

Ph.D. Thesis:

The Athenian Grand Strategy during the Fourth Century B.C.

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To my parents,
who instilled their values into me

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Abbreviations

Aeschin. 1: Aeschines, *Against Timarchus*.

Aeschin. 3: Aeschines, *Against Ctesiphon*.

Aristot. *Const. Ath.*: Aristotle, *Athenian Constitution*.

Aristot. *Econ.*: Aristotle, *Economics*.

Aristot. *Pol.*: Aristotle, *Politics*.

Aristot. *Rh.*: Aristotle, *Rhetoric*.

Arr. *An.*: Arrian, *Anabasis of Alexander*.

DA: *Decree of Aristoteles*.

Dem. 1: Demosthenes, *First Olynthiac*.

Dem. 2: Demosthenes, *Second Olynthiac*.

Dem. 3: Demosthenes, *Third Olynthiac*.

Dem. 6: Demosthenes, *Second Philippic*.

Dem. 8: Demosthenes, *On the Chersonese*.

Dem. 9: Demosthenes, *Third Philippic*.

Dem. 15: Demosthenes, *On the Liberty of the Rhodians*.

Dem. 16: Demosthenes, *For the Megalopolitans*.

Dem. 18: Demosthenes, *On the Crown*.

Dem. 19: Demosthenes, *On the False Embassy*.

Dem. 20: Demosthenes, *Against Leptines*.

Dem. 21: Demosthenes, *Against Midias*.

Dem. 23: Demosthenes, *Against Aristocrates*.

Demad. 1: Demades, *On the Twelve Years*.

Din. 1: Dinarchus, *Against Demosthenes*.

Diod.: Diodorus, *The Library of History*.

FGrH: *Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker*.

GHI: *Greek Historical Inscriptions*.

Hyp. 4: Hyperides, *In Defence of Euxenippus*.

Hyp. 5: Hyperides, *Against Demosthenes*.

Hyp. 6: Hyperides, *Funeral Oration*.

Hyp. Fr.: Hyperides, *Fragments*.

IG: *Inscriptiones Graecae*.

Isoc. 5: Isocrates, *To Philip*.

Isoc. 6: Isocrates, *Archidamus*.

Isoc. 15: Isocrates, *Antidosis*.

Justin.: Marcus Junius Justinus, *Epitoma Historiarum Philippicarum Pompei Trogi*.

Lyc. 1: Lycurgus, *Against Leocrates*.

Lys. 24: Lysias, *On the Refusal of a Pension*.

Lys. 28: Lysias, *Against Ergocles*.

Lys. 30: Lysias, *Against Nicomachus*.

Paus.: Pausanias, *Description of Greece*.

Plb.: Polybius, *The Histories*.

Plut. Ages.: Plutarch, *Agesilaus*.

Plut. Comp. Lys. Sull.: Plutarch, *Comparison of Lysander and Sulla*.

Plut. De Virt. Mor.: Plutarch, *De virtute morali*.

Plut. Dem.: Plutarch, *Demosthenes*.

Plut. Lys.: Plutarch, *Lysander*.

Plut. *Pel.*: Plutarch, *Pelopidas*.

Plut. *Phil.*: Plutarch, *Philopoemen*.

Plut. *Phoc.*: Plutarch, *Phocion*.

Polyaen.: Polyaeus, *Stratagems*.

SEG: *Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum*.

Tac. *Ag.*: Tacitus, *Agricola*.

Thuc.: Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*.

Xen. *Ages.*: Xenophon, *Agesilaus*.

Xen. *Anab.*: Xenophon, *Anabasis*.

Xen. *Hell.*: Xenophon, *Hellenica*.

Xen. *Vect.*: Xenophon, *Ways and Means*.

Acknowledgements

When I was a high school student my father Andreas Lentakis offered me to read Xenophon's *Anabasis* from his library. Xenophon recounted the real story of ten thousand Greek mercenaries who set off to the capital city of Babylon to support the claim of a usurper to the Persian throne, and the subsequent struggle that they went through in order to return to Greece. *Anabasis* instantly inculcated me with an interest in warfare and antiquity. Since my father had authored several highly acclaimed books on classical history, I used every opportunity whenever we met to discuss with him satiating my curiosity about the ancient past, only to have it inflated even more every time we spoke. However, since he was the most active member of the Greek parliament at the time, those opportunities were limited since we met only a few times a week and only for a few hours. My father's early passing when I was fifteen years old was a traumatic experience, yet since I lost him at this young age one would expect that without his influence I would move towards a different direction than the one he would have led me to. Nevertheless, even though my political views have drifted away from my father's own ideas, my interest in armed conflict and classical antiquity has persisted ever since he suggested that I read Xenophon's account of his military campaign within the Persian Empire. I suppose that I ought to cease stalling any further, and simply thank my father for setting me on this path that has led me to write down a PhD thesis on conflict and politics during classical antiquity, and just affirm that I dearly miss him to this day.

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Since almost every author likes to attribute the good parts of their work to the acknowledged individuals and the faults to themselves, I intend to be more sincere and attribute anything that is worth reading to accident, and every fault to design.

Introduction

In 2007 I submitted a thesis on Athenian grand strategy from the aftermath of the battle of Chaeronea to the end of the Lamian War (338-322 BC) as part of completing my postgraduate studies at the University of Edinburgh. Shortly afterwards, I joined the Greek army for a nine-month period, in order to fulfill my military obligations as a Greek male citizen. While I served as a private in the Greek Army, I recall watching an interview of US Army officer John Nagl explaining the tenets of the new counterinsurgency manual published for the US armed forces. I was astounded by how much warfare had changed in a very short period of time. During my final year at high school, the United States as well as other NATO member-states brought to an end an ethnic cleansing campaign carried out by Serbian security forces and paramilitaries against Albanian speakers in Kosovo, which had been orchestrated by the Milosevic regime. The campaign against the state of Yugoslavia was a unique event, for its short duration of merely seventy eight days, from March 24th until June 10th, and being carried out exclusively by NATO air forces.

After the terrorist attacks of 9/11 in 2001, the United States and many of their allies took action against al Qaeda by overthrowing Afghanistan's Taliban government in 2001. In 2003, NATO occupied most of Afghanistan, engaging in a small war against the Taliban, and the US with another set of allies, known as the Coalition of the Willing, invaded Iraq. However, despite the undisputed military superiority of the US-led coalitions against a non-state actor and its allies, the latter refused to admit defeat. In fact, declaring war against al Qaeda and bringing this much attention to it, bolstered the ranks of the Islamist organization to unprecedented levels with volunteers joining in from all over the world. In Iraq, despite toppling the Baathist regime within a few weeks and capturing the brutal dictator Saddam Hussein, the situation worsened. General Franks, who had planned and conducted an excellent invasion against the Iraqi armed forces that defended zealously their country, lacked any planning on what to do with the Iraqis after having won the war. His immediate successors in command of the coalition forces in Iraq seemed to have no clue either, with what to do in order to maintain peace and order in the volatile Arab country.

Making things worse in 2004, the US-imposed Iraqi government of Ayad Allawi, not trusting the Baathist military, decided to abolish it altogether. Allawi's decision turned out to be a tragic mistake that led to the creation of the Iraqi insurgency. By the time the Iraqi armed forces were reestablished, the Sunni insurgency had been hijacked by al Qaeda in Iraq. This branch of the terrorist organization pursuing global jihad was then led by the savage commander Abu Musab al Zarqawi. Under al Zarqawi's leadership, the Sunni insurgency engaged in conducting ethnic cleansing operations against the Christian and Shia communities, all the while carrying out deadly ambushes against coalition forces. These events led to the eruption of civil war in 2006 and the creation of Shia militias. Militant Shias fought back against al Qaeda's insurgents and conducted an ethnic cleansing campaign against their Sunni compatriots in return.

In 2006, the violence in Iraq got out of control and the US and their allies seemed completely unable to put a stop to the bloodshed, as scores of their own troops were being gravely injured on a daily basis. By 2007, the Bush administration decided to entrust the conduct of the counterinsurgency campaign to people who had been critical of the Iraq War from the start, yet they had shown ability in understanding the strategy and tactics needed to deal with this sort of conflict. In February 2007 general Petraeus took command of coalition forces in Iraq and replaced the US military's traditional enemy-centric strategy with a population-centric strategy. Within months, the implementation of the new strategy brought down the high levels of violence, and the Iraqi Sunnis allied with al Qaeda changed allegiance and joined the US against the insurgency. The information of al Zarqawi's hideout was tipped off to coalition forces by his own people, and he died, after a bombing run destroyed his hideout along with his lungs, while staring at US troops standing over him. The Iraqi civil war came to an end, the ethnic cleansing against weak Sunni and Shia communities stopped, the Shia militias were gradually disbanded, and powerful Iraqi national armed forces were established including all of Iraq's different ethnic and religious backgrounds.¹ The

¹ The new strategic conditions that were established in Iraq in 2007 did not favour the Shia militias and forced them to disband. Their mortal enemies, the Sunni insurgents had turned against al Qaeda in Iraq and joined sides with the Coalition forces. The Shia militias were not willing to take on them both, and after the successful crackdown of the new Iraqi national

new strategy that was used with such success was baptized counterinsurgency, turning the infantry into the most important arm of the military in this conflict. Troops were moved from Forward Operating Bases into Iraq's urban centres and rural villages, which until then they had failed to protect from the infiltration of militant islamists. Garrisons were established within the Iraqi communities, granting the latter protection from intimidation by al Zarqawi's thugs, and familiarizing Iraqi society with the foreign soldiers that protected it from the disruptive forces of Sunni and Shia theocrats, who instigated acts of mass violence.² The unsurpassed high-tech capabilities and firepower of the US armed forces that dominated warfare, were replaced by basic infantry tactics and intelligence-gathering in order to win the Iraq War.

This thesis examines the strategies followed by the Athenians in the aftermath of their defeat by Sparta and its coalition in the Peloponnesian War. In 404, Athens ended up without a navy altogether, its formidable defences lying in ruins, with a Lacedaemonian garrison, and a Spartan puppet-government running the city, while most of the Athenian armed forces had been destroyed in a single surprise attack of the Peloponnesian fleet during the previous year. Less than fifty years later, Athens was once more the richest and most powerful Greek city-state. Athens was once more imposing democratic governments abroad, and possessed a fleet of over three hundred warships fending off piracy and overthrowing Lacedaemonian puppet-states in the Aegean and Ionian seas. Yet, Athens failed to reclaim the powerful position that it had in the previous century, and in 338 suffered a devastating defeat by the upstart kingdom of Macedonia, being forced to submit to the Macedonian kings' hegemony. The thesis will examine Athenian policies and strategies in order to decide the reasons behind Athens' successes and failures, hoping that this will provide insight into which

army against the Shia Mahdi Army in Basra during March 2008, Zarqawi's Shia counterpart Muqtada al Sadr came to realize that his cause was hopeless (Biddle, Friedman and Shapiro 2012, pp. 25-6; Ricks 2009, pp. 278-83).

² On the counterinsurgency strategy introduced in 2007, which brought the Iraqi civil war to an end, see Galula 2006; *Counterinsurgency Field Manual* 2007; Nagl 2005. On the troubles the US army experienced in countering insurgents in Afghanistan and Iraq see Ricks 2007; West 2011. On the Sunni tribes allying themselves with the US military against al Qaeda in Iraq see Biddle, et al. 2012; Ricks 2009; Wings 2012.

of these actually work, while incorporating counterinsurgency as a strategy of its own standing, equal in importance to the other strategies that placed together compose a grand strategy.

The EU currently faces similar challenges as Russian aggression against Ukraine supports separatist movements in the latter's eastern provinces. Russia's goal is to prevent Ukraine's European future from unfolding. It has gone as far as deploying Russian Army units in common operations with the separatists against the Ukrainian security forces.³ At the same time, al Zarqawi's former al Qaeda in Iraq has evolved into the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and controls vast parts of the two unfortunate countries, bolstering its armed forces up to nearly fifty thousand insurgents, while it has gained regional allies in Egypt, Libya, and Nigeria. Thanks to the conflicts taking place in Syria and Iraq, militant jihadist organizations have recruited thousands of Muslims from Western countries, allowing them to use these recruits against their countries of origin. Al Qaeda lies behind the horrific terrorist attacks that took place in Paris on the 7th of January 2015, targeting Charlie Hebdo magazine's editors, and the Islamic State is responsible for the subsequent Paris attacks that took place on the 13th and 14th of November 2015 where seven attackers killed 130 individuals and injured 368 others. Currently, the West is in search of an efficient way to promote its interests and values, and that involves exploring which form of strategy is most efficient for reaching these goals. Athens and the other Greek powers of the fourth century suffered from similar problems, as they had to deal with non-traditional forms of warfare, and in the contest between them, they involved peacekeeping in less powerful city-states, increasing their own spheres of influence, which led to the growth of their own power, and to the reduction of those of their opponents. I hope by examining grand strategy, and by considering counterinsurgency to be a vital part of it, we may better understand why it is so important to adopt it in

³ The EU has not responded militarily to Russia's challenges over Ukrainian sovereignty. The EU and the US have so far limited their reactions to the projection of soft power through the imposition of economic sanctions. Despite the heavy impact of the financial sanctions on the Russian economy, they do not seem to be able to prevent Russian assistance to separatists in East Ukraine, and will unlikely lead to a restoration of Ukrainian control over Crimea. On Russian special forces units operating in Crimea and Donbass see Bukkvoll 2016.

the EU as a tool of foreign policy. The EU needs to introduce its own grand strategy in order to deal with security threats, which but seem to multiply outside of its borders, yet their influence penetrates European society and even more those of its neighbours.

Tools of analysis

This section provides an insight into the methods used in order to examine and draw conclusions on the actors involved in the period under examination. The first part describes the analytical tools used in strategic studies and their relevance to the conditions of classical Greece. The second part deals with the international relations' theory of classical realism, while the third part is about conjectural history, the criticisms directed at it, and the reasons why it still remains valuable for critical analysis today.

Strategic Analysis

Grand strategy is the sum of the policies and strategies that a state utilizes in order to achieve a major goal, which may be its own protection from a third party, or its own expansion at the cost of others. That being said, states, much like individuals, operate on self-interest and at their most basic level seek either security or power.⁴ A weak state will seek security in order to survive, and should it achieve that goal, it will then seek power at the cost of others'.⁵ It is important to remember that strategy is not unilateral, states using a combination of strategies against one another, form them and reshape them according to their opponents' own set of strategies. The use of strategies is very complex and apart from the fact that an enemy responds with strategies of his

⁴ On the realist tradition in international relations see Gilpin 1981; Morgenthau 1993, pp. 1-16; Waltz 1979, 62-72, 111-114, 194-110; 2001, pp. 159-186.

⁵ Luttwak, 2013.

own, on several occasions one's own strategies may bring greater harm to his own interests than the enemy's strategies.

Military Strategy

Military strategy is the use of armed forces in order to protect a state's national interests. The simplest way to do this is by deploying them against an enemy in order to reach a strategic objective through the use of organized violence. States resort to the use of force against their enemies, be that other states or non-state actors, in pursuit of political goals. Notwithstanding, military strategy's crudeness, thanks to the variables that affect it, such as weather conditions, political stability, and fluctuations of manpower, remains an extremely complex aspect of grand strategy. The use of organized violence, in what is nowadays called kinetic military operations, is yet another mean to promote one's national interests.

Nevertheless, military strategy means more than just the simple deployment of armed forces against one another in open battle. Armed forces get used to carry out acts of aggression against others. The forceful annexation of foreign territory, defending against threats by occupying fortified strongpoints, and harassing a more powerful invading army by laying out ambushes are all distinct aspects of military strategy. Offensive military operations vary on scale. Large-scale invasions of other countries aim at reducing strongholds and defeating large armies. In small-scale raids, the aggressors avoid contact with defenders targeting soft targets such as defenceless communities. Notwithstanding being of different character and scale from one another, in their execution by one side as well as in the reception from the other side, both are seen as offensive military strategies. Scale in military operations may affect the goals of an offensive strategy, but it does not effectively alter its character.

In conflict a state's goals will vary from offensive to defensive in general, but these are diverse depending on the scale of the conflict, and may interchange according to

the progress of the war, and the new conditions that will emerge.⁶ A state may engage in high-scale conflict by declaring total war against another state, meaning that it seeks to fully annex the latter or force regime-change, or engage in a lower tier of conflict by seeking to capture only a part of another state's territories. In the latter case, the war may escalate should the aggressor attempt to ethnically cleanse the captured territory of its original inhabitants. A state in defense will normally seek to defend itself against such acts of aggression, by cancelling them through a defensive strategy. Nonetheless, the defender may respond by engaging in acts of aggression itself, as in the case where it seizes part of the territory of its enemy, or if it attempted to completely destroy its enemy, despite the fact that it is the one in defence. It is important to understand that regardless of who belongs on the aggressive side and who is on the defensive side in a conflict, both sides will make use of offensive and defensive strategies and tactics in order to achieve their goals.

Conflict being chaotic in most cases rather than orderly, many a time, sees the roles between states at war reversed. A state may declare war upon another, clearly being the aggressor and the latter the defender. Nonetheless, if the former performs poorly in the course of the war, and the defender is met with overwhelming success in defending its own interests, then the defender may turn the tables and become the aggressor itself forcing its enemy in defence. During the 370s, Spartan kings led their troops and those of their allies in massive invasions against Thebes, seeking to destroy the will of the latter to resist. In 371 the situation completely changed when the Thebans managed to bring devastating casualties upon the Lacedaemonian army, forcing the latter into retreat back to the Peloponnese, and by 369 Thebes sought to destroy Sparta itself by engaging in regime change and nation-building in the eastern part of the Lacedaemonian state.

⁶ Regardless of which state is the aggressor in a conflict and which one is in a defensive position, their military strategies do not necessarily reflect their political roles. The state in defence may decide that the most favourable strategy to follow may be to launch raids or a full-scale invasion against the territories of the aggressor, rather than fight the war in its own territory as would seem most likely. In the Peloponnesian War Sparta and its allies declared war against Athens, and in that long conflict all of the important battles that decided the outcome took place far from Attica.

See Keegan 2004, pp. 79-92.

Since strategy seldom is one-sided, both sides in conflict use military force in order to achieve their goals against one another, and armed conflict quickly evolves into a variation of military confrontations in the form of pitched battles and ambushes. The obvious supremacy of the aggressor's armed forces over its opposition could lead the weak side to submit and give up its territory by signing a peace agreement, leading to the loss of territory and political autonomy without having engaged in combat. However, this only happens when warfare is waged in a very orderly manner, and throughout history such orderly conflicts tended to be the exception rather than the rule.

Paradoxically, offensive military strategy was combined with defensive military tactics since late antiquity. The invading armies would hold a strong defensive position in foreign land and the defenders would find themselves forced to carry out an attack in order to oust them from their own country. This paradoxical relationship between military strategy and tactics flourished in the Middle Ages, with the battle of Agincourt serving as a perfect example, where the invading English army defeated a larger French army using defensive tactics.

During classical antiquity the Greeks and Romans despised employing defensive military tactics in open ground, using them only in exceptional cases such as under dictator Fabius during the Second Punic War, due to the earlier massive Roman defeats in three consecutive pitched battles. Until the introduction of full professional armies by consul Marius in the first century BC, the Greeks and the Romans remained committed on avoiding defensive tactics in battlefields to the best of their abilities. Polybius provides a glimpse of this mindset in both Greeks and Romans, when he criticized king Philip V of Macedon for holding a defensive stance on top of a hill while confronting a Roman army, instead of meeting the enemy on the plain.⁷ During the Peloponnesian War, in a unique confrontation between a Peloponnesian army with the Athenian phalanx occupying a strong defensive position almost spelled disaster for the former, when the Spartan king Agis II came within range of the Athenian army's missile weapons.⁸ Throughout the fourth century BC, such defensive tactics were only

⁷ Plb 18.3.3.

⁸ Thuc. 4.33.

employed by the weaker side in conflict and were universally abhorred.⁹ Defensive military tactics were most often employed in combination with the construction of fixed defences. Due to their small pools of manpower, city-states came to rely on fixed defences in order to protect their interests in areas where they lacked a sufficient number of military units capable of repelling a hostile incursion.¹⁰ Throughout the fourth century BC, Greek city-states proliferated the erection of extensive fortifications, leading to the introduction of siege weapons, and the rise of siege-warfare.

Strategic Surprise

Strategic surprise is a part of military strategy that due to its complex nature in Greek warfare, just as counterinsurgency, is going to need a section of its own for analysis. Sometimes states decide to avoid going to war in an orderly manner, either in fear of failing to achieve their goals, or in order to save as much as possible of their military resources from attrition. In that case, armies suddenly cross borders and assault the enemy's territory and population, without war having been formally declared previously. The use of strategic surprise as a military strategy remains ambiguous up to this day. This form of strategic surprise, however, suffers from serious issues, such as lack of international legitimacy, yet it does provide a military advantage over equal or more powerful enemies, if it is carried out successfully. If the strategic surprise fails to succeed, either by accident or because the enemy forces were in a state of alert, then it brings serious repercussions to the state that employed it. Thucydides describes a miscarriage of strategic surprise attempted by the Thebans against Plataea in the fifth century. A small contingent of Theban hoplites infiltrated Plataea during night-time and captured the city-centre. At first the Plataeans thought the situation was hopeless,

⁹ The Thebans during most of the 370s utilized such defensive tactics against massive invading Peloponnesian armies led by Sparta's kings, but they abandoned that practice, as soon as they had taken over Boeotia by the end of that decade (see chapter two).

¹⁰ The fourth century Greeks burdened by frequent warfare and insufficient military manpower resorted to the employment of mercenaries.

for a Theban phalanx had already got inside their city. When the dawn came daylight betrayed that the Theban military presence was meagre, turning the whole Plataean population hostile against the outnumbered Theban hoplites. The situation changed as the Thebans in a matter of hours turned from captors of an entire city-state, to facing complete annihilation in a hostile environment.

The Thebans had succeeded in carrying out a strategic surprise in the best possible way, but due to not committing enough manpower for holding that goal, the strategic surprise turned into a military disaster. Had the Thebans failed to infiltrate Plataea undetected and had they been intercepted by any defenders, they would have suffered fewer casualties in a melee. However, the Thebans had reached the centre of Plataea, and as soon as the locals turned aggressive, they found themselves surrounded by hostiles without a route of escape. An issue with this event is that Thucydides did not explain the reason why the Thebans chose this unconventional course of action against Plataea, instead of forcing a pitched battle after invading the *chora* of the Boeotian city, as was the traditional way of solving disputes through violence between city-states since the late eighth century. It is possible that the Plataeans would not attempt to defend their crops, since the Theban phalanx was superior to theirs, diminishing the political gains from destroying the agricultural produce of the small Boeotian city. It is more likely that the Thebans were not willing to gamble with invading Plataea during the short period of the summer when the crops are ripe and catch fire easily. The period when the crops are vulnerable to arson is very short, because right before, the wheat is still green and difficult to set on fire, and as soon as it was ripe for harvest the producers tended to gather it quickly, in order to diminish the chances of being forced into battle by an invading force.¹¹ The Theban hoplites “cheated” by infiltrating and capturing the city-centre of Plataea in the middle of the night, without having formally challenged the Plataeans to a pitched battle. To achieve such a manoeuvre, without being detected, the Thebans used a small force in order to have higher hopes of remaining undetected while carrying their stealthy military manoeuvre, until they had reached their objective. Nevertheless, a scant phalanx failed to impress the Plataeans, despite having achieved its mission objective. The strategic surprise of the Thebans was intended to subjugate Plataea by destroying its inhabitants’ will to resist without a

¹¹ See Hanson 1998, pp. 36-38.

fight. The Plataeans failed to be subjugated by an inadequate number of hoplites, and easily cancelled the gains of the Thebans, causing a military disaster by having the Theban contingent destroyed.

The fourth century, being more complex in matters of warfare than the fifth, is ample with examples of strategic surprise, yet the most important ones come from Lacedaemon. The Spartans used this form of strategy extensively in their efforts to pacify Greece, when they invaded Thebes and Athens in 380 and 379. Spartan commanders chose to attempt to capture the two cities, and while they were successful against Thebes, they failed against Athens.¹² Despite the lack of political legitimacy in such operations, the gains that the Spartans had from the success of these endeavours were too enormous for them to condemn the use of strategic surprise. In the case of Thebes, thanks to the success of the strategic surprise, Sparta had a powerful adversary removed from the contest for power, and transformed into a faithful and contributing ally. In the case of Athens with the Lacedaemonian body of troops being detected before infiltrating Athens, Sparta failed to have its success against Thebes repeated, and got to declare war against it at a most inopportune time. Even in the case of the successful Spartan strategic surprise against Thebes there were serious repercussions, as suddenly attacking another state while at peace was not received well by the rest of the Greek city-states. Yet, as the alternative would have been for Sparta and the Peloponnesian League to enter another war against Thebes, that would have lasted years and sent thousands of Peloponnesians on lengthy military campaigns, no member-state of Sparta's alliance protested.

Alliances

Alliance theory provides an analytical framework for governments that face external threats, and pursue cooperation with other states in order to protect their own sovereignty. Nonetheless, alliance theory has been based on case studies examining intergovernmental cooperation between the eighteenth and twentieth centuries. The issue is that alliance theory is based on case studies of states in the age of the industrial

¹² Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.23-4.

revolution. The ancient Greek city-states lacked modern institutions and did not share a similar mindset with modern states. Yet, the analysis of the strategies of alliances of ancient city-states is loosely based on alliance theory as the latter provides the analytical tools to evaluate them. In the following part will be viewed several tenets of alliance theory, such as bandwagoning, alignment, and community of interests, all of which are based on case studies of post-industrial revolution European states, and assess to what degree these are relevant to a case study on ancient Greece.

The strategy of alliances is used by states in the pursuit of security.¹³ States allying with one another do not necessarily share the same interests absolutely, yet they form alliances in order to better protect themselves from external threats.¹⁴ The strategy of alliances is seen as a compromise by governments that are challenged with lack of security and instability.¹⁵ The Athenians allied themselves with Thebes against Lacedaemon in the 370s and against Philip in 338, yet they always opposed Thebes' hegemonic aims in Boeotia. The Athenian demos during those periods regarded Lacedaemonian and Macedonian aggression as a greater threat than Thebes' hegemonic pursuit in its own region. As long as the Athenians felt more threatened by Lacedaemon and Philip, they remained allied to Thebes, overlooking its own hegemonic aims, which inevitably set the two states' interests on a collision course.¹⁶ Alliances are used in combination with both violent and non-violent strategies, augmenting their chances of success.¹⁷ Alliances increase manifold the resources and capabilities of their member-states, yet they also suffer from issues of cohesion. Altfeld researching the reasons states form alliances with one another, came to the conclusion that a very important cause behind the decision to form alliances was the desire to reduce the costs of security.¹⁸ A state dealing with a security threat on its own

¹³ Waltz 1979, p. 166.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Daniel 2003, p. 124.

¹⁶ On the turbulent alliances between Athens and Thebes see chapters two and three.

¹⁷ Alliances can be extremely useful as without them, some strategies may be untenable. Containment against a more powerful and larger state may be impossible to be carried out by a smaller and less powerful state. Whereas if the latter allies with the more powerful state's neighbours, it could possibly contain the more powerful aggressor.

¹⁸ Altfeld 1984, p. 528.

is forced to increase spending on defence, resulting in slowing its own rate of economic development. However, should that state come into an alliance with another state in order to deal with that same threat, they both increase their capacity to deal with the threat, without slowing the growth of their economy, as much as they would otherwise. The formation of alliances changes the cost of security from fiscal wealth to some loss of political autonomy.¹⁹ Balancing foreign threats by forging alliances does not increase state power itself. Alliances might not be honoured in times of need, or get cancelled before a conflict takes place.²⁰ Although increased spending in armaments increases autonomy, governments may favour to deal with threats by increasing their alliances, resulting in loss of autonomy instead. States accept the loss of autonomy as a necessity in order to maintain a developing economy. Nonetheless, when they run out of possible allies, or have invested into alliances to such a soaring degree that they possess a very small amount of autonomy that they view any further loss as unacceptable, and then they might opt for investing in armaments instead.²¹ Although Altfeld's research is based on case studies on modern states, it would not be false claiming that his theory is applicable up to a certain degree on fourth century Greek city-states. Despite lacking modern institutions ancient pre-industrial governments were also concerned with security threats, and by resorting into alliances with one another, they managed to reduce the financial costs of procuring security for themselves. The several alliances Athens and Thebes forged with one another throughout the fourth century allowed them to deal with external threats in a cost-efficient manner. Athens relied on Thebes' land-based military power, refraining from having to heavily invest on its own land forces, and Thebes vice versa relied on Athenian naval power. These alliances between the two major city-state powers allowed them to share the costs of defending themselves from Lacedaemonian and Macedonian aggression, even though they had to tolerate each other's conflicting foreign policy goals in Greece.²²

¹⁹ Ibid, p. 529.

²⁰ Doran 1991, pp. 53-4.

²¹ Altfeld 1984, p. 538.

²² On the tumultuous Athenian foreign policy that led to an alliance with Thebes against Macedon see chapter four.

Waltz claims that in the case of the bipolar international system of the Cold War the US and the USSR depended on their own military capabilities in order to balance each other out.²³ Though the rapprochement between Washington and Beijing in the early 1970s says otherwise, Waltz is referring to nuclear superpowers. Pre-industrial Greek city-states did not possess the capacity to grow their economic and military power to the degree of modern states. The Athenians, for a brief period between the battle of Chaeronea in 338 and the outbreak of the Lamian War in 323, invested in internal balancing in order to negate the Macedonian military supremacy, rather than alliances.²⁴ Although the Athenians increased their military power greatly since Chaeronea, they could have never neared the levels of American or Soviet military self-sufficiency, and still had to rely upon the Thessalians for cavalry support, as well as upon the rest of their allies for sheer military manpower.

Waltz noticed that states engaged in creating alliances would adapt their behavior, narrowing down the policies that they adopt, in order to increase their own suitability as allies to other states.²⁵ He used as an example the shift in alliances between Moscow, Berlin, and Paris during the second half of the 19th century. After the end of the Franco-Prussian War, it was presumed that French republicans would not become partners with Russian authoritarianism, yet by 1894 this assumption had been proven false.²⁶ The fourth century was subject to similar situations, as the changing balance of power forced Athens to radically change allies in the 360s, turning from mortal enemy into a protector of authoritarian regimes.²⁷

Some of the dangers with this strategy are that the most powerful member-states may overwhelm the less powerful ones and acquire a hegemonic role over them, or that

²³ Waltz 1979, p. 168

²⁴ See chapter four.

²⁵ Waltz 1979, pp. 165-6.

²⁶ Ibid, p. 166.

²⁷ Increasing tensions between Athens and Thebes resulted in the 360s Athenian realpolitik. Athens after having spent more than six decades as a mortal enemy of Lacedaemon, patronizing democratic movements abroad, allied with the Spartans and every other autocratic faction it could find in Greece against Thebes and its democratic coalition, see pp. 146-8.

several member-states finding their freedom of action limited due to their obligations within the alliances, become disenchanted with them.²⁸

In the classical period, all Greek conflicts involved some sort of alliance between separate communities against a set of other communities. The dreaded Lacedaemonian army was the epitome of coalition warfare, as it was comprised of military units that belonged to different social classes of the Lacedaemonian state. The Lacedaemonian war machine was comprised with military units ranging from the Spartan citizenry, which occupied the top echelon of the social hierarchy, to the *perioeci* and the *neodamodes*, who were second-class citizens living in separate communities within the territories of Lacedaemon.²⁹ The issue with the strategy of alliances was that it was used to enhance military strategy, nonetheless its efficiency depended on interstate politics. City-states had to constantly redefine their roles in alliances in regard to their common enemies, and in a world where the balance of power shifted, each state's priorities changed as well. Waltz noted that the member-states adapt their foreign policy when the balance of power between coalitions shifts, taking into account what the aftermath is going to be.³⁰ Thebes spent the 370s as a member-state of the Second Athenian League, yet as soon as the Lacedaemonian military power imploded at Leuctra, it turned against Athens.³¹ Due to having a zero-sum mentality city-states started viewing their own allies as a threat if the latter increased in power to a greater degree than themselves, especially if their common enemy lost part of his own power, becoming less of a threat. In the early 360s Mantinea thanks to Theban assistance had reunited, despite Spartan opposition.³² Yet, in 362 when the Thebans

²⁸ An example of member-states turning into hegemonic powers would be Athens during the fifth century, as it converted the Delian League into the Athenian Empire. On the lack of freedom of action by members of alliances, Thebes, while being a member-state of the Second Athenian League, had to limit its aggression over its Boeotian neighbours until Lacedaemon was significantly weakened, otherwise it would alienate Athens and forfeit vital Athenian military aid. On imbalances caused in hegemonic systems see Gilpin 1981, pp. 186-210.

²⁹ Nielsen 2014.

³⁰ Waltz 1979, p. 167.

³¹ On the turbulent alliances between Athens and Thebes see chapter two.

³² After signing Antalcidas Peace in 387, the Spartans through brute force broke up the city-state of Mantinea into four separate states (Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.7).

sought to reinvade Laconia the Mantineans chose to ally themselves to their former enemies rather than the Thebans, to whom they owed their renewed unity, and with whom they shared the same system of government. Apparently the reduced state of oligarchic Sparta no longer seemed much of a threat to the Mantineans, whereas the democratic and hegemonic Thebes could pose a threat to Mantinean interests.

Alignment in alliance theory is a concept similar to alliances, yet broader as it describes the expectations of governments on whether they are going to oppose or assist other states' foreign policies.³³ According to Steven David alignment occurs when states emulate their policies in order to achieve cohesion in their security goals.³⁴ The shifts in the balance of power between the European powers decided their alignment to one another during the late 19th and early 20th centuries.³⁵ Balance of power theory claims that states align themselves to one another when they face foreign threats.³⁶ Yet, research on Third World countries during the Cold War reveals that states belonging to that category decided their alignment to either the US or the USSR according to the domestic security threats that they faced.³⁷ Steven David examined how Third World governments engaged in omnibalancing, in order to achieve a monopoly of power by allying themselves to superpowers to counter domestic challengers.³⁸ Third World states joined First or Second World coalitions in order to gain security against domestic threats challenging their power, rather than foreign ones seeking to expand at their expense. Likewise fourth century Greek city-states decided their alignment on most cases according to the counterinsurgency strategies of great powers.³⁹ Each great power followed its own counterinsurgency strategy, procuring subject city-states with security and stability from civil strife. The counterinsurgency

³³ Snyder 1997, p. 6.

³⁴ David 1991, p. 234.

³⁵ Snyder 1997, pp. 7-8.

³⁶ David 1991, p. 234.

³⁷ Ibid, pp. 233-56.

³⁸ Ibid, pp. 233, 235-6.,

³⁹ Securing themselves from civil strife was not the only factor deciding city-states alignment. The more powerful states were more concerned with foreign threats as they enjoyed internal stability, while lesser city-states in many cases decided their alignment by joining the coalition of who seemed to be the more powerful hegemon (see chapters two and three).

strategies of the great powers were different to one another, providing aided states with different costs and benefits. Nonetheless, these strategies were also competitive to one another and the great powers sought to increase their own appeal against their rivals through them, since they depended on their alliances with other states in order to project power abroad. Due to this phenomenon the counterinsurgency strategies of all the great powers are examined, rather than just Athens', in order to compare their effectiveness and see how they influenced the foreign policy of other states.

Morgenthau spoke of the community of interests as a requirement for states to forge an alliance between them, since they lack a common understanding of the threats they face.⁴⁰ To this he used as an example the rapprochement of the United States and the British Empire during the twentieth century. The two states lacked a common world view, yet they both sought to prevent a single state dominating the European continent. USA and Britain regarded their own roles differently in regard to the world stage, yet their common regard to the European balance of power allowed them to overcome their differences and ally with one another against Germany.⁴¹ In fourth century Greece however Morgenthau's community of interests does not seem to apply well, if examined in detail. The Athenians did ally with states that had conflicting interests to themselves, such as Thebes in the 370s and Sparta in the 360s, in regard to Boeotia and Messene respectively. Nevertheless, they did so temporarily in order to share the costs of the conflict against a common enemy. The Athenians never managed to overcome the fact that they did not share the same vision for the Hellenic world with these powers. Armed conflict erupted between Athens and its own allies from time to time, diminishing their capacity to deal with the threats they had in common. In fact the Athenians went as far as to change their own vision in regard to Greece's future. When the Thebans were spreading democratic rule by overthrowing autocratic governments, while the Lacedaemonians were unable to stand up to them, the Athenian demos threw its lot in with every autocratic regime it could find in order to bring to a halt the threatening Theban onslaught.

Offshore balancing is the effort to prevent the rise of hegemonic power by providing its neighbours and opponents with fiscal and material aid to stop that from

⁴⁰ Morgenthau 1993, pp. 198-9.

⁴¹ Ibid.

happening.⁴² This indirect approach allows a power to avert the formation of a threat to its interests by spending the minimum amount of resources available to it, signifying the absence of any direct military engagement. This strategy enables the government using it to avoid squandering its own military manpower in conflict, while it empowers its allies into defending themselves from the common threat. Mearsheimer and Walt make a tempting case for the strategy that would promote US interests at the lowest possible cost, while they do admit that offshore balancing being a realist strategy cannot eradicate conflict abroad. Neither would it prevent humanitarian crises the kind of the Rwandan genocide, nor would it render US military intervention needless.⁴³ Nonetheless, the authors claim that their strategy is worth trying for its benefits would allow for the US to reduce the resources that they spend on defence, investing them at home instead, while increasing domestic consumption and reducing the death toll of American servicemen abroad.⁴⁴ To the merits of offshore balancing is added the reduction of the risk of terrorism.⁴⁵ The last claim is based on two assumptions. The first one is that the presence of the US military in foreign countries forces their opponents to resort to terrorism, due to being unable to attack them directly.⁴⁶ The second is that liberal hegemony's campaigns of social engineering abroad lead to the undermining of local institutions creating power vacuums to be filled by extremists.⁴⁷ Mearsheimer and Walt champion offshore balancing as the right strategy to deal with the rising power of China, as opposed to the strategy of preponderance employed against the Soviet Union during the Cold War.⁴⁸ However, the two realist authors base their claims on reducing terrorism and

⁴² Offshore balancing has recently turned into a popular alternative strategy to the Obama administration's liberal hegemony thanks to professors Mearsheimer and Walt (2016).

⁴³ Mearsheimer & Walt 2016, p. 73.

⁴⁴ Ibid, p. 74.

⁴⁵ Ibid, pp.74-5.

⁴⁶ Ibid, p. 75.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Ibid., pp. 81-2; On offshore balancing argued for as an alternative to the Cold War US strategy of preponderance during the Clinton administration see Layne 1997. Luttwak's case study on the Eastern Roman Empire (2009) advocated dealing with militant Islamism through offshore balancing. Luttwak criticized the Bush administration's "Trotskyist" foreign policy of

provoking Russia into attacking Ukraine with invalid arguments. They claim that Osama bin Laden was motivated to promote terrorist acts against the West by the presence of US troops in Saudi Arabia, and that Russia has engaged in expansion at the cost of Ukraine thanks to NATO's eastern expansion.⁴⁹ Both claims are flawed as Osama bin Laden informed his Muslim audience of their religious duty to engage in jihad against all infidels, and did not refer to any national grievances they might have suffered from.⁵⁰ In regard to the Russian aggression against Ukraine, it was more likely triggered by the downfall of Kremlin's pet Ukrainian dictator Viktor Yanukovich due to the Euromaidan Revolution, rather than any fear of NATO membership offered to the problem-ridden Eastern European country.⁵¹ By claiming

interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, likening it to the Early Roman Empire's wars against its neighbours (2010). Alternatively Luttwak favours offshore balancing as the policy that allowed the Eastern Roman Empire to fend off threats and maintain its primacy in world affairs from the fifth century until the capture of its capital by the members of the Fourth Crusade in the early thirteenth century. An issue with Luttwak's central argument is that the Eastern Roman Empire did not manage to keep the peace beyond its borders, and for the most part of its existence it did not keep the peace even within its own territories. On the contrary it was the Early Roman Empire, which Luttwak considers to be a bad example to follow, that managed to bring peace and stability in a war torn and divided world with the policy better known as Pax Romana.

⁴⁹ Mearsheimer & Walt 2016, pp. 75-6;

⁵⁰ When al Qaeda addressed western audiences it mentioned the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians, and the US withdrawal from the Kyoto Treaty by the Bush administration (Ibrahim 2007, pp. 197-208). Nevertheless, whenever al Qaeda spoke to a Muslim audience there were no mentions of any national grievances or references to state policies damaging the environment. Instead Muslims were told that they are religiously obligated to wage war against all infidels until they convert to Islam or accept to pay tribute (Ibrahim 2007, p. 47, 51). In regard to Christians and Jews, Muslims are told not to tolerate them because their religion is false (Ibrahim 2007, pp. 33-7). The only mention of western intervention into the Islamic world has to do with Western cooperation with Arab governments, which leads to the introduction of secular values into the Islamic world (Ibrahim 2007, pp. 29-31).

⁵¹ The last attempt to bring the Ukraine into the Western fold was carried out by the Bush administration, which had its efforts to extend NATO membership towards Kiev thwarted by Berlin and Paris (Bruno 2008).

that NATO expansion led to Russian aggression against Ukraine, Mearsheimer and Walt seem to ignore that Russian president Putin excused himself for annexing Crimea as having righted a historical injustice committed by Soviet Leader Khrushchev against Russian integrity, rather than to have responded to NATO enlargement.⁵² Professor James Holmes criticized offshore balancing as being an attitude toward strategy rather than a strategy itself.⁵³ Among Holmes' most potent arguments were that US naval power will vanish without offshore naval bases, and that if offshore balancing is supposed to drive the costs of foreign policy down, then having to redeploy US forces in a region where they are absent, will cost even more than before.⁵⁴ Professor Drezner noticed that offshore balancing is not much different to the liberal hegemony pursued by the Obama administration, and seems to be an inadequate policy to deal with the issues of the Russian annexation of Crimea, nuclear proliferation, the aftermath of the Arab Spring and terrorism or the decline of democratic rule worldwide.⁵⁵ Instead offshore balancing would be more useful in informing the American public that they do not need to worry about such problems.⁵⁶

Offshore balancing is an aid policy rather than a strategy. Handing out financial aid or military equipment to a participant in conflict against a common threat is not a strategy by itself. The provider is investing in the receiving state's strategies, as the recipient of offshore balancing pursues his own military and alliance strategies according to the aid that he receives. Offshore balancing on its own it does not consist of a strategy. Regardless that does not mean it is not an effective policy. The USSR withheld the German assault due to the British and US lend leasing of motor vehicles. The Soviets, notwithstanding the industrial deficiencies of the central planned economy, enjoyed superior military logistics to the Third Reich and its coalition, who still relied on horses for the logistical support of their war machine. In the 1990s Croatia against all odds defeated Yugoslav Serbia in both the Croatian and Bosnian Wars thanks to receiving modern military equipment from Germany. The Soviet

⁵² Soldatkin 2015.

⁵³ Holmes 2016.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Drezner 2016.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

Union and Croatia used the aid they received in order to overcome their respective enemies. Their victories did not solely rely upon the offshore balancing policies of their lenders, for had they followed less efficient strategies, they might have failed to defeat their enemies or would have done so at a higher cost. Not to mention that the Soviet and Croatian military strategies would have had to have been vastly different, if the USSR and Croatia had not received vast amounts of military equipment from other states, in order to be victorious. Offshore balancing is an aid policy by a third party, but it does not consist of a strategy in itself. Military success still depends on the strategies pursued by its recipient. Today, the reason why wealthy states prefer offshore balancing to direct intervention in a conflict, has to do with preserving their own manpower and avoiding the political costs of suffering casualties.

In the fourth century, the Greek city-states avoided utilizing offshore balancing as a strategy, probably due to regarding it as a display of weakness, despite its low cost compared to open conflict.⁵⁷ An exception to this is when Philip of Macedon made use of this strategy against Athens in his early years, by funding several Euboean city-states to revolt, in order to pursue total war against Olynthus unmolested.⁵⁸ The Persian Empire employed this strategy against Greek powers for most of the fourth century, in order to avoid employing a more costly direct military strategy that would bring political instability to itself.⁵⁹ Regardless of the Greek powers' disregard for offshore balancing, this strategy employed by Persia had a major impact upon the Greek world. It brought unprecedented wealth to many city-states that they could now challenge major powers such as Athens, Thebes, and Sparta in a manner that was not possible in the previous century.⁶⁰ Persian subsidies resulted in the creation of a multi-polar environment in the Greek world from the beginning of the Corinthian War in 395 until the establishment of the Macedonian hegemony in 338. Ultimately the imported wealth from Persia that was used by the Greeks to pursue wars against each other, led to the development of Greek warfare to such a degree, that by the 330s a

⁵⁷ Demosthenes characteristically praised the Lacedaemonians for preferring to go to war every summer rather than spend their monies to gain an advantage over their enemies (9.48).

⁵⁸ See chapter three.

⁵⁹ See chapter two.

⁶⁰ On the Social War see chapter three.

single Greek power had the means to dominate the Greek world all by itself, and at the same time successfully annex the Persian Empire. Offshore balancing was used extensively for so long by the Persians, in order to make certain that no Greek city-state would challenge their empire, that by the 330s its unintended consequences had made possible the domination of Greece by the upstart Macedonian Kingdom and the conquest of Persia by Alexander the Great.

Walt produced as an alternative to alliances, for states faced with external threats, the policy of bandwagoning. Bandwagoning states align themselves to the threatening party, in hope to escape the latter's aggression, instead of seeking an ally that would balance out the aggressor's superior might.⁶¹ Walt adds that should allies be unavailable, states are forced to bandwagon.⁶² Oddly fourth century Greek city-states tended to choose to confront threats, even when bandwagoning would have been much preferable. The cases of Acanthus and Apollonia prove this point, as they dragged Sparta into a war against Olynthus in order to avoid joining the Chalcidian League, not to mention Elis and Mantinea, which were refused any allies against Sparta, and decided to oppose the Lacedaemonian military power on their own.⁶³

Containment and Deterrence

The strategies of containment and deterrence are non-violent strategies used by states in order to defend their own interests from other parties. Deterrence is the displaying of military power discouraging acts of aggression from others, while containment is the deployment of armed forces in a strategic fashion that makes it hard or impossible for an enemy to achieve his goals.⁶⁴ Appeasement is another non-violent strategy that seeks to neutralize a threat, though unlike deterrence and containment, it relies upon

⁶¹ Walt 1987, p. 17.

⁶² Ibid., p. 30.

⁶³ Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.21-26, 5.2.1-4, 5.2.11-20.

⁶⁴ Containment has also been used in wartime with success, as the Late Roman Empire deployed its armies in a fashion to hinder enemy invasions, albeit at a dire cost to its own economy and social cohesion (Luttwak 1976, pp. 130-94).

the use of diplomacy rather than military readiness and the strategic deployment of armed forces. Nevertheless, appeasement is more effective when used in league with the other two non-violent strategies, as its exclusive use might give the impression of military weakness, and encourage the threatening party to resort to the use of force. During the fourth century the governments of the Greek city-states did not employ these strategies. The Greeks did not find any value in such strategies and preferred to go to war over trivial issues instead. Apparently these strategies have always been better employed by more powerful and sophisticated states such as the Late Roman Empire. Yet they remained unpopular, for many times the Roman elites considered them to be a display of weakness, bringing division and civil war to the fragile Roman state of late antiquity.

Counterinsurgency

Counterinsurgency is the strategy used by states in order to deal with armed political opposition and foreign insurgent forces.⁶⁵ Counterinsurgency may be based on a purely military approach seeking to destroy the armed opposition, or be a combined attempt of political and military means to reach a compromise more preferable to all sides than armed conflict. The former involves the use of armed forces in carrying out state-terror, ousting political dissidents, and outright destroying any armed opposition. The latter form of counterinsurgency seeks to bring stability and reconciliation, and since the Vietnam War is more commonly known as the hearts-and-minds approach.⁶⁶ Both counterinsurgency strategies were exercised by various factions throughout the fourth century with diverse results. In regard to this thesis it is examined which form of counterinsurgency Athens, its allies, and enemies utilized, and how that influenced the balance of power between them. Counterinsurgency did not just affect the extent

⁶⁵ For an introduction to counterinsurgency see *Counterinsurgency Field Manual* 2007, pp. 1-51; Galula 2006, pp. xi-10, 55-60; Rid and Keaney 2010, pp. 1-8.

⁶⁶ On the population-centric counterinsurgency approach see Austin 2006, pp. 23-24, 52-54, 66; *Counterinsurgency Field Manual* 2007, pp. 53-77; Galula 2006, pp. 43-56, 71-74, 89-92; Shadlow 2010, pp. 173-188.

of the influence of the powerful city-states in ancient Greece; it was another strategy, much like its alliance and military counterparts determining the outcome of the conflict between larger city-states.

Powerful states had to employ part of the militaries within smaller states, in pursuit of political goals. Much like Clausewitz's axiom about nineteenth century conventional warfare, that war is continuation of politics by other means, counterinsurgency is the continuation of warfare through politics. In counterinsurgency operations the military has had to take part in the political process and emulate civil government in providing services to the local population, from bringing order and security to employing the locals for public building projects.⁶⁷ Tacitus provides valuable information on the Roman model of counterinsurgency having recorded how Agricola used Roman military power in Britain in order to subdue the local tribes in war, and won the peace by providing the defeated with security, Roman justice, and the building of infrastructure.⁶⁸ Powers such as Sparta, Thebes, Argos, and Athens used counterinsurgency in order to establish private spheres of influence in large parts of the Greek world. This happened by providing services to other city-states that ranged from peacekeeping to nation-building. Whether a state's counterinsurgency was viewed favorably by other city-states, and was more or less effective than its competitors', came to decide the fate of coalitions and large-scale conflicts. Each Greek power pursued its own model of counterinsurgency that brought different results, nevertheless was formed according to its own political traditions and economic wealth. The Thebans and the Argives embarked on the most ambitious nation-building programmes, while the Spartans and the Athenians limited themselves to peacekeeping projects. The Macedonians' own counterinsurgency strategies varied from region to region. In the Greek mainland Alexander promoted tyrannical governments, while in Asia Minor he established democratic regimes. Counterinsurgency worked in conjunction with other strategies that comprised a state's grand strategy and summed up its power. In many cases counterinsurgency was

⁶⁷ This was the case with counterinsurgent forces operating in French Algeria, in British Malaysia and in Iraq between 2007 and 2010 (See Galula 2006; Nagl 2005;).

⁶⁸ Tac. Ac. 18.2-24.1.

responsible for a state's rise and fall, and was equal in importance to military strategy and coalition politics.

In every research conducted over a counterinsurgency campaign, the former is juxtaposed with the strategy of the insurgency it is supposed to overcome. Whether one examines the American intervention against the Vietcong in the 1960s or the British campaign against the Malaysian Stalinists during the 1950s, he has to look at the strategy applied by insurgents as well. The reason behind this is that the counterinsurgency applied in order to be successful needs to be a response to the strategy followed by the insurgents. Nonetheless, in fourth century Greece great powers formulated counterinsurgency in competition with each other as well. In the twentieth century, the competition between great powers was defined by military strategy, industrial production, and strategic alliances, but not on counterinsurgencies. From 1943 until 1949 Greece suffered from a civil war led by a Stalinist insurgency that sought to subvert the government, while the Ukraine suffered the same issue caused by a nationalist insurgency. Both insurgencies had similar aims and operated within countries belonging to the Western and Soviet spheres of influence. Nonetheless, the counterinsurgencies developed by the British and the Soviet governments to deal with them had no effect on one another. As will be shown in the following chapters this was not the case with the competing Greek city-states. The counterinsurgencies followed by Athens and its competitors influenced each other and decided the alignment of minor city-states to one or the other great power. This spillover effect of counterinsurgency upon the strategy of alliances determined the overall military power of each city-state.

The Greek way of War

The ancient Greeks since the beginning of the Archaic Age had turned hoplite warfare into an annual tradition carried out each summer by the city-states. Over petty differences, such as claiming a religious site of no strategic value, the Greek heavy

infantrymen, called hoplites would clash with each other.⁶⁹ Most of the hoplites were landowners, who could afford to pay the hundred seventy five drachmas needed to purchase the hoplite panoply.⁷⁰ The hoplites' military formations were named phalanxes, and these clashed against one another without intrusion from other types of military units, deciding the outcome of the conflict exclusively amongst themselves. The hoplites, being farmers in their majority, invaded the enemy city-state's *chora* in the summertime hoping to burn the wheat, which was possible only when it was ripe for harvest, right before it was picked.⁷¹ The offended farmers, being the ones who would suffer the most by having their properties ravaged, formed a phalanx and marched against the aggressors in hoplite armour. The two phalanxes would meet on even ground and clash against one another, until the hoplites of one of them broke formation and fled the field. The hoplites, wearing heavy metallic armor and experiencing combat stress beneath the summertime sun, would find themselves exhausted and dehydrated within thirty minutes after the initiation of the hostilities.⁷² Tired and stressed hoplites would break rank and attempt to flee the battlefield. This would create confusion in the ranks, signaling that the fight was lost, and their phalanx would soon disintegrate. The cumbersome hoplite armor protected the hoplites from suffering heavy casualties, but under the Greek summer sun it also dehydrated them very fast, deciding the outcome of battles, as the less disciplined hoplites would

⁶⁹ The hoplites' name originated from their large shield called *hoplon*. In late antiquity the term hoplites meant men-at-arms, as *hoplon* took the meaning of weapon.

⁷⁰ Hanson 1999, pp. 291-292.

⁷¹ The *chora* was the city-state's countryside where all of the farmland belonging to farmers was situated. In the Archaic Age it became custom to force battles when an enemy army of hoplites invaded that territory most vital to the locals. The local farmers would arm themselves in hoplite fashion and march against the enemy in phalanx formation. Both sides being comprised of armed land-owners prized the *chora* as the most valuable part of a city-state to attack and defend. The strategic value of the *chora* was very high during the Archaic Age as a quite large part of the population still lived there during that period. In later centuries as the population began to gather around the urban centre (*asty*) would the *chora* begin to lose its strategic value, for the farmers' houses, slaves, and families were safe within the city behind defensive walls (cf. Hanson 1999, pp. 162-163).

⁷² Hanson 2009, p. 56.

attempt to flee from battle, when some of them maniacally tried to get away from the enemy by pushing and shoving against their own comrades.⁷³ Hoplite warfare did not depend on the military skills of individuals, for they lacked maneuverability due to the tight formation of the phalanx, as well as vision thanks to the Corinthian helmets that they protected their heads with.⁷⁴ The casualties from pitched battle between phalanxes were light during the Archaic Age, thanks to the good protection provided by heavy armor, and to the fact that the pursuit of the vanquished did not last long, again thanks to the cumbersome hoplite armor that the victors wore.⁷⁵ While the battle lasted the casualty rates between the two sides were similar. The outcome of hoplite battles depended upon the resilience of the belligerents in difficult conditions, rather than the fighting skill of the commanders and the soldiers.⁷⁶ The victors are estimated to have suffered a five percent casualty rate, while the losses of the defeated were around fourteen percent.⁷⁷ Most of the casualties were caused during the retreat, due to the disruption of the cohesion of the formation of the retreating hoplites, and their incapacity to defend themselves when assaulted from behind. This ceremonial form of warfare allowed city-states to prosper as they would not spend more than a few days at war each year, and suffer light casualties due to allowing only heavy infantrymen to take part in combat. Hoplite battles taking place in plain ground and being fought exclusively between farmers clad in heavy armour was viewed as the essence of

⁷³ Ibid., pp. 179, 181.

⁷⁴ The Corinthian helmet was made of bronze, which turned it into the heaviest metallic helmet, notwithstanding the fact that it was a full helmet preventing its wearer from listening well or seeing clearly (Hanson 2009, p. 72).

⁷⁵ Even during the flight of the broken enemies, the victors did not involve in the pursuit light infantry or cavalry, despite the latter being more suited for that task than heavy infantry.

⁷⁶ The Corinthian helmets lacked any openings for the ears, therefore the hoplites were unable to take commands during clashes. The hoplite commanders did not perform any complex task affecting tactics during combat, their remaining role was to boost their troops' morale by participating in the battle (Hanson 2009, p. 107).

⁷⁷ Krentz 1985, p. 18.

conventional warfare at the time, and any deviation from the norm that conflict was monopolized by land-owners was regarded as unorthodox warfare and immoral.⁷⁸

All that changed in the beginning of the fifth century as the Persian Empire invaded Greece, hoping to add a European satrapy to its territories. The Persians introduced to the Greeks total war and mixed unit tactics, as these aspects of conflict were more appropriate to a wealthier and more powerful people. The Great King sacked Athens, leading the Athenian population into exile, which forced the Athenians to use their navy to decide the war. At Salamis the Athenians destroyed most of the Great King's fleets, making the logistical support of his vast host impossible. The Persians were forced to withdraw most of their land forces back to Asia, leaving a much smaller portion of their original invading army to pursue the war. The remaining Persian forces in Greece were defeated at the battle of Plataea, despite the fact that they faced a Greek army consisting entirely of heavy infantry. The Greek commanders managed to use the terrain to their advantage, negating the benefits of Persian mixed unit tactics.⁷⁹

Yet, despite the Persian defeat in Greece, the lessons that the Greeks acquired from that conflict were not lost. The Athenians developed their navy into an arm that projected their power abroad, and built circuit walls around their city, negating any attempt to be forced into battle by traditional means, due to supplying their city with wheat imported from the Black Sea. By the middle of the fifth century, the Athenians had subjugated their allies, forcing them to sustain financially the costly democratic

⁷⁸ Hanson 1999, pp. 290-291. In Greek mythology the goddess Athena, representing orderly warfare, faced in battle the god Ares, who represented unconstrained violence, and annihilated him, forcing the male god from the field (Van Creveld 1991, p. 92). This Greek myth is an excellent portrayal of how the Greeks viewed hoplite battle as superior in every way to alternative forms of warfare.

⁷⁹ The Persian army suffered from lack of heavy infantry. Persian mixed units tactics were carried out by light infantry, foot-archers and javelin-throwing cavalry. The superiority of mixed unit tactics involving heavy infantry was proven beyond a doubt by the Macedonian kings Philip and Alexander in a span of twenty years from the 340s to the late 320s.

polity and the largest fleet in Greece.⁸⁰ It took decades for the Spartans and their allies to break down Athens, and by that time the Peloponnesian traditionalists had been changed themselves, having acquired a fleet and an empire of their own.

In some of the most dramatic moments of the Peloponnesian War, land battles were decided by non-hoplites, due to the incapacity of experienced hoplite commanders in dealing with any threats other than heavy infantry. In Boeotia at the battle of Delium in 424, the Athenians suffered a major defeat due to panicking at the sight of Theban cavalry appearing behind them, while in Sicily the Syracusan cavalry disrupted the victorious Athenian phalanx's pursuit of the Syracusan infantry in the opening stages of the war, while the Syracusan light infantry decimated Athens' coalition army bringing to an end the Sicilian expedition. However, the most infamous event of the Peloponnesian War occurred in 425 at Sphacteria as Athenian light infantry did what was considered impossible until then, forcing two hundred ninety two Lacedaemonian hoplites into surrender. These events formed cracks in the solid belief held by the Greeks that hoplite battle was the best form of waging war.

Irregular warfare became even more common in the aftermath of the Peloponnesian War. Sparta's failure to impose its hegemony uncontested in the Hellenic World, led to the adoption of total war among the Greeks as a way of resolving conflict. The frequent military engagements of hegemonic Sparta throughout the Hellenic World also led to the transformation of what was seen at that time as irregular warfare tactics into conventional warfare, leading to the adoption of mixed unit tactics in Greece. This development in military affairs was due to Sparta's domination of hoplite warfare, forcing its opponents into seeking alternative tactics to heavy infantry clashes in order to settle disputes through violence. By the time of the death of Alexander the Great in 323 Archaic hoplite warfare had been completely replaced by mixed unit tactics as the fashion with which Greek powers resolved their differences in battlefields.

During the Archaic Age the landless, who outnumbered the hoplites, participated in the military campaigns as light infantrymen, but without taking part in the hostilities.

⁸⁰ Pericles' funeral oration contains a most eloquent apology for converting the Delian League into the Athenian Empire and the obligations of being a hegemonic power (Thuc. 2.63). On the establishment of the Athenian Empire during the 440s see Kagan 1969, pp. 170-192.

Warfare for nearly four centuries was monopolized by the landowners, who had decided how it would be conducted, and were responsible for its short duration. In the second half of the fifth century the Athenians began imitating the Aetolians, who employed light infantry to great effect against the Athenian phalanx, and faced their Lacedaemonian enemies with mixed results. In the fourth century, under the unconventional command of general Iphicrates, the Athenians constantly employed a large number of light infantrymen of foreign origin, called peltasts, as mercenaries. While the Lacedaemonians were the first to establish a standing army thanks to their unique political system, Athens' peltasts were the first Greek attempt to create a true professional army.⁸¹

Soon afterwards cavalry came to the fore, as Thessalians, Macedonians, and Olynthians, increased their military participation in warfare taking place in South Greece. Unlike the southern Greeks, thanks to different geography and social structure, these people had developed aristocratic cavalry into their most potent arm for warfare rather than infantry.⁸² Until late antiquity, cavalry never became the main force of any western army, while at best it played an important role when supported by heavy infantry. The only exception was the army of Alexander the Great, where the Macedonian companions operated as a phalanx on horseback. However, Alexander and his army were sort of an isolated incident in Greek warfare, for his successors relied mostly on pike infantry, none of them ever possessing a cavalry force as efficient as Alexander's. Nonetheless, the investment of Philip and Alexander into developing a native heavy cavalry force based on the Thessalian model paid off, as

⁸¹ Lacedaemon had been using its own armed citizenry as a standing army since the second half of the sixth century. The Spartans went through military training from childhood until the age of eighteen. Nonetheless, in order to retain full civil rights the Spartans were obliged to be constantly prepared to go on campaign, and to provide a tithe to the state through the lands that they owned. Through this unique system Sparta obtained a standing army before any other city-state. The rest of the city-states developed professional military corps by providing steady state-pay to a small number of their citizens during the fourth century.

⁸² In Thessaly and Macedonia the tracts of farmland being much larger than in South Greece, led to the establishment of large-scale landowners who developed into aristocratic cavalry. Whereas the smaller and less fertile pieces of farmland in the south led to the creation of more numerous petty-farmers who practiced heavy infantry tactics in warfare.

these commanders mastered combined arms tactics better than any of their contemporaries, and achieved complete domination of both the European and Asian battlefields.

The influx of Persian gold into the Hellenic world from the late fifth century until the 330s allowed the Greeks to constantly practice warfare and develop new tactics and weapons to violently resolve their disputes. The hoplites being away from their farms for extended periods, and having their own farms destroyed by ravaging armies, ended up seeking work as mercenaries. The constant use of mercenary companies led to the establishment of standing armies, for professional soldiers outmatched the city-states' militias in military performance. An alternative to relying upon mercenaries for the protection of a city-state's interests was the establishment of a standing army based on well trained and state-funded militia. Nonetheless, this required a citizenry that was fully committed in their city-state's foreign policy. In the first half of the fourth century most city-states developed this form of military units to a very small-scale. Lacedaemon and Thebes were the exceptions to this as they both vied for the complete domination of the Hellenic world and committed their entire citizenries to warfare. Athens established its own standing army based on drafted youths after its defeat to Philip in Chaeronea in 338, in order to overthrow the Macedonian hegemony when the opportunity rose. Philip of Macedon established a standing army as well, though under very different conditions to the city-states of Greece, due to the fact that he controlled a vast area similar in size to the Peloponnese and with a completely different social organization to South Greece.⁸³

The use of professional troops brought changes to the nature of the battlefield and the traditional social structure of Greece. In regard to combat, professionals tended to dominate the battlefield whenever the conditions favoured them. If professional troops faced an inexperienced opponent similarly equipped then they would most likely win. When both enemy units comprised of professionals, then the one most favoured by the battlefield conditions, such as geography, weather, and unit sizes, would emerge victorious. Only rarely would militia win fights against professionals, and that would seldom happen due to being favoured by factors such as the terrain or superior

⁸³ Philip's policies that led to the expansion of the Macedonian kingdom and the establishment of a royal standing army are examined thoroughly later.

numbers and better leadership. When entire armies clashed, usually city-states could afford to employ only small numbers of professionals, creating chaotic battlefields, where standing army units would keep fighting while untrained militia routed, creating gaps in both sides' battle lines.

Constant warfare resulted in the desolation of the farmland of many city-states and the subsequent deterioration of Greek farmers, upon whose efforts the city-states' economies relied until then. With Persian gold flowing in freely towards all sides the city-states no longer had to rely upon personal labour in order to sustain their way of life. Agrarian councils gradually lost their political influence, as the city-states' economies and societies became more urbanized. This led to political instability as the farmers' numbers dwindled, and the remaining large-scale landowners used their wealth to promote their interests by advocating the cause of oligarchic governments, while the landless called for radical land redistribution promoted by either extremist democratic factions or tyrannical governments. The interstate wars between Greek great powers led to the proliferation of civil discord throughout the Greek speaking world that promoted intrastate conflict. The great powers were forced to confront the military forces of each other in battlefields, and at the same time conduct peacekeeping operations in the city-states under their sphere of influence.⁸⁴

Manpower

A very important factor that determined a state's ability to project military power was manpower. The city-states capacity to employ military strategies was determined by their manpower limits, which became more restrictive as the fourth century progressed due to the increasing need for specialized military units. The Greek city-states were

⁸⁴ The Athenians during the late 370s faced overextension and war fatigue as they toppled the Lacedaemonian maritime empire in the Aegean and Ionian seas. The Athenians, after every victory over the Lacedaemonians at sea, had to answer pleas of assistance from recently liberated *poleis* by sending in troops, as well as prepare their fleet for the next confrontation with Lacedaemon. Athens' military success strained her manpower and finances, as well as those of her allies, to their limits.

always handicapped in terms of available manpower, because they mainly relied on their citizenries as pools of military manpower.⁸⁵ In order to maintain an empire the more powerful city-states had to install garrisons in a lot of their satellite-states, as well as keep large armed forces ready to face off their competitors. Athens and Lacedaemon possessed large and costly fleets that required large pools of manpower specialized as ship-crews; they had thousands of their own hoplites serve in garrisons abroad, and needed hundreds more to man their own defensive fortifications, while at the same time they fielded armies that comprised of specialized heavy infantry, skirmishers, and cavalry. Such strenuous requirements in manpower were beyond any Greek city-state's human resources. The wealthiest and largest of city-states could afford to specialize in more than one field. Nonetheless, no single city-state would ever afford excelling in more than two fields for an extended period of time. Due to the small numbers of male enfranchised population, powerful city-states excelled in one or two types of military units. These conditions created a very fragile balance of power between competing city-states that would break down completely after a single military defeat.⁸⁶ Training competent military units in the ancient world took months if not years, and losing a few hundred capable soldiers in combat was a devastating loss to them. Mastery in marksmanship with either bow or javelin takes years, while creating unit cohesion in heavy infantry units is a long and difficult process as well. Troops had to endure the horrors of battle in a way that they no longer do since the

⁸⁵ The exception to this rule was Phocis, which in the 350s managed to replace Sparta as the most powerful land autocracy thanks to hiring tens of thousands of experienced mercenaries. Phocis had captured Delphi and used the oracle's vast wealth to employ powerful mercenary armies (Diod. 16.24.2-16.25.1). No other Greek city-state had an economy large enough to emulate such a feat, unless it received Persian subsidies.

⁸⁶ Sparta lost its hegemony after a few hundred of its citizens perished in a Boeotian battlefield in 371, while Athens was forced to give up the Second League and her autonomy after a thousand of its hoplites lost their lives in open battle and two thousand more were captured by the Macedonian army in 338. The numbers of the dead seem quite small, especially when compared to the tens of thousands of Romans who were killed in the battlefields of the Second Punic War, yet Rome kept on fighting for twenty years until the war was drawn to a favourable outcome. The Greek city-states lacked the manpower of the Roman state, due to their reactive conservatism in regard to citizenship.

introduction of the musket into the battlefield.⁸⁷ Soldiers engaged each other in close quarters while marching in tight unit formations, creating a pandemonium of noise and fear that only the most disciplined were able to withstand for an extended period of time.⁸⁸ In order for an army to endure these perilous conditions and to be able to bring harm to its enemy it had to go through rigorous training for a substantive period of time, and not just get armed and show for battle as it did in the age of the agrarian republics described by Hesiod.

The Spartans possessed the finest heavy infantry thanks to their unique political system, and a very efficient navy thanks to Persian subsidies and tribute from their own allies. The Athenians were good at sea and were the first to introduce professional light infantry. In the 320s, they were forced to improve the quality of their heavy infantry, since the defeats of Thebes and Sparta created a gap in that field that needed to be filled in by the Athenians, before they challenged Macedon. The investment in the Athenian land army most likely led to a decrease of manpower for its own navy, which explains in part how the Athenians were defeated at sea and not in land during the Lamian War. The Thebans improved their heavy infantry, and along with the Argives, were the only ones who could directly compete with the Spartans in that field during the first half of the fourth century. During the 360s the confrontation between Thebes and Athens forced the former to build a large navy which depleted its resources in but a few years, forcing them to decommission it. The Argives, since their sixth century competition for influence in the Peloponnese with Sparta, had developed excellent heavy infantry at their disposal. In the fourth century they decided to further invest in it, by creating an *agema*, rather than try introducing something new, which should explain the short range of their political influence abroad.⁸⁹

⁸⁷ Hanson 2009, p. 25.

⁸⁸ Ibid., p. 191.

⁸⁹ The *agema* was a heavy infantry unit whose members were provided with arms and pay by the state. Their trade was warfare, granting the city-state the capacity to conduct military operations during any time of the year. However, they were costly and most states could only afford small-size *agemata*. Still the introduction of *agemata* allowed petty city-states to contest with the Lacedaemonian armed forces in warfare on equal terms.

Things were further complicated after autocrats in Central and Northern Greece introduced programmes of centralization and nation-building that allowed them to use much larger pools of specialized manpower for warfare. Thessalian tyrants and Macedonian monarchs placed under their direct control land masses the size of the Peloponnese. They were able to exploit the military specializations of diverse local communities, without discriminating against them based on their ancestors' origins, such forms of discrimination being the rule in all of the Greek city-states. Philip of Macedon proved out to be the best in profiting from a quite diverse pool of manpower, that brought to him an advantage in all of the fields of land warfare. Philip utilized the excellent aristocratic cavalry of Thessaly and based its Macedonian counterpart on the same model. He employed Illyrians and Thracians as light infantry, in the same way the Athenians had done decades before him. Finally he brought into service the Macedonian communities' youths as his own version of heavy infantry in order to man Macedon's phalanxes, and even created his own version of *agema* known as the hypaspists, based after the Theban Sacred Band.⁹⁰ Philip provided exiled Greeks with citizenship in his recently centralized state, taking advantage of their unique skills in siege and hoplite warfare. Even the most famous component of the Macedonian armies, the pike phalanx, with which Philip conquered Phocian, Theban and Athenian armies in open battles, was created by an Athenian mercenary seeking Macedonian gold.

In the second half of the fourth century the city-states were confronted with large federations that outmatched them in terms of manpower and specialized military units. Faced with this challenge Athens embarked on unique economic and military reforms of massive scale, in order to remain relevant in foreign affairs, rather than end up in the periphery of international decision-making, and managed to corner the Macedonian regent of Greece for a year until reinforcements from Asia arrived to rescue him.

⁹⁰ The Theban Sacred Band was an *agema* notorious for its victories over Peloponnesian phalanxes during the 370s.

Classical realism

In the discipline of international relations classical realism is the oldest and most persistent theory dealing with why states choose to cooperate with each other or go to war. Classical realism is based on the premise that governments ultimately take decisions according to their states' security needs. Security is the most important factor that affects all key decisions in the interactions between states. Morgenthau identified this as power. He wrote that just as wealth is the primary concern of economists in regard to interest, or law for lawyers, power is what defines a state's interest for classical realists. According to realism issues such as the economy, political institutions, and personal ambition are of less importance when it comes to decision-making, distracting scholars from the true causes of top level government decisions.⁹¹

In classical realism there is no social hierarchy between states that would arrange their place and rights amongst each other, instead the international system is governed by anarchy. According to Waltz this anarchic realm is a state of constant war.⁹² That does not mean that each state is always at war with the rest, but that armed conflict may erupt at any time between them. This situation causes states to remain under constant alert and to interact with one another in an environment of distrust. States would be better off cooperating with one another, by establishing economies based on the division of labour. Nonetheless, this does not happen due to their fear of one another's intentions.⁹³ All states involved in a division of labour would benefit greatly, yet the uneven growth of the economy among them would benefit some more than the rest.⁹⁴ This might provide the advantage in a power struggle that would lead a state to subjugate or completely annex its weak partners, hence governments remain suspicious of one another and are evaluated on their ability to preserve their autonomy

⁹¹ See Mearsheimer 1995, pp. 82-93; Waltz 2000, pp. 40-41. Cf. Gilpin 1984, pp. 287-304.

⁹² Waltz 1979, p. 102.

⁹³ Ibid., p. 105.

⁹⁴ Waltz claims that this proves that states are more concerned with sustaining their autonomy rather than their well-being, which serves as a display of the differences between international political and economic philosophies (1979, p. 107).

through vigilance. In political theory this behavioural phenomenon is called the security dilemma and is not limited to state-actors only. Although it may appear as if realist policies keep states from developing as fast as they could, nonetheless other more “positive” theories that do not have the same gloomy view of world politics can lead to conflict and disaster as well. The democratic peace theory became part of the Bush administration’s foreign policy, leading to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, which brought a drop in US and western power during the following years, with chaos erupting in the Arab countries, and Russia grabbing the opportunity to annex territories from Georgia and Ukraine.⁹⁵

Morgenthau identifies power with state interest. States do not pursue foreign policies based on their leaders’ moral values and characters, instead they aim to maximize their national power and to decrease that of the rest.⁹⁶ Carrying out a foreign policy based on interest is to maximize benefits and minimize risks in interactions with other states regardless of moral issues and political preferences.⁹⁷ Ideological concerns and personal interests stand in the way of effective governance, and whenever they determine foreign policy, failure ensues, as they are inadequate criteria for statesmanship. This stark reality stipulated by the classical realist theory explains adequately the reasons why states of opposing state ideologies and systems of government cooperate with each other and choose to fight against those similar to themselves.

The exercise of warfare between states does not provide answers to the matters of authority and right, instead it demonstrates who is more powerful and dictates the allocation of gains and losses.⁹⁸ The relations that are established internationally can only be of strength, as opposed to those of authority at the national level. Each state promotes its interests through the threat of use of force or through its actual use, force being the first and usually only means of interaction. Force defines the success of other means used to advance one’s cause. The threat and the costs of armed conflict

⁹⁵ See Kant 1983, pp. 107-139.

⁹⁶ Morgenthau 1993, pp. 4-7.

⁹⁷ Ibid., p. 10.

⁹⁸ Waltz 1979, p. 112.

lead to the creation of coalitions, and determine the efficiency of diplomacy.⁹⁹ When states feel that war will cost them too much, they decide to compromise and avoid armed conflict altogether.

Due to waging war on a constant basis and being at war with everyone based on unlimited goals is counterproductive, states end up establishing a balance of power between themselves. State-actors according to the balance of power theory attempt to preserve themselves at the lower tier, or to establish a hegemony at the highest tier. Internally they advance their economic wealth in order to increase their military power, while externally they attempt to weaken other states' influence and alliances, as they augment their own.¹⁰⁰ A balance of power between three or more states is based on external efforts, whereas one established between only two states depends on internal efforts. According to Waltz the requirements for a balance of power to prevail are an anarchic international order, and the states populating it must primarily seek to survive.¹⁰¹ The coalitions created in a balance of power remain equal in power even when one of their members is destabilized. When an alliance is weakened by the destabilization of a member-state, the opposing coalition's military efforts are lessened or the cohesion between its member-states is relaxed. States prefer to join the weakest of coalitions in order to avoid being dominated by the leading member-state. Thus, in an international system based on balance of power, power amongst states readjusts itself after every shift between competing factions in a manner that preserves the balance between them.¹⁰² Gilpin added to this theory that the costs of bringing reform to this system are too great and discourage the members of the international system from attempting to introduce change.¹⁰³ Gilpin claims that the members of a system based on a power equilibrium seek change when their domestic elites' interests shift and readjust what they view as national interest.¹⁰⁴ Economic, political or technological progress brings reform to a system based on balance of power in the

⁹⁹ Ibid., pp. 113-4.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 118.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., p. 121.

¹⁰² Ibid., p. 126.

¹⁰³ Gilpin 1981, pp. 13-5.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., p. 13.

short term, while in the long term the uneven growth of power between different states is what erodes the power equilibrium, since the costs for bringing change are no longer prohibitive.¹⁰⁵

Although the author of this thesis does not view himself as a realist, the approach used to analyse Athens' relations to other state-actors was greatly influenced by the theory of classical realism. The Athenians for most of the fourth century based their foreign policy on relations of power. Athens sought security from more powerful states by forging alliances with others, and by using violence against those that threatened it. For a short period during the 370s the Athenians, having created the Second Athenian Alliance, seemed to have adopted a constructivist understanding of international relations. Nonetheless, that was in regard to Athens' interactions with its own allies and how the institution of the Second Athenian Alliance operated internally. Although the Second Athenian Alliance operated in a constructivist manner internally, in its relations with non-member-states, such as Sparta and apostate Thebes, it pursued realist policies. The constructivist approach was undermined by the Second Alliance's most powerful members. First the Thebans ceased contributing financially to the Alliance, while they still enjoyed the benefits from its membership, then they abandoned the Alliance altogether in order to establish their own hegemony, convincing the Thessalians to do the same. The Athenians reacted to these events by adopting a realist approach as well, and from then on they undermined their own Alliance by seeking to reestablish a hegemony similar to the one created by Pericles during the second half of the fifth century. This change in Athenian policy destroyed the constructivist character of the interactions between the member-states of the Second Athenian Alliance, and reestablished a realist dimension between them, leading to the breakup of the Alliance and the violent conflict that was named as the Social War. Despite a couple of brief attempts to establish a constructivist world through the creation of institutions such as the Second Athenian League in the 370s, and the Hellenic League in the 350s, or even the Corinthian League during the 330s and 320s, for the most part of the fourth century the Greek city-states operated in a classical realist environment, establishing relations of power with each other. Athens and her opponents sought to establish themselves as hegemons, not only in order to

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., p. 14.

better themselves above the rest, but because in the Greek world a hegemony was the favourite means for security. An empire was the way to secure one's safety in an anarchic environment, where both interstate and intrastate conflicts tore *poleis* apart. Since this view was shared by all, all of the city-states competed with one another for power, raising the levels of insecurity. The Peloponnesian War ended with Sparta being the single hegemonic power that dominated the entirety of Greece. Sparta, however, abused its power over other states and soon had to fight another devastating war against her most powerful allies, the latter establishing an alliance amongst themselves, and each of them seeking to create a private empire at the same time. Smaller less powerful states soon followed suit and by the end of the 360s there was no single hegemonic power over Greece. Instead a great number of city-states vied for control over one another, spreading chaos across the Hellenic world.¹⁰⁶

Although this thesis does not attempt to become a case study for classical realist theory, it does rely on a great degree upon that theory's tenets, and it is made clear that the foreign policy of the city-states examined was based on realism. An attempt to turn this thesis into a case study that would validate classical realism would succeed in general principle, but would fail as soon as attention was brought to detail. The breakup of the Second Athenian League following the collapse of the Peloponnesian League confirms the classical realist tenet that the breakup of one coalition is balanced by the ensuing weakening of the other. However, when one examines the Social War closely, he notices that the causes of the war were related to Athens' change of foreign policy, rather than the loss of the Spartan hegemony. Another point to display the fallacy of treating classical realism as a doctrine rather than a theory, would be that just as ignoring power, as an interest, when forging a foreign policy has dire consequences, adopting a strict *realpolitik* is not without serious ramifications either, which is thoroughly covered in the chapter on Athens' Social War and confrontation with Macedonian power.

¹⁰⁶ Xenophon ended his historical narrative with the claim that although at the onset of the battle of Mantinea (362) it was expected that the victor would be the new hegemon, nevertheless the battle's outcome left its survivors confused and Greece in disorder (*Hell.* 7.5.26-7).

Classical realism describes the relations between states that were forged on secular terms after the treaty of Westphalia, yet this thesis covers the relations between Greek city-states nearly two millennia earlier. Modern states have governments based on the representation of the citizenry, while although the Greek city-states did not share the same constitution with each other, their citizenries were directly involved in governance, and the character of each polity depended primarily upon the size of the citizenry. Apart from the difference in government, city-states were quite different in their military affairs from modern-states as well. Today the military is separated from society and civil government, but in the Greek city-states these divisions did not exist. The decision to go to war was taken by citizens and warfare was carried out by those same individuals. Needless to say in representative government that is not how things work. However, despite the differences in the *modus operandi* of the government, city-states had similar concerns in regard to security with modern states, and tended to base their decision-making on similar principles to their modern-day counterparts. How the issue of the similarities between modern and ancient state-actors was dealt with is explained in the next part.

Conjectural History

Studying warfare and strategic decision-making in the classical age is a challenge even for historians, since the sources are limited, incomplete, and unreliable to a great degree. For this case study the historical evidence covering the subject, and the research that historians have conducted on it has been thoroughly examined. Additionally, the analytical tools of war and strategic studies have been used to complement the historical evidence and the scientific research. Nonetheless, even though historical methodology is applied on the primary sources, the goal is not to look into the events from the viewpoint of a historian. Instead, the aim is to examine the application of strategy and its consequences upon city states. The aim being to analyse the application of strategy and its consequences upon city-states the theory of

conjectural history, introduced by the members of the Scottish Enlightenment, has been recruited as well.¹⁰⁷

Conjectural history was described by Dugalt Stewart as a method to examine the true causes of events and important phenomena in human history.¹⁰⁸ It sought to explain the causes of human progress and important events, such as the downfall of Republicanism in first century BC Italy, the decline of the Roman Empire, and the spectacular rise in power of Northern Europe from the fifteenth century onwards, by identifying the natural progress that produced them, rather than basing their history upon accidents, such as the character of important individuals.¹⁰⁹ The Scots were at odds with the French contractarians, because the latter advocated Locke's contract theory, whereas the Scots claimed that social change was brought upon by unintended consequences, rather than design, and attempted to understand which of these introduced progress to mankind, and how they affected civil society.¹¹⁰ The Scots were advocates of the Four Stages Theory, rather than contractarianism, which had been introduced in the seventeenth century by John Locke, and during the eighteenth century was fervently promoted by members of the French Enlightenment, such as Rousseau.¹¹¹ According to the Four Stages Theory human progress happened as humans established larger and more sophisticated forms of societies, transcending from communities of hunters to shepherds, then to farmers, and finally into civil society.¹¹²

¹⁰⁷ For an introductory reading on the Scottish Enlightenment see Berry 2001, pp. 1-8; Broadie 1997, pp. 1-37; Emerson 2003, pp. 9-30.

¹⁰⁸ Cf. Berry 2008, pp. 61-71; Broadie 2011, pp. 64-75; Hompl 1978, pp. 19-40.

¹⁰⁹ Stewart 1997, pp. 671-674.

¹¹⁰ Berry 2001, pp. 39-48.

¹¹¹ Locke 2010; Rousseau 1997.

¹¹² Gibbon remains infamous up to this day for *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, which was based on the Four Stages theory, despite the fact that the author was not a member of the Scottish Enlightenment. Gibbon (2005) identified the Romans as a people who had transcended from a farming society into a sophisticated civil society, which came into conflict with peoples whose tribes were still situated in the second stage of shepherd society, such as the Germanic tribes and the Huns. On the Four Stages theory see Berry 2001, pp. 93-106;

Nowadays, the academic community, thanks to its discoveries about the past, has rejected the Four Stages Theory as a means of explaining human progress. Thanks to the efforts of archaeologists we are well aware that the Germanic tribes that conquered the western territories of the Roman Empire were sophisticated peoples, who had experienced centuries of Romanization. The Germans had adopted from the Romans advanced farming techniques, allowing them to increase their food production that brought the increase of Germanic population. Due to the establishment of German client-kingdoms by the Roman government the Germanic elites were able to create their own political clients from part of the population of their own tribes, forming private retinues that would be used as standing armies in warfare, as well as a base of popular support that allowed them to dominate tribal politics for long periods. This social evolution on the other side of the Rhine and the Danube led to the establishment of large tribal federations during the fourth century A.D., such as the Franks and the Goths that lasted for longer periods than their earlier predecessors such as the Marcomanni, their societies becoming much more effective in mobilizing for war. The Huns were a shepherd society, as the Scots had claimed, yet their diet did not consist solely of meat and milk, otherwise they would not have been able to grow in numbers and power. The Huns interacted with their neighbours and traded with farmer communities, yet that did not lead to their transformation into a civil society as the Scots claimed on the fourth stage. The Huns remained a shepherd society and did not attempt to create a civil society before Attila engaged in empire-building.¹¹³

Conjectural History was introduced in order for the Scots to explain the causes of important events and change, since we lack a full history of the distant past. It is not recorded how primitive communities began to tame animals, and keep them in flocks, stopping to outright hunt and kill them, or how a written language was developed. The Scots claimed that human nature remained universal and static, and thus they would be able to draw conclusions about the past, by using sympathy as a tool to discern human

Ferguson 2009, pp. 6-11; Haakonssen 1989, pp. 154-177; Hume 2006; pp. 16-19, pp. 20-23; Kames 1997, pp. 521-531; Millar 1997, pp. 490-496; Smith 1997b, pp. 478-487.

¹¹³ On the interactions between Rome and the Germanic tribes, and how these helped the latter reach a similar level of social development see Goldsworthy 2009; Heather 2005; cf. Delbrück 1990b; Gilpin 1981, p. 192-3.

behaviour.¹¹⁴ Contemporary scholars have severely criticized the Scots for their belief in a universal human nature, and find Conjectural History to be ahistorical.¹¹⁵ The latter claim is based on Dugalt Stewart's argument that the historians ought to ignore "accidents" when in search for the causes that lead to change, for these might not recur and are not part of natural progress.¹¹⁶ Historians ought to examine both the external and the internal causes of historical events. Battles and individuals belong to the external causes of events, the internal causes are the social factors that led important individuals into taking particular decisions causing social uproar.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁴ Hume (1985, pp. 41-46; Berry 2001, pp. 68-71) impressed by the discoveries of Newton aimed to apply the same scientific methodology, of experimenting and observing under different circumstances and conditions, in order to draw conclusions on human behaviour. Hume (1997, pp. 44-60) named his theory the Science of Man, which in turn was adopted and furthered by Stewart; The term sympathy usually means that someone is acting compassionately, whereas Smith used the word sympathy in a technical manner. In the technical sense sympathy means that by reading about the conditions that surround an event the observer can conjecture which feeling the involved person is experiencing. Smithian (Smith 1982, pp. 9-26, 67-73) sympathy is a tool used for historical analysis, not a point of view on moral motivation. Cf. Broadie 1997, pp. 155-6; 2011, pp. 52-54, 187-191; Haakonssen 1989; pp. 7-9, pp. 187-8.

¹¹⁵ Collingwood (1946, pp. 83-84) criticized Hume's analysis of human nature for being based on that of a western European male, whereas under different conditions similar problems might have brought different reactions. Pompa (1990, p. 48) likewise states that Hume's constancy of human nature comes from experience and observation, which is available to him only through contemporary experience. Pompa (1990, pp. 51-2) brings up as an example on the changes introduced to human nature, while criticizing Hume for being unable as a historian to produce an account of the changes in human nature and their causes, the differences in why people go to war at different times. A medieval knight went to war because of his obligation to feudal lords for a short period of time each year, whereas in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries people fought in order to preserve the customs and traditions of their own nations, which whenever threatened, the attack was felt as a personal affront by the individuals who identified with the offended nation.

¹¹⁶ Stewart 1997, pp. 674.

¹¹⁷ Smith 1997a, pp. 653-5.

Conjectural history today remains a useful tool and was used in this thesis as part of an interdisciplinary approach. The Four Stages Theory, as has been already said, is out-of-date, it was not be used to provide a description of how the advanced civil society of Athens ended up in complete defeat by the Macedonians, who rapidly progressed from shepherd communities into the final stage of civil society, thanks to the statesmanship of Philip II and Alexander the Great. Nevertheless, conjectural history relied heavily upon the unintended consequences theory, which has a significant role in this thesis' conclusions. Modern historians seek to explain Athens' fourth century downfall by focusing on ancient literary sources and archeological evidence. They do so by analysing the available speeches of Athenian politicians and the epigraphic evidence that archaeologists have brought to our attention. Although modern history provides good insight into the character and influence of individuals, it largely ignores the lessons provided by strategic studies. A point demonstrating this would be modern historians' belief that *helots* who were chattel slaves were conscripted into the Lacedaemonian phalanx and sent on campaigns.¹¹⁸ Thanks to the West's current involvement in the Afghan conflict we are well aware of how difficult it is to train people, who do not share western values, into an efficient western army, cause we have been failing to do so for over ten years. Yet, modern historians claim that people who were previously owned by others and lacked any rights, simply joined the

¹¹⁸ The ancient sources provide no evidence whatsoever of what sort of military training the *helots* underwent before being sent on military campaigns. On the social status of *helots* cf. Hanson 1999, p. 104; Oliva 1971, p. 39 note 1. Vlassopoulos (2011, pp. 116-7) claims that to the ancient Greeks Lacedaemon's *helots* and chattel slaves in Chios and Athenian fugitive slaves were viewed as being the same. Nonetheless, Vlassopoulos adds that oddly in a fifth century treaty between Athens and Sparta, the two *poleis* agreed that the former would send troops to quell a helot revolt. Yet, there was no reciprocal demand that the Lacedaemonians would come to aid Athens during a slave revolt, probably because it was too unlikely to happen. However, the reason why the *Helots* in question were deemed a domestic security threat by the Spartan government, must have been their prowess in warfare and access to weaponry. Chattel slaves and serfs specialized in agricultural production. Were the *helots* disenfranchised or owned farmers, they could never pose a serious challenge to Spartan rule, just like the 14th century peasant revolts in France never were anything more but an irritation to the Valois regime.

Lacedaemonian phalanx and were instantly transformed into hoplites, without providing any explanation of how that happened. The military efficiency of these “former slaves” against other Greek and Persian armies proves that they were equal to their Spartan overlords, who began training for hoplite warfare long before they reached puberty. This proves that the *helots* joining the Lacedaemonian phalanx were anything but owned chattel slaves before. By employing conjectural history along with the findings of conflict studies we come closer to the truth realizing, despite the claims of Xenophon and Plutarch about these people being slaves, that was not the case for those who served as hoplites in Sparta’s military campaigns. Another point about this would be that despite Sparta’s security needs, the ancients considered slaves serving in the army alongside citizens an atrocity. The Athenians rejected a proposal to allow slaves into the army after their defeat at Chaeronea, and the Romans despite their significant loss of available military manpower after Cannae to Hannibal’s mercenaries did not resort to drafting slaves either. Ancient Greeks and Romans simply did not accept the notion of slaves serving in their militaries, probably due to having dehumanized these people. A contemporary analogy would be westerners considering recruiting child soldiers into their own militaries. Although sub-Saharan societies accept this as a necessary measure when lacking more able military manpower for their conflicts, the British and the French never considered recruiting children after the battles of Somme and Verdun. Security-wise it would make sense for the French and the British to consider recruiting children into their militaries in order to avoid surrender to the German Empire, instead they did not because of their strategic culture. For similar reasons republican Greeks and Romans would not recruit chattel slaves into their militaries. Thus, in regard to drawing conclusions about issues of strategic concern, in regard to fourth century BC Greece, conjectural history and strategic analysis prove to be more useful than modern history.

Conjectural history was used in accordance with the advances made in sociology and conflict studies, in order to identify the causes of why powerful city-states in the period under examination succeeded or failed.¹¹⁹ In order to do that, it is necessary to

¹¹⁹ Political scientist Alexander George (1979, p. 55) suggested that in order to identify the causes that induce an outcome, scholars should choose cases of both success and failure that

adopt the Scots' ideas on human nature, up to a certain degree, that human behaviour at a basic level remains the same at all times and places.¹²⁰ Thanks to international relations' classical realist tradition, as well as due to research on recent conflicts we are aware that people who are faced with foreign invasion and civil war tend to display similar concerns and reactions. They seek security first in order to survive, and then they use conflict to their own benefit in order to resolve their private differences with others.¹²¹ For example we are not fully aware of why the Athenians decided to confront their former allies in the way they did, despite having other options available to them, resulting in a brutal conflict that curbed them of their high influence in Greek affairs.¹²² In order to draw conclusions on Athenian foreign policy, and its effects, without a full image of Athenian politics conjectural history along with classical realism and sociology were put to use in order to fill the vacuum.¹²³

could lead to identifying the conditions and variables that accounted for the difference in the outcome.

¹²⁰ Hart (1991, p. 4) influenced by his personal experiences in military operations during the Great War, thought that all people tend to react in a similar fashion when faced with danger. Though their reactions may differ to a certain level thanks to the influence of factors such as heredity, environment, and training, "the difference is one of degree, not fundamental".

¹²¹ Butalia (2000, p. 45) in her case study, on the population movement of twelve million people who were forced to cross borders after the partition of India and Pakistan, states that people do not tend to be heroic, instead they seek means to protect their jobs, house, family, and most importantly their own lives.

¹²² We lack direct sources on this period and have to rely on Isocrates, who did not influence the Athenian *demos* in taking its decisions, as he did not speak out at the *ecclesia*, and on Aeschines and Demosthenes who spoke of the events of this conflict years later in retrospect.

¹²³ Conjectural history's affinity to international relations' classical realism is further tempered by David Hume's apprehension of the importance of the balance of power in international relations (2006, pp. 154-160).

Chapter One: Military collapse and civil war: From Aegospotami to the fall of the Thirty at Eleusis (405-401 BC)

Historical Overview

The Establishment of the Thirty and the Athenian Civil War

A day after Alcibiades had given sound advice to the Athenian generals on how to reorganize their army and navy, Lysander with the Lacedaemonian fleet took advantage of the lack of high discipline in the Athenian camp and captured it in a surprise assault. Only eight ships under general Conon's command managed to escape to Cyprus, and Paralus, the fastest ship in the Athenian navy, returned to Athens to spread the news of the disaster that had occurred at Aegospotami. Lysander heading the advice of Sparta's vengeful allies executed all of the captured Athenian generals, with the exception of Adeimantus, for he had opposed at the Athenian ecclesia the proposition to amputate the hands of captured enemies. Lysander spared three thousand Athenians, sending them home along with every cleruch he came across on his way to Athens, in order to increase the size of the population in Athens, so that the ratios of food would be exhausted sooner, and the Athenian demos would succumb to starvation during his term as navarch.¹²⁴ Lysander's plan worked out, and

¹²⁴ The *cleruchies* were Athenian military colonies established within their allies' cities. The Athenian *cleruchs* were troops granted the lands of displaced local citizens within an allied city-state, in order to make sure that the latter remained loyal to Athens, and to boost its defences when attacked by the forces of the Lacedaemonian League. The Athenian *cleruchies* acted as garrisons amongst the member-states of the Delian League, but their relationship to the local communities was complex. The establishment of *cleruchs* within a city-state was agreed with the local democratic elite that in turn secured its own monopoly on government through Athenian military presence. The members of the oligarchic elite were exiled and their properties confiscated. Their land was given to the Athenian *cleruchs* who in turn assisted the

he did not lose a single soldier during the siege of Athens. The bulwark of democracy collapsed due to the loss of its food-supply from the Crimea. After Lysander's capture of Samos, which remained recalcitrant despite the complete Spartan victory in the Aegean and mainland Greece, he visited Athens and imposed regime change. Lysander using as an excuse that the Athenians had violated the peace treaty with Sparta, by not having yet completely brought down all of their city's fortifications as they had agreed to, he overthrew democratic rule and replaced it with a temporary government that was run by a council of thirty. The Thirty would oversee the restoration of Athens' "ancestral constitution" which of course meant the imposition of a philo-Laconian oligarchy. The Thirty however soon made clear that they did really intend to ever give up power, instead they would retain their office. Initially the Thirty experimented with autocratic rule, by arresting Athens' known criminals and wrongdoers and had them executed without trial. To this no one spoke against, either because they were too afraid, or because law-abiding citizens did not care about the ill fate of their shady fellow citizens. Soon after the Thirty began to treat similarly wealthy Athenian citizens and metics, due to struggling to deal with Athens' war reparations to Sparta. The Thirty Tyrants led a purge against wealthy Athenians, with the assistance of the Lacedaemonian garrison which they had installed for this specific reason, regardless of their political views. The only criterion behind this violent policy was the victims' wealth, which was confiscated by the government and was used in order to pay back Sparta. This controversial policy did not lead to the rise of an opposition to the Spartan-backed oligarchic regime, but to the creation of an Athenian diaspora, as hundreds of important Athenians sought refuge in Argos, Corinth, and Thebes. The Spartan government issued a decree, proclaiming to the Greek city-states that they ought to send back to Athens all of its refugees. Argos and Thebes openly rejected this order. Thebes, despite being a powerful member-state of the Peloponnesian League, defied Spartan leadership. As for Argos it followed its own traditional foreign policy of opposing Sparta. While the Athenian diaspora was growing, seventy of the exiles who had been granted asylum in Thebes, led by former general Thrasybulus, captured the fort of Phyle in Attica. The Thirty sent an Athenian

local democrats in maintaining their rule and keeping their political opponents from ever returning to their city.

mixed force of infantry and cavalry, the latter including Xenophon in its ranks, along with one third of the Lacedaemonian garrison that served in Athens. The oligarchic armed force failed spectacularly at confronting the very small number of Athenian insurgents, and even suffered a surprise assault that caused it to lose over a hundred troops. The oligarchs retreated and the democratic insurgency increased over ten times in size. Thrasybulus, taking advantage of the lack of fortifications in Piraeus, led into it a thousand men and camped on the hill of Munychia. The Thirty raised the full Athenian levy against the democrats, and despite their superior numbers and equipment, suffered defeat in pitched battle due to fighting uphill. Critias, who had been the most radical and influential of the Thirty fell in battle. Thrasybulus took control of all of Piraeus, and the oligarchs after withdrawing to Athens, replaced the Thirty with a new government of Ten, that would seek peace with the democrats now ruling Piraeus. The remaining Thirty took refuge in Eleusis, while the Ten sought to pursue the war against the democrats, instead of reaching peace. Lysander arrived with his forces to assist the oligarchs and to restore the Thirty in power, but the Spartan king Pausanias reached Athens shortly afterwards with his own forces, and took over from Lysander. The Spartan king arranged for the two sides to have peace talks, and promoted the restoration of democracy in Athens. The Thirty remained in power at Eleusis until 401, when the government of Athens overheard that they were raising an army of mercenaries, it captured by assault Eleusis and executed the surviving members of Lysander's Thirty. The Athenian demos had had democracy restored, yet everything else had changed, as it lacked an empire, it had become a member-state of the Peloponnesian League, and it owed an enormous amount of debt to Sparta. Still the Athenians managed to reconcile with one another, and to pursue an active foreign policy soon after, restoring their city's status as a first-rate power in Greece.

The fragmentation of Athenian strategy

Refusing to accept defeat

After the news of the disaster that took place at Aegospotami arrived in Athens, the Athenians failed to form any strategy that would help them avoid capitulating to Sparta. The Athenian demos had lost all of its allies, with the exception of Samos, who changed sides as soon as they heard that the Athenian fleet was no more, as well as its primary arm of projecting military power, its naval forces.¹²⁵ The Athenians were left with a small army and their city walls as their only sources of military power. Being unable to receive any grain from Crimea, as Lysander had the Hellespont under his control, the Athenians ought to have surrendered as soon as possible, in order to avoid suffering any further, as the situation was only going to get worse for them. The demos was in denial refusing to realize how dire the situation had become, and that maintaining the war effort would bring Athens to the brink of extinction. The Athenians' food supplies were running out as their city was fully surrounded by the land forces of the Peloponnesian League, cutting them off from the farmlands of Attica, and being simultaneously blockaded by the Lacedaemonian fleet, they were unable to import grain by sea.¹²⁶ Soon, people were dying from starvation, and the Athenians sent an embassy to king Agis, asking to join the Peloponnesian League and retain all of their city's fortifications.¹²⁷ The Athenian terms of surrender were rejected, yet a citizen named Archestratus suggested to the *ecclesia* that the Athenians add in the terms of surrender the demolition of ten stadia of the Long Walls.¹²⁸ The demos responded to this sound advice by imprisoning Archestratus, and voted to forbid the repetition of any similar proposal, as if anyone was going to make any rational suggestion after seeing Archestratus carried off from the *ecclesia* to the dungeons. The Athenians being unable to repel the Peloponnesian armies that had cut

¹²⁵ Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.6.

¹²⁶ Diod. 13.107.2-3; Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.8-9.

¹²⁷ Diod. 13.107.4; Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.11-14.

¹²⁸ Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.15.

them off from the rest of the world, were stalling for time, as they were terrified that Sparta's allies would seek revenge for the atrocities that they had suffered from the Athenians.¹²⁹ Theramenes attempted to take control of the situation, by convincing the Athenians to send him to carry out secret negotiations with the Spartans. Theramenes was gone for three months and during that time the Athenians lost a lot of people to starvation, the Athenian politician failed to convince Lysander to spare Athens' fortifications and returned to an Athens that was in complete disarray claiming that he took so long because he was detained by Lysander.¹³⁰ Theramenes told the *ecclesia* that the Athenians ought to demolish the Long Walls, and even then many speakers disagreed with him, but the majority supported his motion, since the only alternative was for all of them to starve to death.¹³¹

The Athenians were aware that after the complete loss of their naval forces and their empire, they would be unable to raise an effective defence against the Peloponnesian League. The reasons why they persisted on vehemently resisting against an inevitable defeat, were paradoxically both reasonable and irrational at the same time. The Athenians had committed atrocities against Sparta's allies during the Peloponnesian War, from the sack of Melos in 416, to the more recent summary execution of the captured crews of two triremes from Andros and Corinth, and it had been decided by the *ecclesia* to cut off the right arm of every prisoner from Lysander's fleet.¹³² The demos was right to fear that the member-states of the Peloponnesian League would push for similar measures to be taken against itself, for the representatives of Corinth and Thebes, and other states demanded to carry out an *andrapodismos*, meaning the execution of every male adult citizen, and the selling into slavery of women and

¹²⁹ Ibid. 2.2.3.

¹³⁰ Ibid. 2.2.16-21. Although Theramenes did not convince the Spartan government not to demolish the Long Walls, his secret negotiations with Lysander may have saved Athens from complete destruction. It is quite likely that the Athenian politician made a convincing argument about the fact that Corinth and Thebes would be harder to control if they claimed Attica for themselves. Athens, by becoming a client-state of Lacedaemon, would raise the power of the latter within the Peloponnesian League, and serve as a buffer-state to the ambitions of the powerful, yet recalcitrant member-states within Sparta's coalition.

¹³¹ Ibid. 2.2.22-23.

¹³² Diod. 13.104-6; *GHI* 96; Xen. *Hell.* 1.73-79, 2.1.1-29, 2.2.3-4.

children, in the same manner that the Athenians had treated the Melians.¹³³ On the other hand, the Athenians exacerbated their lack of leverage, by prolonging the siege of Athens. Had they surrendered right after the news from Aegospotami arrived, they would have avoided many deaths due to famine, and perhaps retained the democratic constitution. It is not likely that Lysander and the Spartan government would allow the Athenians to keep their fortifications, as tearing down the Long Walls was a great victory for Spartan public relations within the Peloponnesian League.¹³⁴ Yet, the direct involvement of Lysander in Athenian politics was not inevitable. He was invited by Athenian oligarchs while he was overseeing the siege of Samos, after their popularity had been boosted due to the exasperation brought about by the Athenian military defeats, and the siege that was going badly for the Athenians. This was not the first time that the Athenian demos rejected a good opportunity to reach peace with Athens. It had failed to do so before, right after its victories at Cyzicus in 410, and at Arginusae in 406.¹³⁵ After being defeated at Arginusae the Spartans had offered to give up the fort of Decelea to the Athenians, from which they raided Attica, as well as to leave the Athenian Empire intact.¹³⁶ The Athenians pursued a maximalist policy in the late stages of the Peloponnesian War, and failed to accept the reasonable peace terms they were offered, at a time when their finances were in disarray due to the revolts of their allies, and the incessant military operations that they carried out in Greece since the Athenian disaster in Sicily.¹³⁷ Despite the complete defeat at Aegospotami the Athenian demos kept on striving for a favourable conclusion to the

¹³³ Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.19-23.

¹³⁴ Ibid. 2.2.22-23.

¹³⁵ Diod. 13.52.2-13.53.3.

¹³⁶ Aristot. *Const. Ath.* 34.1.

¹³⁷ Donald Kagan claimed that the Athenians had difficulty trusting the Spartans due to the failure of the Peace of Nicias. The Spartans had failed to return the control of the fort of Amphipolis to the Athenians, and had allowed the Boeotians to demolish the fort of Panactum in violation of the peace agreement. According to Kagan this had a severe impact upon the Athenians, making them distrustful of the Spartans for the rest of the Peloponnesian War's duration (1989, pp. 378-9).

war.¹³⁸ That opportunity had been already lost with the rejection of the Peloponnesian peace terms offered after the battle of Arginusae. In 404 Athens was spared not thanks to its own diplomatic efforts, but due to the sound thinking of the Spartan government, which chose to ignore the demands of its extremist allies, and to invest in pacifying its former nemesis, in order to use it as buffer-state against the rising power of Thebes and Corinth.

Oligarchs

The Oligarchic faction rose to power for the first time in 411, by staging a coup d'état that cancelled democratic rule in Athens for a short period.¹³⁹ This oligarchic government was short-lived, as the armed supporters of democracy, re-established the domination of Athens in the Aegean Sea after the democrats' successful engagement against the Lacedaemonian navy at the battle of Cyzicus in 410, and the failure of the Four Hundred in the military operations against the Peloponnesians.¹⁴⁰ The oligarchs were overthrown, and a tyranny of the democratic faction was established that lasted until the aftermath of the battle of Aegospotami.¹⁴¹

The oligarchs took their revenge upon the democrats who had removed them from power in 404. The democrats' failure to follow a reasonable policy of surrender after

¹³⁸ The most momentous event highlighting the Athenian *demos*' totally irrational behaviour in the late stages of the Peloponnesian War, was the execution of the victorious generals of the battle of Arginusae. Falling prey to the populism of demagogues the *demos* executed six of the eight *navarchs* who had led Athens' naval forces to victory. Soon after the Athenians lamented their decision, but the whole event demonstrates how unsound the Athenian decision-making had become by then (Xen. *Hell.* 1.7.1-35).

¹³⁹ Thuc. 8.54, 8.65-66.

¹⁴⁰ Diod. 13.50.1-13.51.8; Thuc. 8.93-95.

¹⁴¹ Aristot. *Const. Ath.* 33.1-2; Thuc. 96-98. In the Democracy of the Five Thousand the supporters of the oligarchic faction were disenfranchised, allowing the democratic faction to dominate the *ecclesia* and radicalize Athenian decision-making, due to the lack of dissent in the opinion-making process.

the defeat of Aegospotami, provided the oligarchs with the opportunity to displace their opponents from politics altogether, and to establish themselves as the sole legitimate body of government in Athens.

The oligarchs made a proposition to Lysander, when he was coordinating the siege of Samos, to come to Athens and help them found a philo-Laconian regime. The incentive for Lysander in this was that he was going to appoint the members of the new government, setting up in theory another client-state for Sparta, but in practice Lysander established his own puppet government in a Greek city-state of the highest strategic value to Sparta. After Athens' capitulation had taken place, Lysander at the instigation of the Athenian oligarchs accused the Athenian demos of having violated the peace treaty with the Peloponnesian League, by not having dismantled the Long Walls as it had agreed to.¹⁴² Lysander spoke at the Athenian *ecclesia* and after threatening to use force, he coerced the Athenians to appoint a temporary government of his liking that would restore the ancient constitution.¹⁴³

The leadership of the Oligarchs forged a personal relationship with the Spartan *navarch*, and invited Lacedaemonian intervention into Athenian politics.¹⁴⁴ The Lacedaemonian intervention further discredited democratic government, for the latter had not only failed to expand and maintain the Empire, but had also failed in protecting itself from foreign intervention.

The *Thirty Harmosts*, or Tyrants as they came to be known after the restoration of democracy, became the highest power in Athens. They appointed the members of the Council of Five Hundred (*boule*), and granted citizen rights to three thousand of their supporters.¹⁴⁵ Despite the demolition of the Long Walls and Piraeus' fortifications, as well as the disarmament of the population except for the Three Thousand, the Thirty did not yet feel ready to carry out the purges, with which they would reach the goals of establishing their rule over the population through terror, and pay the war reparations to Sparta, by confiscating the properties of their victims. At first the Thirty targeted

¹⁴² Diod. 14.3.4-7.

¹⁴³ Aristot. *Const. Ath.* 34.3.

¹⁴⁴ Diod. 14.4.4-5; Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.13-14.

¹⁴⁵ Diod. 14.32.3-6; Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.11-12, 2.3.18-19.

sycophants, people who used to slander Athenian nobles for profit.¹⁴⁶ This persecution pleased many Athenians, helping but raise the Thirty's popularity, but it did not bring any of the much-needed income with which they would pay back Sparta. Widespread terror in Athens was initiated after a Lacedaemonian garrison was installed into the city.¹⁴⁷ After the Thirty were done with Athens' unpopular citizens and they had seven hundred Lacedaemonian hoplites at their disposal, they began targeting wealthy Athenians.¹⁴⁸ Sycophancy was probably the most used accusation that was brought against the Thirty's victims during their eight-month reign, but the considerable wealth of the victims suggested a different motive. Proof to this was the fact that the Thirty included wealthy *metics* among the victims' list.¹⁴⁹ The *metics* did not take part in Athenian public life, making it fully obvious that the accusations brought against them were spurious.

The terror's unintended consequence was the creation of a diaspora, which in turn organized an insurgency. Within Athens, no attempt was made to overthrow the Thirty, or at least to challenge their authority. The Athenian demos had been demoralized and humiliated by the series of calamities that hit it within a year, as well as having been disarmed by the Thirty.¹⁵⁰ The disaster at Aegospotami, the starvation of the Athenian population during the siege that followed, the harsh terms of peace

¹⁴⁶ Aristot. *Const. Ath.* 35.3; Diod. 14.4.2; Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.12.

¹⁴⁷ Xenophon claimed that the Lacedaemonian garrison arrived shortly after the establishment of the Council of the Thirty, after securing the approval of Lysander by claiming that a garrison was necessary in Athens in order to realize a new form of government, adding that the Athenians would cover its costs (*Hell.* 3.14). Aristotle placed the installation of the Lacedaemonian garrison in Athens after the defeat of the incumbent army by Thrasybulus outside Phyle (*Const. Ath.* 37.2). Cf. Hignett, 1952, p. 387; Rhodes 1981, pp. 144-145; Wolpert 2002, pp. 20-21.

¹⁴⁸ Aristot. *Const. Ath.* 35.4; Diod. 14.5.5-7; Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.20-21.

¹⁴⁹ The ancient authors agree that *metics* were targeted, and their properties confiscated in order to bribe the Lacedaemonian garrison. Their accounts differ on the number of *metics* executed, Xenophon claimed that many of them perished during the rule of the Thirty (*Hell.* 2.4.1), Lysias asserted that only ten *metics* were executed (12.7), whereas Diodorus raises the victims' count up to sixty (14.5.7).

¹⁵⁰ Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.20.

imposed upon Athens, and Lysander's impudent meddling with the Athenian system of government, had brought the Athenians to an all-time low, and their city had not been erased from existence only thanks to Spartan clemency. There was no active opposition to the Thirty at the time when they initiated the terror, and in addition to that they gained popularity points with the population by dealing swiftly and decisively with the city's sycophants. The series of events that led to the capture of the fort of Phyle and the pitched battle between the democrats and oligarchs at Piraeus were all products of the Thirty's violent domestic policy. Without the mass murder of the most influential Athenians and the wealthiest *metics*, the persecuted Athenians would not have had to abandon Athens, and seek revenge for any grievances.¹⁵¹ The Thirty could have sought to find a more just way to deal with the Athenian debt towards Sparta, much like the demos did after the end of the Athenian Civil War. That however might have made the Thirty unpopular to the majority of the Athenian population, as the latter would have had to contribute to the reparations towards Lacedaemon. Nonetheless, the leadership of the Thirty, did not initiate the terror solely because of fiscal motives, there was an underlying ideological proclivity towards arbitrary violence. Critias convinced his colleagues to have Theramenes executed, when the latter expressed fear at the fact that the terror would destabilize the regime, and when the majority of the members of the *boule* seemed to agree with Theramenes, he threatened them as well.¹⁵² Theramenes had an unrealistic view of the Thirty's regime, thinking that he could seize control of domestic policy from Critias, though the political support of the Council of Five Hundred. Critias and the rest of the Thirty had no illusions about the authoritarian character of their own government, and the fact that it ought to be imposed through their monopoly and exercise of violence in Athens. The Council of the Five Hundred existed only in order to bestow a façade of constitutional rule to the Thirty, not to actually provide their government with checks

¹⁵¹ In this instance both citizens and *metics* are called Athenians, because they were both living in Athens and were targeted because of their wealth.

¹⁵² Diod. 14.4.4-5; Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.52-56. Theramenes had no moral objection towards the use of terror, his dissent was based on the argument that terror would destabilize the new regime.

and balances. Critias and his likes saw violence as the true means that provided them with power, and they were obliged to use it in order to govern Athens.¹⁵³

After the oligarchs were defeated in pitched battle by the insurgents in Piraeus, they decided to overthrow the Thirty and establish another oligarchic government that would win a *revanche* from Thrasybulus, and reclaim Piraeus.¹⁵⁴ The Thirty had led the oligarchs into battle, and failed to defeat their opponents despite outnumbering them and using superior equipment.¹⁵⁵ The oligarchic phalanx was led into *othismos* uphill, and was subject to missiles thrown by people who could not afford to buy their own arms.¹⁵⁶ The oligarchic hoplites were forced to withdraw back to Athens delivering the complete control of Piraeus to the democratic insurgency.¹⁵⁷ This was not the first time that the Thirty had failed to provide adequate command in military operations. They had also spectacularly failed to contain the insurgency at its infancy when it started at the fort of Phyle.¹⁵⁸ Thrasybulus had managed to capture the fort and defend it with but a mere seventy men. The forces sent against him ought to have crushed Thrasybulus and his followers, yet they failed to efficiently blockade him, allowing the insurgents numbers to grow tenfold. What followed was that thanks to the commanders of the incumbent army not taking adequate measures to guard their own army, the incumbent army suffered a humiliating defeat during a surprise attack, that cost it over a hundred troops.¹⁵⁹ The oligarchic faction came to the conclusion that the Thirty were inadequate to deal with Thrasybulus, and if they kept following them

¹⁵³ Wolpert argued that the use of terror was systemic, because the Thirty had to use violence in order to take power, to obliterate the past constitutional traditions, and to destroy the opposition (2002, p. 16). Nevertheless, all three causes that Wolpert mentioned had been already dealt with, at the establishment of the Thirty after Lysander's address at the *ecclesia* (Wolpert 2002, pp. 21-24).

¹⁵⁴ Diod. 14.33.5; Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.23.

¹⁵⁵ The insurgents at Piraeus were unable to provide protective armour of good quality to the new recruits, who joined in after the battle of Munychia, and had to resort to making new shields from plain wood, and wicker-work (Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.25).

¹⁵⁶ Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.18.

¹⁵⁷ Diod. 14.33.2-4.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid. 14.32.1; Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.2.

¹⁵⁹ Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.5-6.

Athens would soon follow Piraeus' fate. The Thirty were replaced with the Council of Ten, which sought to win the civil war against Thrasybulus and retain the oligarchic constitution. Despite the loss of Piraeus Athenian oligarchs could have still won the war against the men of Piraeus. They possessed superior armed forces, having more and better equipped hoplites, as well as cavalry, of which the insurgents did not possess. On top of that Athens still had its fortifications intact, and could easily resist any incursion, while Piraeus had had its own walls demolished, leaving the city vulnerable to invasion. The oligarchs were convinced to reach a peace treaty with the insurgents thanks to king Pausanias' instigation.¹⁶⁰ Had the Spartan king assisted the Athenian oligarchs against the democrats from Piraeus, as Lysander had wanted, instead of seeking a political compromise, the former would have overcome Thrasybulus' army and won the civil war for their faction.

Democrats

The so-called democrats were Athenian exiles who were forced to abandon their city due to their lives being in danger, when the Thirty initiated the terror. Prior to their self-exile they did not show any signs of resisting the rule of the Thirty, even though some of them may have had supported Theramenes, when he objected to Lysander's proposal to establish an oligarchic constitution during the latter's address to the Athenian demos.¹⁶¹ The exiles became outspoken "opponents" of the oligarchic government after having been forced to abandon their homes and had lost their

¹⁶⁰ Aristot. *Const. Ath.* 38.4; Diod. 14.33.6; Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.35-38.

¹⁶¹ Despite that, it is important to remember that Theramenes himself ultimately became one of the *Thirty Harmosts*. His favourable commemoration after the end of the civil war was due to the fact Theramenes was executed by his colleagues in government, and thanks to being seen as a moderate when compared to Critias, the most radical of the Tyrants. His memory as an opponent of radical oligarchy was established after the restoration of democratic rule in Athens. In reality Theramenes was content with the rule of the Thirty, and his attempted coup to overthrow Critias from their leadership, with the assistance of the Council of Five Hundred, does not equal a missed opportunity to bring back democracy, but rather a failure at bringing into being a moderate form of oligarchic government with him at its head.

properties. Thrasybulus led only seventy men, when he initially captured the fort of Phyle, others began to flock to his side, when the inadequacy of the incumbent forces sent against him was made obvious during the months that followed. Thrasybulus' insurgency grew further in size each time the Athenian army suffered setbacks, first with the failure of the incumbent forces to oust him from the fort of Phyle, then with the latter's defeat and withdrawal from Phyle, and finally with the democratic victory at the battle of Munychia and the capture of Piraeus. The growth of the insurgent army was not affixed to the desire for democracy in the exiles and the inhabitants of Piraeus, but to Thrasybulus' military success.¹⁶² The inhabitants of Piraeus joined the side which appeared to be stronger and to be winning the war, not necessarily the one that was closer to their personal political values. If joining a side depended solely on political ideas, then the inhabitants of Piraeus and Athens should have been split in their support towards the warring sides of the insurgent and incumbent forces.¹⁶³ Instead the oligarchs prevailed in Athens, thanks to her remaining strong fortifications, and the democrats in Piraeus as a consequence of the outcome of the battle of Munychia. Even after the victory at the battle of Munychia, the democrats still remained at a precarious position. They lacked fixed defences that would prevent a sudden incursion into the territory under their control, and were still outnumbered and out-equipped by the oligarchs, who monopolized cavalry, and could count on reinforcements from the Peloponnesian League. Thrasybulus' military success was owed to organizing a conventional force into conducting unconventional warfare. His own troops at Phyle were most likely hoplites, who defended the fort of Phyle from capture, and carried out surprise attacks against the incumbent army that confronted them.¹⁶⁴ The insurgent army avoided to engage in the ceremonial pitched battle between hoplite phalanxes, for it was always outnumbered, and faced troops of

¹⁶² Unfortunately we lack vital intelligence on the Athenian civil war, such as the numbers of Thrasybulus' troops before and after Munychia (Wolpert 2002, p. 26).

¹⁶³ Political scientist Stathis Kalyvas (2006) having researched on the field extensively about the Greek civil war, eroded the prevailing polarization theory dominating the incentives of combatants in civil wars as being ideological. His research influenced counterinsurgents John Nagl (2005) and David Kilcullen (2009, 2010), whose ideas regarding small wars were pivotal in the introduction of a new strategy in Iraq in 2007 that changed the course of the war.

¹⁶⁴ Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.3.

superior quality. At the battle of Munychia Thrasybulus added light infantry to his forces, and used it to great effect against the phalanx led by the Thirty, that outnumbered his own force by five to one. In addition to that is the fact that Thrasybulus used the terrain to his advantage, and did not engage the oligarchs on even ground, forcing them to attack him uphill, while his light troops rained missiles upon them.

Thebes and Corinth being upset with Sparta for not having shared the spoils of the war, allowed the Athenian exiles to stay in their cities, despite Sparta's protests. The Thebans went even further and armed seventy Athenians under Thrasybulus, helping them start an insurgency that would ultimately lead to the capture of Piraeus by the democrats and the overthrow of the Thirty by the oligarchs in Athens. Thrasybulus relied on the material assistance given to him by the Thebans, but that was not enough in order to claim that like the Athenian government, that he could pursue a strategy of alliances against his enemy. At best, the assistance Thrasybulus and his followers would get from Corinth and Thebes was their abstinence from sending troops to Lysander and Pausanias, when the two Spartan commanders came to assist the Ten.

Thrasybulus was not a proponent of radical democracy, but a pragmatist, and as soon as king Pausanias proposed peace he accepted the latter's terms, realizing that if he remained uncompromising his recent achievements would be cancelled and his army forced to abandon Attica once more, or face extinction. Thrasybulus remained a moderate democrat in the following years, and successfully opposed all attempts by the radicals to restart a war with Sparta.

The Athenian Reconciliation

The Athenian demos after the restoration of democratic government in their city, took measures to avoid suffering the fate of cities like Corcyra, which had regressed to civil war violence. The supporters of the Thirty and the Ten were granted amnesty, it became forbidden to bring accusations at court against anyone for his actions during the reign of the oligarchs, unless he was directly involved in the murder of Athenian citizens, meaning that only if the accused was identified as the executioner of another

Athenian during the terror would he be liable for prosecution. The Athenians who wanted to pursue revenge, had the opportunity to do so in political process, by coming out to speak at the hearings for citizens whose credentials were examined before taking office. This limited revenge down to smearing, which worked quite well, since Athens avoided being torn apart by civil violence anew.

The Athenians created an official narrative on the events of the civil war, which although did not reflect on the reality of what had happened, was acceptable by all sides, and helped the Athenians to overcome the trauma that their city experienced following its defeat in the Peloponnesian War. The official version of the reign of the Thirty and the civil war, that we know of from the legal speeches that have survived, portray the *Thirty Harmosts* as unpopular tyrants who were solely responsible for every bad thing that occurred during their eight months long reign.¹⁶⁵ The fact that the Thirty were supported by thousands of Athenians, especially the Three Thousand who were granted citizenship, was either downplayed or not mentioned at all. In fact the majority of Athenians did not seem to desire a return to democratic rule, even after the downfall of the Thirty, not to forget that the Thirty were not crushed at Munychia by Thrasybulus' insurgents, but they were actually overthrown by the oligarchic faction in Athens. The oligarchs desired a revanche against Thrasybulus' army after their defeat at Munychia. For that reason, they replaced the Thirty with the new Council of Ten in order to turn around the course of the war that had been going against them until then. Warfare between Thrasybulus and the Ten became more vicious than before. Xenophon recorded the Athenian cavalry harassing and killing several of Piraeus' hoplites in the contested territory between the two warring factions, and he even informs us of the cavalry committing atrocities, by assaulting unarmed civilians from Aexone in search of food, to which the men of Piraeus retaliated by executing a

¹⁶⁵ The official title for the members of the Council of Thirty installed by Lysander in Athens with the task of restoring the city's ancestral constitution was *harmost*. They later became known as the Thirty Tyrants as part of the Athenian post-civil war national narrative seeking to denounce them in the citizenry's memory. The idea that the Lacedaemonians would ever install tyrants is preposterous, as they established and later expanded the Peloponnesian League by replacing tyrannical governments with oligarchies (c.f. Botsford and Robinson 1977pp. 90-1; Hammond 1977, pp. 167-8; Laistner 1970, p. 21.)

prisoner from the cavalry called Callistratus from the tribe of Leontis, who had been captured during a skirmish that took place in the *chora*.¹⁶⁶ The Council of the Ten and the Three Thousand were convinced to make peace with the men of Piraeus due to king Pausanias' counsel. Yet, in the surviving legal speeches the oligarchs are reduced down to the Thirty, and everyone else seems to either be a victim of their policies, or an insurgent fighting against tyranny. The fact that the Thirty were pushed aside in the later stages of the civil war, and the war was pursued by others, was never mentioned, with only exception being the enmity towards members of the Athenian cavalry which still stood for many years after. The Athenian cavalry was identified with committing atrocities and opposing democratic rule, making even Athenian aristocrats denounce their own membership in it, due to its ill fame in the courts.¹⁶⁷

The reconciliation was based on consensual myths that the two sides fabricated as they turned into a single *demos* once again. The state ideology was completely unrealistic and it was hard to convince anyone using common sense, yet after the first generation, the next generations did not doubt this fabricated narrative as the truth about what had happened to their city. Notwithstanding the first generation of Athenians who lived after the civil war rejected these myths, and continued despising each other. They did manage to live peacefully with one other, and avoided resorting to violence in order to gain revenge, thanks to being able to use the political system in order to assert their grievances against each other.¹⁶⁸ This allowed Athens to pursue an active foreign policy, that turned it into a first class power by 378, that led most of the Greek city-states on the path to liberty from the Lacedaemonian hegemony that had been established thanks to the Athenian defeat in the Peloponnesian War.

¹⁶⁶ Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.26-27.

¹⁶⁷ Aristotle reported that after the oligarchs had established the new government of the Ten, the class of the *hippeis* (knights) at Athens stood steadfast in its opposition to Thrasybulus and the supporters of democracy (*Const. Ath.* 38.2).

¹⁶⁸ Andrew Wolpert wrote thoroughly on the Athenian reconciliation. Wolpert claimed that the process of reconciliation was based on the settlement of differences through legal means, and the creation of a fictional narrative about the events of the Athenian Civil War (2002, pp. 119-136).

Conclusions

An Uncompromising Foreign Policy

The Athenians before and after the battle of Aegospotami were acting irrationally by seeking to achieve maximalist goals in their confrontation with the Peloponnesian League. They ought to have recognized that after the disaster of the Sicilian expedition Athens no longer possessed the resources required to force Sparta and its allies to submit. At best the Athenians would resist the Peloponnesian League, but with Persia funding the building of Lacedaemonian fleets the downfall of Athens had become a matter of time. After the disaster at Aegospotami had taken place the Athenians kept on pursuing maximalist aims, while their *cleruchies* were being overrun by Lysander and his troops, the empire was lost, and Athens was being surrounded by hostile troops. The Athenians ought to have surrendered unconditionally as soon as they had the chance. Sparta's allies were pushing for the complete destruction of Athens and its population.¹⁶⁹ The Athenians restored civil rights to all exiles and asked them to come and help their own city, yet that was a completely wrong measure to adopt, Lysander had sent back to Athens the *cleruchs* he came upon, in order to fill the city with people and make its supplies of food run out sooner, by inviting back the exiles the Athenian demos was speeding up its own downfall.¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁹ The city-states advocating Athens' destruction were Corinth and Thebes, as well as the former inhabitants of Aegina, Histiaea, Melos, Scione, and Torone, upon whom the Athenians had inflicted terrible atrocities throughout the Peloponnesian War.

¹⁷⁰ The Lacedaemonians had no intention to capture Athens through assault, as at that time they still lacked the means necessary, such as artillery and siege-engines, to carry out this sort of endeavour. Lysander and Pausanias patiently blockaded Athens by land and by sea for

The constitution of the Nine Thousand was established by the Athenian troops after they overthrew the oligarchic regime of the Four Hundred that in turn had overthrown democratic rule in 411. Although Aristotle praised the Nine Thousand as the best form of democracy to have existed in Athens, the character of that polity was responsible for the disastrous ending of the Peloponnesian War. Moderate and dissident Athenians were disenfranchised due to being viewed as unpatriotic, and the *ecclesia* was dominated by the most belligerent citizens instead. In fact, in order to remain a citizen one had to constantly display his favour in pursuing the war against the Peloponnesian League, creating a spiral of increased violence and atrocities committed by the Athenians in the final years of the conflict. This sort of behaviour was caused by what in social psychology is called groupthink. Social psychologist Irving Janis wrote case studies on the Kennedy and Johnson cabinets that decided to launch the Bay of Pigs invasion and to escalate the US involvement in the conflict in Vietnam.¹⁷¹ In both cases Janis discovered that ill decision-making was not due to poor quality of political leadership, but thanks to the ill effects of what he calls groupthink. The members of those presidential cabinets established a strong group identity that followed the direction that each president favoured. Dissent and critical thought were suppressed, as they were treated as unconstructive and offensive to the collective views of the group. Members who initially raised doubt over the cabinets' decisions were opposed with personal sarcasm, rather than argument, and forced to agree in order to escape ridicule. Witnessing this situation other members who were not fully convinced by the groups' decisions decided to remain silent, in order to avoid being treated in such a poor manner. Thus, the group's members who disagreed censored themselves into silence, establishing an illusion of unanimity within the group. Groupthink leads agreement into creating a positive group feeling, and disagreement into being viewed as a threat to the group's cohesion. When it comes to decision-making instead of examining each option objectively, the members of the group focus on justifying and defending their assumptions and undermining the alternatives. The consequences are that the decision-making group sets maximalist goals overestimating its own strengths and

many months, leading many Athenians to their deaths through starvation, until the *demos* was ready to accept the reality of its defeat in April 404.

¹⁷¹ Janis 1982, pp. 14-47, 132-158.

underestimating its enemies, often leading itself into disaster.¹⁷² Today, academic adherents of the psychosocial approach to terrorism describe this phenomenon as group polarization and use it to describe how terrorist groups radicalize their members and through which process they take decisions.¹⁷³

Twentieth century presidential cabinets and terrorist groups are far smaller groups than the Athenian executive body, which numbered in the thousands, thus easier to suffer from group polarization. Yet, the Athenian demos with the establishment of the constitution of the nine thousand managed to radicalize itself. The Athenians who were opponents to pursuing the war against the Peloponnesian League, and to ill-treating Athens' allies were disenfranchised as proponents of oligarchy. People who disagreed with pursuing an aggressive foreign policy based on Athenian supremacy, such as Eratosthenes and Archestratus, were forced into silence through intimidation. This led to the adoption of an erratic foreign policy and military strategy that brought the disaster of Aegospotami and outright refusing to realize that Athenian demos had to surrender before it worsened its situation even more. In both cases the uncompromising character of the foreign policy and military strategy advocated by radical democrats led Athens to its own demise.

Athenian irrationality did not vanish after Athens' capitulation, nor after the end of the civil war, as there were still voices at the *ecclesia* calling for Athens to go to war and regain her lost empire, even though she had no walls to protect Piraeus from invasion, and would have to overwhelm the Lacedaemonian fleet with but ten warships, that she had been allowed to possess. However, after the restoration of democratic rule in 403 political dissent was never again extinguished at the *ecclesia*, and Athenian decision-making did not fall victim to radicalization.

Political Legitimacy and War Strategy

¹⁷² Ibid., pp. 242-259.

¹⁷³ On the psychosocial approach to terrorism in regard to group polarization see De la Corte 2007; McCauley and Moskaleiko 2008, pp. 422-428; Moghaddam 2005, pp. 165-167; Myers 2012, pp. 224-226; Schmid 2013, pp. 23-25.

With Athens' fleet destroyed at Aegospotami, and the population spared by the Lacedaemonians, the oligarchs used the opportunity to overthrow democracy, albeit with Lysander's assistance this time. The oligarchs sought to establish a regime that resembled the government of Lacedaemon. The council of the Thirty had the same size as the Spartan *gerousia*, while the Three Thousand were probably equal in number to the *homoioi* of Lacedaemon. However, the oligarchs had failed in 411 to maintain power, and ended up overthrown and replaced by the democracy of the Five Thousand. In 404 they acquired Lysander's support, who appeared in the *ecclesia* and threatened the Athenians with annihilation should they refuse to accept regime change. The oligarchs and Lysander advertised the government of the Thirty as a transitional government that would restore the ancient constitution.¹⁷⁴ The Council of the Thirty was advertised as a committee that would oversee the restoration of Athens' ancient laws. In fact it was the head of government whose main purpose was to destroy Athens' democratic traditions. The *boule* existed in order to provide some legitimacy to the actions of the Thirty. When the Five Hundred refused Critias to have Theramenes executed, Critias threatened them and had the latter executed anyway. The Thirty stood above the law as their sacred goal was to completely rid Athens of democracy. They chose to do that by killing over a thousand five hundred former Athenian citizens in accordance with the standards of personal enmity and private wealth. As the Thirty confiscated the properties of their victims they were able to pay back to Lacedaemon the Athenian war debt. Yet, in order to carry out all that they had to involve Sparta into Athenian affairs even more, by requesting a Lacedaemonian garrison to be installed into Athens. The garrison, being bribed with the wealth of the *metics* that it arrested and executed, aided the oligarchs in both the purges and in the military operations against the insurgents at Phyle and Piraeus.

¹⁷⁴ In antiquity the peoples of Rome and Greece were infatuated with the idea that in the distant past their peoples lived in great republics which through time became corrupted. In the case of Athens in 404 what the ancient constitution resembled was based on each citizen's personal views. The democrats claimed that Theseus was the founder of democracy in Athens' mythical past, while the oligarchs claimed that the aristocratic governments before Cleisthenes' reforms were the best forms of government Athens ever had.

The democratic faction had lost its legitimacy to govern and decide the form of the Athenian constitution due to its crushing defeats at Aegospotami in 405 and in 404 at the siege of Athens. After having been defeated the Athenian demos was humiliated by being forced to bring down the walls that had been built by Themistocles. This marked the overthrow of democracy and the beginning of the Thirty. The democrats having lost their credibility were not able to organize an opposition against the Thirty. The demos had grown tired to conflict, and it was not going to follow so soon again the same people who had brought it so low. Yet, the increasing violence of the oligarchic regime provided the democrats with the chance to act. The terror instigated by the Thirty forced a lot of Athenians to go into exile, where the latter organized amongst themselves without obstructions to bring down the Athenian government.

Despite the success of the Thirty in carrying out institutional reform in Athens without active dissent, they failed miserably at suppressing Thrasybulus and his insurgents. Due to the Thirty's utter defeats at Phyle and Munychia, while they held the advantage over the enemy in both occasions, the oligarchic faction overthrew them and elected the Ten in order to pursue the war against the men of Piraeus.

The Thirty's main reason of downfall were not their anti-democratic political ideas that they had been realizing for eight months, but their military failures. The Athenians after the battle of Munychia still did not desire a return to democratic rule. Had they wanted that they could have invited Thrasybulus and his followers to Athens, as soon as they had overthrown the Thirty. Instead the demos sought to win the war against Thrasybulus by electing a new government that was more efficient for that task in hand. The Ten carried out more complex strategies against Thrasybulus and chose not to underestimate him. Part of the reason behind the Thirty's military failures were their public image and lack of political legitimacy in the eyes of the Athenians. The Thirty did not wish for the public to believe that a small-sized insurgency could not be dealt with by them single-handedly. The confrontation between the Thirty and Thrasybulus became a test for the efficiency of the new government. The Thirty ought to have requested for Peloponnesian assistance after the defeat of an incumbent army at Phyle and the capture of Munychia by the insurgency. Nevertheless, the Thirty did not request Peloponnesian aid, after the defeat at Phyle they sought for a revanche that would restore their government's credibility to the demos, hence Critias and the rest of the members of the Thirty this time personally led the Athenian phalanx against

Thrasybulus and his men, which brought the demise of several of them during the *othismos*.¹⁷⁵

The Ten used military strategy in a more conservative fashion than their predecessors. The Ten were more successful at holding off the democrats' advances in Athens, than the Thirty had been at Piraeus. While the Thirty decided to deal with Thrasybulus by employing a monolithic military strategy, the Ten learnt from that mistake, and combined military strategy with alliances in order to increase their chances against the enemy.¹⁷⁶ With the joint-forces of the Athenian incumbent army and the Peloponnesian allied groups under Lysander and Pausanias' command, Thrasybulus would have been vanquished, had not the Spartan king decided to reconcile the two sides and permit the restoration of democracy.

¹⁷⁵ The oligarchic government suffered significant casualties as Critias and Hippomachus of the Thirty, and Charmides of the Ten ruling in Piraeus, were killed in the clash with Thrasybulus' insurgents at Munychia (Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.19).

¹⁷⁶ The Ten, unlike the Thirty did not take any chances, and relying on their membership in the Peloponnesian League, waited for the arrival of Peloponnesian reinforcements in order to crush Thrasybulus' insurgency.

Chapter Two: From the Restoration of Athenian Democracy to the Battle of Mantinea (401-362 BC)

Historical Overview

The Corinthian War

After the restoration of democracy in Athens, the first act of foreign policy by the Attican republic was to join in with Sparta and the Peloponnesian League against the Eleans. The latter had been difficult to deal with for Sparta during the Peloponnesian War, having allied themselves with Lacedaemon's enemies, they banned the latter from taking part in horse-races and athletic events, and prevented king Agis from praying for victory in war. Apart from these minor incidents in the past relationship between Sparta and Elis, the former had managed to establish a second-rate hegemony in the Peloponnese, by forcing their poor neighbours into a federation. The insignificant Eleans became the target of the Peloponnesian League, although they lacked a real empire, and did not possess anything that could remotely present a threat to Greece's most powerful state. The Eleans, who had not even built walls around their city, were subject to Peloponnesian League invasions that completely ignored the city, and focused their attention on plundering the chora. Those raids did not find any resistance, and managed to plunder so much, that the Lacedaemonians in 398 decided to invade on their own, and yet they were joined by the Achaeans and the Arcadians who were uninvited, due to realizing the easy gains they could have from the war against the minor Peloponnesian power. By 397 the Eleans had been terrorized and starved to such a degree that they gave up their hold on their neighbouring communities.

Soon after Sparta came close to suffering a coup d'état by a Lacedaemonian called Cinadon. He had planned with others to bring an end to the monopoly of citizenship by the homoioi, by plotting a purge of the citizenry conducted by Lacedaemon's classes lacking civil rights. His plans were discovered by the Crypteia, and during his

interrogation Cinadon gave the names of his fellow conspirators. This conspiracy, that never came through, became the reason why Sparta began to follow a very aggressive foreign policy, whose primary aim was to avoid having to deal with the issues of the rising inequalities between its social classes, thanks to the shriveling of the Lacedaemonian citizen class, by distracting the Lacedaemonian society with matters abroad.

Soon after the death of Cyrus, the Lacedaemonians led the Peloponnesian League into conflict with the Persian Empire. Apparently because Cyrus had promised to grant the Hellenic city-states of Asia Minor to Sparta, in exchange for allowing him to hire Greek heavy infantry to be used against his brother the Great King, the Spartans were now willing to go to war with their benefactors, thanks to whom they were the sole hegemon of Greece. The Peloponnesian League did go to war with Persia, but several of its member-states chose to abstain, such as Corinth, Athens, and Thebes, hinting of the storm that was to visit Greece. Sparta initially had "commoners" lead the alliance's forces against Persia, but their efforts met with limited success. Sparta dispatched its young king Agesilaus to lead the Peloponnesians already in Asia Minor, along with thirty homoioi, two thousand neodamodes, and six more thousand Peloponnesians, including Lysander as an advisor. Agesilaus turned out to be a brilliant commander who could lead surprisingly well mixed military forces, and not just slow-moving phalanxes of heavy infantry. He recruited and equipped Greek cavalry that rivaled its Asian counterpart on the field, and often managed to strategically outmaneuver with his forces the Persian defenders. In his endeavours he was blessed by the fact that Artaxerxes II, not wanting to face another usurper, did not allow any of his subordinates to raise another great army to quell Persia's enemies. The Great King ordered his satraps in the contested areas to resist the Peloponnesian League with their limited forces, but as Agesilaus' raiding would not stop, and through diplomacy managed to approach and befriend several of the Satraps, as well as the Egyptian secessionists, the Persian throne had to come up with an alternative strategy in order to push Agesilaus away from the Western Satrapies.

Sparta's most powerful allies had grown disaffected with the former's arrogance after the subjugation of Athens. Thebes and Corinth had blatantly refused to join the war against the Eleans, and afterwards Athens as well joined the dissidents within the Peloponnesian League arguing against the war with Persia. The Persians sensing the

division within the Peloponnesian League chose to use it to their advantage, and paid generously these city-states to start a war that would challenge the Spartan hegemony over Greece. The ruse worked as Athens, Corinth, and Thebes, as well as Argos formed the Allied Council in order to overthrow Spartan rule, and soon Greece found itself in another large-scale war that would bring ruin to all of its participants.

Initially Pausanias and Lysander were sent, leading two different armies, in order to quell the rebellion in Boeotia. Lysander arrived first and decided not to wait for the Spartan King, attempting instead to defeat the rebels on his own. Lysander ended up getting killed along with a great part of his army, by the time Pausanias arrived on the battlefield. The Spartan King decided not to risk his own army as well, since the enemy's morale had been boosted a lot by Lysander's fall, and due to the fact that the latter still occupied a strong defensive position that provided the Theban army with a strong tactical advantage. This wise decision cost Pausanias his throne and had him exiled from Sparta for the rest of his life. This massive Lacedaemonian defeat had great repercussions for its hegemony in Central Greece, as most of Sparta's client-states were "liberated" by the allies, and had their Peloponnesian garrisons ousted, while the Lacedaemonian units of those garrisons were massacred. Sparta soon found itself overextended with its most capable military commander, and most of the Peloponnesian League's armed forces in Asia Minor, while a combination of Greece's most powerful city-states undermined its hegemony in the mainland. Athens began to rebuild the Long Walls that connected its Asty to the port of Piraeus, thanks to Persian gold and entire contingents of builders sent from Thebes and Conon.

By 394 the Allied Council had grown bold enough that it tried to repeat its past success outside Haliartus against Lysander and Pausanias in the Peloponnese. The forces of the Allied Council and those of the Peloponnesian League met near the river Nemea and gave battle, with only the Lacedaemonian phalanx left standing on the field at its end. Still Sparta's allied forces had all been vanquished at the battle, and although the Lacedaemonian phalanx was considered the victor, it had failed to force its enemies into submission. The Allied Council had suffered a bloody blow, but its member-states were able to pursue the war effort, while the forces of the Peloponnesian League still lacked access to Central Greece.

Sparta was forced to recall Agesilaus and most of his forces, which were raiding the territories of the Great King, back to Greece in order to stabilize the rapidly

degrading state of Spartan hegemony. Agesilaus marched from Northern Greece into the Peloponnese, managing to arrive with most of his forces, and even forced the Allied Council's armies into retreat, when they confronted him outside Coronea.

Sparta had managed to control the decline of its power in Greece in 394 thanks to waging pitched battles that always favoured its own armies, when they were well led, against its enemies. Both at the battles of Nemea and Coronea the Allied Council failed to repeat its past success against Lysander. However, between these land battles the Lacedaemonian navy clashed with its Persian counterpart and suffered a major defeat. Lacedaemon lost fifty of its triremes and five hundred crew-members, as well as navarch Peisander. This defeat cost Sparta most of her maritime empire, and forced it to bring its aggressive strategy in Asia Minor to an end, due to the loss of its supply lines in the Aegean.

By 393 Athens had completed the rebuilding of its long walls, and now engaged in building a navy that would restore its empire in the Aegean. However, by 392 the Allied Council faced an internal crisis. The Corinthian landowners having faced the brunt of the Peloponnesian League's offensive operations, began to vow for peace between the warring factions. Their political opponents used their fellow citizens' war weariness to conspire against them, and managed to involve the Argives in a bloody purge against them, as well as the rest of the allies' tolerance to the sinister plot. This event brought regime change and instability to Corinth, turning Argive metics into full citizens for their support of the conspiracy, and completely alienated the surviving Corinthian landowners. The members of the Peace Party, thanks to this ill initiative, were forced to change sides. They retaliated against the "Democrats" by conspiring to betray their polis to Sparta. The plot failed to come to full fruition, but a Peloponnesian League phalanx did manage to penetrate the Corinthian defences and rout all of the Allied Council's garrisons that attempted to repel it out of Corinth. The Corinthian landowners, who had assisted the Lacedaemonians, left into exile, and for the remaining duration of the Corinthian War they served Lacedaemonian interests,

undermining the experiment of Isopolity between Argos and Corinth, returning to their fatherland only after autonomy had been fully restored to Corinth.¹⁷⁷

Around this time the Athenians launched a successful expedition, in the North-Eastern Aegean Sea, under Thrasybulus' leadership. The veteran general managed to restore Athenian hegemony in large tracts of Thrace and Asia Minor, however he and his companions turned out to be corrupt and were stripping Athens' new allies of their funds. Due to his ill acts Thrasybulus ended up killed by locals in an uprising at Aspendus, along with many of the men under his command.

Since the aftermath of the battle of Nemea a young Athenian general, leading Thracian mercenaries as light infantry in the Peloponnese, began to terrorize Sparta's allies, forcing the latter to send a mora against him. This resulted in the worst disaster for Lacedaemon's hoplites since Sphacteria in 425. The mora's officers were all killed, and a large number of its members perished while being pursued by the Thracians. Despite the restoration of Athenian power in a large part of the Hellenic world, as well as Iphicrates' impressive tactical victories in the Peloponnese, Sparta would still not give up fighting, since the involvement of Athenian citizens in the rebellion of Cyprus against the Great King caused a rapprochement between Sparta and Persia. The Persians funded the rebuilding of the Lacedaemonian fleet in order to counter Athens' efforts in the Hellespont. Persian fiscal aid allowed the Spartans to regain naval numerical superiority and force a standoff in the Hellespont in a manner similar to the confrontation between the two fleets before the disaster at Aegospotami. In 386 with all of the belligerent poleis having been exhausted from waging war against each other, they managed to reach a peace agreement thanks to the direct involvement and guarantees to maintain the peace by the Persian Empire. The Athenians lost most of their empire, except for Lemnos, Imbros and Scyros. The Argives and the Corinthians were forced to break off their Isopolity and receive the Corinthian exiles back. The Boeotian League was disbanded as well, causing Thebes a great loss of power in Central Greece. Lacedaemon agreed to remove its garrisons and decarchies from its client-states and would play the role of enforcing the King's

¹⁷⁷ Isopolity was the establishment of equal civil rights between the citizenries of different city-states.

*Peace from now on.*¹⁷⁸ Persia had the greatest gains from this peace treaty, due to the restoration of Cyprus, and all of the Hellenic city-states of Asia Minor to its sphere of influence. On top of that Persia was recognized as the main arbiter in Greek affairs and held that position for nearly fifty years, until the aftermath of the battle of Chaeronea in 338.

The Fall of Sparta

The Lacedaemonians two years after they had signed to uphold the King's Peace and to guard the Greek city-states' autonomy began a war against Mantinea. According to Xenophon the Lacedaemonians had suffered several grievances from the Mantineans in the past and decided to take action about it. They accused Mantinea of selling corn to Argos when the latter was at war with Lacedaemon, and that Mantinea did not provide troops in all of the Peloponnesian League's military campaigns, due to religious festivals. Even when the Mantineans did take part in the alliance's joint military operations, they did so without much enthusiasm (sic), and in general they showed delight whenever something bad befell Sparta. The Lacedaemonian army managed to successfully lay siege against fortified Mantinea, by changing the course of the flow of a nearby river. The river undermined the walls of Mantinea, and the inhabitants, who had not made a single attempt to spoil the Lacedaemonian efforts, decided not to fight to maintain their autonomy. The Mantineans wisely surrendered, for even if they had actively resisted, without the support from any other city-state, such as Athens or Thebes, they could not have prevailed, and a lot of their hoplites would have perished to a lost cause. Yet, the Mantineans were forced to tear down their city's walls, and to divide their polity into its original number of communities.

The next state that the Spartans decided to subjugate and force into the Peloponnesian League, was Olynthus. Its neighbour Acanthus asked Sparta for military assistance in order to avoid being forced into submission by its strong neighbour, and made wild claims that democratic Olynthus was becoming a threat to Lacedaemonian interests,

¹⁷⁸ The *decarchies* were governments ran by Councils of Ten.

even greater than the Athenian League during the fifth century. The Spartans, always eager to use their military in offensive operations far abroad, gladly accepted to help them. Initially the military operations did not go that well for Sparta, in part because the Spartan commander of the Peloponnesian League, proved to be less than adept in mixed units tactics, and lost his life, as well as a significant portion of the forces under his command. Eventually Olynthus did fall after a long and costly war, forced to give up its own empire in Chalcidice. Yet, the most important incident during that war had nothing to do with Olynthus itself. When a Lacedaemonian force was on its way to reinforce the Peloponnesian League's army opposing Olynthus, Theban nobles contacted its commander, and involved it in a plot to capture Cadmea, and overthrow the democratic constitution. The plot was quite successful, and despite the scandal that this caused by the clear violation of the King's Peace terms, the Spartan government did choose to support this violent regime change. The leaders of the Theban democratic faction went into exile, and Thebes was reincorporated into the Peloponnesian League as a very loyal and enthusiastic member-state, due to the presence of a Peloponnesian garrison at its acropolis.

By 379, Sparta had complete control over Greece, by having fully incorporated into its sphere of influence Thebes and Boeotia, as well as Olynthus. Corinth had normalized its internal affairs, and once again was a loyal member of the Peloponnesian League. Argos, devoid of allies and suffering political instability of its own, no longer posed any significant threat, and Athens was left without any potential allies should it choose to challenge Spartan hegemony.

War began anew as soon as the democratic exiles from Thebes returned to their polis, in a clandestine manner and in a single night murdered the entire oligarchic government of their city-state. The next day they were joined by the citizenry who desired to see their city-state regain its autonomy, as well as its past hegemony over Boeotia, and laid siege to the Peloponnesian garrison in Cadmea. The Spartan harmost was caught completely off guard, and after having failed to protect Sparta's collaborators in Thebes, he also failed to maintain morale and discipline among the Peloponnesian League's units stationed at the Cadmea. The latter forced him to give up the defence of Cadmea, and not to wait for reinforcements to arrive from the Peloponnese, leading to the unnecessary surrender of Thebes to its democrats.

Soon after the liberation of Thebes, a Lacedaemonian force that was on its way to Boeotia, under dubious conditions made an attempt to capture Athens, in a manner similar to the past capture of Thebes. The Lacedaemonian contingent was spotted by the Athenians roaming outside their polis in the morning, while Spartan ambassadors were negotiating with the Demos within the city. Despite the ambassadors' reassurances, Sparta failed to reprimand its commander who had invaded a neutral state's chora, and achieved in forcing Athens into an alliance with Thebes.

The Lacedaemonians began to invade Thebes' chora on an annual basis, hoping to subdue the rebellious polis, by ravaging its fields. Athens sent its armies to Thebes' aid, making sure that the Thebans did not meet an overwhelming Peloponnesian force on their own. The Athenian assistance was successful in making certain that Thebes did not fall prey to Sparta as Olynthus had a few years earlier. The Athenians however, while they assisted Thebes in a passive defence, were very active in the Aegean. Their fleet, thanks to a renewed tactical superiority, overwhelmed the Lacedaemonian navy, and began to "liberate" island city-states in both the Aegean and Ionian Seas. Soon, the Athenian navy found itself overextended, having to restore security and stability in too many city-states, while lacking the necessary resources, in terms of manpower and funds necessary for such intensive large-scale operations. Nevertheless, the Athenians managed to control the "storm" they were facing thanks to the creation of the Second Athenian League. They created a moderate version of the Delian League, where they remained the most influential member-state, albeit without having the right to force the rest of the League's members into acts that they disagreed with, and were forbidden from subjugating them with the establishment of cleruchies on their territories, as had happened to the member-states of the Delian League during the previous century.

After several incursions into the Theban chora, and Thebes' flawed strategy, to protect its territory by building fortifications, the Thebans introduced a radical reformation of their army that would change the balance of power in Greece. The Theban army became more efficient, as well as aggressive, and managed a string of victories against Peloponnesian armies in Boeotia, leading to a rise in Theban prestige that affected the diplomatic field as well, creating an alliance with Jason of Pherae, who had become overlord of Thessaly. Athens alarmed by the rise of Thebes, became sceptic of providing it with assistance in the next Peloponnesian incursion into the

latter's chora, and sought peace with Sparta, in order to isolate Thebes and bring to an end its rise in power. With Athens seeking peace, all of the belligerent states followed suit, yet the negotiations to restore the King's Peace fell off thanks to Epaminondas' provocations towards Agesilaus. The Thebans would pursue the war with their Boeotian allies against the Peloponnesian League without Athenian assistance. At Leuctra the two factions' armies met, and thanks to the organizational reforms of the Theban army, the Lacedaemonian phalanx suffered an unprecedented defeat in the two centuries of its existence, since the introduction of a militaristic oligarchic constitution in the middle of the sixth century. The Spartan King Cleombrotus lost his life in the field of battle along with four hundred homoioi, and the Lacedaemonian phalanx had been forced to rout single-handedly by a smaller Theban force.

The Peloponnesian League soon collapsed and Thebes took advantage of the power vacuum by violently democratizing and incorporating city-states of the Greek mainland, into its sphere of influence. Sparta was unable to prevent this wave of democratizations taking place, because of a massive Boeotian invasion of its territory, that was joined by Thebes' allies in the Peloponnese as well. The result was the secession of Messenia from Lacedaemon and the creation of the new democratic polity of Ithome, with a citizenry comprised mainly of the Lacedaemonian disenfranchised classes, that would check Spartan aggression for the next two centuries.

In 362 Epaminondas sought to repeat his past success at Messenia, in Laconia this time. With a Boeotian army and Thebes' remaining Peloponnesian allies he sought to invade Laconia and overthrow the oligarchic constitution. The Lacedaemonian autocracy was saved thanks to the assistance of several of its former allies, such as the mercenaries sent by Dionysius of Syracuse and the Great King, by Corinth and Mantinea, and even Athens. The Athenians had grown weary of the Theban success, and seeing a greater threat in a strong democratic Thebes, that was placed much closer to them, than in the humbled oligarchy of Lacedaemon that was far away and had recently seen half its territory taken away, allied themselves to Sparta and sought to save what was left of the autocratic city-state. At the second battle of Mantinea the Thebans were successful in forcing the Lacedaemonian phalanx to rout, and even caused serious injuries to King Agesilaus. Epaminondas however, was killed during the clash with the Lacedaemonians, and the Athenians forced Thebes' allies to rout.

The Thebans wisely decided to make peace and not pursue another clash with the undefeated Athenian army, leaving the Greek world more perplexed than ever as to who was now hegemon in Greece, according to Xenophon.

Alliances

Athens as part of the Peloponnesian League

Democracy was restored in Athens in 403, through the victorious civil war conducted by Thrasybulus' democratic faction and the intervention of the Spartan King Pausanias in the former's favour.¹⁷⁹ Lysander's Council of Thirty was completely forced out of Athenian politics, thanks to the Agiad royal house's assistance towards the factions of the oligarchs and the democrats in reconciling with each other, yet that did not recover Athens' lost might and foreign influence.¹⁸⁰ The Athenians no longer possessed vast resources to go to war against the Peloponnesian League, as they did at the initiation of the Peloponnesian War. Still there were rhetors who provoked the citizenry at the *ecclesia* to renew hostilities with the Peloponnesian League, and take back control of the Aegean. But politicians such as Thrasybulus managed to maintain peace with Sparta. Thrasybulus' faction was no friend of the Peloponnesian hegemon, but most of its members, being veterans of the Peloponnesian War, realized that the Athenians would lose the war if they reengaged in open conflict with Sparta and its allies. The Athenian Demos chose to set its survival as the primary goal in foreign policy, rather than an unrealistic confrontation with Sparta, maintaining friendly relations instead, and becoming a loyal member-state of the Peloponnesian League, participating in the joint-campaign against Elis.

¹⁷⁹ Diod. 14.32.1-14.33.6; Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.2-42.

¹⁸⁰ The Agiad and Eurypontid were the two royal houses of the Lacedaemonian polity.

The Allied Council

The Allied Council was initially comprised of Argos, Athens, Corinth, and Thebes.¹⁸¹ Those were the most powerful states in Greece, after Sparta, in the aftermath of the Peloponnesian War. The latter three were members of the Peloponnesian League, yet they had grown disenchanted with the Spartan leadership, Athens and Thebes were discontent due to Lysander's central role in creating the new order in Hellas, Corinth and Thebes were disgruntled thanks to not being adequately rewarded for the assistance that they provided Lacedaemon with for toppling the Athenian empire, and all of them had in common the fact that they were envious of Lacedaemon's hegemony. Persian diplomats convinced these major city-states into forming a coalition against Sparta and initially funded their war effort.¹⁸² The Persians and the Thebans assisted Athens in rebuilding its fortifications and fleets, wanting to assure that the Athenians would achieve victories over the Lacedaemonians as they had done so in the past without fear of being invaded.¹⁸³

The alliance between these four strong states, in combination with Lysander's disastrous campaign at Haliartus, helped to quickly topple Sparta's client-states in Central Greece.¹⁸⁴ The allies ousted by force the Peloponnesian garrisons, killing the Lacedaemonian troops, yet allowing the rest of the Peloponnesians to safely return home, hoping to gain their home-cities as allies in the future.¹⁸⁵ The *decarchies* were quickly overthrown and the Allied Council benefited greatly in its reputation thanks to opposing these unpopular governments and their foreign guards. The Allies initially sought to undermine the Spartan-controlled Peloponnesian League, by providing an

¹⁸¹ Diod. 14.82.1-2; On the outbreak of the Corinthian War and its distinction from the prior grievances between Phocis and Locrian communities, that escalated into direct conflict between Thebes and Sparta see Hamilton 1979, pp. 211-2.

¹⁸² Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.1, 4.2.1.

¹⁸³ Diod. 14.85.2-4. Berkey considers the destruction of Athens' walls as a display of complete defeat; their reconstruction portrayed Athens as a strong ally for city-states that desired the containment of Lacedaemon (2010, p.77).

¹⁸⁴ Diod. 14.82.1-4; Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.17-20.

¹⁸⁵ Diod. 14.82.5-10.

alternative to the *decarchies*. The Council restored to the liberated city-states their autonomy, and freedom of action, while it also provided them with security from Lacedaemonian retaliation. Still, the Allied Council did not receive tribute from its new allies, thus its ruling member-states were limited to their own financial resources, which had been augmented with Persian aid, in their confrontation with Sparta.¹⁸⁶ Notwithstanding decreasing the number of the client-states of Sparta, helped curtail the latter's income with which Sparta maintained its large fleet, garrisons, and an expeditionary army in Asia Minor. The toppling of the Spartan hegemony in Central Greece helped the Council make itself impervious to assault in that region and took away a significant part of military manpower from the Peloponnesian League, forcing the Spartans to rely on the Peloponnesian and Asian city-states' assistance for its military campaigns against the Allies. The Allied Council during the Corinthian War was an oligarchic organization being collectively led by its most powerful member-states.

The Athenian Contribution to the Allied Council

Initially the Thebans proposed an alliance at the Athenian *ecclesia*, asking the Athenians to act as hegemon of the military collaboration in order to liberate Greece from the Lacedaemonian yoke, for during the years of the Peloponnesian War Athens had stood against the Peloponnesian League, mostly on her own.¹⁸⁷ The Athenians were nowhere near ready to lead an anti-Spartan coalition and had to decline the Thebans' generous offer, which most likely aimed to involve the Athenian demos in the war instead of asserting its hegemony over independent city-states. Athens was a founding member of the Allied Council in Corinth, yet due to her lack of resources had to limit her efforts to deploying the Athenian phalanx to her allies' assistance at the battles of Nemea and Coronea. Yet, the former Athenian general Conon, who was now serving as *navarch* of the Persian fleet, in 394 began funding the Athenians in order to rebuild the Long Walls and their fleet. By 393 as soon as both projects had

¹⁸⁶ Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.1-2.

¹⁸⁷ On the Theban embassy to Athens see Hamilton 1979, pp. 201-2.

been completed, thanks to the generous financial assistance of the Great King, the Athenians engaged with Lacedaemon in a naval war for the first time since their defeat at Aegospotami by Lysander at 405.

The Athenians managed to restore their empire in the North-East Aegean Sea in short time thanks to the efforts of general Thrasybulus, who was killed by the inhabitants of Aspendus, due to being overtaxed by the Athenian forces.¹⁸⁸ The Athenian general Iphicrates won several battles for the allies in the Peloponnese, by waging unconventional warfare against Sparta and its allies, but failed to win over or capture any cities.¹⁸⁹

The allies despite Athens' resurgence in the Aegean, and the overthrow of most *decarchies* in Central Greece, failed to repeat their success in the Peloponnese. The only regime change that the allies achieved in the Peloponnese, was against one of their own members. Corinth in a bloody "democratic" coup had many of its own citizens murdered in the agora, and ended up being assimilated by Argos, forcing many of its most prominent citizens to defect to Sparta for the rest of the Corinthian War.¹⁹⁰

The part that went wrong was that the Athenians allowed volunteers to join king Evagoras of Cyprus in his revolt against the Great King, despite owing their prestige in international relations to Persia.¹⁹¹ With hundreds of Athenians having ended up as

¹⁸⁸ Diod. 14.94.1-4, 14.99.4-5; Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.25.30.

¹⁸⁹ Diod. 14.91.1-14.92.2; Xen. *Hell.* 14.4.15-16, 14.5.11-17.

¹⁹⁰ Diod. 14.86.1-2; Xen. *Hell.* 4.4.1-13.

¹⁹¹ In the spring of 391 the Spartan admiral Teleutias captured ten Athenian warships on their way to assist Evagoras in Cyprus. Xenophon commented on the Athenian blunder to assist an enemy of Athens' most powerful ally (Xen. *Hell.* 4.20-24). The Athenian generals, Aristophanes and Nicodemus, who led this petty expedition returned to Athens where they were tried and executed (Lys. 19.7). Despite the ill fate of Aristophanes and Nicodemus, the Athenians kept on joining Evagoras' ranks as the fiscal incentives to join the war in Cyprus outweighed the fear of being punished by the Athenian justice system. It should be noted that Aristophanes and Nicodemus had served as naval officers in the past alongside Conon serving in the Persian fleet. It is possible that many Athenians joined Evagoras' rebellion due to growing disenchanted with Persia thanks to Conon's persecution.

mercenaries in Cyprus fighting against Persian interests, the Persians decided to reconsider their relationship with Athens. They secretly financed the rebuilding of the Spartan fleet that they had vanquished a few years ago under the command of the Athenian admiral Conon. The Spartans with their new fleet attempted to block the Dardanelles again and threatened Athens' grain supply, endangering the existence of her newfound empire.¹⁹² The founding members of the Allied Council and Sparta decided to sign a peace with the blessings of the Great King, which turned the latter into the guarantor of peace in Greece, and Spartan rule more moderate towards the Greek city-states. In regard to the rest of the signatories the King's Peace cost the Athenians their new empire, the Thebans their hegemony in Boeotia, and to the Argives their domination of Corinth.¹⁹³

Second Athenian League

In 377, following the violent restoration of democracy in Thebes, and a failed Lacedaemonian attempt to capture Athens, the Athenians established a new alliance, based on voluntary induction.¹⁹⁴ The new Athenian League aimed to protect its member-states from Lacedaemonian aggression. However, it was also made clear this time, that it was never going to oppose Persian interests by allowing any subjects of the Great King to ever join in.¹⁹⁵ The Second Athenian League was a more altruistic experiment in alliance-politics by the Athenians. This is because it made clear in its tenets that no Athenian *cleruchs* were ever going to be installed in any of the member-states, and that the Athenian demos was going to have limited influence on the alliance's decision-making. In contrast, in the Delian League where decision-making was monopolized by the Athenians to such a degree, that it is rightfully also called

¹⁹² Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.16.

¹⁹³ Diod. 14.110.1-4; Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.30-34. Berkey acknowledges that Xenophon considered the peace treaty to be a Spartan diplomatic victory, rather than a military one (2010, p. 71).

¹⁹⁴ Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.2-9.5, 5.4.20-24.

¹⁹⁵ IG II² 43.

Athenian Empire.¹⁹⁶ The *ecclesia* of the League had a single representative from each member-state, yet none from Athens itself. The *ecclesia* of the allies could veto the suggestions of the Athenian demos, rendering Athens impotent without the approval of its allies. The member-states contributed financially to the creation and maintaining of the Athenian fleet and the mercenaries that Athens used in order to protect the League's interests. Notwithstanding the limited role of the Athenian Demos, compared to the Delian League, in the process of the alliance's decision-making, the Second Athenian League was de facto led by the Athenians.¹⁹⁷

The Second Athenian League, although it included several of the founding-members of the Allied Council, was an institution whose decision-making was greatly influenced by Athenian interests. The Thebans and the Thessalians did join in, and were loyal members initially. After the Lacedaemonian military power had been curved down by the late 370s, due to the conquest of the latter's maritime empire by the Athenians, and the military victories of the Thebans in Boeotia, Thebes used the power vacuum in its neighbourhood, caused by Lacedaemonian defeats, to establish its own hegemony in Central Greece.¹⁹⁸ The Thebans ceased funding the Second Athenian League, and soon withdrew from the alliance altogether.¹⁹⁹

In its early years the Second Athenian League became very successful in dealing with the Lacedaemonian threat, due to the latter's failure to provide security from piracy,

¹⁹⁶ In the fifth century the Athenian *cleruchs* were introduced by the Athenian *demos* in order to maintain order among its recalcitrant allies. Their necessity highlighted the difficulties of the Athenians to keep tribute flowing into their *polis* from abroad in order to fund the war effort against the Peloponnesian League. The presence of Athenian garrisons among its allies displayed the increased difficulty Athens experienced with providing security from the Lacedaemonians through its naval forces alone. During the fourth century due to the memory of how unpopular the *cleruchies* had made Athens to many of its allies towards the end of the Peloponnesian War, as well as the ill memories of the Lacedaemonian garrison stationed in Athens during the reign of the Thirty, turned the Athenians into sceptics on the placement of garrisons in allied states. This way of thinking expired as soon as Thebes began to rise in power and threaten Athenian interests more than Sparta did (Cargill 1981, pp. 146-160).

¹⁹⁷ Hammond 1977, pp. 486-8.

¹⁹⁸ Diod. 15.67.4.

¹⁹⁹ Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.1.

and thanks to Sparta's overtly aggressive military approach in dealing with city-states suffering from civil strife.²⁰⁰ Sparta's frequent use of regime change as a solution to civil strife, the imposition of Peloponnesian garrisons within city-states, and forceful participation in Sparta's wars were matters that made all of the Greek *poleis* get concerned with. The introduction of a new Athenian League served as the counterweight to Lacedaemonian hegemony. The Second Athenian League's liberal approach to allied decision-making, use of military forces in joint-operations, and constitutional checks and balances over the hegemon made it very popular to states that had experienced being part of the Spartan sphere of influence.

The Second Athenian League served well in turning Athens into a powerhouse that would rival Sparta at sea, and oppose it on land. The Athenian fleet during the 370s enjoyed more success in its confrontation with the Lacedaemonian fleet, than it had during the years of the Corinthian War, and even managed to completely supplant the Spartan maritime empire. The Athenian army campaigned annually in Boeotia, successfully preventing the Peloponnesian armies from overwhelming the Thebans. It was due to this assistance that Thebes, during the very difficult years of the 370s, withstood the brutal annual Peloponnesian incursions. Thanks to Athens, Thebes remained democratic, independent, and found the opportunity to reform its armed forces, so that it would be able to withstand the Lacedaemonian army on its own in the future. The success of the Second Athenian League had the unintended consequence of weakening Lacedaemon too much, to the point where after a single defeat in pitched battle the Spartan hegemony completely collapsed. With the Athenian fleet having already toppled the Spartan thalassocracy, the loss of Boeotia to Thebes was to be expected should the Peloponnesian League suffer a defeat at Leuctra. Yet, the

²⁰⁰ The military intervention against Phlius showcases this issue. Phlius was a Peloponnesian city-state which was suffering from the disputes between some of its citizens. The Phliasian *demos* through Spartan mediation had initially offered to take back its exiles and to have restored their rights and properties. During the Olynthian War that deal was broken, yet because the Lacedaemonian Army was being prepared to seek justice for the broken treaty through force, the Phliasians agreed to honour their past treaty and apologized for their recent misbehavior. Agesilaus rejected the Phliasian attempt to reach a peaceful resolution, and began a twenty-month long siege of the city-state, that resulted in the imposition of a philo-Laconian puppet government (Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.8-10, 5.3.10-15, 5.3.25).

abrupt loss of Spartan authority in the Peloponnese, even before the first Theban-led invasion of Laconia was entirely unforeseen.

The Athenians had been hoping that they would dominate Sparta in the naval theatre of operations, but maintain the status quo in Boeotia steady, with Thebes being democratic and autonomous, dependent upon Athenian aid in order to retain its freedom, and Boeotia being controlled by Sparta, so that Thebes would not rise to unexpected heights of power and begin to threaten Athenian interests.²⁰¹ Athens attempted to take control of the tense situation in the Peloponnese, by inviting all of the city-states to Athens for a conference in order to decide their future, with Athenian fiscal aid and diplomatic support. Athens and the Second Athenian League agreed to an alliance with seventy Peloponnesian *poleis*, yet when Sparta threatened them with war the Athenian demos, fearing that such a conflict would only weaken Athens and Sparta, refused to assist them and forced them to seek help from Thebes.²⁰² The conference however did help the attending city-states to experiment with self-determination.²⁰³ The Thebans took advantage of the situation, and initially they

²⁰¹ The Athenian naval operations against the Lacedaemonian fleet and the client-states of Sparta at sea, as well as the timely assistance of the Athenian army to Thebes during the massive Peloponnesian invasions of the latter, prevented Sparta from carrying out an incessant siege of the city of Thebes, as with those it had waged against Mantinea, Olynthus and Phlius. Had the Spartans managed to conduct an uninterrupted investment of Thebes, the latter would have fallen, like the aforementioned city-states before it, and would have had its democratic government replaced with an oligarchic one, as well as a Peloponnesian garrison installed in the Cadmea.

²⁰² Dem. 16.12; Diod. 15.62.3; Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.19; On whether the Athenians allied with seventy Peloponnesian *poleis* or with twenty-four see Cargill 1981, pp. 46-47. Considering Gilpin's (1981, p. 193) argument that as the number of the members of an alliance increases, the benefits to its members decrease, it is possible that the island member-states of the Second Athenian League did not wish the induction of seventy Peloponnesian city-states, for that would diminish their own influence within the League.

²⁰³ The separated Mantinean republics decided to merge again into a single city-state, and to rebuild their circuit walls. The Arcadians undertook the most impressive social experiment of the 360s, and created a democratic confederacy. The Arcadians had been displaying signs of a

intervened in order to protect the democratization of the Peloponnesian city-states, but soon that turned into a full-scale invasion of Laconia, assisted by thousands of volunteers from the revolting Peloponnesian city-states. Athens did not approve seeing Greece being transformed according to Theban interests, and allied itself with Sparta. This unholy alliance prevented Spartan society from being forced into a democracy, yet Athens lost the most significant member-states of the Second Athenian League. The latter had helped create the Second Athenian League and Athens become a great naval power again, in order to destroy Spartan autocracy, not to prevent Theban efforts from democratizing it.

Lacedaemonian Strategies

The Lacedaemonian domestic crisis

Sparta suffered a minor domestic crisis at the height of its power. Shortly after the coronation of Agesilaus, a staged coup was prevented in Lacedaemon by the *Crypteia*. A man called Cinadon, and other Lacedaemonians were attempting to instigate a coup against the *homoioi* by the rest of Sparta's social castes.²⁰⁴ During his interrogation Cinadon gave up the names of the other conspirators, and they were all promptly executed. This displayed clearly how volatile the domestic situation in Lacedaemon had become. The number of Spartans had dwindled dramatically, because of a law passed by an ephor named Epitadeus. According to Pausanias he was an old Spartan, who did not want his eldest son to inherit his land, and came up with a law that would allow him to grant his property to whomever he thought fit. This legislation allowed the Spartans to liberate their land market, by selling it to each other. Free market economics help raise the wealth of the inhabitants of a country, yet in this case they also brought quite significant unintended consequences upon the rigid militaristic

growing independence from Spartan influence since the early fourth century (Xen. *Anab.* 6.1.30), see Trundle 2007, pp. 490-1.

²⁰⁴ Xen. *Hell.* 3.3.4-11.

state. Lacedaemon did become a wealthier state than it was at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, yet this resulted in a rapid decline in the size of its citizenry. Citizens who sold their land, ultimately ended up ousted from the ranks of the *homoioi* due to being unable to provide the necessary tithe for the common meals. It is estimated that in a very short amount of time the number of *homoioi* went down to one thousand. This brought unrest to Lacedaemon, since many of its inhabitants were disenfranchised armed veterans. Cinadon's conspiracy to purge the *homoioi* was not the only coup d'état plotted during the early fourth century. Lysander himself had conspired to overthrow the two Spartan ruling dynasties, and have them replaced with a kingship based on meritocracy rather than hereditary right.²⁰⁵ This plan aimed to place Lysander at the top of the Lacedaemonian hierarchy, yet in order for such a plot to ever be realized, he would undoubtedly need the aid of the disenfranchised majority that was alienated with Spartan domination, and its exclusion from the political process. Such radical regime change would not stop there. In order to maintain his support, Lysander would have found himself forced to satisfy his base of support, and that would be done by either moderating the law on the requirements for holding civil rights, or through the introduction of radical land redistribution. Lysander died before his plans were realized, yet the conspiracy was discovered thanks to the distrust that had grown between him and his former royal *protégé* Agesilaus. In fact, this plot was deemed so dangerous to the oligarchic government, that it was kept secret from the Lacedaemonians, in fear of the majority wanting to implement it despite the death of its planner and main beneficiary.

The Spartan government came up with a drastic solution to its domestic problem of secret organizations seeking to topple the Lacedaemonian regime. Sparta was to release the pressure that the Lacedaemonian society was gathering by externalizing its issues. Sparta decided that the preferred solution to all foreign problems it had to deal with, from now on would be war. Lacedaemonian and Peloponnesian League armies during Sparta's thirty-three years long hegemony waged war of great scale against other states from the Peloponnese to North Greece and Asia Minor.

²⁰⁵ Diod. 14.13.3-8; Plut. *Comp. Lys. Sull.* 2.1-2; Plut. *Lys.* 24.1-26.4, 30.3-4. According to Plutarch king Agesilaus upon his arrival to Sparta from Asia Minor, discovered that Lysander had organized a plot to overthrow him (*Ages* 20.2).

Elis and Mantinea

A year after Pausanias' military intervention in Athens, Sparta dragged the Peloponnesian League, into a war against Elis. This minor Peloponnesian *polis* managed to offend the hegemon of the Peloponnese by forming a federation with its neighbouring towns.²⁰⁶ After a few years of massive military incursions into its territory Elis capitulated by the summer of 397, in order to escape the plundering of its *chora* by Lacedaemon and its allies.²⁰⁷ Although Thebes and Corinth chose to abstain from the unjust war against the Eleans, Athens honoured its agreement with the Peloponnesian League and joined in the offensive operations led by Sparta.²⁰⁸ This served as a test for the new aggressive Spartan foreign policy. Sparta got to pacify and break up the Elean federation, virtually unopposed, without a single incident of unrest from within the Lacedaemonian society, by its own armies, or even by its allies. Athens joined the military operations for the first time as a member-state of the Peloponnesian League. Only Corinth and Thebes chose to abstain, yet they did not attempt to actively oppose Sparta during the two years long war.

After the signing of the Peace of Antalcidas Mantinea was the first city-state to suffer from Spartan aggressiveness, perhaps due to its proximity to the latter. The Spartans asked the Mantineans to tear down their walls and to break down their polity, in order to restore the original five separate states that it was comprised of.²⁰⁹ All pleas for

²⁰⁶ Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.21. On the troubled relationship between Elis and its *perioecic* communities see Roy 2009, pp. 38-45.

²⁰⁷ Diod. 14.17.8-12, 14.31.1; Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.24-31.

²⁰⁸ Diod. 14.17.7; Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.25.

²⁰⁹ Diod. 15.5.1-3. Xenophon provides us with a different narrative in regard to these events, claiming that the Lacedaemonians initially demanded from the Mantineans to raze their walls. After the Mantineans refused to comply, Agesilaus subdued them by undermining their walls, having altered the direction of the flow of a river towards their fortifications. Since Agesilaus had to force Mantinea to submit to Lacedaemon's will through a protracted siege, the Lacedaemonians increased their demands and forced the Mantineans to break up into four separate republics (*Hell.* 5.2.1-7), as opposed to five according to Diodorus. Historians

assistance to the most powerful democratic *poleis* went unheeded, leaving Mantinea to face the Lacedaemonian onslaught by itself. Mantinea fell after Agesilaus diverted a river's course towards the Mantinean fortifications.²¹⁰ As soon as their walls had been undermined the Mantineans accepted the Spartan terms without further resistance.²¹¹

In both the cases of Elis and Mantinea, Sparta had recently got out of a large-scale war, before it decided to test the cohesion of its alliance and the quality of its armed forces against these petty city-states. Both of these city-states had negligible armed forces that could hardly be considered a threat against the Lacedaemonian military might. The two city-states served as testing grounds for Sparta's aggressive foreign policy, yet they also helped reassert Spartan authority in the Peloponnese after long periods of warfare that had led to its decline, due to Spartan attention being focused elsewhere.²¹²

themselves have been unable so far in finding which claim is correct (see Hodkinson and Hodkinson 1981; Funke 2009). In regard to this thesis' focus either claim makes no difference.

²¹⁰ Diod. 15.5.4-6, 15.12.1.

²¹¹ Ibid. 15.12.2; Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.3-5.

²¹² Elis and Mantinea were subject to Lacedaemonian nation-building against their will. The Lacedaemonians separated the city-states of Triphylia from Elis after their victory over the latter in the early fourth century and divided Mantinea into four or five republics in 385 (Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.7). We know nothing of the details of these Lacedaemonian foreign policy undertakings other than that the Triphylian experiment was successful, as the Triphylians maintained their independence from Elis after Sparta's downfall. The Triphylian independence and the partition of Mantinea are exceptions in Spartan foreign policy. The Lacedaemonian counterinsurgency focused on political stability, avoiding nation-building endeavours altogether. The Lacedaemonians generally preferred to preserve the status quo, and only in Triphylia and Mantinea did they engage in nation-building. The Thebans being the most committed revisionists of the fourth century surpassed every other faction in nation-building.

Persia

Soon after Cyrus' fatal attempt to seize the throne from his brother Artaxerxes, Sparta decided to move against the Persian Empire. The Spartans declared war against Persia, claiming that they were defending the autonomy of the Greek cities of Asia Minor.²¹³ The Peloponnesian League sent thousands of troops to wage war against the Great King, however, Thebes, Corinth, and Athens refused to participate. After Agesilaus brought reinforcements with him from the Peloponnese to Asia Minor, the recalcitrant member-states of the Peloponnesian League, plotted a revolt against Spartan hegemony, choosing to take advantage of the fact that Lacedaemon's main land forces were far away from Greece. Sparta initially dispatched Lysander and Pausanias to Boeotia in order to bring back to order its uneasy ally, but they failed to join forces, and Lysander died on the battlefield along with many of the troops that he led personally.²¹⁴ Pausanias arriving a day later agreed to an armistice in order to claim the bodies of Lysander and his fallen soldiers, but realizing that this would guarantee him the death sentence in Sparta, he decided not to return along with the armies back home.²¹⁵ Pausanias was condemned to death for cowardice in absentia, and Lacedaemon pursued the war against its former allies, which led to a climactic battle between the loyalist forces of the Peloponnesian League and the allies against Spartan hegemony at Nemea.²¹⁶ The Spartans managed to emerge victorious, but the allies' will remained unbroken and they decided to pursue the war. Before the battle at Nemea had taken place the ephors had already recalled Agesilaus with the main bulk of his troops in Asia back to the Peloponnese in order to restore peace, forcing him to leave a residual military force in Asia, which for the rest of the war did not achieve anything worth of note against the Persians.²¹⁷ Agesilaus marched his army back to the Peloponnese in good order, passing through hostile territory in Thrace, Macedonia,

²¹³ Diod. 14.36.4-7; Xen. *Hell.* 3.1.3.

²¹⁴ Diod. 14.81.1-3; Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.17-20.

²¹⁵ Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.22-25.

²¹⁶ Diod. 14.83.1-2; Xen. *Hell.* 4.2.18-23.

²¹⁷ Diod. 14.83.1-2; Xen. *Hell.* 4.2.2-3.

Thessaly and Boeotia, erecting trophies on every occasion where Lacedaemon's enemies attempted to block his way.²¹⁸

The war against Persia apparently began because Sparta wanted to take hold of the Greek city-states of Asia Minor, as it had been allegedly promised by the usurper Cyrus.²¹⁹ Actually, Sparta's client-states provided it with enough gold in order to free itself of the need for Persian aid in order to wage large-scale military operations. The Spartans were also under the false impression that they would cover the costs of the high-cost expedition to Asia Minor by plundering the holdings of the Great King.²²⁰ The notion that fighting against the Persian Empire was the equivalent of mining gold was widespread during classical antiquity, and the successful Descent of the Ten Thousand, helped proliferate the belief of Greek warfare being superior to Persian arms. Sparta due to its financial independence, the notion of its own military superiority, and the false belief that it still had good control over the Peloponnesian League, decided to declare an aggressive war against its patron. Through large-scale warfare against the Persian Empire its uneasy non-citizen hoplites would be appeased by plundering the wealthy satrapies of the Great King, and Sparta would be safer by putting to good use the lethal skills of those who had turned into a domestic threat to the oligarchic government. The Lacedaemonian armies that served in Asia Minor and Olynthus were comprised of thousands of *neodamodes* and *perioeci*, yet only a handful of Spartans served as officers of the army, and as *harmosts* to the Greek city-states in Asia Minor.²²¹

The Lacedaemonian war against the Great King failed due to the rebellion led by the most powerful member-states of the Peloponnesian League. This rebellion was caused by the abundant Persian gold that the Great King sent to the disorderly states, and also by the demise of the Lacedaemonian fleet at the hands of an Athenian *navarch* who was put in command of the Persian fleets.²²² Even under these circumstances Sparta

²¹⁸ Xen. *Hell.* 4.2.8, 4.3.3-4.4.1.

²¹⁹ Diod. 14.35.6-7.

²²⁰ According to Diodorus the Lacedaemonians received a thousand talents per year in tribute from their recently established client-states (14.10.2).

²²¹ Diod. 14.36.1, 14.79.1-2; Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.1-2.

²²² Diod. 14.39.1, 14.83.4-7; Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.1-2, 4.8.6-7.

managed to prevail against its Greek competitors and to maintain its hegemonic position in Greece after the Corinthian War, thanks to its rapprochement with Persia. The success of the Athenian demos in restoring its empire in a large part of the Aegean, and in rebuilding its naval power, as well as the recruitment of Athenian mercenaries by the rebellious king Evagoras of Cyprus, made the Great King uneasy.²²³ Not wanting to be faced with another ungrateful upstart ally, as Persia had ended up dealing with in the aftermath of the Peloponnesian War, the Great King decided to supply Sparta with funds in order to rebuild its fleet, and hold in check the Athenian rise in power.²²⁴

The later Lacedaemonian hegemony

After Sparta and the rest of the belligerent city-states signed the peace treaty that turned the Great King into the arbiter of Hellenic affairs, and Sparta into the enforcer of this treaty, the latter began to reimpose its hegemony through the aggressive foreign policy that had been ordained by the unrealized conspiracies of Cinadon and Lysander. Sparta forced regime change in four democratic city-states in succession, and even attempted to invade Athens in secret, that would have most likely led to the same outcome. Mantinea, Phlius, Thebes, and Olynthus held democratic constitutions, yet that did not necessarily automatically turn them into enemies of Spartan interests. Mantinea and Phlius were allied to Sparta, Thebes had been pacified, and did not hinder the Lacedaemonian troop movements towards Olynthus, which was turning into a powerhouse that defied the Macedonian royal house, yet with a sphere of influence limited to Northern Greece. The democratic parties of Mantinea and Phlius were allied to Spartan political factions, not to the demes of Athens and Thebes. The only aim for Sparta's aggression during the second half of the 380s was to stretch its arm and to strengthen its own alliance. The Spartans had they wanted to, they could have reached a reasonable solution with all of these states through diplomatic means. The capture of Thebes, apart from the fact that it was completely unprovoked and

²²³ Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.22-24, 5.1.10.

²²⁴ Diod. 14.85.2-4; Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.16.

inexcusable, was soon overturned and ultimately cost far more than it ever offered. As for Olynthian aggression, it could have been held in check by providing Acanthus with a garrison, instead of waging a costly full-scale war, whose only benefit was the addition of Olynthian cavalry to the joint armies of the Peloponnesian League.

The Olynthian War gave insight into Spartan politics and decision-making process. Historians held the belief that the Eurypontid dynasty of Agesilaus and the Agiad line of Agesipolis and Cleombrotus advocated conflicting views on how Sparta should wield its hegemony. According to these theories Agesilaus pursued a more direct and aggressive policy of enforcing Spartan interests abroad, while Agesipolis and Cleombrotus were interested in moderating Sparta's foreign policy.²²⁵ Agesilaus was a warlike leader who advocated a direct approach of military engagement with whoever was in conflict with Spartan interests, whereas the Agiads were in favour of reaching diplomatic solutions with those who opposed them, and did not wish Sparta to be engaged in warfare so frequently. Through this claim Agesilaus was presented as a destructive warmonger, while his vice-regents appeared to be lovers of peace and diplomacy. By examining the Olynthian War however this argument is easily refuted. Agesipolis did oppose the capture of Cadmea, because it was a hostility committed against Thebes during peacetime, nevertheless he did not oppose the war against Olynthus.²²⁶ After the defeat of *harmost* Teleutias and the forces under his command by the Olynthian army, the Spartans sent king Agesipolis to lead the Peloponnesian armies against the Olynthians.²²⁷ Agesipolis led a brutal war against Olynthus, and after four years, with both sides having suffered great casualties in a war of attrition, Sparta was victorious.²²⁸ Agesipolis and Cleombrotus never spoke against starting a war with Olynthus. Despite the fact that the Olynthians were not an immediate threat to the Peloponnesian League, and the resources and time needed to subdue their *polis* proved out to be too much for Lacedaemon, for the small benefits that victory brought

²²⁵ Diod. 15.19.4.

²²⁶ Diod. 15.20.1-2; Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.26.

²²⁷ Xen. *Hell.* 5.3.4.

²²⁸ Agesipolis died before the Olynthian War had reached its end. Yet, after the defeat and fall of Agesilaus' brother Teleutias, Agesipolis managed to turn the tables on the Olynthians (Xen. *Hell.* 5.3.18-19).

to Sparta, Agesipolis and Cleombrotus instead of raising dissent against the war effort in Chalcidice, pursued the war against the northern Greek city.²²⁹ Not to mention the Agiads did not object to Sparta waging separate wars at the same time against different states in places far from each other.²³⁰

Due to the long wars that Lacedaemon was engaged in, there was an unexpected effect upon the Peloponnese. From 395 until 387, Sparta was engaged at war in both Asia Minor against Persia, and in mainland Greece against the Allied Council, not to mention the costly naval operations against both factions in the Aegean Sea. In the late 380s, Sparta began separate wars against Olynthus and Phlius, and during the beginning of the conflict with the latter Sparta in a surprise attack violated its peace treaty with Thebes. A Lacedaemonian army captured the Cadmea, and forced regime change in the most powerful Boeotian city-state, as well as the member-states of the Peloponnesian League to pay mercenaries to serve as an occupying force. After the liberation of Thebes in 379 the Spartans started a war with Athens as well, despite the fact that the Athenians had displayed their lack of interest in joining in another war against Spartan hegemony at the time.²³¹

The Peloponnesian city-states still allied to Sparta, due to having their militias constantly raised to take part in unpopular and dangerous campaigns, began to hire mercenaries en masse.²³² The mercenary armies of the Peloponnesian city-states were far more effective in combat, yet Sparta's wars remained an unpopular task for its allies. The citizens of the Peloponnesian *poleis*, no longer had to march far away, and

²²⁹ Cartledge, doubting the theory about warmongering Eurypontids and peace-loving Agiads, claimed that Agesilaus was upset about the death of Agesipolis due to the loss of a partner in-crime, rather than sincerely mourning the loss of a good king (1987, p. 374).

²³⁰ The lack of domestic opposition to Sparta waging separate wars in different locations at the same time is impressive. This policy was quite a costly practice, as it was rapidly depleting Lacedaemon's own resources, and tired its allies with the burdens of constant warfare. Strategically it made no sense at all; throughout history states at war sought to increase the fronts their enemies faced, in order to weaken them. Sparta opened new fronts when it was already engaged in hostilities with at least one enemy, on its own accord.

²³¹ Diod. 15.29.5-8; Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.20-24, 5.4.34.

²³² Xen. *Hell.* 4.4.14.

risk their lives for wars whose aims they did not probably understand, nor care about, be that as it may they still had to pay the extravagant costs of the mercenaries who went in their place. Sparta's belligerence had a great toll upon the Peloponnesian League, which soon after Leuctra ended up being dissolved thanks to the Corinthians' initiative to pursue peace.

Lacedaemonian Counterinsurgency

In the early years following the end of the Peloponnesian War, the Spartan government had to deal with normalizing its relations with its newly acquired client-states from the former Delian League. Lysander had replaced the Athenian-supported democratic governments with *decarchies*, which were ten members' councils hand-picked by himself.²³³ These were highly unpopular governments, due to imposing high taxes on the citizens, and politically segregating most of the citizenry. In order for these puppet states to survive, Sparta had to directly intervene by supplying them with Lacedaemonian garrisons, and *harmosts* who acted as commanders of the garrisons, as well as advisors to the *decarchies*.²³⁴ This system was costly on Sparta due to the manpower drain that it caused to the Lacedaemonian state, yet its benefits, according to the Spartan government, outweighed the costs. The benefits were both political and fiscal. Sparta got to send away from Lacedaemon thousands of troubling hoplites from the inferior classes, helping make its own state safer and more stable. The *decarchies* being governments of extremely small-scale membership, and because they owed their existence to the Spartan government, got to tax extravagantly their subjects. Thanks to this high taxation of Athens' former client-states the Spartans got to maintain the costly Lacedaemonian fleet, that had replaced its Athenian counterpart in the Aegean and Ionian Seas, and grown independent of Persian influence, due to no longer being

²³³ Diod. 14.10.1-2.

²³⁴ Authors such as Polybius claimed that the Spartans due to their stern constitution were not proper for holding an empire (6.49.1-6.50.6.). Gilpin (1981, p. 99) built on Polybius' argument by adding that the Spartan constitution did not encourage aggrandizement and domination due to lacking economic or any other motives to expand.

in need of the Great King's financial aid. The Spartans reprimanded Lysander, thanks to Agesilaus' initiative to strip the Spartan general of rank and influence, and later provided him with a sinecure in diplomatic missions.²³⁵ The original members of the *decarchies*, were replaced, because their loyalty to Sparta itself was dubious, Lysander's hegemonic system was maintained, albeit with new *decarchs*.²³⁶ The *decarchies* provided Sparta with sufficient gold to help maintain its naval forces, and it got to give high pays and to send abroad thousands of non-Spartan Lacedaemonians, in order to appease them and help defuse the situation at home. Despite being heavily criticized, and being to a great degree responsible for Sparta's unpopularity, the *decarchies* proved out to be a very reliable form of control, since only in Athens and Thebes they broke down without foreign intervention.²³⁷ In regard to Spartan military interventions to bring back order in unstable city-states suffering from high levels of civil strife, the Spartans in most cases took sides, resulting in the perpetuation, rather than the resolution of civil conflicts. Notwithstanding, in some occasions king Agesilaus chose to use his personal influence in order to resolve the differences between disputing factions, instead of supporting one side against the other, as he systematically did in Asia Minor.²³⁸

²³⁵ The Spartans were right to demote Lysander, for he was a problem, not only because he posed a threat due to the allegiance of the *decarchies* to himself, instead of Sparta, but also because his mere command was considered to be controversial among Sparta's allies (Plut. *Lys.* 27.1-4). The Thebans and the Athenians despised Lysander. He had hand-picked the Thirty, who had viciously persecuted the members of the democratic faction during their reign. During the civil war Lysander intervened in Athens in order to restore his favourites, against the wishes of the oligarchic faction which had replaced them with the Ten, making himself despised by both of the warring Athenian factions. The Thebans during the rule of the Thirty had welcomed many of the Athenian refugees escaping from the purges of Lysander's puppet regime, and had openly defied the Spartan decree that all city-states apprehend and return to Athens its refugees trying to flee (Diod. 14.16.1-3; Plut. *Lys.* 27.3; Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.1).

²³⁶ Plut. *Ages.* 6.1; Xen. *Ages.* 1.37; Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.7.

²³⁷ Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.23, 5.4.5-7, 5.4.10-11.

²³⁸ Xen. *Ages.* 1.37-8.

Persian Grand Strategy

The Persians after the allies' victory at Haliartus, which cost Lysander his life and Pausanias his kingship, sent monies to the allies in order to boost their effort against Sparta and also launched a naval expedition in the Aegean, targeting the member-states of the Peloponnesian League, led by the former Athenian general Conon.²³⁹ After gaining a foothold in the Aegean and dealing a hard blow on the Spartan navy, Conon visited Athens and contributed financially to the restoration of the Long Walls and Piraeus' fortifications, as well as the construction of a new Athenian fleet, undoing in a few months what the Spartans had strived for decades to achieve.²⁴⁰ The Great King did not wish to raise another large army that would overwhelm the Peloponnesian League's forces in Asia Minor, in fear that its commander, should he be successful, could decide to turn his army back to Babylon and usurp the throne.²⁴¹ The Persian strategy-makers decided to rely on offshore balancing instead of military power in order to deal with the Peloponnesian League, supplying with funds Sparta's disenchanted allies, they forced Lacedaemon to fight simultaneously in two fronts, forcing the Spartan government to deploy its military resources in two different continents.²⁴² Initially former Athenian general Conon led the Persian fleet annihilating the Lacedaemonian naval forces, while ousting Peloponnesian garrisons from the city-states of the Aegean islands, and finally assisting Athens in rebuilding its walls and fleet.²⁴³ Funding the Greeks with small amounts of gold by Persian standards, in order to draw Sparta's attention and resources far from its satrapies worked out well. The Athenians however, after the completion of the Long Walls and their navy, began to reimpose their hegemony in the Hellespont, which could threaten

²³⁹ Diod. 14.81.1-14.82.4; Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.18-20.

²⁴⁰ Diod. 14.85.3-4; Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.9-10; Berkey 2010, pp. 69-70. On the Persian grand strategy against Lacedaemon see Hamilton 1979, pp. 186-191.

²⁴¹ King Artaxerxes had already suffered such an attempt on his throne by his brother Cyrus (Diod. 14.21.5-14.23.6).

²⁴² Cf. Hamilton pp. 213-4.

²⁴³ On the reasons why Conon did not engage in regime change in the Aegean see Hamilton pp. 226-7.

in the future Persian interests.²⁴⁴ Sparta liquidating the Athenian Empire had grown independent of Persian financial aid and turned against its former patron. The Athenian republic had a long anti-Persian tradition in its foreign policy, and if it reproduced the Spartan triumph of 404, there was no guarantee it would not follow an anti-Persian path in its foreign policy, in order to maintain the city-states of Asia Minor under its control, and to gain independence from the Great King. These fears must have definitely come to the minds of the makers of Persian grand strategy, and the fact that the Athenian Demos did not prevent its adventurous citizens to join in Evagoras' rebellion, despite the Athenians' debt to Persian assistance, did not help put such disturbing thoughts at ease.

Persia, in secret, through the satrap Tiribazus, began to fund the rebuilding of the Lacedaemonian fleet. This double game helped Persia establish a balance of power between Athens and Sparta, which benefited itself the most. The belligerent Greek powers after having exhausted themselves by fighting against each other, managed to reach a peace agreement thanks to the direct arbitration of Persian diplomacy. This ended Sparta's adventure in Asia Minor, it turned Persia into the arbiter of Greek affairs, granting it freedom of threats emerging from Greece for fifty years, and also allowed the Persians to hire Greek mercenaries by the thousands, whom they used to create a standing army of heavy infantry for the first time in their empire's history.

Nation-Building

During this period Argos and Thebes carried out revisionist policies that reshaped the political landscape of the Peloponnese with various degrees of success. Their nation-building projects' successes and goals will be examined in regard to what their original goals were, what they cost, and what the final outcome of those projects were for the two major city-states that promoted them.

²⁴⁴ Diod. 14.94.1-4, 14.99.4-5; Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.25-39.

Argos

Because of Corinth being the gateway to Central Greece, Sparta had turned the former into the focus of its military aggression, among the Allies. By 392 the Corinthian landowners who had borne the brunt of Lacedaemonian aggression, and had suffered many casualties at the battle of Nemea, had begun to show symptoms of war weariness.²⁴⁵ They formed a peace party and advocated the end of the Corinthian War, which was bearing its toll mostly on their *polis*.²⁴⁶ However, demagogues took advantage of this situation, and managed to convince the Allied Council that the peace party was planning to betray the Allies and have Corinth change sides.²⁴⁷ In reality there was nothing, before the bloody coup had taken place against them, to imply that these individuals were planning to force Corinth to change sides in the war. On the contrary, until then they had proven their dedication to the Allied cause and Corinth, having contributed the most to the war effort. Notwithstanding, the “democrats” convinced the member-states of the Allied Council to allow the purge of the Corinthian landowners organized by their opposition and Argive *metics* living in Corinth.²⁴⁸ After the purge had been carried out and peace was restored, citizenship was granted to the Argive *metics*, and together with their Corinthian partners dominated decision-making at the *ecclesia*.²⁴⁹ Later Corinthian citizens turned into

²⁴⁵ The landowners comprised most of the Corinthian hoplite phalanx, and until 392 it was the Corinthian heavy infantry that had borne the brunt of the fighting with the Peloponnesian League in the ceremonial hoplite battles. The allied council had dealt successfully with the Peloponnesian League in Central Greece, managing to oust its garrisons from Sparta’s satellite states, but in the Peloponnese, due to the council’s failure to overcome the Peloponnesian forces at the battle of Nemea in 394, Lacedaemonian power had not been curved down at all, and Corinth being more vulnerable than the rest of its allies, suffering the most from Lacedaemonian-led raiding activities. Because of the intensity of the warfare taking place near Corinth the whole conflict was named Corinthian War (Diod. 14.86.3-6).

²⁴⁶ Xen. *Hell.* 4.4.1.

²⁴⁷ Hamilton shares the same view (1979, pp. 222-3).

²⁴⁸ Diod. 14.86.1-2; Xen. *Hell.* 4.4.2-5.

²⁴⁹ Xenophon interpreted the regime change as the foundation of a radical democracy (*Hell.* 4.4.6).

Argive citizens, but this event of regime change, that even had frontiers vanish between their city and its ancient neighbor, resulted in disgruntling the Corinthian landowners even further, who already had good reasons for being very frustrated with their distrustful allies and ungrateful fellow citizens, on top of the costly war effort. The landowners embittered by the violent attack against them, as well as by their political circumvention in the Corinthian political scene, were pushed into Sparta's clutches. They planned to take revenge for their grievances, by attempting to betray their own *polis* to Sparta. They assisted a Lacedaemonian mora in penetrating Corinth's static defences, and in beating all of the allied contingents of Corinth's defenders, by attacking them in detail. The mora despite its tremendous tactical success, failed to achieve its strategic purpose which was to capture Corinth itself.²⁵⁰ The Corinthian landowners of the former peace party ended up in exile from Corinth for the remainder of the Corinthian War, helping Sparta as a valuable contributor in operations against the Allied Council's interests.²⁵¹ The rise of a Corinthian insurgency in alliance with Sparta and the Peloponnesian League, thanks to the defection of a large part of Corinth's hoplite class, helped destabilize the Corinthian republic to such a degree, that two years later the Argives had to annex it completely in order to restore stability.²⁵² The "union" between Argos and Corinth ended with the King's Peace, which restored to Corinth the exiles and the city's autonomy. The Argives' attempt to increase their own power, at the cost of the existence of another member-state of the Allied Council ended in failure.²⁵³ Initially Argos did grow to similar size as Lacedaemon, nonetheless it never achieved to consolidate its gains as it always had to fight against a Corinthian armed opposition. The Corinthian insurgency actively opposed the "annexation" of Corinth, and supplied the Peloponnesian League with valuable military intelligence in its military operations against Argos. The most famous of these military undertakings being the assault led by the Lacedaemonian

²⁵⁰ Diod. 14.86.3-5; Xen. *Hell.* 4.4.7-12.

²⁵¹ Xen. *Hell.* 4.4.13.

²⁵² Xen. *Hell.* 4.4.6. Robinson implied that Corinth was an oligarchy before the coup, and afterwards turned into a democracy (2011, pp. 21-25).

²⁵³ For more information on the effects of terror and counterinsurgency in terms of state power see Lentakis 2015.

Praxitas, who was guided by the Corinthian dissidents Pasimelus and Alcimenes.²⁵⁴ Thanks to the continuous efforts of the Corinthian insurgency and the Argive failure to obliterate the former, Argos failed to fully integrate Corinth into itself. As soon as the alliance against Sparta was dismantled Argos could not compete with Sparta on its own, and had to give up its land-grab.

Thebes

After the battle of Leuctra in 371, where Thebes replaced Lacedaemon as the greatest land power in Greece, the Theban Demos adopted a very aggressive foreign policy of forceful democratization throughout mainland Greece. The Thebans took advantage of the Athenian failure to replace the power vacuum that had been created by Sparta's fall, and began to assist the Peloponnesian *poleis* experimenting with democratization and federalism.²⁵⁵ The Thebans being full of confidence, after their confrontation with the Lacedaemonian phalanx at Leuctra, took the opportunity to confront a weakened Lacedaemon in order to win over Peloponnesus. The Theban Demos provided assistance to the Peloponnesian city-states that were going through difficult transitions to democracy and with establishing their own federations, by protecting them from Lacedaemonian military intervention and in preventing civil strife from escalating into armed conflict. The Lacedaemonians would have tried to prevent the spread of democracy, were it not for Boeotian infantry defending that political experiment.²⁵⁶

²⁵⁴ Xen. *Hell.* 4.4.7.

²⁵⁵ The Athenians backed out when it was made clear that if they pursued this policy they would find themselves forced into a direct conflict with Sparta (Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.1-3).

²⁵⁶ It should be noted that in Boeotia the Theban *demos* followed a completely different foreign policy, that was brutal towards the Boeotians. The Thebans replaced the citizens of disloyal city-states with colonists of their own, who would then vote in favour of Theban interests at the assemblies of the Boeotian League. This policy ultimately had an extremely high cost for the Thebans, since at the siege of Thebes by Alexander in 335, the Boeotians took revenge against their former overlords by committing atrocities during its capture, and

Still it should be mentioned that the Thebans, much like their Athenian counterparts at that time, decided to avoid taking sides in *poleis* suffering from civil strife. They assisted conflicting sides in reconciling and averted the threat of the eruption of mass violence where they could. However, unlike the Athenians the Thebans committed their full resources into these enterprises, and because of that they achieved much more than just a peaceful democratization throughout the Peloponnese.

Thebes embarked on promoting democratic reforms and federalism in the Peloponnese during the 360s. The Thebans assisted the Arcadian and Achaean attempts with confederacy, helped Mantinean communities reunite into a single state, and even stirred a civil war within Lacedaemon that resulted in the secession of Messenia and the founding of the heavily fortified city-state of Ithome.²⁵⁷

The Arcadian League, created in the early 360s, was the largest and most powerful federation in alliance with the Thebans in Peloponnesus. However it failed as its existence relied on the democratization of its member-states, while the Thebans did not commit any of their troops into garrisons to safeguard the upstart democratic governments. The lack of Theban military presence in Arcadia led to the collapse of the Arcadian federation, when several Arcadian city-states reverted to oligarchy and allied themselves with Lacedaemon and Athens against Thebes. The most important repercussion of the failed Arcadian League was that the Thebans in trying to save it from collapse were led into a war where they suffered a terrible defeat. Thebes' power after its defeat at the battle of Mantinea in 362 waned, and its influence in South Greece had disappeared by the 330s.

afterwards voted to sell the inhabitants into slavery, to raze the city, and split the Theban *chora* amongst themselves (Arr. *An.* 1.7.8-1.9.10; Diod. 17.14.2-4).

²⁵⁷ Diod. 15.66.1-6; Plut. *Pel.* 24; Paus. 4.26.27; Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.6-9. In regard to the Achaean League, Epaminondas did treat it as an ally and helped it establish its own federation, but did not push the Achaeans into carrying out democratic reforms, allowing them to remain under an oligarchic constitution. This adoption of realpolitik by Epaminondas must have curved down his popularity in the Theban *demos*, and could be part of the reason why during the late 360s he experienced difficulties in convincing the Boeotians to lead another campaign into the Peloponnese.

The Achaeans and the Mantineans were assisted by the Thebans during the early 360s in their respective nation-building projects. The Achaeans were assisted by Thebes in forming their federation, and were even allowed to remain oligarchic by Epaminondas in a form of Theban *realpolitik*. The Mantineans having been forced by the Lacedaemonians to bring down their city's walls, and separate into several independent city-states, were happy to be provided with Theban protection during their reunification. The Mantineans, having had a democratic past, restored democratic rule without any pressure from the Thebans. Nonetheless, both the Achaeans and the Mantineans by the end of the decade had renewed their alliance to Lacedaemon, and fought against the Thebans and Epaminondas who had invested much in their security.²⁵⁸

The Spartans since the beginning of the fourth century had to deal with civil strife destabilizing their own government.²⁵⁹ After the debacle of Leuctra with over four hundred of the few remaining *homoioi* lying dead in Boeotia, it was not very difficult for the Theban Demos to divide the Lacedaemonian society.²⁶⁰ Having failed to cross the Eurotas River due to its swelling and capture Sparta, the Boeotian forces crossed the Taygetus Mount and "liberated" Messene instead.²⁶¹ The Thebans overthrew the oligarchic system in the periphery of Lacedaemon, and replaced it with a new

²⁵⁸ Historians consider Epaminondas to have been responsible for the unification of the Mantinean city-states in 370 (Curtius 1874, p. 383; Funke 2009), because they swallow uncritically the pro-Theban narratives passed down to the Roman Age (Paus. 9.14.4; Plut. *Pel.* 24). Nonetheless, there is no good reason to assume that it was thanks to a foreigner such as Epaminondas rather than the Mantineans themselves who took the initiative to join their republics into a single city-state. In the early Hellenistic period, Antigonos I forced Lebedos and Teos into a single state, however as soon as he perished the artificial union disintegrated (see SEG 15.717). Since the signing of the Treaty of Westphalia, there has been no case of separate states uniting into a single one due to a third party's initiative. At no time in history has existed a single case of several states successfully merging into a single one at a third party's initiative, and it is highly implausible that Mantinea was an exception as classical historians so readily assert.

²⁵⁹ Diod. 14.13.3-8; Plut. *Ages.* 20.3; Xen. *Hell.* 3.3.4-11.

²⁶⁰ Diod. 15.33.5-6.

²⁶¹ Plut. *Ages.* 32.2; Xen. *Ages.* 2.24.

democratic regime. The Lacedaemonians who had been scorned in the past by not being part of the citizenry, whose political interests were largely ignored and unrepresented in Sparta's assemblies, now became full citizens to a democratic republic, and while its impressive walls were being built, they were granted protection from Spartan reprisal by the Boeotians.²⁶² The Lacedaemonians who joined Thebes must have been baffled by Epaminondas' claims that they were an enslaved people fallen prey to Spartan imperialism. The citizens of the newly founded state came from all of Lacedaemon's social classes, and many of them set foot in the Peloponnese for the first time, as they arrived at Epaminondas' call from all over the Mediterranean Sea.²⁶³ Yet, as in the coming years the Lacedaemonian loyalist and secessionist phalanxes clashed against each other outside Ithome time and again, causing what Agesilaus had initially viewed as Pythagorean rants in a diplomatic meeting, to become state ideology and national history in the coming centuries, that we have come to know today through Pausanias.²⁶⁴ Interstate conflict for over two centuries advanced the Messenian identity amongst Ithome's inhabitants, it differentiated the

²⁶² The Argives took part in the building of Ithome as well (Paus. 4.26.7, 4.27.7), but their contribution to this endeavour was not as significant as the Boeotians'. Epaminondas, before he returned home with his grand army, placed a formidable garrison at Ithome making certain that the Lacedaemonians would not capture the new *polis* (Diod. 15.67.1). Luraghi claims that the presence of Arcadians and Argives in the army that built Ithome suggests that the idea behind the Messenian ethno-genesis may have had its origins in the Peloponnese (2008, p.214). Tausend argued that since the Argive participation in the founding of Messene was not mentioned by fourth century authors, instead it had been recorded by Pausanias six centuries later, that narrative tradition might have been invented afterwards due to increased Argive interest in Messene (1992, p. 155).

²⁶³ Paus. 4.26.5.

²⁶⁴ Paus. 4.4.4-4.24.6. Epaminondas had retorted to king Agesilaus' demand to grant autonomy to the Boeotian city-states, with a similar request for Messene (Paus. 9.13.2; Plut. *Ages.* 28.1-2). Cf. Cartledge 1987, pp. 379-80; Jehne 1994, pp. 71-4; Keen 1996, pp. 115-17; Rhodes 1999.

Messenians from the Spartans and their Arcadian neighbours, and it promoted a single military tradition amongst the Messenian troops.²⁶⁵

Social psychology's theory of retrospective rationality could provide an explanation to the narrative of the Messenian Wars.²⁶⁶ Retrospective rationality is often used in terrorist studies as an analytical tool in regard to the members' of terrorist organizations need to rationalize their actions. Since terrorists engage in carrying out horrific acts, afterwards they need to make these appear as rational decisions to others and to themselves. That is one of the reasons why each terrorist attack is followed afterwards by a bizarre public statement. Retrospective rationality allows the members of terrorist groups to create their own narrative that justifies their actions and portrays them in the light of their preference. As part of distorting reality terrorists employ retrospective rationality in order to hype the effectiveness of their methods in order to achieve their political goals.²⁶⁷ According to Alonso's research many former members of the IRA who committed atrocities against others, by killing, torturing, and amputating people rationalize their actions on the belief that all this was done for a just cause. If they came to realize that all of their actions did not contribute to anything of moral value, and they were committing violent crimes without contributing to any

²⁶⁵ The initial heterogeneous population of Messene, comprised of Lacedaemonians coming from every region of Lacedaemon and from every social rank lacking full civil rights, "Messenians" returning from Sicily and South Italy, and landless Greeks in general who originated from Central Greece and the Peloponnese, who had come to start their lives anew. These different peoples thanks to their conflicts with Sparta and their other neighbours, that lasted until the domination of Greece by the Roman republic in 146 BC, developed a single ethnic identity, as warfare enhanced the us-versus-them dichotomy towards their neighbours. War brought cohesion to the Messenians, making them all pursue the same political goals and strategic objectives, while the Messenians' wars against other *poleis* made their armies create a single military tradition amongst themselves based on common organizational characteristics, instead of forming minority groups following separate norms. On the importance and requirements for the establishment of high cohesion within military units see Henderson 1985, pp. 4-26.

²⁶⁶ The theory of retrospective rationality was first introduced in Aronson's 1972 *Social Animal* (2007, pp. 120-2).

²⁶⁷ See De la Corte 2008, pp. 77-78.

political cause they would probably go mad.²⁶⁸ Terrorist organizations are not the only ones who make use of retrospective rationality. Kalyvas, having interviewed many former combatants of the Greek civil war in the Peloponnese, claimed that initially they ascribed ideological concerns on the reasons why they chose sides, notwithstanding extensive questioning they changed their motives to personal.²⁶⁹

The narrative of the total war that Sparta waged against Messene during the Archaic Age comes to us from Pausanias who wrote during the Roman Age by relying on the oral traditions of the second century AD Messenians.²⁷⁰ There is no source describing any event such as the Messenian Wars, before the founding of Ithome in the fourth century by a Boeotian army led by Epaminondas.²⁷¹ The Theban general announced that he would provide citizen-rights to anyone who came to live in this new city-state, including Lacedaemonians belonging to the inferior classes, Arcadians, Greeks from the West Mediterranean Sea, and the rest of his Peloponnesian allies, not just *helots* from Messene, making thousands of Lacedaemon's inhabitants lacking Spartan

²⁶⁸ Alonso 2003, p. 133.

²⁶⁹ Kalyvas 2006, p. 46.

²⁷⁰ The issue with oral history is that it shapes the past based on present needs. On the unreliability of oral history and tradition see Whittow 1996, pp. 83-5.

²⁷¹ Ithome was the original name of the city-state that came to be known later as Messene. Roebuck (1941, p. 37) was the first to realize that Ithome was the name of the new city-state established through the Boeotian intervention, while Messene was the name of the polity, and that the inhabitants called themselves Messenians. Thucydides mentioned a group of rebels in Lacedaemon, calling themselves Messenians, who in the course of the Peloponnesian War allied themselves to Athens, and after the latter's defeat found employment in Sicily (Diod. 14.34.4-5). They called themselves Messenians, but it would be a mistake to believe that claim. It is highly unlikely that they were exploited slave-farmers, who used the opportunity to arm themselves after an earthquake hit Sparta. They managed to resist quite efficiently all Spartan attempts to suppress their revolt, and for years mocked the Lacedaemonian war-machine, even dedicating to Delphi for their victories over the mightiest Greek city-state in land-power (Luraghi 2009, pp. 111-115). The Messenians' formidable skill at war proves that they were not a group of people who originally ploughed the fields as chattel slaves, never before having held a weapon in their lives. Figueira claimed that, for the fifth century Messenians stationed in Pylos and Naupaktos, being Messenian meant not complying to Spartan law and to the Spartans as a social class (1999, p. 224).

citizenship change sides.²⁷² Modern-day historians have shed light upon the myth of the Messenian Wars using archaeology in order to prove that from the seventh century until the fourth century the Lacedaemonian society of Laconia and Messene was homogenous.²⁷³ Retrospective rationality could explain why the inhabitants of Ithome created the myth of the Messenian Wars, as they sought to invent a new national identity for themselves that differentiated them from the Lacedaemonians, who continued living in Laconia under the oligarchic constitution.²⁷⁴ Many Lacedaemonians had grown tired of being second-class citizens responsible for Lacedaemon's agricultural production, and for waging Sparta's wars in an unthankful manner without having a say in decision-making. They created a national myth claiming that they were Messenians who had been freed from the Spartan yoke, legitimizing the secession of Messene by creating a narrative where they were victims of unjust abuse, who restored justice to their own people by building a new city-state.²⁷⁵ In reality these people were Lacedaemonian traitors who grabbed the opportunity of punishing their own country as soon as a foreign invasion was realized for the first time within its borders. The secessionists lacked civil rights due to belonging to the inferior classes that made up the majority of the population, or because they lost their Spartan citizenship, either by being unable to provide the state with the required tithe for the common meals or by having displayed cowardice on the battlefield. It is true that the state of Sparta owed its power to these people who lacked citizenship, nevertheless participated in the military campaigns against its enemies, and served in the garrisons that guarded its empire. Important as they were, these grievances could not justify open revolt and allying with Sparta's foreign enemies as

²⁷² Diod. 15.66.1; Lyc. 1.62. Epaminondas summoned the "Messenians", who had left Lacedaemon in the fifth century, to come back from Italy, Sicily, and Euhesperides, a community near Cyrene, and start anew in their "country of origin" (Paus. 4.26.5).

²⁷³ Luraghi 2008, pp. 230-248.

²⁷⁴ Ibid., pp. 247-8.

²⁷⁵ Xenophon's accounts that several *perioeci* approached and convinced Epaminondas to invade Lacedaemon, while he was still skeptical about undertaking such an endeavour (*Hell.* 6.5.29), and later many *perioeci* joined Epaminondas and took part in ravaging Lacedaemon (*Hell.* 6.5.32). Xenophon's account is part of the Spartan narrative portraying these people as traitors, rather than liberated slaves (Luraghi 2008, pp. 224-230).

they were trespassing its *chora*. If the Lacedaemonian secessionists' cause was just enough they would not have elaborated the myth of the Messenian Wars four centuries earlier. The *perioeci* and *neodamodes* who fought against their own country lacked economic incentives to fight for their country, as they had done before the Boeotian invasion, in the military campaigns that took place abroad. Now the farms that were being pillaged were their own, and the weakness of the Lacedaemonian political system was revealed to be that although it produced the finest phalanxes of Greece, most of the soldiers that it employed lacked political incentives to remain loyal to their city-state. With the past economic incentives of pillaging foreign countries now completely gone, thousands of *perioeci* and *helots* and disenfranchised Spartans now joined the side that was winning against their own country.²⁷⁶ However, the revolting Lacedaemonians were not going to simply admit that they chose to fight for the winning side against their own country, as that would undoubtedly bring them unrelenting ignominy. Thus, the secessionists created the glorious past of Messene vindicating treason, portraying themselves as victims of an age-old injustice who had finally regained freedom as they ought to.²⁷⁷ Part of the reason behind this apologetic narrative was that in fourth century BC Greece the ancient constitution was presumed to be virtuous, and constitutional innovation a foul concept. For that reason the creation of a Messenian identity, and the establishment of democratic rule were described as the restoration of an ancient past, rather than the product of Lacedaemonian civil war and Boeotian military intervention.²⁷⁸ Nonetheless, the

²⁷⁶ With a massive Boeotian army successfully invading Lacedaemon, and the Lacedaemonian army not attempting to repel the invading forces from Lacedaemon, it must have become obvious that the former were winning and the latter losing.

²⁷⁷ The conflicts between Sparta and Messene in the following decades played a part in enhancing the new identity of Messenians between the inhabitants of Ithome, as warfare instituted the us-versus-them dichotomy amongst the combatants.

²⁷⁸ Robinson claims that hatred for others, helped the new Messenians form their new identity. Nevertheless, Robinson assumes that from the start the Messenians adopted the idea that they were reviving their old identity and country (1987, p. 138). Luraghi despite denying that the new Messenians were descendants of the old ones who predated the Lacedaemonian annexation, claims that the new Messenians legitimized the founding of Ithome as the revival of something that had existed in the past (2009, pp. 117, 119-123).

creation of Ithome's fictional national history was pivotal in the success of the new state. Messene's citizens were a heterogeneous group of people coming from all of Lacedaemon's social classes, as well as from all over from Greece, North Africa, Sicily and South Italy. The narrative claiming that this motley crew of opportunists now ruling Ithome, were liberated Messenians had nothing to do with reality, but it granted them political cohesion by establishing a new identity. The false narrative of the Messenian Wars, in combination with the very real conflicts that followed with Messene's neighbours, helped create the new Messenian identity. It should be noted that Epaminondas was a crucial contributor in creating the Messenian Wars myth. Epaminondas artificially created a new country, granting its citizens a national narrative of originating from an enslaved Messene, while at the same time he was fully aware of its falsehood, as he called for Greeks from all over the Mediterranean Sea to join their ranks.

Today we can easily realize that total war did not occur in seventh century Greece, since Sparta lacked both the material means to carry out such an endeavour, as well as the political institutions that could assist such an attempt in succeeding.²⁷⁹ The Normans during the eleventh and twelfth centuries, despite being a more advanced society than the ancient Spartans in the ways of war and material means, as well as possessing more effective tools of political rule, such as Divine Right, found the task of conquering Wales to be overwhelming for them.²⁸⁰ The Spartans waging total war successfully against their Messenian neighbours is a post-fourth century Messenian

²⁷⁹ Martin Van Creveld rightly claims that the Greeks completely lacked the concept of conquest (1991, p. 152). He argues that the Athenian *cleruchs* sent to Melos, did not add it to the Athenian national territory, and formed a new *polis*. Nevertheless, Van Creveld adds that the Spartans did not annex Messene, but subjugated it instead. However, archaeologists' recent discoveries show that it is highly unlikely that either narrative stands true. It is more probable that the Messenians and the Laconians assimilated each other, in a process similar to that where primitive tribes conglomerate with one another. Besides that the Spartan oligarchic polity as we currently know it, was not introduced until the mid-sixth century BC when all Spartan exports abroad ceased altogether.

²⁸⁰ On the enemy-centric strategy of King William II and the disaggregation approach suggested by Gerald of Wales see Ellis 1976, p. 26.

invention that was part of the origins narrative created thanks to the nation-building process that took place in the western part of Lacedaemon at that time.²⁸¹

The twin aims of democratization and nation-building were achieved thanks to Thebes' full commitment to overthrowing the Lacedaemonian hegemony with every force available, as well as the fact that it had just regained dominance in the reformed Boeotian League. Using a military force, whose size ranged between twenty and forty thousand infantrymen, in order to invade Laconia and occupy Western Lacedaemon for many months, until the walls of Ithome were completed is one of the greatest military achievements of fourth century democracy, and definitely not something that Athens could emulate at that time, even if its demos had wanted to.²⁸² That being said the founding of Ithome and the secession of Messene from Lacedaemon cost Thebes dearly. The Boeotian city-state was forced to abolish its recently built fleet of one

²⁸¹ Through strategic analysis it should be realized that Pausanias' second century AD narrative of the eight and seventh century BC Messenian Wars is untrue. The governments of the Greek city-states in their infancy could not have even considered waging total war, for they lacked any of the needed requirements to do so. The economies of the city-states in the Archaic Age could not have supported the building of circuit walls protecting the entire *asty*, nor afford waging sieges that lasted for years, not to mention that hoplite warfare does not lead to the complete annihilation of one's enemies in victory. Costly circuit walls and long-term sieges are aspects of warfare made possible in the fourth century due to the increased wealth the Greek city-states then possessed. Oddly enough, Koliopoulos in his work on Spartan grand strategy, dedicated an entire chapter of strategic analysis on the Messenian Wars derived from Pausanias (2005, pp. 45-95). He considers these events to have actually occurred, completely ignoring any of the historical and archaeological research undertaken on that part of the Peloponnese (see Hall 2003; Luraghi 2003; Pearson 1962; Shipley 2004) discrediting Pausanias' narrative. Given the fact that the author is willing to dedicate an entire chapter to events, that can be characterized as fictional on the basis of contemporary archaeological and historical research, then one raises the question of his academic credibility especially over the assertion that the Spartans wrote military manuals and passed them on from generation to generation (Koliopoulos 2008, p. 67). It goes without saying that no source is provided for that groundless claim, for it has been clearly fabricated by its author.

²⁸² Mobilizing over twenty thousand Boeotian military-age men to go on a campaign far from Boeotia remained unprecedented until the twentieth century, when the Greek nation-state would employ modern institutions in order to mobilize such massive numbers of manpower.

hundred warships in order to fund the exorbitant Theban adventures in the Peloponnese. Shortly after the battle of Mantinea Thebes having its hands full in the conflict with Phocis gave up most of its hegemonic influence in the Peloponnese, yet Ithome remained independent from Sparta for the rest of antiquity.²⁸³

Military Operations

The allies used various strategies on land and at sea. In land they initiated hostilities with the traditional clash between hostile phalanxes composed of coalition citizen armies on both sides, and by 362 had shifted to using mercenaries instead, who served as cavalry, light infantry, as well as hoplites in a phalanx, according to each city-state's needs and wealth.

Haliartus

Initially the city-states relied on the traditional militia hoplites using them in the ceremonial Greek battles. This approach became more problematic when taking place far from the Peloponnese, especially when the hoplite armies were ill-led, as in the case of Haliartus. At that battle Lysander committed a very serious tactical mistake. He led a Peloponnesian army against the Thebans right next to Haliartus' walls.²⁸⁴

²⁸³ Luraghi claims that the survival of a crippled Sparta was an outcome that was more beneficial to Thebes than to the rest of the allies (2009, p. 116). The Arcadians however campaigned multiple times in Messene in order to enlarge the area under Ithome's direct control (Diod. 15.77.4; Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.25). As for the Argives they participated in the campaign of 370/369 that resulted in the creation of Ithome, and during the Peloponnesian War they displayed high awareness on the potential for stirring instability in Lacedaemonian Messene by restoring the Messenian mercenaries to Pylos (Thuc. 5.56.2).

²⁸⁴ On how a minor conflict between the Phocians and several Locrian communities escalated into a war between Thebes and Sparta Hamilton argued that king Pausanias opposed going to

Lysander exposed the Peloponnesian phalanx to missile fire coming from the fortifications, while the Peloponnesian phalanx was engaged in combat with its Theban counterpart.²⁸⁵ Not to mention that even had things gone bad for the Thebans, reinforcements could sally from Haliartus and either augment the Theban phalanx, or strike at the Peloponnesian hoplites' flank. Had Lysander and his army been victorious, the Thebans could retreat into the city quickly suffering minimum casualties, while the same could not happen to the Peloponnesians because the engagement between the phalanxes took place too close to the city-walls. The reasons why this disaster occurred vary, since it could have easily been avoided. The original plan was for the two armies, led by Pausanias and Lysander, to concentrate at Boeotia, and to engage with the Theban army in concert.²⁸⁶ Instead a single army assaulted the Theban phalanx, which could be excused had the Thebans made a mistake and provided the Peloponnesians with an advantage that would justify such a decision. Judging by the fact that Lysander chose to attack against the Thebans when they occupied a strong defensible position, it was clearly he who had provided the Thebans with an advantage over his own phalanx instead. The reasons that explain why this happened are affixed to Spartan domestic politics.

Lysander had acquired much fame, by being Cyrus' favourite when it came to receiving Persian funds, having established a functional hegemonic system for Sparta, and for having concluded the Peloponnesian War in Sparta's favour at the battle of Aegospotami. However, by shedding light at that Aegospotami's details one concludes that it was hardly a battle. Lysander did not engage with the Athenian fleet when it offered him battle, instead he assaulted the Athenian forces in a surprise attack when they were dispersed and had their ships landed.²⁸⁷ His decision was successful for he destroyed most of the Athenian armed forces while suffering minimum casualties, and

war with Thebes on such a minor issue, while Lysander convinced the Spartan *demos* in the voting (1979, pp. 192-8). However, Hamilton does not provide a satisfying explanation as to why the former *navarch* was more belligerent than his king, other than that Xenophon was trying to shift the blame for the initiation of the war from Sparta to Thebes.

²⁸⁵ Diod. 14.81.2; Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.18-19.

²⁸⁶ Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.25.

²⁸⁷ Diod. 13.106.1-4; Xen. *Hell.* 2.1.27-28.

managing not to lose a single ship. That being said his overwhelming success over the Athenians was thanks to avoiding engaging with them in a pitched battle as all of his predecessors had been doing until then. He had never before achieved a major victory over enemy forces in a battle between equals, as Agis II had done at Mantinea in 418.²⁸⁸

In 396 the situation in Boeotia was not in favour of the Peloponnesians which is why Sparta sent two armies instead of one. The Thebans avoided engaging Lysander in the open far from the walls, and Lysander made the mistake of overestimating the quality of his own troops. He may have had more capable and experienced soldiers on his side, but attacking a well prepared army in a strong defensible position is something that one should avoid, and he could have done so had he waited for Pausanias' reinforcements to arrive. In parallel lives Plutarch apologized to his readers for comparing Sulla to Lysander.²⁸⁹ Sulla achieved dozens of victories against experienced enemies on the field of battle, Lysander had only his great victory at Aegospotami to distinguish himself, which was hardly a battle, since the Athenians' ships were on shore, and their army was scattered far from the camp. Had Lysander attacked the Athenian fleet, when the latter offered battle and managed to destroy it, then he would have proven his mettle as an admiral who had achieved the impossible. His great victory was owed more to the lack of sufficient security measures and enforcement of discipline that the Athenian generals failed to impose, than to tactical genius.²⁹⁰

General Lysander had fallen from grace in the recent past, and that was the first time he was assigned with command again since his attempt to restore the Thirty in Athens. Then king Pausanias had ruined Lysander's plans by supporting the reconciliation between the democrats and oligarchs, and left Lysander's Thirty to await their fate in Eleusis.²⁹¹ Later the young king Agesilaus had humiliated Lysander when he assumed

²⁸⁸ Diod. 12.79.4-9; Thuc. 5.64.5-5.74.3.

²⁸⁹ Plut. *Comp. Lys. Sull.* 4.1-3.

²⁹⁰ *Navarch* Callicratidas failed to acknowledge Lysander as a successful general, for the latter did not confront the Athenian navy in its full strength, when the Athenians offered the opportunity.

²⁹¹ Diod. 14.33.6; Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.29-43.

command in Asia Minor.²⁹² Lysander had found himself in a desperate position, where he needed to prove himself as a capable commander that Sparta was in need of once more. Sharing command with his superior, the vice-king of Sparta, who had spoiled Lysander's plans in the past was not appealing. Lysander seeing himself marginalized in Spartan politics by the two royal houses, it was to be expected of him to have wanted to overthrow them. Had Lysander achieved a single-handed victory over the rebellious Thebans, that would have proven to the Lacedaemonian society that it was not in need of hereditary monarchy. Unfortunately for Lysander the Thebans did not grant him with an easy opportunity over their forces. Lysander decided to engage the enemy based on his personal grievances, rather than by evaluating the tactical situation, attacking a well prepared enemy in a strong defensive position proved out to be fatal for himself and a large portion of his forces.

Nemea

At Nemea the Allied Council attempted to repeat the Theban success at Haliartus, that would have caused the same collapse of Spartan authority in the Peloponnese, which had occurred in Central Greece at the initiation of the conflict. However, at Nemea the Peloponnesian League managed to concentrate its own forces, and the Lacedaemonian hoplites routed every Allied phalanx they met on the field causing heavy casualties to the enemy. The Lacedaemonian army was well led, and displayed its superior skill in hoplite warfare, by maneuvering on the field while maintaining its cohesion, proving to everybody that Lacedaemon remained the dominant land power in Greece.²⁹³ Still the strategic outcome was a draw as either side failed to collapse in its aftermath.

²⁹² Plut. *Lys.* 23.3-9; Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.7-10.

²⁹³ Diod. 14.83.1-2; Xen. *Hell.* 4.2.18-23.

Coronea

The “Asian” army that Agesilaus brought back to Greece with him met in a large-scale engagement the armies of the Allied Council at Coronea. The phalanxes of the Allies were comprised of Aenianians, Argives, Athenians, Boeotians, Corinthians, Euboeans, and Locrians, and their strategic aim was to prevent Agesilaus and his armies from reaching the Peloponnese.²⁹⁴ Agesilaus’ phalanxes reigned victorious against their opponents, with the exception of the Thebans, who routed and pursued the Orchomenians back to their camp. What ensued was unprecedented in Greek military history, according to Xenophon. Agesilaus could have allowed the Thebans to pass through in order to unite themselves with their allies, and as they were passing he could have assaulted them in their flanks with his own forces. Yet, Agesilaus chose not to follow this sound plan suggested by Xenophon, that would have limited the casualties of his own side and maximized the enemy’s. The Spartan king preferred to meet the Theban phalanx head-on with the Lacedaemonian hoplites under his command, believing that the superior Spartan training in hoplite fighting was going to win the day. Surprisingly the Thebans did not give up, and managed to break through the Lacedaemonian phalanx, albeit with high casualties to their side.²⁹⁵ Agesilaus had chosen to carry out a ceremonial hoplite battle, where the two phalanxes met as equals on the field, and went through a trial of wills in order to determine the winner. Had he acted in accordance with Xenophon, he would have caused high casualties to the Thebans, but their survivors would have still joined forces with their allies. Agesilaus chose to attack the Thebans from the front, in order to prevent them from making it through altogether. This would have given the Allies a lesson on the Lacedaemonian phalanx’s superiority, for the Thebans, along with the Argives, had the most renowned hoplites among the Allies. Agesilaus sought to demoralize the Allies, and prove the futility of their rebellion, for the Lacedaemonian heavy infantry would always dominate its enemies. The hopes of Agesilaus failed to be realized, and the outcome

²⁹⁴ Xen. *Hell.* 4.3.15.

²⁹⁵ Ibid. 4.3.18-19.

surprised Xenophon, who had never expected to see the Lacedaemonians not win an overwhelming victory against another phalanx when fighting on equal terms.²⁹⁶

Agesilaus spent his childhood in the agoge. Like all Spartan citizens he was trained to go through the horrible ordeal that was phalanx fighting, without panicking and retreating. The primary Lacedaemonian military ideal was to never retreat, and through following this tenet the Lacedaemonians were always victorious in heavy infantry engagements, which depended more on maintaining morale and group cohesion, than on the use of complex fighting techniques. Being trained since infancy as a hoplite, Agesilaus sought to engage the Thebans on equal standing, for he was certain that his phalanx would not be the one to break. This mentality did bring hundreds of military victories to Sparta, since the introduction of the oligarchic constitution back in the sixth century, yet now that a graduate of the agoge was in power, that brought along political consequences to Sparta's foreign policy.²⁹⁷ In the fourth century this inflexible military doctrine that Sparta had embraced, was bringing more harm than gain in a world where military science was evolving rapidly, and new tactics and forms of units were being introduced into Greek warfare, that cancelled the monopoly of the hoplite phalanx in Greece's battlefields. On top of that, the use of this specific tactical doctrine as a war strategy by Agesilaus, caused Sparta to increase the rate of its involvement in warfare, and ended up overextended by having to carry out several military operations throughout Greece and Asia simultaneously. Instead of choosing to negotiate when the Lacedaemonians were already at war with one city-state, the Spartans used their alliance to booster their forces and force their interests on other *poleis* as well. A foreign policy based on a Spartan hoplite ideal brought war weariness to Sparta's allies, and turned Lacedaemon into a hegemon out of touch with

²⁹⁶ Hamilton thought that Agesilaus' victory at Coronea was dubious, for not following up with an invasion of Boeotia (1979, p. 226).

²⁹⁷ Archeologists confirm that until the second half of the sixth century Lacedaemon possessed a vibrant industry and its goods reached most communities in the Mediterranean Sea (Cartledge 2004b, p. 101). In the second half the Lacedaemonian trade ceased altogether, most likely because of the establishment of the militaristic oligarchic constitution that Sparta remains known for.

reality, hoping in vain that constant warfare was going to tire out its opposition in Greece, before itself.

Olynthus

Harmost Teleutias was the first to lead the campaign against the Olynthians. He managed to deprive the latter of the majority of their *chora*, and left them with only a small part of farmland that could be used to supply the city's population. When Teleutias attempted to keep the Olynthians away from that as well, their cavalry began to harass his men. Teleutias responded by sending his light infantry against the Olynthian horsemen. The Peloponnesian light infantrymen failed to make contact with the Olynthian cavalry, and after the former had got far from the rest of the Peloponnesian army and lost its formation, then the Olynthian cavalrymen turned around and attacked them. The cavalry's charge broke Teleutias' light infantry, and he responded by repeating the same mistake that he had just made on a larger scale. Teleutias ordered his whole army to engage with the Olynthian cavalry, and ended up pursuing the Olynthian horsemen up to Olynthus' walls. With the Peloponnesian troops exposed to missile fire, the Olynthian army sallied out and forced the enemy to rout. Teleutias himself was killed, and a large part of his army was destroyed by the Olynthian cavalry during the pursuit. Agesipolis did not wage any pitched battles against the Olynthian army, but he managed to reverse the situation, by limiting himself to burning the crops, and restricting the Olynthians' access to their own lands.²⁹⁸ Polybiades succeeded Agesipolis in command, after the latter got sick and died, and by carrying out the same strategy, he managed to force Olynthus into submission. The Olynthians after exhausting their food supplies, they desperately began to try luring the Peloponnesian army into a battle that would result in the same outcome as with Teleutias. Polybiades' success was owed to the unorthodox approach of forcing the enemy to attack him, instead of seeking to start the fight himself.

²⁹⁸ Diod. 15.22.1-15.23.3; Xen. *Hell.* 5.3.18-19. It should be noted that Agesipolis had more formidable cavalry than Teleutias, having recruited Thessalian horsemen on his way to Chalcidice.

Agesipolis' strategy of laying siege to Olynthus, and cutting off its inhabitants from their farmland, while not seeking to engage in battle near the city's walls, led the Olynthians to go from harassing the Peloponnesian army and goading it into futile pursuit, that resulted in great human loss for the latter, to being left with no alternative but to attack the powerful Peloponnesian army under conditions that favoured the latter, or end up surrendering due to starvation.

Leuctra

At Leuctra the Lacedaemonian army was led by king Cleombrotus, who had not displayed much enthusiasm for leading his armies into the Theban *chora*, and had failed to emulate Agesilaus' grasp of battlefield tactics. The Lacedaemonian phalanx had failed to respond to the organizational reforms of the Theban army, which had granted it a streak of victories in Boeotia.²⁹⁹ A numerically inferior Theban army triumphed over its Lacedaemonian counterpart, which was also superior in the quality of its troops.

The Theban phalanx was composed of farmers far inferior to the Lacedaemonian hoplites in training and discipline. Had the Theban and Lacedaemonian phalanxes clashed against one another in similar order of battle, the Lacedaemonians would have most likely crushed the Thebans. General Epaminondas negated the superiority of the Lacedaemonian army by reorganizing the Theban phalanx into an extreme formation of fifty men deep.³⁰⁰ The Lacedaemonian phalanx was eight men deep, and it was expected to hold off the fewer Thebans, while its longer line would wheel around the Thebans and outflank them. The Thebans with their narrow front managed to

²⁹⁹ Diod. 15.34.1-2, 15.33.5-6, 15.37.1-2; Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.43-45, 5.4.63-6.1.1. Hanson (2007, pp. 503-520) claimed that no revolution in Greek military tactics occurred at Leuctra, by citing past battles where all of Leuctra's innovations had already transpired. Delbrück (1990a, pp. 149-157) held a similar opinion on the evolution of Greek warfare in the fourth century. Cf. Majoor (2003, pp. 51-55) attributed the Theban victory at Leuctra to the organizational reforms of its phalanx that took place during the 370s.

³⁰⁰ Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.12.

overcome the Lacedaemonians by overpowering those in front of them, using their unstoppable mass to push through them. Initially the fighting was very hard for both sides, but it must have become apparent to the Spartan king that he was going to lose with his army, as his phalanx was being broken up by the Thebans. The allied contingents failed to come to his assistance, as their flanks would stand exposed to the Boeotian phalanxes if they tried to.³⁰¹ At Leuctra Epaminondas proved that winning an opposing army could be achieved by destroying a part of it, instead of defeating it in its entirety. Through this tactic Epaminondas defeated the larger Lacedaemonian army, and destroyed Sparta's military prestige along with four hundred of its *homoioi*. The same tactic would be emulated later by Alexander in all of the pitched battles where he was in command with devastating results for his enemies.

After Leuctra the Thebans repeated their past success against the Lacedaemonian phalanx at Mantinea ten years later, but failed to capitalize on their victory, because of the death of the charismatic general Epaminondas during the clash with the Lacedaemonian phalanx, and the presence of the Athenians on the field on Sparta's side, who had reigned victorious over Thebes' allies, as well as the Theban vanguard.³⁰²

Light Infantry

The first time that light infantrymen defeated the hardened Lacedaemonians was at Sphacteria. The Lacedaemonians expected to easily overcome the Athenian light infantry, in the fashion that Brasidas had repelled it in Thrace, and then to engage against the Athenian phalanx which they considered inferior to theirs. Instead at Sphacteria the Athenian *psiloi* were well led, and the Lacedaemonians failed to successfully repel the light infantry which they considered of trivial importance in Greek warfare.³⁰³ After the battle of Nemea, probably thanks to Athenian high

³⁰¹ Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.13-14.

³⁰² Ibid. 7.5.22-25.

³⁰³ Thuc. 4.31.1-4.38.1. The *psiloi* were light infantrymen armed with javelins comprised of landless citizens lacking the wealth to buy the expensive hoplite armour.

casualties among the hoplite class, the Athenians dispatched to the Allies' aid the general Iphicrates, who commanded Thracian mercenaries as light infantry. Iphicrates was an innovative general in that he introduced many reforms, which became popular among the Greeks later on during the fourth century, such as the frequent deployment of mercenaries instead of militia, and always fortifying his military camp. In regard to the Thracian light infantrymen that Iphicrates led into battle, he issued them with heavy weaponry, and light armor with which they could defend themselves against cavalry, be always superior to other unarmored light infantry, and even threaten the until then dominant hoplite phalanx.³⁰⁴ The peltasts were well trained in carrying out manoeuvres under combat stress, and had developed good skills in marksmanship. Initially they terrorized the Peloponnesian *poleis*, by ravaging their *chora*, and whenever a Peloponnesian phalanx attempted to repel them, the peltasts would run away from the hoplites, forcing the latter to exhaust themselves with running after them while carrying their heavy equipment, and after the hoplites were too tired to pursue anymore, the peltasts would turn around and hit the phalanx with their javelins from its flanks and rear. This tactic had devastating results against the Peloponnesian phalanxes that tried to defend their *chora*, and forced their city-states to ask for Lacedaemonian assistance.³⁰⁵

A Lacedaemonian mora was sent to deal with the security issue that the peltasts posed to Sparta's Peloponnesian allies, however in the engagement that ensued all of the Spartan officers were killed, and many Lacedaemonian hoplites perished while being pursued by the more agile Thracians.³⁰⁶ The Lacedaemonian young hoplites did not manage to force the peltasts into melee combat, where the phalanx would have gained the advantage, instead they quickly lost their lives due to the latter's training to deal with this hoplite tactic. The only way for the mora to deal successfully with the peltasts would have been to use combined arms tactics, by sending the Lacedaemonian cavalry to charge against the Thracians, along with the fastest hoplites, with the bulk of the phalanx following in a role of support. The cavalry and the fast hoplites would

³⁰⁴ The peltasts' name originates from the Thracian light shield that they used, called *pelte* (Diod. 15.44.2-4).

³⁰⁵ Diod. 14.91.2-3; Xen. *Hell.* 4.4.15-6.

³⁰⁶ Xen. *Hell.* 4.5.13-18.

have forced the peltasts to stand and fight, and then the Lacedaemonian phalanx would fall upon them, making the Thracians meet their demise.³⁰⁷ Instead the lack of tactical innovation by the Spartan commander led to a disaster. Agesilaus a few days later challenged the Allies to try their luck against him, the latter wisely chose not to, for the Spartan king had displayed great skill in command, and his Lacedaemonian hoplites remained the most feared force in Greece.

Nonetheless, the use of peltasts by the Athenian Demos did have an unexpected consequence, that did not better the Council's situation in the Peloponnese. The peltasts were very successful in defeating the monolithic Peloponnesian phalanxes, and reigned supreme at the battlefield, displaying great tactical superiority over their opponents, especially in rough terrain. Yet, these tactical victories failed to produce a favourable strategic outcome.³⁰⁸ The Peloponnesian *poleis* that had had their phalanxes vanquished by these exotic troops, with far greater casualties than was normal in phalanx warfare until then, were terrorized to such a degree by Iphicrates' incursions that they invited the Spartans to install Lacedaemonian garrisons into their cities in order to protect themselves.³⁰⁹ These city-states before the coming of Iphicrates opposed hosting Lacedaemonian garrisons in their territories. The Thracians terrorized the Peloponnesian allies of Sparta to such a degree, that the former instead considering to change sides, had their bonds to Sparta strengthened by having to rely upon the latter for the protection of their lands and inhabitants. The outcome of Iphicrates' peltasts, thanks to its purely military approach, had the opposite result to what was expected from the Demos, for it reinforced primary group cohesion among the member-states of the Peloponnesian League. This is actually the normal outcome of most invasions and military interventions in foreign countries, even those suffering from civil war. The invading army, instead of being seen as a liberating force by the majority of the population, gains the image of alien invaders coming from a different world in order to exploit the locals' resources. The peltasts failed to provide any

³⁰⁷ When the polemarch did use his cavalry in assaulting the peltasts, it remained attached to the phalanx, suffering casualties along with the latter (Xen. *Hell.* 4.5.16).

³⁰⁸ The strategic aim of the military operations in the Peloponnese was to take away *poleis* from the Peloponnesian League. Iphicrates only managed to capture a few forts (Xen. *Hell.* 4.5.19).

³⁰⁹ Xen. *Hell.* 4.4.15-17.

services to the Peloponnesian city-states that they visited, instead they killed and ravaged wherever they went. The fact that peltasts looked different and fought in an untraditional manner, to what was the norm in the Peloponnese, did not help in making them sympathetic to the Peloponnesians. The employment of peltasts in Peloponnesus provided the Allied Council and Athens with a tactical advantage, yet for the same reasons Iphicrates' generalship was strategically unsound.³¹⁰

Naval Operations

The first blow against the Lacedaemonian navy was struck by the Persian Empire. A Phoenician fleet under the command of the exiled Athenian general Conon destroyed more than half of its Lacedaemonian counterpart. In a single battle, he achieved the vanquishing of the Lacedaemonian naval supremacy established since 405.³¹¹ After his success at sea, Conon began to oust the Peloponnesian garrisons and the *decarchies* from Sparta's client-states in the Aegean Sea. He replaced the *decarchies* with democratic regimes, and did not install any Persian garrisons, arguing that if the Greek cities were allowed to engage in self-government they would be more inclined to become allies to the Great King.³¹² Conon also manned the ships of the Persian fleet with Athenian crews, who later joined the new fleet of Athens.

³¹⁰ Strauss thinks that it took the Athenians nineteen years to reward Iphicrates for his victory over a Lacedaemonian *mora* (the equivalent of a battalion for the Lacedaemonian army), because the Athenian general had acquired enemies at the *ecclesia* (1986, pg. 156). It is possible that the arguments raised against rewarding Iphicrates sooner, had to do with his failure to win over significant Peloponnesian city-states to the cause of the Allied Council.

³¹¹ Diod. 14.83.5-7; Xen. *Hell.* 4.3.11-12, 4.8.6-10.

³¹² Conon did not force any of the city-states that he liberated into an alliance with Persia, or Athens. He gave them freedom of choice, and quite a lot of them chose to remain neutral towards the belligerent sides, notwithstanding a significant number of the liberated *poleis* decided to ally themselves with Persia thanks to Conon's liberal style of generalship (Diod. 14.84.3-5).

The Allied Council benefited to a great degree from Conon's successful naval operations, for at the outbreak of the Corinthian War the allies lacked any significant naval forces in order to oppose the Lacedaemonian fleet. Following the defeat of the Lacedaemonians at sea Conon provided Athens with funds and his ship-crews in order to rapidly rebuild the Long Walls and its navy.³¹³ By 393 Athens had completed the rebuilding of the Long Walls, and focused its attention on carrying out naval operations in the Aegean Sea. Forty Athenian triremes were led by general Thrasybulus, a veteran of the Peloponnesian War, and former commander of the democratic insurgency that had defeated the Thirty at Munychia. Thrasybulus despite the small size of the naval forces under his command, and the loss of twenty three triremes during a storm, managed to reassert in a short period the Athenian Empire in the Hellespont.³¹⁴ Despite the lack of significant opposition from the Lacedaemonians, and the vast inflation of the Athenian sphere of influence, the expedition did not end well. Thrasybulus fell at Aspendus during a surprise night attack against his camp by the locals. The reasons why Thrasybulus' expedition ended up with such a peculiar disaster had to do with the ill behaviour he and his close advisors had engaged in. Apparently Thrasybulus had got himself involved in an embezzlement scandal. The hero of Athens' new republic stripped its new allies of their funds for his private gain. This behaviour ultimately cost him his life and was an embarrassment for the Athenian *Demos*.³¹⁵ Lysias claimed that it turned out well that the Athenian general fell victim to the retribution of his victims, and did not return alive back to Athens, for he would have found himself under trial for the scandals that he had caused.

Nonetheless, despite Thrasybulus' mismanagement, his expedition did provide Athens with dozens of client-states grabbed from Sparta's sphere of influence. The Athenians provided their new allies with security from Lacedaemonian retaliation and piracy,

³¹³ Diod. 14.85.2-4; Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.10-11.

³¹⁴ Diod. 14.94.1-4; Lys. 28.2; Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.25-27. Thrasybulus had been ordered by the *demos* to assist the Rhodians. It is unknown why he decided to change course and campaigned in Thrace and Asia Minor instead.

³¹⁵ Lys. 28.8.

and allowed them to self-govern, much like Conon did when he was in command of the Persian fleet.³¹⁶

At this point the terrorist campaign of Iphicrates in the Peloponnese with the new unit of Thracian peltasts ought to be compared to Thrasybulus' expedition in the Hellespont, in order to draw conclusions about which type of strategy was more beneficial to Athens. Iphicrates used new tactics in order to terrorize Sparta's allies into submission. His strategy failed, because his acts brought the exact opposite result, which was the strengthening of the ties between Sparta and its Peloponnesian allies. Thrasybulus practiced an old-school type of generalship, and although his expedition ended in disaster, thanks to applying the benefits that came with the Athenian hegemony to Hellespont's city-states, such as providing freedom of action and security, and omitting to repeat its vices, such as the installation of Athenian *cleruchs* to Athens's allies, he re-established a large part of the fifth century Athenian Empire. Iphicrates' innovative tactics against the monolithic hoplite phalanx brought tactical victories and promoted the Revolution in Military Affairs more than any other of his contemporaries, however those achievements were not supplemented by adding any strategic advantages to Athens, whereas Thrasybulus, despite his flaws, managed to achieve significant strategic goals for the Athenian *demos* that undermined Spartan authority, and even allowed Athens to be the single city-state after the end of the Corinthian War that still possessed vassal-states.

Yet, individual Athenians decided to use their private ships and sail to Cyprus in order to assist king Evagoras in his uprising against Persian authority. The fact that Athenians were aiding the rebellious Cypriots, and that the Athenian *demos* did not act to prevent this, did not sit well with the Persians. The latter began to re-supply Sparta with funds in order to rebuild its fleet and challenge the restoration of the Athenian

³¹⁶ Thrasybulus tested Persian patience with the Athenian expedition in the North-East Asia Minor. The city-states that he turned into Athenian client-states belonged to the Great King. Neither Thrasybulus nor the Athenians proclaimed the revival of the Athenian Empire for that would offend Persia. Still Thrasybulus forged a de facto Athenian empire in the Hellespont, by allying with two Thracian kings, and a dozen city-states, by democratizing Byzantium, taxing ships passing through the Hellespont, imposing taxes in Thasos and Clazomenae, and collecting foreign tribute (Strauss 1986, pp. 152-3).

Empire in the Hellespont.³¹⁷ The Spartans once their fleet was ready again put it to good use, and since it was larger than its Athenian counterpart it could harass the Athenian trade routes and oppose Athens' fleet in different places at the same time. The difference in quality between the two fleets was negligible, and since the Athenian fleet was smaller, the Athenian *demos* decided not to try its fortune at a naval battle. Should the Athenians win such a battle Sparta would just rebuild its fleet, without significant repercussions to its own alliance. However, if the Athenians lost this new fleet, they would have no means to rebuild it, they would soon forfeit their empire in the Hellespont, and would have found themselves in desperate need for access to grain supply in order to feed their large population. This time the Athenian *demos* wisely did not follow maximalist aims, as it had in done in the negotiations with the Peloponnesian League after its success at the battle of Arginusae. Thanks to avoiding a naval confrontation under desperate conditions the Athenians retained a small part of the empire they had recently regained.³¹⁸

In the 370s after Athens and Sparta got involved in another war against each other, the Athenian navy despite being of similar size to its Lacedaemonian counterpart, it proved out to be vastly superior in quality. Near Naxos the Athenians defeated the

³¹⁷ Navies cost immensely and without either Persian subsidies or tribute from client-states no single Greek city-state could afford them. According to Hanson a fleet of a hundred triremes cost five times as much as a Greek army of ten thousand hoplites and their assistants (2005, p. 151.). A short conflict lasting a single week would not cost such an army over seventy thousand drachmas, whereas a fleet of a hundred triremes patrolling the sea for a month would cost twenty times as much (Hanson 2005, p. 152).

³¹⁸ The situation at sea had deteriorated so much that the Athenian fleet was stationed in the Hellespont in order to prevent Sparta from blockading the Straits and cutting off the grain supply towards Athens. The Lacedaemonians recaptured Samos, Cnidus, and Rhodes, where they installed oligarchic governments. The newly installed philo-Laonian governments in turn equipped and manned twenty-seven triremes to join in with the Lacedaemonian navy (Diod. 14.97.4). The Athenians kept scarce forces at home in order to protect Attica. The Lacedaemonians took advantage of this situation and used Aegina as a nearby base in order to harass the grain ships coming to Athens, and even carried out a successful raid against the port of Piraeus (Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.19-24). The Athenians, in their desperation, sent a military force to capture Aegina, which came close to being destroyed (Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.1-5).

Lacedaemonian navy, regaining their long lost naval superiority.³¹⁹ Apparently during the years that Athens was not at war, after the signing of the Peace of Antalcidas, the Athenians having been forced to abdicate their new empire in the North-East Aegean, lacked the income to increase the size of their fleet. Since the Athenians could not outnumber the Lacedaemonian fleet, they decided to invest in training their ship-crews instead. Athens' navy proved to be way out of the Lacedaemonian fleet's league, deciding in a matter of years who was master of the Aegean and Ionian Seas. The Athenian navy had not been this efficient in naval engagements since the disaster of Aegospotami in 405. Yet, as said earlier the Athenians still could not afford a very large navy. The defeat of Sparta's navy was swiftly followed by the collapse of its maritime empire.³²⁰ The Athenian navy with its meagre forces found itself in the difficult position of having to carry out military interventions in multiple city-states in order to restore order and expand its empire. The strategy of improving the Athenian navy's quality instead of quantity, that was forced upon Athens by the King's Peace terms, turned out to be a great success, for through low-cost means the Athenians replaced the Spartan maritime empire with their own. However, this success had repercussions for Boeotia. The Theban allies of Athens, took advantage of Sparta's weakening by the Athenian fleet's efforts, and began to defeat Lacedaemonian garrisons in Boeotia. The Thebans' increase in power, and their aggressive policies towards their Boeotian neighbours, provided them with freedom of action from the Second Athenian League.

Epaminondas challenged the Athenian domination of the Aegean in the summer of 363 with a hundred triremes, after having approached the strongest member-states of the Second Athenian League, Byzantium, Chios, and Rhodes. The Thebans sailed up to Byzantium and assisted many city-states in seceding from the Second Athenian

³¹⁹ Diod. 15.34.4-15.35.2.

³²⁰ The Athenians had grown weary of the Theban atrocities against the inhabitants of Plataea and Thespieae, and of the growing Theban independence from the Second Athenian League due to the revival of the Boeotian League. In 374 they signed a peace treaty with Lacedaemon and restored to the latter several of the Aegean city-states that they had already liberated. The peace did not last long as the Lacedaemonians would not allow Corcyra to come into the Athenian sphere of influence, and the Athenians were forced to recapture the city-state that they had restored to Lacedaemon all over again (Diod. 15.45.1-15.46.3; Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.1-4).

League unopposed. The upstart Theban fleet did not engage in decisive battle with its Athenian counterpart, nevertheless it was successful in taking advantage of the rift between Athens and several member-states of the latter's League.³²¹ Nonetheless, Thebes was not as wealthy as Athens, and could not simultaneously carry out costly naval expeditions and engage in nation-building abroad. The Thebans chose to disband their fleet, and pursue establishing a land-empire in the mainland instead. Be that as it may the short-lived Theban fleet did weaken Athens by removing some of its most powerful allies from the Second Athenian League.

Conclusions

Grand strategy in the first half of the fourth century mainly depended on forming alliances with other powerful states, in order to augment their own side's armed forces, and reaching a violent resolution to the differences with their enemies in pitched battle. Nevertheless, soon after the most powerful member-states of the Peloponnesian League began a rebellion against Sparta the progress of the war complicated their war plans. From using brute force against one another in open battle, in a matter of years the most powerful city-states went to establishing complex spheres of influence amongst themselves. In the latter approach the major powers promoted constitutional reforms, federalism, and even carved out new city-states out of old ones.

Pitched battles being the pinnacle of Greek military strategy were relied upon to shape the political landscape for each side. The Theban victory over Lysander at Haliartus sparked the Corinthian War, and led to the shattering of Lacedaemonian influence in Central Greece. After Lysander's demise at Haliartus Sparta soon lost all of Central Greece, and after King Cleombrotus' defeat at Leuctra the Lacedaemonians even lost all of their allies in South Greece for a short time. The Lacedaemonian naval defeats to Persia during the 390s and Athens during the 370s were costly as well.³²² Sparta being unable to recover its naval power without Persian subsidies ended up forfeiting its

³²¹ Diod. 15.78.4-15.79.1; Isoc. 5.53; Plut. *Phil.* 14.1; *GHI* 141.

³²² Diod. 14.83.4-5; Xen. *Hell.* 4.3.11-12.

maritime empire and the revenue generated by the latter. Still, Sparta's naval defeats were never as devastating as Athens' at Syracuse and Aegospotami during the Peloponnesian War. Sparta suffered far more in the land battles of Haliartus and Leuctra. Both battles were Theban military triumphs that allowed Sparta's enemies to reshape Greece against the Peloponnesian power's interests.

The disenchanted member-states of the Peloponnesian League turned the military victory of Thebes over Lacedaemon at Haliartus into a disaster for the latter. After Lysander's destruction, the Allies exploited the fact that the Peloponnesian garrisons stationed in the *poleis* of Central Greece could not be relieved with reinforcements. The best and largest part of the Peloponnesian loyalist forces were on campaign in Asia, and the Lacedaemonians instead of immediately organizing a relief force for Central Greece with what they could, they engaged in court shows throwing the blame for Lysander's recklessness and demise at the surviving King Pausanias.³²³

Lacedaemonian counterinsurgency was very successful in maintaining order in the Greek city-states, and in supplying Sparta with enough gold in order to maintain its fleet. Lysander's defeat however soon turned into disaster. Sparta's former allies, having cut off the Lacedaemonian forces and their allies at Haliartus from reinforcing Central Greece, turned against the Peloponnesian League's garrisons and massacred all of the Lacedaemonians troops that they could find. This turn of events showed how a single military defeat would become a disaster, as garrisoned troops in a hostile and isolated area would end up massacred, further worsening the military situation for a hegemonic power.

Surprisingly, the Lacedaemonians held off the Allies' at the battle of Nemea, preventing them from dismantling the Peloponnesian League in South Greece. This made the conflict reach a stalemate in the Greek mainland, and raised war-weariness in Corinth, which had borne the brunt of the conflict. Corinthian war-weariness turned into mass murder, and soon after megalomaniac Argive nation-building, which failed to improve Corinthian domestic security.

Despite the Argives' failure at nation-building, the Thebans during the 360s would follow their example and reshape Greece. The Theban model for counterinsurgency

³²³ Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.25.

was the complete opposite to the Lacedaemonian approach. The Lacedaemonians installed military garrisons and established oligarchic regimes within city-states maintaining the status-quo. The Thebans promoted radical democratic reforms and federal integration across South Greece. Thebes would install garrisons in South Greece as a means of protection for their newfound allies from Lacedaemonian reprisals, not for providing domestic politics with stability. Democratic revisionism had an exorbitant cost for Thebes which relied on an agricultural economy. Just as with Argos, Thebes' experimentation with nation-building did not benefit it in the long term. By the end of the same decade its newfound allies in the Achaean League, Mantinea, and the Arcadian League had restored their relations with Sparta, and turned against their benefactor. One of the few cases where Theban nation-building in South Greece was both successful and remained loyal to Thebes was Messenia. Unlike the aforementioned Peloponnesian allies of Thebes, the Messenians could not forge an alliance with Sparta as the latter refused to accept its secession from Lacedaemon. Nevertheless, Messenia was a unique success-story for nation-building, thanks to two aspects of Theban assistance. The first being the immense military aid in the form of installing a military garrison that provided Messenia with protection from the Lacedaemonian army during the former's formative years, and the building of Messenia's circuit walls. The other aspect of Theban assistance, that was pivotal in the Messenian nation-building in the long-term, was Epaminondas' narrative about the Messenians origins. Unlike all of the other nation-building projects that the Thebans promoted, Messenia's national myth was provided by Thebes. This extreme case of Theban intrusion into another state's politics was key to the success of this project.

Athens initially attempted to reinstate its great power status by simulating its fifth century defence policies. The Athenians with Persian subsidies rebuilt their circuit walls and their fleet. Then, they attempted to restore part of the fifth century Athenian Empire with some success. Having been forced to forfeit their newfound hegemony by the terms of the Peace of Antalcidas, the Athenians resorted to a new alliance in order to recover their strength. The Athenians denounced hegemony and formed the Second Athenian League on the basis of equal partnership with its member-states. However, this new alliance and the Athenian naval war brought the meteoric rise of Thebes as an unintended consequence in the contest with Sparta. The Athenians having witnessed the replacement of oligarchic Sparta with the radical democracy of Thebes in leading

Greek affairs, further innovated with introducing realpolitik into their foreign policy. Athens began installing oligarchic regimes when it intervened in city-states suffering from civil-strife, and allying with autocratic regimes against Thebes. The Athenians from promoting democracy and equal partnership during the 370s, went to allying themselves with the foulest states that they could find, in order to prevent Thebes from dominating Greece. The Athenians achieved their foreign goals at the battle of Mantinea in 362, when they crushed the Theban hopes of democratizing Sparta. Yet, they failed to restore their democratic foreign policy, and Athens remained allied to autocratic city-states, alienating most member-states of the Second Athenian League. After the Allies' defeat at the battle of Nemea the Athenians innovated the creation of a professional corps of light infantry. Its tactical performance against the Lacedaemonian army was far beyond any expectation, yet it failed to better the strategic situation for Athens.

Chapter Three: Athens from the Social War to Chaeronea (361-338 BC)

Historical Overview

The Social War

In the aftermath of the battle of Mantinea a peace was signed by all of the city-states of mainland Greece establishing the “Greek League”, with the exception of Sparta, due to refusing to recognize Ithome’s autonomy. The signatories signed to have peace with each other, which probably meant that they ought to seek to settle disputes between them through diplomacy, and also to provide military assistance to any member-state that was in need. The Greek League had a congress of delegates, with one vote to each city-state, yet its decisions did not hold much authority over the member-states. The idea behind this “alliance” was to uphold the peace in mainland Greece and to bring to an end the incessant fighting that had erupted since the battle of Leuctra.

In 362 Athens forged several alliances in South and Central Greece, in order to contain Thebes. Achaea, Arcadia, Elis, and Phlius became Athens’ Peloponnesian allies, and the Thessalian League in Central Greece, changed sides and joined Athens as well.³²⁴ By 357 revolts erupted in Euboea opposing Theban domination. Both the Boeotian League and Athens sent their armies, in the island, but after a month of fighting the Boeotians evacuated the island and Athens integrated Euboea’s city-states into the Second Athenian League. Then the Athenians proceeded to make secret deals with Philip of Macedon, agreeing to hand over to him their ally Pydna, in exchange for Amphipolis. Later the Athenians made an agreement with the city-states of the

³²⁴ Thebes, being upset by the successful diplomatic offensive of Athens in the Peloponnese, responded with a military campaign of the Boeotian League in Arcadia. The Boeotian League’s main objective was to uphold Theban influence over Megalopolis. In Thessaly only Alexander of Pherae remained within the Theban sphere of influence, nonetheless he was not considered to be a reliable ally.

Chersonese, that the latter would join the Second Athenian League, as well as pay tribute to the Thracian kings who provided Athens with mercenaries.³²⁵ However, by the summer of 357 Athens' strongest allies in the Second Athenian League rose in revolt, and started the Social War. Thebes used this opportunity to send Boeotian troops in Thessaly to regain control of Central Greece, but then Thebes suffered a setback as it attempted to discipline a recalcitrant Phocis, by using the Amphictyonic Council, starting a horrific conflict that lasted many years that depleted the former's citizen-armies.

In 357 Athens' allies Chios, Rhodes, and Cos, encouraged by the renegade satrap Mausolus of Caria, with the support of Byzantium, overthrew their democratic governments and seceded from the Second Athenian League. Initially the Athenians set up a garrison at Andros, and general Chares blockaded Chios and prevented reinforcements from reaching the inhabitants. However, in the summer of the same year Chabrias led a land assault against Chios, while Chares blockaded Chios from the sea. Chabrias was killed in action, and failed to capture the polis. The failure to capture Chios, and the death of an important Athenian general resulted in more secessions, the most important being that of Sestus. Chares withdrew to Byzantium, in order to carry out hostilities against it. Philip of Macedon broke his deal with the Athenians, after capturing, in the autumn of 357, Amphipolis. Instead of turning it into a client-state of Athens as had been already agreed, Philip reinstated the city-state's autonomy, which the new government used as an opportunity to oust Athenian partisans from the city. In the winter Philip captured Pydna, and allied himself with the Chalcidian League, resulting in further loss of power for Athens during this crisis. Philip later captured Potidaea and offered it to the Chalcidian League, further weakening Athens while strengthening his Chalcidian allies.

In 356 the situation worsened for the Athenians, as Chares, in a futile attempt, tried to hold on to the Chersonese with a fleet of sixty ships, while the rebels with a fleet of a hundred warships raided Lemnos, Imbros, and even invested Samos.³²⁶ In a naval confrontation with the rebels between the straits of Chios and Erythrae, due to bad weather, the Athenian navarchs Timotheus and Iphicrates refused to engage, while

³²⁵ Cardia was not included in this treaty.

³²⁶ The Samian *cleruchs* managed to fend off the rebel forces.

Chares assaulted the enemy on his own, resulting in his fleet being decisively defeated. Athens responded to the loss of Potidaea by sending a petty fleet in the region, as well as by raising a coalition of local forces against Philip, which were defeated by the latter in the summer of 356.

The Athenians having failed to put under control their former allies, or to cease Philip's expansion of influence in the Chersonese and Chalcidice, decided to gamble by exporting their problems to the Persian Empire. Athens joined Artabazus' revolt in order to draw pay from him, and then further monies from the Great King, in order to evacuate Asia Minor. The Athenians were victorious in a large-scale military engagement, and got paid handsomely by Mausolus, but Artaxerxes' response to this defeat was quite different to what they had expected. The Athenian demos was warned that if it did not abandon its support for Artabazus, the Phoenician fleet would join in with the rebels of the Second Athenian League. The Athenians wisely heeded the warnings of the Persian crown and in 355 signed a peace treaty with their former allies, finally accepting the latter's secession. The Second Athenian League was left only with Euboea, the Northern Sporades and a few city-states in the Cyclades and Thrace. The defeat of Athens in the Social War turned the islands near Caria into easy pickings. Mausolus conquered Cos and Rhodes, and replaced their democratic governments with oligarchic client states. The Athenians pursued a low-scale war against Philip for eleven years; in 354 they lost Methone to Philip, who captured the Athenian client-state through direct assault, before a relief force arrived. Sometime in 352-351 Rhodian exiles requested an Athenian intervention, in order to restore the democratic constitution, which the Athenian demos wisely refused, due to its lack of funds and energy.³²⁷

The Sacred War

The Phocians had refused to take part in Epaminondas' 362 campaign at Mantinea, and later they had hoped to be removed from the Theban zone of control by using

³²⁷ Demosthenes began his political career by giving a speech *On the Liberty of the Rhodians* (Dem. 15), arguing for the cause of the Rhodian democrats.

Athens, but their plans were thwarted by the eruption of the Social War. The Thebans, using the Amphictyonic Council, demanded that Phocis pay the fines of Sparta for the past occupation of the Cadmea, and that the Phocian general Philomelus and his partisans paid a fine for cultivating sacred land. The Phocians responded in 356 by electing Philomelus supreme commander of their armed forces (strategos autokrator), and after consulting with the Spartan king Archidamus, following his advice apparently, they captured Delphi, annulling the Amphictyonic Council's decision of imposing fines upon them. Philomelus initially deterred the Boeotian League from attempting to retake Delphi, by holding it with five thousand mercenaries. Then the Phocian general forged alliances with Achaea, Athens, and Sparta, to which Thebes responded with using the Amphictyonic Council to declare a Sacred War. This meant that the war was going to be waged on behalf of the god of Delphi, with no prisoners taken, and no quarter given to the enemy. Philomelus appropriated Delphi's funds and raised an army of ten thousand mercenaries. The Phocian general defeated first the combined armed forces of the Boeotian League and Locris, and then those of Thessaly, forcing the latter out of the contest.

By 354 the defeat of the Thessalian League provided the tyrants of Pherae with the opportunity to challenge its authority once more. Boeotia having its hands full with Phocis could not decide this conflict, making the League ask Philip for assistance. The tyrants approached Philip's enemy, Athens, for an alliance, the latter being happy to oblige, in accordance with the realpolitik that had been introduced in the 360s. After the fall of Methone, Philip invested Pagasae, which was the port of Pherae, the Athenian fleet failed to reach it in time, and it fell to the Macedonian army, isolating Pherae.

In late 354, the Phocian general Philomelus was killed at Neon, in Phocis, and his armies were routed. Boeotia decided to take advantage of the situation, by sending general Pammenes, along with five thousand Boeotians, to the aid of the rebel satrap Artabazus, while the remaining Boeotian armies would bring the Sacred War to a favourable conclusion. In regard to taking part in the Satraps' Revolt, the Boeotians shared the same thinking that had led the Athenian demos to ally itself with Artabazus only a few years earlier, in order to gain gold by taking advantage of the Persian conflicts. Pammenes on his way to Asia Minor, met with Philip in Thrace and helped him sign a pact of non-aggression with the Thracian warlord Cersebleptes, formally

establishing the friendship between Philip and the Boeotian League, and securing free passage for the Boeotians under his command, to Asia Minor.

In 353 the Boeotians paid heavily for their decision to send away a capable commander with that many soldiers. The Phocians elected Onomarchus to be commander of their armies. Onomarchus hired more mercenaries, and invited the Greek city-states to send representatives to Delphi for the rebuilding of the temple. Athens, Corinth, Epidaurus, Locris, Megara, Phocis, and Sparta responded favourably, and sent funds. This brought to an end Phocis' political isolation, while Onomarchus annexed Locris, Thronium, re-founded Orchomenus, and even brought the conflict with the Boeotians to a standstill. However, Onomarchus attempted to expand Phocian influence in Thessaly as well, and this backfired on him, because the Thessalian League alarmed by his alliance to the tyrants of Pherae, summoned Philip to its own side. During the summer of 353 the combined forces of the Thessalian League and Philip routed those of the tyrants and Phaylus.³²⁸ In the autumn however Onomarchus himself marched with his armies into Thessaly and won a bloody revenge against Philip and his allies, forcing the Macedonian king to leave Thessaly for the rest of the year. Onomarchus on his way home from Thessaly met in battle the Boeotian army, and defeated it as well, allowing him to capture Coronea.

The Athenian demos in 353 allied itself to the Thracian chieftain Amadocus, and general Chares finally conquered Sestus, butchering all of the adult males, and forcing the rest of the population into slavery. The Thracian king Cersebleptes, lost his courage and surrendered. Cersebleptes was forced to cede all of the city-states in the Chersonese, except Cardia, and allied himself with the Athenians, effectively turning his kingdom into a satellite-state of Athens.

In 352 Philip returned to Thessaly with a large army, and laid siege to Pherae. Onomarchus mustered his mercenaries, and agreed with the Athenian demos to combine their armies against the Macedonian king. Onomarchus however was intercepted by the Macedonian army, before the Athenians could disembark from their

³²⁸ Phaylus was brother to Onomarchus leading seven thousand mercenaries.

ships, and was killed along with nearly half his army.³²⁹ Pherae capitulated, the tyrants and two thousand of their mercenaries were allowed to evacuate, the whole of Thessaly was pacified by Philip, Gomphi received Macedonian settlers, and Philip was also granted strongpoints in Olooson and Tempe, and installed a garrison at Pagasae in order to prevent the return of the tyrants and their armies back to Pherae. Philip was formally recognized as the commander of the Thessalian League's armed forces, and was granted the market and harbour dues of the country.

The Phocians elected Phaylus in the place of Onomarchus, and with his mercenaries, and contingents from Achaia, Sparta, and the mercenaries serving the tyrants of Pherae, he pursued the war against the Boeotian League without much success. When Philip attempted to cross Thermopylae in order to join in with the Boeotians against the Phocians and their allies, Phaylus captured the pass, and with Athenian military assistance as well, prevented Philip from crossing through.

By 352 Philip had returned to western Thrace, where he allied himself to Amadocus, Byzantium, and Perinthus against Athens' ally Cersebleptes. The latter was defeated and granted some of his remaining territories to Philip's allies, while Philip's kingdom expanded up to river Hebrus. In the autumn of 352 the Chalcidian League had grown disenchanted with its alliance with Philip, because of his significant rise in power and influence. There were secret negotiations with the Athenian demos in order to forge an alliance, but the plans were leaked, and when Philip returned from Thrace in 351 he threatened the Chalcidians forcing them to abandon their plots. The Athenians dispatched a small expeditionary force in the Chersonese, however its size was smaller than originally planned, because Philip grew sick.

The Phocians sent troops into the Peloponnese in order to assist Sparta in a war against Megalopolis. The situation escalated quickly, as the Spartans were joined by the mercenaries of the tyrants of Pherae, and the forces of Phalecus, while Megalopolis was joined by Argos, Boeotia, Messene, and Sicyon. The outcome was an

³²⁹ Onomarchus led twenty thousand infantrymen and five hundred cavalrymen, while Philip commanded an infantry force of similar size to Onomarchus', but was clearly superior in cavalry, having three thousand mounted men at his side. Philip's cavalry superiority was owed to having agreed, prior to the engagement, with the Thessalian League that Philip would lead its forces.

armistice signed in 351 in favour of Sparta. Phocis and Boeotia having won nothing but glory from this conflict, had their forces return home in order to pursue the Sacred War in Central Greece.

With Philip staying away from Athenian interests in 351, the Athenians turned their attention to the East. Athenian generals served as mercenary commanders in the courts of both the Great King and the secessionists who were fighting against him. Diophantus of Athens in command of Egyptian forces repelled the armies of the Great King in their attempt to recapture the satrapy of Egypt, while Phocion in service to king Artaxerxes subjugated Cyprus, which had revolted once more. The Athenian demos befriended Orontes, the satrap of Mysia, at that time, and when he revolted during the 340s, Athenian interests were well secured in the Hellespont. During this period Philip subjugated the Illyrians, he consolidated his power in Northern Macedon, and secured his interests in Epirus and Thessaly.

In 349 Philip began his confrontation with the Chalcidian League. He sent an ultimatum to the Chalcidians, ordering them to surrender to him his two half-brothers, who had still not given up their claims to the Macedonian kingship. The League rejected Philip's ultimatum and allied itself with Athens against Philip. The Macedonian king began a brutal offensive against the Chalcidians, in the winter of 349, when Athens could not assist in time the Chalcidians, due to bad weather conditions. Some Chalcidian city-states were captured, and the only diversion that Philip suffered was the re-capture of Pherae by its former tyrant Peitholaus, who was forced to withdraw from Pherae by the January of 348. Philip however created a far more successful diversion of his own against the League's Athenian allies. He encouraged the Euboeans to revolt against Athens, and the latter turned most of its attention there, leaving the Chalcidians unaided at a crucial time. The Athenians dispatched general Phocion with an elite force, and his forces did surprisingly well, considering that his army was outnumbered by the enemy, who had received Macedonian reinforcements from Thessaly. Phocion was replaced when the full Athenian militia arrived in Euboea, yet his successor suffered a severe defeat, and the Athenian demos was forced to capitulate, paying fifty talents in ransom for the return of Athenian prisoners, and keeping only Carystus under Athenian control, out of all of Euboea.

In the winter of 348, Philip began his offensive against the Olynthian League anew, nonetheless this time the Athenians were able to dispatch reinforcements to the Olynthians in time. In the summer however the Olynthians were defeated in two pitched battles against Philip, and he laid siege against their city. The Olynthians asked for further Athenian military aid and in specific for Athens' citizen-army. The Athenians did send a large force, yet before it could arrive, Philip captured Olynthus using traitors from within. Olynthus was razed to the ground, and its population was sold into slavery. The Chalcidic League was thus destroyed, and Chalcidice became part of the Macedonian kingdom. The Athenian demos responded by persecuting its own generals, and Demosthenes engaged in belated oratory on strategy that bordered with philosophy at that moment, arguing that had the revolt in Euboea been ignored, then Chalcidice would have been successfully protected, and the Athenians would have kept safe their more important ally against Philip, instead of losing them both.

The Athenians, having lost Chalcidice as a point of invasion against Philip's own territories, wisely decided that it was time to have peace with him, and recuperate their strength, now that he was still occupied with the Sacred War. By 346 Philip had only provided minimum assistance to Thebes against Phocis, and with the Athenian demos feeling unthreatened, ambassadors were sent to the Macedonian king. Philip proposed more than peace, but an alliance as well, and promised not to invade the Chersonese while the Athenian demos deliberated on his proposal. The Athenians agreed to ally themselves and their partners with Philip, leaving aside their Thracian vassal Cersebleptes, Philip in May of 346 took an oath to uphold an alliance with Athens. This treaty became known as the Peace of Philocrates, and for many years later the Athenians who had spoken in favour of signing it, would blame each other for its signing.

From the Peace of Philocrates to the Battle of Chaeronea

Philip shortly afterwards captured Phocis, and the Amphictyonic Council deliberated on its punishment. The Oetaeans suggested the adult males should be executed, and the rest of the population driven into slavery. Aeschines, on behalf of the Athenian demos, claimed that the Phocian population should not be identified with its leaders,

and be shown mercy instead. Philip decided, due to controlling the Thessalian votes, that the Phocian demes be split into separate republics, the Phocian soldiers were disarmed, the Phocians had to pay a fine annually to the temple of Delphi, they were excommunicated, and Philip got to use their two votes in the Amphictyonic Council from now on.

For the next three years both Philip and Athens avoided conflict with each other. Philip led invasions against his neighbours in the Balkans, while Athens was forced by her isolation to deal with her financial issues. The diplomatic isolation of the Athenians after the annexation of their allies in Central Greece and in Chalcidice by Philip, caused enough desperation to the Athenians that they incurred extreme measures upon themselves in order to deal with their bad finances. Philip as well was engaged in fixing his own house, for in that period he introduced city-building in Northern Macedonia, that completely changed the lifestyle of his subjects, from resembling that of their barbaric Thracian neighbours, to that which had dominated South Greece for the last four centuries. Philip further consolidated his reign in Thessaly, by removing the remaining tyrants, by strengthening the demes over the city-states, and by having the Thessalians elect him Archon, granting Philip full control of the Thessalian armed forces, the raising of taxes, and over their foreign policy.

In 343 Philip intervened in Epirus, in favour of his client-king Alexander, extending the latter's kingdom, as well as consolidating his reign. Yet, that backfired, because Ambracia and Leucas, ancient colonies of Corinth, appealed for assistance to their mother-city and the latter to Athens. Athens' appeal to other city-states increased, especially to those seeking to escape from Philip's domination. Ambracia, Corinth, Corcyra, and Leucas allied themselves with Athens, as well as the Achaean League which had grown alarmed from Philip's recent alliance with their antagonist, the Aetolian League. Philip in 342 finally subjugated the Odryssian kingdom and allied himself to Apollonia and Odessus, yet his military success dismayed his own allies, Byzantium and Perinthus.

In 342, the Athenian demos used an Athenian commander's raiding operations against Cardia, which was allied to Philip, in order to strain its relations with him. Although neither side declared war, the Athenians began to prepare for war, and allied themselves with Byzantium and Abydos. The Athenians carried out a successful military intervention in Megara, and forced a democratic regime change, and then

assisted the Megarians in building long walls that connected their city to the port of Nisaea. The Athenians in joint military operation with their Megarian allies captured Chalcis, and instigated democratic revolutions in the Euboean city-states. Therefore the Euboean city-states allied themselves to Athens, albeit they did not restore their membership to the Second Athenian League. Philip responded to these provocations, by laying siege against Perinthus and Byzantium, and almost capturing the former. Philip's military operations in the Hellespont, threatened the Athenian grain-supply coming from the Crimea, resulting in Athenian military aid towards the besieged city-states, that thwarted Philip's plans for expansion in the region.

In 339 the Amphictyonic Council deliberated on the recent conflict between its members. The representatives of West Locris suggested that a fine be set upon Athens for failing to appropriately dedicate spoils captured from Persia and Thebes to Delphi. The Athenian diplomats successfully refuted this by accusing the Amphissians of having used as farmland the sacred land of Delphi, and of having collected tolls at its port as well. A Sacred War was declared by the Amphictyons against the Locrians of Amphissa, and Athens escaped from being fined. However, the next year through a majority of votes, Philip acquired the control of the Amphictyonic Council's armed forces, in order to lead the war against the Locrians. This alienated Philip's ally Thebes, who had always despised his domination in the Amphictyonic Council, and until then had enjoyed friendly relations with the Locrians.

Philip and his armies marched into Central Greece, and despite the Theban forces' attempts to block their route, the former managed to reach Elatea, which was only a two days' march from Athens. Both Athenian and Macedonian envoys appealed to the Theban demos, asking for an alliance against one another. The Athenians won over the Thebans, by offering command of their armies against Philip, recognizing all of Boeotia as subject to Thebes, and promising to cover two-thirds of the war effort. The Thebans and the Boeotian League broke their vows of alliance with Philip, and found themselves involved in yet another Sacred War, despite the fact that they had lost their great power in the previous one.

The Athenians and the Boeotians initially attempted to block Philip's forces from entering Boeotia through Phocis. The Athenians mobilized their entire citizen army, as well as ten thousand mercenaries in order to prevent Philip from crossing. Acarnania, Achaia, Corinth, Corcyra, Euboea, Leucas, and Megara allied with Athens and

Thebes. Philip, along with the Amphictyonic Council, decided to restore the Phocian republic, to rearm it, and to help it rebuild its fortifications. After many months of indecisive skirmishes along the passes, in July 338 the commanders of the ten thousand mercenaries, having relaxed their guard, in a surprise night attack were destroyed by Philip, allowing him to capture Amphissa. Macedonian forces began crossing into Boeotia, and the Athenian and Boeotian armies withdrew to Chaeronea. Philip proposed peace, and Phocion encouraged the Athenian demos to accept it, but Demosthenes convinced both the Athenian and the Theban demes to reject the proposal. On the 2nd of August the entire Macedonian and Thessalian armies met in pitched battle with the Athenian and Boeotian armies, routing them both, inflicting heavy casualties upon them, and capturing thousands of prisoners. The political outcome of the battle of Chaeronea was severe for Athens and Thebes. The Boeotian League was disbanded; Thebes had to accept back its exiles, and have an oligarchic government installed, as well as Macedonian garrison set up at the Cadmea. Athens was deprived of the Second Athenian League and had to completely withdraw from the Chersonese, yet she retained Delos, Imbros, Lemnos, Samos, Salamis, and Scyros as her personal client-states. Philip decided to show great clemency towards the Athenians. The Athenian democracy was spared, and no Macedonian garrison was installed in Attica, in addition to the fact that the Athenians, unlike the Thebans, did not have to pay ransom for the safe return of their prisoners. With Athens and Thebes subdued, only Sparta was left to oppose Philip's hegemony in Greece, posing little threat since the Peloponnesian city-state had been severely crippled by the loss of king Archidamus and his army in Italy, while fighting against barbarian tribesmen.

Alliances

Containing Thebes

After the battle of Mantinea the Athenians allied themselves to Achaea, Arcadia, Elis, and Phlius, as well as to the Thessalian League.³³⁰ All of them had been significant allies of Thebes in the previous decade, where the infamous Theban generals Epaminondas and Pelopidas invested most of their *polis*' resources in order to promote democracy and federalism. The Arcadian experiment with federalism, despite being promising, collapsed, and the Achaeans, even during Epaminondas' presence in the Peloponnese along with Boeotian armies, preferred to maintain oligarchic governments, while they built their own confederation.³³¹ The Theban meddling into Peloponnesian affairs being so conspicuous backfired, for as soon as the Boeotian League, showed signs of weariness, these allies changed sides, and allied themselves to Athens.³³² Interfering directly into another state's domestic affairs is always very costly for the stronger state, since despite its intentions, it is ubiquitously seen as an aggressive foreign force that seeks to exploit the local population and the invaded country's resources.³³³ The Boeotian military interventions of the 360s into Central and South Greece brought democracy and federalism, but failed to create a lasting relationship between Thebes and those states in the long-term. The Thessalian League only initially joined the Sacred War against Phocis, due to being member to the Amphictyonic Council, and thanks to its alienation from Thebes, the Thessalian

³³⁰ *GHI* 144; 147.

³³¹ Diod. 15.94.1-3.

³³² Mantinea had turned against Theban interests earlier, and fought at Sparta's side in the decisive battle that took place in its own territory in 362 (Diod. 15.82.4-5, 15.84.4; Xen. *Hell.* 7.5.1-25).

³³³ A more recent example of this phenomenon is from the Napoleonic Wars. After Napoleon had annexed Spain, he cancelled the peasants' heavy tithe to the Church, yet the peasants kept on opposing the French occupation, for the priesthood convinced them that the French aimed to transfer Virgin Mary from Spain to Paris.

armies did not join those of Boeotia against Phocis, both ending up defeated in detail by Phocian mercenary armies. The Peloponnesian allies of Athens served as a bulwark against further intervention from Thebes. Thebes led large Boeotian forces into the Peloponnese again for an insignificant war between Megalopolis and Sparta, which somehow managed to reach great magnitude involving lots of Greek city-states, costing a lot of money and manpower for all of the belligerent states, and not giving back in return anything other than glory.³³⁴ The alliance of Athens to the Peloponnesian states was only temporary, and it did not benefit the former during the Social War. Had the Athenians inducted the Peloponnesian cities and the Thessalian League into the Second Athenian League, they would have strengthened their own League, kept Thessaly secure from tyranny, and would have been better prepared for the upcoming conflict with Philip.³³⁵

The Hellenic League and the Second Athenian League

The Athenians had the opportunity to lead the newly founded Hellenic League, after the battle of Mantinea in 362, as there was no other Greek power having greater prestige than them at that time. Yet, the Hellenic League itself turned out to be nothing more than a conservative institution whose sole purpose was to maintain the existing

³³⁴ Thebes initially attempted to restore its influence in Arcadia with a military campaign, but failed to achieve its strategic goal.

³³⁵ Cargill (1981, pp. 150, 160) offers a different view arguing that the Athenian establishment of *cleruchies* in non-member states was not alarming to the rebels, the latter are suggested to be opportunists who attacked both the Athenians and other loyal member-states. Notwithstanding Cargill does not provide a solid explanation for the acts of aggression that the rebels committed, as he insinuates that the war was instigated by the oligarchic allies of Athens because of their intolerance of democracy (1981, p. 179). Nevertheless, he makes a good case in his defence of the establishment of *cleruchies*, as he mentions the cases of Paros and Thebes (1981, pp. 163-168). Paros was the first ally to secede in the 370s, and be restored back to the League through force, Thebes was the first to successfully desert, and there is no indication that either one of the two states was disenchanted with the installation of Athenian garrisons.

status quo rather than stir up international relations. Since most Hellenic city-states were members of the League, had it chosen to, it could have liberated the Greek cities of Asia Minor and Cyprus from Persia. Yet, its purpose was to set under control the turmoil that had been brought by constant regime change since Sparta's downfall at Leuctra. Regime change brought instability and civil war to city-states, which led to great numbers of citizens losing their civil rights and properties, and even their lives and families, through violent purges carried out by civil war partisans.

The Greeks League's only decision that we know of was in regard to the Satraps' Revolt against the Great King.³³⁶ The Satraps invited the Greeks in a military alliance to oppose the Persian royal government. The League replied that it would remain neutral in this conflict, yet it would respond in force to any aggression towards its member-states. The Greek League was a reactionary institution that lacked ambition. This decision let the Greek city-states of Asia Minor remain under the authority of the Great King, until Alexander's victory over a large Persian force at river Granicus in 334. The Greeks lacked a hegemon in order to have a direction in foreign policy. The League was not established in order to unite the Greek city-states for the execution of a single cause, but to pacify and bring stability to mainland Greece. The Athenian *demos* did not show any interest in becoming the hegemon of the Hellenic League, and lead its member-states in a confrontation with Persia, for the liberty of the Greek city-states of Asia Minor. The Athenians, instead, chose to oppose Thebes, and to form new alliances in Greece.³³⁷

Athens could have provided assistance to the member-states of the Hellenic League into becoming stable again, and then focused their energies in confronting the Great King, for all the damage his empire did by meddling into Greek affairs. The Athenians missed this great opportunity, and instead of assimilating the Hellenic League through the Second Athenian League, they embarked into catastrophic empire-building.³³⁸ The relations between Athens and the Second Athenian League's member-states were put under heavy strain, when the Athenian *demos* decided to embark on a foreign policy

³³⁶ *GHI* 145.

³³⁷ Cf. Dmitriev 2011, pp. 54-62.

³³⁸ Cargill (1981, p. 185) wrote that the Athenian imperialism was a product, rather than a cause, of the Athenian decline in power.

based on *realpolitik* soon after the Spartan disaster at Leuctra in 371. The Athenians chose to oppose democratic Thebes and to ally themselves with reactionary Sparta.³³⁹ The whole purpose of the formation of the Second Athenian League, was to oppose Spartan influence, as it was identified as something malevolent in Greek politics. Yet, the Athenians feeling more threatened by the sudden rise in power of upstart Thebes, decided to intervene in the war between the two great Greek land powers, in favour of Sparta, who was fighting for the restoration of its lost prestige, hoping to rebuild its empire based on puppet governments ruled by private clients, and supported by Peloponnesian garrisons manned by mercenaries. The member-states of the Second Athenian League got involved into a large-scale conflict with Thebes, who initially competed with Athens even for the control of the Aegean Sea. The costly war with a democratic power, which was engaged in supporting the formation of democratic governments, and confederations in the Peloponnese, made it very difficult for the Athenians to legitimize the war effort. Then the Athenians decided to engage in empire-building of their own in the Aegean, forcing out the citizen population of city-states in the Aegean, and replacing them with *cleruchs*, a practice that was very unpopular amongst their own allies during the fifth century.³⁴⁰ The Athenians should have held a single policy in order not to alienate their allies. The *demos* could have either helped the Aegean city-states in joining the Second Athenian League, or force the installation of *cleruchies* in all of its allies, in order to secure their loyalty. The latter was altogether impossible for the Athenians to achieve at the time, due to not being strong enough, as was proven during the Social War. The Athenian empire-building policy made many member-states of the Second Athenian League feel threatened by their major partner. With such an aggressive foreign policy, Athens

³³⁹ An example of how extreme the Athenian *realpolitik* was, is that the Athenians after liberating Corcyra from Spartan control chose to support the maintenance of an oligarchy in Corcyra, fearing that a democratic polity would rather ally with Thebes instead of Athens (Cargill 1981, pp. 175-6).

³⁴⁰ During the 360s the Athenians installed *cleruchies* in Crithote, Potidaea, Samus, and Sestus, all of them being city-states that were not signatories of the Second Athenian League, therefore the League's constitution had not been violated (Diod. 16.2; Xen. *Vect.* 3.7; Isoc. 15.108-112; Dem. 2.14, 15.9; Din. 1.14; Polyæn. 3.10.9, 3.10.14. Aristot. *Rh.* 2, 1384b32; Aristot. *Econ.* 1350a23, 1351a18).

would become less dependent on its allies in projecting military power, much in the same way Sparta did with its own allies, after the end of the Peloponnesian War due to the establishment of the *decarchies*. Had the Athenians allowed these city-states to join as equals the Second Athenian League, the League itself would have grown more powerful, and its founding member-states would feel safer, seeing the Athenians treating other city-states with respect, rather than exploiting them for the sake of Athenian petty interests. Yet, the Athenian *demos* decided to stop augmenting its power through the increase of allies with equal rights to itself, and invested into building a conspicuous hegemony.

After failing to contain the revolt of their own allies, the Athenians were weakened to such a degree, that the new king of the Macedonians Philip II took the opportunity to annex several of their client-states, which were situated in his vicinity, without the Athenians being able to retaliate.³⁴¹ On top of that the *demos* made the situation even worse when it intervened in the Satraps' Revolt in favour of Mausolus. The Athenians hoped to gain enough monies from the Satrap, for providing him with military aid, as well as from the Great King for leaving the latter's territories in peace. The plan backfired, as the Great King threatened to send a fleet into the Aegean Sea that would topple what remained of Athenian power.³⁴² The Athenians were forced to abandon Asia Minor without the gold they had wanted from Persia, having had their military weakness been displayed in public, their former allies' resolve was strengthened in asserting their independence. By 354 the Athenians were forced to give up the war and were left with bad finances and a handful of petty states as members of their League, while still engaged in a war with Philip, whose power was rising rapidly. The ill fiscal situation of the Athenian state led it to become more introverted during the next years and less inclined to assume the initiative in international affairs. Since the fifth century Athenian democracy had been supported by the considerable tribute coming from its foreign allies.³⁴³ With the wealthiest of Athens' allies gone after the end of the Social

³⁴¹ Diod. 16.8.3-5.

³⁴² Ibid. 16.22.1-2.

³⁴³ The *ecclesia* and the *Heliaea* (the largest court in Athens) were comprised of thousands of Athenian citizens in each session, whose pay came from foreign tribute and not from domestic taxation, the latter not being very developed in Greek city-states.

War the Athenians were forced to decide, whether they were going to maintain an active foreign policy, or keep paying the salaries of the vast executive and judicial bodies, and they chose the latter.

Phocis and Sparta

The Athenians allied themselves to Sparta during the 360s in order to contain the sudden increase of Theban influence throughout Greece. Thebes was suppressed in the Peloponnese after 362, thanks to failing to impose regime change in Laconia, and the dissolution of the Arcadian Confederation. In 357 Athens took the opportunity to aid the revolting Euboeans against their Boeotian overlords, depriving the Boeotian League of its neighbouring island.³⁴⁴ The Phocians proved out to be more successful than the Lacedaemonians in pursuing war against Thebes. Phocian reliance upon great numbers of experienced mercenaries at war allowed an insignificant city-state to compete against the *polis* with the most powerful army in Greece.³⁴⁵ Theban military power was depleted in a war of attrition with Phocis, who did not have to rely on its own manpower in order to wage the costly war. Both the Boeotian and the Thessalian Leagues were humbled in their conflict with the Phocians.³⁴⁶ The defeat of the Thessalian military forces led to domestic political instability, that was followed by the return of tyrant rulers in the region. The Thessalian tyrants maintained their autocratic rule through mercenaries, the latter having been proven more than capable at keeping Thebes at bay.

Achaea, Sparta, Phocis, and the Thessalian and Sicilian tyrants, became Athens' most important allies, because they were enemies with Thebes and the Boeotian League, and also because they were very powerful in terms of military strength. Athens used its alliance with these autocratic powers in order to diminish the Theban zone of influence in the Peloponnese and in Central Greece. All three powers had their authority depend upon the use of standing armies, rather than uniting Greek city-states

³⁴⁴ Diod. 16.7.2.

³⁴⁵ Ibid. 16.30.1-2.

³⁴⁶ Ibid. 16.30.3-4; Isoc. 5.54-55.

based on common values such as justice, liberty, and democracy. These factions were attractive to Athens only due to their hostility towards Thebes, because the Athenian *demos* had been embittered by the fact that its efforts to undermine the Spartan Empire had led to the rise of Theban hegemony, instead of the reestablishment of the Athenian Empire. These allies however had one thing in common amongst themselves, they lacked a just cause, and for that reason there was no way Athens could justify its alliance with these autocratic powers, to the member-states of the Second Athenian League. Achaea and Sparta were oligarchic and the latter sought to reclaim Messenia by destroying Ithome and Megalopolis. Phocis experimented with military dictatorship by having illegally occupied Delphi, and by using the latter's funds in a war of attrition against the Boeotian League. The Thessalian and Sicilian tyrants were notorious for their bloodthirsty ways, mocking justice and the rule of law in every single one of their acts, imposing their rule upon the Thessalian populations in the a manner similar to Dionysius in Sicily.

Athens' alliances with this sort of foreign powers were viewed as entirely unethical by its own allies in the Second Athenian League. It was impossible for Athens to maintain the League's cohesion, while the member-states were not inclined to cover the extravagant costs of warfare against democratic powers, or tolerate the imposition of *cleruchies* in Greek city-states, while growing disenchanted with the Athenian *realpolitik*.³⁴⁷ The Athenians should have continued to pursue the enlargement of the Second Athenian League, instead of building a private empire at the cost of their own allies' finances, and forging alliances with autocratic states. The gains from allying with unpopular city-states, that were pursuing unjust causes, as well as installing *cleruchs* on other city-states, did not outweigh the benefits Athens got from the Second Athenian League. Since the foundation of the Second Athenian League until the late 360s, when several of its important member-states began to secede at Theban instigation, Athens had managed to dominate the Aegean and Ionian Seas, toppling the Spartan maritime empire, bringing stability and democracy to the liberated city-states, saving them from the ravages of civil war violence. The Second Athenian League transformed Athens into a first class power that would have dominated Greek politics, had the Athenians not changed their policies regarding Sparta and the treatment of

³⁴⁷ Aeschin. 1.63; Dem. 6.20; Diod. 18.18.9; Strab. 14.1.18.

weaker states after Leuctra. Following a *realpolitik* in favour of autocracy and building a new empire, ran against the policies that Athens had abided to in the 370s when the Second Athenian League was created. Thebes' rise in Greek politics made the Athenians decide to follow alternative strategies in order to contain its Boeotian neighbour. The main reason behind this change of direction in policy was that Thebes had been a member-state of the Second Athenian League in the latter's early years, and apparently the Athenians feared that their success through the League, could lead to the rise of another city-state, in the same manner that Thebes had grown independent of Athenian assistance in defending itself from Lacedaemon. Even if that were possible, it did not necessarily lead to the subversion of Athenian interests.

The Athenians overreacted to the sudden rise of Theban power, for the latter did not pose the same threat to Athens as it did during the previous century. Thebes had changed its constitution from a pro-Spartan oligarchy to a philo-Athenian democracy, thanks to Theban exiles who had taken refuge in Athens during their forced absence from their *polis*. Athenian refugees as well had found refuge in Thebes, who had chosen to openly ignore the Lacedaemonian order of forcing all Athenian refugees to be returned back to the Thirty Tyrants. Although at the end of the Peloponnesian War a Theban representative had proposed to the Peloponnesian League to destroy Athens, and sell its population into slavery, just a few years later Thebes had provided refuge to Athenian exiles, and Theban volunteers assisted the Athenian *demos* in restoring the Long Walls, in order to turn impervious to Peloponnesian incursions into Attica.³⁴⁸ After the restoration of democracy in Thebes and the ousting of the Peloponnesian garrison from Cadmea, Athenian armies annually campaigned in the Theban *chora*, alongside their Theban counterparts in order to preserve Theban freedom. The Thebans benefitted more than anyone from the power vacuum created by the Lacedaemonian disaster at Leuctra, but that did not necessarily put Athens in danger. Even if it did, after the Boeotian defeat at Mantinea in 362, there was no immediate reason to pursue an anti-Theban policy which relied on extreme measures. Allying with autocrats, whose main value as allies was their military power, and having Thebes as common enemy, proved out to be disastrous as it put Athens on a collision course with the Second Athenian League, whose ties had already been weakened in

³⁴⁸ Diod. 14.6.1-3, 14.85.3-5; Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.19, 3.5.8.

the 360s as had been already proven by the Theban expedition. In the 350s the Athenians should have taken measures to reassure their allies of their intentions, and to restore trust in the Athenian leadership, rather than follow opportunistic policies against Thebes, which had already lost most of its influence in South Greece shortly after its defeat at Mantinea.

Olynthus – The Chalcidic League

The alliance between the Athenians and the Chalcidians, was one of necessity. The two powers were both democratic and based their influence abroad on naval power, making them see each other as antagonists. This was the cause why the Athenians were sceptic as to whether they should assist the Olynthians and the Chalcidian allies against Philip, besides Athens during the Social War still pursued to establish a hegemony in the area, by allying with Philip and selling off to him its ally Pydna.³⁴⁹ The alliance with the Chalcidic League was most useful for Athens, not just as means to oppose Philip in general, but for putting to use Chalcidice as a launching point for an invasion of the Macedonian kingdom's most wealthy lands in the south. Chalcidice and the forces of the Chalcidian League would have been more useful against Philip if they had been used in an aggressive manner, rather than in passive defence. Nonetheless, with Athens having grown weary of warfare after its defeats in the Social War, and in the early contest against Philip, the *demos* was not willing to consider sending its full levy to campaign so far against the Macedonian king, just to help secure another confederation from annexation, for which the Athenians did not really care about. The Athenian *demos* instead, got engaged in passive defence against the Macedonian forces, and limited its military interventions in Chalcidice to being small-scale. Most of the armies that Athens sent to the Chalcidians' aid were comprised of mercenaries, while only during the late stages of the war were significant numbers of Athenian citizen hoplites involved in the defence of Olynthus.³⁵⁰ The capital of the Chalcidic League fell to Philip's forces in 348, thanks to treason committed by

³⁴⁹ Dem. 2.6.

³⁵⁰ Ibid. 3.35-36.

Olynthian noblemen, despite Demosthenes' claims Athens could not have prevented its fall.³⁵¹ Had the Athenians created an offensive alliance with Olynthus, instead of a defensive one, the outcome might have been more favourable to the two democratic city-states.³⁵²

Boeotia – Byzantium – Perinthus – Megara

After Philip had finished conquering his Thracian tribal neighbours, his own allies in the area, Byzantium and Perinthus grew weary of his expansion.³⁵³ They allied themselves to Athens and defied his summons to accompany him to war. The Athenians by aiding in time these two city-states managed to save them from Olynthus' fate.³⁵⁴ Philip's increasing aggression against Greek city-states was turning his own allies against him. His domination over the Amphictyonic League's voting procedures, and the Sacred War Philip led against the Amphissians alienated him from

³⁵¹ Ibid. 8.40, 9.56-66, 19.265, 19.342; Philochorus, fr. 132.

³⁵² Demosthenes (6.16-18) suggested that the Athenians send two separate forces, one as relief to the Chalcidians, and the other to invade Macedonia while Philip and his army were operating in Chalcidice. The potential for an offensive strategy was displayed in the success of the Athenian general Charidemus, who had brought with him Athenian troops from Euboea, in a joint-campaign with the Chalcidians, while Philip was occupied in Thessaly (Diod. 16.52.9; *FGrH* 328 F 50).

³⁵³ Diod. 16.71.1-2. Perhaps the former member-states of the Second Athenian League foresaw that having followed the same steps that the Chalcidians had taken, in seceding from the League with Athens, and seeking safety in an alliance with Philip, they would end up suffering the same fate as Olynthus.

³⁵⁴ Diod. 16.77.1-3. The Athenians were not completely altruistic in aiding the Thracian city-states. The expansion of Philip's domains into Thrace put Athenian interests in the Hellespont in peril. The Athenian demos had responded by increasing the number of the *cleruchs* in the area. Protecting Byzantium, Perinthus, and Selymbria from losing their autonomy, was an additional measure in order to secure Athenian interests in the region (Worthington 2013, p. 215).

the Boeotian League.³⁵⁵ The Boeotians thanks to Demosthenes' diplomatic efforts put behind them their past differences with Athens and allied themselves with their old rival.³⁵⁶ After Philip's forces broke through the guarded passes and began to ravage the Boeotian fields, Philip proposed peace but the two allies refused him.³⁵⁷ Had they done so the Thebans would have maintained their control over the Boeotian League, and the Athenians would have retained the Second Athenian League. Philip's infiltration in South Greece would have been viewed in a negative light by the Peloponnesian city-states, much like his domination of Thracian and Hepirote affairs was seen by Ambracia, Byzantium, Leucas, and Perinthus, compelling them to commit more against his ambition for hegemony over their affairs, than just diplomatic support towards Athens.

Military Strategy

The Social War

Athens' war with her own allies had a heavy cost from the very beginning. Athens' heavy reliance on mercenaries made the war effort too costly, preventing the Athenians from using their own naval forces to their full extent, since those who covered Athens' costly expeditions during the two previous decades had now become enemies. The Athenians after the disaster that they had suffered at Chios, losing general Chabrias and many of his troops, which encouraged more of their own allies to

³⁵⁵ Aeschin. 3.128; Dem. 18.147-148.

³⁵⁶ Dem. 18.174-179; Diod. 16.85.1. The Athenians restored Oropus and Thespieae to the Thebans, the Athenian demos recognized the Boeotian League, the Athenians agreed to cover two thirds of the military operations in land and the total costs of the naval expeditions, and also agreed to grant full command of the land forces to the Boeotarchs and share command in the naval operations (Aeschin. 3.141-145).

³⁵⁷ Aeschin. 3.148; Plut. *Dem.* 18.3; Plut. *Phoc.* 16.1-3.

join the revolt, should have signed for peace.³⁵⁸ Never during the conflict did the Athenians manage to overpower their allies' combined navies, which outnumbered or matched in size their own. The Athenians lost all legitimacy to their cause thanks to fact that due to lack of funds their generals were forced to use extreme measures in order to provide the mercenaries under their command with pay.³⁵⁹ The Athenians were lucky in the case of Euboea, for the Boeotian invasion, failed due to Thebes' mistake of starting simultaneously a war with Phocis, based on wishful thinking that it would quickly discipline its uneasy ally. Philip however, used the Social War as a distraction quite efficiently, allying himself to the Chalcidic League, pushing it further away from Athens at a time when it needed the latter's assistance, and reducing Athenian client-states in the vicinity of his kingdom.³⁶⁰

The Athenians being faced with too many enemies simultaneously were unable to concentrate their forces against their opponents, for they were either distracted by assaults on their territories, or had to avoid battle because they were outnumbered. This situation led them to seek much needed funds by getting involved in the Satraps' Revolt in Asia Minor. Their general Chares was successful in a pitched battle against the Great King's army, however Artaxerxes was not afraid of escalating the war, now that Athens was in a weakened state. The Athenians when threatened with losing their remaining loyal allies to Persian invasion took the correct decision and signed peace with the Great King. The Social War was a very painful experience for the Athenians, and based on the fact that Athens could not maintain large naval forces, due to lacking the necessary funds, there was no military strategy that could have led to an Athenian victory in that conflict. The best course of action for the Athenian *demos* would have been what Isocrates suggested, to abandon its plans for building a maritime empire

³⁵⁸ Diod. 16.7.3-4.

³⁵⁹ General Chares, after the capture of Sestus, in the Chersonese was forced to loot the *polis*, and sell its inhabitants as slaves in order to pay his mercenaries' wages. This kind of atrocity was necessary for Athens in order to cover the upkeep of her military operations, nevertheless it alienated the *demos* from its remaining allies, further undermining the strategic goals of the Athenians in sustaining the cohesion of their own League (Diod. 16.34.3). Iphicrates in order to pay the wages of his own mercenaries committed sacrilege by capturing and selling statues of gods sent to Delphi by Dionysius II (Diod. 16.57.3).

³⁶⁰ Dem. 1.5, 2.14, 6.20, 20.63, 23.107-108; Diod. 16.8.1-5.

and have peace with its former allies.³⁶¹ Had the Athenians followed this course, they would have kept their military forces and finances intact, as well as better relations with their allies, and would have been better at dealing with Mausolus' and Philip's depredations.

The confrontation with Philip

The Athenians having allied themselves to Phocis since the beginning of the Sacred War, remained true to their ally when Philip came to Thebes' assistance. After Onomarchus' successful engagements against Philip and his Thessalian allies within Thessaly, the Athenians offered to the promising Phocian general assistance against Philip. However, they failed to disembark from their ships in time for battle, and their assistance was limited to rescuing Phocis' mercenaries who managed to swim up to the Athenian fleet.³⁶²

The same situation was to be repeated again during Philip's war against the Chalcidian League. Philip always began his military operations in bad weather, in order to face the Chalcidian armies on their own.³⁶³ In all of the engagements with the Chalcidians his forces proved their superiority, severely demoralizing the latter. In the January of 348 Philip created a diversion by financing a revolt in Euboea against Athens.³⁶⁴ The

³⁶¹ Isoc. 8.6. Interestingly Isocrates blamed the Social War itself for Athens' poor popularity among the Greek city-states, rather than her policies prior to the war's break-out (8.19).

³⁶² Diod. 16.35.5.

³⁶³ Dem. 19.266; Worthington 2013, p. 142. It should be noted that Philip was innovative for Greek warfare in that he did not care for forcing a pitched battle through invading a *polis'* *chora* during the summer threatening to burn down the crops. His armies waged total war, instead of the ceremonial hoplite battle, aiming to completely annihilate their enemies, instead of forcing them to sign peace after defeating them in open battle.

³⁶⁴ Callias the tyrant of Chalcis started a war in order to create a league of Euboean city-states under his rule. Philip chose to back him in order to force the Athenians to intervene and ignore Chalcidice. The Athenians supported Plutarch who was the tyrant of Eretria (Dem. 9.57; Dem. 21.110; *FGrH* 328 F 160). The latter promised to provide Athens with troops but did not, and

Athenians won but a single pitched battle against the rebels, and that was quickly overturned after a decisive battle in which the full Athenian citizen army took part.³⁶⁵ The Chalcidians reverted to defending their fortified cities against Philip's besieging forces. Athens managed to have two thousand of its hoplites in Olynthus in time to defend it during its investment, nonetheless Olynthus was captured due to treachery, despite the best efforts of its defenders. The decision to ally with Olynthus and the Chalcidian League against Philip was correct, yet the problem was the military strategy that Athens followed rather than the alliance itself. Chalcidice would have served better Athens and its ally as a launching point for an invasion against Philip's domains. Yet, the Athenians never planned to invade and cancel Philip's nation-building in Macedonia at its early stages, instead they focused on passive defence. Hoping that by defending Olynthus would somehow be enough to negate Philip's ambitions, was more of an exercise in vanity rather than a sound strategy, for the only course of action that could have bestowed the Chalcidians and the Athenians with a favourable outcome had to be an invasion of Philip's power base, meaning his Macedonian territories.³⁶⁶ Having lost the opportunity to prevent Philip from destroying the Chalcidian League, the Athenians followed the only rational course of action left to them, and signed peace with Philip. The treaty known as the Peace of Philocrates procured an uneasy peace which was effectively a cold war between Athens and Philip. In 339/8 war broke out again as Philip, tired of Athenian passive-

because of that Phocion found himself under siege at Tamynae (Cawkwell 1962, pp. 127-130; Carter 1971, pp. 418-429; Worthington 2013, pp. 144-5).

³⁶⁵ Dem. 21.161-164; Plut. *Phoc.* 12-13.

³⁶⁶ Hobbes stated that passive defence is but an invitation to defeat, as those who increase their power by conquest, inevitably overwhelm those who wish to maintain their possessions through defence alone (1999, pp. 87-8). Hobbes argued in favour of maintaining the Stuart monarchy in the political context of the English Civil War. Nevertheless, that did not stop the school of realists from turning Hobbes' political views into an international relations' theory, hoping to establish realism's roots back to the seventeenth century. Regardless, Hobbes' argument fits perfectly in the context of the conflict involving Philip against Athens and the Chalcidian League.

aggression and meddling into what he viewed as his personal affairs, declared war on Athens, forcing the latter to ally with its old nemesis, Thebes.³⁶⁷

During Philip's descent into Southern Greece, the Athenians and their Boeotian allies chose to block the passes from Phocis. In this they were successful for a time, but again this strategy was nothing more than passive defence against Philip's forces.³⁶⁸ The only aggressive move the two allies attempted against Philip was their involvement in small-scale skirmishes against the latter's warbands. It would have been very difficult for the Athenians and the Thebans to attempt a counterattack against the Macedonian and Thessalian armies that were opposing them, since Philip had reinforced his own positions. The only sound military strategy for a counterattack against Philip would have been the employment of an Athenian expedition joined by Athens' allies in Thrace, against Philip's dominion, while the main bulk of his army was pinned in Central Greece. Thanks to lack of funds the Athenians did not attempt a simultaneous maritime attack, while defending the passes leading into Boeotia. Philip annihilated Athens' mercenary army, thanks to the incapacity of its commanders to enforce discipline and efficiently guard their own posts, rather than due to an extraordinary superiority in fighting skills by Philip's own men.³⁶⁹ In the following open battle at Chaeronea it was the superiority of mixed units tactics enforced by the Macedonian and Thessalian armies that decided the outcome, in lieu of a numerical or qualitative advantage over the Boeotian and Athenian phalanxes.³⁷⁰

³⁶⁷ Hammond (1977, pp. 554-5) has a realist perspective on the second conflict between Athens and Philip, arguing that its breakout was inevitable, for maintaining the Peace of Philocrates guaranteed that the Athenians would end up dominated by the Macedonian king.

³⁶⁸ Aeschin. 3.146-147.

³⁶⁹ Din. 1.74. Philip had allowed a messenger to be captured by the mercenaries of Chares and Proxenus, falsely informing them that Philip and a large part of his army had left for Thrace. This led to the relaxation of security at the Gravia Pass (Polyaen. 4.2.8).

³⁷⁰ Diod. 16.85.5-16.87.3. On the capabilities of the two sides' armies see Hammond 1994, pp. 149-151; Worthington 2008, pp. 147-9.

Military Tactics

The Macedonian infantry

The Revolution in Military Affairs proceeded differently in this period compared to the period between the battles of Aegospotami and Leuctra. No actual new military units were introduced, with the exception of the Macedonian phalanx, which was but a light variant of the traditional hoplite phalanx, forced to differ by the King's manpower demands and lack of funds in providing the full hoplite panoply to his soldiers. It was invented by the Athenian mercenary Charidemus, who was notorious for having served in opposing sides, and even Athens' own enemies.³⁷¹ Still despite the Macedonian phalanx's light equipment, its role in the battlefield was identical to that of heavy infantry.³⁷² The Macedonian phalanx was composed of the so called foot-companions, its members were either low-class Macedonians coming from all parts of Philip's domains and non-Macedonian Greeks in Philip's employ who had either chosen to take advantage of Philip's nation-building and make Macedonia their new home, and even Chalcidians who had been forced to move after the sack of Olynthus. All of Philip's troops were trained, armed, and paid by the royal treasury. The foot-companions wore light armor, if any, carried the small *pelte* as a protective shield, instead of the large, expensive, and unwieldy *hoplon*, and used a long pike with both arms rather than the one-handed spear carried by the hoplites. The foot-companions' equipment was cheaper than the hoplites', and it was paid for by the king, rather than the companions themselves, allowing Philip and Alexander to use

³⁷¹ Charidemus was not trusted by Alexander, and after Philip's death the new Macedonian king had the Athenian mercenary exiled, who in turn was employed by the Persian Empire (Arr. *An.* 1.10.6; Justin 11.4.9-12).

³⁷² Demosthenes (9.49) insinuated that Philip lacked a phalanx. The reason for this tragic misconception may be that during his visit to Macedonia Demosthenes may have failed to identify the Macedonian phalanx due to its lack of metallic armour, when compared to the Athenian hoplites. Worthington instead claims that Demosthenes repeatedly lied in regard to Philip's aims and the efficacy of his army, in order to convince the Athenian demos to go to war (2013, pp. 137-8, 154).

very large armies, unlike the city-states whose hoplites were limited to their farmers, because the latter had to cover on their own the costs of the expensive hoplite weapons and armour. That being said due to the foot-companions' lacking protective equipment, they were vulnerable in protracted melee engagements with other heavy infantry units, and often needed the assistance of either allied cavalry to disrupt the formation of the enemy, or when their own formation was lost, the intervention of the hypaspists was required in order to allow the foot-companions to reform.³⁷³

The hypaspists were originally servants to the Macedonian nobles, whom they accompanied in military campaigns. The hypaspists were reformed by Philip as an elite infantry force of three thousand that were heavily armored and well trained. They proved to be very efficient against the Theban heavy infantry in both Chaeronea and during the siege of the latter's city, as well as against Persian light infantry at the battles of Issus and Gaugamela. Fox was right to say that the hypaspists' glory, during Alexander's wars, was stolen by the foot-companions, only to be restored during the Successors' Wars.³⁷⁴ There was nothing innovative about them, as most city-states had developed *agemata* in the first half of the fourth century. Nonetheless, much like the Theban Sacred Band, the hypaspists were employed efficiently by Philip as reserve shock troops.

Athens' mercenary armies

In regard to the Athenians, they canonized the use of mercenary land armies, over citizen hoplites, due to the latter's weariness from constant warfare, as well as thanks to the citizens' detachment from protecting Athenian interests themselves. This phenomenon allowed Athens to employ highly experienced armies against its enemies, however it cost the Athenian *demos* an arm and a leg to employ such costly military units, especially after the breakout of the Social War. The incessant employment of mercenaries, made Athens' citizens avoid to go to war themselves, except in dire situations, such as during the revolt of Euboea, during the siege of Olynthus, and

³⁷³ Diod. 17.12.1.

³⁷⁴ Fox 1986, p. 78.

during the blockade of Philip's forces into South Greece. This had the ill effect that Athens' citizen army lacked combat experience, for which it paid a heavy cost at Chaeronea.

Mixed Units Tactics

Philip in his confrontations with the Illyrians, Olynthus, Onomarchus, and the joint Athenian-Theban armies proved that it was possible to defeat an enemy, despite his superior quality and equipment in heavy infantry, thanks to better utilizing mixed units. Philip's majority of infantry was not high quality, nor well armored, yet its job was to pin down the opposing phalanx, and allow his excellent cavalry to break the cohesion of the enemy's formation while engaged.³⁷⁵ Philip used this tactic against his enemies with enormous success, mainly because they chose to ignore the value of cavalry. Philip by becoming the Thessalian League's archon got hold of Greece's finest heavy cavalry, and modeled its Macedonian counterpart after it. The south Greeks continued to invest in heavy phalanxes manned by experienced mercenaries, or well-trained citizens. Their lack of a sizable and high quality heavy cavalry however, allowed Philip to always overwhelm them in the battlefield. The exception to this was the Olynthian cavalry, which however was smaller in number compared to the combination of its Macedonian and Thessalian counterpart. The Illyrians matched Philip's army in size, but they were lacking in quality. Phocis, and afterwards Athens and Thebes at Chaeronea did not match Philip in cavalry. The Athenians at Chaeronea fought very well against the Macedonian infantry, but after a feigned flight by their enemy, they engaged in pursuit, and thanks to lack of experience failed to reform before a Macedonian counterattack struck them. The Thebans did just as well against

³⁷⁵ Philip's cavalry was comprised of the Thessalian cavalry and his own, which was an imitation of the former. Heavy cavalry in coordination with infantry units, had made an impact against the more infantry-oriented armies of the south, during the conflict between Olynthus and the Peloponnesian League. Philip employed his cavalry in a very efficient manner, always outnumbering that of his opponents', using it to attack the enemy's infantry when the latter was engaged with his own phalanx.

the phalanx led by Alexander, but the Macedonian cavalry outmatched the Sacred Band in mobility, taking full advantage of the Theban heavy infantry's vulnerability at its flanks, before the Sacred Band could intervene in time. Philip's opponents sealed their fate, by over-relying in heavy infantry in order to achieve victory, while he was victorious thanks to investing more in the diversity of his own armed forces.

Conclusions

Athens missed the opportunity to become the hegemon of the Greek city-states, by lacking interest in taking over the Hellenic League, and by not reasserting the same liberal foreign policy that had led to the increase of her power during the 370s. The Athenians attempting to establish a hegemonic empire, while still relying on their allies for subsidies to operate their warmachine, proved out to be catastrophic. Athenian realpolitik had led to an alliance with autocratic powers such as Dionysius of Syracuse, Phocis, and Sparta, in order to wage war against the former ally and member-state of the Second Athenian League, democratic Thebes.³⁷⁶ The latter treated its Boeotian neighbours brutally, but beyond its own region Thebes pursued a programme of democratization and of providing assistance to city-states in experimenting with federalism. Yet, after Thebes had been contained in Central Greece due to its conflict with Phocis, the Athenians had the opportunity to regain their allies' trust, by resuming the past policies of promoting democracy and bringing freedom to the island city-states. Instead the Athenians distanced themselves from their own League and began to install *cleruchs* in the city-states that they liberated from foreign garrisons, by ousting the local citizens. This blatant form of imperialism did not sit well with many city-states in the Second Athenian League. Athens' allies got worried over whether they were going to suffer the same fate as the member-states of the Delian League nearly a century before. The Athenians having lost the financial support of the wealthiest member-states of the Second Athenian League were left with a small revenue that weakened them for many years, as their foreign policy was

³⁷⁶ Isoc. 5.44.

crippled due to being unable to cover the costs of democratic government and the upkeep of military operations simultaneously.

The Athenian grand strategy after the battle of Leuctra was flawed. The Athenians pursued two diametrically opposite strategies of alliances at once. On one hand they allied themselves to autocratic powers that were hostile to Thebes, and on the other they relied on the Second Athenian League to enhance their naval and economic power. The Second Athenian League's reason of existence was to oppose autocratic rule and to promote democracy, which was what Thebes was doing abroad. One way for the Athenians to legitimize the anti-Theban foreign policies to the member-states of the League, would have been to emphasize on the treatment of the Boeotians by the Thebans. In its own region Thebes had behaved as a cynical imperialist bringing harm to thousands without any possible way to justify those atrocities. Instead the Athenians demanded obedience from their allies as they pursued the war against Thebes in a fashion that seemed threatening to them. Perhaps the most important mistake of the Athenians, and one should be aware that this is argued *a posteriori*, was that they overestimated the Theban threat during the 350s. Thebes had lost its most influential generals, and its power was depleted due to the extravagant policies it pursued during the 360s, allowing Phocis to successfully revolt. The Thebans no longer presented a threat of great magnitude as they did in the 360s. However, it could be safe to assume that the Athenians were not only aiming to overthrow Thebes from their seat in international relations, but also to claim its possessions, by taking into account how quickly Athens jumped into Euboea as its cities revolted against Thebes.

The satrap Mausolus of Caria used this opportunity to harm Athenian power by annexing some Greek city-states. The Athenians ended up exhausted by the Social War and were unable to prevent Mausolus from appropriating some of their former allies, such as Rhodes. Not only they were not able to deter the satrap of Caria from conquering Greek communities, but even Philip of Macedon, sensing the vulnerability of the Athenians resulting from their recent conflict with the secessionists of the Second Athenian League, began to prey on their possessions near his territories. The Athenian shift in its strategy towards petty city-states brought the unintended consequence of weakening the cohesion of the Second Athenian League. The violent secession of the most important member-states of Athens' League left the latter without enough resources to pursue an active foreign policy and to cover the costs of

the exorbitant democratic government. The Athenian *demos* became introverted, as it constantly struggled with paying its citizens their salaries for taking part in democratic government, allowing foreign threats to inflate virtually unopposed, until they became obvious.

Philip used every means available to him in order to further his cause. Unlike the Greek city-states which were very selective on who should possess citizen-rights, Philip did not care about his subjects' origins whenever he established new city-states, advancing the level of his people's living conditions to that of the citizens of the southern city-states. With this policy he created wealthy communities that financed his endeavours, as well as grateful subjects who served enthusiastically in his armies. To Philip it did not matter whether someone was not born in the place where he was now living, by parents who had lived there before him as citizens. Philip only cared about increasing his own power, and he did that by benefiting his own subjects. Charidemus, an Athenian mercenary, well known for having served different sides in the same conflict, was hired by Philip and helped him organize a phalanx that could withstand a clash with hoplites. Thessaly offered Philip its own cavalry in return for assistance against tyrants who encroached on its city-states. Philip provided good services to his subjects and allies, and for that he was aptly rewarded with their loyalty and military services.

Athens could not have prevented Philip's advances in the heartland of Macedon, in Epirus and in Thessaly. The Athenians could have been successful however in disrupting Philip's influence in Chalcidice and Thrace. There Philip's own allies had grown disenchanted with his meteoric rise in power, and switched their allegiance to Athens. The Athenians in the case of the Chalcidian League ought to have pursued a more aggressive stance towards Philip, instead of relying on a passive defence and hoping for the best. Had they committed their full military strength in a joint-campaign with the armed forces of the Chalcidians, then Athens would have stood a chance in bringing Philip's rise in power to a halt. Nonetheless, an important reason why the Athenians were not as aggressive in that conflict as they should have been, was that they had grown weary of warfare due to the bitter outcome of the Social War. The Athenians were not ready to commit their full levy to a confrontation with Philip, as that would mean that they would have to commit the monies of the Theoric Fund for warfare, rather than the maintenance of their high standard of living. The

Chalcidian League, although it was of the highest strategic importance in the struggle with Philip, was too far away from Attica, for the Athenians to quickly realize how important its security from Philip's aggression was. Philip was also successful in using offshore balancing to draw Athenian military resources away from his forces, by instigating a revolt in Euboea. The Athenians were unsuccessful in quelling the revolt, but even had they been successful, that would not matter to Philip, as his purpose for initiating a proxy war had been to keep most of the Athenian armed forces away from Chalcidice.

Yet, Philip's own success provided Athens with opportunity, as the Thracian city-states having witnessed the tragic fate of Olynthus and the subjugation of the Thracian warlords, became disenchanted of their alliance with him, and sided themselves with Athens. The Athenians having learnt their lesson from their past failure in assisting Chalcidice, managed to aid Byzantium and Perinthus well enough for those city-states to survive Philip's incursions, even forcing him to change direction in his war strategy as he failed to achieve much in that region, due to the Athenian forces countering his plans.

Philip's increasing aggression alerted most Greek city-states and Athens seized the opportunity to lead a coalition against the Macedonian king. The Athenians even achieved in turning Thebes and the Boeotian League away from Philip, which was a great diplomatic victory. Yet, although the Athenians managed to conduct themselves very well in the anti-Phillipic coalition that they forged, victory did not depend upon diplomacy, but in the use of organized violence. Having dealt with their own financial issues the Athenians were able to hire thousands of mercenaries and employ them for months. The latter's sudden collapse under a Macedonian surprise attack was a heavy blow. Yet, the confrontation with Philip in the routes from Phocis into Boeotia was not going to last forever, and Athens and its allies should have made a plan to engage with Philip in pitched battle. Instead they were forced into battle at Chaeronea at Philip's terms, after the Macedonian-Thessalian army had crossed into Boeotia. Athens' responsibility for its defeat at Chaeronea was that its army was outdated when compared to the military force that Philip commanded. Although the Athenian infantry performed well initially during the clash with the Macedonian phalanx, all it could do well was to push forward. It was unable to manoeuvre in the field, and fell victim to a feigned flight. Not only the Athenian infantry could not have performed such a feat

itself, after suffering casualties from this, it failed altogether to reform and reengage the enemy in a proper fashion. The Athenian hoplites broke formation and routed, leaving the Thebans to fend off against Philip's full force by themselves.³⁷⁷

Should we consider that everything Demosthenes claimed on Macedon as true, we still cannot explain why Athens ended up losing its autonomy to Philip. Demosthenes accused Philip of failing to keep his word, and of leading his armies against cities after he had sent them his envoys to assure them that all he wanted was peace. Philip's lack of Greek city-state élan was not the main reason why he was ultimately successful and not Athens. The Athenians and their opponents throughout the fourth century had brought innovation into Greek warfare, introducing siege artillery, professional light infantry, and heavy cavalry. The city-states however, already had long military traditions, which they were unwilling to accommodate along with recent innovations in Greek warfare. The Thebans and the Athenians continued to mainly depend on the performance of their hoplite phalanx, while the Thessalians only seemed to have cavalry as something that performed well on the battlefield. Philip's armed forces lacked any significant military tradition and had no great record of victories. Philip adopted the Thebans' training of the Sacred Band for his own hypaspists, his own light infantry took after Iphicrates' peltasts, the Macedonian aristocracy was made to ride in the same fashion as the Thessalian cavalry, while the poorest of his own subjects joined the Macedonian phalanx to serve as pikemen. The Athenians introduced no significant military reforms at this time. In fact they distained from using mixed units tactics at Chaeronea, probably due to the dislike of the citizen-hoplites for the foreign mercenaries who served as peltasts, and thanks to the ill-belief that the latter were not a reliable armed force when it came to conflict with a powerful opponent such as the Macedonian armed forces.

Still Athens and Thebes could have avoided the loss of their autonomy and of their leagues had they accepted Philip's peace offer before the battle of Chaeronea.³⁷⁸

³⁷⁷ NATO's former commander in the Bosnian War Rupert Smith claimed that the idiom that states prepare for the last war is wrong; states actually prepare for the wrong war (2006, p. x). In regard to the conflict between Philip and Athens ranging from Chalcidice to Boeotia the Athenians proved him right.

³⁷⁸ Aeschin. 3.148.

Thebes would have kept control of Boeotia, and Athens would still have the Second Athenian League at its side. Yet, Demosthenes' intransigence cost both city-states a heavy price, proving that despite his rhetorical skill, when it came to statesmanship he was no equal to Philip.³⁷⁹

³⁷⁹ Habicht wrote that Lycurgus succeeded Demosthenes in the leadership of the democratic faction in the following years, making the period known as Lycurgan (1997, p. 8). The Athenian democrats might have forced this succession due to considering Demosthenes' intransigence during the negotiations before the battle of Chaeronea as responsible for the Athenian and Theban defeat.

Chapter Four: From the aftermath of Chaeronea up to the end of the Lamian War (338-322 BC)

Historical Overview

The death of Philip and the Theban Revolt

The Athenian demos after Chaeronea decided to avoid direct conflict with Philip. It allied with Macedon, by joining the newly founded League of Corinth. The new League was the Macedonian king's own, helping him promote his own interests in Greece, despite Corinth being its seat. Philip was voted Hegemon of the Corinthian League, and unlike the Hellenic League founded in the late 360s, its new version was to prepare to reignite the Persian Wars. Meanwhile the Athenian demos undertook a vigorous programme in order to reinvigorate the economy and to create powerful armed forces, that would in the future meet Macedon's experienced armies as equals on the battlefield.

Philip was murdered in 336, when only a small contingent of his armies was campaigning in Asia Minor under the joint command of Antipater and Attalus. Alexander took over the Macedonian throne, quickly executing Attalus, along with several of his family members who also laid claim to the throne. The Athenians initially underestimated Alexander, after all he was but an inexperienced youth, whose only act of note was the defeat of the Theban phalanx at Chaeronea. Despite his military success at his father's side, Alexander had not displayed any skill at statesmanship and diplomacy, and it was still dubious whether he would manage to hold together his father's kingdom.

Alexander soon after personally defeated armies of Thracians and Illyrians, but as the opponents of the Macedonian hegemony began spreading fake news about his death in Illyria, the situation in Greece became unstable. The Persians offered three hundred talents to the Athenian demos to engage in anti-Macedonian activities, which the latter refused to take, but Demosthenes accepted, and used it to arm Theban exiles, and send

them off back to Thebes. They in turn overthrew the oligarchic government established by Philip, but failed to overpower the Macedonian garrison at Cadmea. Alexander, by force-marching his army, managed to arrive very soon in order to assist his garrison within Thebes. He failed to reach a peaceful solution, as the Theban leaders refused to sign peace, and proclaimed the Great King rightful overlord of Greece, as his predecessors had been recognized by the Peace of Antalcidas. The matter came to a violent resolution, as by accident Alexander's forces managed to capture Thebes in but a single day. His Thracian mercenaries, and Boeotian allies committed terrible atrocities against the Theban population, the city was razed, and its population ended up in servitude. Alexander sought to punish the Athenians involved in the Theban Revolt, yet Athenian envoys managed to convince him otherwise, luckily for Athens the Arcadian mercenaries hired by Demosthenes to assist the Thebans, did not reach the latter in time.

The Revolt of Agis III

The next incident in Greek affairs took place during Alexander's confrontation with Darius after the battle of Issus. The Great King's navy had made a quite successful counterattack against the Greek city-states belonging to the Macedonian zone of influence in the Aegean. Yet, when Alexander laid siege to the Phoenician polis of Tyre, its Phoenician enemies joined him, and after the city was captured through a brutal seven-months long siege, all of Phoenician Syria capitulated. With the Phoenician city-states coming to Alexander's side, the Persian fleet abandoned its operations, as the ships and crews were comprised of Phoenicians. Nonetheless, the Persian commanders funded the Spartan king Agis III and he hired a large mercenary army, in order to create a diversion for Alexander back in Greece. Agis acquired an army of significant size, which was filled mainly with Greek mercenaries who had served Darius at the battle of Issus. However, he limited his campaigns to the Peloponnese, by waging war against the Megalopolitans and the Messenians. Since no one in all of Greece felt nostalgic for the Spartan hegemony, Agis found himself politically isolated, despite his overtures to bring down the Macedonian hegemony. Antipater was not the most popular of regents in Greece, but Macedonian rule in

South Greece was quite lenient, and was viewed as preferable to a return to the cruelty of Lacedaemonian rule. Neither Athens nor any of the other member-states of the League of Corinth seceded, on the contrary they allowed thousands of their citizens to volunteer to join Antipater's army, bolstering the latter's forces to nearly double the size of the Lacedaemonian army. Antipater met with Agis outside Megalopolis and routed his army, with the Spartan king lying dead on the battlefield. Sparta came under the Macedonian sphere of influence, Antipater sent to Alexander's court fifty Spartans as hostages, the defeated city-state joined the League of Corinth, and all of its allies ended up with Macedonian garrisons installed within them.

The Harpalus' Affair and the Exiles' Decree

In 323 after Alexander returned back to the Persian heartland of his Empire from the Indian campaigns, he began a purge of the satraps that he had placed in their positions. During Alexander's long absence the satraps raised their own private armies, by hiring tens of thousands of unemployed Greek mercenaries. Alexander identified this as a challenge to his rule and executed several of them in his eastern domains, and ordered the rest to disband their private armed forces.³⁸⁰ Harpalus who had served in Asia Minor as the empire's treasurer, was alarmed by his overlord's menacing behaviour. In addition to hiring thousands of mercenaries who had previously served Darius against Alexander, Harpalus was also guilty of embezzling the state's funds. Not wanting to end up like his eastern colleagues, Harpalus fled to Athens, which had rewarded him with citizenship, for his past assistance in providing the city with sufficient grain during a shortage crisis. He was welcomed into the city, albeit the private army accompanying him was not. Harpalus proposed an alliance to the Athenians, and provided them with seven hundred talents. When Alexander demanded that Harpalus be expedited to him, the Athenian demos placed Harpalus

³⁸⁰ Badian identified the crossing of the Gedrosian desert as the true reason behind the Satraps' purge (1961, p. 21). Alexander was no saint, but the raising of mercenary armies by the satraps during the Great King's absence in India being a serious act of insubordination, could not be uncontested.

under arrest, but apparently thanks to bribing several Athenian politicians Harpalus escaped from the city. After Harpalus' flight from Athens only half the amount that he had brought with him was still stored in the Acropolis. The Athenians issued an inquiry by the Areopagus, which reported that several prominent Athenians, among them Demades and Demosthenes, had pocketed the missing amount from the money that Harpalus had brought with him. Harpalus ended up being murdered by a Spartan officer of his own corps, and the Athenian demos found itself embarrassed from a corruption scandal that got out of hand.

The next crisis that the Athenians found themselves in happened in the summer of 324. During the Olympic Games Alexander issued a decree concerning the fate of the Greek city-states' tens of thousands of exiles. As hegemon of the Corinthian League Alexander ordered all of the member-states of the League he was in charge of, to allow their exiles to return back home. This outraged all of Greece, for the city-states had benefited from the long absence of the exiles, by confiscating these peoples' lands and turning them into common land, in order to deal with their financial issues. The sudden return of thousands of Greeks back to their original homes, was going to break the social balance that these states had managed to establish with great difficulty, bringing to an end the long period of civil strife taking place in Greece. Yet, the ones who were most vocal about this issue were the Aetolians and the Athenians. The former were going to lose the lands of the Oeniadae and Athens its hold over Samos. Yet, again the Athenians kept their calm and did not declare war, which they were certainly going to lose; instead they sent to the Macedonian king gifts, and envoys, asking to be an exception to this decree.

The Lamian War

In 323 Alexander died in Babylon, and the Athenian demos upon hearing the news was barely able to contain its joy, and not immediately go to war against Antipater. Against general Phocion's sound advice, the Athenians declared war, hijacking the majority of the member-states of the Corinthian League in the process, which had grown disenchanted with Alexander thanks to his autocratic ways in dealing with them. The Athenian general Leosthenes moved to occupy Thermopylae in order to

prevent the Macedonian army from entering Central Greece. The Boeotians attempted to prevent Leosthenes and his mercenaries from joining with the Athenian citizen-army at Thermopylae, and suffered a crushing defeat that prevented them from playing any significant role for the rest of the conflict. Antipater moved quickly with his armies from Macedonia to Central Greece, in order to quell this uprising before it got out of hand. Nevertheless, when he approached the Athenian army at Thermopylae, his Thessalian allies changed sides, providing the latter with an advantage in heavy cavalry. In the ensuing pitched battle Antipater was defeated, notwithstanding he managed to withdraw in good order back into Lamia, and the Athenians and their allies, led by general Leosthenes, laid siege against him. Leosthenes, who had hired thousands of Greek mercenaries from Taenarum, and successfully led a joint army against Antipater's Macedonians, was killed in a skirmish that took place outside of Lamia's walls. He was succeeded by another capable Athenian general called Antiphilus.

The Lamian War was decided in the Aegean Sea, as the Athenian navy struggled to intercept the Alexandrian navy, and in a series of sea battles ended up utterly crushed. With the Athenian navy gone, the Macedonians were able to bring reinforcements directly to Antipater, as well as lead amphibious assaults against the rebellious city-states whose armies were pinned in Lamia. The first wave of reinforcements came directly to Antipater's aid, but they were defeated by the Athenian coalition, and their commander Leonnatus was killed in action. Nevertheless, Antipater succeeded in escaping from Lamia while the Athenians were engaged against the Macedonian reinforcements. Antipater withdrew back to Macedonia with the remaining forces of his own and Leonnatus' armies. There he was later joined by Craterus, who brought with him thousands of Macedonian veterans from Alexander's campaigns, as well as a large amount of gold.³⁸¹ Antipater and Craterus led together their joint-forces, against the Athenians who were left only with their mercenaries and the Thessalians, since the rest of the allies had returned to their homes, in order to defend their own city-states from the rampaging Macedonian navy. Athens itself suffered a large-scale amphibious

³⁸¹ Craterus was a very high-ranking Macedonian companion whom Alexander had entrusted with the training of about thirty thousand Persian youths to serve as pikemen in the Macedonian heavy infantry.

assault in Attica, while the largest and best part of its army was serving in Central Greece. Phocion, completely unforeseen, defeated the Macedonians, with an army hastily raised with mostly men past military age and youths.³⁸² In Central Greece the Macedonian armies met with the Athenians and the Thessalians near Crannon, and thanks to their numerical superiority, forced the latter into a defensive position. While the Athenians and their allies were unable to leave their position or be faced with defeat, Antipater captured through siege several Thessalian cities, forcing the Thessalian army into surrender. The Athenians, whose only alternative was to maintain the war by suffering a siege of Athens which would inevitably lead to its violent capture, surrendered to Antipater. The Macedonian regent, not being as lenient as Philip had been after the battle of Chaeronea, forced the demos to disenfranchise thousands of Athenian citizens, by introducing property requirements in order to possess civil rights. Antipater then offered to the disenfranchised veteran Athenians employment as mercenaries in Thrace, bolstering his own forces in the tumultuous region.³⁸³ A Macedonian garrison was installed in Athens, and until the Second Macedonian War, the city remained a prize that the Successors fought over amongst themselves, losing forever its own claim to hegemony and democratic self-government.³⁸⁴

Alliances

The rejected alliances with Thebes - Sparta – Harpalus

In the years between Philip's death and the breakout of the Lamian War the Athenians were offered with an alliance against Alexander three times. The reasons why Athens chose to remain ostensibly loyal to the Macedonian king and its membership of the Corinthian League, had to do with the fact that the Athenians in all three occasions

³⁸² Plut. *Phoc.* 24.1-25.2.

³⁸³ Ibid. 28.4.

³⁸⁴ Ibid. 27.3-4.

judged that the conditions for open warfare against Macedon were not ripe yet. Their post-war rebuilding programme proves that the Athenians were not happy with the new order established by Philip after the Battle of Chaeronea, in fact they were preparing to overthrow the Macedonians as soon as they found the right opportunity.

Thebes

Demosthenes instigated the Theban Revolt by using Persian funds to supply Theban exiles, who were at the time staying in Athens, and sent them off to Thebes to overthrow the oligarchic government that had been established by Philip in 338.³⁸⁵ The Theban leaders of the insurrection being former Boeotarchs, Demosthenes should have expected that they were not going to limit their ambition only to Thebes. Perhaps Demosthenes hoped that they would overthrow Alexander's puppet government and oust the Macedonian garrison from the Cadmea, but the former Boeotarchs also wanted to reclaim Thebes' hegemony in Boeotia. It is highly unlikely that should such a thing come to pass the Athenians would be happy about it. The Athenians had overthrown the Theban hegemony over Euboea in the past, and always sought to maintain Plataea in their own zone of influence, which had brought them into direct confrontation with Thebes.³⁸⁶ The restoration of the Boeotian League after 371 had been seen as a direct threat to Athenian interests, and caused a conflict between the two allies, that lasted for nearly two decades. The Athenians completely gave up Boeotia to Thebes only after Philip threatened their own *polis* with siege, and were desperate for an alliance with the powerful Boeotian city-state.³⁸⁷

The leaders of the Theban Revolt had set completely unrealistic goals for their own *polis*, for the Boeotian city-states were quite happy with Macedonian hegemony.

³⁸⁵ Aeschin. 3.160; Arr. *An.* 1.7.1; Din. 1.10-11; Diod. 17.8.5; Plut. *Dem.* 23.1.

³⁸⁶ Aeschin. 3.85.

³⁸⁷ Aeschines claimed that Demosthenes betrayed Athenian interests by giving up all of Boeotia to Thebes, for the outcome of the war proved that the Macedonian king was moving against the Thebans and not Athens, Demosthenes knowingly chose to hide that fact from the Athenian demos (3.140-143). Diod. 16.84.5-16.85.1.

Philip had restored Orchomenus, Plataea, and Thespiae, as well as removed the Theban colonists from the rest of the Boeotian city-states, and had restored the Boeotian exiles to their original homes. The Thebans based their foreign policy according to nostalgia for a past that was not going to be realized ever again. Hoping to repeat the series of events that led to the battle of Leuctra was a folly. In 336 Philip and Alexander had far better relations with their own allies, than Sparta did in 371 with its own. By the battle of Leuctra Thebes had achieved a streak of victories over Lacedaemonian armies, and Athens had destroyed the Spartan maritime empire. In 336 Thebes had had its military strength depleted by constant warfare against Phocis' mercenary armies, and had also suffered a devastating defeat at Chaeronea alongside Athens, the latter becoming part to the Macedonian system of hegemony on its own accord, by joining the League of Corinth.³⁸⁸ The Theban leaders having failed to take the Boeotian city-states to their own side, had no chance at overthrowing the Macedonian dominance of Greece, no city-state in the south of Greece made any attempt to join their rebellion, fearing for their own fate.³⁸⁹ Demosthenes sought to hire Arcadian mercenaries and send them to Thebes' aid, but luckily for Athens he failed to do so in time, and Alexander arrived at the revolting city before any reinforcements could reach it.³⁹⁰ The Athenians had a good understanding of how vain it would have been to ally themselves to Thebes for a rematch with Alexander. After all, since Athens had lost the Second Athenian League, and Thebes was no longer in charge of Boeotia's joint-armed forces, it was obvious that the two *poleis*, being weaker than before, would not be able to defeat the Macedonian king, whose power had but increased since the battle of Chaeronea. The Theban rebels should have signed a peace treaty with Alexander and given up armed struggle, as they stood with no allies and their city was under siege facing an army at least three times the size of their own. Had the Theban *demos* chosen a peaceful resolution instead of pursuing war, it would have retained a democratic government and its city-state, albeit with a

³⁸⁸ Plut. *Phoc.* 16.4-5.

³⁸⁹ The Thebans had asked their old Peloponnesian allies from Elis, Arcadia, and Argos to join them in a coalition against Macedon (Diod. 17.8.4), but the latter delayed sending their troops to Thebes, waiting to see which side was winning (Diod. 17.8.6; Justin 11.3.3-5; Plut. *Dem.* 23.2).

³⁹⁰ Aeschin. 3.240; Din. 1.20-21.

Macedonian garrison still stationed at Cadmea as guarantee of Theban loyalty to Alexander.³⁹¹ Instead of consolidating on what they had already gained and signing a peace treaty, the Theban democrats chose to remain at war.³⁹² They trained the Theban army well, and defeated the first wave of attackers, but since Alexander's army was vast, the Thebans would have never been able to defeat such a large military force on their own.³⁹³ In fact the Boeotians, upon whom Thebes' had relied on in the past, in order to boost its own military power, served with the enemy and committed atrocities in revenge for Thebes' domination of their own cities in the past.³⁹⁴ The Theban leadership was out of touch with reality, and should be considered partly responsible for the destruction of its own city-state. Had the Athenian *demos* lost its common sense, and joined the Theban Revolt, in the best case scenario it would have suffered Thebes' fate after Chaeronea, having a Macedonian garrison installed at the Acropolis and changed its constitution into an oligarchy, otherwise it could have been set as an example like Thebes, with the whole city razed and the Athenian population forced into slavery.

Agis III

In 331 the Spartan king Agis received Persian subsidies from the Persian admirals who were engaged in terrorizing the Aegean as a distraction for Alexander.³⁹⁵ They did so after the battle of Issus had taken place, as tens of thousands of Greek mercenaries were returning to Greece, while contact with Persian authorities was lost, due to the annexation of Syria and Egypt by the Macedonians.³⁹⁶ Agis III took advantage of

³⁹¹ According to Plutarch Alexander demanded the surrender of two Theban demagogues to his court (*Alex.* 11.4), he did not seek to replace Theban democracy with an oligarchy like Philip did after the battle of Chaeronea.

³⁹² Diod. 17.9.1.

³⁹³ Ibid. 17.11.4-17.12.2.

³⁹⁴ Arr. *An.* 1.7.8-1.9.10.

³⁹⁵ Diod. 17.62.4-6.

³⁹⁶ Ibid. 17.48.1.

Antipater's occupation with a Thracian revolt and started a war in Greece hoping that he would be joined by the city-states under the Macedonian hegemony.³⁹⁷ Antipater attacked the Megalopolitans and the Messenians, and sent envoys to many Greek cities, including Athens, but he was joined only by some Arcadian city-states, Achaea, and Elis.³⁹⁸ The Athenians despite their aversion for the Macedonian hegemony, had more reasons to reject an alliance with Sparta against Antipater.

Most member-states of the Corinthian League refused Agis' offers for a renewed war against Macedonia, because they did not see any benefit in replacing the moderate Macedonian hegemony with a new Spartan Empire.³⁹⁹ Should Sparta achieve its goals, it would become the master of the Peloponnese once more, install oligarchic puppet governments that would quite likely engage in purges of the opposition, and force the Greek city-states to have Lacedaemonian garrisons in their acropolises. Until Agis' Revolt in the Peloponnese the Macedonians had installed a garrison only in Corinth, which served as a security force protecting the council of the League, instead of an occupation army enforcing a puppet regime.⁴⁰⁰ It was highly unlikely for the Greeks to genuinely desire the replacement of Macedon's projection of soft power in South Greece with the brutal Spartan autocratic rule.⁴⁰¹

³⁹⁷ Ibid. 17.62.4-6. On Memnon's revolt in Thrace see Badian 1967, p. 179; Burn 1952, p. 84; Hammond 1977, p. 619.

³⁹⁸ Diod. 17.62.7. Fox wrote that the Spartan ecclesia procrastinated in going to war with Macedon, having lost its opportunity to participate at the battle of Chaeronea (1986, p. 223). The actual reason why no Spartan troops were present at Chaeronea was that during the same year the Spartan king Archidamus was killed in action in South Italy alongside a Lacedaemonian expeditionary army in an engagement with barbarians (Diod. 16.88.3). Cf. Badian 1967, p. 172.

³⁹⁹ Bosworth makes the same argument as well (1993, p. 204).

⁴⁰⁰ In South Greece Alexander had displaced the Theban population, sacked Thebes, and installed a garrison in the area, but in order not to displease the Boeotians; the latter were permitted to divide Thebes' *chora* amongst themselves.

⁴⁰¹ The city-states of Achaea, Arcadia and Elis that joined Agis' Revolt must have been lured by the gold that Sparta received from the Persian admirals, yet the rest of the Greek city-states chose to remain loyal to Alexander (Bosworth 1993, p. 204.).

Agis certainly did not make his cause more appealing by starting a war with Megalopolis and Messene. Had the Spartan oligarchy tolerated Megalopolis at its borders, and recognized the secession of Messene, and asked its two neighbours for an alliance in order to topple Macedonian interference with Peloponnesian affairs, then Agis would have had an actual chance at forging strong alliances with most of the Peloponnesian city-states and Athens.⁴⁰² Instead the Spartans desired to turn back time and restore Lacedaemon to its previous extent.⁴⁰³ The way to do that was by destroying Megalopolis and Ithome, which betrayed the fact that the ruthless Spartan ways of ruling had not changed at all, since the collapse of its empire in the late 370s.⁴⁰⁴

The Athenians, besides the fact that they were not interested in the destruction of Megalopolis, Ithome, and the subjugation of the rest of the Peloponnesians to Sparta, also had to worry about their own hostages held by Alexander. Due to joining the Corinthian League, the Athenian *demos* was obligated with providing a small-sized fleet to Alexander that was engaged in naval military operations. Although the Athenian naval contingent was of marginal value to Alexander's war effort, its true role was that its crews were de facto hostages of Alexander, and should Athens ally with Persia or take part in any anti-Macedonian activity, their lives would be forfeit. Additionally Alexander still had under his possession probably hundreds if not thousands of Athenian mercenaries that he had captured and imprisoned at the battle

⁴⁰² Sparta and its Arcadian and Achaean allies, being on the losing side of Agis' Revolt, were forced to receive Macedonian garrisons in their cities, and to send hostages to Alexander (Aeschin. 3.133). When Athens started the Lamian War they were not able to join Athens' coalition due to the presence of Macedonian troops in their own territories, and probably due to not having recovered from their recent defeat yet.

⁴⁰³ The Spartan strategy against Macedon was completely flawed from the beginning of the war. Instead of seeking to lead the southern Greeks in a joint campaign against Antipater in Central Greece, the Spartans declared war on their own neighbours. The Spartan strategy-makers challenged the Macedonian system of security in a way that enhanced the dependence of the member-states of the Corinthian League upon Macedon for protection.

⁴⁰⁴ Even before the establishment of Macedonian hegemony in South Greece the Athenians feared the fall of Megalopolis to Lacedaemon, as well as the restoration of Messene to the latter (Dem. 6.19-22).

of Granicus. Had the Athenians joined Agis, then their relatives and friends would suffer Macedonian retribution.

Plutarch claimed that the Athenian *demos* was determined to ally with Sparta against Antipater, yet the Athenians changed their mind right before the voting to go to war, because Demades stated that the war effort would exhaust the Theoric Fund.⁴⁰⁵ Having mentioned all of the problems the Greek city-states experienced in allying with Sparta against Macedonia, it is highly unlikely that the Athenians intended to vote to go to war.⁴⁰⁶ Nevertheless, due to the loss of the Second Athenian League, the Athenians were more aware of their financial issues than ever before. The exhaustion of the Theoric Fund stood as an obstacle to declaring war, as well as that Alexander used effectively the Athenian hostages as a means to hinder Athens' philo-Persian rhetoricians from convincing the *demos* to declare war against him.⁴⁰⁷

Harpalus

After Harpalus fled from his position as treasurer, taking with him five thousand talents, six thousand Greek mercenaries, and thirty ships, he went to Athens asking for an alliance against Alexander.⁴⁰⁸ Although the Athenians had bestowed on him citizenship for having supplied them with grain during a shortage-crisis, they did not

⁴⁰⁵ Plut. *Cleom.* 27.1; *De Virt. Mor.* 818e-f.

⁴⁰⁶ Hammond wrote that *On the Treaty with Alexander* was Demosthenes' proposal to ally with Agis, and to declare war against Antipater (1977, p. 619). The speech may have been delivered at that time, but it displays none of the rhetorical skills possessed by Demosthenes. Badian on the other hand argued that Demosthenes took revenge on the Spartans for not sending troops to him at Chaeronea, by convincing the Athenians not to join Agis (1967, pp. 182-3). However, it is possible that the Athenians were planning to revolt should Alexander perish at Gaugamela as they were hoping (Habicht 1997, p.21).

⁴⁰⁷ Worthington (2013, pp. 191-3) claimed that Demosthenes did not advocate joining the Spartans. Due to the destruction of Thebes in 335, Demosthenes had realized that Macedonian power in Greece was absolute, and resisting it would prove fatal to the Athenians.

⁴⁰⁸ Diod. 17.108.6.

initially accept him for two reasons.⁴⁰⁹ If Harpalus entered Athens alongside his mercenary army that would be perceived as a declaration of war by Antipater, secondly Harpalus in command of six thousand mercenaries posed a security risk on his own.⁴¹⁰ There was no guarantee that the Macedonian treasurer would not attempt to reconcile with Alexander by capturing Piraeus for him.⁴¹¹ Harpalus wanting to convince the Athenians of his good intentions, left his army at Taenarum, which was an old Lacedaemonian military base that had turned into a refuge for Greek mercenaries. Harpalus entered Athens without his army, but he did bring with him seven hundred talents in order to convince the Athenians into going to war. However, the Macedonian treasurer had his proposition rejected, and the *demos* decided to heed the appeals of Antipater, Olympias, and Philoxenus, and have Harpalus arrested.⁴¹² The Macedonian asylum seeker escaped through committing bribery, yet although he did not start a war, he did manage to involve many prominent Athenians in a scandal of corruption. After Harpalus' departure from Athens the *demos* wanted to return the funds that he had brought with him back to Alexander as a move of good will. Nevertheless, in the Acropolis only half the amount that Harpalus had brought with him was found. The Areopagus after investigating the case, came to the conclusion that Demades and Demosthenes, among others were involved in the case of missing money.⁴¹³ Demades paid a fine and forfeited all of his political influence, while Demosthenes unable to cover the fine was forced into exile.⁴¹⁴

The Athenians were right not to go into an alliance with Harpalus. In the past he had benefited them by supplying them with grain, when there was a food shortage in the city, and for that the *demos* awarded him with citizenship. Yet, going to war just to save the hide of a corrupt royal official was out of the question, despite the fact that he

⁴⁰⁹ On Harpalus supplying Athens with grain, and the *demos* rewarding him with the Athenian citizenship see Python, TGrF1, no. 91, F 1.16.

⁴¹⁰ Parke commented that had the Athenians allowed Harpalus to enter Athens with his army, then such a provocation would have been received as a declaration of war by Antipater and Alexander (1993, p. 202).

⁴¹¹ Bosworth 1993, p. 216.

⁴¹² Diod. 17.108.7; Hyp. 5.8; Paus. 2.33.4.

⁴¹³ Din. 1.53, 1.89; Hyp. 5.10; Plut. *Dem.* 26.1-3.

⁴¹⁴ Plut. *Dem.* 27.6.

possessed Athenian citizenship. Harpalus brought with him considerable resources to start a war, yet the Athenians correctly judged that those were not enough to go to war against the wealthiest and most powerful individual on the planet.⁴¹⁵ Harpalus had no military credentials, and was not in charge of any coalition against Alexander. As soon as the Macedonian king returned from his military campaigns in India, and discovered that his own satraps were raising private armies he executed four of them, as well as three of his generals.⁴¹⁶ The survivors of the purge disbanded their armies, lest they would become examples as well. Were Harpalus a capable negotiator and military commander he would have raised the disgruntled satraps in open rebellion against Alexander, and then asked Athens and the rest of the city-states for a military alliance against the new Great King. In fact Harpalus did not pose any real threat against Alexander's empire, and it proved out a mistake coming to Athens, for he almost found himself expedited to the Macedonian authorities, being saved instead in the last minute by bribing prominent Athenians who helped him escape.⁴¹⁷ The only thing of significance, that Harpalus achieved by appealing to the Athenian *demos*, was the international humiliation of Athens in a scandal that cost Demades and Demosthenes their political careers.

The Corinthian League

The League of Corinth was established in 338 by Philip, after the battle of Chaeronea. The military alliance between Athens and Thebes failed to contain the Macedonian king in Central Greece, and he and his forces could now march on any city-state in the south without meeting any significant obstacles. Yet, Philip did not imitate the ruthless Spartan hegemony, instead he chose to build a security-system that would promote

⁴¹⁵ Ferguson considered Harpalus a worthy ally for Athens to rise in revolt against Alexander (1911, p. 13).

⁴¹⁶ Arr. An. 6.27.4, 7.4.1-3; Diod. 17.108.6.

⁴¹⁷ Worthington (2013, pp. 210-6) thinks that Harpalus arrived in Athens after the release of the Exiles Decree, ordering the Greek city-states to receive back thousands of exiles who had been gone from their homes for years, adding even more anxiety to the *demos*' meetings.

Macedonian interests as well as maintain the status-quo in the southern city-states. The Corinthian League's main difference from the Hellenic League established in 362/361 was that it had a hegemon who was willing to further the Hellenic cause in Asia.⁴¹⁸ Philip ordered the member-states to organize an army of their own for an invasion of the Great King's domains, in order to bring forth a reckoning for the destruction of Greek temples during the Persian Wars over a century and a half ago. Philip had united the Greeks before under his command in the Sacred Wars against Phocis and Athens, and was about to repeat the same strategy against the Persians as well.

Philip however was murdered in 336, and was succeeded by his son Alexander. Alexander left Antipater in charge of the Greek affairs, and proceeded against the Great King with mainly Illyrian, Macedonian, Thessalian, and Thracian troops. He did not bother to stay any longer in Greece, as his state was already in great debt. Alexander disbanded the Macedonian fleet, and invaded Asia Minor with over thirty thousand troops. Alexander's indifference for the Corinthian League, gave the Persians an edge in recruiting Greek mercenaries, as around fifty thousand of them were hired by the Great King for his empire's defence, instead of the Greek city-states hiring them for the needs of the Hellenistic Campaign. Still the League of Corinth maintained the peace in Greece, as its member-states had to rely upon Macedonian protection in order to remain free from Spartan aggression. After the defeat and capitulation of Sparta at the end of Agis' Revolt, the cohesion of the League of

⁴¹⁸ Cargill (1981, p. 186) claimed that the League of Corinth imitated the Second Athenian League in the same way that modern military regimes imitate the institutions of republican government, Hammond (c.f. 1977, pp. 571-2) argued that the League of Corinth had more in common with the Hellenic League founded in 362/361. Cargill based his argument on the fact that Alexander showed the true colours of the League of Corinth, when he razed Thebes for attempting to secede, in order to discourage any potential deserters in the future (1981, p. 187). In regard to the ultimate fate of Thebes, Cargill seems to ignore the fact, that it was the Boeotians who carried out the worst atrocities during its sack and later demanded Thebes' destruction from Alexander (*Arr. An.* 1.7.8-1.9.10).

Corinth begun to come under pressure, since with both Persia and Sparta vanquished, there was no foreign threat left that would serve as a cohesive factor to the alliance.⁴¹⁹

Alexander, after pacifying an insurgency in Central Asia, and leading a brutal invasion into Pakistan, began managing his empire with a statesmanship less moderate than that of his father. During the Olympic Games of 324 Alexander surprised everyone in Greece by releasing the Exiles' Decree.⁴²⁰ He ordered all of the Greek city-states to receive back their exiles, who were gone from their original homes for many years, and if any city-state refused to comply Antipater would use force against it.⁴²¹ According to the constitution of the League, Alexander as its Hegemon had to consult with his allies first, the member-states were not comprised of puppet governments to be given orders in all of a sudden.⁴²² Alexander, apparently due to his vast elevation in power, and adoption of the eastern autocratic style of rule, treated his allies with less tact than ever before, much like the Spartans did after their own triumph in the Peloponnesian War, with the decree that ordered all of the Greek city-states not to accept Athenian refugees fleeing from the reign of terror unleashed by the Thirty. This behaviour alienated Alexander from his own Greek, with Athens and Aetolia being the most offended of them all for they would lose control of Samos, and Oeniadae. The Athenians forged close ties with the Aetolians, but chose not to act on this yet, instead they appeased Alexander by recognizing his divinity and sending him gifts in Babylon.⁴²³

⁴¹⁹ Agis' Revolt and the collapse of the Persian Empire confirmed Luttwak's iron law of coalitions that as they are "formed to resist enemies, they do not long outlast them" (2003, p. 83).

⁴²⁰ Din. 1.82.

⁴²¹ Arr. An. 7.19.1. The only exception from the Exiles' Decree were the Boeotians, the Thebans were not allowed to restore their *polis*.

⁴²² The constitution of the League of Corinth (IG II² 236). Hammond despite the lack of evidence wrote that Alexander must have consulted with the League's member-states on the Exiles' Decree (1977, p. 636), Botsford and Robinson, as well as Cary thought otherwise (1977, p. 410; 1951, p. 5).

⁴²³ Arr. An. 7.19.1; Din. 1.94; Hyp. 5.31. Demosthenes chose to appease Alexander by recognizing the latter's divinity (Din. 1.94; Hyp. 5.31. Cf. Habicht 1997, p. 32). Hammond claimed that the city-states consented to the Decree and for that reason crowned Alexander

The Greek city-states due to the long periods of civil strife taking place within them during the hegemonies of Sparta and Thebes, had had thousands of citizens lose their properties and civil rights in the internal conflicts that sprung with regime change and foreign intervention. These people had been forced to become mercenaries, fighting for the highest bidder, in order to make a living. During the 330s nearly fifty thousand of them found employment in the Persian Empire, in order to defend it from Macedonian aggression. As Darius' authority vanished beyond the Euphrates after the battle of Issus, the Greek mercenaries embarked on private adventures in Egypt and Cyrenaica, and fought for the Spartan cause in Crete and the Peloponnese. After the capitulation of Sparta, and the conquest of Persia by Alexander, the mercenaries began to find employment in the latter's state, being used to man garrisons for peacekeeping. Still there were too many of them for Alexander to employ, and they were not easy to manage with.⁴²⁴ Thousands of them formed the satraps' new private armies, or found refuge in Taenarum, waiting in idleness until trouble stirred again. Alexander thought that he could deal with this problem by ordering his allies to take back all those people, without considering the consequences that such a measure would bring upon the Greek city-states. The latter had gone through a lot in the previous decades, and a way to defuse the civil strife taking place within, was to disenfranchise and exile thousands of their own citizens, confiscating their properties in the process and turning it into common property, in order to solve their own fiscal issues.⁴²⁵ By restoring the exiles to their properties and previous positions, the city-states would return to the state of instability that they had found themselves in the past. Nevertheless, not being able to refuse the decree the city-states did not bring any objections, yet Alexander died before the exiles had the chance to return to their original homes.

(1977, pp. 636-7). Errington is probably closer to the truth by adding that the city-states' embassies approached Alexander in order to express their demes' discontent, rather than gratitude, to the sudden arbitrary intrusion of their domestic affairs (1975, p. 54).

⁴²⁴ Bosworth thought that with the Exiles' Decree Alexander planned to turn the unemployed Greek mercenaries into his personal support base in Greece (1993, p. 227). In 323 as soon as Alexander had died, thousands of Greek mercenaries in Central Asia rose in revolt, and used force to demand a safe return back to the Mediterranean (Diod. 18.7.1).

⁴²⁵ Botsford & Robinson 1977, p. 410.

When Alexander died, the Athenians hijacked the Corinthian League from Macedonian control and led it against Antipater. Most of the member-states joined with Athens, with the exceptions of Achaea, Arcadia, Elis, and Sparta, due to having Macedonian garrisons installed within them since their defeat in Agis' Revolt.⁴²⁶ The Exiles' Decree, not having been implemented yet, turned out to be a massive incentive for the Corinthian League to openly rebel against the Macedonians, and the fact that the exiles had not yet been restored to their homes, allowed Leosthenes to hire thousands of them for the Athenian cause. The Exiles' Decree in combination with Alexander's death soon afterwards, brought both the Corinthian League and the mercenaries into the Athenian zone of influence. The Thessalians and the Aetolians who were previously Philip's most valuable and vociferous allies, now turned against Antipater, tipping the balance of power in favour of Athens in the war taking place in the Greek mainland.⁴²⁷

The Athenians proved to the rest of the League that they were genuinely calling for a restoration of the city-states' autonomy and bringing to an end the unwanted Macedonian meddling into their domestic affairs, by covering the cost of the war with their own funds. Athens hired the thousands of Greek mercenaries stationed at Taenarum with her own funds, no ally was asked to contribute financially to the war effort, not even for the deployment of over two hundred Athenian warships.⁴²⁸ The allies sent their citizen-armies to Central Greece, for a war that benefited themselves, and not just the Athenian hegemon's interests. The *demos*' decision to join the Corinthian League in 338, despite Phocion's protests, turned out to be a brilliant decision.⁴²⁹ The Athenians maintained good relations in the council with their previous allies, and managed to forge a friendship with the Thessalians and the Aetolians, with whom they were previously enemies. After the complete destruction of

⁴²⁶ Diod. 18.11.1-2. Botsford and Robinson argued that the Athenians turned the League of Corinth into the Hellenic League (1977, p. 410).

⁴²⁷ Diod. 18.12.3. The Thessalians must have grown disenchanted with Alexander's archonship, as he pushed further east and appealed more to his Asian subjects, rather than to the Greeks, with the adoption of eastern customs and an authoritarian style of rulership.

⁴²⁸ Diod. 18.10.2.

⁴²⁹ Plut. *Phoc.* 16.4-5.

the Athenian naval forces at Amorgos, the allies were forced to withdraw their armies from Central Greece, in order to defend their own territories from Macedonian amphibious assaults.⁴³⁰ The Aetolian army withdrew from Lamia, in order to deal with domestic issues, yet it never surrendered to Antipater, after the capitulation of Athens the Aetolians offered an obstinate resistance to the subsequent invasion of their country that met with success. The Thessalians were forced into surrender, as at Crannon their armed forces were pinned down into a defensive position, while Antipater laid siege to their city-states.

The Athenians did everything right in maintaining the cohesion of the anti-Macedonian Alliance, by avoiding the past mistakes they had made with the Second Athenian League. The main reasons why the Athenian-led alliance was broken down and defeated, were the destruction of the Athenian fleets in the Aegean Sea, and the possession of unlimited monies and military manpower by Antipater.

Military Strategy

The formation of the Athenian standing army

The Athenians took many lessons from their conflict with Philip, which climaxed in 338 at Chaeronea. They learnt that Philip's armed forces were far superior to any other army in Greece, because they were a standing army that relied on the use of combined arms tactics. The Athenian phalanx had performed very well in the phase of *othismos* against the Macedonian infantry. Yet, the Athenian phalanx collapsed because it fell in for the Macedonian feigned flight, breaking formation in order to pursue the enemy, and was subject to a counterattack by Philip's reserves before it managed to reform in time. Regardless of its defeat at Chaeronea, there was an additional reason behind

⁴³⁰ Diod. 18.15.8-9, 18.16.4. Athens itself was subject to a Macedonian maritime invasion, while most of its troops were campaigning in Central Greece (Plut. *Phoc.* 25.1-2).

Lycurgus' ephebic reforms.⁴³¹ The destruction of Thebes in 335 and the capitulation of Sparta in 331, left Athens without an ally possessing a powerful army that could compete with the Macedonian kings' standing armies. The Athenian *demos* was forced to invest heavily in its own land army, assuming a role that it had wilfully left to others before. The past lack of interest for the land army, had allowed the *demos* to invest more in its own navy, turning the latter into the primary arm that projected Athenian power, and into the most efficient naval forces in the East Mediterranean region. Due to the loss of Thebes and Sparta, Athens was forced to play the role of the most powerful land army when facing the Macedonians.

The Athenian phalanx, comprised of citizen-hoplites who rarely saw action in their lives, was an instrument of war fit for the ceremonial hoplite battle that had been taking place in Greece for the last four centuries, but was found lacking when it met Philip's professional infantry at Chaeronea. The Athenians reformed the institution of the ephebes, imitating the Macedonian new model army in many aspects.⁴³² It is not clear whether the Athenians replaced the traditional hoplite phalanx with the cheaper

⁴³¹ Initially after the Athenian defeat became known to the *demos*, Hyperides suggested that the Athenians manumit their slaves willing to bear arms in Athens' defence, to enfranchise all of the *metics*, that the five hundred members of the *boule* get armed for war, and that the exiles be restored to Athens with full citizen rights (Hyp. *Fr.* B18.1-3; Lyc. 1.37, 1.41; Plut. *De Virt. Mor.* 849a). The Athenians preferred to adopt Lycurgus' military reforms on the ephebic institution instead of Hyperides' radical programme. Mitchel thought that despite Hyperides' radicalism, the Athenian rhetor was not a laicist opportunist, due to not urging the *demos* to go to war during the Theban and Spartan revolts of the 330s (1970, p. 23-24).

⁴³² William Scott Ferguson claimed that during the Lycurgan period Demades and Phocion became responsible for the Athenian foreign policy, while Demosthenes and Lycurgus managed domestic affairs. It is highly unlikely that Demosthenes, best known for his speeches on foreign policy, would abstain from his primary passion after Chaeronea. As for Phocion, who was Athens' best general, having no hand in the military reforms that ensued is dubious to say the least (1911, p. 7). Mitchel's claim that Demades and Demosthenes must have cooperated in order to keep Athens out of Agis' Revolt is probably true (1970, p. 16), yet the relationship between the two rhetors was not without incident (Demad. 1.16-17).

pike variation used by Philip.⁴³³ Even so Athenian youths joined the Athenian army at the age of eighteen, and carried out a military service lasting two years. They were trained to fight in phalanx formation, but were also trained in the use of light arms tactics, and in the employment of artillery.⁴³⁴ During the first year the ephebes received their training and were stationed in the forts of Piraeus, while during the second year they were stationed throughout the forts of Attica, carrying out patrols as border guards. The ephebes' costs of armor and arms were covered by the state treasury, so that the size of the Athenian heavy infantry was no longer limited by how many farmers Athens had.⁴³⁵ In addition to the fact that by including landless citizens among the ranks of the phalanx and providing state-pay to them, the Athenian farmers were no longer hard pressed to fight for short periods of time during the summer, eager to return home as soon as possible, in order to work on their own fields. Philip had changed the way Greek warfare was waged. He did not care much for ravaging his enemies' crops, instead he used his own infantry to wage total war, capturing fortified communities by assault, rather than laying long sieges that sought to demoralize and starve the enemy into surrender. Philip initiated assaults against his enemies during winter time, making it very difficult for the latter's allies to raise armies and come to their aid in time. The Ephebic reforms took all of that into account, and established an

⁴³³ Judging from the performance of the Athenian phalanx against its Macedonian and Boeotian counterparts during the Lamian War, it is uncertain whether it was a hoplite or a pike phalanx, be that as it may the training did pay off as the Athenians were victorious in all of the engagements between heavy infantry units, except for the battle of Crannon, in which the outnumbered Athenians fought against a Macedonian force of greater size to a standstill.

⁴³⁴ The ephebes were trained in the use of the bow and the javelin. It is unclear how skilled they were in archery, as it takes years of training to develop that skill to a good degree (Aristot. *Const. Ath.* 42.1-5).

⁴³⁵ Hanson argued that the fourth century increased taxation and decline of the agrarian councils led to the substantial reduction the numbers of farmers (1998, pp. xii-xiii).

Athenian standing army comprised of citizens capable of fighting Macedonian veterans on equal terms, during all seasons.⁴³⁶

Naval Forces

The Athenian navy during the conflict with Philip failed to achieve much, partly because the latter deliberately initiated his offensives against the Chalcidian League during the winter, when there was rough weather on the seas. The core of Philip's dominion was in the hinterland of Macedonia far away from the sea, and for that reason the Athenian navy could not play an offensive role against the Macedonian monarch. The Athenian navy was used in a supportive role, in order to carry troops to the Chalcidians' aid, or to protect Athenian interests in the Chersonese and Thrace. The war against Philip's rise to hegemony was decided in a land battle that took place in Boeotia, and the Athenian navy had nothing at all to do with the conflict's outcome.

After the Athenians surrendered and joined the Corinthian League, they invested a lot in improving their land forces, but they did not neglect their navy.⁴³⁷ In fact the Athenians improved their navy by increasing its size, and introducing much more

⁴³⁶ Parke, disregarding the impressive performance of the Athenian army in all of its armed engagements throughout the Lamian War, claimed that the outcome of the War itself proved the ephebic reforms to have been a failure (1933, p. 205).

⁴³⁷ Plutarch portrayed Demades as a pro-Macedonian Athenian fifth-columnist (Mitchel 1970, p. 18). Yet, Demades' record proves otherwise. He had taken part in the battle of Chaeronea, where he was captured along with two thousand other Athenians, he was partly responsible for the large investments in the Athenian navy during the Lycurgan era, and there is no evidence indicating that Demades opposed the ephebic reforms. The improvement of the Athenian navy and the ephebic reforms prove that Athens was preparing for a coming conflict with Macedon, yet Demades did nothing to hinder the naval and army reforms. It is more likely that the Athenian rhetor did not propose that Athens went to war with Macedon during the turbulent regency of Antipater in Greece, because of his pragmatism, realizing that Athens could not yet emerge victorious in such a conflict (Demad. 1.29, 1.53), rather than due to belonging to the Macedonian kings' payroll.

expensive and heavier warships.⁴³⁸ In order to fulfill its alliance obligations the Athenian *demos* deployed twenty warships and their crews, that played a small military part at the theatre of operations in the Aegean Sea, but whose main function was political, as the crews were de facto hostages of Alexander. Although the Athenians took part in Alexander's war against Persia with a petty fleet, the Athenian *demos* maintained the largest navy in Greece for a specific reason. After the battle of Chaeronea and the subjugation of most of the city-states in the Greek mainland to Philip, the Hellespont was under Macedonian control, and if Athens started another war, the grain supply-line from Crimea to Athens would be cut off. The population of Athens having reached two hundred thousand people could not be sustained through the Attican farm production alone. The Athenians would always need a large and strong navy in order to maintain the wheat-supply, since it was utterly vital to them in order to hold their freedom.

The Athenian navy would either be deployed to secure the Hellespont, capturing the forts guarding the region, which would be nigh impossible if the Macedonian army marched on them during the siege, or if the Macedonians descended upon Athens itself while most of her armed forces were deployed far away. The Athenians having suffered a food supply crisis during the 320s, which was averted thanks to Harpalus' assistance, launched a very large-scale expedition in the Adriatic, in order to secure a grain-supply from Sicily and South Italy. The only details we know of, thanks to but a single epigraphy, is that the Athenians deployed over a hundred triremes, and that the commander responsible was a general named Miltiades, of whom we know nothing other but his name.⁴³⁹ Whether the expedition to eliminate piracy in the Adriatic, and establish Athenian military colonies, was successful remains unknown. Nonetheless, the fact that Antipater did not attempt to blockade the Hellespont when the Lamian War broke out, points to the case that he might have thought, that such a measure would not carry much of an impact, perhaps thanks to Athens' additional grain-supply

⁴³⁸ According to the naval lists in 330 the Athenians possessed three hundred ninety triremes and eighteen quadriremes (IG II². 1627.266-275), and by 325 the Athenian fleet was comprised of three hundred sixty triremes, fifty quadriremes and seven quinquiremes (IG II². 1629.801).

⁴³⁹ IG II² 1629.128-302.

from the Western Mediterranean. The Lamian War was decided in the Aegean Sea in a series of naval battles, that culminated with the complete destruction of the Athenian navy near Amorgos.⁴⁴⁰ The Athenians and their allies, despite their successes in mainland Greece, could not hope to win the war without a navy that would prevent the arrival of Macedonian reinforcements from Asia.

Financial Reforms

One of the peace terms that Philip imposed upon the Athenian *demos* was to relinquish the Second Athenian League. Athens lost the tribute of dozens of city-states that would reach an annual income of four hundred talents. Without this petty empire the Athenians found themselves at an even more difficult position, than in the aftermath of the Social War, struggling to pay the costs of their naval supremacy in Greece, and at the same time maintain the democratic political system at home that relied on providing salaries to the Athenian citizenry in order to occupy itself with public affairs.

The Athenians embarked on building a strong economy that was self-reliant. They imposed two taxes upon the *metics* as well as an annual ten talent fee that supported the dockyards and the state armory. They also allowed individuals to invest in the old mine-sites, while they opened new ones as well, and in the use of common land, increasing the price of the leasing fees for all of them.⁴⁴¹ During the 330s, because of the panic caused by the loss of their petty League, the Athenians engaged in increasing their state revenue through the use of the justice system as well. Apparently the Athenians tended to judge against the wealthy in order to confiscate the latters' properties and increase state revenue.⁴⁴² This malpractice thankfully did not last for

⁴⁴⁰ Diod. 18.15.8-9, 18.16.4

⁴⁴¹ Hyp. 4.35-37.

⁴⁴² The Athenian juries were comprised of citizens, instead of a professional and independent judiciary. The consequence to this was that in times of crisis the juries behaved as "people's courts" subject to the rampant populism of opportunists who took advantage of the growing

long, but it did scar the city, and gave several of its prominent citizens a bad name for taking part in it. Despite Athens' difficulties the city was able to financially recover, and even without an empire the Athenians reached the high revenue that they had during the years of Pericles.⁴⁴³ This, and the long peace that they enjoyed from 338 until 323, gave enough time to the Athenians to build a strong economy, allowing them to hire thousands of mercenaries, while at the same time they deployed their entire army and most of their navy for high-tension military operations, being able to employ all of them at once for as long as was needed.

The decision to go to War

The Athenian *demos* introduced economic and military reforms after its army's defeat at Chaeronea. The main cause behind these much-needed reforms that transformed Athens, from a slumbering city-state that without allied contributions had turned into a second-rate power during the 340s, into an autonomous *polis* with high revenues and armed forces that would put to shame Pericles' empire, was the Athenian desire to topple the Macedonian hegemony established by Philip. The *demos* voted to join the Corinthian League, in order to remain in close terms with the Greek city-states that were now part of the Macedonian system of security established in South Greece. The revolutions against the Macedonian order in Greece by the Thebans and the Spartans were not appealing to the rest of the Greeks, and without massive support against Macedon, those uprisings were doomed to failure. The Athenians recognized that Thebes, with the Boeotian city-states now standing against it, could not defeat Alexander's army. The sudden collapse of the Theban resistance on the first day of the siege must have been a surprise to everyone, including Alexander. The Athenians and everyone else, except Thebes itself, always knew what the ultimate outcome would be,

desperation in the citizenry, and would decide in violation of Athenian law, as in the trial of the generals after the battle of Arginusae.

⁴⁴³ Thanks to Lycurgus' good statesmanship and the Athenian absence from large-scale military operations the state-revenue got as high as one thousand and two hundred talents (Plut. *De Virt. Mor.* 842f, 852b).

between Alexander's joint-army and an isolated Thebes that proclaimed Persia the righteous overlord of Greece.⁴⁴⁴

The Spartan endeavour to overthrow the Macedonian hegemony was flawed from the beginning. The Spartans assaulted Megalopolis and Messene, in order to increase the size of their own state at the expense of their neighbours'. If successful it is true that Lacedaemon would be more powerful than it was before the annexation of the two city-states, but this undisguised aggression against Peloponnesian city-states brought back to the Greeks memories of the most brutal aspects of the Spartan Empire from the first half of the fourth century. Sparta thanks to its blatant imperialism alarmed the Greek city-states, and they in turn mobilized their armed forces and put them under Antipater's command, in order to make certain that Sparta never restored its unpopular hegemony in Greece, raising his forces at the battle outside Megalopolis to nearly forty thousand soldiers.⁴⁴⁵

During Agis' Revolt and Alexander's confrontation with the Great King Darius at Gaugamela, many in the Athenian *demos* advocated war with Macedon, believing that Alexander and his army would meet their end far away in Asia. Alexander however, until the capture of Persepolis, kept the Athenian *demos* on a short leash, using both appeasement and threats in order to keep the most powerful city-state in Greece under control. After the victory at Granicus the Macedonian king sent Persian armours back to Athens as a gift, for the city's services to the Greek cause during the Persian Wars.⁴⁴⁶ Nonetheless, Alexander still kept the crews of twenty triremes as de facto hostages, and captured hundreds of Athenian mercenaries as prisoners of war at Granicus and Issus. Alexander decided to release his Athenian prisoners during the conflict between Agis and Antipater, in order to appease the *demos* in staying loyal.⁴⁴⁷

⁴⁴⁴ Diod. 17.9.5.

⁴⁴⁵ Ibid. 18.16.4.

⁴⁴⁶ Arr. *An.* 1.16.7.

⁴⁴⁷ Ibid. 3.6.2. Habicht (1997, p. 18) claimed that Alexander's proclamations to be fighting against the Great King in order to punish him for the destruction of Athens' temples, while at the same time he refused to release the Athenian prisoners, who had been captured at the battle of Granicus, was perceived as an insult by the Athenians.

Nevertheless, Alexander kept the Athenian crews as hostages until the aftermath of Gaugamela in 331, releasing them only after the war in Asia had been decided.⁴⁴⁸

The Athenians came close to going to war in 324 when Alexander issued the Exiles' Decree. However, the Macedonian king remained undefeated, his sources of military manpower and funds had increased beyond the stretch of Greek imagination, and the Macedonian military presence in the Peloponnese had increased by that year, due to the installation of garrisons in Achaëa, Arcadia, Elis, and Lacedaemon. The Athenians used Leosthenes to befriend the mercenaries stationed at Taenarum, and the Aetolians, who were also willing to go to war in order to retain Oeniadae in their possession.⁴⁴⁹

Despite the fact that Alexander's Decree and autocratic management of the Corinthian League alienated him from its member-states, the Athenians decided to negotiate at first, by sending envoys bearing gifts to him in Babylon. After the news that Alexander had died the Athenians could barely wait to start the war, and only managed to postpone its declaration for a few days in order to confirm that the Macedonian king had indeed died without any heirs. Alexander's death in combination with the fact that most of the Macedonian armed forces were stationed in Asia, and that a garrison of considerable size in Central Asia had begun an uprising, convinced the Athenians that now was the time to act.⁴⁵⁰

⁴⁴⁸ Arr. *An.* 3.19.6. Cf. Wilcken 1967, p. 131.

⁴⁴⁹ Leosthenes in 324 acting as a private citizen had transported eight thousand Greek mercenaries from Asia Minor to Taenarum (Diod. 18.9.1). The Thessalians were probably approached at this time as well. We have no information in regard to what led them to abandon Antipater and change sides right before the confrontation with the Athenian coalition forces (Diod. 18.12.3). Errington (1993, p. 98) believed that Alexander alienated the Thessalians by not paying much attention to his personal relationship with the Thessalian aristocracy, upon which Philip had invested heavily after his defeat to Onomarchus during the Sacred War against Phocis.

⁴⁵⁰ The Athenians were also in a hurry to start the war against Antipater in fear of him implementing the Exiles' Decree. If that came to pass the Athenian *demos* would lose access to thousands of mercenaries, as well as most of its allies opposing the Macedonian hegemony, since it would be very difficult to vote to go to war with the former exiles restored to their homes thanks to Macedonian intervention.

The War Strategy

The Athenians in the conflict with Antipater relied on two main strategies. The first one was based on forging alliances, which meant the hijacking of the League of Corinth in order to gain a numerical advantage over the enemy in armed forces, as well as security at home for the Athenian army to operate far from its city. It would have been impossible for Athens to win the war against Antipater, had most Peloponnesian member-states of the League of Corinth remained loyal to the Macedonian regent. Their armies would march unhindered upon Athens and laid siege against the city, while her army would have found itself engaged against Antipater and the Macedonian forces under his command.

The second military strategy, on which the Athenian *demos* stood up its hopes for victory in the Lamian War, was its own naval supremacy in the Aegean. The Lamian War was decided in the Aegean Sea in a series of conflicts between the Phoenician fleet led by Macedonian *navarchs*, and its Athenian counterpart. The Athenian fleet's role was to prevent Macedonian reinforcements from reaching Antipater. In this the Athenian fleet failed, as it was first defeated near Abydos in the Hellespont, and then finished off close to Amorgos in the Cyclades in July 322. Unfortunately we have no details of how the final Athenian disaster came to pass. It could be assumed that the two-centuries old Athenian way of naval war, which was unique in that it relied upon their ships' and crews' superiority in carrying out manoeuvres and ramming enemy ships, was no longer as efficient as before, due to the introduction of larger warships, such as quadriremes and quinquiremes, that restored the primacy of marine combat in naval battles.⁴⁵¹

In regard to the strategy of alliances the Athenian *demos* did an outstanding job by appealing to most of the member-states of the Corinthian League, including the Aetolians and the Thessalians that during Philip's reign were considered the most

⁴⁵¹ The Romans during the First Punic War achieved naval supremacy over the maritime empire of the Phoenicians based in North Africa, thanks to the deployment of cumbersome warships, that negated the latter's superiority in manoeuvre and ramming.

loyal allies of the Macedonian monarchy. The Athenians at the time called the Lamian War as the Hellenic War, in order to draw from the ancient glory that the Greeks had enjoyed in being victorious in the Persian Wars. Calling the conflict with Antipater “Hellenic War” brought two advantages in the form of public relations. The first one was that it alienated the southern city-states from the Macedonian overlords, as it identified them as foreigners and people with different customs, not fit to rule over the Greeks. The second benefit to this kind of propaganda was that it was referring to a conflict whose outcome was victory for the Greeks, hence the peoples of the city-states found it easy to identify with their ancestors who had repelled the Persians, and thought that now they had the opportunity to repeat history.⁴⁵² The Greek city-states mobilized their citizen-armies to meet Antipater’s military forces in Central Greece, but they remained amateur armies fighting against a standing army. The citizen-armies’ main contribution was to bolster the size of the Athenian-led coalition forces, which in turn contributed to high morale for the anti-Macedonian army. Yet, the units most responsible for the spectacular victories over the Macedonian standing armies and the Boeotian citizen army, were the reformed Athenian infantry, the Greek mercenaries, and the Thessalian cavalry.⁴⁵³

⁴⁵² Hyperides in the funeral oration to those lost in the Lamian War, compared the Athenian general who fell outside Lamia with the Athenian commanders of the Persian Wars, Miltiades and Themistocles, and claimed that those who fell in the conflict they did so while guarding Thermopylae (Hyp. 6.37-38, 6.12). The Athenians were not the only ones nor were they first at making comparisons with the glorious Greek past. Alexander had proclaimed that he was at war with the Great King in order to punish him for the destruction of the Athenian temples that Persian troops had brought to ruin nearly two centuries ago. Neither Alexander’s nor the Athenian *demos*’ claims of fighting for the lost Greek glory over Persia were honest, but they both had a large audience that enjoyed being subject to such demagoguery.

⁴⁵³ The Aetolians mobilized ten thousand troops, deploying the second largest army after the Athenians, yet its quality was dubious. The Aetolians managed to retain their autonomy after Athens’ and the rest of the allies’ capitulation, mainly thanks to using the rough terrain of their country to their advantage against Antipater, and the fact that the latter was distracted by the political ambitions of his colleagues, who began fragmenting the empire that Alexander had created (Diod. 18.17.7-8).

Apart from city-states in the Greek mainland, in regard to additional military manpower Athens relied on Leosthenes to win over the Greek mercenaries, who was standing by at the old military base of Taenarum. At Taenarum were situated thousands of mercenaries in need of employment, and if Leosthenes had not been there to hire them as soon as the news of Alexander's death reached Greece, they would have probably joined with Antipater against Athens and her coalition. The mercenaries were of critical value for the war effort, as they were experienced veterans of the past conflicts between Darius and Alexander in Asia, and between Agis and Antipater in the Peloponnese. The Greek mercenaries were very familiar with the Macedonian military tactics, and although their past employers had been vanquished by Macedonian generals, the mercenaries themselves had managed to survive the onslaught and defy the Macedonian war machine in the field of battle. Thanks to Leosthenes, Taenarum's mercenaries were an invaluable contribution to the Athenian war effort bringing victory after victory against the Boeotians, Antipater, and Leonnatus.⁴⁵⁴

The Athenian war strategy was similar to the one they had employed in 338 against Philip. The Athenians led a joint-force, of their own army and of their allies, along with a significant size of mercenaries, in order to meet with the Macedonian army in Central Greece. In the Lamian War there was the addition of the Aegean theatre of war, which included the feature of naval warfare. The Athenians thanks to their successful military and economic reforms were able to overwhelm the Macedonians and their allies for most of the war's duration in Central Greece. Nonetheless, the complete defeat of the Athenian navy decided the war. Athens' allies fearing amphibious assaults upon their own cities by the Macedonian navy were forced to withdraw from Central Greece, allowing Antipater and Craterus to turn the war around by mobilizing superior numbers of troops to those opposing them at Crannon.

⁴⁵⁴ The Boeotians were the first to engage Leosthenes and his mercenary army, in an attempt to vanquish him before he joined in with the Athenian citizen army. Leosthenes and his mercenaries routed the Boeotians instead (Diod. 18.11.5).

Conclusions

The Athenian *demos* after suffering an ignoble defeat at Chaeronea in 338, which led to the dissolution of the Second Athenian League, took the decision not to end up isolated and bitter. It joined Philip's new League formed in Corinth and acted as a loyal member-state during Alexander's war with the Persian Empire. From 338 until 323 the Athenians gave up three opportunities to go to war and topple the Macedonian hegemony. The Athenians refused to answer the calls of Thebes, Sparta, and Harpalus, not because they were happy with the Macedonian hegemony, but due to deeming that their potential allies in this endeavour lacked the necessary means to win the war. Nevertheless, the Athenians deserve a lot of credit for not for not being induced to go to war when they could not win, and for not letting their emotions towards Antipater cloud their judgement.

Athens prepared for war by establishing its own standing army for the first time in its history. Throughout the Lamian War the Athenian army managed to defeat the Boeotians and the Macedonians on many occasions, both of whom until then were considered to possess Greece's finest armies. Yet, part of the reason behind the military success that Athens enjoyed in Central Greece were the financial reforms introduced by Lycurgus, and the hijacking of the League of Corinth conducted by Athenian diplomats for years before 323. The financial reforms brought Athens an annual income of one thousand two hundred talents per year, turning the city-state into an economic powerhouse despite the loss its client-states.⁴⁵⁵ Thanks to the good state of the Athenian finances Athens employed thousands of mercenaries for over a year, and deployed most of its warships, without having to ask for tribute from its allies. The good state of the Athenian land forces, as well as the success of its wartime propaganda on reclaiming the glory of the Persian Wars, allowed the *demos* to lead its allies from one victory to the other against Antipater and his fellow Macedonian commanders. The war ended with an Athenian collapse because of the complete

⁴⁵⁵ Habicht thought that the funds headed to the Theoric Fund must have been reduced during the Lycurgan period (1997, p. 23).

destruction of the Athenian fleet in a series of engagements in the Aegean Sea. Antipater was able to reform in Macedonia, by receiving many Macedonian veterans returning from Asia. After the loss of the Athenian fleet Athens' Peloponnesian allies were forced to return home in order to defend their own city-states from amphibious assault, while many of the mercenaries under Athenian employ must have changed sides after Leosthenes' death, and seeing the war turn in Antipater's favour. The Macedonian regent with the gold brought to him by Craterus must have hired thousands of mercenaries who had formerly fought against him at Lamia, reducing Athens' sizable army, while further increasing his own. Antipater thanks to his numerical superiority managed to pin down the Athenian-Thessalian army at Crannon and began investing Thessalian city-states, forcing the Thessalian army into surrender. The Athenians without any allies left in Central Greece, that were willing to help them repel Antipater, were right to surrender. Despite the harsh terms that were forced upon them, otherwise the alternative would have been to meet the same fate as Thebes. The Athenian strategy was not flawed in any way. The only mistake made was that Leosthenes refused to come to terms with Antipater at Lamia, wishing to gain an unconditional surrender by the besieged Macedonian regent. This uncompromising behaviour led to disaster and very harsh terms imposed upon Athens, but the one responsible for it was an Athenian general, who had proven his skill at war but was found wanting in sound statesmanship, not the Athenian war strategy.⁴⁵⁶ Athens did not commit any strategic mistakes, other than not accepting peace under moderate terms when Antipater offered to negotiate in Lamia, the main reason behind the defeat at the Lamian War was the loss of its own naval forces. The Athenian fleet suffered defeat due to its inferiority in the tactical field, not thanks to a flawed strategy followed by the *demos*. We are not aware of the naval battles' conditions, but the use of much heavier and larger ships by 322 had made the Athenian way of naval warfare obsolete.⁴⁵⁷

⁴⁵⁶ Plutarch depicted Leosthenes as a populist in contrast to Phocion's moderate policies (*Phoc.* 23.1-2).

⁴⁵⁷ The Athenians since the Persian Wars relied on carrying out skilled manoeuvres with their triremes, ramming them onto the enemy ships' sides.

Chapter Five: Observations on Grand Strategy

The Athenians throughout the fourth century were torn between attaining security and increasing power. The transitions from one strategic direction to the other were not smooth, and there were inconsistencies in the strategies with which the Athenians tried to achieve their utter goals. There was no clear outcome of success or failure depending on whether the Athenian *demos* sought to acquire either safety or supremacy. Athens sought security in four periods during the fourth century.⁴⁵⁸ In the first two and in the fourth one the Athenian efforts were rewarded with success, while in the period that the Athenians confronted Philip they failed to halt his rise in power and lost what little remained of the Second Athenian League. In regard to expanding its own power the Athenian *demos* experienced four periods in the fourth century.⁴⁵⁹ During the first two the Athenians were successful in increasing their power at the expense of others, while in the latter two they failed and suffered grave consequences. It would be tempting to try to explain Athenian success and failure through a statistical approach in order to measure how often the Athenians met with success, but that would lead to ignoring which strategies worked and under which conditions.⁴⁶⁰

⁴⁵⁸ The periods that Athens sought security: 1st From the end of the civil war in 404 until the completion of the Long Walls and the rebuilding of the Athenian fleet in 393. 2nd From the aftermath of the Battle of Leuctra in 371 until the aftermath of the Battle of Mantinea in 362. 3rd From the end of the Social War in 353 until the defeat of Thebes and Athens by Philip at Chaeronea in 338. 4th From the aftermath of the battle of Chaeronea in 338 until the death of Alexander the Great in 323.

⁴⁵⁹ The four periods during which the Athenians attempted to increase their power: 1st From 393 until the signing of the King's Peace in 386. 2nd From the eruption of war with Lacedaemon in 379/378 until the battle of Leuctra in 371. 3rd From the aftermath of the battle of Mantinea in 362 until the end of the Social War in 353. 4th From the eruption of the Lamian War in 323 until the capitulation of Athens to Antipater in 322/321.

⁴⁶⁰ Each strategy is not certain to fail or succeed. Both the Thebans and the Macedonians disbanded their fleets, due to their high maintenance costs, and focused on a land-based military strategy in order to build their empires. By 361 the Thebans' most powerful ally in the Peloponnese, the Arcadian League, had broken down, and several Arcadian city-states

Strategy of Alliances

In all of the periods that the Athenian *demos* came out victorious it had invested greatly in creating alliances that were based on foundations of mutual interest. Athens' successful alliances were characterized by reciprocity in the fields of military assistance during war. During the Corinthian War the Athenian citizen-hoplites and cavalry took part in the Battle of Nemea and suffered great casualties in the melee. The Athenian *demos* had also provided Corinth with a garrison that helped prevent its capture by Corinthian traitors in collaboration with Lacedaemonian invaders, yet again suffering great casualties in the process. Due to the significant losses that the Athenian hoplites suffered in the joint military operations of the Allied Council, the Athenians began using extensively Thracian mercenaries under Iphicrates' command in order to assist their Peloponnesian allies. Iphicrates and his men enjoyed more tactical success, than the Athenian hoplites before them, in the engagements with the military units of the Peloponnesian League, and the Council seemed to be quite satisfied with their performance in the Peloponnese. During the 370s the entire Athenian citizen army campaigned in Thebes annually, saving the latter from being captured by large armies of the Peloponnesian League, which were always led by Sparta's kings. Athens

allied themselves to Sparta against the others. The Mantineans as well despite the military assistance they received from the Boeotian League in uniting their communities into a single polity, and adopting a democratic constitution, they joined with Sparta as well. The Thebans in an attempt to reverse the situation gambled everything in leading a Boeotian campaign of retribution in Mantinea, and at the subsequent battle not only they did not manage to recover what they had lost, but ended up significantly weakened from the failed endeavour, suffering great casualties including Epaminondas, which led to their complete loss of influence in the Peloponnese in the next few years. Alexander likewise disbanded the Macedonian fleet that he had inherited by his father, in order to invest everything in his land armies. Because of that the Persian fleet ran a quite successful expedition in the Aegean facing a marginal opposition. However, Alexander capturing the Phoenician city-states of Syria, forced the Phoenician crews to surrender, rendering the Persian naval power impotent through this land-based strategy. The same strategy had different effects for the Thebans and the Macedonians, as it did not work out for the former, but contributed to the latter's success in empire-building.

benefitted greatly in return, as the Peloponnesian armies would not invade Attica, as they had done during the Peloponnesian War, due to being unable to go through the Corinthian fortifications during the 390s, and through Thebes during the 370s. The Second Athenian League during the 370s and 360s provided the Athenian *demos* with enough funds to carry out large-scale military operations in the Aegean and Ionian Seas, that the Athenians could not have afforded on their own. Yet, fearing the sudden rise of Theban power and its expanding influence in all of Greece, the Athenians allied themselves to every autocratic power that opposed Thebes, from Sparta to the Thessalian and Syracusan tyrants. Relying on two different strategies of alliance could not go on forever, and the Athenians made the mistake of not ending their alliances with autocratic powers after Thebes had been humbled at Mantinea. Adding insult to injury the Athenian *demos* began to establish hegemonies in the city-states that it captured, disenchanting even further the member-states of the Second Athenian League, which led to violent conflict with many of them as they seceded from the League. After Athens' defeat at the Social War, resulting in the major loss of revenue from the loss of the richest member-states of the Athenian League, the Athenians focused on improving their own economy in order to finance their government and military operations. What remained of the Second Athenian League could not provide Athens with more than four hundred talents per year, and after their defeat at Chaeronea the Athenians never again received foreign tribute. In the alliances that the Athenian *demos* forged against Philip and Antipater, it bolstered the size of its military forces against the large Thessalian-Macedonian armies led by Macedonian commanders. The Athenians did not request tribute from the Boeotian, the Corinthian, and the Chalcidian Leagues. Instead they focused on carrying out joint military operations against the Macedonians. This change in Athenian alliance policy made Athens more desirable as an ally by other city-states, making many of them, that had fought hard in order to distance themselves from Athenian influence during the 350s and 340s, rejoin Athens in its coalition against Philip in the early 330s, as well as convert some of Macedon's most loyal allies into the anti-Macedonian cause during the Lamian War.⁴⁶¹

⁴⁶¹ Byzantium and Pisatis were former member-states of the Second Athenian League that had fought against Athens during the Social War. Both joined Athens' coalition against Philip in

The Athenians were most successful at using alliances to their own benefit when those were based on mutual consent and interest, rather than being of a hegemonic character in the style of the fifth century Delian League. Part of the reason behind this was that the Greek city-states had significantly grown their own wealth during the fourth century, tending to establish small-scale standing armies, fortifying their *asty* with circuit walls, and possessing their own fleets that consisted of dozens of warships. Athens' fifth century uniqueness through these elements became obsolete during the fourth, ergo the Athenian *demos* was not capable of dominating its allies like it did in the fifth century without risking serious insurrection.⁴⁶² The Athenian defeat at the Social War brought to an end the *demos*' hopes for a revival of the Athenian Empire.

Military Strategy

During the fifth century, the Athenians sought to promote the democratization of weaker city-states through military intervention, and to curve down their enemies' foreign influence through open battle either at sea or on the land. Like every other Greek faction of the Classical Period Athenian land warfare was based on coalition-fighting.⁴⁶³ The Athenians in every armed engagement on land were accompanied by allied military units in order to secure victory. Yet, due to their defeat in the Peloponnesian War the Athenians learnt a valuable lesson, which they never forgot

the early 330s. The Thessalians and the Aetolians remained loyal to Macedonian rulers until the death of Alexander the Great. When the Lamian War broke out the Aetolians instantly joined the Athenians, and the Thessalians changed sides when Antipater led them near the Athenian army outside Lamia.

⁴⁶² During the 360s Athens lost several important member-states of the Second Athenian League to secession, but due to Thebes' active support towards them, the Athenians did not take serious action against them. In the 350s, during the Social War, Thebes was occupied with Phocis and could not intervene in the Second Athenian League's internal affairs. Nonetheless, the secessionists were victorious in the war without serious outside help, because by combining their own military resources they managed to outmatch Athens in what turned out to be a war of attrition.

⁴⁶³ Nielsen 2013.

throughout the fourth century. The Athenian *demos* never again concentrated the sum of its armed forces in a single location. The Athenians were defeated in the Peloponnesian War because they had made huge gambles with their military strategy, by concentrating most of their army units and fleets in the same place. Twice during the Peloponnesian War did the Athenian *demos* suffer disaster thanks to this precarious policy. The first time it occurred in Sicily in 413, during the war against Syracuse, where in a series of engagements the Athenians lost their whole fleet, and soon later their entire army, while at Aegospotami in 404 they lost both arms of their armed forces in but a single surprise-attack. During the fourth century the Athenian armed forces suffered many setbacks, yet because they were not all concentrated at the same place, never was Athens' existence threatened as much as during the Peloponnesian siege of 405-404 in the aftermath of the disaster at Aegospotami. The worst military defeat that Athens endured in the fourth century was the crushing defeat of its fleet at the battle of Amorgos in 322.⁴⁶⁴ Yet, because the Athenian land forces were campaigning in Central Greece at the time, the Athenians were still able of resisting the Macedonians, and although Antipater imposed harsher peace terms than Philip did in 338, the Athenians never got close to being destroyed by their enemies as they had in 405.

The Athenian military strategy's objectives on land differed to those at sea. At sea the Athenians were very aggressive and sought to annihilate in open battle the enemy fleets. At land the Athenians' military objectives depended on the general carrying them out. In most engagements the Athenian phalanx comprised of citizens at arms carried out ceremonial hoplite pitched battles where one side forced the other into routing. However, Athenian generals began to involve Thracian mercenaries as light infantry. The peltasts when engaging heavy infantry units sought to annihilate the latter by exploiting their advantage in mobility. Initially the peltasts' efforts were met with great success, because the Peloponnesian League did not use professional light infantry yet, however as soon as their opponents adopted similar military units of equal size on the battlefields, the opposing units of light infantry were used to counter one another, and usually the side that was victorious in those clashes, was the first one

⁴⁶⁴ Diod. 18.15.8-9, 18.16.4

that brought in reinforcements from either heavy infantry units or cavalry, turning the skirmish into a full blown battle.

The Athenians contributed greatly to the revolution in military affairs, by being the first to use professional light infantry and mercenaries extensively in the Greek battlefields, and by filling their *chora* with numerous forts, from which their military units would harass and hinder the advances of enemy forces into Attica. The Athenians adopted better than any other Greek city-state, in the Eastern Mediterranean, the use of siege weapons, and adapted their fortifications according to the advances made to the former.

The statesmanship of Philip II and Athens' decline after the end of the Social War were the decisive factors that led to the subjugation of Athens to the Macedonian hegemony. Philip began a programme of nation-building on a very large scale, creating a single ethnic and political identity for people living in different communities and having different origins to each other. Philip's Macedonia was larger than the Peloponnese, yet because its regions lacked equal development among themselves, Philip reinvented the Macedonian identity from being that of abstract geographic character, similar to its Peloponnesian counterpart, into one of political distinction. The autonomous city-states, Athens included, went in the opposite direction, by introducing measures that would hinder the proliferation of citizenship, while Philip acquired many exiles who had been shunned by their city-states as his subjects. They in return built wealthy city-states in Macedonia and manned his armies and paid taxes for his wars. Philip controlled a superstate in the Greek mainland, where he enjoyed great popularity, and had come to be recognized as a great military leader. The resources in military manpower, gold-extraction, and ship-building timber, that Philip acquired through controlling Macedonia, outmatched those of any single city-state in Greece. Macedon lacking any great military tradition such as Sparta's and Thebes' heavy infantry formations, Athens' naval power, or Thessaly's cavalry forces, led Philip to invest in combined arms tactics. Due to the deficiency of any single arm of the Macedonian war machine compared to those of the most powerful city-states, by combining the sum of the Macedonian arms Philip gained battlefield dominance.

Athens invested greatly in developing the separate arms of its army, and in using them in conjunction, which helped the Athenians to go through undefeated in all of the engagements that they took part during the Lamian War. Yet, the Athenians lacking a

population the size of Macedon's, were forced to rely upon their allies' contingents in order to reach in size the Macedonian army. This worked out well during the early stages of the Lamian War, but the rest of the city-states had not introduced the reforms that the Athenian *demos* had during the Lycurgan era, their armed forces remained Archaic to a great degree.⁴⁶⁵ Most of the city-states allied to Athens could not endure constant warfare for long, and had to have their armies comprised of farmers return home and disband themselves, so that the latter harvest the fields and feed their cities. The Athenian *demos* had developed its economy to in such a manner, that its army was able to campaign from the beginning until the end of the war far from Attica, without worries about the harvest, much like the Macedonian army did during the 340s. Yet, by 322 the Macedonians controlled an area that encompassed most of the known world, their resources for war were unmatched, even in comparison with all of the city-states' combined. The Athenian general Leosthenes, by refusing to negotiate for peace, and seeking to enforce an unconditional surrender on Antipater, sealed Athens' fate to suffer defeat. The Macedonian regent by forcing a *timocracy* upon Athens, disenfranchising thousands of Athenians, and sending them away to Thrace as his own mercenaries, managed to make sure that Athens would never again rise as a power, and her fate served as a testament to the rest of the city-states, of what would happen to them should they ever seek to challenge him and the Hellenistic Empire.⁴⁶⁶

Counterinsurgency

Through counterinsurgency the Athenians and their rivals provided security to unstable city-states, and included them into their spheres of influence. Counterinsurgency was based on two approaches. The cheaper one involved exporting

⁴⁶⁵ The ten thousand Aetolians who had helped Athens force Antipater to hide behind Lamia's walls, had to return home before the final defeat of the Athenian fleet at Amorgos (Diod. 18.17.2).

⁴⁶⁶ *Timocracy* was a constitution similar to democracy, the two differ in that in the former citizenship was granted according to wealth criteria. By replacing democratic rule with its *timocratic* equivalent Antipater disenfranchised thousands of the landless citizens.

security by establishing a military garrison in a troubled city-state, that would perform peacekeeping tasks. The more radical approach was based on nation-building. Nation-building involved radical constitutional reforms, border changes, and even the creation of new ethnic identities. Each approach was not exclusive to the other, and states such as Thebes and Macedon tended to combine them, albeit at great financial cost.

Peacekeeping

Powerful state-actors such as Athens, Thebes, Sparta, and Macedon had to deal with the civil strife that was a major issue of instability for the Greeks during the fourth century. By establishing alliances with petty city-states, and according to the approach that powerful *poleis* used in tackling civil strife, they enjoyed a variety of benefits which affected their overall capacity to project power.

Sparta tended to deal with civil strife by establishing oligarchic puppet states, and by installing Peloponnesian garrisons within the allied city-states, which in turn were commanded by Spartan *harmosts* who also served as advisors to the city-states' governments. The Lacedaemonians in most cases brought civil strife to an abrupt end through direct military intervention, yet that did not make the problem disappear, since the causes of civil strife were suppressed but not extinguished. With this approach the Lacedaemonians gained tribute from their client-states, allowing them to possess and employ a large navy, that they would have been unable to based on their own finances. When the Lacedaemonian military prestige was liquidated at Leuctra, the Lacedaemonian foreign influence came to an abrupt end, causing upheaval throughout the Greek city-states which reengaged in civil war as soon as the Peloponnesian garrisons were gone leading to the immediate collapse of the Spartan backed governments.

Outside Boeotia, Thebes, engaged in promoting federalism and the spread of democracy. The Thebans, in the Peloponnese at least, chose not to take sides in civil disputes, as the Argives had done in Corinth during the Corinthian War and the Athenians in Corcyra during the Peloponnesian War, instead they decided to facilitate the reconciliation of the quarreling factions. The Thebans invested greatly in providing

assistance towards their petty allies, setting up large garrisons, building formidable fortifications, and leading massive military campaigns in Thessaly and Peloponnesus. The Thebans used the Boeotian League in an exhaustive way, having over forty thousand troops march into the Peloponnese in order to assist the recently founded Arcadian League against Lacedaemon. The issue, with the Thebans' way of providing assistance to lesser states, was that they picked the most costly ways to achieve their overambitious foreign policy goals. Engaging in nation-building, installing garrisons abroad, and carrying out large-scale military campaigns, all combined ran Thebes dry within but a few years, due to its lack of a commercial economy such as Athens'. When the Arcadian League broke down in the late 360s autocratic Achaeans, Arcadians, and democratic Mantineans allied themselves to Sparta, despite having received Theban assistance in the recent past, when they reclaimed their autonomy from Sparta. The Thebans chose to deal with their rapidly declining influence in the Peloponnese, by throwing everything they had into a failing investment. Epaminondas led another large-scale military campaign, which ended in failure, and resulted in diminishing the Theban influence over Peloponnesian affairs shortly afterwards.

The Macedonian counterinsurgency was based on the establishment of military garrisons, yet there was no standard policy in regard to constitutional change. In Greece Philip and Alexander established tyrannical governments in their subject city-states, while in Asia Alexander displayed a preference for democratic governments. Philip's League of Corinth, created after the battle of Chaeronea in 338, was a moderate way to accommodate the Greek city-states with the Macedonian hegemony. The Corinthian League served as a conduit of communication between the king of Macedon and the ruling elites in the city-states. The League managed to preserve Greece under relative stability, even when Thebes and Sparta sought to cause uproar. In addition, when Antipater was in need of troops in order to fight off the Spartan king Agis and his mercenary army, lacking any experienced soldiers due to having dispatched most of them to Alexander, the Macedonian regent was able to rely on the Corinthian League. The member-states of the League of Corinth preferred to remain under the moderate Macedonian sphere of influence that Philip had established, rather than witness a return to the brutal Lacedaemonian hegemony. Thus, the allies of Macedon in Greece provided Antipater with forty thousand volunteers, allowing the Macedonian regent to overwhelm Agis' army with their numerical superiority. The

Athenians having a better understanding of the purpose behind the League of Corinth than the Thebans and the Spartans, did not seek to antagonize it, and joined it instead. When they saw an opportunity in 323, that being the death of Alexander in Babylon, the Athenians hijacked the League and employed it to overthrow the Macedonian hegemony.

Athens had learnt a very valuable lesson from its fifth century intervention in Corcyra. There in a domestic dispute, between the oligarchic and democratic factions, the Athenians chose to support the latter, and allow them to purge their political opponents. This event started a civil war, which led to the rise of an oligarchic insurgency that allied itself to the Peloponnesian League, not allowing the Athenians to take full advantage of Corcyra's resources throughout the Peloponnesian War.⁴⁶⁷ Eventually the Athenian *demos*, despite its large investment in pulling Corcyra into its alliance, saw the powerful city-state vanish from the Athenian sphere of influence after the end of the Corcyrean civil war. The Athenians during the fourth century, much like the Thebans, avoided taking sides in cases of civil strife, and sought to reconcile the disputing factions instead. This led to having reliable allies, whose elites were indebted to Athens for the latter's assistance in reaching a peaceful resolution. The Athenians also granted these pacified city-states membership in the Second Athenian League, making certain that Lacedaemon would not return and seize control of them again, they gained access to their resources in order to promote Athenian interests in a benevolent and acceptable by the member-states' manner. The matter with the Athenian counterinsurgency was that Athens did not invest in it as much as Thebes did. The Athenian *demos* lacked the resources and the will to match Thebes in its promotion of security and democratization. After the Athenians had allied themselves to seventy Peloponnesian city-states, they failed to provide aid to the latter when Lacedaemon threatened them with war, in its attempt to halt the spread of democracy through brute force. The Athenian reluctance to go to war with Sparta, brought over most of Athens' new Peloponnesian allies, to the Thebans who were

⁴⁶⁷ The Corcyrean oligarchs, prior to the Athenian intervention, and the subsequent massacre which they endured, they had not displayed any favour towards allying with the Peloponnesian League. In fact the unprovoked assault that they suffered from the democrats was what pushed them into Lacedaemon's clutches.

more than willing to spend their resources for the advancement of federalism, democracy, and nation-building in the Peloponnese, through a massive invasion of Lacedaemon itself. After the Athenians had witnessed the loss of their Peloponnesian allies to Thebes, they decided to engage in *realpolitik* in order to halt Thebes' rise to power. The Athenian *demos* allied with the autocratic regimes of Lacedaemon, Dionysius of Syracuse, the tyrant rulers of Thessaly, Elis, and the Achaean League, and began installing *cleruchies* in the city-states that it now captured, expelling the local citizens and placing Athenian garrisons in their stead. This imperial policy brought to an abrupt end the counterinsurgency strategy that had promoted the Second Athenian League, and alienated the latter's member-states from Athens, leading to the Social War and the rapid decline of Athenian power in its aftermath.

Thucydides identified the undertaking of the Sicilian Expedition as the main cause behind Athens' defeat at the Peloponnesian War.⁴⁶⁸ Although the disaster in Sicily had occurred nine years before Athens' surrender, and during the Expedition's subsequent years the Athenians enjoyed several great military victories against the Peloponnesian League. In similar fashion to Thucydides, who did not identify Athens' cause of defeat in the Peloponnesian War as the disaster at Aegospotami, the reasons behind Athens' failure to maintain its rise in power and contain Macedonian expansionism in Chalcidice, Chaeronea, and win the Lamian War, should not be sought not in the tactics and outcomes of pitched battles such as those at Chaeronea and Amorgos. It was Athens' shift in her own counterinsurgency strategy which led to the dismantling of the Second Athenian League and the eruption of the Social War. These events took place decades before the deciding moments in the contest with Macedon, and they significantly impaired Athens' capacity to project power deciding her ruin.

Nation-Building

Nation-building was the most extreme way to deal with civil strife. As a foreign policy applied abroad it required vast amounts of wealth to spend, and a full military

⁴⁶⁸ Thuc. 2.65.11-13.

commitment to have protected. Nation-building was an extreme measure bringing to an end civil strife by creating a new state entity. States such as Argos, Thebes, Lacedaemon, and later Macedon, pursued nation-building in order to promote their own national interests. Of all of them the most ambitious power pursuing nation-building was Thebes, yet the most successful was Macedon.

Thebes after the implosion of Lacedaemonian power at Leuctra completely rearranged Peloponnesus. Under Epaminondas' guidance the Thebans promoted one federal project after another, including the powerful yet short-lived Arcadian League, and the lasting Achaean League that came to dominate South Greece during the third century BC until the sack of Corinth by a Roman republican army in 146 BC. Thanks to an alliance with Thebes, the Mantineans reunited their republics into a single polity, without Lacedaemonian intrusions. Nonetheless, despite the success of the Achaean and Mantinean projects thanks to Theban assistance, both factions turned against Thebes within the same decade and played a great part in that power's downfall at the battle of Mantinea.

The most successful nation-building project by the Thebans turned out to be the secession of Messenia from Lacedaemon. Having failed to capture Sparta, Epaminondas and his Boeotian Grande Armée turned their attention to East Lacedaemon, where they built the fortified city of Ithome. Notwithstanding the Lacedaemonians who defected and became Messenian citizens, Epaminondas brought in people from all over Greece, Italy, Sicily, and North Africa to settle and diversify the Messenian citizenry.⁴⁶⁹ Epaminondas was pivotal in the creation of Messene's national myth, as the first time anyone heard of it was at the peace negotiations taking place before Cleombrotus' fateful invasion of Thebes.⁴⁷⁰ Messene was by far the most ambitious nation-building project of the fourth century, because it was built on top of the well-established and powerful city-state of Lacedaemon. The main reason behind its success was the collapse of Lacedaemonian prestige and the military superiority of the Thebans over the Lacedaemonians after the battle of Leuctra.

⁴⁶⁹ Paus. 4.26.5.

⁴⁷⁰ Plut. *Vit. Ages.* 28.1-2

Fourth century nation-building projects demanded great amounts of spending and military effort in order to protect them from domestic and foreign opposition. More specifically in order for a great power to contribute to nation-building it required a combination of its resources ranging from military manpower to technical and financial aid. Military manpower was used in the context of traditional coalition warfare, or for establishing military garrisons abroad. Technical and financial aid contributed in the building of fortifications, especially of circuit walls which were imperative for the security of such projects. Counterinsurgency's demands involving nation-building made it an exorbitant strategy to pursue.

In the 360s Messene was granted a formidable Boeotian garrison that prevented a Lacedaemonian intervention from interrupting that project. The Argive unification with Corinth in the late 390s required a constant military presence of Argive hoplites, since the Corinthians could not deal with the Peloponnesian League's incursions on their own. Nonetheless, in the case of Triphylia, during the 390s the Lacedaemonians did not install a garrison to safeguard the new republic, and the newly independent city-state's autonomy from Elis, even after the implosion of the Lacedaemonian power during the 360s.⁴⁷¹ Mantinea reunified in the 360s in spite of the Lacedaemonian wishes. With merely Theban encouragement and no Theban military garrison the Mantineans successfully joined their republics into a single state with a democratic constitution.⁴⁷² The Lacedaemonians were unable to prevent the Mantinean unification

⁴⁷¹ See Chapter Two.

⁴⁷² It is unknown whether the Mantineans restored an identical constitution to the one they enjoyed before the forced partition of their state by the Lacedaemonians. According to literary evidence, Mantinea was a democratic republic before the partition, and was so again after its reunification. Nonetheless, Mantinea's division into four or five republics could have been maintained after the reunification as an administrative division that did not exist before the Lacedaemonian meddling into its internal matters. Since Athens' democracy changed qualitatively thanks to Cleisthenes' administrative reforms, there is no reason why the Lacedaemonians did not have a similar impact upon Mantinea, albeit unintentionally. Germany after its reunification in 1990 was a democratic federation once more, however it did not revert to its state during the Weimar Republic, as Adenauer's post-war electoral reforms persisted. Similarly, the Mantineans could have resorted to a unified democratic polity, albeit retaining the administrative division forced upon them by Lacedaemon. Just as Cleisthenes'

in the midst of having lost half their territory to a perioecic town of their own. At that time they were overwhelmed with fighting and losing in a civil war of their own. The establishment of the Arcadian League was the most ambitious nation-building project of the 360s. Forming a democratic federation between the city-states that provided most of the Peloponnesian League's military manpower guaranteed the dissolution of Lacedaemon's grip over the Peloponnese. The Arcadians relied on a military alliance with Thebes in order to establish a federation free of Lacedaemonian intervention, and might have received some technical assistance in building Megalopolis, but they lacked a heavy Theban military presence within their borders.⁴⁷³ The relapse of several Arcadian city-states into oligarchy by 362 may have been prevented had there been more Boeotian troops present in the region. Nonetheless, the Boeotian garrisons' purpose in Peloponnesus was to deter hostilities against Thebes' democratic allies, rather than enforce democratic rule.

Macedonian nation-building was the most successful in the fourth century. Philip turned Macedonia from a loose geographic region of tribes and city-states into the most powerful federation in all of Greece. Philip invited people from all of Greece to join in the building of his kingdom, not snobbing them of citizenship due to their place of origin or social class. Macedonia quickly became a pole of attraction for landless farmers, mercenaries, and even Athenian philosophers looking for pay and a new home. Philip's liberal attitude with granting citizenship to his kingdom's new inhabitants, turned Macedon from the backwater of the Greek world into the primary promoter of Greek way of life beyond its borders. Philip's Macedon brought to an end the age of the introverted Greek city-states, replacing it with Greek culture, military

administrative and Adenauer's electoral reforms had a significant impact on Athens' and Germany's political cohesion and prestige abroad, King Agesipolis' intrusion in Mantinean politics may have had a lasting positive impact (Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.7). This outcome may have been the reason behind the Mantineans' baffling alliance with Lacedaemon against Thebes in the late 360s.

⁴⁷³ It is uncertain whether the Thebans installed a Boeotian garrison in Megalopolis during its building, and how strong that might have been. In the Peloponnese during the 360s the most powerful Boeotian garrison was situated in Ithome (Diod. 15.67.1), which had its hands full with safeguarding the autonomy of the new republic from Lacedaemon, and would not have been able to intervene in Arcadia.

innovation, and political process expanding into the world. Paradoxically, Philip's nation-building, unlike Thebes', had a domestic focus, but due to its incredible success it changed most of the known world. Alexander and his successors brought about the Hellenistic Age by carrying out nation-building in North Africa and Asia based on Greek policies introduced during the fourth century.⁴⁷⁴

⁴⁷⁴ Ptolemaic Egypt was the longest lasting and most successful nation-building project carried out by the Macedonians abroad. Nonetheless, the development of the Hellenistic states is unrelated to this case study's topic.

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