

**PANTEION UNIVERSITY  
OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL SCIENCES  
GRADUATE PROGRAMME  
DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN STUDIES**

**A National Security Strategy for Jordan**

**ANDROMACHI GHANMA**



Supervising Professor: Marios Evriviades

Athens, September 2011

*To my dear friend*  
*Fadi A. Qwayder*

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS .....	3
INTRODUCTION .....	4
CHAPTER I	
History of Jordan .....	5
1.1 The great Arab Revolt .....	5
1.2 The tragedy of Palestine .....	9
1.3 Unification of the Jordan River Banks .....	11
1.4 Black September .....	16
1.5 Treaty of peace .....	21
1.6 The reign of king Abdullah II .....	23
CHAPTER II	
Jordanian national security .....	26
2.1 The concept of national security .....	26
2.2 National security dimensions .....	29
2.2.1 Political dimension .....	29
2.2.2 Economic dimension .....	34
2.2.3 Military dimension .....	36
2.2.4 Social dimension .....	37
2.2.5 Geopolitical dimension .....	39
CHAPTER III	
National security strategy .....	41
3.1 SWOT analysis .....	41
3.1.1 Strengths .....	41
3.1.2 Weaknesses .....	43
3.1.3 Opportunities .....	46
3.1.4 Threats .....	48
3.2 Strategy formation .....	50
3.2.1 Strategy of alliances .....	51
3.2.2 Strategy of balancing .....	54
CONCLUSION .....	57
BIBLIOGRAPHY .....	59

## Introduction

At the outset of writing this dissertation, I made an attempt to carry out an extensive research in Arab and foreign bibliography in order to explore the literature conducted on the subject. Unfortunately, I only found one Arabic book entitled “Jordanian National Security, Internal and External Challenges”. I emphasize that it was an unfortunate finding, since the main objective of this book was, as a Greek saying goes “to caress the ears of the rulers”; this book however, fortified my conviction that scientific research is a one-way street that could ultimately lead to a brighter future.

The purpose of this study is to try and define a general frame within which a viable national security strategy can be formed for this small country. It is located in a much unsettled region; it holds center stage in the world political map; is considered to be of extreme significance in providing essential raw materials, being a pivotal spot that attracts world attention, especially under the changing pattern of state-to-state relations. In light of the newly formed international environment, national security has become complicated, ambiguous, and commonly incomprehensible.

The study will start by demonstrating the most important stages in Jordan’s brief, nonetheless, overcrowded history, in an attempt to set the record straight and afford the essential background for this study. International relations specialists and strategists have always tried to explore important historical events, so as to learn from past experiences, avoid repeating past mistakes, and improve their effectiveness and efficacy. Chapter two attempts to define the concept of national security, and its particular dimensions, specifying Jordan’s power determinants, in this era of globalization and interdependence, the dissolution of borders in the modern information age, the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the evolving terrorist threat. The first part of the last chapter of this study will concentrate on Jordan’s internal strengths and weaknesses, as well as the surrounding opportunities and threats; this analytical tool will assist us in moving toward the last part of this study, which will discuss the proposed national security strategy for Jordan, and its success potentials.

Chapter one will start by unfolding events of World War I that led to the creation of Jordan and other states that compose the greater Middle East.

## **CHAPTER I**

### **History of Jordan**

The wider Arab region was under Ottoman rule since 1516 and this unmerciful rule lasted four centuries, it is to this period that many historians attribute the lack of education and consequently the lack of development that characterizes the region, always in comparison, of course, to the era of enlightenment that was spreading fast over Europe. The sole accomplishment the Arabs attribute to the Ottomans during this period is the Hijaz Railway, connecting Damascus to al-Madina al-Munawarra, which was initially designed for transporting pilgrims to Mecca al-Mukarrama. Through this project the Ottoman Sultan Abdul Hamid II was aspiring to be appointed as the ultimate spiritual leader of Islam worldwide<sup>1</sup>. This project, however, enraged the desert Bedouins; it deprived them of the steady income they made renting their camels to pilgrims, as well as of the bribes they took for allowing the caravans to pass by their desert. The project also enraged the citizens of the empire, since they had to pay the enormous cost of its construction; it also proved to be a tool to resist their Great Arab Revolt (Haddad 2003, 66-67).

#### **1.1 The great Arab Revolt**

The Arabs were contemplating the overthrow of the Ottomans for many years, due to the great oppression they suffered by the Ottomans, as well as the long endured Turkification policies that aimed at eliminating the Arabic language and culture. These policies discriminated against the non-Turkish inhabitants of the empire and, Arabs were faced with political, cultural, and linguistic persecution: the use of Arabic language and its teaching in schools was banned and their natural resources were used to support the Ottoman wars from which the Arabs had nothing to gain. These unjust and cruel policies gradually led to the rise of nationalism, especially in Syria, Iraq and Arabia; the golden opportunity, as it seemed back then, came with World War I, when

---

<sup>1</sup> The Hijaz Railway was 1320 km long; the project started in 1900 and the first voyage was successfully completed in 1908.

the Ottomans joined the Central Powers, backing Germany against the Triple Entente (Ibid, 70).

The Great Arab Revolt was announced by Sharif Hussein Bin Ali, Emir of Mecca, in Mecca on June 10<sup>th</sup> 1916<sup>2</sup>. On October 29<sup>th</sup> 1916, Sharif Hussein was appointed King of Hijaz and King of the Arabs, and received the assurances of Great Britain and France, for a single unified Arab state under Hashemite rule. Sharif Hussein had four sons, his two middle sons, Emir Abdullah and Emir Faisal; both strongly supported their father for initiating the Great Arab Revolt. Emir Abdullah was the master-mind and the political planner, while Emir Faisal was the leader of the Arab forces. By the end of the War in 1918, the Arab forces had succeeded in liberating Damascus from Ottoman rule, and controlled much of southern Syria, all of modern Jordan, and the Arabian peninsula (Abu Nowar 2000, 13).

The political map of the world at the time, had urged the Arabs to ally themselves with Great Britain, many letters had been exchanged between Sharif Hussein and Britain's High Commissioner in Egypt, Sir Henry McMahon, in which Britain pledged to support Arab independence under condition that Hussein's forces would revolt against the Turks. Sharif Hussein trusted British promises but was back-stabbed by his allies, since the true motives of the Triple Entente were to destroy the Ottoman Empire from within, using the Arab Revolt as the means, and had already divided the area into zones of permanent colonial influence through secret pacts and agreements (Ibid, 14).

The first secret agreement took place on March 18<sup>th</sup> 1915, the Constantinople Agreement, in which the Entente decided to divide the Ottoman heritage, promising Russia the right to control parts of Iran, Turkey and Kurdistan, in case the War was won, while France would control parts of Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq, and Great Britain would control most of Iraq, Palestine and Jordan; the agreement failed after the 1917 Bolshevik revolution in Russia. The second secret pact, the Sykes-Picot Agreement signed in 1916 and named after its negotiators Sir Mark Sykes and the French diplomat Charles Francois Georges Picot, divided the area into zones of permanent colonial influence. It recognized French interests in Greater Syria and northern Iraq, while

---

<sup>2</sup> According to the Islamic Calendar, it was a Saturday, Sha'ban 9<sup>th</sup> 1334 Hegira.

acknowledging British influence from the Mediterranean to the Gulf, needed in order to protect its trade and communication links with the Indies; the agreement also specified that most of Palestine would be entrusted to an international administration. The agreement clearly contradicted the promises made to Sharif Hussein through the McMahon-Hussein correspondence. Another secret agreement was signed in St. Jean de Maurienne in 1917 between Britain, France, and Italy, ensuring the latter's interests in the Middle East and Africa, as well as giving the latter further interests on condition of its non alignment with Germany (Haddad 2003, 75-81).

To make matters even worse, entrusting Palestine to an international administration was just a preamble to the deceitful Balfour declaration of November 1917. The British government's decision came in the form of a letter, signed by Arthur Balfour, Britain's Secretary of State for foreign affairs, in the name of His Majesty's Government, to the leader of the British Jewish Community Baron Walter Rothschild, promising Britain's commitment for a Jewish home in Palestine; the letter stated:

"His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country" (Shlaim 2007, 8).

Too many writings have been dedicated to the famous, or rather infamous, Balfour Declaration, arguing the true motives behind the British government's decision in issuing this document; historians have stated various reasons and contradictory ones, some stated that the Jewish community paid in gold for obtaining this document, others supported that Great Britain wanted to be relieved of the Jews and shifted their problems to the Arabs, and others supported that there was fear that Islam would dominate the region, thus the decision to enlarge the Jewish community in the Middle East, in order to balance a potential threat.

The truth of the matter is that this act of British foreign policy has caused a fatal injustice to the Palestinians, and sparked a long-standing conflict in the Middle East. The 2<sup>nd</sup> of November is considered a celebration day among the Jews worldwide, and a

mourning day for the Arabs who still wonder how could the British government give away what was not its own in the first place.

At the 1919 Paris Peace Conference that ended WWI, Sharif Hussein was represented by his son Emir Faisal, who demanded independence for the Arabs. Unfortunately the newly founded League of Nations rejected this demand and awarded Britain the mandates over Transjordan, Palestine and Iraq, while France was awarded the mandates over Syria and Lebanon. In 1920 Emir Faisal had formed an independent government in Damascus, and his brother Emir Abdullah was offered the crown of Iraq; the former was removed from the throne of Syria by the French forces and Britain prevented the latter from assuming the Iraqi throne. Emir Abdullah was determined to unify the Arab nation under the Hashemite banner and, following a failed attempt to restore the Syrian throne to his brother Faisal, he focused on forming a government in the lands of Transjordan. This area was divided into three administrative districts, and the British consented on proclaiming Abdullah ruler of these districts following the Churchill – Abdullah meeting in Jerusalem, leading to the formation of the first centralized government in Amman on April 11<sup>th</sup> 1921 (Haddad 2003, 91-97).

Meanwhile, King Faisal I assumed the throne of the Kingdom of Iraq, and the Hashemite family ruled over Iraq till July 14<sup>th</sup> 1958, when King Faisal II was murdered in a coup by Nasserist sympathizers (Moussa 1996, 18). The Hashemites had also suffered a major blow in 1925, when the eldest son of Sharif Hussein King Ali, lost the throne of the Hijaz Kingdom to Abdel Aziz bin Saud of Najd, who was assisted by followers of the religious Wahhabi reform movement, and led to the establishment of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which ended over one thousand years of Hashemite rule in Mecca. On May 25<sup>th</sup> 1923 Britain recognized the Emirate of Transjordan as a state under the leadership of Emir Abdullah, and acknowledged that Transjordan would be prepared for independence under the general supervision of the British High Commissioner in Jerusalem. In May 1925, two more administrative districts<sup>3</sup> became part of the Emirate (Haddad 2003, 102-105).

During the interwar period Emir Abdullah sought to build political unity by melding the disparate Bedouin tribes into a cohesive group; he also realized the need for

---

<sup>3</sup> The former districts of the Hijaz: Aqaba and Ma'an.

a capable security force to establish and ensure the interior and exterior security of the state, thus the Arab Legion was set up with assistance from British officers, the most famous of whom was Lieutenant-General Sir John Bagot Glubb, better known as Glubb Pasha. In April 1928 the first Constitution was promulgated, and the first Legislative Council was elected in 1929 (Abu Nowar 2000, 259).

Between 1928 and 1946 a number of Anglo-Transjordanian treaties were signed; Britain retained a degree of control over foreign affairs, armed forces, communications and finances, while Abdullah commanded the administrative and military machinery of government. In 1946 Abdullah negotiated a new Anglo-Transjordanian treaty, ending the British mandate and gaining full independence for Transjordan. In exchange for providing military facilities within Transjordan, Britain continued to pay a financial subsidy and supported the Arab Legion. On May 25<sup>th</sup> 1946, the Transjordanian parliament proclaimed Abdullah King, while officially changing the name of the country from the Emirate of Transjordan to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. In 1947 the second Constitution was promulgated and the first parliamentary elections of the Kingdom were held. On March 15<sup>th</sup> 1948 the third Anglo-Jordanian treaty was signed, stating that Britain will retain its military base in Jordan for another 25 years (Haddad 2003, 108).

## **1.2 The tragedy of Palestine**

The Balfour Declaration's commitment to a Jewish national home in the British mandate of Palestine soon came back to haunt the British and the Arabs. During the 1920's Jewish immigration to Palestine caused little alarm, the situation changed dramatically with the rise of Nazi persecution in Europe. Thousands of European Jews flocked to Palestine, inflaming nationalist passions among all Arabs. Palestinian resistance turned to a revolt and lasted from 1936 to 1939; it was the first major outbreak of Palestinian-Zionist hostilities (Abu Nowar 2003, 225).

During the 1930's the Jewish population in Palestine increased sharply; fighting between Jews and Arabs increased as well, and both sides had only the British to blame, who failed miserably in reaching an acceptable settlement to all. During WWII both sides cooperated with the British and the hostilities between them were kept in waiting till after the end of the war, when the crisis reached its peak; in the wake of the

Holocaust, the Jews gained unprecedented international sympathy, and the British government was under enormous pressure to admit thousands of displaced Jews. Meanwhile, a terrorist campaign was initiated against the British by Jewish groups such as Irgun and the renegade Stern Gang. Washing its hands of the desperate mess in the Middle East, in February 1947 Britain declared that its mandate over Palestine would end (Ibid, 310-315). The matter was then addressed by the United Nations, issuing its General Assembly Resolution 181 on November 29<sup>th</sup> 1947, the Partition Plan for Palestine into an Arab state and a Jewish state, with Jerusalem put under UN trusteeship (S.C.R. No. 181 at The Avalon Project 1996, pt. 1, par. 4). On May 14<sup>th</sup> 1948 the British mandate over Palestine was terminated, and the Jews immediately proclaimed the independence of the state of Israel, the tragedy of Palestine was born.

The termination of the British mandate over Palestine is considered one of the most important moments in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict, it is the moment each side was waiting for in order to step in and establish its presence and legitimacy. The Israelis consider the victorious outcome of the 1948 war as the celebration of their independence, and the Arabs proved they were unable to unite their forces and establish their will, while Jordan was the unfortunate scapegoat for the disastrous outcome of the war.

This war has two different phases, the first phase started with the issuance of the UN partition plan, which caused an unofficial civil war between the Arab and Jewish communities living in Palestine, an unprecedented violence led more than half a million Palestinian Arabs to flee their homes and settle in what became known as the West Bank. The second and official phase of the war started on May 15<sup>th</sup> 1948, immediately after the proclamation of the state of Israel; Lebanon, Syria, Egypt and Iraq sent troops to join with the Jordanian forces in order to defend the Palestinians, however, the attacks were uncoordinated and each army took orders from its own commanders, their defeat was catastrophic. Of all the Arab forces engaged in the war, the Arab Legion was the most successful in preserving a major part of the Palestinian lands, the territory known as the West Bank as well as the Old City of Jerusalem (Haddad 2003, 108).

Jordan saw a viable solution in the UN partition plan; in November 1947 King Abdullah held a secret meeting with Golda Meyerson (Meyer) in Naharayim, a site on the border by the Jordan River. King Abdullah promised to respect the borders of the

Jewish state according to the UN partition plan, and in return the Israelis would respect the borders of the Arab state. The Arab League refused the partition plan and the escalation of violence in Palestine led to their decision of April 1948 to go to war with Israel, and King Abdullah was appointed as commander of the Arab forces, consequently and under the new circumstances the agreement with Israel could not be fulfilled; a second secret meeting was held between King Abdullah and Golda Meyer, this time in Amman, on May 10<sup>th</sup> 1948, when the King explained his reasons for going to war with Israel, since the situation for the Palestinians was changing dramatically and the refugees were arriving by the thousands to Jordan (Shlaim 2007, 27).

Many saw these meetings as an act of betrayal on the Jordanian part. Things are not quite that simple, however, Jordan was a second home to thousands of refugees from Palestine, and the Jordanian Arab Legion defended as best as it could Palestinian lands as well as Jerusalem, but the superiority of the Israeli military capabilities was a fact, and the King had to face the reality of the inevitable Israeli presence; consequently secret diplomacy had to be deployed and pragmatism was essential for reaching a viable solution; the alternative was hiding behind fake Arab nationalism that led to the disgrace of the Arabs and the displacement of thousands of Palestinian refugees. The first Arab-Israeli war came to an end in mid 1949 through a series of armistice agreements, signed between the Arabs and Israel in the Greek island of Rhodes (Haddad 2003, 109).

### **1.3 Unification of the Jordan River Banks**

As a result of the war, many Palestinian Arabs found that union with Jordan was of the utmost importance, in order to preserve the West Bank territories that had not fallen to the Israelis. In December 1948, a group of Palestinian notables convened a historic conference in Jericho, where they called for King Abdullah to unite the two banks of the Jordan into a single state under his leadership. On April 11<sup>th</sup> 1950, parliamentary elections were held in Jordan, in which the Palestinians were equally represented, and the new parliament unanimously approved a motion to unite the two banks, constitutionally expanding the Kingdom in order to safeguard what was left of the Arab territory of Palestine from further Zionist expansion (Ibid).

Many Arabs including some Palestinians saw Abdullah as a traitor, and accused him of trying to expand his own territory, although if he had not sent the Arab Legion into the war, the Israelis would most probably have occupied the whole of Palestine, and if he had not united the two banks, the Palestinians would not have had any land left to hope for. By uniting the two banks, Abdullah did not expand his territory; he simply adopted the Palestinian issue and offered the possibility of a normal life for thousands of Palestinians, who would have otherwise remained stateless refugees. On July 20<sup>th</sup> 1951, King Abdullah, accompanied by his grandson Hussein, went to attend the Friday prayer at the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem; he was murdered by a young Palestinian, who also fired at the young prince, but the bullet ricocheted off a medal on his chest. Shlaim (2007, 37) wrote:

Although alliances with foreign powers strengthened the position of the Hashemites regionally and internationally they also laid them open to the charge of serving other people's interests, of being clients and, even worse, collaborators. Abdullah was much more strongly identified in the public eye with pragmatism than with ideology. He saw himself as an Arab patriot, but he was, in the final analysis, the king of realism. This mixed legacy is crucial for understanding Jordanian foreign policy during the brief interregnum of his son Talal and the long reign of his grandson Hussein.

The Jordanian throne passed to Crown Prince Talal, the late king's eldest son. King Talal assumed the monarchy on September 6<sup>th</sup> 1951, and abdicated the throne less than a year later, on August 11<sup>th</sup> 1952, in favor of his eldest son Prince Hussein, due to health reasons. During his tenure, King Talal initiated the development of a new constitution. Prince Hussein assumed kingly duties on May 2<sup>nd</sup> 1953, after coming of age by the Muslim calendar (Haddad 2003, 110-111).

The creation of the state of Israel, as well as the continued exertion of influence by the colonial powers over the Arab world, caused a general dissatisfaction and a sharp growth in support for several radical pan-Arab ideologies<sup>4</sup>. One of the key players in the

---

<sup>4</sup> The Ba'th (Renaissance) Party originated in Syria in the late 1940s under the leadership of two Damascus schoolteachers, Michel Aflaq and Salah al-Bitar. It championed the immediate political unity of all Arab states under the slogan of "Unity, Freedom, and Socialism". While gaining a degree of popular support throughout the Mashriq region, it eventually gained power in Syria and Iraq through military coups.

Arab political arena during the 1950s and 1960s was Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser<sup>5</sup>, who possessed charisma and oratory skills which enabled him to rally the Arab masses<sup>6</sup>; he appeared to be the new Salah Eddin who would unify the Arabs and re-conquer Palestine. Nasser, the Ba'th and radical pan-Arabists frequently proposed unity agreements only to see them dissolved in mutual recrimination; the unity proposals consisted of one state seeking to impose its domination over another; the short-lived United Arab Republic, consisting of Egypt and Syria, lasted from 1958-1961 and demonstrated the shortcomings of the radical unity plans; while appealing to the people, this risky approach maximized rivalry among Arab states at a time when unity of purpose was needed more than ever before (Moussa 1996, 17).

On March 1<sup>st</sup> 1956 King Hussein dismissed the British commanders of the Arab Legion and in March 1957 terminated the 3<sup>rd</sup> Anglo-Jordanian Treaty, provided that Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Syria would cover the discontinued British grants for a period of ten years<sup>7</sup>; while Saudi Arabia respected its obligations, Egypt and Syria denied providing Jordan with any financial assistance, which led Jordan to signing the 1957 agreement with the United States for providing the denied financial assistance by its Arab neighbors (Prados 2006, 11).

As a response to the United Arab Republic, the two Hashemite states, Jordan and Iraq formed the Arab Federation on February 14<sup>th</sup> 1958, but the bloody military coup in Iraq by pro-Nasserist officers shattered the Arab Federation and left Jordan isolated, and in a state of siege by its neighbors: the UAR and Saudi Arabia closed their borders toward Jordan, and prevented oil carriers from passing through their airspace to deliver oil to Jordan; the UAR announced with pleasure the success of the coup, and rushed to recognize the Republic of Iraq; meanwhile the Nasserist propaganda incited massive riots in Jordan and inspired an unsuccessful coup attempt which forced King Hussein to impose martial law. Jordan surpassed this difficult period of isolation

---

<sup>5</sup> Coming to power in 1954 after participating in the 1952 Free Officers' coup which overthrew King Farouk.

<sup>6</sup> Nasser's brand of pan-Arabism, broadcasted via radio throughout the Arab world, especially appealed to the displaced Palestinians; his popularity grew enormously after the Suez Crisis of 1956, when he successfully stood up against the combined front of Britain, France and Israel.

<sup>7</sup> According to the Arab Solidarity Agreement, signed in Cairo on January 19<sup>th</sup> 1957.

through accepting British military help and American oil airlifts from Lebanon, through the Israeli airspace, after being denied any help from neighboring Arab states. On August 8<sup>th</sup> 1958 Jordan submitted a complaint against the UAR to the United Nations Security Council, in which it asked for international aid in respecting the sovereignty of the Kingdom, this led to Dag Hammarskjöld's visit to Jordan and to his putting an end to the crisis with its Arab neighbors (Moussa 1996, 27).

During the 1960s the economy of Jordan improved tremendously, the potash and phosphate industries were developed, an oil refinery was constructed as well as the port of Aqaba, and in 1962 the Kingdom inaugurated its first national university, Jordan University in Amman. Jordan witnessed economic growth and the industry provided job opportunities, this progress gave rise to a new middle class of educated Jordanians and Jordan became more stable (Ibid, 14).

During the 1964 first Arab League Summit in Cairo, Arab leaders decided to resolve inter-Arab conflicts, adopt common principles regarding the struggle against the aggressive policies of Israel, and created a joint Arab force<sup>8</sup>. Another outcome of the Cairo Summit was the establishment of the Palestine Liberation Organization, to coordinate Palestinian efforts under the control of the United Arab Command. The mid 1960s also saw the rise of independent Palestinian guerrilla groups (known as fedayeen), the most notable of which was Yasser Arafat's Fatah movement. The fedayeen conducted guerrilla raids in Israel and in response, Israel launched major attacks on West Bank villages; by the spring of 1967 the situation had become extremely intense. On May 16<sup>th</sup> Nasser asked the United Nations to withdraw its forces from Sinai, on May 22<sup>nd</sup> he closed the Straits of Tiran, and on May 30<sup>th</sup> an Egyptian-Jordanian Mutual Defense Treaty was signed; the Treaty stipulated that Jordan's forces were to be placed under the command of Egyptian General Abdul Moneim Riad (Ibid, 168-179).

Israel saw the closure of the Tiran Straits as one *casus belli*, and made its intentions crystal clear on June 4<sup>th</sup> 1967, when Levi Eshkol formed a National Unity Government, co-opting Moshe Dayan as Minister of Defense and Menahem Begin as minister without portfolio; it was clear to the world that the reformed ministry was a

---

<sup>8</sup> The United Arab Command was composed of Egyptian, Syrian, Jordanian and Lebanese elements, and was headed by Lieutenant-General Ali Amer of Egypt.

war machine getting ready to attack. The great powers of the time were split into two camps, the United States and Britain both supported Israel's view that the Aqaba Gulf waters are international waters, while the USSR supported the Arabs; their views were made clear during the UN Security Council sessions that were held (Ibid, 163).

Israel launched a surprise attack on June 5<sup>th</sup> 1967, virtually eliminating the Egyptian air force in a single blow, at that point the outcome of the war was decided; Israel had complete control over the skies, raining down deadly bombs on the Arab forces. The Jordanian army was forced to retreat for preserving the East Bank heartland against the Israeli expansion. When the final UN cease-fire was imposed on June 11<sup>th</sup>, Israel possessed the Egyptian Sinai, Syria's Golan Heights, and most significantly, what remained of the West Bank, including Arab East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip. Of the states participating in the conflict, Jordan paid the heaviest price; over 350,000 Palestinians became refugees and fled to Jordan. Half of the Kingdom's industrial establishments, and more than half of Jordan's agricultural land were located in the West Bank; Jordan's economy was devastated (Moussa 1996, 227).

On November 22<sup>nd</sup> 1967 the UN Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 242, calling on Israel to withdraw from the areas it had occupied in the recent war, and for all countries in the region to respect the right of others to live peacefully within recognized boundaries<sup>9</sup> (Security Council Resolution No. 242/ 1967); Jordan accepted the resolution as a basis for negotiations. In 1969 the United States proposed the Rogers Plan<sup>10</sup>, which was welcomed by Jordan and Egypt, but was doomed to failure since it was rejected by Israel, Syria and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (Moussa 1996, 236-239).

---

<sup>9</sup> Resolution 242 also called for freedom of navigation through the international waterways in the area; it emphasized the need for achieving a just settlement to the refugee problem; the necessity of respecting the political independence of every state in the area; and a Special Representative was appointed to the Middle East.

<sup>10</sup> The Rogers Plan was proposed by United States Secretary of State William P. Rogers, to achieve an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict after the Six-Day War, which was followed by the failure of the implementation of Resolution 242.

#### **1.4 Black September**

On March 21<sup>st</sup> 1968 Israeli forces carried out a major attack on the Jordan Valley village of Karamah; where the Palestinian fedayeen of Fatah had stationed, and used the village as a base for launching their attacks on Israeli targets; the Jordanian army launched a heavy artillery barrage against the Israeli tanks and the raid was repelled with heavy losses to the invading Israeli troops. Israel had announced that its objective was to eliminate the fedayeen basis in the Karamah village, although the Jordanian army found documents in the battlefield that proved the true intentions of the Israelis, to occupy the Balka' heights and reach Amman (Moussa 1996, 256).

The Karama Battle was supposed to be a victory for Jordan and the Palestinians; unfortunately it was just the beginning for what has become known as the shameful Black September. The Palestinian Fatah movement celebrated the Karama victory gloriously throughout the Arab world, emphasizing that the courageous fedayeen won the battle, while the Jordanian army's presence was of minor assistance; this propaganda won the fedayeen a great deal of respect, moral support, and financial aid; in less than two years the fedayeen managed to create an army of over ten thousand men, and Fatah came to be known as a strong political entity within the Kingdom. Riots and strikes were organized, armed guerrillas patrolled the streets, and Fatah soon became a state within a state, with its own army, mass media, hospitals, schools, and even created its own social security institutions.

The pervasive and chaotic presence of armed Palestinian fedayeen groups led to a state of virtual anarchy throughout the Kingdom; moderate Palestinian leaders were unable to reign in extremist elements, who ambushed the king's motorcade twice and perpetrated a series of spectacular hijackings<sup>11</sup>; the situation was out of control, and the international community regarded Jordan as a state where chaos and anarchy has prevailed, the situation demanded immediate interference; On September 15<sup>th</sup> 1970 King Hussein declared martial law, and on the next day, Jordanian tanks attacked fedayeen headquarters in all the major cities of the Kingdom (Ibid, 322-324).

---

<sup>11</sup> On September 6<sup>th</sup>, fedayeen hijacked three civilian airplanes, two American and one Swiss, two landed in Jordan, while the third landed in Cairo since it was a huge Pan Am Jumbo. Three days later the same fedayeen hijacked a British civilian airplane which also landed in Jordan.

The government in Jordan was worried that the Ba'thist regimes of Syria and Iraq would unite their efforts to assist the fedayeen, and in a single blow, overthrow the regime in Jordan, but the mistrust between the two Ba'thists diminished the Jordanian fears; the Iraqi vice president, General Hardan al-Takriti, decided not to intervene in the crisis<sup>12</sup>, while Syria invaded the northern borders of the Kingdom, in an effort to assist the fedayeen, but the Jordanian air force launched continuous attacks on the Syrians, and the latter withdrew their forces, leaving the fedayeen in the hands of the Jordanian army (Ibid, 331-338).

On September 27<sup>th</sup> in Cairo<sup>13</sup>, King Hussein and Yasser Arafat signed an agreement that called for a ceasefire, and in a gesture of goodwill the King called upon Ahmad Toukan, a Jordanian of Palestinian origins, to form a government. On October 13<sup>th</sup> the King and Arafat signed a second agreement in Amman, with which Jordan recognized the PLO as the official representative of the Palestinian people<sup>14</sup>. But radical Palestinians opposed this agreement and continued the fedayeen mischief; the King called upon Wasfi al-Tal to form a new government, and put an end to the chaos caused by the Palestinians in the Kingdom. By July 1971 al-Tal had accomplished his mission and brought peace and security back to Jordan; on November 28<sup>th</sup> 1971 Wasfi al-Tal<sup>15</sup> was killed in Cairo by Palestinian fedayeen (Shlaim 2007, 334-340). The events of Black September marked the victim as victimizer and benevolence was repaid with ingratitude.

The events of Black September, combined with the dreadful propaganda by radical Palestinians, led most Arab leaders to take a public stance in favor of the fedayeen, in order to embellish their credentials as Arab nationalists. Jordan was marked as the black sheep of the region, deprived of friendly Arab assistance, since Kuwait and

---

<sup>12</sup> General al-Takriti was dismissed from office, and assassinated in the city of Kuwait one year after these events.

<sup>13</sup> President Gamal Abdel Nasser served as mediator toward achieving this agreement, and this was the last thing he did; Nasser died the next day.

<sup>14</sup> This recognition on the part of Jordan caused the eventual recognition of the PLO as the "sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people" at the 1974 Rabat Summit.

<sup>15</sup> Wasfi al-Tal served as prime minister three times, and he was one of the most loved, trusted, respected, and admired political figures in the history of Jordan. Al-Tal was accompanied on his last journey by thousands of Jordanians, and was buried with full military honours in the royal cemetery in Amman.

Libya cut their economic assistance toward Jordan<sup>16</sup>. Saudi Arabia was the only state that continued to respect its obligations toward the Kingdom (Moussa 1996, 343).

On November 13<sup>th</sup> 1970, the Syrian Minister of Defence Hafez al-Assad carried out a military coup, and assumed the role of President under the Syrian Corrective Revolution; meanwhile the Iraqi forces withdrew from the Jordanian territories, a thing that brought some stability to the Kingdom (Ibid, 347-348).

On March 15<sup>th</sup> 1972 King Hussein offered a plan in which he proposed the establishment of a United Arab Kingdom; this plan would recognize the Kingdom along federal lines, with the East Bank and West Bank each having its own parliament and administration; matters relating to foreign and defense affairs would be dealt with by a central governmental structure with equal representation from both banks. The King and his plan were treated with unprecedented suspicion, and the PLO administration asked all Arab states to cut their ties with Jordan, a request that was satisfied by most Arab states, excluding Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Sudan, and Lebanon (Ibid, 389). Jordan's isolation in the Arab world consequently resulted in increasing its dependence on American and British aid.

The October War, also known as the Yom Kippur War, or the Ramadan War, was when Egypt and Syria launched a surprise attack against Israel on October 6<sup>th</sup> 1973, to regain control of the Golan Heights and the Sinai desert. Jordan was not directly involved in this war, although it did send troops to assist Syria, since the former's ties with both countries had been reestablished just before the war. Israel won this war and the lost territory from 1967 was not restored, nevertheless this war proved that the Arab nation can make a difference once united, and the Israeli military myth was dissolved; if it wasn't for the American assistance and the lack of coordination between the Egyptian and Syrian forces, Israel would have lost the war, on the other hand, the states of the Arabian Gulf, suspended oil exports to the United States and proved they can make a difference through applying pressure via their valuable liquid (Ibid, 408-409).

On October 22<sup>nd</sup> 1973 the UN Security Council passed Resolution 338, calling all parties to a cease fire, to the implementation of Resolution 242, and to start negotiations between the warring countries, for achieving peace in the Middle East

---

<sup>16</sup> An air bridge was created between Tripoli and Damascus for insuring the arrival of the Qaddafi assistance to the Palestinian fedayeen, which were now based in Syria.

(Security Council Resolution No. 338/ 1973). This led to a series of disengagement agreements between Israel, Egypt and Syria. This process culminated for Egypt and Israel in the 1978 Camp David Accords<sup>17</sup>, however, Israel annexed Syria's Golan Heights in 1981, and both countries remain in a state of war (Moussa 1996, 451-457).

In 1980 war erupted between Iraq and Iran, and attention switched from the Arab-Israeli conflict to the Arabian Gulf. Throughout the eight-year war, Jordan and the Arabian Gulf states supported Iraq against the threat of Iranian revolutionary expansionism. It was during this time that trade between Jordan and Iraq began to flourish; in particular, the supply line from Jordan's Red Sea port of Aqaba overland into Iraq assumed major strategic importance, contributing significantly to the development of Jordan's economy. This was due in part to the disruption of political and economic ties between Iraq and Syria, as the latter allied itself with Iran and halted trade with Iraq (Ibid, 498-500).

On July 31<sup>st</sup> 1988 King Hussein announced the severance of all administrative and legal ties with the occupied West Bank, after thirty eight years of unity between the two banks of the Jordan River (Habib 2008, 17). The disengagement decision marks a turning point in the history of the Kingdom, a painful and difficult decision that had to be taken. The previous year the intifada<sup>18</sup> erupted in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the Palestinians were fighting against the Israeli occupier, but this fight soon turned against Jordan in defense of the PLO, since most of the West Bankers wanted to be solely represented by the PLO. There were rising fears that the intifada would spread to the Palestinian East Bankers as well, as there was also fear that Jordan would be considered as an alternative homeland for the Palestinians. The pressure from other Arab states was enormous after the 1974 Rabat summit, but the pressure intensified after the 1988 Algiers summit, when the Arab states decided to support the intifada via

---

<sup>17</sup> The Camp David Accords between Egypt and Israel, neither state required the Israelis to withdraw from occupied territories (excluding Sinai) nor asserted Arab sovereignty over them; most Arab states including Jordan, rejected the treaty as destabilizing to the region, since it shattered the chances for a just settlement to the conflict.

<sup>18</sup> The first intifada started in 1987 and lasted till 1993, it represented the Palestinian uprising against the Israeli occupier, its roots lay in the miserable living conditions and the grave poverty endured by the West Bank Palestinians; the most striking icons of the intifada, are the boys who threw stones onto the Israeli army and tanks, the spreading of these pictures around the globe, won millions of sympathizers to the Palestinian cause.

the PLO channels, without acknowledging any role for Jordan; during the same year, the United States declared its intentions of starting peace negotiations for resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict, with the PLO as a legitimate member. All these facts projected Jordan as a threat to the Palestinians, and an incapable negotiator and representative of the Palestinian cause: every act of Jordan was criticized and misunderstood, every initiative was suspicious and mistrusted, a bitter sense of humiliation was rising, till the decision of disengagement seemed the only way out of this endless insult (Shlaim 2007, 453-462).

The doors of bedlam reopened when a new crisis hit the region, on August 2<sup>nd</sup> 1990 when Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait<sup>19</sup>, and Jordan suffered tremendous losses on account of the first Gulf War. Iraq was Jordan's primary trading partner, the Gulf Crisis and international sanctions against Iraq crippled the flow of commerce at the port of Aqaba, and disconnected the overland trade route to Iraq; aside from the economic losses, Jordan hosted over a million refugees from the conflict. While most of these were third party nationals in transit through Jordan, about 300,000 became permanent returnees from the Gulf, many of whom were Palestinian refugees who benefited from Jordan's policy of granting citizenship to Palestinians.

Jordan's political position during the Gulf crisis has been thoroughly misinterpreted, and deserves an explanation. Jordan stood in full agreement with the international community that the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was a breach of international law; however, Arab interests dictated that the matter should be settled on a regional basis, without foreign intervention. Jordan paid dearly for its position during the crisis, and was rewarded with complete regional and international isolation.

In the wake of the war, America's success in repelling Saddam Hussein's invasion, as well as the termination of the Cold War, urged the United States to sponsor and organize the Middle East peace conference, aiming at achieving Arab-Israeli peace; this conference was held in Madrid on October 31<sup>st</sup> 1991, under the auspices of the United States and the Russian Federation<sup>20</sup>. Secretary of State James Baker was the


---

<sup>19</sup> Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait and was so determined to the extent that he drew new maps of the new Iraqi borders, and named Kuwait as the 19th district.

<sup>20</sup> In December of the same year the Soviet Union ceased to exist; its presence during the conference was rather figurative than actual.

leading figure in the whole process. During negotiations, Jordan extended an umbrella to the Palestinian delegation, allowing the latter to directly negotiate with the Israelis for the first time; meanwhile Jordan was able to proceed in its long desired peace negotiations with Israel, in conformity with the general Arab consensus, rather than in defiance of it, as Egypt had done more than a decade earlier (Muasher 2008, 30-31).

Two years later, on September 13<sup>th</sup> 1993 the PLO and Israel signed Oslo I<sup>21</sup>; the negotiations in Oslo were held in complete secrecy, Syria and Lebanon were surprised, but Jordan was utterly stunned for being kept in the dark on such important developments; ever since 1967, Jordan was so watchful in dealing with the Palestinian issue, more than half of Jordan's population was of Palestinian origins, this conflict was as much of Jordanian as it was of Palestinian interest; how could the PLO proceed in secret negotiations and keep the Kingdom in the dark? On the other hand, the PLO was recognized as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians, and it had every legitimate right to go ahead with Oslo; of course this was the straw that broke the camel's back, and eventually opened the road for Jordan to proceed on its own negotiating track with Israel, the Jordan Israeli Common Agenda of negotiations, was initialed one day after the PLO-Israeli Declaration of Principles (Ibid, 27-28).



### 1.5 Treaty of peace

On July 25<sup>th</sup> 1994 King Hussein met with Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin<sup>22</sup> in the Rose Garden of the White House, where they signed the Washington Declaration, formally ending the 46-year state of war between Jordan and Israel. Jordan signed the Peace Treaty with Israel on October 26<sup>th</sup> 1994, at the southern border crossing of Wadi Áraba. The treaty guaranteed Jordan the restoration of its occupied land, it also defined Jordan's western borders clearly and conclusively for the first time, putting an end to the dangerous Zionist suggestion that Jordan is Palestine. Seeking to lay a firm foundation for a just, comprehensive and lasting peace based on UN Security Council

---

<sup>21</sup> A mutual Declaration of Principles, outlining a negotiating framework that would lead to a final status treaty between the Palestinian and Israeli peoples.

<sup>22</sup> The fifth Prime Minister of Israel, he served for two terms and was the first native-born prime minister. In 1994 Rabin won the Noble Peace Prize along with Shimon Peres and Yasser Arafat. In 1995 he was assassinated by a right-wing Israeli radical, who was opposed to Rabin's signing of the Oslo Accords.

resolutions 242 and 338 in all their aspects, the treaty also outlined a number of areas in which negotiations would continue; to this end, the two states signed a series of protocols establishing a mutually beneficial framework of relations in fields such as communications, culture, energy, trade, transportation, tourism, science, navigation, the environment, health and agriculture, as well as agreements of cooperation for the Jordan Valley and the Aqaba-Eilat region (Haddad 2003, 3-20).

One of the most important topics of the peace treaty was the water issue; Article VI is dedicated solely to water, a long standing issue of the dispute between the two states; the treaty guaranteed Jordan an equitable share of water from the Jordan and Yarmouk rivers, with the latter being controlled by Israel and Syria; Jordan would also receive an additional quantity of drinkable water; to this end a joint committee would be formed after the entry into force of the treaty (Manna 2006, 60-62).

The peace treaty with Israel marked a turning point in the history of Jordan, and outlined with clarity the strategic importance of the Kingdom. Nevertheless, domestic opposition to peace with Israel was not missed, especially from opposition parties such as the Islamic Action Front Party (IAF)<sup>23</sup>, which condemned the peace process and expressed its refusal to the normalization of relations with Israel under the slogan “Protection of the Nation and Resistance to Normalization”. King Hussein regarded peace with Israel as the most important achievement of his career, and as a true pragmatist, the King considered peaceful coexistence as a one-way with no alternative for the progress of the region, and the majority of the population supported the King as well as peace with Israel (Moussa 1996, 615-617).

Relations between the Kingdom and the PLO were strained anew, article three of the Washington Declaration provoked PLO complaints not only to the Arab League but to Washington as well, it provided the recognition of the Hashemite special status in regard to the Muslim religious monuments in Jerusalem, it also gave Jordan the primary role in conducting the negotiations in regard to their status, bearing in mind Jordan’s historic role in their preservation, as well as the Hashemite inheritance. This provision

---

<sup>23</sup> The Muslim Brotherhood “*Jama’at al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin*” popularly abbreviated as “*al-Ikhwan*” is one of the oldest Islamic organizations in the world, with offices throughout the Middle East including Jordan, which advocates the pre-eminence Sharia law. In Jordan, the Muslim Brotherhood is the main source of political opposition to the government and the monarchy, through their political wing the Islamic Action Front (IAF).

was repeated in Article IX of the Peace Treaty, and the PLO insisted on its role as the sole negotiator for Jerusalem's political status. Jordan was not interested in the political but in the religious status, and so the crisis was bypassed, when Yasser Arafat paid the King an official visit in January 1995, ending the crisis by a general agreement that sealed Jordan's supervision over Jerusalem's religious heritage (Ibid, 618-620).

King Hussein ruled Jordan for forty six years, He passed away on Sunday, February 7<sup>th</sup> 1999, it was a sad day for all Jordanians, for he was truly loved and admired by his people. The King's Brother Hassan served as Crown Prince since 1965, but two weeks before His passing, on January 25<sup>th</sup>, He named his eldest son Crown Prince. There was a smooth transition of the throne and Abdullah II became the third Hashemite King of Jordan (Habib 2007, 149-151).

### **1.6 The reign of king Abdullah II**

Following the steps of Jimmy Carter, and towards the end of his second term in office, American President Bill Clinton took the initiative to invite the PLO and the Israelis to Camp David, in order to continue their negotiations on the Middle East peace process; the summit took place in July 2000 and ended without an agreement being reached (Muasher 2008, 107). During September of the same year the second intifada erupted and unprecedented violence broke between the Palestinians and the Israelis. The reign of King Abdullah II started with major changes in both the regional and international scenes. The Republicans won the national elections and George W. Bush became President. In March 2001 the right-wing Likud party assumed power in Israel, under its leader and prime minister Ariel Sharon; In September the Al-Qaeda terrorist attacks shook not only the United States but the whole world as well.

On March 28<sup>th</sup> 2002 the Arab League Summit in Beirut unanimously passed the first Arab Peace Initiative. This proposal was initiated by Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah and was championed by Jordan. The proposal called upon Israel to withdraw from the lands occupied in 1967, to recognize an independent Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital, and to achieve a fair solution to the refugee problem; while the twenty two members of the Arab League committed themselves to ending the state of war with Israel, gave security guarantees for all the states in the region, including Israel, and offered a collective peace treaty that would guarantee the normalization of relations

with Israel; unfortunately the two major concerned parties of the conflict, the Israelis and the Palestinians, were busy in provoking each other and challenging each other's will and endurance. Israel had trapped Yasser Arafat in his headquarters in Ramallah, the Israeli army had launched major attacks on the West Bank, killing and arresting Palestinians; while the latter were busy organizing suicide attacks on Netanya and Tel Aviv; thus the peace initiative was put aside and the cards had to be reshuffled, since peace without Israeli and Palestinian willingness and commitment was void (Ibid, 116-133).

The United States was severely injured by the 2001 terrorist attacks, the American administration had launched war against terror, and there was no room left for the peace process, since war on the Iraqi regime was decided, the Arab-Israeli conflict had to wait until the Bush administration would close up its unfinished business with Saddam. Over the years the Palestinians have managed to gather international support and affection for their cause, but this affection started somewhat to fade away, since the whole international community was absorbed by the ugliness of terrorism and its consequences, Israel managed to present the intifada as acts of terror against Israeli civilians, forgetting the tremendous imbalance of power between the Palestinians and Israel that has allowed the latter to impose brutal occupation for nearly forty years. During 2002 violence in the West Bank reached its peak, Jordan was constantly appealing to the Palestinians to stop their suicide bombings, but the radicals could not see how their actions undermined their just cause. Israeli raids were launched with no mercy, and it was obvious that Israel did not have peace in mind, despite Israeli violence and Arab support to the intifada, no Arab state has withdrawn from the peace initiative till this day, not even Syria (Ibid, 176-179).

The Iraq War led by the United States on March 20<sup>th</sup> 2003, did not last long, but its consequences were severe on multiple fronts; primarily the Iraqi people whose lives have been devastated and were thrown in the ashes of war once more, this time the alibi was their own freedom. On the regional level the balance of powers was disrupted in the whole region, and the fears of a threatening Shi'a Crescent reemerged (Black 2007, par. 1); last but not least, the American economy paid dearly for retaining its troops in an endless guerilla confrontation. Jordan received new waves of refugees and lost all its

supplies from Iraqi oil, fortunately, some Gulf States<sup>24</sup> granted Jordan its daily needs of crude oil, thus the Kingdom was able to abide the consequences of the war. Meanwhile the Road Map was on track for reaching a settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict, summits were held and Arab leaders intervened, in order to achieve consensus between the Palestinians and the Israelis.

Unfortunately, the Israeli administration under Ariel Sharon's Likud guidelines, was not interested in giving the slightest compromise, while Yasser Arafat was under siege and could not, or most probably, would not reign in the extremist elements, and suicide bombers continued to bury their cause under the ruins of what has been widely referred to as terror. The Bush administration refused to sympathize with the Palestinians since it launched its sacred war against terror, and the Arabs once more failed to exert pressure in any direction. The Road Map was announced, accepted, and essentially turned down part and parcel.

On November 9<sup>th</sup> 2005 Jordan experienced three simultaneous terrorist bombings at hotels in Amman. 57 people died and 115 were wounded. Al-Qaeda terrorist group in Iraq, led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, claimed responsibility (Slackman and Mekhennet 2005, par. 7).

---

<sup>24</sup> Saudi Arabia agreed to grant Jordan 50,000 free barrels of oil a day, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates also agreed to grant Jordan an additional 25,000 barrels each.

## **CHAPTER II**

### **Jordanian national security**

There is an organic relation that binds Jordanian national security to Arab regional security, the two concepts intertwine and affect one another since Jordan is, geographically and intellectually, an inseparable part of the Arab nation. Bearing in mind the dissolution of borders in the modern information age, the unprecedented development in technology, the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the emergence of irregular war fighting, and the evolving terrorist threat, these events have had implications for every facet of Jordanian national security policy and Jordanian society. The once clearly definable notion of protecting the nation is now considered an ambiguity, the uncertainty, insecurity, and vulnerability that characterizes national security is urging for rapidly changing the field of national security as part of a comprehensive vision of integrated aspects.

#### **2.1 The concept of national security**

National Security must be adapted to meet the exigencies presented by globalization and increased global interdependency; it must also protect the rule of law, enhance security and preserve civil liberties. The concept of national security has been defined and redefined many times, depending on the evolving world order. During the nineteenth century and early twentieth century the concept of national security concentrated on the military aspect and on the state's ability to repel external aggression via military force; during the interwar period and especially after WWII this concept evolved and the given definition became interested in a more comprehensive perspective of national security (Maayta 2007, 17).

Encyclopedia Britannica defined the concept according to the elapsed military aspect as "Protect the nation from the danger of oppression at the hands of a foreign power", while the known strategist Frederick Hartmann<sup>25</sup> defines security as "the

---

<sup>25</sup> Dr. Frederick Hartmann was a distinguished international relations scholar, born in 1922 in New York city, and received his Ph. D. from Princeton University in 1949. He taught for many years at the Naval War College in Rhode Island, and a host of other public and private institutions. His definition of "international relations" was included in UNESCO's Social Science Dictionary published in 1965. He retired from the Naval War College as Alfred Thayer Mahan Professor Emeritus.

collective vital national interests of the state” and these interests can be internal as well as external (Ibid, 19).

Arnold Wolfers stated that “security, in any objective sense, measures the absence of threat to acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked” (Buzan 1991, 17). Walter Lippmann’s definition is similar to Wolfers’, he viewed security in its traditional military context “a nation is secure to the extent to which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice core values, if it wishes to avoid war, and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by victory in such a war” (Lippmann 1943, 53). Buzan offers the closest and more operational definition, where the security issue is presented as posing an existential threat, which is anything that questions recognition, legitimacy, or governing authority, to a designated referent object, for example a state (Buzan et al. 1998, 21-22).

The traditional concept of national security used to focus mainly on military and political sectors; since security is a dynamic field, and given the newly emerged challenges and threats, where the traditional military-political sectors were not sufficient to explain and develop solutions, it was revised and broadened to include economic, environmental, and social sectors. Traditional national security, namely military, was defined as “the ability to withstand aggression from abroad”<sup>26</sup> that practically underlined the fixation on the military power, and military capabilities of the state. In the late 1970s another interpretation appeared, that was based on the interdependence theory, the new definition was offered by Keohane and Nye, it saw security not only as state-centric military policies, but also in a broader framework that encompassed interdependence between regions and states in the economic, military, and social sectors. The emergence of international regimes, and breakthroughs in telecommunication technologies greatly strengthened the interdependence argument; the main argument was that “conflicts of interests are reduced by interdependence, and cooperation alone holds the answer to world problems” (Keohane and Nye 1977, 7).

Security is defined by the threats that challenge it; a threat can be seen as potentially undercutting sovereignty, thereby preventing the political “we” from dealing with any other issue. The special nature of security threats justifies the use of

---

<sup>26</sup> A definition offered by Giacomo Luciani.

### *Political System*

The political system of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is parliamentary with a hereditary monarchy<sup>27</sup>, the religion of the state is Islam and Arabic is the official language<sup>28</sup>, while English is considered the second language, due to the fact that Jordan was established under the British mandate. According to the 1952 Constitution, the King is the head of state and the head of the executive branch, he appoints the Prime Minister and ministers; the King is the Supreme Commander of the military, naval and air forces, he declares war, concludes peace and ratifies treaties and agreements; the King also ratifies the laws and promulgates them<sup>29</sup>.

The legislative power rests in the National Assembly that consists of two houses, the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. The Chamber of Deputies consists of 120 members, elected in general and direct elections for a four year term; the Jordanian electoral law (Ryan 2010, par. 5) reserves twelve seats for women, nine seats for Christians, and three seats for Jordanians of Chechen or Circassian origins; the Senate consists of no more than half the number of the members of the Chamber of Deputies, and the members of the Senate are appointed by the King<sup>30</sup>. While the legislative power lies in this bicameral assembly, the powers vested in the King allow him to dissolve both bodies of the National Assembly by decree, declare the holding of new elections, and even postpone scheduled elections if a force majeure occurs.

According to the Jordanian Constitution, the third branch of government is independent, and judges can exercise their judicial functions free of any authority other than that of the law, although judges are appointed and dismissed by royal decree. The courts in Jordan are divided into three categories, civil courts, religious courts, and special courts. The King has the right to grant special pardons and remit any sentence;

---

<sup>27</sup> Article 1 of the Constitution.

<sup>28</sup> Article 2 of the Constitution

<sup>29</sup> All the powers vested in the King are under chapter four of the Constitutions, articles 28 – 40.

<sup>30</sup> All the legislative powers of the National Assembly are under chapter five of the Constitution, articles 62 – 74.

the Jordanian law applies the death penalty, but no death sentence can be executed without a royal decree<sup>31</sup>.

Based on the above mentioned the political system of Jordan revolves around its monarch, whose powers shadow the three branches of government. According to the 2010 Corruption Perceptions Index of Transparency International, Jordan ranked 50<sup>th</sup> out of 178 states, thus a substantial separation of powers needs to be implemented in order to obtain a healthier system of checks and balances that can guarantee a constitutional start for Jordan's democratization program.

A positive step toward this end was taken in May 2011, when a royal committee was set-up by the King for the revision of the 1952 constitution (Mustafa 2011, par. 2); this committee presented its recommendations on August 14<sup>th</sup> 2011, and the proposed constitutional amendments include:

- The establishment of a constitutional court to monitor the constitutionality of laws. This court would replace the high tribunal which is currently headed by the speaker of the Senate.
- The establishment of an independent commission to oversee elections instead of the Ministry of Interior.
- The enhancement of civil liberties, including citizens' rights, public freedoms, and the protection of the secrecy of all forms of communication between citizens.
- The limitation of the government's ability to issue temporary laws during the absence of parliament.
- The limitation of the State Security Court's jurisdiction to cases of high treason, espionage, and terrorism<sup>32</sup>.
- The limitation of the government's ability to dissolve parliament without having to resign itself.

These amendments still have to go through the legislative process before they are adopted. Reactions in Jordan ranged between two extremes, hailed as a quantum

---

<sup>31</sup> The Judiciary is under chapter six of the Constitution, articles 97 – 109.

<sup>32</sup> This amendment to the State Security Court's jurisdiction provoked various reactions in Jordan, since the definitions of high treason, espionage, and especially that of terrorism, are not clearly laid out, which grants the Court endless options in applying its jurisdiction.

leap forward by some and rejected as merely cosmetic by others, since the King's powers have been left intact. Still, the amendments are an important first step, bearing in mind that the constitution will witness its first major change since it was adopted in 1952 (Ghazawy 2011).

### *Foreign Policy*

Despite Jordan's small size, the scarcity of its natural resources, and the consequent substantial dependence on outside powers for economic and military support, a fact that has contributed to Jordan's caution in foreign policy, it is considered one of the most important Arab states for several factors, and its foreign policy has occupied center stage in regional and international politics. It is no secret that one of the most important factors is that Jordan shares with Israel and the Palestinian territories the longest peaceful borders that function as a buffer zone. This small sized state also has borders with Iraq, a fact that has increased Jordan's strategic importance, bearing in mind that since 1980 Iraq has fought three wars, the last of which has changed the geopolitical map of the region (Qwayder 2006, 3).

Taking a glimpse on Jordan's foreign policy, one can distinguish some general features that have lasted throughout time; it is often characterized as rational, distanced from chaos and sentimentality, moderate as it avoids extremism and exaggerated positions, pragmatic as it avoids rigid ideologies and empty slogans, flexible and adaptable to unexpected events, it lacks confinement behind rigid positions, it is an open policy that interacts with regional and international actors, and always tried hard not be isolated nor remote; Jordan's foreign policy always avoided religious or ethnic discrimination, and it always respected international organizations and their resolutions.

The Jordanian foreign policy objectives can be determined by two main categories (Ibid, 6-7):

- The supreme strategic objectives, namely, the protection of the state's territorial integrity and sovereignty, through minimizing the sources of external threats; the protection of the state's political system, and maintaining the Royal Hashemite Court through strengthening its popular loyalty and enhancing the sense of national belonging; ensuring the state's strategic interests through minimizing the prejudices that can cause

great harm to the safety of the state, its citizens, water and energy resources, and undermine national unity.

- The secondary strategic objectives, namely, enhancing the general interests of the community that are contained within the supreme strategic objectives such as economy, trade, tourism, financial transactions and cultural relations; ensuring a prominent place for Jordan among other states through promoting a good reputation for the country in order to encourage other nations to develop their relations with Jordan; protecting Jordan's religious, historical and cultural symbols through international media projection and promotion; ensuring the scientific, economic, and social development of the country through strengthening the network of state relations internationally.

The Jordanian foreign policy has worked to achieve those two types of strategic objectives and goals, guided by a number of principles that govern its political behavior, namely, balancing between national and regional interests, supporting joint Arab action towards achieving Arab unity, and responding to the demands of the international environment for providing opportunities to help achieve those goals.

The process of Jordanian foreign policy and decision making is affected by multiple internal and external factors due to a variety of restrictions and applied pressures, mainly because of the economic vulnerability of the country and the dependence on foreign aid. In general the Jordanian foreign policy is influenced by a range of elements and variables. Jordan is a small state of about 92 thousand square kilometers, and is characterized by long desert land borders and short maritime boundaries. Jordan's geographical location has influenced its foreign policies not only positively, but negatively as well. Jordan's geographical and historical links with Palestine, has made the Palestinian issue one of its most important foreign policy issues, its geographical proximity to the richest oil wells and Iraq, has made it adjacent to a region where international competition for energy resources is tremendous. Jordan's geographical proximity to Egypt, a country with substantial weight in the Arab region, has influenced its foreign policies; the scarcity of its natural resources, limited agricultural space, and dependence on foreign aid has narrowed the margin of maneuver to the Jordanian foreign policy maker; Jordan's diverse demography and the fact that more than half of its population is of Palestinian origins has had a crystal clear impact on its foreign policy as well. On the other hand, when Jordan is compared to other

developing countries, its stability over the various crises has made it somewhat easier to rally support for its foreign policy either on the domestic, regional or international levels.

### **2.2.2 Economic dimension**

Jordan is a small nation with a small population<sup>33</sup> and sparse natural resources; it has long been referred to by its Arab neighbors as their “poor cousin”. Jordan is compelled to import many capital and consumer goods, as well as vital commodities as fuel and food. The Kingdom is the world’s third largest producer of phosphate; this export income offset some of its high import bills. Jordan’s strategic geographic location in addition to its free enterprise economy have assisted the country’s economy through becoming a regional transit point for exports and imports between Europe and the Middle East; it also worked hard to achieve attracting foreign direct investments in the fields of banking, insurance and consulting services to foreign clients. Jordan is also highly dependent on its educated work force that remits its income from working abroad, especially in the Gulf region.

Consequently, Jordan’s economy depends heavily on imported commodities, foreign aid, trade, investments, and expatriate income; facts that deeply concern the government as to the vulnerability of the Jordanian economy to external forces; bearing in mind the severe isolation the Kingdom suffered during the 1991 first Gulf crisis, when foreign aid, especially from the United States, stopped, while Iraqi oil was scarce, and over one hundred thousand Jordanians and Palestinians were expelled from Kuwait, thus leaving the Kingdom paralyzed and deprived of any assistance.

One of the major problems the Kingdom faces is the scarcity of its water resources; the water issue is of vital importance to Jordan, to the extent that it was one of the most significant issues in the 1994 peace treaty with Israel (Manna 2006, 58). Another major issue for Jordan is the energy sector; in a televised interview with the Jordanian Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources (MEMR) on July 8, 2011, Dr. Khaled Touqan stated that Jordan imports about 96% of its energy needs; up until the war on the Saddam regime, Jordan’s needs of crude oil were supplied from Iraq, but

---

<sup>33</sup> According to the May 2010 booklet issued by the Jordanian Department of Statistics (DoS), Jordan’s population is 6,113,000.

after the 2003 invasion, oil has been provided by some GCC member states, and gas has been provided by Egypt through the Arab Gas Pipeline, but this situation is far from stability. Dr. Touqan added that during 2011 the Egyptian gas was suspended for a total of 82 days, and the pipeline that serves Jordan and Israel suffered three bombings during the second quarter of the same year (Ezziben 2011).

Jordan is seeking to raise and stabilize the influx of Egyptian gas through a renewed treaty with Egypt that is currently under discussion, it is also negotiating a lowered price in comparison to the previously agreed, especially after discovering the lower prices that were agreed with Israel during their 2005 treaty (Al Jazeera 2008, par. 5). Dr. Touqan also informed Jordan television that the country is also trying to explore its own natural gas resources through British Petroleum that is currently running sized mixed studies in the Kingdom, since it had initial positive indicators.

Jordan's economy is mainly service oriented, the service sector, which is comprised of financial services, trade, transportation, communication, tourism, construction, and education, contributes 66.2 %, industry contributes 30.3 % to GDP. The remaining 3.4 % is contributed by the agricultural sector (CIA Factbook 2011, Jordan).

According to the May 2011 booklet issued by the Jordanian Department of Statistics (DoS), the main economic indicators for the year 2010 are:

GDP:	\$ 13.83 billion
Annual real growth rate:	3.1 %
Per capita GDP:	\$ 4,510.4
Inflation rate:	5%
Export:	\$ 12.2 billion
Imports:	\$ 17.85 billion
Net trade balance:	\$ -5.64 billion
Unemployment rate:	12.5 %

It is worth noting that Jordan has signed more free trade agreements than any other country in the region, most important of which are those signed with the United States, the European Union, and the Gulf Cooperation Council. On May 10<sup>th</sup> 2011, the

GCC issued its initial acceptance to Jordan's application for becoming a member in this rich club; Jordan first made this application in the 1980s but it was denied a membership (Halaby 2011, par. 1-3), this is maybe the most recent example of how Jordan can be greatly affected by external circumstances, though surprisingly this time, in a positive way.

### **2.2.3 Military dimension**

The military dimension has traditionally been included in the concept of national security, and it is considered the core for the whole formation of security. At the present age, sovereign states are less vulnerable to direct military attacks from other sovereign states, due to developed military capabilities, and especially nuclear capacity, however this does not mean that states do not use their military forces against external and internal threats, especially for applying their political will, and they are usually used for persuasion and intimidation. In the case of hegemonic powers like the United States for instance, they use their military forces for protecting their national interests, veiled under humanitarian intervention, as the case was with the U.S. war on terror in Afghanistan and against the Iraqi regime; however, this does not apply to Jordan, with its modest military capabilities in comparison to those of the United States, nevertheless they are quite remarkable for a country the size of Jordan.

Jordan has good defensive capabilities and a well disciplined army. The Jordanian forces are divided between various military branches like the Armed Forces (JAF), Land Forces (RJLF), Navy, Air Force (RJAF), and the Special Operations Command (Socom). In order to be efficient in dealing with relatively new sources of threat, Jordan has designed a Special Operations Training Center (KASOTC), as a counterterrorism training center for Jordanian and foreign forces (Kibler 2008, par. 2). The Kingdom is also a strong supporter of United Nations peacekeeping missions; it is ranked third on the international level in participating in such missions. Jordan also takes the lead in the Middle Eastern region for training the new Iraqi security forces and police; it also provides annual training courses for GCC member states forces (Maraqa 2011).

As previously mentioned in Chapter One, the Arab Legion was initially trained and supported by the United Kingdom, but ever since WWII and especially since 1957,

the United states has stepped in and started granting Jordan significant assistance, both economical and in the form of military assistance, including arms sales, tanks, and air fighters. The total U.S. military assistance to Jordan since the 1991 Gulf war<sup>34</sup> and up until 2007 amounts to \$ 2.45 billion (Prados 2006, 16), while U.S. military grants to Israel<sup>35</sup> amount approximately to \$ 2 billion annually (Sharp 2010, 24). The United States is considered a major provider for Jordanian military aid; this aid, of course, comes with a number of obligations on the part of Jordan, for this relationship is of bilateral nature with mutual interests, taking into account the strategic position that Jordan holds in the Middle East, a region where America holds national interests of extreme importance (Terrill 2008, 53-54).

In 1974 a joint U.S.-Jordanian Military Commission was formed, in order to conduct combined military training, that has been carried out ever since at least once a year (Prados 2006, 15). From the above mentioned, one can observe the tight relationship between the two countries, but this hadn't always been the case, for as we said, mutual, and most importantly, national interests are at stake, and this relationship was strained several times in the path of history due, not only, to a conflict of interests, but to deeper conflicts in beliefs and priorities, for Jordan's positions always proved that Arab interests can be better served without foreign intervention, whenever the case was addressed.

#### **2.2.4 Social dimension**

When the Emirate of Transjordan was created under the British mandate in 1921, the majority of the population was organized in tribally oriented groups, in the form of Bedouin nomads. The Bedouins have traditionally been considered the cornerstone of the Emirate and the Kingdom afterwards, since their support has always been of the utmost importance to the survival of the Hashemite throne. This tribal form of society was not only found in the desert, it was a general form of society that also resided in agricultural villages near to urban centers. For all the economic and cultural

---

<sup>34</sup> Bearing in mind that the U.S. military assistance to Jordan was suspended in April 1991, and released in early 1993.

<sup>35</sup> U.S. military grants to Israel started in 1949, no wonder the latter was able to support nuclear capabilities.

development during the past century, and all the domestic migration toward the cities, the formation of the Jordanian society is still based on this tribal character (Buzan and Waever 2003, 187), and it is proved on every occasion when national elections are held.

As previously mentioned, Jordan is a small country with a population of approximately six million inhabitants, more than half of which are of Palestinian origins, who migrated to Jordan during the 1948 and 1967 wars with Israel. The Kingdom is also home to minority groups like the Armenians; the Circassians, who resided in Jordan after the Caucasus Mountains were ceded by Russia in the 1880s; another minority from the Caucasus region, is the Chechens, or Shishan, as they are referred to in Jordan; all minorities are fully incorporated in the community, however they retain their native languages as well; as to their political status, the Jordanian electoral law preserves their equal representation in Parliament (Ryan 2010, par. 4).

Jordan is an Arab, Sunni-Muslim state, the majority of the population are Muslims, but there are Christian Jordanians as well, who share most of the cultural habits and values with Muslim Jordanians, and their sense of identity and belonging is no different from the latter's. The Christian populations of Jordan practice their religious rituals in total freedom, they work, study, and socialize with the Muslim population; the only unwritten rule that applies between Muslims and Christians is that intermarriage between them is unwelcome.

During the brief history of the Kingdom, emphasis was given to education, and Jordan has become a labor exporting country, to the states of the Arabian Gulf, especially after the oil boom of the 1970s, while it became a major labor importer country as well; more than half a million Egyptian laborers work in Jordan today, in addition to thousands of workers from Syria, India, Pakistan, and the Philippines.

The Kingdom also became home to more than seven hundred thousand Iraqi refugees after 2003, who fled Iraq because of the war, and show no sign of wanting to return, especially after the Shi'a predominance in the Iraqi political system (Alterman 2007, par. 4); in addition to the fact that most refugees made and their families settled in Jordan, and they do not want to re-disturb their tranquility.

Jordan is characterized as a stable state in a much troubled region; this stability has many of its roots in the cultivated national unity and the common national identity among the population; if this unity is threatened, then the stability of the whole system

will be affected. Jordan's history has shown severe signs of instability during the early 1970s, when the fedayeen threatened to overthrow the Hashemite throne, fears have also been consistent in regard to Israeli ambitions of seeing Jordan as an alternative homeland to the Palestinians.

### **2.2.5 Geopolitical dimension**

Traditionally, geopolitics revolved around a combined analysis of the strategic significance of the state's geographic location and its impact on the state's political power. Of course the geopolitical dimension not only indicates the sources of power that a state can take advantage of, it also indicates the sources of threat, that can be fatal to national security, and consequently to a state's sovereignty. Jordan is located in the much troubled region of the Middle East; it is bordered by Syria to the north, by Iraq to the east, by Saudi Arabia to the east and south, and by Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories to the west, with which the country shares the longest border. Jordan is landlocked, while its only outlet to the sea is a shoreline along the Gulf of Aqaba that provides access to the Red sea to the south.

Taking into consideration the surrounding status of the Jordanian borders, one can only detect the difficulty with which stability can be retained. Jordan received waves of refugees from its western and eastern neighbors, its northern neighbor has never been particularly friendly not only to the Kingdom, but to the whole international community, and has always been a blind fanatic of Arab nationalism, while its current state has a doubtful future. To the east and west, the Israeli, Palestinian, and Iraqi regimes have inflicted severe implications to Jordan's security over many decades, and the repercussions have never ceased to cause upheavals and unrest, while in the meantime this very reason of unrest offers Jordan a unique strategic importance in the Arab region and further beyond.

Over-passing this tight circle around the Kingdom, opportunities await in the Gulf area, on the one end there is the Gulf Cooperation Council<sup>36</sup>, with its rich oil reserves and by now, friendly regimes that have recently accepted Jordan's application

---

<sup>36</sup> The Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, also known as the "GCC" consists of six Arab countries along the Arabian Gulf coast, comprising the United Arab Emirates, Kingdom of Bahrain, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Sultanate of Oman, state of Qatar and State of Kuwait, and was established in May 1981.

for GCC membership (Halaby 2011, par. 1), and on the other end there's Iran, with which relations can be developed in order to mend past differences, and provide future alternatives. There is also Turkey that has developed into a strategic regional player, and stands on the crossroad between Europe and the east, with which cooperation can prove to be quite effective.

Jordan's lack of natural resources ultimately asserts outward searching and stresses the importance of the geopolitical dimension that can be of the utmost importance, if it is used wisely toward achieving clearly stated goals.

## **CHAPTER III**

### **National security strategy**

#### **3.1 SWOT analysis**

A starting point in order to visualize the form of a potential national security strategy could be a SWOT analysis, containing the following elements: building on strengths and minimizing weaknesses, in regard to the internal environment of the state; while seizing opportunities and counteracting threats, in regard to the external environment of the state. SWOT analysis handles actual facts and data concerning a state's abilities and surroundings, thus it needs to be flexible, since situations change with the passage of time, and an updated analysis should be made frequently. SWOT usually reflects an existing position and viewpoint, which can be misused to justify a previously decided course of action, rather than used as a means to open up new possibilities. It is important to note that sometimes threats can also be viewed as opportunities, and weaknesses can sometimes be turned into strengths, depending on the parts involved (Wheelen and Hunger n.d., 109).

##### **3.1.1 Strengths**

This analysis will begin with an examination of Jordan's internal strengths. Jordan's geographic location could be considered one of its greatest strengths; Jordan shares the longest peaceful border with Israel; some call this peace a cold peace (Tobin 2011, par. 1), it really doesn't matter whether it is cold or warm, having signed a peace treaty comes with serious obligations, primarily on the basis of respecting internationally acknowledged borders.

It is also well known that Israeli interests are of the utmost importance to the United States, regardless of the White House occupant, since the Israeli Lobby in the United States always finds its way to affect the two branches of government, the legislative and the executive (Mearsheimer and Walt 2006, 16); this doubtless fact grants Jordan significant privileges with the United States, besides being an ally in a region of supreme importance for the United States, being a peaceful neighbor in a hostile region for Israel, is definitely a source of strength to Jordanian national interests and security.

Jordan also shares its eastern borders with the largest member state of the GCC, Saudi Arabia, and this border can be seen as a source of strength for Jordan in various ways. Saudi Arabia has many unresolved issues with various states in the Middle East, primarily with Iran after the Islamic revolution of 1979, with Iraq ever since the latter's invasion of Kuwait in 1990, with Israel and its policies toward the Palestinians, and with Yemen over its oil-rich southern border (McDowell 2003, 30-31), while the Saudi relations with Jordan are friendly, both countries are monarchies with a majority of Sunni populations, and in light of the aforementioned, it is of the utmost importance for Saudi Arabia to maintain its friendly relations with Jordan, while the latter benefits from the Saudi financial and energy grants (Tayseer 2011, par. 1-2). Saudi Arabia also supported Jordan's application to become a GCC member state, especially after the eruption of the Arab Spring Revolutions that started in Tunisia, swept over Egypt, and is currently making its way through Syria (Katira 2011, par. 13).

Jordan is also seen as a protector of the Gulf's western gate via the Saudi borders (Habib 2011, par. 9), since the Jordanian armed forces is considered one of the best trained and most disciplined armies in the Arab world (Younes 2011, par. 10-11). According to the Regional Report on the Near East (2011, 2-3) issued by the Council of the European Union, the Jordanian border control authorities capture significant quantities of drugs and narcotics that are trafficked majorly from Lebanon and Syria through Jordan, for consumption in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, thus Jordan plays a significant role in protecting Gulf states from illicit drugs.

In this era of non-traditional threats to national security, and in a much troubled region, the cornerstone of Jordan's strength in regard to security issues, lies in the General Intelligence Department (GID) or as it is widely referred to in Arabic *Mukhabarat*, which is considered one of the most effective intelligence bureaus in the Middle East and internationally, especially after establishing an "anti-terrorism task force" that has proven quite effective for detecting networks of the so called *Jihad* (Binyon 2010, par. 1-2). Over the last decade, cooperation between Jordanian *Mukhabarat* and American CIA has had tremendous impact on reaching

counterterrorism objectives. According to Juan Carlos Zarate<sup>37</sup>, “The American-Jordanian counterterrorism relationship has always been based on the fundamental perception of common enemies – namely, violent Islamic extremism – that threaten both countries and stability in the Levant. There are few relationships that are as strong, multifaceted, and important to the United States.” The extent of U.S.-Jordanian intelligence partnership consists not only of information sharing, but of joint training and on the ground cooperation (Bseiso and Dildine 2010, 3).

In this era of revolutions that are spreading over the wider region, the recently proposed amendments to the Jordanian Constitution can be considered as a fundamental source of strength for the stability of the Jordanian regime. These amendments are still far from completion, they should be followed by a more comprehensive, institutional, inclusive, and measurable reform process that would offer a more extensive political and economic reform, nonetheless, the amendments are seen as a drastic measure taken to enhance internal stability, bearing in mind that the Jordanian population, with all of its ethnic and social classes, strongly supports the King in leading this process.

To summarize, Jordan’s strength lies in its geographical location, bordered by Israel to the west and Saudi Arabia to the east, it also lies in its capable armed forces and effective intelligence, in the recently proposed constitutional amendments that would enhance internal stability, but most importantly Jordan’s strength is based on its well educated population, as late King Hussein used to say: “Man is our most precious asset”.

### **3.1.2 Weaknesses**

Jordan’s geographic location is one of its greatest strengths as listed above; simultaneously this source of strength reveals a severe weakness as well. The Kingdom’s proximity to Israel and the Palestinian territories comes with serious disadvantages, considering that more than half of Jordan’s population is of Palestinian origins, and bearing in mind the old Zionist suggestion that Jordan is Palestine; in addition to this old illusion, during the past few years, members of the Israeli Knesset

---

<sup>37</sup> A senior adviser to the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), the senior national security consultant and analyst for CBS News, and a former deputy assistant to the president and deputy national security adviser for combating terrorism from 2005 to 2009.

and especially from the right-wing Hatikva political party<sup>38</sup>, which forms one of the factions of the National Union alliance in Israel, started a grand media campaign in which they propose that the Kingdom of Jordan should be turned into a sovereign Palestinian state, thus solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on Jordan's expense, and completely abandon the two-state solution, in order to maintain a sovereign Israeli state consisting of the lands of Israel and Palestine as well (Gedalyahu and Kempinski 2011, par. 1). This illusion however, was also adopted by the leader of the Dutch party for Freedom, Geert Wilders, who is a vicious critic of Islam, and never misses the chance to proclaim that Jordan is actually the longed for Palestinian state (Benari 2010, par. 4), this propaganda combined with Jordan's demographics could prove quite disturbing.

This weakness can be put aside for the time being, since it is considered the perception and hope of a minority, while it hasn't crystallized yet in a degree to constitute a threat, Jordan has other more pressing weaknesses that need to be addressed. Primarily Jordan's economy is considered probably its most pressing weakness, ever since the 2003 war on the Saddam regime, Jordan lost its major energy supplier, and under the world financial crisis, Jordan has faced tremendous repercussions to its economy, its major unemployment issue, and the unprecedented fall in its growth rates, while the country's deficit and inflation rates are on the rise (Schenker and Pollok 2011, 1).

As previously mentioned, the lack of domestic energy resources forces the country to import 96% of its energy requirements, this fact combined with the sharp rise in the price of crude oil internationally, substitutes a major weakness for Jordan. In a televised interview with the Jordanian Minister of Foreign Affairs on August 7, 2011, Mr. Nasser Judeh stated that during 2010 the price of crude oil increased from \$75 to \$125 per barrel, this sharp rise cost Jordan around \$2 billion, a price that had to be paid in order to cover the country's energy needs (Maraqa 2011).

---

<sup>38</sup> Hatikva is a Hebrew word literally meaning The Hope. It was formed in late 2007 by its leader Professor Aryeh Eldad. In the 2009 elections, Hatikva joined the National Union, with Eldad winning fourth place on the Union's list.

One of the gravest natural and environmental weaknesses that Jordan faces is the scarcity of water; Jordan has one of the lowest levels of water resources in the world<sup>39</sup>, water resources in Jordan can hardly cover the needs of the Kingdom's population, and more so after the latter's sharp growth due to the periodical influx of refugees, thus the gap between water supply and demand widened significantly. The water scarcity has been exacerbated by the fact that Jordan shares most of its surface water resources with neighboring countries, whose control has partially deprived Jordan of its fair share of water (Antelava 2009, pt. 2, par. 5). The river-damns built in the region by Israel, Syria and Turkey, are exhausting Jordan's resources of fresh water, in addition to the major water shortage problem, Jordan's climate reinforced the development of agriculture along the Jordan river valley, and these products are exported to Europe and the Gulf; while these agricultural exports are considered a major income source for Jordan, the problem of water scarcity far exceeds this income (Schneider 2009, par. 6-9).

Jordan has done much to attract ever increasing levels of foreign investments in an effort to boost the economy, while poverty and acute levels of unemployment still blight the Kingdom. The official unemployment rate in Jordan fluctuates between a minimum of 12% and a maximum of 14%, while the actual unemployment rate far exceeds this percentage (Prados 2006, 2-3). Jordan also has a major deficit in its trade balance, which is due to the country's great dependence on imports, mainly of basic goods, raw materials, oil and oil derivatives, machinery and transport equipment. This means that any increase in the prices of these goods in the international market is immediately reflected on the level of local inflation, thus the high inflation rates in Jordan are due mainly to imports (Kandah 2011, par. 3). The 2010 Poverty Report that was published by the Department of Statistics, which was based on the 2008 poverty line, shows that 13.3% of Jordanians live below the poverty line (Mansur 2010, par. 3).

To summarize, Jordan's weaknesses lie in the scarcity of its natural resources, the high levels of poverty and unemployment, as well as its ever increasing economical deficit and high inflation rates; while Jordan's demographics foster a potential weakness that might as well develop into a serious threat.

---

<sup>39</sup> According to the United States Agency USAID, Jordan is one of the ten most water-deprived countries in the world. Whereas the average U.S. citizen has more than 9.000 cubic meters of fresh water available per year, the average Jordanian has less than 200 – a 45-fold difference.

### 3.1.3 Opportunities

Jordan is located in a much troubled region that never seems to attract world attention, and it is usually due to unfortunate upheavals within the Middle East, or on account of foreign intervention, nevertheless the Kingdom is characterized by a peculiar stability that has enabled it to survive and retain its serenity, even during the roughest of times. This same region though, offers tremendous opportunities that can be seized, in order to improve the country and reduce its weaknesses and vulnerabilities.

As previously mentioned, Jordan shares its eastern borders with one of the wealthiest states in the Arabian Peninsula and internationally, Saudi Arabia. On May 10<sup>th</sup> 2011 the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) announced its decision to welcome Jordan's long forgotten request to become a member in the GCC. Jordan's geographical proximity to the Arab Gulf states is not the only reason, for which its accession negotiations will start during September 2011; its accession to this rich club comes with mutual benefits. Jordan will benefit through an unprecedented economic boost, its energy resources issue will be addressed, and a grand labor market will open for its major unemployment problem, while the GCC member states will benefit through submitting a stable state that has a system of hereditary monarchy like their own, that comes with a population of Sunni majority (Neimat 2011, par. 6). It is still unclear whether Jordan will be offered full or partial membership, regardless of the kind of membership Jordan will receive, major issues will be addressed and hopefully improved, including economic cooperation, the Jordanian work-force in the Arabian Gulf, entry and movement status of Jordanian citizens, and last but not least, energy supplies (Khan 2011, par. 4). This is probably considered one of the best offered opportunities to Jordan, and with wise negotiations the Kingdom is expected to make the best of it.

As previously indicated, Jordan's demographics foster a potential weakness that might develop into a serious threat, but might as well take a more optimistic turn and produce a unique opportunity for Jordan. During September 2011, the Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas will address the United Nations to announce the establishment of a Palestinian state, and ask for UN membership (Ezzedine 2011, par. 1). In a televised interview with the Jordanian Minister of Foreign Affairs on August 7, 2011, Mr. Nasser Judeh stated that any state that wishes for UN membership

has two options, the first option is to address the UN Security Council and obtain membership through the approval of nine states out of fifteen<sup>40</sup>, provided that no permanent member would use the veto power, and the second option is to directly address the UN General Assembly, and obtain membership through the approval of the two thirds out of 193 member states in the UN today. Mr. Judeh added that the Palestinian Authority already has the support of 122 states, among which Russia and China, while fears of a potential American veto still remain.

If the Palestinian Authority (PA) succeeds in establishing a Palestinian state that is recognized by the international community, then the Arab-Israeli conflict will have a legal substance as well, and issues like the Palestinian right of return and/ or compensation can be addressed. This prospect fosters a great opportunity for Jordan on multiple levels, because only then can the Kingdom address many national issues and proceed in the implementation of fundamental changes to the Jordanian, much needed, political reform. We must not neglect though that this optimistic scenario, depends on the borders of this Palestinian state and its total area.

Another opportunity for Jordan can be seen a bit further with a non-Arab state, but nevertheless an important player in the region, Turkey's unique geographic location which serves as a link between the east and west, the tremendous changes it has undergone over the last decade, and the new role it is assuming in the wider region, projecting a stable democracy, a growing economy, and a proactive foreign policy, makes it an ideal ally for Jordan in the Middle East. Jordan's relations with Turkey are problem free, and there is appropriate ground and potential to improve bilateral relations in many fields. Since 2002 the Justice and Development Party (AKP) has made remarkable changes in Turkey's policies, but especially in its foreign policy (Akyol 2011, par. 1). Turkey has assumed a more active role in the Middle East, and especially in regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Turkey, which for decades was a reliable ally for the United States has expressed an independent stance in its foreign policy toward the countries of the Middle East, abandoning its historic neutrality and assuming the role of a constant criticizer of Israel due to the latter's policies toward the

---

<sup>40</sup> The Security Council is composed of five permanent members: China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States, and ten non-permanent members that are elected by the General Assembly for a two-year term, and are not eligible for immediate re-election.

Palestinians in Gaza, and especially after the Israeli raid on the Turkish *Mavi Marmara* that was part of the “Gaza Freedom Flotilla”, where nine Turkish nationals were killed by Israeli troops.

Turkey has launched a new foreign policy of “zero-problems with neighbours”<sup>41</sup>, and has approached two hot topics of American special interest, Israel and Iran (Tisdall 2010, par. 12). Jordan’s relations with Turkey have entered a new phase of multilateral cooperation in recent years, a number of bilateral agreements have been signed between the two countries, and several official visits have been reciprocated. Growing disenchantment between Ankara and Tel Aviv, in addition to Turkey’s opening up to Arab countries, has provided a fresh impetus for Amman to establish closer relations with Turkey, this relation if anything, could prove effective in exerting pressure over the United States and consequently Israel, for a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

To summarize, Jordan’s opportunities lie in the neighboring Gulf Cooperation Council, in the prospect of an internationally acknowledged Palestinian state, and in preserving and further strengthening its relations with Turkey.

#### **3.1.4 Threats**

Jordan’s geographic location and surrounding environment, as well as the country’s bitter past experiences, but especially during the past decade, clearly lay out its perceived external threats. Jordan knows about terrorism from bitter experience, the Kingdom’s moderate stances have often made it a prey for terrorist activities, as evidence by the loss of its founding monarch King Abdullah I, who lost his life to terrorism, Jordan also lost two of its Prime Ministers<sup>42</sup> as victims of terrorism. In 2002 an American diplomat was assassinated in Amman, in 2005 three international hotels in Amman were bombed by Al-Qaeda terrorists, in January 2010 an official Israeli motorcade was struck, and in April and August 2010, rockets were launched from the Sinai Peninsula and struck the port of Aqaba, the list goes on.

---

<sup>41</sup> A policy Ahmet Davutoglu first articulated in his book, *strategic Depth*, issued in 2001.

<sup>42</sup> Prime Minister Hazza’ Al-Majali, who was assassinated in his office on August 29<sup>th</sup> 1960, killing him and 11 other people, and Prime Minister Wasfi Al-Tal, who was assassinated in Cairo on November 28<sup>th</sup> 1971.

Jordan has faced challenges from radical Islamist terrorists, until his death in 2006, the key terrorist figure was Abu Musab al-Zarqawi<sup>43</sup>, but he was not the only one, a number of Jordanian radicals left the country to fight U.S. troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, following the U.S. interventions in these countries. The Jordanian government perceived that this violent radicalism stems not only because of anti-western sentiments, but is also due to poverty and unemployment. In light of these findings, the government in Jordan has launched several projects in an effort to relieve poverty in certain regions of the Kingdom<sup>44</sup>, create numerous local jobs and consequently combat the poverty that certainly breeds terrorism (Terrill 2008, 38-39).

Another issue that Jordan perceives as an imminent external threat is the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the region. It is a common secret that Israel does have nuclear weapons in its arsenal, although the Israelis never confirmed this allegation, reports show that Israel started nuclear research ever since the establishment of the state in 1948 (Farr 1999, pt. 4, par. 7). Iran's dream to acquire nuclear weapons goes a long way back to 1975, when the Shah was aspiring for a leading role in the Gulf and the wider region, he had ordered four German nuclear power reactors (Joffe and Davis 2011, 8-9), and today's Islamic Iranian government is trying to fulfill the Shah's dream. An old ideological and actual rivalry exists between Iran and Saudi Arabia, if the former gets to have nuclear weapons, the latter's intentions of doing the same is a very probable case scenario. Saudi Arabia has signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), nevertheless this fact does not prevent any NPT signatory from developing the required technology for producing nuclear fuel, beside the fact that Saudi Arabia has close relations with Pakistan, a state that can provide the Saudis with operational nuclear weapons and delivery systems (Edelman et al. 2011, 67-71). Moving further to the northern part of the region, Turkey has also expressed its intentions of "going nuclear" (McNamara 2010, par. 2).

---

<sup>43</sup> His real name was Ahmad Fadel Khalayla, and he was known as the prince of Al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia. He was Jordanian by birth, and had a long history of terrorist activities in Jordan. He began his career as a small criminal in Jordan, he fled to Afghanistan to become part of the anti-Soviet jihad, where he became involved with Al-Qaeda.

<sup>44</sup> A centerpiece of these efforts is "King Abdullah bin Abdul Azziz al Saud Residential City", the construction of this modern and affordable housing near the city of Zarqa has started, with funding from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

Jordan is a signatory of the NPT and has repeatedly expressed its concern over nuclear proliferation in such a sensitive region as the Middle East, since having three or four nuclear powers in the region would cause great unease and instability, especially if these weapons fall in the hands of non-state actors; bearing in mind the short distances between states in the Middle East, further hardens a secure second-strike capability, and states might easily confuse the source of a ballistic missile and strike a third state, which would most certainly end up in total chaos (Edelman et al. 2011, 73).

The latest developments on the Arab scene that started in Tunisia during December 2010 have developed into a spreading revolutionary wave that toppled long standing authoritarian regimes and reached neighboring Syria, these revolutions were just the natural sequel to what the Arab peoples endured for many decades. Protests have reached Jordan, but were of a different nature, since the people demanded political reform, immediate anti-corruption measures, and not the overthrow of the regime, while the Kingdom is much concerned with the outcome of these revolutions, especially in Syria, because it fears a potential civil war, as well as the recurrence of the Iraqi experience, which resulted in a devastating instability that produced tremendous terrorist activity, from which Jordan is still trying to recover; this, in addition to the continued and provocative settlement construction<sup>45</sup> by the Israelis in the occupied territories, which further strengthens the Jordanian anxiety toward the continuous reduction of the West Bank, and consequently the gradual elimination of the much needed two-state solution.

To summarize, Jordan's threats lie in the imminent terrorist threat, in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, in the outcome of the Arab Spring and especially through acquiring neighboring failed states, and last but not least, in the continued Israeli settlement activity.

### **3.2 Strategy formation**

It is commonly understood that the roots of the strategic behavior of international actors lie in the anarchical nature of the international system. This is due to the fact that regulations cannot be applied to international competition, and the latter is

---

<sup>45</sup> On August 10<sup>th</sup> 2011, the Israeli government issued an approval for constructing 1600 new settlements in East Jerusalem.

considered a basic component of strategy. Strategy has been defined and redefined several times; from the various definitions one can conclude that strategy lies in the state's conjunction of means and ends, under the influence of international competition, at times of peace and war as well (Koliopoulos 2001, 27-28), in other words, strategy consists of three components: means, ends, and opponent (Koliopoulos 2008, 44).

The survival of states in an anarchical and insecure international system is based on four archetypal strategies (Papasotiriou 2000, 22-23):

- The strategy of containment: states develop their own powers in order either to ensure their defense, or to be able to assert themselves before a threatening state.
- The strategy of alliances: states ally with other states that face a common threat, or with which they have common interests.
- The strategy of Balancing: states eliminate threats through balancing with other states, in order to deprive the opponent from gathering his efforts against them.
- The strategy of appeasement: states blunt a threat through concessions, either unilateral or mutual; the ambitious version of this strategy aims at totally exceeding the existing rivalry.

States usually build their security through combining two or more of the aforementioned strategies. Hereunder, we will try to apply the most appropriate ones for building the national security strategy for Jordan.

### **3.2.1 Strategy of alliances**

The basic characteristic of this strategy is that it unites several powers in order to achieve common goals within the system of international competition. The strategy of alliances does not only include conventional military alliances like NATO, in which parties undertake to mutually support each other in case war occurs, the strategy includes all kinds of alliances, conventional or not, in all cases every close and long-term cooperation that aims at ameliorating the competitive status of the participating states within the international system. The advantage of alliances lies in the concentration of resources and power for promoting common goals, i.e. the strength in unity; on the other hand, alliances have disadvantages, they inevitably limit the freedom of action of their members, and they are vulnerable to the "free rider" concept,

since each member of the alliance is interested in maximizing benefits while minimizing the attributable burden; as a rule one can observe that alliances face difficulties in preserving their consistency (Papasotiriou 2000, 25); however, the formal character of alliances presents, apart from the formal commitment, a sense of righteous commitment that enhances the perseverance of the formed alliance (Snyder 1997, 8).

The components of the strategy of alliances differ according to the alliance's form, for instance in a military alliance, the consistency and integration of the allied military strategies in the joint strategic planning is of the utmost importance, the level of integration suggests the level of efficiency; in an economic alliance the economic policy is required to bring benefits to all members of the alliance in order to increase their interdependence, thus ensure the overall consistency of the alliance. In the strategy of alliances, diplomacy bears the burden of coordination and maintenance of the political consistency of the allied parties, since their interests cannot be identical; on the contrary they usually have different priorities. As to the legitimacy, the preservation and the success of alliances, these are highly dependent on the alliance's support by each state's domestic society, alliances that are based on common values like nationalism, ideology, culture, or religion, ensure an easier acceptance by societies, and have a more solid ground than alliances that are based only on the calculation of interests and benefits (Papasotiriou 2000, 26-27).

The aforementioned strategy can be adopted by a small power like Jordan, in order to improve its status in the regional and consequently the international system, it can also prove quite effective in enhancing Jordan's national security. As listed above in the conducted SWOT analysis, one of the most significant opportunities that made its appearance on the regional scene is the decision announced by the GCC to welcome Jordan's request for obtaining membership in the rich Gulf club. Following the basic features of the strategy of alliances, one can observe that obtaining a membership in the GCC, would not be an occasional opportunity on the contrary, it would mean a close and long-term cooperation between Jordan and the GCC member states.

The main theme of the strategy of alliances is that strength lies in unity, by uniting capabilities and resources each state gains stable and solid support. Now, we must figure out how can this alliance work and benefit both parties, bearing in mind that the GCC was established thirty years ago, and Jordan would be its newest member state.

Jordan's accession would come with mutual benefits, on the one hand, Jordan will have a stable solution for its major problem of energy resources, and the economy will be definitely improved through a grand labor market that will be available for its major unemployment problem, on the other hand, the GCC member states will benefit through submitting yet another stable state that has a system of hereditary monarchy like their own, that comes with a population of Sunni majority, a fact of the utmost importance for the Gulf states, especially under the growing Shi'a pressure from Iran and Iraq, as well as the continued revolutions against the regional autocratic regimes. Boosting Jordan's economy will bring internal stability to the monarchy, while submitting a stable monarchy to the GCC will in turn enhance the latter's stability.

The disadvantages of this strategy lie in the "free rider" concept and in the attached limits to the freedom of action. As the situation develops in the Middle East, Jordan would definitely not behave as a "free rider", the country's well trained security forces and capable intelligence are much needed in the Gulf region, as to limiting Jordan's freedom of action, being the only GCC member state that has signed a peace treaty with Israel, this fact would not cause any conflict of interests, bearing in mind that most Gulf states have economic cooperation with the state of Israel (Guzansky 2009, par. 2), beside the fact that Jordan has signed the peace treaty since 1994, and this is a well known and irreversible fact, additionally, the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative was initiated by the Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah, and the twenty two members of the Arab League committed themselves to ending the state of war with Israel.

It is not negligible that Jordan has a number of common values with the Gulf states; all states have in common the Arabic language, their culture, ideologies and history, beside the fact that they all are not only Islamic countries, but their societies consist of Sunni majorities and moderate leaderships, and last but not least, their societies are based on a tribal form that still holds strong in the structure of their local communities, this fact ensures an easier acceptance by their respective populations, which helps in creating a more solid ground to the alliance and not just a superficial alliance that is only based on a mere calculation of interests.

Establishing an economic alliance with the Gulf Cooperation Council would not only help in the internal stability of Jordan, the Kingdom already has a significant geostrategic location in the region, such an alliance would also boost the country's

status regionally and internationally, for one thing its dependence on foreign grants and financial assistance would be significantly reduced, maybe even eliminated, thus the Kingdom would acquire the ability to conduct its negotiations on a stronger basis, beside being able to re-form and re-orient its foreign policy in ways that were unthinkable in the past.

### **3.2.2 Strategy of balancing**

The strategy of balancing is characterized by a high level of flexibility in the formed correlations between powers; the quintessence of this strategy lies in the rapid and flexible adjustment of powers to the particular formed circumstances, not only of power, but of threat as well. Walt (1987, 17) defines balancing “as allying with others against the prevailing threat”. The advantage of this strategy lies in the elimination of threats at a low cost, relatively limited resources are used to divide opponents, in order to cause diversions to a threatening power or support the opponents of an emerging power with hegemonic aspirations, it is best characterized by the saying “divide and conquer”. The disadvantage of this strategy lies in the high degree of uncertainty, delicate readjustments to the correlations of power and the occasional balancing collaboration in favor of a certain power can be easily reversed against it; its success depends not only on the leadership’s diplomatic skills, but on the surrounding circumstances as well.

In the strategy of balancing, the main burden lies on the shoulders of diplomacy, while military strategy is called upon only to support the delicate moves of diplomacy, through limited force projection in favor of the occasional partners; as to the role of the economic policy in contributing to the delicate diplomacy of balancing, it should be able to offer a short-term influence in order to backup the needs of diplomacy; this short-term backup could for example be economic or technological assistance, investments, or favorable tariff treatment and the supply of strategic raw materials. A precondition for the state’s ability to use the economic policy in its balancing strategy is to be able to redirect the financial resources for its foreign policy, without domestic resistance. The strategy of balancing is usually an attractive policy, but the problem lies in the difficulty of it being understood, supported and accepted by domestic societies. As to the issue of international legitimacy, the delicacy of the balancing strategy entails

the risk of undermining the image of the state as a trustworthy partner on the international scene (Papasotiriou 2000, 27-28).

In an attempt to apply the aforementioned strategy to Jordan, in light of the existing regional status quo, we must first make some clarifications in order to proceed. The most imminent perceived external threat for Jordan's national security is the continued settlement construction by the Israeli state on the occupied West Bank territories, the gradual elimination of Palestinian lands, and the unavoidable collapse of the two-state solution, thus the rising of Jordanian anxiety toward its being the alternative homeland for millions of Palestinians, bearing in mind that Israel is the sole holder of nuclear capacity in the region, and has been unilaterally applying its policies according to its interests, without having to make any compromises, puts Jordan in a position to try and balance the rising Israeli threat, but how and toward which direction could this balancing work? In light of the latest developments in the wider region, there are two poles of actual strength, Iran and Turkey.

Ever since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran has emerged as a fierce regional opponent to the Israeli existence itself. Iran is a Theocratic Republic with a hostile rhetoric and a nuclear agenda, a state that is causing much tension in the region and beyond. Iran's relations with Hezbollah, Hamas, Syria, and the newly formed government in Iraq, as well as it being the worst nightmare to the states of the Arabian Gulf, makes it an inappropriate partner for Jordan in the latter's attempt to balance the Israeli rising threat, beside the fact that the longed for alliance with the Gulf Cooperation Council, limits Jordan's ability of conducting any kind of balancing diplomacy with Iran.

Turkey, under the Justice and Development Party (AKP) is proceeding with an independent policy toward the wider region, ever since the failure of its repeated attempts to join the European Union (EU), Turkey has redirected its efforts to get closer to the Arab world. Turkey was the first Muslim country to recognize the State of Israel right after its establishment in 1949, the military and diplomatic cooperation between the two countries was of the highest priority for each state, nonetheless, ever since the May 2010 Gaza flotilla incident, relations were extremely strained between the two allies, and Turkey has been trying to approach neighboring Arab states ever since (Pope 2010, 168, par. 2).

The recently issued UN “Palmer Report” managed to further strain Turkish-Israeli relations, Turkey downgraded its diplomatic ties with Israel, and suspended the long standing joint military cooperation; Ankara repeatedly demanded an Israeli apology over the Mavi Marmara incident, but the Israeli government has refused several times to grant Turkey this gesture, which led Ahmet Davutoglu, the Turkish foreign minister to announce these drastic measures (Batty 2011, par. 2).

In light of these developments, Jordan can grasp this opportunity in order to step in the created gap in Turkey’s foreign relations with Israel and strengthen the bilateral relations between the two states, through an official public stance that shall create the needed ground for launching its strategy. Turkey can be the most appropriate candidate with which Jordan could develop its balancing strategy, in order to weaken the rising Israeli threat. Turkey might not be an Arab country, but it has a majority of Sunni population, which is well accepted domestically and regionally. The unmerciful rule of the Ottoman Empire might not be totally forgotten in the hearts and minds of Arabs, nonetheless, Turkey has been projecting, with great success if I may add, the image of a secular democracy, a much needed model for the, still standing Arab regimes, bearing in mind that a potential collapse of the Syrian regime, could further weaken the Iranian influence in the Middle East, thus strengthen this alliance if Syria is included.

Consequently, an attempted alliance with Turkey, for achieving a readjustment of powers in the region, and ultimately balancing the Israeli threat, will not face much internal resistance domestically, and will not undermine Jordan’s image internationally, in addition, Jordan’s GCC membership will provide the country any economic contribution it might require, in order to support its flexible diplomacy.

## Conclusion

The creation of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the other states that make up the Middle East, was a direct result of the great Arab Revolt against the oppressive Ottoman ruler. It is probably the only period during which the Arabs united their efforts and shook off a long endured injustice, only to be replaced with a greater injustice, the Palestinian issue. Citing Jordan's history shed light on the long standing Jordanian ties with Palestine, the deep roots that connect the two states, and the nature of intra Arab relations. Peace with Israel was considered an end in itself, now it can be seen as a preamble to a new era of challenges and provocations.

Reciting the events that marked Jordan's history in the twentieth century, during the various crises of the region, pointed out Jordan's eternal vulnerability, its constant dependency on exterior factors and actors that have always dictated its foreign policy. Every time Jordan decided to take a unilateral decision, the repercussions were immediate and harsh. Now is the time for Jordan to create a strategy that will preserve its national security and identity.

Defining national security and its particular dimensions, through analyzing Jordan's internal state and the surrounding external environment, allowed for Jordan's power determinants to crystallize, while the conducted SWOT analysis pointed out Jordan's specific internal strengths and weaknesses, and the evolving external opportunities and threats. This analysis contributed enormously towards visualizing the actual state of Jordan's national security. Although being a small and poor state, geographically located in a turbulent region, it can be acknowledged that Jordan did well so far. The Kingdom has managed to retain its sovereignty and stability, while, more often than not, being forced to implement policies that did not represent its true identity and intentions.

In this era of unconventional threats, and especially during this period of massive changes, sweeping over the wider Arab region, it is now time for Jordan to make drastic changes, assume a more active role and abandon passive past positions. Therefore, it requires a suitable grand strategy, a compass to guide its future steps.

The proposed grand strategy is a combination of two archetypal strategies that aspire to preserve Jordan's national security, and identity, in an anarchical international environment. Approaching Jordan's national security strategy through adopting a

combination of the strategy of alliances and that of balancing, was found to be the most suitable and realistic agenda Jordan could adopt, bearing in mind the afforded means, the aspired ends and the most imminent and evolving threat.

Establishing an economic alliance with the Gulf Cooperation Council is to provide Jordan with a much needed economic stability; it would boost its status on both the regional and international scenes, and pave the way for Jordan to mould its own distinct policies, ones that serve the country's national interests. In light of the current regional status quo as to the formed correlations of power, Jordan can combine a balancing strategy with Turkey, thus shift the exerted Israeli pressure toward the emerging Turkish opponent.

In conclusion, it can be observed that the international system of states is a peculiar one; it is in this system that the past Ottoman foe becomes an ally to fend off a new and imminent threat.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

### Books, Reports and Journals

#### Greek Bibliography

Κολιόπουλος, Κωνσταντίνος. 2001. *Η Υψηλή Στρατηγική της Αρχαίας Σπάρτης (750-192 π.Χ.)*. Ε' έκδοση. Αθήνα: Ποιότητα.

Κολιόπουλος, Κωνσταντίνος. 2008. *Η Στρατηγική Σκέψη: Από την Αρχαιότητα έως Σήμερα*. Β' έκδοση. Αθήνα: Ποιότητα.

Παπασωτηρίου, Χαράλαμπος. 2000. *Βυζαντινή υψηλή στρατηγική: 6<sup>ος</sup>-11<sup>ος</sup> αιώνας*. Ε' έκδοση. Αθήνα: Ποιότητα.

#### Foreign Bibliography

Abu Nowar, Maan. 2000. *A History of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the Establishment and Development of Transjordan 1920-1929*  
[تاريخ المملكة الأردنية الهاشمية : قيام وتطور أمارّة شرق الأردن 1929-1920]. Amman: Maktabat Al Rai.

Abu Nowar, Maan. 2003. *A History of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the Development of Transjordan 1929-1939*  
[تاريخ المملكة الأردنية الهاشمية : تطور أمارّة شرق الأردن 1939-1929]. Amman: Maktabat Al Rai.

Buzan, Barry. 1991. *People, States, & Fear*. Great Britain: TJ International Ltd.

Buzan, Barry, Ole Waever, Jaap de Wilde. 1998. *Security: a New Framework for Analysis*. UK: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.

Buzan, Barry, and Ole Waever. 2003. *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*. 3<sup>rd</sup> edit. 2005. United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.

Edelman, Eric S., Andrew F. Krepinevich, and Evan Braden Montgomery. 2011. The Dangers of a Nuclear Iran: The Limits of Containment. *Foreign Affairs* 90 (1): 66-81.

Habib, Randa. 2007. *Hussein, Père et Fils: Trente années qui ont change le moyen-orient* [الحسين أبنا : الأردن في ثلاثين عاما]. trans. Arabic edition 2008. Beirut: Dar Al Saqi.

Haddad, Amjad. 2003. *The Political System in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan* [نظام الحكم في المملكة الأردنية الهاشمية]. Amman: Dar Wael.

Joffe, Josef, and James W. Davis. 2011. Less Than Zero: Bursting the New Disarmament Bubble. *Foreign Affairs* 90 (1): 7-13.

Jordanian Department of Statistics. 2011. *Jordan in Figures 2010*, Issue 13. Amman: DoS.

Keohane, Robert, and Joseph S. Nye. 1977. *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition*. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, Inc.

Lippman, Walter. 1943. *U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic*. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, Inc.

Maayta, Saleh. 2007. Jordanian National Security: Dimensions and Challenges [الأمن الوطني الأردني : الأبعاد والتحديات]. *Jordan Journal of International Affairs* 1 (1): 17-46.

Moussa, Suleiman. 1996. *History of Jordan in the Twentieth Century 1958-1995* [تاريخ الأردن في القرن العشرين 1958-1995]. Volume II. Amman: Maktabat Al-Muhtaseb.

Muasher, Marwan. 2008. *The Arab Center: The Promise of Moderation*. New Haven & London: Yale University Press.

Pope, Hugh. 2010. Pax Ottomana? The Mixed Success of Turkey's New Foreign Policy. *Foreign Affairs* 89 (6): 161-171.

Qwayder, Fadi. 2006. Decision-making Centers in Jordanian Foreign Policy [مراكز صنع القرار في السياسة الخارجية الأردنية]. diss., Jordanian Institute of Diplomacy.

Shlaim, Avi. 2007. *Lion of Jordan: The Life of King Hussein in War and Peace*. London: Penguin Books.

Snyder, Glenn. 1997. *Alliance Politics*. New York: Cornell University Press.

Walt, Stephen. 1987. *The Origins of Alliances*. New York: Cornell University Press.

Wheelen, Thomas L., and J. David Hunger. n.d. *Strategic Management and Business Policy*. Eighth edition. New Jersey: Prentice Hall.

### Internet Sources

Akyol, Mustafa. 2011. Turkey's Maturing Foreign Policy. *Foreign Affairs*, 7 July. <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67974/mustafa-akyol/turkeys-maturing-foreign-policy> (accessed September 1, 2011).

Al Jazeera. 2008. *Egypt Court Freezes Israel Gas Deal*, 18 November. <http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2008/11/2008111895917929279.html> (accessed September 2, 2011).

Alterman, John B. 2007. The Next Iraq Problem. *Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)* September. <http://www.rcusa.org/uploads/pdfs/CSIS,%20Next%20Iraq%20Problem,%209-07.pdf> (accessed September 1, 2011).

Antelava, Natalia. 2009. Jordan faces up to water crisis. *BBC News*, 6 October. [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle\\_east/8292228.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8292228.stm) (accessed September 1, 2011).

Batty, David. 2011. Ban Ki-moon urges Turkey and Israel to end diplomatic row. *Guardian*, 3 September. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/sep/03/ban-ki-moon-turkey-israel-diplomatic-row> (accessed September 4, 2011).

Benari, Elad. 2010. Dutch MP Wilders and Israeli MK Eldad: Jordan is Palestine. *Israel National News*, 12 June. <http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/141007> (accessed September 1, 2011).

Binyon, Michael. 2010. Western ally Jordan boasted of having best spies in Arab world. *The Sunday Times*, 6 January. <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/afghanistan/article6977026.ece> (accessed September 1, 2011).

Black, Ian. 2007. Fear of a Shia full moon. *Guardian*, 26 January. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/jan/26/worlddispatch.ianblack> (accessed September 1, 2011).

Bseiso, Dalia, and Chelsi Dildine. 2010. Jordan's Counterterrorism Strategy & US-Jordanian Cooperation. *The George Washington University*. <http://www.gwu.edu/~imes/research/Bseiso,%20Dildine.pdf> (accessed September 1, 2011).

Central Intelligence Agency. 2011. *The World Factbook: Jordan*. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/jo.html> (accessed September 1, 2011).

Ezzedine, Hossam. 2011. Most nations expected to recognize Palestine in 2011. *Middle East Online*, 10 January. <http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=43542> (accessed September 1, 2011).

Farr, Warner D. 1999. The Third Temple's Holy of Holies: Israel's Nuclear Weapons. *USAF Counterproliferation Center*. <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/cpc-pubs/farr.htm> (accessed September 1, 2011).

Gedalyahu, Tzvi Ben, and Yoni Kempinski. 2011. Petition to 10 Jordanian Embassies: Jordan is Palestine. *Israel National News*, 24 May. <http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/144449> (accessed September 1, 2011).

Ghazawy, Mohammad. 2011. Royal Committee's Propositions on Constitutional Amendments. *Ammon News*, 24 August. <http://www.ammonnews.net/article.aspx?articleNO=95697> (accessed September 1, 2011).

Guzansky, Yoel. 2009. Israel And The Gulf States: A Thaw In Relations?. *Israel Policy Forum*, 29 September. <http://www.israelpolicyforum.org/blog/israel-and-gulf-states-thaw-relations> (accessed September 1, 2011).

Habib, Randa. 2011. Jordan, Morocco could boost GCC "monarchy club". *Agence France-Presse*, 11 May. <http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5ghopEaFIvwkj2k9n2UQSOTIGy3zQ?docId=CNG.a6e23f58edf0879da98617c7bf6239a9.a71> (accessed September 1, 2011).

Halaby, Jamal. 2011. Jordan's GCC Membership Push Offers Mutual Gains. *ABC News*, 12 May. <http://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory?id=13586238> (accessed September 1, 2011).

Kandah, Adli. 2011. How to curb imported inflation. *The Jordan Times*, 21 February. <http://jordantimes.com/index.php?news=34691> (accessed September 1, 2011).

Katira, Sumita. 2011. Saudi Grants \$1 billion to Jordan. *Arabian Gazette*, 28 July. <http://arabiangazette.com/saudi-grants-1billion-jordan/> (accessed September 1, 2011).

Khan, Ghazanfar Ali. 2011. GCC to begin membership talks with Jordan. *Arab News*, 7 July. <http://www.arabnews.com/saudi-arabia/article467802.ece> (accessed September 1, 2011).

Kibler, Joan. 2008. Construction Progressing on the Special Operations Training Center in Jordan. *Special Operations Technology*, March. <http://www.special-operations-technology.com/sotech-archives/54-sotech-2008-volume-6-issue-2/400-kasotc.html> (accessed September 1, 2011).

Manna, Maya. 2006. *Water and the Treaty of Peace between Israel and Jordan*. Roger Williams University. [http://docs.rwu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1031&context=cmpd\\_working\\_papers&sei-redir=1#search="history+of+the+hashemite+kingdom+of+jordan+paper"](http://docs.rwu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1031&context=cmpd_working_papers&sei-redir=1#search=) (accessed September 1, 2011).

Mansur, Yusuf. 2010. Poverty in Jordan. *The Jordan Times*, 3 August. <http://www.jordantimes.com/?news=28869> (accessed September 1, 2011).

McNamara, Sally. 2010. Turkey Going Nuclear – A Game Changer. *The Foundry*, 26 July. <http://blog.heritage.org/2010/07/26/turkey-going-nuclear-a-game-changer/> (accessed September 1, 2011).

McDowell, Steven R. 2003. *Is Saudi Arabia A Nuclear Threat?*. California: Naval Postgraduate School. <http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/mcdowell.pdf> (accessed September 1, 2011).

Mearsheimer, John J., and Stephen M. Walt. 2006. *The Israel Lobby And U.S. Foreign Policy*. Chicago: University of Chicago. <http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/A0040.pdf> (accessed September 1, 2011).

Mustafa, Abdul Jalil. 2011. Jordan Islamists see proposed constitutional amendments inadequate. *Arab News*, 15 August. <http://arabnews.com/middleeast/article489136.ece> (accessed September 1, 2011).

Neimat, Khaled. 2011. "Jordan is a natural extension of the GCC". *The Jordan Times*, 19 May. <http://www.jordantimes.com/?news=37631> (accessed September 1, 2011).

Prados, Alfred. 2006. Jordan: U.S. Relations and Bilateral Issues. *Congressional Research Service (CRS)*, 26 April. <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/IB93085.pdf> (accessed September 2, 2011).

*Regional Report on the Near East*. 2011. Council of the European Union, 20 January. <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/11/st05/st05020.en11.pdf> (accessed September 2, 2011).

Ryan, Curtis R. 2010. Jordan's new electoral law: reform, reaction, or status quo?. *Foreign Policy*, 24 May. [http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/05/24/jordan\\_s\\_new\\_electoral\\_law\\_reform\\_reaction\\_or\\_status\\_quo](http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/05/24/jordan_s_new_electoral_law_reform_reaction_or_status_quo) (accessed September 1, 2011).

Schenker, David, and David Pollok. 2011. Jordan: Heightened Instability, But Not Yet a Major Crisis. *The Washington Institute for Near East Policy*. Policy Watch #1748. <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=3298> (accessed September 1, 2011).

Schneider, Howard. 2009. In Water-Scarce Mideast, Jordan and Israel Join in Controversial Projects. *The Washington Post*, 5 September. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/04/AR2009090403775.html> (accessed September 1, 2011).

Security Council Resolution No. 181, available at *The Avalon Project*. 1996. New Haven: Yale Law School. <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/un/res181.htm> (accessed September 2, 2011).

*Security Council Resolution*. S/ 8226 No. 242 (November 22<sup>nd</sup> 1967). United Nations Organization. <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/240/94/IMG/NR024094.pdf?OpenElement> (accessed September 2, 2011).

*Security Council Resolution*. S/ 11010 No. 338 (October 22<sup>nd</sup> 1973). United Nations Organization. <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/288/65/IMG/NR028865.pdf?OpenElement> (accessed September 2, 2011).

Sharp, Jeremy. 2010. U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel. *Congressional Research Service* (CRS), 16 September. <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33222.pdf> (accessed September 1, 2011).

Slackman, Michael, and Souad Mekhennet. 2005. Jordan Says Bombing Suspect Aimed to Avenge Brothers. *The New York Times*, 15 November. <http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/15/international/middleeast/15jordan.html> (accessed September 1, 2011).

Tayseer, Mohammad. 2011. Saudi Arabia Grants Jordan \$1 Billion for Budget, Al Arab Says. *Bloomberg*, 26 July. <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-07-26/saudi-arabia-grants-jordan-1-billion-for-budget-al-arab-says.html> (accessed September 1, 2011).

Terrill, W. Andrew. 2008. *Jordanian National Security And The Future of Middle East Stability*. United States: Strategic Studies Institute. <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdf/files/pub838.pdf> (accessed September 1, 2011).

Tisdall, Simon. 2010. Turkey starts to love its neighbours. *Guardian*, 12 January. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/jan/12/turkey-neighbours-cyprus-israel> (accessed September 1, 2011).

Tobin, Jonathan S. 2011. Peace with Jordan Gets a Bit Colder. *Commentary Magazine*, 14 February. <http://www.commentarymagazine.com/2011/02/14/peace-with-jordan-gets-a-bit-colder/> (accessed September 1, 2011).

Younes, Ali. 2011. The impact of Jordan on Arab Gulf States. *Al Arabiya News*, 12 May. <http://english.alarabiya.net/views/2011/05/12/148835.html> (accessed September 1, 2011).

### **Television Programs**

Ezziben, Abeer. 2011. *Sittoun Daqiqa* [ستون دقيقة]. television program. Amman: Jordan Television, July 8.

Maraqa, Jareer. 2011. *Noqtat Nidam* [نقطة نظام]. television program. Amman: Roya Television, August 7.



