances, diminishes local enthusiasm for domestic football and turns the focus on the Turkish League (Menary, 2010, p. 256) thus enhancing Turkish ethnic affiliation at the expense of local identity and “Cypriotness”. In July 2005, the Republic of Cyprus refused Turkish journalists based in Northern Cyprus to enter the south to cover a football match between Greek Cypriot side Anorthosis Famagusta and Turkish side Trabzonspor. Reporters from Northern Cyprus were not subject to the same restrictions (Menary, 2007). While this move is an attempt to signify the difference between Cypriot and Turkish national identities, such acts may fuel ethnic tensions given the multiplicity of identities in Cyprus. Moreover, nationalist cries prevail in these cases and as a result the Turkish ethnic identity may overshadow the domestic Cypriot one.

Complications in the field of sports have also caused breakdown of official, political negotiations. In 2007, the British Luton Town Football Club was invited to play a friendly game against Çetinkaya in the north. The CFA complained and the game was cancelled. In retaliation, Turkish Cypriot politicians cancelled talks with their Greek Cypriot counterparts (Menary, 2010, pp. 258-259).

Impediments to Individual Athletes. Beyond sports teams, the division of the island also binds individual athletes. Turkish Cypriot athletes are not allowed to participate in sporting events outside Northern Cyprus. Since December 1963 no individual from Northern Cyprus has participated in any games, sporting tournaments,

athletics championships or competitions (Embargoed!, n.d.). Yasin Kansu's (a Çetinkaya player and several times top scorer in the Northern Cyprus league) disappointment is representative of the situation Turkish Cypriot athletes face:

“We voted for the solution in Cyprus and still we can't play football with the rest of the world. In a few years, I will be retiring and if this situation continues, I will never get the chance to play against first class international opposition and know just how good I am.” (Menary, 2007)

In specific, footballers from Northern Cyprus are in a limbo with nowhere to go and compete at a higher level (Menary, 2010, p. 254). Turkish Cypriots can get passports for the south of the island, and play in Greek Cypriot clubs as the north of the island is still regarded as part of the Republic of Cyprus and players are allowed to play by CFA. However, especially under the Denktas leadership, this was not an attractive option as players moving to the south were stigmatised and treated as deviant personalities.


Sabri Selden, a Turkish Cypriot footballer that signed a professional contract with a Greek Cypriot first division club was denounced as a "weak character" by President Denktas (Menary, 2008). Sabri Selden along with his younger brother Raif signed with the AEK Larnaca club (Howden, 2002). Being overly optimistic, the chairperson of the club Stavros Xeni rushed to state: *"This was a political move. We did this to send a message that we believe in a united Cyprus."* (Howden, 2002a) Eventually, Selden did not manage to stay in the Greek Cypriot League and returned to the north (UEFA, 2002). His return involves several speculations, from threats to his remaining family in the north, to personal phone calls by Rauf Denktas. In any case, Selden failed to break the football deadlock and he and his brother were branded by the Turkish Cypriot media as traitors (Charalambous S. , 2002) and mercenaries (Howden, 2002).

Likewise, in 2014 Greek Cypriot footballer Dimitris Vassiliou signed a contract with the Turkish Cypriot Değirmenlik club. Vassiliou, after being insulted and threatened for his choice, decided to recall his decision. *"If I knew all this turmoil was going to happen with my transfer, I would have never gone to play there"* Vassiliou stated in a Greek sports website (Papadopoulos, 2014). Vassiliou was not the only Greek Cypriot football player that was criticised for his choice to sign with a Turkish

Cypriot side. Stelios Kittos also signed with Değirmenlik and when attacked defended his choice through the social media by saying that his accusers politicised what was a professional move (Sigmalive, 2015).

Football Fan Clubs in the Greek Cypriot Community. As mentioned above, Greek Cypriot sports fans appear to be negative civil society actors. The 2005 Civicus report recorded the aggressiveness of sports fans (The Management Centre of the Mediterranean, NGO Support Centre, 2005, p. 23), while the respective 2011 one mentioned the very frequent involvement of fans of various sports teams in violent acts and hooliganism over the years of the research. (The Management Centre of the Mediterranean & NGO Support Centre, 2011, p. 50). In the south, over time, depending on what football team one supports, more or less, his political opinion is revealed. This political influence prevails today even though independent athletic organisations exist as well (Fröström, 2008, p. 10). In the Greek Cypriot community, there are two major football clubs connected to political positioning which, at the same time are the most popular among Greek Cypriot men (Figure 89).

Figure 89: Football Club Support (Greek Cypriots)



Support for each football club.

Republication from “Cyprus: a Football Crazy Nation?” by Kartakoulis N. et al (2009, p. 231)

Politicised support of Cypriot football clubs, and in specific of APOEL and Omonia, are closely related to social classes. According to Kartakoullis, Kriemadis, & Pouloukas (2009, pp. 241-242) the most popular clubs on the island, Omonia FC and APOEL, draw their major fan support from blue-collar workers and professionals

respectively, explaining politicisation of football in Cyprus with teams being split between the left-wing party and the right-wing party.

On one hand, there is APOEL whose fans identify themselves as primarily Greek and secondarily Cypriot and hold nationalistic positions like the “*enosis*” doctrine. APOEL fans usually hold national flag of Cyprus or Greece call the Omonia supporters “Turks” in a devaluating manner since they consider the Turkish Cypriots, Turks and do not recognise their rights on the island (Just-football, 2015). In addition, APOEL fans are also connected with the National People’s Front far right party (a “brother” party with the Greek neo-Nazi Golden Dawn) whose members in certain occasions waive swastika flags inside stadiums. On the other, there is Omonia, which is traditionally associated with the Communist Party (AKEL). Omonia supporters use as their symbol the hammer and sickle (Left Wing Soccer, n.d.) and believe in a unified island where the two ethnicities would coexist on equal terms.⁴⁹ In the case of APOEL fans, they promote and preserve nationalistic notions along with intolerance and discrimination. In the case of Omonia supporters, while their position promotes the idea of coexistence, positions are seconded in a climate of antagonism, conflict and in a zero-sum manner. Omonia and AEL (the second largest leftist football team) use symbols, such as the national flag of Cyprus, that demonstrate their Cypriotness while APOEL and Appolon (the second largest right-wing football team) use symbols (like the Greek or the Byzantine flag) that show their Greek identity (Stylianou & Theodoropoulou, 2013, pp. 8-9). In the case of both clubs’ fans, violence as a means to defend one’s position against the other is advocated to be righteous. According to research by Kartakoullis, Kriemadis, & Pouloukas (2009, pp. 237, 242) sports fans violence inside and outside football stadiums, that is mainly football hooliganism, is by far the biggest problem facing Cypriot football (64% of the men answered the questionnaire). Given the high popularity of football in Cyprus (Table 37), fan violence constitutes a serious social issue.

⁴⁹ What stands for the APOEL and Omonia political affiliation stands, more or less, for all the Greek Cypriot clubs

Table 37: Football Club Support (Overall Percentage)

Section 1: Team support – percentage support for football clubs

Table 1a. Do they support any team?

	%	Number of men
They do not support any club	22.9%	48,000
They support some club	77.1%	162,000

Republication from “Cyprus: a Football Crazy Nation?” by Kartakoulis N. et al (2009, p. 230)

Sports as a Promoter of Contact. Apart from triggering nationalistic reaction and state restrictions, Cypriot footballers signing with clubs on the other side of the divide, slowly but steadily break the rule of no contact among athletes and try to alter the status quo. Coskun Ulusoy, like the Seldan brothers, wanted to play on a high football level. Unlikely the Seldans, Ulusoy was successful in his attempt. He moved to the south after the opening of crossings and under the, more moderate than the previous, Mehmet Ali Talat administration. Ulusoy joined Nea Salamina, where the fan base is regarded as left wing and more sympathetic to Turkish Cypriots, stayed there for two seasons and only left for personal reasons. His experience with the Greek Cypriots was positive suggesting that the divisions between the communities could be overcome. As Menary cites, Ulusoy’s testimony mentions:

“I was always very friendly with the other Greek players, there were no problems. A lot of the Salamina fans know Turkish and they are to the left. Sometimes the right-side teams shout at me, but nobody hit me or nothing.” (Menary, 2010, p. 255)

His departure was bad news for the Greek Cypriot club professionals: *“When I cancel the contract, they [Nea Salamina] are very sorry. I never forget they said to me they lose a friend and I said that I lose many more friends.”* (Menary, 2007) In 2004, Nea Salamina also signed the Turkish Cypriot Ali İmam. Ulusoy and İmam were the first Turkish Cypriots that took part in the Cypriot League after thirty years (Pathfinder, 2005).

Nea Salamina did not only sign Turkish Cypriot individuals but also organised a significant football match in March 2005, between Nea Salamina and the Turkish Cypriot Yeni Tzami. This game was the first bicomunal football match after fifty

years (Agkarra, 2014). Many Greek Cypriot politicians and officials attended the event, among them the president of the parliament, ministers, mayors, highest rank orthodox clerics and football federation agents (Typos.com.cy, 2005). Kartakoulis and Loizou (2009, p. 1659) refer to some initial attempts to involve institutionalized sport where Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot football teams initially played friendly games and later organised a common veterans' tournament. The success of these initial efforts at an institutionalized level, cultivated hopes for even greater cooperation in the field of sport (Kartakoullis & Loizou, 2009, p. 1659). In 2014, a friendly football match was organised by the Peace Players-Cyprus NGO where a mixed team of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots faced a UN soldiers' team in the buffer zone. The official Cyprus Issue negotiators of the two communities also played in the Cypriot team (Dimitriou, 2014). In 2018, Nea Salamina announced a new friendly match, this time with the Turkish Cypriot side Magusa FC. The match would take place in 2019 and the two clubs received an award from Stelios Hadji-Ioannou Foundation for promoting peace and friendship (Balla, 2018).

Positive developments were also recorded in the federations' issue. The Turkish Cypriot football federation decided to reject the attempt of the Turkish Football Federation to open a branch office in Nicosia. In 2015 it started rapprochement attempts towards the Greek Cypriot federation with the ultimate goal of the unification of the Cypriot football federations (Diner & Bas, 2015), as in 2013 they have already agreed to move towards the formation of a single national team (Today's Zaman, 2013). These developments come on top of the thrifty inclusion of athletes beyond football in national teams as according to Leonidou (2011) Olympic teams of Cyprus feature several Turkish Cypriot athletes.

Greek Cypriot Alki FC followed the example of Nea Salamina. Alki signed in 2011 Mustafa Gabira, considered one of the biggest Turkish Cypriot talents (Kathimerini, 2011) and Mustafa Yaşinses. Yaşinses signed while trying to avoid obligatory military service and on that basis, was blocked from crossing the Green Line by Turkish Cypriot authorities turning the Greek Cypriot club against the Turkish Cypriot authorities (Akan, 2011). Despite the obstacles, the trend of Turkish Cypriots signing in the south grows.

At the same time, not only Turkish Cypriot footballers signed with Greek Cypriot sides but also Greek Cypriots agreed with football clubs in the north. Argyris Christofi, Stelios Kittos and Michalis Michail followed Dimitris Vassiliou mentioned

earlier, in signing with Değirmenlik (Kerkida.net, 2015). Like Kittos who defended his choice, as mentioned earlier, Christofi also held his position stressing his economic hardships and the fact that despite media and social media attacks, no one was courageous enough to criticise him face-to-face (Sportdog, 2014)

Bicommunal Sports Activities. Regarding bicommunal events, in contrast to cultural activities that were the most popular in terms of participation of people, sports activities were the least common along with and environmental ones (The Management Centre of the Mediterranean & NGO Support Centre, 2011, p. 113).

The first bicommunal activity to take place in the field of sports was the Doves Olympic Movement, which represented an attempt on the island of Cyprus to utilise sport and related activities to build trust and skills of peaceful interaction between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot children. The purpose of the project was to enhance favourable development and relationships between youth from the two communities, and was conducted by the Centre for Leisure, Tourism, Sport Research and Development of the University of Nicosia. (Kartakoullis & Loizou, 2009, p. 1656) (Lyras, 2014, p. 247). According to Alexis Lyras (2006, pp. 88-89), (2005, pp. 7-9) founder and President of Olympism For Humanity Alliance, The Doves Olympic Movement was an educational sports initiative founded in 2003 which aimed to utilise the Millennium Developmental Goals of the United Nations under the principles of the Olympic Movement. Through this program, children, parents and instructors from diverse backgrounds came together and engaged in activities. The Doves Olympic Movement program aimed to use sports to achieve stability, peace, personal development and promote social inclusion. In the summer of 2005, the Doves Olympic Movement conducted the first bicommunal educational sport initiative on Cyprus, The Doves Olympic Movement Summer Camp 2005 pilot program that was the first step to a four-year long initiative. The aims were to provide new generation in Cyprus with the essential resources to facilitate them in overcoming long-held negative beliefs and practices of the past by encouraging Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots to develop a better understanding on the needs of each other, interethnic tolerance, individual friendships and patterns of working together in the pursuit of common goals. Lyras (2006, p. 89) claims that his field experimental research preliminary analysis indicated changes in attitudes and behaviours of the participants and in specific the breaking down of stereotypes and prejudice of children and instructors.

The most significant example of sports bicomunal initiative is the Washington D.C.-based, non-governmental organisation Peace Players International (PPI). PPI is the only all-year, bicomunal youth sports organisation in Cyprus. Its activities bring together Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot youth to play basketball, learn and build positive relationships beyond traditional mistrust and the physical barriers to interaction posed by the divide (Peace Players International, n.d.). Data from 2008 record that, PPI in Cyprus had about 150 youth involved in weekly basketball practices and twelve teams in six places on both sides of the Green Line. In every place, they have one female and one male team. Different teams play in different tournaments and competitions arranged for them, so the youth come together and play. They also hold events in special occasions where other youths in both communities are invited to take part in their activities. During the 2006-2008 period, they have worked with about 1000 young people (Fröström, 2008, p. 20).

As Kartakoulis & Loizou mention (2009, p. 1653):

“When dealing with non-institutionalized activities, the activities of sports can be perceived as being great socialization agents [...] in some instances, the nature of a collective sports programme and the possibilities offered by its sports policies could have an impact on its members’ feeling of belonging.”

This seems to be the case with the PPI. Orhun Mevlit, a member of the PPI, thinks that the initiative may not affect the society in general, but that on an individual level they have a remarkable impact. They give young people a meaningful spare time, and create a place where it is acceptable for them to come together and play, no matter who they are. Change in behaviour of youth is visible and is judged as important. (Fröström, 2008, p. 21)

The Lefkos Academy (TLA), a Cypriot school that admits students from both communities, is related to PPI since it constitutes one of the Cypriot sites where PPI tries to perform its activities and build contact and communication. The TLA, in general, aims to create a team spirit amongst students even though they come from different communities through compulsory sport in its curriculum. However, as Shaw’s (2014, pp. 270-271) field research shows, sports do not always work in a positive manner since Turkish Cypriot students choose to abstain from afternoon sports

activities. These students do like sports but do not enjoy or value sports inside the school, while they prefer to play sports at home. In the TLA case, students benefit from everyday school contact in general, but sports do not function as a means of rapprochement between classmates. On the contrary, the decision of the Turkish Cypriot students to play sports at home enhances their in-group identity. Shaw (2014, p. 272) argues that the TLA is a mirror of Cyprus where people attempt to integrate through British-style education, yet when they cross the divide and return back to their community they are faced with the reality of societal division.

Conclusions on Sports Activities. In general, sports bear both a positive and negative potentiality towards contact, tolerance, stereotype-breaking and rapprochement, depending on the manner they are utilised. As Kartakoulis and Loizou (2009, p. 1654) claim, “*sports are a means to exalt the natural being of an individual.*” On the one hand, when practicing sports, people interact at different levels than they would do in a normal social setting, thus being able to reconsider and overcome fixed perceptions and behaviours. Communication, cooperation and trust built in sports could be transferred to other walks of life. On the other hand, sports and in specific popular sports can function as a channel of building and preserving ethnocentrism and introversion and as a means for promoting the use of violence in order to achieve goals.

Concerning non-institutionalised athletic events that fall in the category of bicomunal activities, the effect seems to be more positive towards promoting rapprochement with the example of TLA showing the dangers oversimplified and hurried approaches bear.

Individual contact among youth appears to be a key goal of bicomunal, sports efforts. As the PPI claim (Peace Players International, n.d.) “*children who play together can learn to live together*”. These attempts are based on the premise that sports build individual contacts that can deepen and create communication and trust that will enhance rapprochement. Literature indicates that socialisation through sports is particularly evident in younger generations. As indicated by McPherson (1977, pp. 18-19) sport may be an agent of social change to enhance socialisation (the ways social interaction through which people develop, extend and modify their conceptions of who they are and how they relate to the social world around them) and transmission of cultural sensitivity since social meanings are transferred from generation to generation and undergo changes in the process. Thus, socialisation through sports occurs through

real, imagined or anticipated social relationships. Hence, through sports, the individual can contact and decide his level of interaction with the players who are from the other side (Shaw, 2014, p. 270).

Furthermore, children's participation in sports is largely influenced by the manner in which sport is integrated into their life, particularly through the influences of family. In other words, the most important thing is how the children's interpretation of the sport experience is mediated through relationships with others. This in turn translates in the transmission of basic values through family. (Kartakoullis & Loizou, 2009, p. 1654)

As the vision of the director of TLA was to build a sense of togetherness, an element the Cypriot communities were missing, sports can facilitate such a venture. However, although education, in general, and sports, in particular, can be a means to promote coexistence in Cyprus, there is a need for education to overcome its current partisan positioning that promotes the historical and political interpretations of each community to the exclusion of the other's respective narrative (Shaw, 2014, p. 263). Overall, like cultural heritage, sports will pay whatever the Cypriot communities make out of them.

The fields of culture and sports demonstrate the equal capabilities of such activities as promoters of discord or peace. Depending on the specific type of activity and current political realities, they can be seen as negative or positive and depending on the circumstances as more or less influential towards these trends. While cultural activities seem more dependent to heritage use and the momentum of different identities, sports activities are more prone at reflecting political realities.

In part IV of the thesis, I presented the data on the three main parameters/categories; CSOs' and NGOs' activities, economic interdependence, and cultural and athletic activities. The underlying element of all parameters is that the activities take place under the political and social division on the communal level and constitute the bicomunal exception to the ethnic divide rule. All sets of activities seem to be equally capable of boosting or reducing stereotypes, as well as to influence the conflict in both a positive or negative manner. The degree of their contribution to the transformation of the conflict towards a peaceful or more frictional course remains quite hazy. In the next part, I analyse the data presented in this chapter. In order to do so, I use specific theoretical tools, as set in chapter 9 of the third part of the thesis; 1) contact

hypothesis, contact theories and interdependence theories for CSO and NGO activity, 2) theories of economic interdependence and the contact hypothesis for economic activity and 3) contact hypothesis and peace-through-culture approaches for cultural activity and contact hypothesis and peace-through-sports approaches for sports activity.

V. Discussion

In part V of the study, I analyse the data presented in part IV. In specific, I analyse data on the three parameters/activities of the thesis (CSO and NGO activity, economic activity and cultural and sports activity) under the prism of the theoretical background as well as the specific theoretical tools set in the theoretical part. I use the images and stereotypes theory and the sociological approaches to conflict as well as the selected theoretical tools (contact hypothesis, complex interdependence, pluralism and economic interdependence and peace-building through culture and sports) for examining and analysing the data. Through the data analysis I present the results of the thesis and try to answer the research questions; Do CSO and NGO activity, economic activity and cultural and sports activity influence stereotypes in the case of Cyprus? In what degree and in what direction do they do so? Has this influence on stereotypes any impact on the transformation of the Cyprus conflict? Are there any direct ways in which activity categories impact conflict transformation? Lastly, beyond data analysis based on theoretical background and tools, in part V I also include the overall results of the dissertation.

13. Civil Society

General Remarks. The study of the CSO and NGO activities offers important information on the role and capability of the civil society to contribute to stereotype-breaking and consequently to conflict transformation or towards the opposite direction.

In general, Greek Cypriot CSOs and NGOs do not enjoy the trust of the society. Mistrust is based on obscure funding, political dependency and negative depiction by the media. The above reasons, that feed mistrust, naturally influence participation, which is considered as low. Low participation can be also explained due to the high partisanship in the Republic of Cyprus. However, membership seems to be moving in line with the EU average. Concerning their impact in policy-making and their ability to hold the state accountable, organisations do not seem to be that effective, or in the eyes of the optimist, not that ineffective. This lukewarmness can be partly explained by the factors that also cause low trust of the society as well as by the low trust they enjoy among decision-makers. It is important to note though, that impact on policy-making and accountability is higher on the local level compared to the national one.

The Turkish Cypriot civil society has to demonstrate a period of high mobilisation in the early 2000s with its heyday being the pre-Annan Plan referendum period. In the northern part of the island, quite controversially, over time CSOs and NGOs are a means of expressing opposition to the status quo and the, each time, dominant domestic political forces. At the same time, they are more or less economically dependent from motherland Turkey. A big issue tormenting the Turkish Cypriot civil society is freedom of expression. CSOs and NGOs have not only been breached and infiltrated, but also overtly or covertly persecuted from time to time. Citizen participation is low but it is higher than in the south. a big drop due to the disappointment by the Greek Cypriot “no” to the referendum followed the high participation of the pre-Annan Plan referendum period. Given the economic dependency from Turkey and the freedom of expression situation, Turkish Cypriot civil society is not effective in holding the community decision-makers accountable and its contribution in influencing policies is insignificant.

Stereotype-breaking and Conflict Transformation. On the whole, bottom up approaches, meaning ones that would actively include CSOs and NGOs in the peace process, have never been actively tried in Cyprus despite the fact that such an option has been identified early in the development of the conflict. In any case, what research shows is that the public opinion is, and feels ignored concerning important political decisions and the peace process is detached from the concerns and fears of the citizens. An important indicator for this is that community leaders are accused of being responsible for major mistakes and of serving the interests of the “motherlands” instead of the ones of the nations they are supposed to represent. This is the reason why CSOs and NGOs use as their main weapon in confronting stereotype and rapprochement, unofficial contact initiatives.

Contact and Interaction. As contact is seen as one of the most important means for achieving reduction of prejudice and breaking of stereotypes, physical division heavily influences the case of Cyprus. The Green Line is a huge barrier in contact efforts despite the fact that restriction of movement is less and less strict and thus contact is more and more easy. The culture of division is an everyday life experience, including from living separately and age-long isolation among communities to *acquis*

communautaire and trading goods restrictions. Psychological division and socialisation in ethnocentrism are also serious impediments to contact.

All the above create and maintain a culture of non-communication that is constantly fed by the language and narrative of the conflict, mutual non-recognition strategic choice and the media that reproduce and sustain stereotypical depictions and perceptions.

Despite the fact that the opening of crossings offers new contact opportunities, quality of contact and trust remain low. Willingness to coexist is not that high, while intention to mingle families is out of the question. Even the quantitative aspect of contact, meaning visits to the other community, is low with visits declining for a long time before being stabilised. Furthermore, big parts of both communities refuse to visit the other side at all. On the other hand, the trend of not visiting at all is declining too. Contact with the “other” is getting to be more accepted in time and person-to-person encounters have some impact that cannot be depicted in statistics. The same stands for young people that believe in personal contact as a means of rapprochement but show a low degree of contact and interaction that only increases with age. In general, however, Cypriot youth do not intend to befriend fellow youth from the other community. What stands for both younger and older Cypriots is that the tool of online communication is facilitating contact by, at the same time, allowing them to avoid feelings of guilt and treason and behaviours publicly discouraged in the own community.

Tolerance and Trust. People in both communities are relatively tolerant towards not only the “other” but also to people from different racial, religious and linguistic background in general. Data show that Cypriots associate with people from different religions and ethnic origins to a degree equal or higher, compared to other EU peoples. Discrimination is an existent issue but it is on the same level with other EU countries. Statistics imply that discrimination is mainly based on the mistrust of the “other”. Although this is a known issue, CSOs and NGOs show little contribution in fighting it. Their effectiveness is contained to people working in organisations that show low levels of discrimination. However, this finding is also questionable since people with a non-discriminatory background are also more prone to work in civic and non-profit environments in the first place.

As a result of contact, tolerance, and interaction comes trust. In the case of Cyprus reciprocal mistrust is the main trend. Turkish Cypriots are more sceptical in

trusting than the Greek Cypriots. A positive sign concerning trust is the fact that stakeholders on both sides have identified mistrust as a big issue that should be faced in order to build cooperation.

Cooperation. Considering all the above-mentioned parameters of contact, interaction, tolerance and trust, findings on cooperation towards the direction of stereotype-breaking are not promising, since this aspect demands structured and joint work on specific goals. There are instances and cases where cooperation between members of the two communities occurs, always depending on the each-time political temperament. Of course, given the physical and psychological divide, like all other aspects of human interaction, cooperation is restrained. However, compared to the pre-division era, it is more widespread across the political spectrum and seems to follow a growing trend. In addition, despite the fact that fanaticism prevails, it is more and more socially accepted to cooperate with the “other”.

Overall, cooperation is perceived as limited and various factors are considered to be impeding it. The Turkish army presence, the divide and the lack of solid synergies are some of these factors. The Green Line, beyond being a concrete and psychological obstacle to cooperation, is also an opportunity. Some CSOs and NGOs are established in the buffer zone facilitating cooperation and bearing a new symbolism for it.

Participation in Bicomunal Activities. The most important aspect of civil society contact and interaction that bears the potential to lead to the building of tolerance, trust and cooperation in the case of Cyprus is bicomunal activities. There is a wide acceptance among Cypriots that non-communication has fed the conflict in the past. Bicomunal activities aim at rebuilding contact and communication and, through these, at fighting stereotypes and prejudice against the “other” exactly because of non-contact and non-communication. Although a first glance seems to show that such activities influence stereotypes positively, researchers and even supporters of bicomunal contact accept that the impact of bicomunal activities is hard to evaluate. Moreover, it is common for CSOs and NGOs to fall into self-selection bias when evaluating impact (Evans & Wydick, 2016), (Jennings, 2012). Although there are no related data on Cypriot organisations, there are indications of the phenomenon in reports.

Regardless of whether bicomunal activities are effective or ineffective towards confronting stereotypes or even enhancing stereotypes and prejudice against their aim, there are several obstacles in the way of organising CSOs, NGOs, and citizens that render participation burdensome and difficult. In the past, participants and organisations were initially characterised naïve and idealistic in their efforts before being stigmatised as unpatriotic and traitorous for contacting and working with the “other”. The nationalistic mainstream, including political parties, political organisations and the media, were systematically against bicomunal events and were characterising participants as betrayers and conspirators.

Another barrier that both sides face is the recognition issue. On the one hand, the Greek Cypriot authorities avoid endorsing bicomunal activities under the fear of providing recognition to the Turkish Cypriot regime. On the other hand, Turkish Cypriot authorities fear that bicomunal events offer international recognition and status to the Greek Cypriot side. Given these facts, there are many occasions where organisations do not wish to carry the burden of being the ones offering recognition to the “other”. In fact, the recognition issue has been a manipulation tool in the hands of decision-makers on both sides. According to the each-time political conditions and interest, they characterise cooperation as profitable or harmful for Cyprus. Occasional crises, like the Florakis Naval Base incident, confirm this trend but also offer a more optimistic face of bicomunal relations. The phenomenon where crisis instances enhance collaboration and promote rapprochement has also been noticed in the Mediterranean region in the 1999 Greco-Turkish seismic diplomacy (Pasamitros N. G., 2010).

In general, it is difficult for CSOs and NGOs to find and mobilise participants for bicomunal events. All the above factors combined with poor promotion, visibility, and rarity of co-sponsored or co-organised events by organisations from both the north and the south render the activities unpopular. Participation of CSOs has risen after the Annan Plan referendum due to external funding accompanied with obligatory conditions of bicommunality. Although Turkish Cypriots were disappointed by the referendum result, their community is the one that, over time, participates more in bicomunal events. After 2003, crossings are allowed and Greek Cypriots demonstrate higher participation in the post-referendum era.

Beyond the physical, political, ideological and psychological negative factors mentioned above, there is a stain following bicomunal activities. Due to the direct or

indirect involvement of IGOs, INGOs and foreign state funding, bicomunal activities are associated with an imposed solution to the Cyprus problem that is, according to some prevailing historiographies, equally imported to bicomunal antagonism on the island.

Bicomunal Events and their Importance. In the 1990s, where bicomunal events became more widespread, they mostly served the purpose of establishing a, more or less, lost contact between the community members. In the conflict resolution field, efforts had started in the 1960s, before the division, by pioneers such as John Burton, Herbert Kelman and Ronald Fisher. Like bicomunal events in general, the effectiveness of conflict resolution activities is ambiguous and hard to estimate. In qualitative terms, such events offered the participants new skills and constituted the alternative to ethnocentric and nationalist approaches. Again, like all bicomunal events, conflict resolution activities carry the burden of being perceived as imposed by external actors, acultural and insensitive to local realities or even neo-colonialist. Other important bicomunal events work at building contact and relations between young Cypriots, in order to pave the way for a reunited island in the future and attack stereotypes at a young age. In other cases, the focus is nature and the environment so Cypriots get to work together on a common goal and for their mutual benefit. Others revolve around sports, trade, labour, culture and other issues always with the underlying aims of contact, cooperation and trust-building.

Value of Bicomunal Activities for Peace and Conflict Transformation. The value of bicomunal activities in terms of its impact on stereotype-breaking and conflict transformation is debated among researchers and practitioners. As mentioned, many times before, the impact of such activities is difficult to measure. However, there are certain facts that highlight their importance. Firstly, from 1974 to 2003 bicomunal events were one of the few means of contact across the physical divide between the two communities. Secondly, Cypriots in both communities tend to value the importance of bicomunal activities judging them as positive towards peace and rapprochement. Perhaps Cypriots, through these viewpoints, express their desire and need for contact. Even in this case, if we take into account Image Theory that presupposes behaviour is based on the people's perception of reality, bicomunal activities have some positive contribution per se. Thirdly, while public participation in bicomunal events is

discouraging, especially after the 2004 referendum, CSO and NGO involvement is more frequent and deeper. Lastly, the importance of bicomunal events derives, not only from the attempt to alter perceptions of the “other” and fight prejudice and stereotypes but also from the fact that they also have the immediate goal to influence the policy agenda and hold decision-makers accountable.

As citizens tend to evaluate bicomunalism positively, in terms of establishment of contact, trust and friendship-building and bicomunal culture deepening, the need for CSOs to attract more citizens in activities becomes imperative. Breaking the popularity deadlock would weaken the image of the activities as, real or imagined, externally imposed. Furthermore, if organisations do not manage to mobilise citizens in bicomunal contact, there is a possibility as time goes by, for externally funded bicomunal projects, addressed to limited audiences to become a professionalised part of the problem rather than part of a future solution. In fact, this parameter is already on the table, and not only in the case of Cyprus. CSOs and NGOs, that have been created and exist because of the conflict and its consequences, are many times considered to be, intentionally or unintentionally, for the perpetuation of the conflict rather than for its resolution.

Ineffectiveness and low participation are not the only obstacles to stereotype-breaking and rapprochement. Civil society includes many actors and some of them have nationalistic agendas, based on ethnocentric historical narratives of the “motherlands”. Actors, like the Orthodox Church, in several occasions oppose unofficial rapprochement efforts by promoting intolerant positions or by monopolising cultural heritage and by using it as a symbol of division. One step further, other organisations like politicised sports fan groups or the Grey Wolves promote or even use different forms of violence.

The biggest obstacle of all for CSOs is the issue of dependency. Data show that, in both the north and the south, civil society is dependent on political parties and international funders. Political parties dominate civil society and, in that way, CSOs are unable to diversify. After 2008, the environment is more enabling for civil society activities since decision-makers have, at least superficially, recognised the significance of civic organisation in the society. The Annan Plan era, along with the Europeanisation process have contributed to this recognition. However, CSOs remain dependent on political parties and this is always a debilitating factor. Concerning international dependency, external financiers are, in a way or another, setting the agenda of projects

they fund. In many instances, projects are considered western-centred, neo-liberal and neo-colonialist. A positive development in that matter is that, as civil society ripens, conflict resolution approaches become increasingly Cypriot-owned. Finally, professionalization of CSOs, that leads to retreat of social mission and volunteerism and favours the constant pursuit of funding, render organisations inefficient and part of the problem rather than part of the solution.

CSO Activity and Interdependence. As I mentioned in the theoretical tools chapter, part of the analysis of the data is based on the theoretical acknowledgement of interdependence that identifies multiple non-state actors as important in shaping international and intrastate realities and the, opposite to the realist, notion that power does not always play the central role in contemporary international reality.

On the one hand, in the case of the Cyprus conflict, current divided reality is set by military power and especially the Turkish foreign intervention in the island. On the one hand, power politics definitely play an important role in past and current developments. The “Motherlands”, Greece and Turkey, cast their shadow over the island by directly or indirectly influencing policies of the communities. In the case of Greece, influence in the realist sense is fading as Greek Cypriots enjoy EU and Eurozone membership and Greek economic hardships from 2009 and on, turn the motherland’s attention to domestic issues. In addition, recent readings of the history of the Greek role in the division of Cyprus render its involvement unpopular to both decision-makers and citizens. Concerning Northern Cyprus, Turkish influence is significantly higher. It is not only the constant Turkish presence and the settlement policy that defines reality but also international isolation that creates a relationship of severe dependency between Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot community. This dependency is often evident in politics, society and economy.

On the other hand, power politics become less apparent with the passage of time. Intercommunal violence has vanished and decision-makers do not comply that often with what the “motherlands” dictate. Although the Cyprus problem persists, movement across the Green Line is now allowed. What is more, the EU space, despite the fact that it carries the Cyprus issue within its core for more than a decade, does not favour hostilities and surely offers a mechanism for the appeasement of power politics and coercion. Soft power is nowadays more relevant in Cyprus in the sense that the communities, more or less, favour the path of co-shaping their fate. Civil society is a

considerable factor in this effort. The power of civil society lies in its potential to create a trend of contact and cooperation that could drag decision-makers to negotiate more often and more persistently and in its capacity to offer the fertile ground to decision-makers to render a potential agreement accepted by the people in both communities. In both cases, the peace process becomes more open to the Cypriot civil society and society. Influencing policies and holding decision-makers accountable as much as possible enhances potential solutions that enjoy wider acceptance in society.

CSO Activity and the Contact Hypothesis. Bicomunal projects, activities and events aim at establishing, or for others restoring, contact between people of the two communities. Certain approaches consider contact as the first step in achieving interaction, tolerance, cooperation and trust. According to Gordon Allport's Contact Hypothesis, interpersonal contact is an effective way to reduce prejudice between majority and minority group members. For that to happen, certain conditions, as described in the theoretical part, need to exist for contact to be effective.

The first condition is contact under equal status. Contact under equal status is difficult to achieve in the case of Cyprus. While organisers and participants attend bicomunal events as equals with similar backgrounds, the difference between the north and the south in terms of quality of life, wealth, professional and personal development opportunities is significant. The international isolation and the suspension of the *acquis communautaire* in Northern Cyprus deprive Turkish Cypriots. On the other hand, the 2003 opening of crossings has increased opportunities for population in the north and narrowed the inequality gap. This by no means brings the Turkish Cypriots on a level with the Greek Cypriots.

The second Contact Hypothesis condition and an important aspect of bicomunal contact is setting and working on common goals. Regarding short-term goals inside projects or series of projects, a superordinate goal might not always be that clear. However, bicomunal contact for CSOs and citizens is a means to meet with the other and promote rapprochement. In that sense, participants and organisations come at the same table willing to reconcile or at least to coexist. Common interests, purposes and goals deriving from this, sometimes clear and sometimes indirect, aspiration set a basic superordinate standard. Restraints in CSOs and NGOs functions by dependency mentioned above may blur the agendas and hamper common goal-setting. However, common goals are a matter of each bicomunal event and in most of the cases the

subject-matter of the project sets them for organisations and participants. One cannot say that bicomunal activities have an overall, set direction but most of individual events are goal-oriented efforts.

The third prerequisite is cooperative work without competition. In general, one cannot say that there is no competition among CSOs and that the environment is always a cooperative one. Depending on the mission and vision of each one, organisations might engage in competition. Especially between CSOs that support rapprochement and ones that have ethnocentric orientation, competition is given even when they belong to the same community. Competition may also occur on the individual level, inside projects between participants, since bicomunal events include strong emotions and disagreements due to real or perceived incompatibility of interests. However, cooperation, especially while citizens attend willingly, is the overarching principle of bicomunal activities.

The fourth criterion is personal interaction between group members. Given the nature of bicomunal contact, personal interaction is ensured. Bicomunal projects presuppose the interaction of community members in an informal setting and in conditions that would not cause anxiety and discomfort to participants.

The final condition of the Contact Theory is the support of an authority or a normative sanction to intergroup contact. This authority should support equal attitude and discourage in-group - out-group comparisons. On that field, the Cypriot environment does not facilitate the contact precondition. One might say that the various diplomatic missions, institutions or the United Nations play the role of this authority. Still, the most important potential facilitators of bicomunal contact are the governing authorities of the communities. The governments of the two sides do not uniformly support intergroup contact. As said earlier, support or discouragement of bicomunalism depends on the, each time, political conditions and interests of the authorities. In the recent past, participants and organisers have been stigmatised, intimidated, and scapegoated on both sides. The post-2003 era signalled a loosening of the authorities' negativity to bicomunal events and the post-referendum time the recognition of the role of civil society in the resolution process. Thus, while the precondition of authority support is evidently not established in the case of Cyprus, as time passes and conflict transformation pushes non-nationalist, non-coercive approaches to the mainstream, authorities tend to somehow recognise and accept the importance of civil society in the peace process, at least superficially. This means

neither that decision-makers fully support bicomunal events, nor that political parties do not influence CSOs.

Experimental research on intergroup contact in Cyprus, in many instances shows that direct contact tends to result to positive attitudes towards the “other”. The same stands for indirect contact but in a lesser extent.⁵⁰ On the contrary, negative effect of contact is often overlooked. Most researchers focus on the positive effect of contact and neglect the existence of a negative one, often argued to be more influential than the positive. However, as Paolini et al (2014, p. 548) demonstrate in their four-country experiment research that includes Cyprus, even negative (direct and indirect) contact and its effects can be buffered by positive and diverse intergroup contact in the past and thus limit the potential for negative spiralling of intergroup relations. In any case, there are no recorded, negative effects of contact that have led to the deterioration of intergroup relations. The fact that citizens engage in contact voluntarily, weakens its negative effects, compared to involuntary contact where the effect is higher. Anyway, as Levine and Hogg (2010, p. 472) note people that engage often in intergroup contact tend to report both positive and negative contact and at the same time show lower prejudice towards the “other”. In addition, they point out that while some researchers may maintain that in some cases segregation is the optimal solution to reduce conflict, the striking failure of all walls in modern history to build good neighbourly relations shoots down their argument. What is more, there are no violent incidents involving citizens’ crossings to the “other” community and no frictions between citizens in bicomunal meetings. In the worst case, citizens after attending bicomunal events return back having confirmed their image for the “other”.

As direct contact can lead to positive perceptions and attitudes, the same goes for extended and vicarious contact. Extended contact refers to positive attitudes deriving from the knowledge that members of the in-group have contact with ones from the out-group. Vicarious contact is the reduction of prejudice through the observation of group members’ contact that occur as by-products of direct contact. Such forms of contact influence prejudice and stereotypes but in a lesser extent. For example, the fact that there is a significant rate of crossings shows the willingness to contact the “other” and the influence of indirect contact to individuals. Undoubtedly, the number of

⁵⁰ A prominent example is the research of Maria Ioannou on attitudes of Greek Cypriot female students towards the Turkish Cypriot community (Ioannou, M. (2009): Comparing Direct and Extended Contact in Cyprus. *Journal of European Psychology Students*, 1, 1-10.)

crossings followed a declining trend in the 2006-2010 years (that is connected to several other factors including the disappointment of the Annan Plan failure) but now seems to get stabilised with an upward tendency. Online contact is also important, especially for younger generations, because on one hand it surpasses the physical divide through the use of the internet space and also works as a follow-up opportunity to previous direct contact. Some Cypriots, that otherwise would not leave their comfort zone and attend bicommunal events and some others that wish to sustain and strengthen direct contact, engage in online contact.

Contact and Conflict Transformation. As also indirectly stated in the previous part, breaking negative stereotypes and prejudice through contact on one hand and contributing to conflict transformation through contact on the other are two completely different issues. As data show, contact may influence prejudice and related attitudes and have an impact on negative images but there are no outright indications that contact is directly related to conflict transformation in the case of Cyprus. Data indicate that quality of contact seems to correlate with the reduction of stereotypes in the case of the Greek Cypriots but not in the case of Turkish Cypriots. Contact theorists may argue that this disparity is the result of ineffective contact, meaning contact that does not correspond to the criteria set by the Contact Hypothesis. Realistic Conflict Theory would identify the inconsequentiality of CSOs and their activities in a greater realpolitik world of real or perceived scarcity of resources. Theorists following the Social Identity Theory may argue that those that seek to attribute interpersonal traits to intergroup relations there is an arbitrary shift of the level of analysis by. In addition, they would turn researchers' attention to in-group favouritism instead of contact and its criteria. The Self-Aspect Model of Identity approach in a way supports the study of contact theorists since it combines psychological aspects and social cognition by suggesting that experiences are interpreted through self-aspects that can be both collective and individuals. Thus, in a way contact might bring to the surface interpretations of perceived reality based on individual self-aspects and make ones based on collective, socially shared self-aspects. Given the Social Categorisation Theory approach on the nature of stereotypes that accentuates that they are fluid, variable and context-dependent perceptions obtained through the prism of group membership, reducing stereotypes and promoting rapprochement through contact is possible.

What is evident through the research on Cyprus is that the low performance of the CSOs and NGOs to hold decision-makers accountable and to significantly influence policies on the Cyprus Issue, hampers the effect of contact on stereotypes and conflict transformation. Even the potential to facilitate decision-makers in rendering an agreement more easily accepted by Cypriot citizens, is sapped by low trust in both communities. As Charalambous and Christoforou (2015, p. 160) point out political parties view civil society engagement as secondary at best and as implementers and communicators of state agenda at worst. Thus, it is not only the influence party politics have on civil society but also its devaluation by political parties that further marginalises their influence.

14. Economic Interdependence.

General Remarks. As expected, the physical division of Cyprus affects economic and trade transactions, and restrains the economic effects of EU membership. This division creates an economic cleavage between the two communities, with the south achieving growth and the north being economically underdeveloped, isolated and dependent on Turkey. This cleavage further complicates resolution by breeding and sustaining economic obstacles. In addition, the recognition issue causes problems in entrepreneurship and trade, like in the civil society sector. The economic future of a Cyprus that would have resolved the political issue preoccupies all Cypriots. Greek Cypriots fear that they will have to pay a high cost for integrating the poor north and that a future opening to the Turkish market would overrun local business. Turkish Cypriots fear that the Greek Cypriots will economically dominate them. All these fears might be real but at the same time, data show that the benefits of a resolution would be high for all Cypriots. Lastly, as the EU accession-without-resolution showed the Greek Cypriot perception that time is on their side and that they would avoid sharing the pie with the Turkish Cypriots proved to be false. long-term profit of resolution seems as a more attractive choice (Ηρακλείδης, 2002, p. 323).

Contrary to CSOs and NGOs, the goals and motives of entrepreneurs and merchants are profit-making. Thus, profit-related incentives motivate them to get involved. It seems that a Cyprus free from the current conflict would constitute an environment of increased profit opportunities for businesspersons and traders.

Businesspersons, apart from being less ethnocentric in matters related to their work, have also a different perspective on the overall economic situation of Cyprus. Turkish Cypriots perceive the current economic situation in the north as being in a fundamental structural crisis and wait for increased economic opportunities on all sectors from prospective resolution. Greek Cypriot businesspersons believe that resolution would open the vast Turkish market to Cyprus and help exploit further EEZ reserves. Consumers' behaviour shows that Greek Cypriots are less willing to purchase in the north than Turkish Cypriots in the south. Yet, this trend might fade along with the Cyprus Issue if resolution occurs.

In general, economic interdependence seems to be facilitating a future resolution since businesspersons, through mutual benefit, engage in interaction and cooperation at their own initiative and will, and thus create profit and welfare ties. In addition, economic interdependence would facilitate a potential resolution in its implementation since the waiver of current barriers will boost mutual profit and welfare and consequently common interests.

Business: Working together: Mixed Enterprises, Employing and Being Employed by the “Other”. Economic cooperation is, in general, existent in Cyprus but there are no extensive joint business ventures, island-wide projects, or exchange programs for professionals that would indicate structured and established large-scale cooperative efforts. The ACT and the Economic Interdependence projects have backed and funded most efforts in the field. Additionally, official bodies such as the Greek Cypriot Chamber of Commerce and the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce have backed economic initiatives. The participation of the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce is important as it enjoys international recognition, unlike most institutions and bodies in the north.

Cooperation is existent between businesspersons from the two communities with data showing that there is a generally positive drift for professional cooperation among Turkish Cypriots while for Greek Cypriots opinions are equality split.

It is very common for Turkish Cypriots to be employed in the south with social security data not showing the whole picture since undeclared work is a widespread phenomenon. This fact does not only increase bicomunal cooperation but also increases the labour income of Turkish Cypriots and contributes in closing the intercommunal income gap.

The Field of Tourism. Given the geographical location and the climate of Cyprus, tourism is a very important economic sector for both communities and has a continuous contribution in boosting development. Data on the field of tourism show that, not only the tourist industries of the two communities are not competitive to each other, but that in fact tourist products and services can be supplementary and that a joint tourist strategy would benefit Cypriot-wide tourist professionals. Obstacles to tourism originate from the political issue and relate to psychological barriers and the property problem. Data show that Greek Cypriots sometimes discourage tour operators and agents from creating tour packages that include Turkish Cypriot destinations. Research shows that Greek Cypriot hotel managers are not willing to cooperate with Turkish Cypriot managers while Greek Cypriot tour operators and tourist agencies are willing to collaborate. In quantitative terms, current cooperation is low and willingness to cooperate is somewhat higher with Turkish Cypriots being more open to the eventuality. What brings optimism towards cooperation on the tourist field is that, on both sides, most people believe that a resolution of the Cypriot issue will lead to a win-win situation.

In the case of Greek Cypriot tourist professionals, contact theory tested by Webster et al was not confirmed, since Greek Cypriot tourist businesspeople that employed Turkish Cypriot employees did not show any increased will to cooperate with similar Turkish Cypriot businesses. However, in the case of Nicosia, willingness to collaborate is greater due to its urban, cosmopolitan character.

Intra-island Trade and Spending on the Other Side.

Trade. The *acquis communautaire* suspension heavily impedes trade in Cyprus. Although the Green Line Regulation eases economic activity and allegedly facilitates intercommunal trade, legal barriers along with political and psychological ones create difficulties to trade. Many professionals that attempt to trade across the divide face difficulties. The lack of information is one important impediment that is usually surpassed by traders through addressing the Chambers of Commerce, which try to utilise to the utmost the Green Line Regulation. Despite the difficulties though, intercommunal trade has an augmentative drift. In total, intercommunal trade is marginal (5% of the total trade activity) but there is an upward selling trend of goods coming from the other side. Furthermore, these transactions mostly occur through personal contact or initiative of the buyer.

Trade of utilities is also an important interdependence sector. The positive precedent of the Florakis Base incident has established stable cooperation in the field of electricity. Such trade, beyond mutual profit also builds cooperative governance structures among the communities.

In general, unwillingness to trade with the “other” is not the primary reason for low performance in Green Line Trade for the Turkish Cypriots. Other reasons that reduce profit, like lack of procedural knowledge, bureaucracy, long procedures that make products perish, no advertisement, no knowledge of the consumption needs of the other side and hesitation to dare intercommunal trade are above unwillingness due to political reasons. People already engaged in such activities are supportive of further measures to facilitate trade. In general, however, Greek Cypriots are negative towards Green Line trade. This attitude reflects political positions. One significant difference is that while for the Turkish Cypriot economy Green Line trade is significant, given the economic isolation and stagnation, for the Greek Cypriots it is not equally vital. One step further, the limited success of intercommunal trade reflects the antagonistic attitude of the communities on the trade sector which reflects the respective perception on the Cyprus problem.

Spending on the Other Side. An important economic activity is the direct spending of the members of each community on the other side. This kind of transaction seems to be more influential in creating contact, in immediate terms. The opening of crossings has positively affected retail market on both sides. In specific, consumers and shopkeepers on both sides see the opening of the Ledra/Lokmaci crossing in the heart of Nicosia, which is on the historic commercial street of the city, as a positive development. Micro-level trade liberalisation along with civil society activities gives a bottom-up dynamic to the historical centre.

In Cyprus, economic interaction on various sectors could favour resolution in two main ways: 1) by creating economic interdependence and thus leading the communities to a positive entrapment where cooperation leads to significant absolute gains. In this case, people need from decision-makers to resolve the conflict so that they can unfold their full potentials. This aspect of economic interaction has a bottom-up connotation. Moreover, 2) by enhancing and solidifying contact between citizens of the two communities and in that way making it easier for decision-makers on both

communities to “sell” a political agreement. This side of economic interaction is more the cultivation of the ground for a top-down solution to be applied.

The Potential Contribution of Economic Interdependence to Conflict Transformation. As theory suggests there is a relation between resource access and the perpetuation of conflict. Economic interdependence and mutual profit can promote positive-sum mentality and solutions. In Cyprus, these potentials are not only hampered by the divide but also by psychological obstacles. For the Greek Cypriots, cooperating with Turkish Cypriots and profiting through this, is dressed with the fear that any interaction could provide legitimisation to the regime in the north. Turkish Cypriots drive themselves to self-victimisation through the fear of inferiority. Often Green Line trade is perceived as a humiliating experience by both sides.

Researchers of the Cyprus intercommunal economic interactions claim that most of the economic interdependence benefits derive from Green Line movement of people rather than by official Green Line trade. For some approaches, economic interaction of the business and trade sectors in Cyprus bears a potential for reconciling the communities since crossings and spending on the other side have multiplied in a short period of time and economic interaction occurs with minimal encouragement. According to others however, growth models may lead to the preservation of conflict due to the perpetuation of social inequalities. For example, degrowth theorists claim that the trickle-down effect of growth, meaning the diffusion of part of the wealth sourcing from the enrichment of the already wealthy, is not enough as it does not address the central issue of justice (Demaria, Schneider, Sekulova, & Martinez-Alier, 2013, p. 199).

Business, Trade Interaction and Economic Interdependence. The preoccupation with the data on intercommunal business and trade and their analysis vis-à-vis stereotypes and conflict transformation in Cyprus is based on the notions of pluralism and economic interdependence. According to these approaches business transactions are better conducted by non-state actors and commerce promotes societal peace through the exchange of ideas between traders, the emersion of scepticism on one’s own customs, the creation of networks beyond borders, the cultivation of a spirit of careful consideration of own interest and the creation and establishment of regulatory rules. One step further, economic cooperation and interdependence tie conflicting

parties through mutual gain and interests and create a “positive entrapment” that promotes and sustains peace and renders conflict unprofitable.

As mentioned earlier, the Turkish military intervention largely shapes Cypriot reality. “Motherlands” are very important business and trade actors for the two communities. For both, and especially for the Turkish Cypriots, reliance on the motherland leads to established economic ties. Greek Cypriots enjoy the liberal benefits of the EU memberships while Turkish Cypriots live in a restricted environment regulated by provisional treaties. Willingness to work and do business together with the “other” varies according to the social group. Although Cypriots do not grasp the potentials, there is a rise in intercommunal economic interdependence. Mutual benefit, profit and common interests are factors that are easier in mobilising Cypriots in interacting and cooperating. Given the prosperity of citizens in the south, more incentives need to be given to Greek Cypriots in order to boost intercommunal economic cooperation. For the Turkish Cypriots, the opening of crossings and the Green Line Regulation, even though they are restrictive, are a big opportunity to boost an underdeveloped and isolated economy. As data show, economic cooperation occurs with minimal encouragement. Except from projects that aim at boosting business cooperation, Cypriots pursue joint economic ventures at their own initiative. Motives for such ventures could further boost such cooperation.

Economic interaction and cooperation have an impact on conflict transformation on all levels. The Florakis Base incident shows that high-level cooperation is possible and mechanisms established through crises can be sustained and lead the way to further cooperation. Tourism and trade show a limited degree of cooperation that could be exploited further, and spending on the other side, shows that Cypriots, not only are willing to spend and interact with each other but also that they believe such interaction is beneficial for conflict transformation.

Profit through business and trade could constitute an important factor towards conflict transformation, if their potentials are fully utilised by Cypriot professionals, through intense cooperation and institutional facilitation. Social groups that have stakes and could lose by deterioration and profit from resolution could exercise significant pressure to decision-makers. Accordingly, decision-makers could be entrapped in an environment of economic interdependence and bandwagon with such a trend. Finally, on the individual (cooperation between businesspersons) and the group level (Chambers) contact can lead to less prejudice and stereotypes.

Business and Trade Interaction and the Contact Hypothesis. Contrary to the civil society activities and CSO and NGO bicomunal projects, contact is not the primary aim of intercommunal economic activities. Contact comes with interaction and cooperation in the way to achieve common benefits. Yet, contact occurs in economic interaction and the Contact Hypothesis is an applicable explanatory tool in this case.

Like in the case of civil society contacts, equal status in business and trade contact is hard to achieve. The purchasing power, professional choices and business opportunities are not the same for the two communities. Greek Cypriots come from a prosperous and functional economic environment, work with the strong Euro currency and enjoy the EU membership privileges. Turkish Cypriots live in an economy of severe dependency and isolation, in a suspended EU acquis environment and use the Turkish lira for their transactions. In addition to economic capabilities inequality, perceived inequality is also significant. The fear of inferiority recorded in the Turkish Cypriot community leads to self-victimisation and consequently to unequal status in contact.

Contrarily, the superordinate goal, accentuated by Contact Theory as a prerequisite for effective contact is existent. Business and trade either if they refer to joint activities or to cooperation and interaction contain the common goal of gain. When professionals engage in such activities, they aim at profiting from them. Even in the simplest case of spending on the other side, where there is a vender-consumer relation, both aim at profiting from the transaction.

When it comes to the cooperation without competition criterion, the nature of economic activity complicates things. Business and trade often nurture competition. Competition in many instances contributes in the flourishing and evolution of these fields. In the case of effective contact though, competition, according to Contact Theory does not facilitate the fighting of prejudice and stereotypes through contact. As seen in chapter 11, there are several occasions where competition arises either because of zero-sum realities (i.e. hotel bed-nights) or due to zero-sum perceptions (intercommunal business is zero-sum like the Cyprus Issue). Unfair competition is also an issue where the “other” creates obstacles for products from the other community. Refusing advertising or utilising bureaucratic regimes are among such unfair practices that not only discourage effective contact but also block economic interdependence in total. On the other hand, when cooperation is already established, the common goal mentioned above puts competition aside.

The fourth prerequisite of Contact Theory is personal interaction between members of the groups. In most business and trade activities, partners meet in person at least in the beginning of collaboration and usually again in fixed meetings in order to arrange, refresh and adjust strategies in the pursuit of maximum profit. In the case of buying on the other side, purchasing requires personal contact between the customer and the seller. Furthermore, individualised communication between sellers to buyers creates stable purchasing relations and repeated personal contact.

Finally, Contact Theory sets the prerequisite of the support of an authority to intergroup contact. Like in CSO and NGO-led bicomunal activities, in the case of economic interaction there is no clear authority or regime that supports contact. The Chambers of Commerce of the two communities could be considered such authorities. The two chambers have constant cooperation in the course of time and in addition, the Turkish Cypriot Chamber is one of the few bodies recognised by Greek Cypriots as well as on the international level. There are also several initiatives (led by corporate social responsibility projects and IGOs) that encourage and fund joint business ventures. The Green Line Regulation could also be counted as a supportive regime since it aims at facilitating movement of goods for as long the acquis is suspended, yet its limited effectivity is often seen as an impeding rather than a facilitating factor. Nevertheless, support of governing authorities is questionable. On the official level, such initiatives are encouraged but there is also an unstable environment where signs can be either negative or positive, following the political climate. The Greek Cypriot psychological barrier of offering recognition and betraying the country is based on discouragement by ethnocentric viewpoints of political reality. For Turkish Cypriots, the fear of inferiority and self-victimisation lead to hesitation in doing business with the “other”.

Negative contact may also occur in the case of business and trade activity. Like in the civil society contacts, there are no negative effects of contact recorded leading to the deterioration of intergroup relations. Contact occurs voluntarily by professionals and customers, that wish to engage and thus negative effects of contact are minimised. As mentioned above, people that often engage in contact tend to report both positive and negative contact and at the same time demonstrate lower prejudice. Given that, negative experience reported from employing the “other” by Greek Cypriots, does not lead to worsening of intergroup relations. Actually, the fact that business owners continue to employ Turkish Cypriots also shows that the benefits from working with

the “other” are higher than the loss. Otherwise, employers would have moved to another, better option. The alternative proposed for avoiding negative contact is no contact. In the case of business and trade, this is an unrealistic option since it is impossible to completely restrict movement of goods in the contemporary globalised world and furthermore such a choice would lead to loss of profit greater than in any other eventuality, an occasion that would be highly unwelcome by professionals. Again, as in the case of civil society contact, the worst instance is the confirmation of a pre-existing negative image.

Indirect contact also bears a degree of importance in overall business and trade contact. Extended and vicarious contact maximise the influence of direct contact. In the case of spending on the other side, as the culture of shopping contains the transmission of shopping habits, extended contact may lead to direct contact for more in-group members when goods and services obtained by the ones already contacting, are judged as being of quality. As for professionals, the aforementioned antagonism that occurs in all business and trade activities might lead from indirect to direct contact in the attempt to provide as much and even more than the in-group professional competitor. All the above lead to more contact be it direct or indirect. The rising trend of doing business, working and purchasing from the “other”, along with the dynamic of intercommunal trade and business are the result of the aforementioned direct and indirect contact and of the routinisation of intercommunal business, trade and spending.

Business and Trade Interaction and Conflict Transformation. Like in the case of civil society contacts, business and trade interactions may relate to stereotype and prejudice-fighting but there is no certain indication that they also directly contribute to conflict transformation. According to data, economic benefit is a significant motivating factor for Cypriots to pursue some kind of settlement or resolution in the political issue. In that sense, economic interdependence contributes to conflict transformation depending on the degree of interdependence between the communities. Data on feelings for having the “other” as a business partner show that both communities have mixed sentiments (Greek Cypriots are in general more negative than the Turkish Cypriots). This fact, on the one hand indicates that contact is not often or not effective enough and on the other, that Cypriots are open to future cooperation. When tourism professionals were asked about the current situation in relation to their work, the majority of Greek Cypriots believed that in both communities there is a loss

followed by a significant number that says the Greek Cypriots lose and the Turkish Cypriots benefit. 2011 data showed that most Cypriots see economic benefits as a factor motivating them to find a solution and contrarily to the Turkish Cypriots' fear, Greek Cypriots claim to be even more motivated by the potential economic benefits of a settlement than the Turkish Cypriots. The majority of the Turkish Cypriots think that there is a loss for their in-group followed by those that believe both communities lose. The results show that most Cypriots think that there is loss from the current situation for their in-group. Furthermore, the majority in both sides thinks that a settlement would benefit both. Based on these findings, both communities would prefer increased economic interdependence rather than the present reality. On the utilities sector, the example of the Florakis incident and the cooperative governance channels created, show that rapprochement structures for future solutions can be established through economic interdependence in the instance of emergencies. Spending on the other side might also create a perceived positive climate for future conflict transformation. Data from the Ledra/Lokmaci opening show that in both communities, people believe that the opening will have a positive impact for Cyprus. The "air of normality" created would be important for people wishing and accepting a future solution. The "positive entrapment" is the key factor for promoting conflict transformation through economic interdependence. It could be a means of pressure and at the same time an impetus for decision-makers, not only to avoid deterioration of relations but also to pursue resolution.

The input of Realistic Conflict Theory in this aspect of the Cyprus Problem would be that competition might arise from real or perceived scarcity of resources. Most of the sectors of existing or potential economic interdependence could have a share for all professionals as in many cases, goods and services are supplementary and manage to cover a variety of needs. The example of hoteliers' competition over bed-nights is an exception that proves the rule. However, even hotel services is a domain of real competition that could change into a domain of cooperation. For Realistic Conflict Theory, contact is not sufficient to promote conflict transformation. Only a superordinate goal is capable of enhancing cooperative action. In the case of business and trade in Cyprus, as shown above, the superordinate goal is existent and this is maximisation of profit. However, zero-sum perceptions and attitudes, favoured by ethnocentric viewpoints and the political environment create perceived barriers.

The explanatory significance of Social Identity Theory is evident in the case of Turkish Cypriots employed in the south. According to the theory, individuals seek for positive distinctiveness. If the Greek Cypriots are perceived as the high-status group and the Turkish Cypriots as the low status group in an uneven intergroup relation, the latter seek for positive distinctiveness through individual mobility. Individual mobility in this case is achieved through employment in the south where members of the Turkish Cypriot community improve their personal status.

Overall, economic interdependence in Cyprus seems to be dynamic, with great potentials that are not fully utilised. Institutional, political and psychological obstacles impede interdependence and consequently the positive effects of contact that go with it. Conflict transformation is promoted by interdependence and could be further promoted as interdependence is expanded. Pressure coming from a cooperating and coordinated merchant class (meaning business and traders) from both communities could be influential on decision-makers' policies towards resolution. Profit as the driving force for cooperation could constitute an element of "positive entrapment" for professionals and could lead to influence high politics too.

15. Culture and Sports.

Culture and Bicomunal Contact.

General Remarks. As culture is a set of knowledge and habits that determine understanding and behaviour, in Cyprus the cultures of the motherlands have dominated reality for many years. Recently, the underlying Cypriot culture has surfaced as an identity that stands above the ones of the "motherlands". Data show that the majority of Cypriots do not support the Huntingtonian notion that differences in cultures and civilizations cause conflict. This goes against ethnocentric readings of the conflict. Moreover, school curricula in recent years follow a more reconciliatory stance towards the "other". Anyway, experience shows that along with cultural differences there exist significant cultural similarities too.

Eurostat data show that Cypriots have a big interest in intercultural events. This interest finds a fertile ground for expression in the island due to its cultural heritage richness. However, cultural heritage in the island is a source for boosting both rapprochement and friction depending on the instance.

Bicomunal committees and projects work on the preservation of cultural heritage and nurture professional and personal contact between working members.

These activities offer communities the opportunity to appreciate their cultural heritage, get trained in cooperation, build trust and engage in joint decision-making.

In other instances, culture and religion foster conflict and fuel ethnocentric and nationalistic viewpoints and narratives. It is common, in both communities, to hear claims that the in-group protects cultural heritage while the out-group destroys it, by performing ethno-cultural cleansing. Often, both sides instrumentalize heritage to legitimise their claims and support their policies on the Cyprus issue. In other occasions, heritage is ethnicised in order to be monopolised and serve ethnocentric narratives and aims. In the case of cultural heritage, there are instances where contact functions as a negative, stereotype-enhancing factor. Crossing to the other side and encountering destructed or converted sites of the past oftentimes enhances in-group anxiety and the sense of loss. Beyond enhancing rapprochement or strife, heritage also functions as the manifestation of mainstream cultural wealth in the expense of other, minor cultures. This reading of culture promotes bicomunalism and devaluates lesser cultural traditions of Cyprus. In that case, cultural hybridity is perceived as abnormality.

Intercultural Understanding. According to the intercultural understanding approach, culture is capable of promoting peace and conflict transformation. All aspects of culture can be the tools for the promotion of perceptions and attitudes that foster conflict transformation. Experience shows that political and economic solutions are not enough to sustain peace.

Culture as a tool for contact and cooperation, intercultural dialogue, intercultural understanding and protection of heritage are important for fighting stereotypes and prejudice. Intercultural dialogue and understanding facilitates the engagement in interactions that help meet the “others”, learn (or relearn) about their culture and cultivate tolerance for diversity. Additionally, it helps individuals and groups understand, through exploration, that cultural differences in the case of Cyprus are not that big and that in fact cultural similarities are a lot. Caring and acting about heritage sites promotes the universal value of culture and the benefits that come with its protection and site preservation.

Professionals working on common projects breed intercultural understanding and disseminate it through their work. Individuals visiting their former hometowns on the other side pay their tribute to a lost culture or a lost cultural site, and many times through a tense psychological procedure, manage to leave it behind and move forward

to shape a new culture based on current realities. Moreover, by visiting hometowns and former houses they engage in cultural encounter with current inhabitants of their old houses and villages, practice tolerance and explore cultural commonalities. In that way, stereotypes and prejudice are reduced through cultural tolerance and acquaintance.

On the contrary, intercultural understanding may not be feasible in other cases. Many times, manipulation and misappropriation of culture by ethnocentrism and nationalism lead to polarisation, with culture and heritage sites being the point of reference. Dividing cultural narratives may boost strife through in-group – out-group distinctions on cultural elements and sites. Ethnocentric approaches often point out the negligence or systematic destruction for “our” heritage and the care for that of the “other”. Cultural differences are in this case exaggerated in expense of similarities. When this image comes to the surface, the in-group slips to the existing viewpoints where the collective identity of the “other” is not accepted. This rejection of identity, along with cultural insecurity, brings to the surface collective memories of prejudice and repression, victimisation and unwillingness to contact the “other” (Ηρακλείδης, 2002, pp. 326-327).

Cultural meetings may be negative too. Visiting old hometowns and family houses on the other side may confirm the destruction of “our heritage” narrative and confirm stereotypes. In addition, the presence of the “other” in now converted cultural sites may create feelings of anxiety and agitation to current inhabitants. In these instances, stereotypes may be sustained or even enforced.

Culture and the Contact Hypothesis. As seen earlier, contact between the two communities also occurs in a cultural context. Depending on the setting, these contacts can be judged as effective or ineffective towards confronting stereotypes and prejudice.

Regarding contact in a cultural context, the equal status criterion is better fulfilled than in any other contact category examined above. Communities attend contact on equal premises. Both bear two cultural identities a Cypriot and a “motherland” one. For both there is a lost heritage trapped on the land of the “other” and both have nowadays the opportunity to visit. One might claim that Turkish Cypriots are a cultural minority in absolute terms but the strength of the bicomunal reality in expense of lesser cultures shows that they do not face cultural suppression. On that matter, Greek Cypriots might in comparison claim, that the ghost of the Turkish army

is a more tangible danger for Greek Cypriots. In addition, as Turkish Cypriots admit, the constant flow of mainland Turks in Northern Cyprus poses an internal threat to the Turkish Cypriot culture.

Common goals, is a matter that depends on cultural contact. In the case of structured, bicomunal projects common goals exist and are set by the aims of the activities. The overall goal is the preservation of diverse cultural sites and the preservation of the common Cypriot cultural heritage. When the case is individual or group visits to places of origin on the other side, the goal is the same for visitors no matter the community they come from but it is not a common one. The same stands for preservation of heritage under an ethnocentric context where the goals are opposing and are tied to conflictual nationalistic narratives.

The same applies for intergroup cooperation. Cooperation exists when individuals and groups come together under a project. When people visit former towns and homes, the nature of cultural activity does not include cooperation. In several instances though, current inhabitants of towns, villages and houses, in a way cooperate with visitors from the other side by offering help in various manners. Current owners invite visitors in their former houses and current inhabitants help visitors find family and religious sites and old neighbours, and in that way cooperate in their heritage quest. When cultural activity is connected to ethnocentric viewpoints, ventures are antagonistic from the beginning and thus cooperation is non-existent.

Personal interaction in an informal setting is also fulfilled in cultural settings. People participating in projects meet in both a work environment and in a friendly one. People visiting the other side usually interact with people in their places of origin in their cultural visits. Only in the case of antagonistic cultural encounters, in several occasions, members of the communities do not meet and rely on information by ethnocentric sources.

Finally, as seen in other contact settings, there is not always support from the authorities. Depending on the political situation, bicomunal cultural projects may be backed or stigmatised. In other cases, ethnocentric cultural depictions and narratives are urged and thus, culture functions as an element of antagonism. Individual and group meetings to the other side occur because of personal or joint initiative without support from any authority.

Forms of indirect contact, in the case of culture can be both positive or negative towards prejudice and stereotype-fighting according to the political instance. Extended

and vicarious contact may lead to perceptions that are more positive. Furthermore, knowledge of and observation of contact of another in-group member may encourage more members to participate in cultural initiatives or visit the other side and thus, engage indirect contact too.

Culture and Conflict Transformation. Culture is a domain that can be approached perceived and utilised in different ways, which may lead to different outcomes. Contact and cooperation through culture are dynamic elements that may both facilitate rapprochement or boost strife. When intercultural projects and encounters occur in a setting of common pursuit, they facilitate rapprochement. In Cyprus, common projects carried out by professionals promote tolerance, underline common heritage and urge cooperation. Furthermore, they create platforms of cooperation that could be potentially useful for the future, they engage communities in common decision-making procedures and structures, and create and implement common strategies for development. Visits of places of origin on the other side, based on individual or group initiative, help Cypriots discover or rediscover common culture and reunite with old neighbours from the other community. Most importantly, people get to revisit family land and houses and reconceptualise them in today's terms. In that way, in many occasions, Cypriots are able to redefine cultural points of reference in current conditions and move forward by honouring the past but at the same time leaving its burdens behind. On the one hand, all the above may occur through overcoming stereotypes and prejudice for the "others" or by surpassing personal or group psychological burdens. Changing school curricula and including reconciliatory educational tools in school assist in this direction.

On the other hand, if cultural interaction is based on existing ethnocentric viewpoints, it may function in the opposite way. Strife may be preserved or even fed. The most common practice in this context is dividing cultural aspects and sites in the ones belonging to the in-group and the others to the out-group culture and identity. In this way, in-group culture is used in order to moralise "us" and out-group culture to devaluate the "other". In specific, in Cyprus it is very common to point out the neglect, disrespect and systematic destruction of in-group cultural heritage by the "other" and at the same time the careful treatment of their own and the generous treatment of their cultural heritage in the soil of the in-group. Such attitude preserves negative images of the "other" and underlines their "barbarism" in contrast to the civility of the in-group.

The contribution of culture towards conflict transformation is highly dependent on decision-makers' inclination. Both negative and positive use of culture is existent in Cyprus intercommunal relations. What is positive in recent years is that on the decision-makers' level leaders are dedicated to appeasing cultural conflict and, on the educational level, that school curricula have included reconciliatory tools and a narrative of Cypriot culture and "Cypriotness" in an attempt to leave behind ethnocentric narratives.

Sports and Bicomunal Contact.

General Remarks. Modern athletic activities and sports promote the values of peace, cooperation, friendship and noble competition. At the same time, they are a means of social and political expression for many Cypriots and a big industry that involves significant economic stakes. Eurobarometer data show that Cypriots value the ideals of team spirit and respect for others, promoted through sports. In the south, sport associations and clubs are quite popular and play a significant role in the athletic, social and political life of Cyprus. Associations and clubs are also very effective in getting their policy proposals approved by the Greek Cypriot government. Data on the Turkish Cypriot community show that athletic clubs are popular too. Clubs are the organisations with the most active members and very important in the socialisation of the community.

Sports as a Promoter of Discord: The Recognition Issue. As in many other facets of the Cyprus problem, the recognition issue emerges once more in the field of sports. The fear of political recognition leads Greek Cypriot authorities and organisations to persist on non-recognition of associations and federations in the north. This stance sustains a negative environment since it excludes Turkish Cypriots from many sport and sport-related activities and is interpreted by them as a persistent unwillingness of the Greek Cypriots to cooperate in the field.

The example of the CTFA, not only shows that the fear of recognition shapes the decisions of Greek Cypriot officials, but also that Turkish Cypriot decision-makers are equally unwilling to facilitate a resolution to the football federations issue. This stance shows that the Turkish Cypriot decision-makers prefer to maintain separate federations as elements of national and ethnic differentiation, even if this means isolation and international non-recognition. The status of CTFA and the absence of a Turkish Cypriot football league bear another repercussion; Turkish Cypriots turn to the

Turkish League and through that, Turkish ethnic affiliation is enhanced and local Turkish Cypriot and Cypriot identities are pushed back. Beyond indirect effects, discord in sports has also caused direct breakdown of political negotiations (for example, as in the case of the friendly game between Çetinkaya and Luton Town).

Greek Cypriot Football Fan Clubs: Negative Civil Society Actors. In the Greek Cypriot community, sports fan clubs, and mainly football fan clubs are negative civil society actors in the sense that, from time to time, they use hate rhetoric and violence. Greek Cypriot football fans, like the respective clubs they support, bear political and party affiliations. The Omonoia Football Club fans are associated with the working class, the AKEL Party and support the idea of a unified island where the two ethnicities would coexist on equal terms, while the APOEL football club fans are associated to the professional class, right-wing parties, and identify themselves as primarily Greek and hold nationalistic positions like the “*enosis*” doctrine. In some occasions, APOEL fans not only bear Greek flags but also swastika flags connected to extreme right and neo-Nazi parties. There is an obvious cleavage in football supporters, which reflects political and party divisions of the Greek Cypriot society. Football fans often clash with each other and use violence in the form of verbal and physical hooliganism inside and outside athletic venues to support the perceived correctness of their viewpoints.

Impediments to Individual Athletes. The political situation is not only impeding group athletic activity on the level of federations and clubs but also individual sport activity. In Northern Cyprus, due to the lack of international recognition, Turkish Cypriots are not allowed to participate in international sports competitions. They only have the opportunity to either compete under the national colours of a recognised state or engage in athletic activities in the Republic of Cyprus. In the latter case, they have to comply with the Republic’s criteria in order to bear the citizenship of the Republic of Cyprus⁵¹. Furthermore, Turkish Cypriot athletes face also psychological barriers, meaning that competing in the Greek Cypriot community is perceived as an act of treason. For Greek Cypriots, although formal restrictions do not exist, psychological

⁵¹ Naturalised Northern Cyprus citizens are characterised as “illegal settlers” by the Republic of Cyprus and do not have the right to cross the Green Line

obstacles are equally hard to overcome. On both communities, pressure from politics, media and sports fan clubs is high when in-group athletes decide to compete on the other side. Admittedly, sports bear a high symbolic significance in Cyprus. It is not only the fact that, in many cases, athletes that decided to compete on the other side withdrew due to political pressure that proves the fact. What is more, in at least one occasion, the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community personally intervened against a “traitorous” professional athlete.

Sports as a Promoter of Contact: Individual and Group Actions. In recent years, there are also examples of athletes that defied the negative precedent and decided to compete on the other side. Home fans received warmly Turkish Cypriot footballers that moved to the south to play for the Greek Cypriot League. The fan club affiliations are still obvious since it was not only that the athletes were signed by left-wing affiliated clubs but that also there were verbal insults towards them by opposition, right-wing affiliated fans. Nevertheless, there were no incidents recording physical violence or threats. Greek Cypriot football players that defied fan, media and social media attacks also moved to the north in order to play for Turkish Cypriot clubs. Like in the case of Turkish Cypriots going south, no face-to-face incidents were recorded either.

Greek Cypriot football clubs, professional and amateur players moved one step further by organising friendly matches with clubs from the north or with mixed Cypriot teams of professionals and other amateur players like UN employees and official negotiators.

Bicommunal Sports Activities. Sports have been also used as a means of contact and trust-building in bicommunal events. In specific, bicommunal activities that involve sports often bring together Cypriot children and youth. All activities aim at building contact and trust and transmit values like tolerance, friendship and cooperation among young participants. It seems that such activities have positive impact on individual relations and at the same time bypass the antagonistic environment of professional sports domain, which includes social and ideological infusion.

Promoting Values through Sports. IGOs, athletic federations, NGOs and the private sector often refer to the capability of sports to promote universal values

like human justice, equality, social development and social change and their usefulness as a tool for strengthening social ties, peace, non-violence and tolerance. According to these approaches, like in the case of culture, sports can be the means or tool to build contact, tolerance, trust, cooperation and conflict transformation.

Firstly, given the popularity of sports and athletic clubs in Cyprus, the impact of sports activities on both communities, be it positive or negative, is high.

If we take into consideration the conditions of long isolation and the trend of blaming in-group members that have contact with the “other”, the fact that individual professional athletes decide to have a career on the other side is a big step forward. These athletes promote the values of friendship, cooperation, tolerance and “Cypriotness”. Since professional athletes are very popular, especially among young people and children, their example reaches a big number of people and in specific in the future generations of Cypriots. Surely, Cypriot sportspeople do not enjoy global popularity. However, most of the ones that dare to work on the other side are football players and football is the most popular sport in Cyprus as well as around the world. Even if Cypriot media do not promote or promote in a negative way such moves, sports fans and sports club fans usually, follow the news from multiple sources. Football news travel around the world easily and rapidly through new media and the internet. Thus, role models that chose to contact the “other” or less popular athletes that decide to do so and become an example for fans have a big impact on sports audiences.

The same stands for group efforts to meet, be friendly and show tolerance to the “other”. Clubs or groups of athletes that organises matches between clubs from the two communities, or ones of mixed, or veteran teams, constitute an example, at least to their fan base. Such occasions bring to the fore the values of classic and modern Olympism. In specific, veteran games re-establish and promote individual contacts, mixed matches promote messages of rapprochement, and friendly, club matches create visions of an imagined future where a solution would have positively influenced sports.

However, excessive optimism and wishful thinking does not create realities. The impediments to athletes are big to overcome, especially for Turkish Cypriots where in many instances they may choose to work on the south because of no alternatives. For both communities, it is the exception to compete with the colours of a club of the out-group and it is not widely accepted. Even for Greek Cypriots, for whom there is no international isolation, psychological burden and ethnocentric pressure is a heavy load. On the group level, Turkish Cypriot federations remain unrecognised, clubs degraded

and sports marginalised. Even in the occasion of professional footballers' transfers and friendly matches between clubs there is always an ideological element. "Right-wing" clubs would not sign players from the other side. This means that the clubs that do sign players from the other side do it in a left-wing, ideological framework. Bearing in mind that all fan sides resort to ideological threat or use of violence, such moves kindle political differences and polarise fans and societies. Moreover, ethnocentric fan viewpoints and behaviours work as an aversive factor for athletes to follow their compatriots on the other side. What is more, media on the other community use such ethnocentric viewpoints and behaviours in order to point out hostile attitudes and confirm established stereotypes.

Concerning bicomunal sports activities, their significance seems to be high. Children and youth come together through sports, which is a setting that facilitates contact. Getting to meet with the "other" at a young age through the tool of sports helps to familiarise and cultivate tolerance. Of course, sports are not enough and schooling should complement face-to-face encounters with cool-headed narratives. The example of the TLA shows that sports is not a cure-all for youth.

Sports and the Contact Hypothesis. Be it positive or negative, sports are a significant contact point, means and tool for Cypriots. Sports offer a setting of universal values where contact is facilitated in order to fight prejudice and stereotypes. Regarding Contact Theory, sports activities do not seem to fulfil most of its criteria.

In the field of sports, the Cypriot communities are far from having equal status. On the one hand, Greek Cypriots enjoy full recognition of their federations, which are parts of the respective international bodies. Sports clubs and individual athletes participate in European and international competitions. On the other hand, Turkish Cypriot sports and athletes are unrecognised and embargoed (with the exception of south Cyprus for individuals). Regarding the status between the communities, inequality is again present. The Greek Cypriot competitions are professional and recognised, whereas the Turkish Cypriot ones are unrecognised and undeveloped. This has an impact on economic prospects of clubs since Greek Cypriot teams have access to international funding, sponsorships and broadcast contracts in contrast to Turkish Cypriot ones. In the case of individual athletes competing on the other side, terms are equally hard but again Greek Cypriot athletes have the opportunity to taste top-level

international competitions. Only in bicomunal sports events, youth and children attend and participate under the equality provided by the rules of sports.

On the common goals' criterion, beyond the overarching group and individual goals of applying and evangelising sports ideals as described above, the situation is complicated. While there are attempts from time to time to unify the football federations of the two communities (a development that could open the way for the unification of other sports federations), the two separate authorities do not have a fixed common goal. Greek Cypriot federations enjoy recognition and normality and do not feel any particular pressure for persistently pursuing unification. Turkish Cypriot federations and athletes remain stagnant by non-recognition and isolation, and are in need of some kind of status change in order to progress. Similarly, individual athletes do not have common goals. In the south, athletes enjoy privileges like all their fellow athletes in the rest of the EU, while in the north athletes seek a way to escape isolation and compete on a higher level. When talking about athletes that cross to the other side to compete, they all have the same goals (to compete and earn profit) but this does not mean they are common too. When it comes to participants of bicomunal athletic events, the case is the same like in CSO and NGO bicomunal activities, as they voluntarily attend or willingly let their children attend. In addition, the superordinate goals of sports matches and athletic games also get into the picture in bicomunal sports occasions.

The prerequisite of intergroup cooperation is dependent on the contact type. When it is about bicomunal sports activities, intergroup cooperation is existent. When it comes to federations and their recognition, cooperation is occasional and completely dependent on the criterion of the common goals. When athletes cross to the other side to compete, there is no intergroup cooperation yet there is individual one in the context of the sports club.

The criterion of personal interaction is fulfilled in all the above-mentioned sports contacts. Participants of bicomunal events, individuals competing on the other side and federations hold personal relations with their fellow Cypriots. The only relation described above, that does not involve personal interaction, is the negative contact between Turkish Cypriots playing in the south with fans of opposing clubs.

Finally, all contacts described above, do not enjoy the support of any authority, at least in a continuous fashion. Decision-makers, depending on the political circumstances, either back or oppose negotiations between federations. In most occasions, predisposition is negative and, in specific occasions, Turkish Cypriot

authorities pursue and cause the breakdown of negotiations. The stance of the International and European federations can be seen as facilitating settlement but the role of domestic politics is by far more important. When talking about bicomunal sports activities, the occasional support or opposition by decision-makers follows the same trend as in other bicomunal initiatives. Individual athletes working on the other side, not only lack the support but also face the direct or indirect opposition of domestic authorities. Sometimes, reactions of decision-makers are disproportionately big to the impact of signing with an out-group athletic club.

Extended and vicarious contact in the case of individual athletes on the other side and bicomunal friendly matches has a big impact given the popularity of sports and athletes and in specific football and football players. The impact is big on both fans and colleagues. Competing on the other side is a more accepted professional choice in recent years as there is an increasing number of athletes take this decision. The same stands for bicomunal sports events, as in the rest of bicomunal activities.

Sports and Conflict Transformation. Approaches based on Olympism and UN declarations accentuate the power of sports to promote tolerance and peace. On the one hand, the most powerful element of sports in that direction is its universal “language” and values and the radiance of individual athletes as role models to offer examples of behaviour to a worldwide fan base.

On the other hand, the intertwiningly social and political character of sports renders them a potential force of ethnic tension and strife. Nationalists have used the federations’ issue as a means of ethnic distinction in the north and as a tool of exclusion in the south. Fan clubs in the Greek Cypriot community are a negative civil society force and a promoter of violence. The ones that promote ethnocentric ideals do not only reject resolution but also confirm in the eyes of the “other” all the existing stereotypes. What is more, regardless if fans are supporting tolerance or ethnic hatred, the means of violence and imposition cannot, in any case, help a civil society-supported or a civil society-led solution to the Cyprus Issue.

The federations’ contacts, although unsuccessful so far, show that not only the two sides are willing to coexist and cooperate in this field but also that despite the obstacles they persist from time to time in their efforts. Through that, more negotiations on other fields are encouraged in the spirit that reconciling in specific domains can lead to a viable solution in high politics. Realistic Conflict Theory on unequal status groups

would point out that sport is another theatre of antagonism over real or perceived scarcity of resources and that all sports issues except the recognition one, are inconsequential. The intervention of the Turkish Cypriot leader in the federation talks would provide evidence for that.

Regarding bicomunal sports events, their contribution on conflict transformation is the same as the one of the CSO and NGO bicomunal activities analysed above. A special characteristic of the sports events is that in cases where they are successful in promoting conflict transformation, the gravity of this contribution is potentially higher since they address young people and children. Cultivating values and providing tools at young age has a potentially higher and more future-oriented impact towards conflict transformation. The use of such tools should be skilful in order to be effective. Nevertheless, the TLA example shows that sport is not a panacea for reconciling children.

Individual athletes working on the other side give an example of coexistence to a big audience, given the nature of their profession. An out-group member living among the in-group not only contradicts stereotypes but also offers a real-time example that coexistence is possible. Back home, those that oppose such decisions scapegoat the athlete. On the contrary, for those that are not against it, extended and vicarious contact offer a coexistence example back home. For fellow athletes, such professional moves encourage more to follow their example. In that way, a new sport, professional and contact trend is created and the communities get used to these types of relationships and mobility. This phenomenon for the Turkish Cypriots can be interpreted under the individual mobility concept of the Social Identity Theory. What is less optimistic in this individual mobility phenomenon is that the vicarious and indirect contact is not always effective. The example of the dispute between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia shows that while many athletes (mostly football and basketball players) moved to Greece to compete, this mobility did not have any significant contribution towards conflict transformation. It was rather perceived as the exception that proves the rule.

Overall, sports bear the capability to facilitate conflict transformation and at the same time to also boost strife. The former results from the values promoted by sports, and the latter from their social and political aspects. In Cyprus, there are domains, agents, and aspects of sport contact and athletic activity that promote conflict transformation and others that feed conflict. Decision-makers, media, CSOs and fan

clubs play a significant role on the occasional, positive or negative, contribution of sports to rapprochement. There are both positive and negative contributing elements. The positive can be summarised as follows: what Social Identity Theory calls individual mobility, occurs more often than in the past. Individuals that cross to the other side function as agents of rapprochement. There are persistent efforts by federations to resolve the status issue of the Turkish Cypriot ones. Bicomunal sports activities for youth are nowadays an established reality. The negatives contributing elements are: the scapegoating tactic of individual mobility by nationalists, the persistent unresolved federations' issue and the acts of Greek Cypriot organised fan clubs as agents of violence.

16. Results

CSO and NGO Activity: Results on Stereotype-Breaking. Summarily, on all three parameters of the thesis, there are conciliatory and divisive elements that affect stereotypes among Cypriot communities in both positive and negative ways.

Regarding the activity of CSOs and NGOs, socialisation in bicommunality through the continuous implementation of activities creates a positive entrapment in (at least occasional) contact. This contact may lead to a real or perceived realisation of mutual benefit through some kind of tolerant coexistence. Such intergroup contact, may lead to the reduction of stereotypes for the “other”. In addition, problematising or working on common civic issues, can lead to the direction of breaking stereotypes. What data show is that although CSOs and NGOs do not hold a significant power, are nowadays recognised by decision-makers as influencing actors on the conflict. The main contribution of civil society in the case of Cyprus is the attempt to create and sustain a trend of contact and cooperation that could on the one hand, create patterns of coexistence, and on the other render the peace process more open to the civil society and the society.

When using the theoretical tools set by the thesis, the influencing capability of CSOs and NGOs seems limited. When it comes to interdependence, there are external non-Cypriot forces that cast significant attractive powers to the two communities. For both communities, the “motherlands” exercise high influence that boosts ethnocentrism and preserves the conflictual conditions. Especially in the case of the Turkish Cypriot community, the power of Turkey is often overwhelming and casts its shadow on any significant civil society effort. For Greek Cypriots, the EU is the main driving

institution as it heavily influences political and social life since the 2004 accession, while also Greece remains a significant political companion. When it comes to civil society matters, apart from the Cyprus conflict and bicomunal events, the preoccupations of the organisations on the two sides seem quite different.

Likewise, the Contact Hypothesis is not confirmed in the case of Cyprus. No significant or at least no tangible results can be drawn. Advocates of the Contact Hypothesis would claim that the basic conditions for the amelioration of relations between majority and minority group members are not met in the case of Cyprus. Those that reject the theory would pose different claims. Supporters of Social Identity Theory would claim that inter-group relations remain antagonistic as in-group members, in their effort to enhance their self-image hold prejudice or even discriminate against the out-group. Realistic conflict theory would suggest that it is wrong to pursue contact criteria and that the right way is to try to remove the sources of competition that are in real or perceived scarcity. Overall, one could claim that there is a positive trend of establishing constant intercommunal contact and thus, of confronting stereotypes. At the same time, no matter the causes, the case of CSO and NGO activity in Cyprus does not confirm the Contact Hypothesis.

What is important to note is the existence of negative impact of CSO and NGO activity. This can be either intentional or unintentional.

Firstly, the existence of nationalist, ethnocentric and intolerant actors and their activity have a negative impact on stereotype-breaking. This is because, they not only spread viewpoints and act in the way of perpetuating stereotypes, but also, they promote and sustain a negative image on the “other”. The Orthodox Church and the Grey Wolves are the most striking examples in the Greek and the Turkish Cypriot community respectively.

Another issue that is often neglected is the quality of contact. Simpleminded approaches that all contact is good may have negative impact on stereotype-breaking. Hasty activities, non-professional attempts and other efforts that do not take into account the sensitivity of intercommunal contact may lead to opposite than the expected results. In the same line, bicomunal contact or cooperation can lead to the confirmation, and thus strengthening of existing stereotypes.

Another important aspect is the incompatibility between the agendas of CSOs and NGOs and stereotype-fighting. Not only negative civil society actors fall in this category. There might exist organisations that although include in their goals the

resolution of the Cyprus issue, they do not aim at confronting stereotypes. This might mean that in their way to achieve their goals they may have a negative impact on stereotypes.

Economic Activity and Economic Interdependence: Results on Stereotype-Breaking. When it comes to the parameter of economy, findings are not much different from the CSOs and NGOs. In this case, there are also positive and negative aspects of these activities towards stereotypes.

Entrapment through mutual economic benefit is the main positive element of economic interaction and interdependence. Doing business, trading, cooperating, employing and spending on the other side creates relations of mutual gains. Such activities establish and strengthen economic ties that, through contact and cooperation, can break stereotypes. Even when contact verifies established stereotypes, mutually profitable situations of cooperation feed understanding and tolerance for the “other”.

When employing the theoretical tools, that is the Contact Hypothesis, contact does not seem to meet all the criteria set by the theory. The most obvious difference is the gap of economic status of the two communities. Such a disparity is very important in shaping the reality in the highly antagonistic field economic and trade activity. On the contrary, the element that brings optimism is the superordinate goal of economic benefit that is also responsible for the positive entrapment.

On the negative side of things, working together, as already mentioned above, can strengthen through contact the already established stereotypes. Given that economic profit is the primary motive in these kinds of activities, antagonistic viewpoints can enhance negative images.

Overall, despite positive trends in contact in the frame of economic interdependence, the Contact Hypothesis criteria are not met.

Cultural and Sports Activities: Results on Stereotype-Breaking. The third parameter, that is cultural and sports activity, is again a mixture of positive and negative factors of contact. There are activities and actors that promote stereotype-breaking and others that preserve or boost strife and intolerance.

On the positive side, joint cultural projects and activities unite experts or non-experts under common goals. It is not only cooperation that influences stereotypes but also the meeting under a common cultural setting and the cultivation and emergence of

an identity of Cypriotness above “motherland” identities. Under this prism, culture and heritage are seen as of common ownership, contrary to antagonistic understandings and uses sourcing from ethnocentric viewpoints based on the “motherlands”.

Regarding the Contact Hypothesis, the parameter of cultural activity fulfils all criteria with only the occasional exception of the support of authorities. When it comes to cultural preservation, urban planning and other intercommunal projects where professionals come together, all criteria are met and people cooperate in a context where their professional capacity and the common cultural gains are above all other identities. Even in cases where non-professionals meet for cultural projects, working together can lead to the breaking of stereotypes through contact. Finally, contact also helps groups and individuals, not only see commonalities, but also realise cultural differences and cultivate respect and tolerance for the culture of the “other”.

Contrary to the stereotype-breaking functions described above, culture and heritage can also be used for defending ethnocentric viewpoints and nationalistic notions. In this case, under the Social Identity Theory explanatory framework, it is not only the “own” heritage that is stereotypically inferior to the one of the “other” and vice versa. It is also that the in-group is civilised and respects all cultural heritage under its patrimony in contrast to the out-group that is uncivilised and neglects the one of the others within its soil. Moreover, intercultural contact can also lead to negative results that enhance stereotypes. Crossing to the other side in order to visit in-group heritage places, can shock visitors. In these occasions, neglect and destruction can reinforce the ethnocentric viewpoints and the disrespect for the “other’s” heritage narrative and thus, lead to consolidation of stereotypical images.

When it comes to athletic activity, it seems that sports have, over time, been a promoter of discord than of stereotype-breaking. The issues of non-recognition have overshadowed or have been influenced by the respective recognition issues of sports federations. The fans of the most popular sports constitute negative actors in the sense that their political affiliations either promote ethnocentrism, intolerance and stereotypes on the “other” or, in the case of both nationalistic and left-wing affiliated fan bases, use violence or the threat of violence towards the ones that disagree with their viewpoints.

On the positive side, bicomunal events involving youth or adults, promote the spirit of rapprochement and in that sense boost stereotype-breaking through contact. In addition, in recent years, individual athletes have broken the deadlock and move to the

other side in order to work there. In these occasions of individual mobility, tolerant sports fan clubs have a positive contribution on stereotype-breaking by accepting and welcoming the “other” in their club “family”.

When it comes to the values of sports promoting peace, the impact of the sports spirit on stereotypes is limited. On the one hand, bicomunal events and individual mobility of athletes are in fact important as the outreach and impact of sports is significant. Direct or indirect contact spreads ideals of cooperation and tolerance through multiple channels. On the other hand, the non-recognition and marginalisation of Turkish Cypriot sports and individual athletes, the ethnocentric sports fans behaviours in the south and the great influence of Turkish sports in the north, have negative impact and preserve established stereotypical images.

Regarding the Contact Hypothesis, most of the criteria set by the approach are not met or, are just met on an occasional basis. The absence of equal status, stable common goals, continuous cooperation and support of authorities, show that the existent contact cannot be judged as effective towards fighting stereotypes, according to theory.

In total, all parameters of the thesis seem to have both positive and negative aspects in the direction of confronting intercommunal stereotypes. Despite the fact that there is a more positive trend towards the “other” and the re-emergence of a strong common Cypriot identity, stereotypes seem to be firm and ready to come to the surface, in strained political occasions. After all, confronting stereotypes cannot be very useful in a divided society. This is why it is important to draw conclusions on the impact of the activities examined, on conflict transformation.

CSO and NGO Activity: Results on Conflict Transformation. Concerning conflict transformation, although the role of CSOs and NGOs for influencing change in Cyprus is increasing over time, these organisations also carry the heavy burden of dependency, low trust by society, activity of negative actors and other, important, inherent deficiencies.

On the one hand, CSO and NGO contact and cooperation create a positive entrapment for organisation members, activities’ participants and decision-makers. Cooperation links and networks created can “trap” decision-makers in a social relation that does not comply with an antagonistic policy towards the “other”. In the extreme

case, if cooperation is firmly established, Cyprus could turn to an island where there would be a de facto transformation with a significant civil society cooperation, and antagonistic policy-making from the side of the decision-makers. All the above, are directly connected with the degree in which the civil society can hold the decision-makers accountable for their policies on the Cyprus issue. Moreover, this constitutes the weakest point of the CSOs and NGOs preoccupied with the transformation of the Cyprus issue, as on both sides organisations perform very low in this aspect. This low performance is accompanied by the low trust of people in such organisations. In total, CSO and NGO activity has contributed in the ripening of the civil society, rendering rapprochement and transformation approaches increasingly Cypriot-owned.

On the other hand, the negative or no impact results can be attributed to several factors. The main critique exercised to the CSO and NGO involvement in most conflicts, stands also in the case of Cyprus and has to do with the role of the organisations per se. In many occasions, CSOs and NGOs are considered a part of the problem rather than part of the solution. Nationalistic and ethnocentric civil society actors have conflictual motives and viewpoints, and act in bettering the position of their own community at the expense of the “other”. They represent hard-line positions and support no concessions policies, and do not exclude the threat, or use of violence from their toolboxes. What magnifies their negative impact is the fact that negative activity always attracts more attention and spreads broader and faster than positive activity. However, not only negative actors can intentionally boost hostility. Opportunist, sloppy and non-professional attempts can harm transformation efforts by approaching serious conflictual conditions with simple-mindedness. Moreover, a serious critique to the intervention of CSOs and NGOs is the professionalization hazard. Third sector experience and practice show, that it is common for CSOs and NGOs to retreat from their social mission and voluntary character and favour the pursuit of funding. Such phenomena are connected to the fact that CSOs and NGOs do not only aim in fulfilling their missions and visions, but also ensuring the economic livelihood of their members and staff. In the same manner, it is often claimed that CSOs and NGOs may turn to be for the perpetuation of conflict, as they need it in order to continue to exist. Furthermore, as data presented earlier show, CSOs and NGOs are highly dependent on political actors. This fact renders them no more, and no less reliable in transforming the conflict than Cypriot political actors. Even in the case where such organisations are free from domestic political influence and pressure, they, oftentimes, have their own agenda that

may be incompatible with conflict transformation of the Cyprus issue. This does not only stand for negative actors, but also for organisations that reflect the agendas of their funders.⁵² As IGOs, INGOs, foreign state and private institutions fund most of the intercommunal activity, civil society cannot be considered as independent. The example of the politicised character of humanitarian and foreign aid is quite relevant in Cyprus. Aid interventions often turn into dysfunctional and patronising relationships of western aid givers and beneficiaries and carry past burdens of imposition and even colonialism (Slim, 2002, pp. 1, 5). In analogy, such relations may occur in interventions where there are no humanitarian emergencies, but relations between donors and beneficiaries can lead to the imposition of solutions that bear no domestic ownership. As Vogel (2016, pp. 2, 13, 14) notes, although there is a significant in the support of civil society in order to integrate local perspectives into peacebuilding, most types of international support cause civil society actors to adapt their agendas to external priorities, and exclude alternative, less professionalised, critical voices.

Even in the cases where external funding comes with a full support for rapprochement, indirect external intervention inevitably comes with politicised positions. Experience shows that different approaches have not managed to lead to viable solutions to intercommunal conflict. Conflict Management methods, although they assume that conflict is a long-term process that requires time to be resolved, are often accused of objectifying groups as something to be controlled or driven. Conflict resolution implies that conflict is a phenomenon that requires resolving, neglecting processes of conflict saturation and maturation.

Overall, in terms of achievement, reality is rather discouraging on the impact of CSOs and NGOs in the transformation of the Cyprus conflict. All significant change that has occurred in the past stems from decision-makers and top-down approaches. Even in the cases where there was pressure exercised by the civil society, like the opening of crossings, the contribution of CSOs and NGOs was rather secondary. Despite the fact that there is increased acceptance of the potential role of such organisations by decision-makers, political and economic dependency weakens their influencing role, transformative power, and societal legitimisation.

⁵² Lidén et al (2016, pp. 10-11) claim that the EU has funded ethno-nationalist organisations in the past thus supporting negative actors. In addition, their field research shows that CSO and NGO representatives feel that although there is a process of setting priorities for funding, they feel they have limited input. Lastly, the demand of funders for measurable outcomes turns organisations to short-term projects with limited sustainability.

Economic Activity and Economic Interdependence: Results on Conflict Transformation. The parameter of economy and interdependence is not different from the civil society. Research shows that the potentials for conflict transformation are not deployed. One cannot also ignore the fact that the economic field grounds are equally fertile for feeding antagonism, as they are for rapprochement. In total, the capability of economic cooperation and economic interdependence to create a positive entrapment, that could influence high politics, has not been utilised.

There are important positive developments regarding economic cooperation, bettering the relations between the two communities. The Florakis Base incident shows that there is, not only the capability, but also the willingness to build structures of coexistence based on resources' management. Furthermore, the immediate response of economic cooperation in a case of emergency brings to the surface the opportunities for the creation of cooperative governance channels. Regarding everyday economic and trade activity, although the numbers are not very encouraging, what feeds optimism is that cooperation is alive even under harsh circumstances and that contact motivated by economic profit is real and is difficult to suppress. Moreover, the case of the Ledra/Lokmaci opening in Nicosia brings an "air of normality" that is important in transforming people's perceptions on the conflict.

With respect to the negative sides of economic interdependence, there are serious institutional, political and psychological obstacles that hinder contact and reduce potential change. The conflict is very much alive, especially for the Greek Cypriots, regarding psychological pressure and fear of offering recognition through economic transaction and cooperation. For the Turkish Cypriots, fear is the key element; a solution to the Cyprus issue is tempting due to the economic prosperity and opportunities of the EU, but at the same time, it bears the fear of economic domination by the prosperous Greek Cypriots. One step further, economic activity and the pursuit of gain can be perceived as zero-sum and lead to more strife. At this point, the explanatory power of Realistic Conflict Theory underlines the real or perceived scarcity of resources as the source of conflict. For international relations theory, the Realist approach would point out the pursuit of relative gains instead of absolute gains, as presented by Liberal theories. Degrowth approaches would present the same reasoning on antagonism but through a different route. Peace or economic models that present the trickle-down effect as a positive phenomenon, underplay the possibility of the preservation of conflict due to the perpetuation of social inequalities. So far, economic

prosperity has not proved to be enough for a solution to the political issue. In 2013, the Greek Cypriot president was elected upon hopes of reuniting Cyprus under the economic opportunity of the offshore gas extraction. Not only the two communities have not managed to find a solution under the prospect of profit, but the gas exploration and drilling operations have been a source of serious friction between the Republic of Cyprus and Turkey, thus worsening the prospects of positive developments on conflict transformation. All these factors lead to a burning question, posed by very different approaches to the issue: if the main driving force is profit, why would the Greek Cypriots seek for conflict transformation when profit is already satisfactory for them? Why would the Turkish Cypriots abandon their current embrace with Turkey that offers safety, or perceived safety, to risk, once again, marginalisation by their prosperous, fellow Greek Cypriots? Although it seems that economic interdependence can be a stronger factor for conflict transformation than CSO and NGO activity, no ground-breaking changes seem to occur.

Cultural and Sports Activities: Results on Conflict Transformation.

Findings of the present research verify that culture is highly interconnected to identity. Depending on the, each time, use of culture and cultural heritage, the influence on conflict transformation can be positive or negative. Culture and heritage are perceived and interpreted through the prism of identity and, at the same time, used to define identity according to the needs of particular groups and individuals (Pasamitros N. , 2017, p. 292).

When cultural heritage, cultural preservation, urban planning and intercultural projects are implemented, there are common goals among professionals or non-professional participants. In the first case, professional affinity and in the second intercultural cooperation, increase tolerance. Projects and decision-making on joint development enhance cooperation and bind communities into the potentiality of a common future. Visits on the other side may lead people (re)discover cultural commonalities, meet old neighbours and redefine cultural points of reference in current conditions.

When heritage sources from in-group unity and favouritism, it boosts ethnocentrism and nationalism and preserves strife. Such negative perceptions view culture and heritage under national ownership, thus exaggerating in-group – out-group cleavages and devaluating the “other” as inferior. As mentioned earlier, a common

argument is that the “other” neglects, disrespects and systematically destroys in-group cultural heritage while, on the contrary, the in-group respects and preserves all heritage under its patrimony, including that of the “other”. Such arguments back the claims of out-group “barbarism” and in-group civility.

In total, culture seems to be a field where cooperation flourishes more easily than the other activity fields. However, this does not mean that the impact on conflict transformation is significant. On the one hand, developments like the decision-makers’ stance towards appeasing cultural conflict and shaping common school curricula are on the positive side. On the other, underlining cultural differences in difficult political occasions, limiting cooperation to professionals and traumatising individuals through shocking cultural experience on the other side, do not favour cultural cooperation.

Athletic activity is a different story, as the overall impact of the parameter is mostly negative. Despite important bicomunal activity on the group and individual level, two important parameters preserve, and in some instances, boost strife.

The first and most important aspect of negative influence is the recognition issue of the Turkish Cypriot sports federations. The non-recognition policy of the Republic of Cyprus includes federations. In addition, non-recognition casts a negative shadow on politics, as sports are not only popular among people, but also constitute a huge market and an important tool of public and athletic diplomacy. Current reality has several implications for conflict transformation. Turkey embraces unrecognised Turkish Cypriot sports more and more in terms of influence, group activity and individual mobility. This embrace also strengthens sports’ economic ties. In the Greek Cypriot community, interconnection with Greece is also high and gets tighter and tighter, as the development of Greek Cypriot sports follows the Greek example. Under such influence, Cypriotness is not expressed as the “motherlands” overshadow sports in the divided communities.

The second is sports fans. Sports fans also bear a negative influence on conflict transformation. Greek Cypriot sports fans, use violence or the threat of violence towards the ones that disagree with their viewpoints. It is not only the fans of the sports clubs that are politically affiliated with nationalistic parties that exercise negative influence, but also the ones of the left-wing parties. The former, represent intolerance, ethnocentrism and conflictual attitude towards the Turkish Cypriots. The latter, although are tolerant and open to individuals and groups of the Turkish Cypriot

community, they provoke nationalists on both sides of the island through their violent behaviour towards dissidents.

Of course, like in all activities presented before (CSO, NGO, economic and cultural), there is also a positive side. There are significant bicomunal events that involve veteran and active athletes, politicians, prominent internationals and other symbolic figures and youth from both communities. In addition, individual mobility of athletes working on the other side is increasing over the years. All these positive elements cannot be overlooked. They all bear symbolic messages of rapprochement that, given the popularity and outreach of sports promote a culture of tolerance, coexistence and Cypriotness.

Overall, like in the case of stereotypes, all parameters of the thesis seem to have both positive and negative influence on conflict transformation. However, positive trends on contact and cooperation cannot reverse overnight a political legacy and a social reality established on division and fear, and shaped by conflict and violence, for many decades. Physical and psychological barriers render bicomunal efforts difficult. Habit, as the driving force of human life, has been built on separation and denial.

On the optimistic side, all parameters examined; CSO and NGO activity, economic interdependence and cultural and sport activity have some positive impact on conflict transformation. Contact, interaction, cooperation and tolerance trends, seem to somewhat change viewpoints of Cypriots. All parameters bear some positive influence on transforming bicomunal relations. This influence is hampered by inherent deficiencies of the actors and their activities. In addition, negative influence is contributing in sustaining and even worsening the existing conditions of the conflict. However, above all, positive or negative influence towards conflict transformation is of secondary significance. Official diplomacy and high politics, exercised by the main actors of the Cyprus conflict, have shaped, shape and will shape the fate of the island. Despite claims of liberal and pluralist approaches governmental actors (in the case of Cyprus the political authorities of the two communities) are the main intrastate conflict players. No matter how influential non-governmental actors are, no change can occur without the main parties of the conflict having the final say. This secondary, supplementary role of non-governmental, unofficial diplomacy actors is further limited, by their structural and functional constraints. Low legitimisation among citizens, poor capacity to hold the decision-makers accountable, economic and political attachments

to domestic and international actors and the professionalization trend, limits CSO and NGO activity. Zero-sum antagonism, fears of economic domination, growth inequality and recognition issues constraint the influence of economic activity an interdependence. In-group identity favouritism, exclusivist heritage use, cultural contact anxiety for cultural activity, and non-recognition of sports federations and fanatic sports clubs for athletic activity reduce the influence of culture and sports.

In the case of Cyprus, there are no outright indications that contact is directly related to conflict transformation. The effectiveness of Intergroup Contact Theory is not confirmed. Findings of the present thesis show that there is no direct or immediate relation between bicomunal contact exercised or encouraged by CSOs and NGOs, and conflict transformation in Cyprus. Stereotype-breaking and rapprochement efforts may have some pro-resolution contribution among public opinion in a future negotiation effort. In such a case, they may also prepare the societies of the two communities for coexistence through cultivating a culture of tolerance and change. Similarly, negative civil society actors seem equally ineffective in influencing conflict transformation. Occasional outburst of extremist behaviours and their increased publicity do not have the power to affect the conditions of the conflict. Nationalistic expressions and violence strengthen ethnocentric viewpoints or confirm established realities in the eyes of the people, but do not drive decision-makers in their policy decisions.

Regarding economic interdependence, there are no direct or immediate indications that contact and conflict transformation are related. Economic cooperation and exchange, although are on the rise and create more and more ties between the communities, have not demonstrated the capability to affect conflict transformation directly. Economic actors and bicomunal profit-making do not seem capable to significantly pressure decision-makers. Cypriots seem to either be satisfied with their current economic condition or favour it under the fear of negative change. Economic development and profit, although may feed antagonism, they do not seem to add up to the current state of affairs. Even military moves of the Turkish navy, related to Cypriot undersea drilling operations, are rather the tactical reaction of the “motherland” than the antagonistic questioning of the enormous economic activity of a multinational consortium.

Likewise, cultural and sports activity show no direct linkage to conflict transformation. Contact through bicomunal activities, (re)builds cultural links and

“rebrands” Cypriotness as a common identity that is more relevant to a common Cypriot future compared to the “motherlands” identities. Specific bicomunal cultural projects (like the Nicosia masterplan), elaborate ways of joint cultural understanding and tangible, future structures for coexistence. Nationalistic actors often employ antagonistic cultural use in order to praise in-group cultural grandeur and degrade the culture of the “other”. Such cultural heritage use preserves ethnocentric viewpoints and negative perceptions of the “other”.

In sports activities, the recognition issue diminishes any potential effects of contact. Greek Cypriot fan clubs are rather an expression and extension of party politics, rather than an independent political phenomenon that might individually influence the conflict in a negative way. Attachment of Turkish Cypriot sports to Turkey, preserve the existing situation. Individual mobility of athletes and bicomunal events increase contact, cooperation and tolerance but mostly affect the conflict in a symbolic manner.

Overall Impact of Unofficial Diplomatic Activity. All in all, civil society, economic, and cultural and sports activity bear the potential to positively impact conflict transformation in two different, not mutually exclusive, manners: 1) create a positive entrapment that would pressure decision-makers to negotiate a solution to the Cyprus issue, and 2) facilitate the decision-makers in “selling” an agreement for the Cypriot issue to their communities more easily. The findings and results of the present thesis, although they indicate certain influence of different activities on the conflict through contact, cooperation and tolerance, demonstrate that the creation of a positive entrapment is not possible. As I analysed in this chapter, the impact of activities is low, fragmented, and of short-term influence. The potential to render a political agreement more easily acceptable by citizens however, is significantly higher. In the present research I showed that, although the influencing capability of the activities examined in altering social trends in the Cypriot society is important, there is no direct relation between these activities and significant conflict change. High politics remain the primary force of stagnation or change. Unofficial contact remains secondary and complementary to official diplomacy. Non-governmental activity may also be creating perceptions and structures for a unified future for Cyprus. However, the final say on such a future lies in the hands of the Cypriot decision-makers.

Limitations of the Thesis. In Part III (Research Design), Chapter 7 (Approach, Methods and Data Collection) of the thesis, I presented the limitations of the present research. The multiplicity of factors and relations that rule international politics and intrastate realities is a huge challenge for the study of the capabilities of unofficial diplomacy in Cyprus. I attempted to take into consideration all the parameters, side parameters, bidirectional relations, external, structural and systemic factors that influence the contact – perception and the contact – conflict transformation relationships. In this attempt, I faced two constraints; firstly a doctoral thesis requires the extended analysis of a topic within a given timeframe thus one cannot broaden its scope too much in the effort to analyse all intervening factors of a phenomenon. Secondly, the Sociological Approaches to Conflict as theoretical tools offer more of a focused rather than an exhaustive, wide analysis of intergroup relations. Lastly, the use of mostly indirect sources creates additional limitations to the research of the phenomena. Due to lack of resources, I conducted a limited number of interviews with stakeholders inevitably turning the thesis to desk research. A field research seeking for qualitative data through interviews with stakeholders (representatives of unofficial diplomacy actors, decision-makers and active citizens) would enrich the study of influencing capability and perceived impact of unofficial diplomacy.

VI. Conclusions

The aim of the present thesis was to study the influence of the activity of specific non-state actors on established stereotypes and conflict transformation in Cyprus.

The theoretical kick-start of the thesis was the international relations' approaches that divide diplomatic activity in different tracks. In specific, the thesis sources from the distinction between official and unofficial diplomacy. In addition, the research uses the multi-track diplomacy Figure for distinguishing between diplomatic tracks and for understanding different diplomatic activity strands. From the beginning of the thesis, I presupposed that unofficial diplomatic tracks examined (civil society, economic, and cultural and sports activity), are secondary in significance and supplementary to the official one. Given this fact, I aimed to explore the influence and the degree of influence of such diplomatic activity, on stereotypes and on conflict transformation in the island of Cyprus.

The next theoretical step was to go through the theory that examines images, perceptions and stereotypes, and their relation to conflict. The landmark for this is the study of Image Theory introduced by the American multi-scientist, Kenneth Ewart Boulding. Boulding set the basis for the understanding on conflict as the phenomenon occurring due to, real or illusory, incompatibility of images. This position puts the subjective knowledge at the centre of behaviour. This theory together with later approaches, turn the focus from antagonism over resources, to behaviour shaped by perceptions. Theory accentuates that positive images dictate positive behaviour while negative images lead to negative behaviour. In the same manner, stereotypical images and perceptions are the ones that lead to, feed, sustain and rekindle conflict. Given these theoretical foundations, confronting stereotypes is part of the attempt for settlement, management, resolution or transformation, of a conflict, depending on the approach. In specific, in this research I consider as important stereotypes on two different levels; 1) the level of the decision-makers that shape political realities, and 2) the level of the citizens/people that are part of a bidirectional relations of influence with the decision-makers and policy influencers. Given these theoretical presuppositions, it makes sense to engage in stereotype-breaking in order to create the conditions for ameliorating relations and for turning conflict to peace.

In order to examine group behaviour and the causes of intergroup conflict I examined and involved in the thesis sociological theories on the causes of conflict.

Firstly, I presented the much-debated Intergroup Contact Theory of Gordon Allport, also known as the Contact Hypothesis. This theory attempts to explain and offers a way to improve intergroup relations by reducing prejudice between majority and minority group members. The theory presupposes a set of different criteria in order for the reduction of prejudice through contact to be effective. Realistic Conflict Theory, in contrast to the Contact Hypothesis points out the central role of competition for the rise of intergroup conflict. In specific, real conflict of interests over scarcity, or perceived scarcity, of resources is the source of intergroup conflict. The next theoretical approach is the Social Identity Theory. Its creators, Henri Tajfel and John Turner, accentuate the study of self-perceived membership in groups, as a way to understand and explain intergroup behaviour. Social Identity theory, along with the kindred concept of Self-Categorization Theory, that describes perception and self-perceptions of belonging to a group, offer useful tools for explaining in-group – out-group relations and in-group formation and behaviour. Lastly, the Self-Aspect Model of Identity theory by Bernd Simon, by putting the individual in its centre, offers a meso-level analysis that attempts to demonstrate that the group and individual level traits are falsely presented as based on opposite self-aspects and attempts to bridge the discontinuity between analyses focusing of individual and group behaviour. Such theories were not only useful for exploring the thesis data. In specific, the Contact Hypothesis is one of the main theoretical tools I used for the analysis of the Cyprus case. As intergroup contact either is a primary aim or just recurs when non-governmental actors pursue other goals, I tested the validity of the theory, in the case of the three selected categories of activities/parameters.

The theoretical basis of the research and the emphasis given to specific theoretical elements, led to a research approach based on the presuppositions of a mixed human nature and a subjectivist and pluralist perception of conflict. Specifically, I base the dissertation on the Conflict Research approach as set by A. J. R. Groom.

In order to pursue the aim of studying the influence non-governmental actors' activity on stereotypes and conflict transformation in Cyprus, I set an open research hypothesis. Namely, I explored the way contact affects perception (the positive-negative axis of stereotype-change) and consequently conflict transformation (meaning, either positive or negative change in the frozen conflict in Cyprus). In order to avoid a narrow-minded analysis and manage to reflect the complexity of social reality, I tried to incorporate other elements, such as the influencing capability of tolerance, the

contact-stereotype relation and the contact-tolerance relations. Given the above, my aim was set to be the study of the effect of unofficial diplomatic contacts on stereotypes in intercommunal, frozen conflicts and its potential for conflict transformation. In order to reach the aim, I set the objectives of the exploration of three parameters (sets of activities) of unofficial diplomatic contact; 1) the activity of CSOs and NGOs, 2) Economic interdependence and joint economic activity and, 3) Cultural and sports activities. For each one of the three parameters, I set under examination specific indicators; 1) Citizens' trust and participation, state accountability and societal impact, interaction, trust, tolerance, cooperation and participation in bicomunal activities for CSOs and NGOs, 2) mixed enterprises, employment on the "other" side, intercommunal trade, cooperation on tourism and spending on the other side for economic interdependence and activity and, 3) joint cultural activities, cultural visits on the "other" side, recognition in sports, intercommunal sports activities, individual mobility of athletes and sports fans behaviour for culture and sports. Beyond the theoretical foundations set in the beginning of the research, I appointed specific theoretical tools to each parameter: 1) complex interdependence and contact theories for CSOs and NGOs, 2) economic interdependence and contact theories for economic activity and, 3) contact theories, peace-building through culture, and peace-building through sports for the parameter of culture and sports.

In order to study the set indicators for the parameters, I gathered and examined both qualitative and quantitative data. Specifically, I drew qualitative data from academic articles and books, IGO and NGO reports, interviews, official state documents, online and print press journalistic articles. In addition, I collected quantitative data from IGO, NGO and state reports and official institutions' databases. I applied a Grounded Theory Analysis trying to answer to the question of influence of contact over stereotypes and transformation in intercommunal conflict. Lastly, my focus was on after-Annan Plan referendum data onwards.

The data on CSOs and NGOs offered a series of findings. In general, CSOs and NGOs suffer from several weaknesses that reduce their effectiveness and influencing capability. Mistrust, political dependency, economic attachment, low citizens' participation, low capability to hold the state accountable, freedom of expression problems, are issues that torment the organisations in the communities. On the positive side, organisations show high mobilisation on an occasional basis, a significant number of registered members and availability for being a platform for expressing opposition

to the status quo. Public opinion feels ignored when it comes to important political decisions and citizens believe the peace process is detached from their concerns. Physical and psychological division as well as the culture of non-communication pose serious impediments to contact. On top of non-contact, the media reproduce and sustain stereotypical depictions of the “other”. Even though there is a quantitative increase in bicomunal contact due to the opening of crossings, its quality remains low. Willingness to coexist with the other community is low and intentions to mingle families is out of the question. Furthermore, there are big parts of both communities that refuse to visit the other side. On the positive side, the trend of denying to visit the other side is declining and contact with the “other” is getting to be more socially accepted. Youth tend to believe in personal contact as a means of rapprochement but they do not intend to befriend youth from the other community. Additionally, younger and older Cypriots extensively use online communication as it helps them avoid disapproval and negative feelings for behaviours that are publicly discouraged by the in-group. Citizens on both sides are tolerant towards the “other” community but also towards other groups. Discrimination is not a widespread phenomenon and is mainly based on mistrust of the “other”, as in Cyprus, reciprocal mistrust is the main trend. CSOs and NGOs show little contribution in this. Cooperation in the direction of confronting stereotype is not widespread and is dependent on the, each-time, political conditions. Despite negative findings, cooperation demonstrates a growing trend and is more socially accepted than in the than in the past. The divide and the lack of solid synergies are some of the reasons of low cooperation. On the positive side, the Green Line has proven to be an opportunity for organisations that are established and functioning inside the buffer zone. When it comes to bicomunal events, although there is a trend to perceive their impact as positive, in fact it is hard to evaluate it. The stigmatisation of CSOs and NGOs and the recognition issue constitute obstacles that renders bicomunal activities difficult to implement. Furthermore, it is difficult for organisations to mobilise participants as there is poor promotion and rarity of really co-sponsored or co-organised events. Despite difficulties, Turkish Cypriots diachronically support bicomunal events, while after 2003 Greek Cypriots demonstrate increased participation.

Regarding data on economic interdependence and economic interaction, physical division largely affects Cyprus. There is also an economic cleavage between the prosperous south and the poor north that shapes economic reality. The recognition

issue, the psychological burden on legitimacy, and the economic future of a unified Cyprus create a climate of constraint. However, most data indicate that a potential resolution would benefit all Cypriots in terms of economy. Businesspersons and traders on both sides, moved by profit-related incentives, believe for their own reasons that a solution to the Cyprus issue would profit their communities. International programmes and the two communities' Chambers of Commerce back mixed enterprises and employment on the other side. Cooperation is existent, limited, but on a rising trend. Employment on the other side is a common reality for many Turkish Cypriots. In tourism, data show that services in the two communities, not only are not antagonistic, but are in fact complementary. Many times, though, they are perceived as antagonistic. Research shows that while Greek Cypriot hotel managers are not willing to cooperate with Turkish Cypriots, Greek Cypriot tour operators and tourist agencies are willing to collaborate. In quantitative terms, cooperation is low but willingness to cooperate is somewhat higher, with Turkish Cypriots being more open to it. Trade is heavily impeded by the *acquis communautaire* suspension. Although Green Line Regulation facilitates intercommunal trade, legal, political and psychological barriers pose difficulties to trade. Intercommunal trade is marginal but has an augmentative drift. Low performance is due to bureaucracy, time-consuming procedures, lack of advertising, insufficient knowledge of the consumption needs of the "other" and hesitation to dare intercommunal trade. Generally, Greek Cypriots are negative towards Green Line trade, while Turkish Cypriots are more positive as it is significant for their economy. Furthermore, direct spending of the members of each community on the other side is an economic activity that creates contact in immediate terms. Consumers and shopkeepers on both sides see the opening of the Ledra/Lokmaci crossing in Nicosia, as a positive development. Micro-level trade liberalisation along with civil society activities gives a bottom-up dynamic to the historical centre.

On culture, the cultural influence of the "motherlands" dominates the reality of the conflict. Recently, a cultural identity of Cypriotness is again on the rise. There are positive developments in the field, like the change in intolerant school curricula, and the interest of Cypriots for intercultural events. On the positive side, bicomunal committees and projects work on the preservation of cultural heritage and nurture professional and personal contact between working members. On the negative one, often culture and heritage are instrumentalised in order to back ethnocentric views and legitimise antagonistic policies on the Cyprus issue.

Regarding sports, Cypriots are positive to the ideals of respect and team spirit they promote. For Greek Cypriots, sport associations and clubs are popular and play a significant role in their athletic, social and political life. Greek Cypriot sports enjoy full international recognition and participation. In the Turkish Cypriot communities, athletic clubs are popular and important for community life too. However, their non-recognition puts them in a situation of difficulty and dependency on Turkey. Therefore, recognition is a source of discord. The fear of Greek Cypriot authorities and organisations lead them to persist on non-recognition of Turkish Cypriot federations. When it comes to sports supporters, Greek Cypriot fan clubs are negative civil society actors as they use violence and hate rhetoric towards in-group and out-group members. There is also an obvious cleavage in football supporters, which reflects political divisions of the Greek Cypriot society. Individual mobility of athletes to the other side is constraint by legal (mostly for the Turkish Cypriots) psychological barriers of treachery and stigmatisation. However, in recent years, there are examples of athletes that defied the negative precedent and decided to compete on the other side. In addition, bicomunal sports events promote contact among youth and adults, professionals and amateurs for promoting the values of tolerance, friendship and cooperation. Given the popularity of sports in both communities, the impact of sports activities, be it positive or negative, is high.

The last part of the thesis included the discussion, findings and results based on the research data. Regarding CSOs and NGOs, the value of bicomunal activities is important as, for many years, it has been one of the few means of contact across the physical divide. Both communities judge such activities as positive despite the fact that their impact is at best difficult to estimate and at worst, low. The influence of contact on stereotypes is questionable although the individual-level contact cultivated may contribute to the strengthening of a joint Cypriot identity. Given the facts that bicomunal activities demonstrate low participation, CSOs and NGOs enjoy low trust by citizens, show limited capacity to hold the decision-makers accountable, and hold high dependency on political parties, the influence of contact on conflict transformation is low. When it comes to the issue of interdependence among the Cypriot communities, there seems to be increasing cooperation and interaction among civil society actors. However, such interdependence does not seem capable enough to influence intercommunal political activity in the island. De facto division, military power of Turkey, “motherlands” influence, and EU political influence mainly shape realities in

Cyprus. Although power politics become less apparent over time, violence diminishes and “motherlands” seem less attractive to Cypriots, decision-makers shape political reality without any significant pressure or influence by civil society actors. Intergroup Contact Theory testing shows that most of the basic criteria for effective contact are not met. Thus, there might be a potential for fighting stereotypes through contact in the future, but for the time being, civil society-led contact serves as a channel of re-establishing ties between the divided Cyprus societies. With respect to the influence of contact on conflict transformation, there are no outright indications that contact is directly related to conflict transformation. What is evident is that the low performance of the organisations to hold the decision-makers accountable and to influence policies on the Cyprus Issue in a significant manner hampers the effect of contact on stereotypes and prejudice to affect conflict transformation.

Results on economic activity show that interdependence through mutual economic benefit can, if not contribute in stereotype-breaking, increase intercommunal tolerance. When it comes to the application of theoretical tools, the form of contact does not meet Allport’s criteria. Given this, there is a possibility that stereotypes may be strengthened by contact, and economic antagonism may enhance negative images. Depending on the economic activity, contact may increase or reduce antagonism. In any case, direct or indirect contact seems to have an overall positive impact with reduction of stereotypes or realisation of the difference of the “other” that can lead to respect and tolerance. Regarding conflict transformation, the influencing capability of economic activity is not fully utilised. In addition, economic activity can be a source of antagonism as well as a source for rapprochement. There are developments where economic cooperation, can better community relations but psychological and legal barriers, along with the fear for the economic future, make economic actors on both sides, reluctant. It is important that most Cypriots believe the existing situation leads to economic loss for both communities and a potential solution would benefit both. Pressure coming from a cooperating business and merchant class from both sides, could be an element of “positive entrapment” for professionals and could facilitate decision-makers’ policies. Although economic activity seems that it can be a stronger influencing factor for conflict transformation than CSOs and NGOs, no apparent, significant changes seem to source from it.

In the field of culture, bicomunal projects bring together experts or non-experts under common goals. The spirit of cooperation and meeting under a common

cultural setting positively influences stereotypes. Use of heritage under the Cypriot identity, instead of the “motherlands” identities, brings people closer. Regarding Contact Theory, usually, almost all criteria are met and people meet under their professional capacity and under a common culture. In other occasions, ethnocentric readings of culture and heritage and negative contact lead to the preservation or worsening of stereotypes. When it comes to the influence on conflict transformation, the case of Cyprus verifies that culture and heritage are perceived and interpreted through the prism of identity. When jointly working on cultural projects, transformation through contact, cooperation, and co-shaping a common future is facilitated. The same stands for the cases of (re)exploring cultural commonalities and proximity. When culture and cultural heritage use happen under the context of in-group favouritism, strife is preserved and negative occasions may even boost it further.

Sports, due to the heavy influence of the recognition issue on them, have mostly been a negative field for stereotype-breaking. Turkish Cypriot sports federations, despite efforts, remain domestically and internationally unrecognised and isolated. Popular sports fans in the south have a negative contribution as their political attachments either promote ethnocentrism, intolerance, and stereotypes, or use violence or the threat of violence. Contrarily, there are positive developments like bicomunal events and individual mobility of athletes to the other community. Overall, the impact of the athletic spirit on stereotypes is limited. Non-recognition and marginalisation of Turkish Cypriot sports and athletes overshadow any positive developments. When it comes to the Contact Hypothesis, most of the criteria are not fulfilled. Concerning conflict transformation, contribution of sports is mostly negative. Unrecognised Turkish federations turn Turkish Cypriots further in the embrace of the Turkish soft power. Likewise, Greek Cypriot sports are closely connected to the ones of the Greek “motherland”. Violent fan clubs’ behaviours do not favour the promotion of peace through sports, even if they claim their motives are solidarity-based. Bicomunal youth, veteran and professional sports activities are not enough to balance the negative context.

Overall, the findings and results of the thesis, show that although there is significant non-governmental activity that attempts to fight stereotypes and work for the transformation of the Cyprus conflict, there are no patterns of direct relations between 1) contact and stereotype-breaking, and 2) contact and conflict transformation.

The Cyprus issue is rather shaped and driven by domestic decision-makers and international actors. The role of the non-governmental actors examined in the present research, is rather secondary and complementary to official contacts and official diplomacy. These non-governmental actors are unable to pressure decision-makers in an effective manner, due to inherent deficiencies, low influencing capability, political and economic attachments, unwillingness, incompatibility of goals and antagonisms. Thus, in Cyprus, there are no apparent, effective, bottom up efforts on conflict transformation. Their influencing capability is limited in the (positive or negative) contribution of their work to possible agreements or political acts of the Cyprus communities' decision-makers.

The aim of the thesis was to research and draw lessons from the activity of non-governmental actors in Cyprus. It is also inside the goals of the research to offer knowledge that can be transmittable to other conflict cases and, more generally, useful for the study of intercommunal conflict. There are some results drawn from the study of non-governmental actors in Cyprus that are generalizable and may be useful as guidelines for studying relevant activity, or as open questions to for further exploration in other frozen conflicts. Firstly, a deep glance at the persistence of intractable conflict shows that the lack of violence, even for a long time, does not mean that a conflict is more prone to resolution. The threat of force posed by external or domestic actors, the underlying fear and traumatic memory of violence in the societies, and the socialisation under cultural violence, cast a heavy shadow in the every-day life that outsiders can hardly trace. To put it simply, the absence of violence does not mean that hard power is not one of the main factors of the conflictual condition.

Heavy CSO and NGO activity does not mean that such organisations can surpass the main conflict actors and bring peace. Self-fulfilment, optimism and the sense of purpose that overwhelm individuals or groups engaged in intense civil society activity cannot replace or jump over conflict transformation processes. External non-governmental involvement, in many occasions turns to be bitter. The need for respect and high expectations cultivated to locals, oftentimes lead to inconclusive results and huge disappointments. The examples of Cyprus, Bosnia, Kosovo, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and many more, show that international assistance and involvement come with a dependency cost and a set of values the intervening parties try to spread, directly or indirectly. External involvement of IGOs, INGOs and NGOs renders the term “reconciliation” a bitter joke among domestic populations. In other

occasions, like the case of the Open Society Foundation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Decision-makers demonise and attack external involvement and aid as activity against national integrity. The other side of the coin is the professionalization of non-governmental activity that turns non-governmental actors from part of the solution to part of the problem. The sense of local ownership of non-governmental initiatives is very important for the production of domestically owned realities. Incomplete domestically owned solutions are preferable among populations and decision-makers than externally imposed ones, as they seem to enjoy wider approval.

Wealth and material prosperity are a very important part of transformation, but they cannot replace safety and social needs, integral to humans. Economic activity can be an open communication channel during violent times but it is often independent from political solutions. The example of 1994 Greek embargo at the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia shows that neither political decisions can halt economic activity, nor economic actors have the influencing power to pressure decision-makers. Economy can be both a decompression valve and the fuel for antagonism; non-violent economic activity can serve the human need for antagonism but at the same time, antagonism over economic gains can fuel, ignite or reignite strife.

Working under the umbrella of cultural commonality or cultural tolerance, can transform stereotypical images and negative perceptions through identity-shift; as culture is used according to the each-time identity needs and self-perceptions of groups, such conditions can alter images of the in-group and the out-group alike. Identities may be perceived as unchangeable but their dynamic nature, based on the cultural projection of the past for present needs, leaves space for the creation or revitalisation of joint narratives. In addition, culture is the fertile ground where nationalism and ethnocentrism sow and reap; exclusivist cultural narratives and demonising images of the “other” can constitute the basis for mobilising in hostile and violent behaviours. Domestic, negative civil society actors seem to be more influential when nationalism is at a peak. The compliance of almost all Greek political parties to the Macedonian name dispute nationalistic hysteria is just one of the many examples where non-governmental pressure is effective.

Sports activity can also function as the field of antagonism decompression. However, the passion and zest sports cause, and their political, economic and social ends, can render them just another arena of strife. The Olympic values do not carry any

inherent peace-making power. They are norms that come from an ancient tradition and are at the discretion of state and non-state actors to make the best out of them.

When it comes to theoretical tools, it is important to remember that they constitute our incomplete means to understand perceived realities. Fitting realities in our conceptual constructions leads to misleading results. The Contact Hypothesis, which I extensively used during the research, is not the philosopher's stone, at least not in international politics. We cannot use Contact Theory as a checklist for the fulfilment of the goal of peace. The same stands for Realistic Conflict, Social Identity, Self-Categorisation and Self-Aspect Model of Identity theories. They can provide fragmented insights on intergroup and interpersonal behaviour, but they cannot cover the abundance of factors and parameters that shape social and political realities. After all, the lives of groups and individuals are complex, dynamic processes with a perception of continuity, not a race to a promised land. It is not the struggle to reach a finish line, that gets conflicts solved and groups to coexist, but rather the constant effort for the best result without a clear roadmap.

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