LINA VENTURAS
editor

INTERNATIONAL
"MIGRATION
MANAGEMENT"
IN THE EARLY
COLD WAR

The Intergovernmental
Committee for
European Migration

UNIVERSITY OF THE PELOPONNESE
SCHOOL OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL SCIENCES
Faculty of Social and Educational Policy

This collective volume examines the emergence of the policies, practices and discourses underlying the notion of international "migration management" by tracing the establishment and the activities of the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM) in the early Cold War era. The ICEM was renamed the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in 1989, after having been gradually transformed into one of the main "migration management" bodies in the world. The studies comprising the volume explore the historical processes and the ideological premises that led to a comparatively high degree of intergovernmental cooperation and to a coordinated approach to the regulation of European population outflows in the period following the Second World War, and investigate how migration regulation was conceived in the past and how it was actually implemented. They focus on the initial years of the ICEM's history, mainly the 1950s, during which the organization galvanized its constitution, its strategies and policies, and arranged for the resettlement of almost one million Europeans in overseas countries. They analyze the specificity of the processes leading to the establishment of international organizations in the immediate postwar period—highly dependent on the salience of nation-states, yet partly inspired by and requesting transnational political, social and cultural agency and knowledge.

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THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE
FOR EUROPEAN MIGRATION

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EDITED BY

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Introduction: "Migration Management" and the History of the International Organization for Migration

Lina Venturas

> [T]he transfer to Germany of German populations, […] should be effected in an *orderly and humane* manner
>
> Potsdam Agreement (art. XIII), 1945

> [IOM's Strategic Focus is] to enhance the *humane and orderly* management of migration […]
>
> IOM website, 2015

> [I]nternational migration […] is and must be of general benefit to all concerned. It relieves undue demographic pressure and thereby political tension in over-peopled areas. It increases the labour resources of those under- and fully-developed parts of the world where manpower is absolutely or relatively scarce. And finally and principally, it is intended to improve the lot of the migrant both materially and morally.[1]
>
> W.E. Rappard, 1951

> Moving low and semi-skilled workers from lower to higher-wage countries can be a 'win-win-win' situation, with migrants benefiting from higher wages, destination countries from more employment and higher GDP, and countries of origin from jobs for otherwise unemployed workers, remittances and returns.
>
> IOM, World Migration Report 2008:
> Managing Labour Mobility in the Evolving Global Economy

Although multiple barriers impede the free movement of people, human mobility is stimulated by high global inequalities and the economic and social integration processes of globalization. As international migration is a trans-state phenomenon driven by global forces, it is beyond the power of any one state to regulate or control it; however, states endeavor to manage migration in order to maximize potential benefits and minimize

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[1] Rappard, W.E. (1951). "Preface." In H.A. Citroen, *European Emigration Overseas Past and Future*. The Hague: Nijhoff, pp. ix–x. W.E. Rappard, an academic and diplomat, was at the time Professor at the University of Geneva and Director of the Graduate Institute of International Studies.

possible negative consequences. While all states have a strong interest in efficient regulation, the goals of managing migration may be quite different from state to state and national policies can be significantly limited by differences and deficiencies in the operational systems of other countries (Taylor, 2005). States have been increasingly working together to regulate population movements and provide refugee relief through regional and global negotiations and international coordination. In the early twenty-first century, the European Union adopted a "Global approach to migration," recognizing "the need for a common, global immigration policy" and noting that "managing migration requires dialogue and close cooperation with third countries" (EU MEMO/07/549, December 5, 2007; MEMO/07/188, May 14, 2007). At the global level, since 2001 several international forums have addressed the issue of intergovernmental "migration management," such as the Berne Initiative Process, the International Dialogue on Migration launched by the *International Organization for Migration* (IOM), the Global Commission on International Migration, the United Nations High-Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development, and the Global Forum on Migration and Development. Renewed interest in remittances and the development impact of migration has also attracted international financial institutions, including the World Bank.

Current literature, both supportive and critical of the notion of international "migration management,"[2] often presents it as an innovative policy and as a set of new practices, whereas, actually, there is a long history of intergovernmental efforts for the regulation of human mobility. Many social scientists, critical of "migration management" practices and discourses, write about them as if they were situated in a decontextualized, unbounded and extended present. However, although the term that was in use was not "management" but "control," and even if the historical context, the stakes at hand and the institutional infrastructures were radically different, steering and filtering refugee and migrant movements with the assistance of international agencies, tailoring emigration to the manpower needs of receiving countries and the depoliticizing message of what we call today "win-win-win" discourses, all have a notable past.

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[2] For references to this vast literature, see the following chapters.

This volume examines the emergence of the policies, practices and discourses underlying the notion of international "migration management" by tracing the establishment and the activities of the *Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration* (ICEM) in the early Cold War era. The ICEM was renamed the *International Organization for Migration* (IOM) in 1989, after having been gradually transformed into one of the main "migration management" bodies in the world. The studies included in this volume explore the historical processes and the ideological premises that led to a comparatively high degree of intergovernmental cooperation and to a coordinated approach to the regulation of European population outflows in the post-Second World War era, and investigate how migration regulation was conceived in the past and how it was actually implemented. They focus on the initial years of the ICEM's history, mainly the 1950s, during which the organization galvanized its constitution, its strategies and policies, and arranged for the resettlement of almost one million Europeans in overseas countries. They analyze the specificity of the processes leading to the establishment of international organizations in the immediate postwar period—highly dependent on the salience of nation-states, yet partly inspired by and requesting transnational political, social and cultural agency and knowledge.

In the long processes of state- and nation-building, human mobility was gradually incorporated into the domain of government policies (Xiang & Lindquist, 2014, p. 127); controlling international migration became a prerequisite to "the territorial and social closure" that preserves the status of citizens and "supports the exclusionary treatment of non-citizens" (Geiger & Pécoud, 2013, pp. 18–20). Although states were never by any means the only actors intervening in the regulation of human mobility, they played a major role in installing rules and procedures which upheld the distinction between inside and outside in territorial terms and between insiders and outsiders in social and political terms, thus according differential access to membership, belonging and rights (Gamlen & Marsh, 2011, p. xvii). Sovereignty entailed the right of states to shape the constitution of their population by both encouraging and forbidding entry into their territory based on racial, ethnic, class and gender criteria (Bashford, 2008, p. 187; Schlosser, 2009, p. 475). Many modern Western states developed, albeit in an uneven manner, systematic policies to control

borders and to steer population movements during the nineteenth century. As states gradually "monopoliz[ed] legitimate means of movement" (Torpey, 2000), they established an expanding bureaucracy to coordinate procedures on provincial and national levels and they implemented surveillance and identification techniques (Cook-Martin, 2008, p. 86). The capacity of states to shape flows depended, on the one hand, on bureaucratic agencies and personnel strength, official regulatory practices, implementing agencies, demand for entry, existing legal institutions, constitutional protections, the independency of the judiciary and their immigration tradition; on the other hand, it was a function of their positioning in international political and economic fields (Cook-Martin, 2008, pp. 87–88). Complex, multifaceted relations between governments, private actors, and civil society played a role in migration, while political, economic and legal structures and markets shaped the logic of migration management (Gammeltoft-Hansen & Nyberg Sørensen, 2013, p. 3). Nevertheless, despite the transboundary nature of international migration and the interdependence of migration policies, sovereign states retained a relatively large degree of autonomy in determining their policies (Betts, 2013b, p. 47)

Human mobility cannot be comprehended without according attention to the infrastructural moorings that configure and enable it (Hannam, Sheller & Uri, 2006). Migration implicates commercial, regulatory, technological, humanitarian and social infrastructure (Xiang & Lindquist, 2014). Xiang and Lindquist go as far as to define migration as a "social process that organizes and channels mobility" maintaining that "we cannot understand how migrants move unless we examine how they are moved by others" (2014, pp. 124, 131–132). In an attempt to reduce costs and rationalize part of the infrastructures necessary for migration to proliferate, some receiving states in the late nineteenth century began to install migration control outposts at points of embarkation or transit, and to set up official recruitment and screening agencies in sending countries. They also started to place a greater burden on the sending side to provide required documents (passports, criminal records, mental health certificates, etc.) and to undertake control measures. Although immigration control was considered a core function of sovereignty, receiving states came to rely increasingly on the administration of emigration countries. Receiving countries also turned private commercial lines into state agents enforcing them to carry out

monitoring activities on their behalf, while recruiters often selected and managed immigrants on behalf of both employers and state institutions. Sending states, for their part, adopted measures to counter perceived threats of emigration and to impede the departure of certain categories of their population, such as military aged men (Cook-Martin, 2008, pp. 95–104). In the early twentieth century, bilateral migration agreements between sending and receiving states begun to be signed, becoming an important component of migration regulation, while private non-profit organizations became increasingly implicated, not only in agenda-setting on refugee and migration issues, but also in organizing movements (Bohning, 2012, p. 4; Marrus, 2002, p. 39).

More importantly for the issues tackled in this volume, restrictions on immigration became transnational phenomena in the interwar period, coinciding with calls for international collaboration to regulate human mobility (Bashford, 2008, pp. 184, 208). Attempts to establish international agencies to undertake, amongst other missions, the task of regulating economic and forced migration, go back to the end of the First World War, with the creation of the *International Labour Organization* (ILO) and the *Commission for Refugees of the League of Nations*. Global mobility regimes concerning refugees' documents and their relief as well as travel and passport issuance developed, while the ILO set out common labor standards concerning migrant workers (Betts, 2013b, p. 48).

The enormous humanitarian crisis caused by mass population displacements during and immediately after the Second World War transcended national interests and led to the creation of successive international agencies to face it: The *United Nations Refugee Relief Agency* (UNRRA), the *International Refugee Organization* (IRO) and the *United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees* (UNHCR) undertook the administering and resettlement of displaced persons and refugees after the war. With the end of the war in Europe, economic difficulties and poverty, fuelled by what was seen as "overpopulation" and by high unemployment rates, plagued several countries in the continent, endangering the transition to peace. Many European countries were willing to support emigration in order to ameliorate conditions in their labor markets, but their efforts were hampered by the restrictive measures on inflows, which had been implemented in the interwar period by the main receiving countries.

States gradually became more aware of their interdependence on migration issues and of the need for international coordination to ensure the compatibility of regulations and procedures. Soon, the Cold War transformed Europe's refugee and "overpopulation" problems into issues that transcended humanitarian or economic considerations, linking them to major stakes in the political realm and in international relations.

In the international context of the early Cold War and in the Western world under United States leadership, the course charted by international institution-building, fears about the political consequences of unemployment, the force of labor unions and the establishment of welfare states in many countries quickly led to the implementation of a comparatively higher degree of legal regulation, state and international intervention, and a more coordinated approach to migration issues. Migration was discussed in many multilateral meetings until finally, in December 1951, a conference of interested Western governments in Brussels established an institutional framework for the mass migration of Europeans to overseas countries. It was here that the United States led the creation of a provisional intergovernmental body, outside the United Nations framework, to act as a bridge between the sending and receiving countries. Its initiators, while institutionalizing and internationalizing regulation, simultaneously aimed at outsourcing certain migration management functions, such as recruitment, screening or transportation, and they therefore designed an operational intergovernmental administrative and transportation agency. The newly formed organization began operations in February 1952, and was initially named the *Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe* (PICMME). Within a year the PICMME was renamed the *Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration* (ICEM). In 1980 it became the *Intergovernmental Committee for Migration* and finally in 1989 it assumed its present incarnation as the *International Organization for Migration* (IOM).

Although there are many historical studies on the international organizations that administered the resettlement of Displaced Persons and refugees after the Second World War,[3] scholarship on past international attempts at regulating

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[3] For references to this literature, see the following chapters.

and/or managing migration is still scarce. Research up to now has focused mainly on the ILO's efforts to establish legal regulations concerning migrant workers' rights and on inter-state migration agreements. Notably, considered research into the more than 60-year old history of the IOM has been at best partial, despite the controversies surrounding this organization and despite its global visibility. This is astonishing, as the ICEM (the IOM's predecessor)—a "migration industry"—arranged transport for nearly a million migrants in the 1950s and came "to administer heavily subsidized travel schemes and transport logistics and to manage the promotion, recruitment, and selection of migrants" as early as the 1950s.[4] Nevertheless, interest in both the history of migration and the history of international organizations has grown during the last decades. More and more calls for a "historical turn" in these scholarly fields underline the importance of studying the origins and the development over time of contemporary institutions, discourses and notions in order to comprehend how present practices and issues have come to be defined and understood in their current terms. The study of the past, through the wealth of information it provides and through a process of defamiliarization with what is taken for granted, can provide for a useful heuristic for the reflection and analysis of current issues, and, in our case, for analyzing the changing processes of "migration management" over time.

It is beyond this volume's brief to offer a complete history of the more than 60 years of the IOM's existence and of its transformation into an organization with local missions and projects in countries all over the world. The studies it comprises document the history of the establishment of the IOM by examining the formative stages of its predecessor, the PICMME/ICEM. They contextualize the inception and evolution of the ICEM, cataloging its creation as an international bureaucracy, the processes of formulation of its rules and priorities and the shaping and implementation of its practices. They focus on the ICEM's activities up to the end of the 1950s, the formative years which coincide with the period which saw both overseas emigration from Europe and management of European outflows as significant international issues. In the second half of the 1950s, the spectacular economic development of many Western European

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[4] https://www.iom.int/iom-history

countries altered the dynamics of migration movements leading to the abrupt rise of intercontinental labor migration. Overseas emigration from Europe gradually lost its major political and economic significance. The ICEM's political and international purview, as well as its priorities, were transformed as the developing world, and refugees fleeing conflicts there, grew increasingly important once they became entangled with Cold War stakes.

The volume is structured around three axes: the emergence of the international regulation of migration; the establishment, development and functioning of the ICEM from 1951 to 1960; power imbalances, knowledge, meaning in the international regulation of migration. The chapters first trace the emergence of the idea of the international regulation of migration in the interwar years and provide an in-depth investigation of the immediate post-Second World War era in order to document the re-emergence of the debates and subsequent policies that led to the creation of the PICCME in 1951. The aim here is to explore a set of questions: What was the impetus for the development of a specific body to manage the flow of migration? Which were the political actors that attempted to turn migration into a more orderly, predictable and manageable process? Moreover, the chapters document the range of practices ICEM developed in the 1950s; the organization's formal attributes, such as its charter, voting procedures and committee structures; the formation of bureaucratic politics; its projects, endeavors and failures; its collaboration with government agencies and NGOs; its funding and its growth in terms of budget and scope of activities. In addition to the examination of the organization's formal attributes, discrepancies are also investigated between constitutional designs and organizational practices seeking to elucidate the actual decision-making processes, the complex interplays between strategies and interests of various actors, and the asymmetric power of individual states. These chapters also provide an overview of overall movements from Europe overseas, as well as of all ICEM-assisted migrations from 1952 to 1960, with the aim of identifying the specific population groups which were selected by Western states to be subsidized to travel. Finally, the volume explores the organization's role in shaping peripheral countries' migration apparatuses and their decisions. It analyzes the discursive and cognitive frameworks that constructed the meaning given to migration regulation in the 1950s. It follows the complex interweaving of

perceptions of labor demands, questions on population, narratives on development, modernization and technical expertise, humanitarian, political and security concerns. The relevant chapters question ICEM's function as a dispenser of collective legitimacy, as a vehicle of agenda setting in international politics and as a forum for the creation of coalitions in the Western world.

The transnational nature of the organization involved sourcing data in archival collections located in various countries. We undertook archival research mainly in the United States, Australia, Greece and Switzerland. Apart from Switzerland, where the IOM's Headquarters and archives are to be found, the choice to scrutinize archives in the three other states was determined by several factors. (a) The fact that the ICEM was a United States-led and funded organization; more generally, the United States set the international policy agenda in the Western world in the early Cold War era. (b) Australia was one of the founding member states of the organization and the most important recipient of ICEM-assisted migrants in the immediate postwar period. (c) Greece was also one of the Committee's founding members and one of the five ICEM-assisted European sending countries at the time. In addition, the unique and to date unutilised archive of the ICEM local mission in Greece is located in today's IOM headquarters in Athens. These archives gladly provided us with ample documentation on ICEM operations in Latin America.

The IOM archives in Geneva, where the organization has its headquarters, have established an extremely restrictive policy concerning researchers' access to all files and documents. Claiming that they cannot disclose confidential data (which is perfectly understandable), they apply this rule to all documents, however old, and consider that what is confidential data needs to be decided on a case-by-case basis, but typically includes personal data, confidential correspondence between ICEM and member states, confidential financial data, Essential and Council documents, which in fact means virtually all documents except for those that were already public when they were created. This restrictive policy made research on the history of ICEM on the basis of the IOM archives extremely difficult, if not impossible. Thankfully, many of the ICEM member states and some of the international and non-governmental agencies it has worked with since 1952, have much more research-friendly access procedures, which means that a huge quantity of documents on ICEM's past is available

to researchers from other archives. We consulted the national archives of the United States, Australia and Greece, the archives of the ILO and the UNHCR in Geneva, and those of the Greek Mission of the IOM in Athens.[5]

More research on the organization's history, especially from the 1960s onwards, is needed in order to understand why and how this initially provisional organization was transformed into a permanent international institution which survives up to today with an enlarged membership and an expanded mandate. This volume will hopefully generate a flow of new research, enriched with innovative questions that will extend our knowledge of the history of migration management, of the IOM, and, more generally, of international organizations. Some of the questions which this volume opens to further research, and which its contributors, with the benefit of some hindsight, consider especially intriguing, are the following: The extension of the mandate of international organizations, and specifically of ICEM/ICM/IOM, to non-Western areas; the shift of focus from the East/West to the North/South dichotomy; non-Western actors' presence in international institutions and the problematization of the hegemony of the West; the presence and growth of commercially driven interests in the international management of migration and the links between international institutions, state based and market driven stakeholders; the role of private non-profit organizations in international agencies' agenda-setting and in organizing and regulating international refugee and migration movements; and the experiences of refugees and migrants themselves in relation to ICEM/ICM/IOM, and their perceptions of the services it rendered and the impact they had on their lives.

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[5] We consulted the following archives: (a) the IOM's Headquarters in Geneva; (b) the archives of ILO and UNHCR in Geneva; (c) the US National Archives in Washington D.C.; (d) the Franklin Delano Roosevelt Archive in Poughkeepsie in New York; (e) the Harry S. Truman Library and Museum in Independence, Missouri; (f) the National Archives of Australia in Canberra, Sydney and Melbourne; (g) the archives of the World Council of Churches in Geneva; (h) the archives of the IOM's local mission in Athens; (i) the Archives of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Athens.

PART I The Emergence of the International
        Regulation of Migration

The Emergence of the International Regulation of Human Mobility

Dimitris Parsanoglou and Konstantinos Tsitselikis

Introduction: The Origins of an Idea

In the history of international migration and particularly in the history of the international *regulation* of migration in the Western world many refer to a quasi-emblematic figure who is considered to be the creator of the idea of 'migration management,' long before the term was even coined and without ever having used it. Albert Thomas, the French socialist politician and first director of the *International Labour Organization* (ILO), had already stated during the 1927 World Population Conference in Geneva that "the moment has yet arrived for considering the possibility of establishing some sort of supreme supranational authority which would regulate the distribution of population on rational and impartial lines, by controlling and directing migration movements and deciding on the opening-up or closing of countries to particular streams of immigration" (Thomas, 1927, p. 262).

It is clear that even if the term "migration management" was first used by scholars only in the 1990s, the idea of the need and the possibility of regulating the distribution of population through migration movements was already put forth in the 1920s. In fact, the assumption formulated by Thomas was part of quite an expansive idea, which appeared and established itself during this very period—the idea of *Governing the World*. In his book of the same title, Mark Mazower (2012) is very clear as for this idea's deep historic roots: "In his 1933 fantasy *The Shape of Things to Come*, H. G. Wells (the famous English writer) had foretold the eventual triumph of world government—he called it 'manifestly the only solution to the human problem'" (p. xii). This was not just an isolated idea coined by one of the proclaimed fathers of science fiction, but it was part of a larger picture.

As Mazower puts it:

> […] (T)he Wellsian idea of a rational supranational government for the world was just one species within a much larger genus of secular internationalist utopias that go back the best part of two centuries and span a vast ideological range. In contrast to the Wellsians, for instance, communists, free-market capitalists, and anarchists have all sought to get beyond the state completely and imagined a kind of postpolitical mingling of peoples. Somewhere in the middle, between world government and no government, lies a vision of organized cooperation among nations—in technical terms, intergovernmentalism rather than, or modified only weakly by, supranational institutions—of the kind that has inspired the United Nations, the European Union, and other such multilateral organizations. (p. xiii)

From the above-mentioned passage, it becomes clear that the Interwar period can be considered crucial in two intertwined respects. Firstly, with regard to the consolidation of the idea that human mobility can and should be internationally regulated. Secondly, with regard to the expansion of the idea that social problems—therefore human mobility as well—can be tackled by supranational or even global institutions of governance. In fact, policies of control and regulation of population movements have a long history. Both sending and receiving states and international organizations have attempted to control migration in the past by developing laws or agreements, policies, practices and agencies. The history of these attempts elucidates the birth of international migration regulation during the early twentieth century, which was followed by other configurations that led to the contemporary emergence of the notion of "migration management" just before the twenty-first century.

Labor Mobility as an Issue for/of Regulation

For centuries, European states were more preoccupied with controlling the departure of their inhabitants than dealing with the arrival of aliens. While hostile to the flight of their skilled workers, European states facilitated the departure of those considered as burden or as being undesirable. States oscillated between the encouragement and the discouragement of emigration (Zolberg, 2006, p. 43). Legal restrictions, however, collided with the difficulties

faced by authorities in controlling outflows. During the nineteenth century, realism and free-trade policy slowly led to the easing of restrictions on migration and to the gradual spread of *laisser-faire* principles (Zolberg, 2006, p. 52).

Furthermore, from the mid-nineteenth century, the focus of state attention was gradually redirected from emigrants to immigrants. Pre-existing movements that avoided control started to become the object of political concerns, policies and measures. Regulation mechanisms and the institutionalization of immigration control gradually became structural elements of migrant mobility. Border controls, passports and employment contracts, along with bilateral agreements based on the alleged needs of (national) labor markets started to make their appearance. This profound restructuring of societies illustrated the triumph of nation-state principles in all sectors of social life. *Immigration* in the modern sense of the term, in contrast to previous forms of 'migration,' is an outcome of the importance that juridical and administrative means of state intervention obtained in controlling individuals' everyday lives in general, and their mobility more specifically (Noiriel, 1989, p. 179).

International migration as we define it today is a product of modernity and more specifically of *national* modernity:

> The development of the nation-state also had serious consequences for the history of cross-border labour migrations: they became 'international' migrations, while the development from national revolutionary ideas of the early nineteenth century to the ethnic nationalism of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries created collective definitions that distinguished between members of one's 'own' and 'other' 'nationalities'. At the same time, the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries formed an important transitional phase between a liberal era of relative freedom from state controls in European migrations of the nineteenth century and one of protectionist state migration and labour market policies between the First and Second World Wars. (Bade, 2003, p. 130)

One of the means for regulating international mobility was the conclusion of official agreements between states. In 1868, the United States and China signed the *Burlingame Treaty*, under which the Chinese were permitted to immigrate freely into the country without, however, acquiring any corresponding right to become naturalized American citizens. As Torpey (2000) suggests,

"because they were barred from inclusion in the US body politic, the Chinese admitted under the Treaty were, in effect, early versions of what came to be known as 'guest-workers' during the post-Second World War era in Europe" (p. 96).[1] France started using this tool from the beginning of the twentieth century, in order to attract and channel labor inflows from several major sending countries to industrial sites that needed supplementary cheap manpower (Noiriel, 1988; Blanc-Chaléard, 2001).

It is important to note, however, that attracting immigrants was not always the case during these early years of state-regulated mobility. The United States policy *vis-à-vis* Chinese immigrants is indicative in this respect. In less than twenty years after the signing of the Burlingame Treaty, President Chester Arthur signed (on May 6, 1882) the *Chinese Exclusion Act*, which revised the treaty and led to, after a renewal in 1892, the permanent suspension of Chinese immigration to the United States, a measure that would remain valid until 1943. During that same period, Australia, another major destination for European emigrants, inaugurated its "White Australia Policy," which would remain the dominant perspective of the country's immigration policy for decades. The 1901 *Immigration Restriction Act*[2] launched the preference given to British immigrants over all other nationalities, a policy that would not be revised, but only gradually after the Second World War; its formal and definitive abandonment came with the *Racial Discrimination Act* of 1975, which rendered racially-based selection criteria unlawful.

Following the rise of nativism and the ideas of eugenics in the late nineteenth century, reservations towards foreigners started to take significant dimensions during the First World War, instigating additional major developments with regard both to human mobility and attitudes towards it. Before the war, the first wave of globalization (1870–1913) entailed free international mobility of capital under the gold standard, along with relatively unrestricted labor mobility across more or less porous national borders. The European continent was the main source of emigrants in the Western world during the "classic" period

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[1] For more on Chinese immigration to the United States, see among others Zolberg 2008, pp. 175–196.

[2] "Immigration Restriction Act 1901 (commonly known as the White Australia Policy)." Retrieved from http://www.naa.gov.au/collection/a-z/immigration-restriction-act.aspx

of international migration, accounting for more than 52 million migrants from 1820 to 1924, especially to the Americas and the colonies.[3] During this period, the United States alone received more than 30 million European migrants (Myers, 1993, p. 11). Apart from the transatlantic movements, one should not underestimate the intra-European flows: Two revealing examples are that there were 1,160,000 foreigners in France in 1911, while in Germany, this number was 1,259,873 in 1910 (Potts, 1990, pp. 134–135).

During this period, labor mobility was relatively free for Europeans. This can essentially be attributed to two types of reasons: economic and demographic. On the one hand, the ideological and practical dominance of the *laissez-faire* model tempered any argument presented for an increase of interventionism (Green, 2002, pp. 82). On the other hand, the New World, with all its constituents in the Americas and elsewhere, founded its development and growth upon an extensive and intensive enlargement, demographic growth being one of its main elements. Indeed, if the example of the United States is taken into account, which is the most indicative case in this respect, its population rose from five point three million at the beginning of the nineteenth century to over 100 million in just one century, numbering 105.7 million in 1905 (Potts, 1990, p. 131). Similar situations were recorded for the rest of the Americas and Oceania: 11 million (21 percent) of European migrants of that period headed to South America and three and a half million, mostly of British descent, to Australia and New Zealand (Page Moch, 1996, p. 124). These developments explain why the demographic factor—particularly in Malthusian terms—was considered to be determining in the first explicative models of migration, condensed in Ravenstein's "Laws of Migration" (1885).

It is important to note that equally significant migratory flows were observed during this period in other parts of the globe, particularly in North and South-East Asia. Critiques of Euro- or Atlanto-centrism have been thoroughly deployed by numerous researchers; such as Patrick Manning, a scholar of World history and African migrations, and Adam McKeown, a specialist in Chinese migrations. The latter fundamentally questions the accepted belief that mass migrations across the Atlantic world during that period were unique in nature and

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[3] Estimated numbers vary among historians (Bade, 2003, pp. 96–97).

volume (McKeown, 2004). Rather, by using a macro approach, he redirects the reader's attention to two other major migration systems in Northern and Southeast Asia that took place between the mid-nineteenth century and the outbreak of the Second World War. Furthermore, he argues that Asian migrants moved for the same reasons, and under similar circumstances, and reacted to economic stimuli in similar ways, moving to areas with a high demand for labor. He also shows that all three migration systems were integrated within the same global economy (as cited in Lucassen, 2007, pp. 91–92).

Nevertheless, in the aftermath of the First World War, "the *laissez-faire* era in international labor migration had come to a close" (Dowty, 1987, p. 83). The pre-1914 economic and political order collapsed with the First World War, giving rise to two decades of economic instability, inflation, exchange and capital controls, depression and exacerbated nationalism. These trends were clearly inimical to both international migration and international capital mobility. International trade also became more restrictive during that period. After a relatively long period of free movement, extensive attempts of regulation—and particularly restriction—were implemented.[4] The Interwar period would be characterized by a significant withdrawal towards an economic autarchy followed by most of the states involved in the war:

> State intervention in cross-border migrations reached an unprecedented range and intensity in the twentieth century. For the development of migrations in Europe and the Atlantic realm, the First World War was simultaneously an epochal break and a pacesetter. It marked the end of the age of liberal migration policies that had allowed the 'proletarian mass migrations' of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to develop a momentum and dynamic of their own. Cross-border migrations became increasingly limited and forced into prescribed routes. Therefore, the history of migration in the age of world war and refugees must be based on state-imposed migratory conditions. (Bade, 2003, pp. 165–166)

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[4] However, critics and attempts to end the *laissez-faire* type of mobility appeared already since the end of the nineteenth century. An example of this is the organisation of the *Congrès international de l'intervention des pouvoirs publics dans l'émigration et l'immigration* (International Congress of the Intervention of Public Powers in Immigration and Emigration), held in Paris on August 12–14, 1889.

In this context, control and regulation became the main instruments of migration policy which aimed at national(ist) closure and exclusion (Bade, 2003, p. 320). The system of passports was gradually generalized in all countries, while "protectionist" restrictive measures were implemented in most destination countries:

> With the general rise of the protectionist state out of the fires of the First World War, the countries of the North Atlantic world became caught up in a general trend toward nationalist self-defense against foreigners. Documents such as passports and identification cards that help determine "who is in" and "who is out" of the nation here took center stage, and thus became an enduring and omnipresent part of our world. (Torpey, 2000, p. 121)

This "restrictive turn" found its emblematic illustration in the famous quotas that the United States government imposed in 1921 and 1924. The fact that the United States followed a restrictive policy *vis-à-vis* immigration constitutes a seeming paradox, if the economic situation the country was in during the aftermath of the First World War is taken into account. Contrary to the experience of the European belligerent countries, the United States, being the real economic winner of the war, was in full prosperity during the 1920s. The restrictive turn obeyed more to political than economic reasons. The "nationalization" (in the sense of homogenization) of American society that had already started with the strong industrialization of the 1890s (Higham, 1981, pp. 19–20), the rise of xenophobic sentiments during the First World War, particularly against German-Americans, (Glazer, 1997, p. 85) and the strengthening of the *nativist* movement, long-established and integrated into the American political system "which was concerned by the massive arrival of the new Slavo-Judeo-Latin barbarians" (Lacorne, 1997, p. 29), were the main factors leading to this shift. Political pressure was the main reason for the implementation of the *Quota Act* in 1921 and the *National Origins Act* in 1924, both imposing strict quotas on nationalities and practically excluding some regions of the globe, e.g. East Asia (Lambert & Taylor, 1990, p. 23). It is revealing that during the period 1920–1950, only five and a half million migrants—mainly, if not exclusively, Europeans—arrived in the United States, while in the previous period 1880–1920, their number exceeded 23.5 million (Myers, 1993, p. 11).

In Europe, the rationale behind the "restrictive turn" was apparently more economic than political. Ravaged economies and unprecedented levels of unemployment called for an increasing control and regulation of labor mobility. In Germany, where industrial production was developing very slowly immediately after the First World War and would not reach pre-war levels until just before the 1929 crisis, measures for the protection of the labor market were twofold: on the one hand, aiming at preventing emigration of qualified labor and, on the other hand, promoting preference of local workers against foreigners. During this period the Weimar Republic implemented a series of administrative mechanisms for the regulation of the labor market, which culminated in 1927 with the establishment of the *Reichsamt für Arbeitsvermittlung und Arbeitslosenversicherung* (Reich's Office for the Allocation of Work and the Unemployment Insurance). Preferential treatment of German workers and required annual registration of demands in labor became the two axes on which the number of labor visas and authorizations for work were based (Bade, 2003, p. 192).

France, the other major destination country of intra-European international migration, followed a different path from that of Germany. The French economy, being relatively prosperous after the military victory, was in increasing need of labor, a need which could not be covered by the local labor force. The low birth rate combined with the huge demographic losses of the war (more than ten percent of adult men), rendered transnational migration the most plausible way to meet labor demands. Nevertheless, interventionism was dominant; either through the use of bilateral agreements with labor supply countries, namely Poland, Italy, Spain, Belgium, Czechoslovakia (Noiriel, 1988, pp. 114, 407–408) or through the intensification of the regulation and canalization of immigration. In fact, it was in 1917 that all foreigners who lived in France were made to hold an identity card, following the decision of the Ministry of the Interior to increase police control of immigration (About, 2007, p. 126). It was at that time that the "characteristic universe of the modern migrant" was consolidated as part of the integration process of nation-states:

> With the 'papers' and the 'labor contract' the characteristic universe of the modern migrant is born, accompanied with the preoccupation to be 'in order'. Within immigration a new border is created between 'legal' and 'illegal'; a border, the economic function of which is undeniable. As the

economists have shown, the illegal are in fact essential for the functioning of the 'secondary' labor market. (Noiriel, 1989, p. 183)

After the Russian Revolution and the strengthening of labor unions during the First World War, the idea of implementing an international mechanism for the regulation of labor mobility appeared. In 1919, the Preamble of ILO's Constitution referred to the "protection of the interests of workers when employed in countries other than their own." In the era of international institution-building that followed the war, the right to intervene in states' regulation of inflows, a cornerstone of their sovereignty was accorded to an international institution for the first time, despite the negative stance of several powerful states. Thus, the importance of migration and of the migrants as workers entitled to labor rights was acknowledged. In the words of Albert Thomas, the first director of ILO:

> [T]here is the immense 'people' of emigrants, the masses who, uprooted from their homelands, ask for some measures of security and protection applicable to all countries and supervised by an international authority. (Thomas, 1921, p. 20)

In 1921, the ILO set up an International Emigration Commission which was later renamed *Permanent Migration Committee*. The Committee managed to prepare a convention concerning the inspection of ships carrying emigrants that was adopted in 1926, but all other efforts aiming at concluding resolutions on migration and migrant rights were undermined both by the economic crisis of 1929 and the reactions of the states that had a leading role in Interwar international institutions. In 1939, a Migration for Employment Convention was adopted, but, because of the outbreak of the Second World War, it never entered into force. It did, however, provide the blueprint for postwar international regulations on labor migrant rights (Böhning, 2012, pp. 2–14).[5] The *Permanent Committee of Migration for Settlement* established in the same year (renamed yet again to *Permanent Migration Committee* after the Second World War) reaffirmed the interest of certain states in the establishment of an international agency, which would have "a constructive part to play in the

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[5] In 1949 the ILO opened for signature the Convention No. 97 on migrant workers' protection during the journey towards the state of reception and during stay in the latter.

methodical and rational resumption of migratory movements after the war".
(ILO, 1941, p. 76)

Despite the efforts and small steps achieved by international organizations,
human mobility remained under the strict domain of state sovereignty during
the Interwar period. States retained the right to manage movements and
expulse those violating national norms on entrance and residence (Böhning,
2012). After the Second World War, the regime charted by international organ-
izations, the Cold War and fears pertaining to the political consequences of
unemployment, in combination with the strength of labor unions and the estab-
lishment of welfare states in Europe, all these factors led to a comparatively
high degree of legal regulation over migration movements, operationalized
through international and national means alike.

Forced Migrations: Imperial Collapse and Displacements

> A woman drags herself along. A child in one arm, a heavy parcel in the
> other. It holds everything she could possibly take with her; two more
> children hang onto her skirt. One child falls to the ground. The mother
> places the parcel on the ground, leans it against her leg, helps her child
> up with her right hand, grasps the parcel again, cheers the little ones up
> with kind words and puffs along further. Her husband is in the war.
> Two little girls lead their elderly grandfather to the train station. Another
> grandfather, supported by a walking stick, carries his grandchild in one
> arm. Nearly limping, he continues on his way. Three elderly women, one
> very frail in the middle, move forward with great difficulty. One woman
> cries, another groans over and over, "God, oh God, God, oh God!"
>
> —[Newspaper Article of Unknown Author],
> October 15, 1914, Vienna: *Arbeiter-Zeitung*

> Twenty miles of carts drawn by cows, bullocks, and muddy-flanked
> water buffalo, with exhausted, staggering men, women, and children,
> blankets over their heads, walking blindly along in the rain beside their
> worldly goods.
>
> —Ernest Hemingway, *Toronto Star*, October 20, 1920

The two passages above capture two moments of early twentieth century
"refugeedom" through a vivid description. As Peter Gatrell (1999) has pointed
out for the case of Tsarist Russia, the discourses about and responses to wartime

displacement were the very processes by which the empires were displaced and replaced by nationalizing successor states (see also Thorpe 2011, p. 102). The "refugee question" emerged far before the official definition of "refugee" was coined by the United Nations in 1951. In fact, one could argue that, apart from war casualties, forced displacement was actually the human price paid for the restructuring of the international system of states generated during and by the "Great World War" (1914–1945) that (re)shaped Europe and the whole world (Bourne, Liddle & Whitehead, 2000).

It is true that the great bulk of international mobility during the Interwar period—to be more precise from the early 1910s—was linked to major developments during the collapse of empires and the formation of new nation-states in Europe. Forms of *forced migration* had certainly appeared in several historical conjunctures during the nineteenth century, particularly during and after revolutionary upheavals (such as those in 1830, 1848 and 1870), when members of the defeated parties had to flee to other countries.[6] However, it was during the first half of the twentieth century that displacement and exile took unprecedented forms.

Even if labor migration during the Interwar period had entered a period of strict control with the implementation of state, intra-state and international measures of regulation, the most effective attempts of regulation undertaken concerned forced migrations that occurred during and after the First World War. If, in the pre-First World War period, the dominant figure of the moving person was the more or less poor individual who seeks *his*[7] fortune by emigrating to the New World, in the post-First World War period, the dominant representation profoundly changed: it was now the moment of displaced persons who leave their homelands without gender or age exceptions, in order to gain their supposedly natural, yet completely unfamiliar, space.

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[6] To give an illustrative example, Greece repeatedly accepted waves of "political refugees" during the nineteenth century, in Ermoupoli (the capital of the island of Syros), in Patras and in other industrial centres. For more see Parsanoglou (2009, pp. 70–89).

[7] For a review of the feminist criticism on the predominantly male figure of the representation of migrants, see among others: Green, N. (2002). De l'immigré à l'immigrée. In *Repenser les migrations* (pp. 126–151), Paris: PUF. See also the recent comprehensive historic account of Donato and Gabaccia (2015).

However, when referring to the state during this period, one has to bear in mind the instability and malleability of geopolitical conditions that produced a series of fundamental transformations that affected both mobility and regulation. Mark Levene (2011) starts his assessment on the "Nation-State Formation and the Destruction of Imperial Peoples" as follows:

Once upon a time there was a world of diverse cultures and civilizations. Within them, peoples of different background, hue, religious orientation (whether orthodox or schismatic), sedentary and traders, in public service or seasonal passers-through, interacted and interrelated with each other. The passers-through, in particular, crossed and re-crossed state or imperial frontiers, with only rare challenges to their right to do so, let alone challenges to their credentials. Polyethnicity was standard and normal. (p.51)

This reality, which according to the author "was rarely rosy," started to fade already from the beginning of the twentieth century; and, it finally smashed into pieces with the First World War.

One of the main matrices in which pre-Second World War "refugeedom" was forged, is the *imperial collapse* "as a driving force in the rearrangement of the ethnic map of Europe and South Asia, destroying communities that had lived in their homes for centuries, and even millennia, in some cases" (Panayi, 2011, p. 13). The collapse of old empires, Tsarist Russia, Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire, and their substitution by ethnically-defined nation-states was not only a geopolitical shift of huge importance. It also altered once and for all the human geography of Europe—not only in the very concrete sense of actual human displacements and alteration of the ethnic composition of vast regions, but also in the way that social viability and sustainability was perceived, desired and achieved. From being a given pre-existing social condition, ethnic mixing started to be considered an obstruction to social cohesion—to use a term from the present—and peace.

In this sense, the First World War provided the possibility to (re)arrange socio-cultural belongings in a concrete, yet intolerant way. It is revealing that even before the huge waves of international forced migration generated by the fall of the Russian and Ottoman Empires, displacement was used as a method for internal rearrangements of the population. This was the method used in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, where up to two million civilians were internally

displaced between 1914 and 1918, just before the imminent imperial collapse (Thorpe, 2011, p. 102). In the western peripheries of the Russian Empire, at least five million refugees flooded the interior provinces from the periphery, even before the February revolution of 1917 (Rieber, 2000, p. 11). In addition, one cannot ignore the all-out assault of Turkish authorities against the Armenian population of the Ottoman Empire: By the official end of the regional conflicts in 1923 and the Treaty of Lausanne, the Armenians had been reduced from a population of about two million to less than 25,000 (Kuper, 1986, p. 52).

Even if the compulsory transfer of populations could not yet be openly accepted as a suitable method for the consolidation of the newly established nation-states, as it ran counter to the "idealist tendencies governing the 1919 plans for a new Europe,"[8] the idea was already there. The most important repercussions with regards to population movements were undoubtedly produced within the process of the Ottoman Empire's disintegration and collapse. This process had started from the nineteenth century with the formation of the first nation-state (Greece) on imperial soil, and gradually, not directly but surely irreversibly, led to the full collapse of the Empire and its substitution by several nation-states. One of the main components of each disintegrating episode was the displacement of populations that had no place in the newly-established homogeneity-driven states. Apart from the opposition "Empire vs. new national(ist) forces," hostility also developed between the emerging nation-states, a situation leading to additional forced migratory flows.

Already in 1906, Greek-Bulgarian antagonism over the region of Macedonia led ethnic Greeks from Bulgaria to immigrate to Greece. During the same year, ethnic Greeks from Romania had to leave their homes because of the tension between the Greek and Romanian states over the question of the Aromanian (Vlach) minority (Andriotis, 2003, p. 95). The population movements provoked by the Balkan wars of 1912–1913 were on a much more significant scale:

> The end of the Second Balkan War in 1913 marked the beginning of the long series of resettlements of the first half of the twentieth century, based on bilateral treaties which aimed at 'ethnic unmixing' through the exchange

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[8] These words belong to Eduard Beneš, the Czech representative to the Paris Peace Conference and later Prime Minister and President of Czechoslovakia (as cited in Frank, 2011, p. 95).

of populations. A wide strip of land extending 15 kilometres on either side of the Turkish-Bulgarian border was established in 1913 for the exchange of respective minorities. The regulation affected almost 100,000 people. In general terms, the Balkan Wars, which significantly altered relations among nationalities in the Balkans, resulted in the escape and resettlement of about 900,000 people in 1912–14. (Bade, 2003, p. 178)

However, the "exchange of populations," for which—according to a German law scholar of the 1930s—"the twentieth century ha[d] reason to be ashamed of itself" (Erler, 1931; as cited in Frank, 2011, p. 82), found its paradigmatic form and representation at the closure of the Greek-Turkish conflict in 1923. After a three-year military presence in Anatolia (1919–1922), Greek troops were pushed back by the Turkish Nationalist forces, forcing the Greek-Orthodox population, particularly from the Izmir/Smyrna region, to flee their homelands. The general turmoil that followed and the increasing tension between ethnic groups and states stemming from the dominant intolerant impulse and the desire for national/ethnic homogeneity, resulted in the Lausanne Convention of January 1923. This convention and the Treaty signed, provided for "a compulsory exchange of Turkish nationals of Greek Orthodox religion established in Turkish territory and of Greek nationals of Muslim religion established in Greek territory." In all, over one and a half million people from both nations were involved in the transfer, the largest such exchange in history to that point (Marrus, 2002, p. 103; Pentzopoulos, 2002; Tsitselikis, 2006).

What was until then "ridiculed as absurd," that is "the idea of an exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey being desirable" (Frank, 2011, p. 87), not only verified the predictions and the suggestions of some conservative scholars of that time, such as Siegfried Lichtenstädter, but also set the grounds for a radical, yet "realist-like" approach to problems that were seen as emanating from ethnic diversity. Apart from the humanitarian tragedy that the term "exchange of populations" euphemistically conceals, there would be deeper corollaries with regards to the limits of intervention and regulation of population settlement and resettlement:

The Lausanne Convention of 1923—which formalized a Greco-Turkish exchange of populations, and which might be seen as being the first of a series of revisionist challenges to the post-1919 settlement—was the first

time ever that the principle of compulsion had been included in any international treaty regulating intermigration. […] Although by the early 1930s population transfer was still far from being seen as a respectable alternative in liberal Europe […] nevertheless, the following decade would transform the prevailing discourse on 'solutions' to the European minorities problem. By the late 1930s, population transfer had become the fashionable panacea. 'Everywhere I go I find [that] there is a general belief that transfer is the right solution for minority problems', one British authority on the subject commented in 1941. 'People […] now speak as if transfer were a simple and straightforward solution.' (Frank, 2011, p. 95)

The Legal Birth of the "Refugee"

In 1951, the United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees included among others under the definition of "refugees" the following cases:

> As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. (UNHCR, 2011, p.14)

It should be noted, however, that the international protection of refugees has a formal history that dates from the Interwar period. As mentioned above, the First World War, the massacres against the Armenians by the Ottoman Empire, the establishment of the Soviet Union and the forced Greek–Turkish population exchange were major causes, among others, that forced millions of people to leave their homes and seek refuge abroad or within their country in the first two decades of the twentieth century. The international response to such phenomena, if any, was usually partial, if not fragmented. Nevertheless, the emergent situation that followed the Russian Revolution and the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, led the Joint Committee of the International Committee of the Red Cross and the League of Red Cross Societies to call

an international conference in February 1921. One of the outcomes of this conference was the creation of the first international agency ever to deal with refugees.

In June 1921, the League of Nations established the *High Commission for Refugees from Russia*, in order to deal with people who fled the country after the establishment of the Soviet Union. The Commission was headed by the Norwegian scientist, Arctic explorer and politician, Dr. Fridtjof Nansen, an emblematic figure in the history of refugee protection. Nansen started his humanitarian work at the end of the First World War. At first, he worked independently, but in the spring of 1920 he was appointed as High Commissioner for Prisoners of War by the League of Nations. Under his command, some 450,000 ex-prisoners of war from twenty-six countries returned to their homes. Furthermore, Nansen played an instrumental role in organizing emergency relief to victims of famine in Russia during the years 1921–1923, while in 1922, he personally dealt with the problem of refugees from Asia Minor. He served as High Commissioner for Refugees of the League of Nations from 1921 to 1930, and inspired the global movement for the protection of refugees.

Soon, the High Commission for Refugees from Russia extended its functions to non-Russian refugees as well, as the problem of Greek, Armenian Turkish, Assyrian and other refugees had emerged in the meantime. The Commission established refugee camps in Turkey in 1922, providing assistance against disease and hunger. By 1923, Nansen omitted the term "Russian" from his title and renamed his function to High Commissioner for Refugees. The Commissioner established the so-called *Nansen certificate*, an international substitute for a passport, as a means of identification for stateless people. The Nansen Passport, which initially concerned stateless people from Russia, was extended to refugees from Turkey, those of Armenian, Assyrian or Assyro-Chaldean ethnic origin. The Nansen Passport guaranteed its holders the right to travel to certain destinations for a twelve-month period. In addition, refugees protected by the Nansen System were granted protection by governments (Psomiades, 2011).

As assistance to refugees became more and more linked to issues of employment and economic integration, administrative and financial support for the High Commissioner's Office was transferred to the Refugee Section of the

International Labour Office, where it remained from the beginning of 1925 until the end of 1929. In 1930, the High Commissioner's Office returned to the Secretariat of the League of Nations. In addition to a limited staff in Geneva, Nansen appointed delegates in refugee-hosting countries, in order to be in touch with governmental officials, private voluntary organizations and the refugees themselves.

After Nansen's death in May 1930, the agency was reorganized. In April 1931, it was renamed Nansen International Office for Refugees, the Statute of which was approved by the Council of the League of Nations in January 1931.[9] The Office, the revenues of which were obtained both from private contributions and mainly from fees charged for the Nansen Passport, started its operations by April 1931.[10] Among the accomplishments of the Nansen Office, the most significant was the adoption of the 1933 Refugee Convention by fourteen states; and, of course, the material, legal, and financial assistance provided to almost a million refugees during the whole period of its existence.

The protection of refugees became a very difficult and complex task after the establishment of totalitarian regimes in Europe. The growing numbers of refugees from Germany, Italy and Spain and the reluctance of member states of the League of Nations to take relevant action undermined any attempt to effectively deal with refugee problems. The problem of German refugees (Jews and other categories of fugitives) after the rise of the Nazi regime in Germany, became so acute in 1933 that the League of Nations established a specific *High Commission for Refugees Coming from Germany*.[11] James G. McDonald was the first High Commissioner of this entity, serving from 1933 to 1936. In 1936, MacDonald resigned in protest of the "intransigence of the international community" in facing the German refugee problem. The High Commissioner's Office promoted the 1938 Convention concerning the Status of Refugees Coming from Germany, which provided for travel documents and a series of

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[9] League of Nations, General Assembly, 62nd Session, O. J. No. 2 of 1931, Annex 1263.

[10] Retrieved from:
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1938/nansen-history.html

[11] For archival material on the Commission see:
https://archive.org/details/highcommissionforrefugeesfromgermany

special rights—among which educational and professional training—to be granted to refugees from Germany by other states, as explained in the Convention text (p. 59). The mandate of the High Commission was later broadened to include both Austrian and Sudetenland refugees. It collaborated with numerous prominent individuals and refugee-aid organizations, among others Jewish organizations that were mostly founded in the US and the UK, and played a very significant role in assisting Jewish people who continued to flee Germany. The termination of the High Commissioner's office, however, at the end of 1938, ended its interventions, despite the dramatic increase of refugees from Nazi Germany and Fascist Spain.

The High Commission for Refugees Coming from Germany was immediately replaced by a new agency functioning under the aegis of the League of Nations, the *Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees*, based in London. The duties of the High Commissioner as defined in the constituent Resolution adopted by the League's General Assembly (1938) were the following:

(i) To provide for the political and legal protection of refugees; (ii) To super-intend the entry into force and application of the legal status of refugees, as defined by international agreements; (iii) To facilitate the co-ordination of humanitarian assistance; and (iv) To assist the Governments and private organizations in their efforts to promote emigration and permanent settle-ment. (p. 137)

The outbreak of Second World War, however, minimized the capacities and efficiency of this new agency.

The last episode in the pre–Second World War organization-building process took place in 1938, under the initiative of the United States government, which made significant efforts to convene an international conference in order to respond to mounting political pressure with regards to the Jewish question in Nazi Germany. The Evian conference, convened by the United States President Franklin Roosevelt outside the formal framework of the League of Nations, was held in July 1938 "for the primary purpose of facilitating involuntary emigration from Germany (including Austria)" of: "(1) persons who have not already left their country of origin, but who must emigrate on account of their political opinions, religious beliefs or racial origin, and (2) persons as defined in (1), who have already left their country of origin and

who have not yet established themselves permanently elsewhere [...]" (Skran, 1985, p. 209). The main outcome of the conference was the establishment of the *Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees* (ICR), which aimed at administering intergovernmental efforts to resettle refugees from Nazi Germany and Austria, preparing for the resettlement of future German emigrants and establishing an international organization with the objective to work for an inclusive solution to the refugee problem. Moreover, the ICR was mandated to start negotiations with the German government to grant Jewish emigrants the right to preserve their assets back home.

The ICR was also entrusted with the protection of Nansen refugees. However, it received little authority and virtually no funds or other support from its member states. Its achievements were limited and the outbreak of the Second World War in September 1939 put an end to any serious effort. As Marrus (2002, p. 172) puts it, "Evian simply underscored the unwillingness of the Western countries to receive Jewish refugees." In fact, the ambition expressed at the Evian Conference not only to provide immediate assistance to German and Austrian refugees, but in the longer term, to lead to the establishment of an international machinery for resettling Europe's surplus population, supervising "orderly emigration" and developing opportunities for "permanent settlement," proved to be an absolute failure. Moreover, the organization of the conference and the establishment of the ICR outside the formal structures of the League of Nations were also revealing of the League's overall failure to tackle the refugee problem (Mazower, 2009, pp. 110–111).

Thus, soon after the Evian conference, Hungary and Yugoslavia closed their borders; Italy announced its 1938 anti-Jewish decrees, and the Netherlands, Belgium and Switzerland reinforced control over their borders in order to restrict the entry of refugees. In February 1939, the member states of the Committee appointed the recently appointed High Commissioner for Refugees, Sir Herbert Emerson, as the ICR Director as well. The ICR headquarters were also in London. After the war, the Committee concluded some agreements related specifically to the resettlement of refugees. It finally ended its mandate on June 30, 1947, when its activities were taken over by the *International Refugee Organization* (IRO), a special agency created by and within the framework of the United Nations.

Conclusion: Setting the Foundations for the International Regulation of Mobility

It has been attempted to argue that during the Interwar period, the bases were set for much of what is taken for granted in post–Second World War years and in contemporary ways of regulating migration movements. In general, the Interwar period and the challenges it produced with regard to human mobility (particularly forced mobility), led to innovative international tools and mechanisms that marked the beginning of the history of international refugee-aid organizations (Bade, 2003, p. 200). Moreover, the foundations for the control of international labor mobility were laid by almost all Western migrant-receiving countries during this period. The desire for control—basically meaning restriction—became the driving force and the dominant paradigm for national, transnational and international migration policy in Europe, the United States and the settler countries.

The tools that were invented and the mechanisms that were established during these years would collapse as soon as the Second World War would break out. New problems of displacement and new priorities with regard to labor needs would alter the international order of things. The post–Second World War universe would undoubtedly become a radically different one. In other words, the immediate postwar world would be a laboratory, not so much in the sense that completely new problems requiring completely new solutions would arise at that time; but more so, a laboratory primarily in the sense that preexisting problems would take unprecedented forms and intensity, while the ideas and methods of resolution previously conceived, would be, for the first time, operationalized and implemented in concrete and consistent ways by necessity. More precisely, the post–Second World War refugee crises and the ideas concerning the "overpopulation problem" of ravaged Europe, in combination with the Cold War, would urge Western nation-states to undertake efforts to manage these problems at a supranational level.

Operationalizing the Regulation of Human Mobility in the 1940s

Yannis Papadopoulos and Dimitris Parsanoglou

Introduction

During the Second World War, millions of Europeans were displaced from their homelands as a result of both Nazi demographic policies and military or political activities. Towards the end of the war, the advance of the Red Army into Eastern Europe led many inhabitants of the region to flee westwards. Furthermore, the Allies, believing that the "disentanglement of populations" would be the most appropriate method for the resolution of existing minority problems, imposed the expulsion of ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe and their resettlement in occupied Germany. They thus adopted the principle of "ethnic homogeneity" within nation states in order to avert internal instability (Mazower, 2009, p. 142). Other groups in Eastern Europe were forced to move as a result of population exchange treaties signed between neighboring states after the war (Schulze, 2011, pp. 51–52; Goussef, 2011, p. 91; Ahonen, 2005, p. 10; Corni 2011, pp. 71, 84; Petacco, 2005, p. 27). Although according to article XII of the Potsdam Agreement of 1945 "any transfers that take place should be effected in an orderly and humane manner," population movements caused tremendous suffering. They also introduced important demographic changes into Eastern Europe and Germany. The war thus proved to be pivotal with regard to the shift from international guarantees of minority rights to the "territorialization of postwar planning" (Mazower, 2009, p. 113). In other words, the war shifted priority from the international protection of minorities' rights to the efficient control of national space by state authorities (Reinisch & White, 2011, p. 32).

The coordination of refugee relief and repatriation or resettlement were among the primary concerns of the victorious Allies. A large number of "Displaced

Persons" (a term that, as explained futher below, is officially coined in the post-Second World War period) were repatriated immediately after the war, while the rest were settled in Displaced Persons camps in Germany, Austria and Italy. The Allies distinguished ethnic German refugees arriving in occupied Germany from those displaced by the Nazis during the war, initially refusing to contribute to the relief of the former; they also separated the Jews, for whom repatriation was impossible, as opposed to other categories of Displaced Persons considered eligible to repatriate. The creation of the camps led to the streamlining of the process of "registration, certification, recording and documentation" or, in Foucauldian terms, to a streamlined mechanism of physical surveillance (Foucault, 1995, p. 177). This allowed for a more efficient control of individuals by occupation authorities and a selective resettlement of entire groups, according to specific criteria (Reinisch & White, 2011, p. 301).

Defining People Who Move: Official Discourses and Hidden Rationales

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the refugee question appeared as an extremely pressing problem in the 1920s, after the First World War, the October Revolution in Russia and imperial collapse triggered massive displacements. It is during the Interwar period that defining a person's status emerged as a necessary criterion for the provision of humanitarian assistance. The League of Nations had used "ethnic origin" and "statelessness" as criteria in its definition of "refugees" (Gatrell, 2011, p. 9). After the Second World War, the United Nations and the *United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration* (UNRRA), that was set up in November 1943 and became part of the United Nations machinery in 1945, adopted the term "Displaced Persons" (DPs) in order to describe forced laborers transferred to Germany by the Nazis, concentration camp survivors and prisoners of war (Cohen, 2011, p. 5). Thus, a person's status at the end of the war became the criterion for his/her inclusion or not in the category of "refugee" (Salvatici, 2011, p. 224).

Before the end of the Second World War, the Allies had already started to organize postwar relief. To this purpose, the UNRRA introduced an extensive social-welfare program to war-ravaged countries, featuring "planning, coordination and scientific expertise" as the cornerstones of postwar relief efforts

(Davey, Borton & Foley 2013, p. 20). The organization concentrated on distributing relief supplies, providing relief services, training personnel and aiding agricultural and economic rehabilitation. Although UNRRA's mandate was limited to assisting "the return of prisoners and exiles to their homes," the organization, monitored by Allied military authorities, organized camps with international personnel and provided food to millions of Displaced Persons and refugees (Marrus, 1985, p. 317).

If the League of Nations had limited the scope of its activity mainly to the coordination of private relief operations, the UNRRA mobilized Allied governments and defined the practices which international organizations would adopt during the following decades (Cohen, 2011, p. 60). In tune with the emerging post–Second World War consensus on the enhanced role of states in the economic and social spheres, this new approach was largely promoted by the United States officials, who joined the UNRRA after having worked in New Deal agencies founded by President Franklin Roosevelt to combat the Great Recession (Cohen, 2011, p. 60). As the United States became a superpower, members of the bureaucracy that resulted from Roosevelt's expansion of state mechanisms considered themselves ready to broaden their scope of activities. That is, to implement at an international level the technique of "modern public welfare" adopted during the New Deal in the United States, in terms of organizing refugee relief, providing aid to war-torn countries, boosting development and raising living standards (Reinisch, 2008, p. 376; Reinisch, 2011a, p. 251; Cohen, 2008, p. 437). In this sense, the UNRRA marked the end of the 'charitable phase' of modern humanitarianism and exported to Europe some of the main tenets of New Deal social policies: American social workers promoted "active" welfare over "passive" charity aiming at stimulating self-help among recipients (Cohen, 2008, p. 438).

The United States authorities wished to find a solution to the refugee problem as soon as possible, mainly because of the high economic cost of refugee relief. Moreover, they feared that destitute refugees might constitute a destabilizing factor in Germany (Cohen, 2011, p. 17). As the UNRRA was set to cease its activities, there was a prevalent view that a new organization was needed in order to deal with refugees in Europe. During 1946 and the beginning of 1947, the dominant view in the United States was that the UNRRA provided

aid on the *basis of need* instead of calculating its dispatches so as to promote United States interests (Reinisch, 2013, p. 87). However, not all United States officials shared this view: Some saw international organizations as a means of advancing foreign policy goals, while others preferred unilateral action, stressing that since the United States contributed the majority of funds, it should distribute aid directly without the intervention of an intergovernmental organization (Reinalda, 2015, p. 15; Cohen, 2011, p. 17; Reinisch, 2011, p. 392).

Given the planned termination of UNRRA operations at the end of 1946, the United States government agreed to refer the issue to the United Nations and to provide substantial financial aid for the resettlement of Displaced Persons, on the condition that the majority would not immigrate to the United States (Cohen, 2011, p. 18; Loescher & Scanlan 1986, p. 17). The Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe under its influence, accused the United States of wanting to terminate the UNRRA mandate in order to end economic assistance to Eastern European countries (Reinalda, 2015, p. 13). The Soviet Union soon also clashed with the Western Allies on the issue of the repatriation of Displaced Persons, since it demanded the unconditional repatriation of all Displaced Persons except for Jews, claiming that the only people who might not wish to return to their homeland for fear of retributions would be those who had fought alongside or collaborated with the Nazis (Cohen, 2011, pp. 25–26). On the other hand, the Western countries were not willing to repatriate all Displaced Persons, after noting the refusal of many to return to their Communist-led countries.

The resolution of the United Nations General Assembly, on February 12, 1946, attempted to reconcile the claims of both sides: It mandated the "surrender and punishment of war criminals, quislings and traitors" and encouraged voluntary repatriation of Displaced Persons, while stressing that "no refugees or Displaced Persons who have finally and definitely, in complete freedom and after receiving full knowledge of the facts, [...] expressed valid objections to returning to their countries of origin [...] shall be compelled to return to their countries of origin" (Cohen, 2011, p. 26).[1] Following this resolution, the limits

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[1] United Nations General Assembly. (February 12, 1946). *Official Records: Thirtieth Plenary Meeting*. First Part of First Session, Report of Third Committee A/45.

between *stateless persons* and the *provisionally displaced*, became blurred.[2]

Within this context and in the midst of strong disputes between Western countries and the Soviet Bloc, the UN General Assembly held on December 15, 1946, decided to establish the *International Refugee Organization* (IRO), a new agency to replace UNRRA (Cohen, 2011, p. 30).[3] IRO was established as a provisional agency functioning outside the UN framework and remained under the United States control from its establishment onwards. Not surprisingly, the Soviet Union and the other Eastern European countries abstained from this new entity, regarding it as a tool for the promotion of Western interests (Cohen, 2011, p. 30). Beginning its operations on July 1, 1947, the IRO assumed responsibility for the legal protection, relief and resettlement of refugees, i.e. tasks previously undertaken by the UNRRA, the *Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees* (ICR) and the *High Commissioner for Refugees*.

Moreover and more importantly, the IRO adopted a broader definition of the term "refugee," which included those persecuted for "reasons of race, religion, nationality, and membership in a particular social group or political opinion" (Gatrell, 2011, p. 9). With the IRO, therefore, "persecution" and "political objection" became valid reasons for claiming asylum status for the first time (Cohen, 2011, p. 34). Breaking away from the Interwar criteria for the identification of refugees, IRO granted protection to victims of persecution on an individual, case-by-case basis.

In order to counter Soviet charges that the West protected war criminals, the IRO's Constitution stipulated that no international aid should be provided to Nazi collaborators, nor should their extradition and punishment be prevented (Loescher & Scanlan, 1986, p. 16; Cohen, 2011, p. 31).[4] In fact, in the beginning, the Western Allies did try to locate collaborators of German occupation

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[2] The Geneva Convention of 1933 and the subsequent provisions of the League of Nations for Germans and Austrians who fled the Nazi regime, stipulated that a refugee was a person who became *stateless* (*heimatlos, apatride*).

[3] United Nations General Assembly. (October 24 – December 12, 1946). *Official Records: Summary Records of Meetings*. Second Part of the Second Session, Report of the Third Committee A/45.

[4] The Constitution of the IRO was adopted by resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations (December 15, 1946). *Annex I, Definitions*. Retrieved from http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/decad053.asp#1

authorities, as well as citizens of the Baltic countries and Ukrainians who had fought on the side of the Germans in the Eastern front or had been members of paramilitary groups. However, many of those traced claimed they had been drafted involuntarily or that they had volunteered in order to avoid forced labor in Germany or that they were motivated solely by the will to fight the Communists (Cohen, 2011, p. 39). Up to 1948, when the Communists assumed power in Czechoslovakia, IRO representatives adopted a negative stance towards Displaced Persons who had collaborated with occupation forces. During the following years, however, the Organization started treating Nazi collaborators with increasing leniency, except for leading figures of occupation authorities or military groups (Salomon, 1991, p. 154; Kay, 1995, p. 154; Cesarani, 1992, p. 160). In 1949, IRO decided that men from the Baltic States who were drafted by the Germans after April 1943 had the right to receive assistance as well as those with a "moral intention," i.e. those who had collaborated with the Germans not out of hostility to the Western powers, but with the aim of resisting the Soviets (Cohen, 2011, pp. 48–49).

On the other hand, many refugees were suspected as crypto-Communists and were therefore considered as dangerous. In order to detect "politically dangerous" refugees, the Displaced Persons camps were transformed into a space for monitoring, questioning and screening, providing the model for practices adopted by the ICEM in the following years (Cohen, 2008, p. 439; Gatrell, 2011, p. 11). Every refugee had to prove that he/she was not a member of any communist organization (Gatrell, 2011, pp. 8, 18). Gradually, as the lack of confidence between Soviets and Western countries evolved into the Cold War, the notion of the "refugee" became primarily associated with those who had fled their homeland because of their opposition to a communist regime.

Defectors from the communist countries, the so-called "escapees," became an important tool in the United States foreign policy during the Cold War. As soon as the *Central Intelligence Agency* (CIA) was created in 1947, it started to collect security information from escapees and in 1950, the National Security Council adopted a policy of using "covert economic, political, and psychological warfare to stir unrest and revolt in the satellite countries" (Loescher & Scanlan, 1986, p. 31). Escapees were employed in Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, both financed by the *National Committee for Free*

Europe, a CIA front in order to disseminate Western propaganda across the Iron Curtain and encourage further defections (Puddington, 2000, p. 2). As Harry N. Rosefield, member of the *United States Displaced Person* (USDP) *Commission*, underlined, encouraging defection was part of the plan for destabilizing communist regimes; however, it failed to make good its promises to many of those who took the risk to escape (Loescher & Scanlan, 1986, p. 33).

During 1951, the objectives of various agencies converged in shaping a more comprehensive United States policy towards the escapees, culminating in the *Mutual Security Act* which authorized exceptions in the restrictive immigration regime "for any selected persons who are residing in or are escapees" from the communist bloc countries "either to form such persons into elements of the military force supporting [NATO] or for other purposes" (Marrus, 2002, p. 354; Loescher & Scanlan, 1986, pp. 38–39). Some even suggested the creation of a *Volunteer Freedom Corps* comprised of "Iron Curtain nationals in the defense of the North Atlantic area" that would eventually participate in the toppling of communist regimes in Eastern Europe (Carafano, 1999).

The coordinated efforts by the Truman administration to encourage mass fleeing from communist countries and to relax strict immigration legislation, were not unrelated to the process that led to the foundation of the *Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movements of Migrants from Europe* (PICMME)—later the *Intergovernmental Committee for Migration* (ICEM). The inclusion of "freedom of movement" as a prerequisite for a country's participation in the Committee was, in a way, an incentive for Eastern Europeans to flee (Carruthers, 2005, p. 917). Nevertheless, if the Cold War pushed for a moderate and highly selective liberalisation of the United States immigration legislation, it simultaneously strengthened restrictionist positions based of fears of a communist infiltration into the United States. These concerns led to the passing of the *Internal Security Act* of 1950, which expanded existing provisions for the exclusion and deportation of aliens seen as potential threats to national security. The United States foreign aid and humanitarian programs started increasingly to reflect the country's national security concerns. Since even defectors were seen by many in the United States as a potential security hazard, American officials sought ways to finance their passage to other overseas countries (Carruthers, 2005, p. 926). Nevertheless, the State Department

requested PICMME to deal with the transfer of fugitives from Eastern Europe to the *United States under the Escapee Program* (USAP), during its first year of operation.[5] According to a December 1951 "top secret" policy guidance report of the Psychological Strategy Board, issued just a few weeks after the establishment of ICEM in Brussels, "although principally concerned with the problem of alleviating surplus populations in Europe, the Committee's charter is broad enough to provide for movement overseas of Soviet orbit escapees."[6]

If refugees were considered dangerous, many politicians and scholars thought that overpopulation was even more threatening to the unstable post-war order, as it created a fertile ground for the spread of communist ideas (Clayton, 2004, p. 589; Cohen, 2011, p. 103). Ideas on "overpopulation" produced and disseminated in international forums during the Interwar period permeated the plans introduced during and after the Second World War. In this respect, Roosevelt considered that the global demographic crisis was one of the factors to blame for the recourse to war (Mazower, 2009, p. 24). In 1942, the president of the United States initiated, as part of the preparation for post-war reconstruction, what was named the *M Project*, the aim of which was to plan the relocation of millions of people into overseas countries and territories (Cohen, 2011, p. 102). The M Project staff located the regions that suffered most from overpopulation as well as the refugee groups that could not be repatriated. The aim was to match the latter to "potential areas of settlement with an appraisal from economic, social, geographic, ecologic, demographic, and geopolitical angles," taking into account previous resettlement schemes in order to propose the most adequate solution for each case.[7] The project, although

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[5] USEP-ICEM Agreement and Addendum, Contract number PO-GE 99, May 1954, ICEM, Seventh, Eight Session 1954 / ICEM, Seventh Session Geneva 1954, NAA, Canberra; Circular Airgram No. 1785, March 15, 1953 and No. 869, June 8, 1953 as cited in "The U.S. Escapee Program," October 29, 1957, Hungarian Refugees (1956–1961), Loose Material, NARA, Washington D.C.

[6] More more information: *Psychological Strategy Board: Psychological Operations Plan for Soviet Orbit Escapees Phase A* [Code Name: Engross]. (December 20, 1951). PSB D–18/a. The document was only very recently declassified in its entirety (September 29, 2014). Retrieved from: http://www.archives.gov/declassification/iscap/pdf/2012-089-doc1.pdf

[7] Enrique de Lozada, "Survey of Laws and Regulations Dealing with Migration and Their Application to South and Central America," *Studies on Migration and Settlement, 1, L-10,*

shelved after the war, also contributed in shaping post–Second World War plans for global population redistribution (Cohen, 2011, p. 101). At the same time, it perpetuated the idea that both "surplus" population and ethnic minorities were a source of instability in Europe. In this context, the transfer or emigration of such populations to overseas countries seemed a plausible solution (Mazower, 2009, p. 105; G. Robinson, 2005). Thus, in the immediate postwar years, the view that overpopulation led to the exhaustion of resources, which could generate poverty and thus create favorable conditions for the spread of communist ideas became rapidly dominant in the United States (J.F. Kantner & A. Kantner, 2006, p. 19; Schlosser, 2009, p. 477; Bon Tempo, 2008, p. 35).

The issue of overpopulation also became a primary concern for other global agents in the immediate post–Second World War period. The twin problems of "overpopulation" and "depopulation" and the global distribution of arable land, linked to concerns about development, became the focus of discussions in the United Nations Population Division in 1946 (Frey, 2011: 83). In the late 1940s, various other agencies of the United Nations, such as the *United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization* (UNESCO), the *Food and Agriculture Organization* (FAO) and the *World Health Organization* (WHO), also started to discuss aspects of the overpopulation problem related to land, production and population density, following the terms of the discussion that started during the Interwar period. UNESCO focused on "cultural, scientific and intellectual aspects of population pressure" in order to "contribute to peace" (Bashford, 2008, p. 332). According to UNESCO's first director General Julian Huxley (1946, p. 45), "the recognition of the idea of an optimum population size (of course relative to technological and social conditions) is an indispensable first step toward that planned control of populations which is necessary if man's blind reproductive urges are not to wreck his ideals and his plans for material and spiritual betterment."

Thus, it is not by chance that economic concerns were as important as political considerations in shaping IRO's priorities. The IRO — along with many private organizations assisting it — insisted on the need to introduce vocational

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p. 5, Franklin Delano Roosevelt Presidential Library and Archive, Hyde Park, FDRPLA, New York, NARA, New York.

training in the camps, in order to prepare Displaced Persons for becoming "useful" and "productive" citizens in their host countries (Holborn, 1956, p. 267; Gatrell, 2011, p. 16).[8] Therefore, the IRO took responsibility and acted not only for the care and maintenance of refugees in camps, but also for their vocational training. Moreover, the organization tried to detect the availability amongst refugees of a workforce that would contribute to the economic development of receiving countries, while simultaneously presenting them as victims of Communism (Cohen, 2011, p. 101).

In order to persuade the governments of America, Oceania and Western Europe to receive a part of the Displaced Persons stranded for years in camps, the IRO assumed the role of a *supranational employment agency* that attempted to link the resettlement of refugees to the manpower needs of receiving countries. This was mainly achieved by concluding agreements with countries willing to receive Displaced Persons and refugees to this end (J.F. Thomas, 1971, p. 13).[9] Therefore, IRO began to resettle refugees as "manual laborers," aiming at matching their skills to the needs of 'host' labor markets (Karatani, 2005, p. 530). In this sense, it was the first postwar international organization that planned, coordinated, managed and administered mass migration in what was then considered a productive and mutually profitable way (Marks, 1957, p. 482; Ducasse-Rogier, 2001, pp. 13–14).

This "technocratic"—or, maybe more accurately, utilitarian—approach was clearly dominant in the post–Second World War era. Interestingly enough, the Western powers that occupied Germany, as well as the successive organizations that dealt with refugee relief, were seriously preoccupied by refugees' "idleness" in Displaced Persons' camps. The IRO's constitution even explicitly excluded from aid all persons "unwilling to return to their countries of origin because they prefer "idleness" to facing the hardships of helping in the reconstruction of their countries."[10] The distinction between *political refugees* and *economic migrants* is to be found in this article for the first time (Cohen, 2011, pp. 32, 51).

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[8] ERC Fieldworkers 1947–1948, Box 425.1.031, WCC-A, Geneva.

[9] Constitution of the IRO. Art. 2(2). Retrieved from http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/decad053.asp#1

[10] Ibid.

Discourses on the "apathy" and "idleness" of Displaced Persons were thus related to the broader plan to organize the resettlement of Displaced Persons in overseas countries that needed additional labor. It is in this very period that "regulating movements according to strictly defined categories became one of the most effective ways for states to control, and restrict, the entry of people" (Madokoro, 2012, p. 5). Those excluded from the "refugee" definition became "migrants," portrayed as those who had a choice to stay at home but preferred to move in order to improve their lives. Thus, the concern and the 'obligations' towards them were centered on financial assistance in order to enable them to immigrate to places with labor shortage, whereas for *refugees* the concern focused on protection or safe resettlement (Karatani, 2005, p. 520).

By the late 1940s, the refugee issue was thus increasingly viewed as part of the broader "surplus population" problem, seen at that time as a threat to Western Europe's economic recovery and political stability. The United States government was specifically concerned with economic stagnation and mounting social unrest, both considered to be closely related to the "overpopulation" problem in some European countries, e.g. Italy. In May 1950, the foreign ministers of the United States, France and Great Britain met in London in order to discuss the question of Europe's "overpopulation" issue, with emigration appearing as the most plausible and satisfactory solution (Marks, 1957, p. 482; Karatani, 2005, p. 524). Relieving Europe of refugees and "surplus" population was therefore narrowly linked to the security of the continent and the "defense of freedom," goals that had also led to the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (Cohen, 2011, p. 121). This assumption was deeply rooted in the mindsets of the agencies, national and international, which played some role in the regulation of human mobility.

Designating Who Will Move the People: The Creation of the ICEM

In 1951, it became clear that the anticipated work of the IRO would not be completed by the termination of its mandate, in 1952. Many Displaced Persons still remained in camps in Europe, while, contrary to the assumptions of the founders of UNRRA and IRO, the refugee problem had proven to be a long-term issue. Even after the resettlement of the majority of persons displaced

during the Second World War in their new homes, more than 1,500 Eastern European refugees were still moving to Western Europe every month (Holborn, 1975, p. 42), while conflicts and political upheavals in other parts of the world were creating millions of others. Before the closure of the IRO, its director Donald Kingsley emphasized the fact that a new organization should be founded in order to deal with refugee relief (Orchard, 2014, p. 175; Reinalda, 2015, p. 18).

However, Congressman Francis E. Walter and Senator Pat McCarran put every effort into impeding the creation of a new international agency that would potentially call for a relaxation in the United States restrictive immigration legislation. Their main arguments were, on the one hand, the tax increases that participation and contribution to such an agency would entail for potential member states and, on the other hand, the danger of the arrival of Communists in the United States and other Western countries. Although Walter saw the IRO as a means "to get refugees off to other countries,"[11] he believed that the organization was far too costly (Reinalda, 2015, p. 18). Walter and McCarran both developed a fear that communist agents had infiltrated the IRO, helping subversive elements to immigrate to the United States. United States domestic conflicts and foreign policy priorities were pivotal in the closure of the IRO, just as they had been in its founding. But, even among the various parties recognizing the need for a new organization that would take over the work of the IRO, there were competing views about its status, mandate, priorities and membership. The Cold War transformed Europe's refugee and 'overpopulation' crisis into issues that transcended humanitarian considerations, as it explicitly linked the social and political impact of unemployment and poverty to international security. Thus, in addition to being an economic concern,

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[11] "In UNRRA and IRO the United States. was paying 70 to 75 and 80 percent of the cost. We were paying for the support of the refugees in Germany. We were feeding them through our subsidization to the German economy. That's where Congressman [Francis E.] Walter comes in. He was just as opposed to having refugees enter the United States as every other Congressman, and that's why he was interested in creating IRO, International Refugee Organization, in an effort to divert the pressure on the United States to get refugees off to other countries." *Oral History* Interview with George L. Warren by Richard D. McKinzie, November 10, 1972, George L. Warren Papers, Harry S. Truman Library, Missouri. Retrieved from http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/warrengl.htm

Europe's "overpopulation" and international migration became major political and international relations issues (Clayton, 2004, p. 587).

In the post–Second World War era, several organizations were created in the domain of international cooperation and intervention. The main goal of these organizations was to avoid economic conflict and to maintain currency stability and free trade. If movement of capital and goods was increasingly taken into account and facilitated through specific international agencies, labor mobility still remained under the strict rule of state sovereignty. The just recently established the *United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees* (UNHCR) mandate being restricted to the legal protection of refugees, there was no agency to respond to material needs of refugees, neither to problems of "over-population" or labor shortages. Contrary to the approach adopted with regard to refugees, states maintained a strong national right to regulate migration and to expel those violating national legislation on entrance to their territories.

However, the idea of the usefulness of an international agency in regulating migration was deeply entrenched in the thinking of several US officials and specialists, such as the Russian American Eugene Kulischer, father of the term "Displaced Persons," who wrote in 1945:

> Yet, we cannot dream of a return to free migration as before the First World War. It will not come back—the time of immense free and accessible spaces, of exceedingly rapid increase of food and raw material resources, of open doors for international migration—this epoch of 42 years of undisturbed peace, unique in the history of Europe. In our time migrations, to be effective, must be internationally organized.[12]

In this complex setting, discussions began for the creation of an international organization specializing in migration issues. More precisely, during the short period from the decision to liquidate the IRO and the Migration Conference organized by the *International Labour Office* (ILO) in Naples, in October 1951, contacts proliferated among different stakeholders striving to influence the outcome of negotiations on which agency would undertake the task of coordinating the regulation of international migration flows.

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[12] Eugene M. Kulischer, "Planned Migration and the International Labour Office," *Studies of Migration and Settlement, Memorandum Series*. No. M-212, March 1, 1945, p. 3. NARA, Washington D.C.

The ILO, a long-established organization for enhancing cooperation among states regarding the protection of workers' rights, had shown interest in migration issues in the interwar period. As the Assistant Director of the ILO, Pierre Waelbroeck, mentioned in 1944, "it is significant that one of the first meetings convened in Geneva by the ILO—this was in 1921—was a Commission on International Migration. It is equally significant that among the last meetings held in Geneva before the War broke out—in 1938 and 1939—the ILO dealt with migration problems."[13] The ILO Conference in Geneva, in February–March 1938, convened specifically "for the study of those measures which could or would be taken, unilaterally or in cooperation between the two groups of Countries [emigration and immigration], with a view to finding solutions to the technical and financial difficulties which seemed to be the obstacles to a resumption of migration movements." It adopted among others the recommendation "of setting up an organization by emigration and immigration countries in order to give to migrants adequate information before they leave their homes, to help them during the journey and, more particularly, to help their settling after arrival and their adjustment to new conditions of life."[14] In 1939, the ILO had drafted the Convention No 66 "on the recruitment and conditions of migrant workers," which never did come into force because of the outbreak of the Second World War. In 1949, the organization opened for signature Convention No. 97, based on the prewar one, "on migrant workers' protection during the journey towards the state of reception and during the stay in the latter." The organization also remained quite active in promoting the idea of internationally planned migration after the Second World War.

Given the conviction that the ILO was "the best-qualified to deal with large-scale migration operations,"[15] officials within the organization strived to consolidate its position as the most competent coordinating body on migration issues. In September 1950, during an informal international meeting on migration convened by the ILO, it was commonly acknowledged that the

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[13] Pierre Waelbroeck, "The International Labour Office and World Migration," *Studies of Migration and Settlement, Lecture Series*. No. L-35, September 15, 1944, p. 1, NARA, Washington D.C.

[14] Ibid., p. 5.

[15] Personal letter of Jef Rens to David Morse, May 1, 1951, AILO, Geneva.

responsibility for the coordination of migration activities at the international level should be entrusted to the ILO.[16]

In this context, in October 1951 the ILO took the initiative to convene under its auspices a Migration Conference in Naples in order to discuss the issue of "overpopulation" in Europe. The conference failed because of the refusal of the United States and other Western states to vest the ILO, an organization with two communist and several non-European member states at the time, with the power to coordinate migration operations. This stance mainly reflected the confrontation between the capitalist and the communist world. With communist countries prohibiting emigration just a short time before the Naples Conference, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the United States House of Representatives had put forward the following condition for further US financial contributions: "No sum shall be spent […] or put at the disposal, of an international bureau, institution or organization which includes in its membership states which do not take part in the free movement of international emigrants or immigrants."[17] But, they also had in mind that the ILO formed part of the United Nations system and that the 1944 Declaration of Philadelphia which became part of ILO's postwar constitution in 1946, was addressed to "all human beings, irrespective of race, creed or sex" (Reinalda, 2009, p. 278). Finally, the ILO was a tripartite organization also including trade unions. Thus, curtailing ILO's competence over migration issues became a significant political consideration for the United States and their Western allies in order to ensure that management of labor migration and economic development in the Western world would stay within the jurisdiction of liberal governments.

Revealing of the political stakes and priorities in the United States is the part in these negotiations of a prominent figure in the country's foreign policy, who occupied a central position in the implementation of its migration and refugee policy throughout the 1940s and 1950s and even later. George L. Warren, State Department adviser on refugees and Displaced Persons, adviser to United States delegates to the United Nations General Assemblies and

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[16] Coordination of Migration Activities at the International Level, 1951, AILO, Geneva.

[17] The United States House of Representatives: The Foreign Affairs Committee. *Preliminary report of April 1951 on the Mutual Security Act.* As cited in Plender (1972, p. 222).

United States representative in the General Council and Executive Committee of the IRO, was the main messenger of the United States government's purposes regarding international migration and the regulation of refugee movements. Warren was the main vehicle through which the United States positions were conveyed to members of other concerned governments and organizations:

> In his view, […], the ILO was not capable of operating a migration project because of its tripartite constitution and because it included in its membership other nations from Eastern Europe, Asia and elsewhere not interested in European migration and these countries would have an opportunity to interfere. He said that his discussions with the Director-General of the ILO revealed that Mr. Morse would co-operate only on the basis that ILO would supply the Secretary-General of a new migration organization, that it would deserve to the ILO Director-General the right to nominate the Director of a new organization, and that ILO representation covering governments, labour and employers should sit on the Board of such an organization although without voting powers. Mr. Warren felt that these conditions would make it impossible to establish a working arrangement.[18]

Shortly after the Naples Conference, in December 1951 the Belgian government, at the request of the United States, convened another conference on migration in Brussels which was only open to countries of the Western world interested in migration issues. From the discussions prior, during and after the Brussels Migration Conference, the concerns and hopes expressed by representatives of both states and international agencies surpassed the question of refugees. From the very beginning two basic principles were set regarding both emigration and immigration: The former was considered in mainly demographic terms, more precisely in terms of the problem of European "overpopulation" or "surplus population" which was a constant subject in all texts and discussions of the Committee throughout the 1950s. The latter was mainly conceived in economic terms, particularly through the lenses of economic underdevelopment and shortcomings or development and opportunities,

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[18] Australian Delegation to the European Office of the United Nations, Memorandum of Patrick Shaw, Permanent Delegate for the Secretary, Department of External Affairs, Canberra, No. 159, July 18, 1951, NAA Canberra.

offered in the New World, especially in the vast unexploited territories of Latin American countries. Both these issues were associated with the economic problems of sending countries, such as the unemployment which in some cases was endemic.

Therefore, as early as the Third Session of the PICMME, held in Washington D.C. on June 10–13, 1952, economic issues under the duality of "overpopulation–underdevelopment" featured prominently in the discussion. The delegate of the Peruvian government explained his government's interest in participating in the session as an observer by stressing the paradox that "some countries have problems of surplus populations, while vast territories of South America, including Peru, with natural resources which need nothing else than manpower in order to be transformed into economic values, have problems posed by low density of population, labor shortage, lack of exploitation."[19] In the same spirit, the Italian delegate exclaimed in reference to what a delegate from another Latin American country had said: "I am very touched from what the representative of Chile has said. He has spoken of a land without men, me I am speaking of men without land, so we see that the reasons for an agreement among us exist, let us now study the means to achieve it."[20]

These passages contain the founding ideas for the establishment of an international organization for migration: overpopulation, economic development, labor mobility and international cooperation. As early as the 1950s, there was a conviction that labor mobility issues could not be effectively resolved solely on the basis of bilateral agreements between nation-states which confront reverse problems, i.e. overpopulation/unemployment – under-population/labor shortages. The germs were present of the idea of a global governance of human mobility, not in the form of abstract, wishful thinking—this had already been present in the interwar period—but as an operational idea for managing migration in an economically productive way.

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[19] Fernando Morales-Macedo, "Verbatim records (French)," Third Session of the PICMME, June 13, 1952, NARA, Washington D.C.

[20] Comte Giusti Del Giardino, "Verbatim records (French)," Third Session of the PICMME, June 13, 1952, NARA, Washington D.C.; see also "Summary record of the twenty-fifth meeting, held at the International Conference Suite Department of State, Washington, at 10:40 a.m. on Friday, 13 June 1952," PIC/SR/25, NARA, Washington D.C.

To come back to the discussions within the PICMME, the means to which the Italian and other delegates at the Third Session referred to, were to be examined in detail by the newly elected first director of the ICEM, Hugh Gibson, and presented in a report to the following Fourth Session, held in Geneva in October 1952. This report highlighted the fact that the obstacles to the expansion of migration lied with the receiving countries rather than with the emigration countries. Referring more particularly to Latin American countries, the director mentioned that "the present stringent limitations [to absorb immigrants] are attributable to the lack of capital needed for the overall economic development programs of the countries concerned and to the fact that, while a number of organizations engage in the necessary activities for the promotion of resettlement possibilities, there is at present insufficient effective coordination of their efforts."[21] These difficulties, combined with the interest in supplying various migration services and the twofold objective of relieving emigration countries of their "overpopulation" and economic problems, as well as enhancing economic development in immigration countries through the admission of necessary labor force from Europe, explain the variety of international organizations to which the ICEM was linked from the beginning.

To sum up, one could argue that although it was not part of the United Nations, nor was it affiliated with the ILO, the PICMME/ICEM was part of the international institutional structures set up and consolidated after the Second World War in order to preserve peace and—most importantly—development throughout the so-called "free world." As has been extensively pointed out (Mazower, 2012, pp. 230–235), the impelling force behind post–Second World War international institution-building (apart from the idea of a World Federalism, fueled by the fear of a new atomic bomb and cherished by certain politicians, but also by intellectuals and scientists such as Albert Einstein) was the idea and intent to expand and enhance economic development in the free world. As the German American legal scholar, Wolfgang Friedmann, noted in 1964, "the greatest development of the postwar era lies in the concept of inter-

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[21] "Technical Aid and International Financing for the Encouragement of Migratory Movements from Europe. Report of the Director submitted in accordance with Resolution No. 24" paragraph 20, October 2, 1952, PIC/72, NARA, Washington D.C.

national economic development aid as a permanent and inevitable feature of contemporary international organization" (as cited in Mazower, 2012, p. 273).

The creation of the PICMME and its rapid consolidation as ICEM, must be seen as part of this "Free-World-Making through development." The *migration–development nexus*, which even today remains an important international policy concern, was one of the main driving forces for the establishment and development of the Committee, with another being the resettlement of the large numbers of escapees fleeing communist regimes. Economic concerns also led to the assigning the ICEM with a broader scope of activities in order "to promote the increase of the volume of migration from Europe by providing, at the request of and in agreement with the Governments concerned, services in the processing, reception, first placement and settlement of migrants which other international organizations are not in a position to supply, and such other assistance to this purpose as is in accord with the aims of the Committee."[22]

Conclusion

On the grounds laid by both state governments and international organisations during the Interwar period, the contradiction between control and freedom of mobility became a persistent element of the post-Second World War era. As restrictions on the exit of their citizens were implemented in the Eastern Bloc countries, both sending and receiving countries in the Western world employed the principle of "free movement" as a feature of their foreign policy in order to discredit communist countries. Nevertheless, all receiving countries ensured that acceptance of this *freedom of movement principle* did not compromise their sovereign right to control entry into their territory. Moreover, where on the one hand, traditional receiving countries espoused restrictive and selective immigration policies, on the other, their refugee admission policy was mainly guided by the belief that the resettlement of refugees from the Eastern Bloc countries in the West served to embarrass and discredit communist regimes. The international community therefore strived to regulate migration and refugee flows by accommodating principles and goals which did not always

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[22] ICEM Constitution, November 1953, MC/55, Art. 1(b), NARA, Washington D.C.

converge: national security, economic development, respect for human rights, and avoidance of social and political instability.

Despite the global character of mobility and the universal aspirations of the international organizations that dealt with it, international cooperation during the Cold War era was largely limited to states belonging to the West. Moreover, nation states, especially powerful ones, were not prepared to make concessions as regards their sovereignty rights in favor of an international regulation of mobility. The dawning of a new era, freed from the nationalist burdens of the bellicose past, did not begin in the early 1950s. However, despite the prevalence of national interests, the forms and methods of the international regulation of mobility which emerged during this period, would survive for decades to come. In this sense, some of the ideas and practices that will be described in the following chapters go far beyond the confines of the analytical framework of the Cold War and constitute real shifts in the ways that states and international actors deal with human mobility.

PART II The Establishment, Development and
Functioning of the Intergovernmental
Committee for European Migration
(1951–1960)

Organizing an International Migration Machinery: The Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration

Dimitris Parsanoglou

From a *Provisional* to a *Non-Permanent* International Organization

The constituent instruments of most international organizations are multilateral treaties approved during international conferences. Multilateral treaties are binding agreements entered into by state parties and fall within the framework of the international law of treaties (Dinh, 1999). Exceptionally, an international organization may be created through a resolution adopted by an international conference, and the *Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe* (PICMME), established in 1951, was such a case. Its mandate was thus tied from the beginning to the will of its member states, rather than to an international convention (Carrete & Gasper, 2010).

The resolution by which government delegates to the Brussels Migration Conference decided the foundation of the PICMME, included the provision "that the Committee [would] examine the need for its continuing existence beyond a twelve-month period"[1] and indeed, in less than a year, the Committee, "being convinced that the reasons justifying the resolution adopted on 5 December 1951 at Brussels remain[ed] unaltered" and "being satisfied that the activities of the Committee [had] justified the confidence placed in it by the governments concerned," decided to prolong its activities for the following year and rename it as the *Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration* (ICEM).[2]

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[1] Resolution to establish a Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe (Adopted at the 13th Meeting, December 5, 1951)," Brussels Migration Conference, MCB/9, December 6, 1951, NARA, Washington D.C.

[2] Resolution No. 30: Resolution on Prolongation of the Existence of the Provisional Inter-

The Resolution No. 30 of 1952 secured the first extension of the Committee's existence and laid the foundations for its more permanent character, despite underlining that it "in no manner affect[ed] or change[d] its legal status and the powers given to its officers by previous resolutions."[3] The decision for the prolongation of the Committee's life span was accompanied by a "request [to] the Director to submit for consideration […] a preliminary Draft Constitution so that it [might] be discussed during the first session of 1953." The Constitution was deemed necessary as it was "important for the functioning of the Committee that it should be recognised as possessing legal status and that the Committee, the representatives of Member States as well as the Officials and Administrative Staff of the Committee should enjoy the immunities and privileges generally accorded to international organizations […]."[4]

One year later, following the submission of the first draft in February 1953[5] and the amendments proposed by member governments,[6] the Constitution was adopted during the sixth session of the ICEM held in Venice in October 1953. The Constitution, as stipulated, came into force on November 30, 1954, when "sixteen Member Governments, representing 81,51% of the contributions to the administrative part of the budget, [had] communicated to the Director their acceptance of the Constitution."[7] The ICEM was nevertheless established

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governmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe and on the Change of its Name (Adopted at the 34th Meeting, October 17, 1952)," Fourth Session of the PICMME, PIC/92, October 18, 1952, NARA, Washington D.C.

[3] "Resolution No. 39: Resolution on the Legal Status of the Committee and the Powers of its Officers, (Adopted at the 38th Meeting, October 20, 1952)," Fourth Session of the PICMME, PIC/100, October 20, 1952, NARA, Washington D.C.

[4] "Resolution No. 31: Resolution on a Preliminary Draft Constitution (Adopted at the 34th Meeting, 17 October 1952)", Fourth Session of the PICMME, PIC/99, October 20, 1952, National Archives and Records Administration, NARA, Washington D.C.

[5] "Preliminary Draft Constitution (Submitted by the Director in accordance with Resolution No. 31)," Fifth Session of the ICEM, MC/2, February 9, 1953, NARA, Washington D.C.

[6] All the amendments and comments are included in the "Draft Constitution: Comments received by the Director," Sixth Session of the ICEM, MC/28, September 7, 1953, NARA, Washington D.C.

[7] "Resolution No. 77: Resolution declaring the coming into force of the Constitution (Adopted at the 72nd meeting, November 30, 1954)", Eighth Session of the ICEM, MC/100/Rev.1, December 4, 1954, NARA, Washington D.C.

formally as a "*non-permanent* organization,"[8] which would continue to function for as long as the need existed. During the session in which the Constitution of the ICEM was adopted, the member states discussed at length whether the term "organization" would be more appropriate than that of "committee" (Perruchoud, 1987, p. 533), before finally opting for the latter.

The establishment of the Committee through a resolution rather than a treaty, and the insistence on the provisional character of the organization reflected the reluctance of the United States—as well as other states—to commit to new international obligations on a long-term basis. In this spirit, the United States convinced the states invited to the Brussels Conference to participate in the creation of the Committee by underlining that their involvement would only be provisional, as would the additional burden on their budgets, and that their sovereign right to shape and implement their own immigration policies would be fully respected. Besides, all states that participated in the Conference shared the conviction that the European refugee and "overpopulation" issues were temporary (Murdock, 1983; Loescher, 2001).

Notwithstanding continued emphasis on its provisional existence and despite the fact that the preamble of its Constitution formally determined the ICEM's "non-permanent" character, the Committee was eventually to become the most long-lived agency with a mandate to manage migration flows at the international level. The organization endured under the same name for twenty-eight years until 1980, when it was renamed as the *Intergovernmental Committee for Migration*. Finally, in 1989 it assumed its present incarnation as the *International Organization for Migration* (IOM).

The ICEM's Mandate and Main Concerns

Although the PICMME/ICEM was established as a temporary organization, it was conceived from the very beginning as a fully *operational* organization. According to its Constitution and the will of its founder states, the organization was to have four guiding characteristics: small, flexible, efficient and

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[8] As it is described in the Preamble of its Constitution: see "Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration, Constitution," MC/55, November 1953, NARA, Washington D.C.

economical.[9] Consensus amongst receiving and sending countries with diverging interests was achieved by the focus on a technical field of cooperation, i.e. the transportation of refugees and migrants.

Moreover, the Brussels Resolution clearly stated that only states with democratic governments had the right to join the Committee.[10] Therefore the PICMME/ICEM was established exclusively by emigration and immigration countries of a certain political profile. According to Article 2 of its Constitution, which referred to membership of the ICEM, only states that supported the "free movement" of people could become members of the organization. Certainly, "free movement" was subject to various interpretations by the Committee's member states, but in practice this provision excluded communist countries, which had prohibited the emigration of their citizens from membership.[11]

In strict terms, the PICMME/ICEM was a technical organization, and delegates participating in its meetings often underlined that it had a clear non-political character. However, the exclusion of all communist countries was undoubtedly political, contributing to the ideological homogeneity of its member states. But what was equally of prime importance for the Committee's homogeneity and cohesion was the implicit exclusion of all non-European or non-settler countries. It was an organization designed to serve the mobility of Europeans only, and meant to transport them only to areas where "Western civilization" was hegemonic and the white race controlled the state apparatus.

The ICEM was the first international organization mandated to deal with refugees, displaced persons and migrants. It adopted the inclusive concept of "migrant," which encompassed all categories covered by the terms used by its predecessors: refugees, Displaced Persons, expellees, stateless persons, as well

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[9] "A Plan to facilitate the movement of surplus populations from countries of Western Europe and Greece to countries affording resettlement opportunities overseas (Submitted by the United States Delegation)," Brussels Migration Conference, November 24, 1951, MCB/3, NARA, Washington D.C.

[10] "Resolution to establish a Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe (Adopted at the 13th Meeting, December 5, 1951," MCB/9, December 6, 1951, NARA, Washington D.C.

[11] ICEM Constitution, November 1953, MC/55, NARA, Washington D.C.

as workers who migrated to other countries for economic reasons. The absence of any definition of this inclusive and vague term in the ICEM's official documents and the parallel use of the term "refugee" made the transportation of many different categories of people possible, without creating legal problems and without the Committee exceeding its jurisdiction.

The vagueness of the terms "migrant" and "refugee" should be seen in the context of the Cold War and of the specific European realities in the late 1940s and early 1950s. On the one hand, the United States could use the ICEM to transfer groups and persons considered useful in its fight against Communism, without having to worry about their legal status. On the other hand, the close coexistence of all these categories and the thin borderlines between them created large grey areas: men and women who had become refugees before the war, those displaced during the war, those categorized as refugees after the war; those fleeing religious persecution or politically hostile governments; men and women living in refugee camps as well as those living amongst local populations; both nationals and refugees encountering endemic unemployment or men and women seeking employment and a better life abroad and so on.

In other words, the ICEM was mandated to transport a much larger range of people than those defined as refugees by the 1951 Geneva Convention and the UNHCR. The Committee was to deal with *de facto* or *de jure* refugees and with any European who *wanted* to migrate but did not have the means to do so. Poverty and unemployment, and the need to eliminate potential social and political tensions in Europe, were amongst the main considerations that led to the establishment of the Committee. The economic development of Western states, in Europe, the Americas and Oceania through the redistribution of man-power would augment the possibilities for the United States to contain the spread of Communism.

As far as operational activities are concerned, the main task of the ICEM was considered to be the safe transportation of European migrants and refugees overseas. But the transportation of these categories of people required a series of operations preceding and following their movement, such as identifying, informing, recruiting, preselecting, screening, documenting, training, embarking, receiving, housing and placing them. Based on the experience acquired from 1945 onwards by the *United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration*

(UNRRA) and the *International Refugee Organization* (IRO),[12] the ICEM performed many of these operations. Depending on the sending and receiving countries concerned, and the migration scheme under which groups or individuals were transferred, the Committee undertook some or all of these operations.

Receiving countries, each in its own specific manner and depending on the period, transferred several of the administrative tasks concerning the processing of refugees and migrants heading to and disembarking in their territory from their state apparatus or steamship companies to the ICEM. For instance, in the beginning of the twentieth century overseas receiving countries used to send representatives to ports in sending countries in order to supervise the health examination of prospective migrants; with the creation of the ICEM, in many cases receiving countries transferred this procedure to the Committee, for all those who were travelling under its programs. In other cases in the past and particularly in cases of spontaneous migration, steamship companies were obliged to ensure that their passengers were travelling abroad legally, to submit lists of passengers to officers of receiving states and repatriate at their own expense all those not admitted. These obligations were subsequently undertaken by the ICEM for all those who were moving abroad under its auspices.

Sending countries also transferred part of the processing of refugees and/or prospective migrants to the Committee—especially to the ICEM's local liaison missions or offices. In an equally uneven manner, they often authorized the ICEM to perform a series of migration services within their territory: to inform their citizens about the possibility to migrate; to identify and recruit prospective migrants; inform them about the selection criteria, the procedures set by various receiving states and the working and living conditions abroad; document, pre-select and present candidates to receiving countries' selection missions; organize language and orientation courses and/or provide vocational training; organize transport from villages to ports as well as board and lodging before embarkation; control their baggage; check their documents before embarkation; produce nominal lists for vessels; administer and supervise embarkation

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[12] For more on IRO operations, see International Refugee Organization, "Procedures in countries of immigration," *Migration from Europe... A Report of Experience*, Geneva, IRO, 1951, pp. 71–76.

etc. Thus, both receiving and sending states transferred—or, to use a term in fashion today, "outsourced"—part of the administrative and financial burden of processing refugees and migrants to the ICEM.

More precisely, since 1953 the ICEM had tentatively started to organize vocational courses for potential migrants from Southern Europe. These experimental projects included intensive language courses in English, Spanish and Portuguese; orientation to the new labor market and short-term basic training addressed to male workers in agriculture, construction and mechanics. These programs were restricted to sending countries, concerned some few hundreds of potential migrants and offered more experience than satisfactory results, as relevant reports admit.[13] The experience gained was utilized after 1955 for the design and development of extensive training projects in Italy and Greece, countries that presented the greatest need.

On the other hand, reception and placement services developed in receiving countries, mainly in Latin America, were considered complementary to the training programs in Europe and a precondition for the implementation of comprehensive large-scale schemes. Efforts were made to adapt both services to the actual needs and realities of labor markets in sending and receiving countries respectively. Joint study groups of the ICEM and the ILO organized field trips and carried out manpower surveys in Latin American countries in order to assess the extent of demand for immigrant labor by sector and skills, while the local branch offices collected comparative data concerning purchasing power and living standards of workers in emigration and immigration countries.[14] In the reception and placement centers set up in industrial areas, experienced ICEM personnel assisted in the settlement of immigrant workers, their absorption into the local labor market and their reunification with their family members.

Furthermore, a set of interrelated pilot projects designed to increase the absorptive capacity of immigration countries were promoted in 1958 and

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[13] "Migration Services Programme. Report of the Director," Third Session of the Council of the ICEM, MC/154, September 20, 1955, pp. 23–24, NARA, Washington D.C.

[14] See the two joint ICEM/ILO missions in Latin America in 1956 and 1959: "Joint Project Mission with ILO. Study on professional qualifications for migrants," IGO 022-7, AILO, Geneva; "Pilot Project No. 7. Experiments in Vocational Training Centers for Migrants in Latin America," MC/EX/83, March 5, 1959, AILO, Geneva.

1959.[15] Despite the ICEM's budget deficit in the late 1950s, some of these projects were actually implemented, e.g. the establishment of the international *Training Center for Migrants* in Salerno in 1960, the organization of training courses for immigration and placement officers in Canada and the creation of a Farm Training and Placement Center in Argentina. The purpose of all these "technical assistance services" was to provide governments, for a temporary demonstration period and upon request, with the necessary expertise to enable them to prepare and incorporate permanent training and placement programs into their administrative apparatus.

During the 1950s, the Committee elaborated and presented several *classification systems* of its services in an effort to rationalize its activities, those successfully concluded as well as those projected, and to promote them to member governments. By facilitating understanding of its procedures, the ICEM attempted to convince delegates of member states of the significance of its migration services and of its competence to operate them. A more rigid classification of the ICEM's operational activities was formulated at the end of the decade on the basis of principles established by a special working group composed of five member states: Australia, Brazil, Italy, the Netherlands and the United States.[16] This working group distinguished between migration services by applying several methods of classification, according to whether they were essential for current operations or for future movements, whether they were permanent or temporary, and whether they lay under the responsibility of the ICEM or of the governments concerned. The difficulty of the classification process stemmed from the fact that migration demanded several complicated and interrelated services, some of which were carried out exclusively by the Committee and some by member states individually. Certain governments had been engaged in programs of planned migration for many years and had established the

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[15] For more information, see: "Pilot projects to increase the absorptive capacity of immigration countries," Eighth Session of the Council of the ICEM, MC/EX/66, April 16, 1958, NARA, Washington D.C.; "Pilot Projects: Further Proposals of the Director," 12th Session of the Executive Committee, MC/EX/83, February 26, 1959, NARA, Washington D.C.

[16] "The Classification of the Operational Activities of ICEM other than Transport," Tenth Session of the Executive Committee, MC/EX/67, April 24, 1958, NARA, Washington D.C. See also "International Operations and Technical Assistance Services. Report of the Director," Thirteenth Session of the Council, MC/EX/420, October 17, 1960, NARA, Washington D.C.

necessary machinery for this purpose, whereas other countries—sending and receiving alike—had not done so. Therefore, the Committee had to provide different kinds of technical assistance to each country and for different durations.

The fluidity of the vocabulary used, the ever-increasing criteria proposed for the organization and the differentiation of the ICEM's services derived mainly from the fact that during the 1950s the organization was actually still experimenting with a series of procedures. In its effort to expand into new areas, to respond to fluctuating needs and attract contributions from its member states, the organization deliberately avoided the creation of a limiting and precise definition of migration services. On the contrary, it tried to identify them through a variety of generic terms or descriptive titles,[17] constantly open to the inclusion of more categories and new types of activities.[18]

The ICEM as an International Organization: Administrative Structure

The ICEM's approaches, structure and rules were influenced to a large extent by the trajectory of (a) its predecessor international organizations, such as UNRRA and the IRO; (b) organizations created before the ICEM that continued to function, such as the UN and the ILO, and (c) by the almost simultaneously established agency, the UNHCR. UNRRA, integrated into the United Nations system in 1945, had operated not only in Western Europe, but also in the Soviet Union, in Eastern Europe and in Asia. It proved to be a costly organization that, according to the dominant view, had not promoted United States interests sufficiently, even though it was largely financed by the latter. While the IRO, a provisional agency in which communist countries did not participate, was considered efficient and successful, it was also perceived as costly. During the early Cold War period, the United Nations provided many states and other international agencies with theories and ideas regarding plausible "solutions"

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[17] See the discussion with regard to the definition of migration services in "Third Report of the Working Group," Tenth Session of the Executive Committee, MC/EX/63, March 4, 1958, NARA, Washington D.C.

[18] For more information on the classification proposed in 1958: "The classification of the operational activities of ICEM other than transport," Tenth Session of the Executive Committee, MC/EX/67, April 24, 1958, NARA, Washington D.C.

to a broad range of global "problems." It was instrumental in the construction of mainstream concepts and approaches to demographic, economic and social issues, such as "surplus population," "economic development" etc. The ILO, in its turn, had long-standing experience in dealing with migrants' rights, with the issue of international standardization of skills and with workers' vocational training. The UNHCR had been mandated by the United Nations General Assembly with the legal protection of refugees.

The approaches and concepts that the officials of these organizations adopted as well as the procedural patterns or practices they had established, served as the blueprint or the negative example for the organizational structure and the operational activities of the ICEM. For example, the IRO had tried to match refugees' skills to the labor needs of receiving countries using a methodology that would later be adopted by the ICEM. Regarding medical examinations, the ICEM adopted the criteria and the procedures that the ILO had standardized even before the creation of the Committee.[19] The ICEM was to be a small, flexible and economic organization of the Western world in contrast to UNRRA and so on. Finally, the ICEM was to be the UNHCR's operational, United States-controlled counterpart, mandated to transfer European refugees and migrants overseas.

The formal organizational structure and decision-making processes of the ICEM were determined by its Constitution. These constitutive rules, norms and procedures, designed within the specific context of the international and organizational environment of the early Cold War period, bear the mark of this era and reflect specific interests and priorities of the state that instigated them. The ICEM's features were determined by the overwhelming military, political and economic power of the United States and its hegemony in the Western world in the early 1950s, as well as by the dependence of both European and overseas states on United States economic and military support, particularly within the Cold War conflict.

Nevertheless, it seems that during the initial discussions around "the question of further intergovernmental study of the [migration] problem," the

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[19] For more, see International Labour Organization, "Report of the Committee on Medical Selection of Migrants," Migration Conference, Naples, October 1951, C.Mig/I/05/1951, AILO, Geneva.

United States government had not yet reached a clear position. The Report on the Naples Conference drafted by the United States delegation mentioned that the "conclusions of the Conference objectively viewed suggest that "there is no need for an international migration organization with operating functions."[20] Less than two months later, however, the United States delegation to the Brussels Migration Conference had prepared and submitted a "Revised Draft Resolution to Establish a Provisional Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe" to the Plenary Session. Through this draft the United States government recognized that "provisional intergovernmental arrangements are necessary in order to move persons who support the principles of *democracy* in which the governments of the *free world* subscribe and who desire to migrate to overseas countries where their services can be utilized under acceptable international standards of employment and living conditions."[21] Moreover, the United States had also prepared "a plan to facilitate the movement of surplus populations from countries of Western Europe and Greece to countries affording resettlement opportunities overseas,"[22] where issues, such as objectives, organizational arrangements, proposals for operations during the year, means of financing etc. were tackled in some detail. It seems that the changing and contradictory dynamics that often govern states' positions were quickly surmounted in this case, leading the United States government to overcome doubts and hesitations and to ask Belgium to organize the Brussels Conference. There is no doubt that the United States took the initiative to establish the PICMME/ICEM and prescribed its main characteristics as an operational organization specialized in migration.

If the United States initially had doubts about the necessity of a new agency specialized in migration issues, it had no second thoughts about the creation

[20] "Report on Naples Migration Conference," October 23, 1951, p. 5, NARA, Washington D.C. (emphasis added).

[21] Delegation of the United States of America, "Revised Draft Resolution to Establish a Provisional Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe," MCB/2/Rev.1, November 24, 1951, p. 1, AILO, Geneva (emphasis added).

[22] "A Plan to facilitate the movement of surplus populations from countries of Western Europe and Greece to countries affording resettlement opportunities overseas (Submitted by the United States Delegation)," Brussels Migration Conference, MCB/3, November 24, 1951, NARA, Washington D.C.

of a multilateral institution deliberately outside the limits and scope of the United Nations machinery (Loescherm, 2001; Carrete & Gasper, 2010; Orchard, 2014). The sole criterion for the selection of potential partners in this endeavor, besides an interest in migration, was that of political regime: Membership of the new agency was open exclusively to countries of the "free world." In fact, the ICEM was designed to be an organization of the Western world, excluding from its membership both Eastern Bloc and developing countries, with the exception of those of Latin America.

In most cases, formal decisions were made within the complex—or maybe extremely simple—framework of interactions between ICEM officials and delegates of member states occurring in various settings within the organizational structure of the Committee. To be more precise, following the blueprint of other post–Second World War international organizations, the established organs of the Committee which were fully-operational following its Eighth Session in November–December 1954, were three: a) the Council, (b) the Executive Committee, (c) the Administration.

The Decision-Making Organs of the Committee

During the first decade of its existence, member governments played the paramount role in outlining the Committee's priorities and in designing its policies and projects. Formal decisions were essentially taken within organs and other instances where member governments had a decisive role. Nevertheless, many important decisions were shaped in informal meetings and communications between representatives of member states, before being approved by the official organs of the Committee. This kind of functioning appeared from the very first steps of the Committee, even during the Brussels Conference, where the director's powers were vested provisionally in George Warren and Franz Leemans, counselor to the Belgian Government (Murdock, 1983). As the *New York Times* commented, "it is understood that the heads of the delegations, at a secret meeting [...] unanimously decided that the director should be a United States citizen and left it to Mr. Warren to find the right person."[23] But even

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[23] "2 Directors Named by Migration Unit; But New Committee Leaves It Up to U.S.

before this "secret meeting," the nomination of the first director general of the PICMME had undergone several fluctuations within the United States government and Congress, reflecting not only potential differences between the United States and other—namely European—member states of the Committee, but also serious internal, i.e. congressional, differences:

> The United States, which is providing $10,000,000 of the new agency's initial annual budget of $37,000,000, received authority from the member governments at their recent conference to name a director at the forthcoming Geneva meeting. Ticklish domestic problems, however, have held up the State Department decision and, as a result, Mr. Warren departed for the "nominating convention" without a candidate. [...] It is widely conceded that J. Donald Kingsley, director general of the refugee organization [IRO], would be the candidate most agreeable to the member nations. [...] During that conference [Brussels] the State Department informed Mr. Warren it would be inadvisable to offer Mr. Kingsley's name because of "practical reasons arising from uncertainties over Congressional differences." The fact that the State Department has not nominated Mr. Kingsley was attributed partly to the opposition to him expressed by Senator Pat McCarran, Democrat of Nevada, chairman of the Senate appropriations subcommittee that would handle fund request for the committee, and chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, which handles immigration legislation.[24]

Democratic Representative Francis Walter of Pennsylvania, another leading figure in the United States domestic policy, proposed the United States Commissioner for Württemberg-Baden in Germany, General Charles Gross. This proposition was not taken up because, as an active member of the armed forces, he would constitute a potential focus for "communist propaganda."[25]

The State Department proceeded to other suggestions, such as Robert J. Corkery, then European Director of the United States Displaced Persons Commission, who had previously served as an administrator of the UNRRA

Delegate to Pick American as Leader," *The New York Times*, December 9, 1951.

[24] "US Delays Choice of Migrant Chief. Delegate leaves for Geneva Talks without final word on naming of Kingsley," *The New York Times*, February 5, 1952.

[25] And also because of the opposition of West Germany, since he was an occupational officer there. (Ibid.).

refugee and Displaced Persons program in the United States zone of Austria and, later, as an adviser of the United States refugee program within the IRO.[26] However, despite his experience in refugee affairs, Corkery was finally not nominated since his appointment would have entailed his previous superior as the Deputy Director of IRO, Pierre Jacobsen, becoming his subordinate.[27] Hugh Gibson, notwithstanding his age and bad health, was eventually imposed by the United States government to lead the PICMME, on the basis of his experience in humanitarian relief and his knowledge of Latin America; a continent that, according to the United States, should absorb a considerable percentage of Europe's surplus population.[28]

The complexities described above are revealing of both the imbalance of power between member states of the Committee, stemming from the preponderant role of the United States in its creation and funding, and of divergent views amongst United States political stakeholders. Both these elements played a fundamental role in setting up the ICEM's administrative machinery. Soon, powerful states within the Committee started to build alliances, such as the "Big Four," comprising Australia, Canada and the Netherlands, in addition to the United States. This group of governments, or more accurately of government representatives, i.e. Warren G. Warren for the United States, Tasman Hudson Eastwood Heyes for Australia, Colonel L. Fortier for Canada and B. Haveman for the Netherlands, often held private meetings, where several financial and political issues related to the activities of the Committee were discussed.[29]

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[26] "Emigration from Europe," Memorandum No. 646/52, April 29, 1952, NAA, Canberra; "Mr. Corkery's CV," Second Session of the PICMME, April 10, 1952, NARA, Washington D.C.

[27] "Candidates for the position of ICEM's Director. Placement of Jacobsen as Deputy Director," O.3036, February 29, 1952, NAA, Canberra.

[28] «Τρίτη Σύνοδος ΔΕΜΕ στην Ουάσινγκτον»/"Third Session of the ICEM in Washington," Report of Athanassios Politis, ΙΑΥΕ, Φ.Κ.Υπ. 1952 71.8, Sections 1, June 1952, AGMFA, Athens.

[29] See the example of informal meetings held during the Eighth Session of the Council of the ICEM between the delegates of these countries, where "pilot projects" in Latin America, financial and administrative issues were discussed in detail. For more, see "ICEM, Eighth Session, Geneva, May, 1958," Personal and Confidential letter of G.C. Watson to T.H.E. Heyes, May 19, 1958, NAA, Canberra.

This complex continuum of national strategies and *ad hoc* alliances constituted the substratum of the formal governing structure of the Committee. The Council was the main governing body of the ICEM which brought together the representatives of all member states twice per year, each entitled to one vote, in order to determine the ICEM policy, and review and approve the budget and the activities of the Executive Committee and the Director. The Council was responsible for admitting or suspending member states according to the provisions of the Constitution.[30] The Executive Committee, elected by the Council for one year was comprised of representatives of nine member governments. Its main task was to prepare the sessions and make recommendations to the Council by reporting on financial and budgetary issues, on annual and special reports of the director and on any other matter referred to it by the Council.[31]

Assistance to the constitutionally appointed organs of the Committee was provided by a number of subcommittees. These subcommittees were designed to provide fast and flexible responses to specific issues and were of two types, according to the nature of the issues they were called upon to address: *ad hoc* or *permanent*. Ad hoc subcommittees dealt with one-off issues, such as the *Ad Hoc Subcommittee on the Constitution*, which was charged with the task of coordinating the consultation and drafting of the Constitution of the ICEM. Another example was the *Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Draft Rules and Regulations*. Appointed in October 1953 and composed of the representatives who participated in the *Ad Hoc Subcommittee on the Constitution*, this subcommittee drafted and presented the Draft Rules of Procedure for the Council and for the Executive Committee. It also worked on the Draft Financial Regulations and the Draft Permanent Staff Regulations and examined the possibility for the establishment of an *Advisory Committee on International and National Organizations*.[32] The latter was in fact established by the Council, in April

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[30] "Rules of Procedure for the Council," First Session of the Council of the ICEM, MC/103, December 8, 1954, NARA, Washington D.C.

[31] See "Rules of Procedure for the Executive Committee," First Session of the Executive Committee of the ICEM, MC/EX/4, December 30, 1954, NARA, Washington D.C.

[32] For more information, see: "Report of the Ad Hoc Sub-Committee on Draft Rules and Regulations," Seventh Session of the ICEM, MC/72, April 27, 1954, NARA, Washington D.C.

1954, in order to "establish closer working relations between the ICEM and the international organizations of workers and employers who believe in the free movement of persons and other basic principles of the ICEM."[33]

In contrast, the permanent subcommittees dealt with issues of major importance for the ICEM, such as *transport* and *finance*. The resolution adopted at the Brussels Migration Conference described the main issue that led to the creation of the Committee:

> Although the movement of migrants should as far as possible be effected by the normal commercial shipping and air transport services, co-ordination in this field is necessary in order to enable the movement of the largest possible number of migrants by those services, and furthermore to ensure that the IRO's present shipping facilities are applied to the extent necessary to secure an additional movement of migrants.[34]

In this spirit, the Working Party on Shipping (set up during the Brussels Conference, and comprising shipping experts from the delegations of France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, the United States as well as from the IRO and the *Organization for European Economic Co-operation* [OEEC]), and immigration specialists from Australia, Canada and Norway, formulated specific suggestions regarding the question of transport of refugees and migrants. It recommended the establishment of an intergovernmental shipping group, under the auspices of the Committee and consisting of representatives of governments who would meet with representatives of commercial shipping interests, when necessary, to ensure their cooperation and liaison. This arrangement would enhance efficiency in the utilization of available space and would reduce costs by eliminating the need for an extensive liaison staff.[35]

Thus, at the Second Session of the PICMME, the *Intergovernmental Subcommittee for the Coordination of Transport* was established[36] in order: (a) to

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[33] "Draft Resolution on the Establishment of an Advisory Committee on International and National Organizations," Seventh Session of the ICEM, MC/77, April 28, 1954, NARA, Washington D.C.

[34] "Resolution to establish a Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe [...]," op. cit.

[35] "Report of Working Party of Experts on Shipping," Brussels Migration Conference, MCB/7, November 30, 1951, p. 3, NARA, Washington D.C.

[36] "Intergovernmental Subcommittee on the Co-ordination of Transport. Note by the Sec-

ensure that the movement of migrants would, as far as possible, be effected by the normal commercial and government-sponsored services; (b) to investigate all the obstacles which tended to prevent or delay the movement of migrants through these services; (c) to advise on the steps to be taken to deal with movements which could not be handled by such services, such as the employment of specialized vessels as they became available from IRO charter; and (d) to study the standards of migrants' accommodation on the IRO chartered vessels and recommend necessary improvements in order for them to meet the requirements of the countries they left and those of their destination.[37] Composed of representatives of eight or nine alternating member states and meeting at least once every three months at ICEM Headquarters, the Subcommittee for the Coordination of Transport continued to address transportation issues, the ICEM's main *raison d'être*.[38]

The other central issue was undoubtedly that of funding. With the sustainability of the Committee in mind, the United States, its principal funder, submitted in June 1952 a Draft Resolution for the Establishment of a Subcommittee on Finance,[39] which was adopted at the Third Session of the PICMME held in Washington D.C. According to this, the Subcommittee of Finance, composed of representatives of Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and the United States, would meet before each session of the Committee in order: (a) to study all budgetary and financial questions and to transmit its recommendations thereon to the Committee; (b) to advise the director on budgetary and financial matters, and, (c) to take decisions on behalf of the Committee, if it could not convene, in case of emergency.[40]

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retariat," Second Session of the PICMME, PIC/23, January 28, 1952, NARA, Washington D.C.

[37] "Memorandum on the Formation of an Intergovernmental Subcommittee for the Coordination of Transport (Submitted by the Working Party of Experts on Shipping, established by the Migration Conference)," First Session of the PICMME, PIC/5, December 6, 1951, p. 2, NARA, Washington D.C.

[38] For more information on the activities of the Subcommittee during the 1950s, see the "Reports of the Subcommittee on the Co-ordination of Transport," MC/15, MC/99, MC/180, MC/206, MC/288, MC/322, MC/427, MC/464, NARA, Washington D.C.

[39] "Draft Resolution on the establishment of a Subcommittee on Finance (Submitted by the United States Delegation for consideration under item 9 of the Agenda)," Third Session of the PICMME, PIC/58, June 12, 1952, NARA, Washington D.C.

[40] Such decisions were to be submitted to the Committee at its following session for

When the organizational structure of the ICEM assumed its definitive form, the functions of the Subcommittee on Finance were handed to the Executive Committee. Nevertheless, within less than a decade, it became clear that "the difficulties which ICEM [had to] face every year in its operational budget and the great importance of financial questions within the framework of the Committee's activity, suggest[ed] that new arrangements be agreed upon in order to allow the Committee to act more easily and, consequently, with greater efficiency."[41] In this spirit, after a proposal submitted by the Italian delegation, and accepted by the Council in 1960, a new *Subcommittee on Budget and Finance* was set up, composed of representatives of five member states, elected annually, with enhanced competency on financial matters regarding both the administrative and the operational budget.[42]

The Administration

The third pillar of the ICEM's structure, the Administration, mainly implemented the policy which was designed by the other two organs, i.e. the Executive Committee and the Council. In 1955, according to a plan presented by director Hugh Gibson in November 1954, an updated organizational structure and staffing plan of the Administration came into effect with the aim to "restore order and logicality to a system that had gradually grown up out of day-to-day practice" and to "endow the Administration with maximum efficiency at minimum cost".[43] Having this objective in mind, the Headquarters

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approval. See "Resolution No. 22: Resolution of the establishment of a Subcommittee on Finance (Adopted at the 23rd Meeting, on 12 June 1952)," in "Resolutions Adopted at the Third Session (Nov. 20–28)," June 14, 1952, NARA, Washington D.C.

[41] See the Italian proposal submitted in the 15th Session of the Executive Committee, in April–May 1960; "Letter of G. Borga to R. E. Armstrong," March 22, 1960, which encloses a copy of the document, NAA, Canberra.

[42] "Revised Resolution No. 212 (XII) on the Establishment of a Sub-Committee on Budget and Finance, adopted by the Council at its 115th meeting on May 13, 1960 and revised at its 122nd meeting on 6 December 1960)," Thirteenth Session of ICEM Council, MC/407/Rev.1, 6/12/1960; and "Sub-Committee on Budget and Finance: Amended terms of reference," Fourteenth Session of ICEM Council, MC/407/Rev.1/Add.1, June 7, 1961, NARA, Washington D.C.

[43] "Information Paper on the Organization and Staff Structure of the Administration," Eighth Session of the ICEM, MC/INF/16, November 26, 1954, p. 1, NARA, Washington D.C.

were organized through the allocation of functions between five departments: Operations, Plans & Liaison, Shipping, Finance, Budget & Administration.

All Headquarters' departments were subject to the authority of the Director and somehow—even if not clearly—reflected the priorities and the objectives of the ICEM. Thus, the department of *Operations* was divided into four parts: Medical Services, Statistical and Analytical Services, Migration and Voluntary Agencies (comprised of the United States Section and the Voluntary Agencies Section), and Programs (comprised of the Commonwealth, Latin America and Migration Services Sections). The very structure of this department demonstrates that ICEM operations were organized according to geographical, institutional and thematic criteria, whereas Migration Services—considered to be the main tool for the successful movement and integration of migrants into receiving societies—were 'squeezed' into one subsection.

The structure of the department of *Plans and Liaison* demonstrates the significance that the ICEM accorded to the question of matching the aspects of the twofold problem that allegedly hindered global development: "overpopulation" in Europe and "shortage of labor" in Commonwealth countries and Latin America. A specific Land Settlement Section, along with a Research and Liaison Section, and the Conference Secretariat formed the department. The Department of *Shipping* was organized according to a combination of two types of criteria: geographical and means/methods of transport. Therefore, it was divided into the following four sections: the Atlantic and Military Sea Transportation Service Section, the Australia Section, the Latin America and Individual Bookings Section, and the Air Charter Section.

The Department of Finance was divided into three services: Internal Audit, Finance and Accounts Services. Finance services included Banking, Contribution and Payment authorization sections; Accounts had the General Accounts and the Field Accounts Sections. The Department of Budget and Administration included Legal Services, Budget and Administration. Budget services were divided into the Operational and the Administrative Section, while the Administration included Personnel, Office Services and Translation Sections. A reorganization of the Administration that occurred in the late 1950s concerned only the last two departments, which were modified as follows: Budget and Finance were merged into one department, which included the Budget,

Accounts and Finance Sections, while the Personnel and Administrative Services became a separate department with three Sections: Personnel and Management, General Services and Translation Services.

The ICEM Administration was built on three main pillars: the director, the deputy director and the staff. Both the director and the deputy director were appointed by a two-thirds majority vote of the Council and served under contract. Already at the First Session of the PICMME, the representatives of member states agreed upon the duties and competencies of the director to be as follows: (a) He[44] would be the chief administrative officer of the Committee. (b) He would be elected by the Committee and would serve under a contract that would stipulate his salary, allowances and other conditions of service. (c) He would be responsible solely to the Committee and would carry out its administrative and executive functions in accordance with the Committee's policies and regulations. (d) He would have authority to appoint staff in accordance with staff rules and regulations that he would promulgate subject to Committee approval. (e) He would have the power to delegate appropriate powers and authority to members of his staff; contract for and undertake obligations; enter into agreements with governments and international, intergovernmental or non-governmental organizations in order to carry out the objectives of the Committee; institute legal proceedings; perform any legal act delegated to him by the Committee; receive and disburse public and private funds; establish offices as necessary; attend or otherwise participate in international and other conferences dealing with matters of interest to the Committee. (f) He should submit financial, operational and other reports to the Committee, in such forms and at such times it may direct.[45]

As far as the staff is concerned, the framework of rights and duties was outlined within the staff rules and regulations. The PICMME, in February

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[44] We keep the gender used in the official text, since it is clear that in the minds of the delegates there was no probability for a woman to become director. In fact, the history of the IOM did not prove the founders of the organization to be wrong, since to date no woman has become Director General; from 1994 onwards, however, the position of the Deputy Director General has been held by women, namely by Narcisa L. Escaler from the Philippines (1994–1999), Ndioro Ndiaye from Senegal (1999–2009) and Laura Thompson for Costa Rica (2009–today).

[45] "Terms of reference of the Director," First Session of the PICMME, PIC/8/Rev.2, December 14, 1951, NARA, Washington D.C.

1952, adopted staff regulations that designated its staff as having the status of international civil servants.[46] In the following sessions of the PICMME/ICEM, staff regulations were discussed: Thus, specific staff regulations for officials were adopted in October 1952[47] and amended in following sessions,[48] while staff regulations *specifically* for the employees of the ICEM, which became an issue of negotiation from 1954[49] were finally adopted in November 1955.[50]

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[46] "Staff Regulations Covering the Staff having the Status of International Civil Servants," Second Session of the PICMME, PIC/24/Rev.2, February 26, 1952, NARA, Washington D.C.

[47] "Staff Regulations for Officials (As adopted by the Committee at its Fourth Session in accordance with Resolution No. 37)," Fourth Session of the PICMME, PIC/103, October 23, 1952, NARA, Washington D.C.

[48] See "Permanent Staff Regulations. Report of the Director," Fifth Session of the ICEM, MC/5, February 17, 1953, NARA, Washington D.C.; "Draft Permanent Staff Regulations: Comments received from Member Governments (Revised Compilation)," Seventh Session of the ICEM, MC/W/24/Rev.1, April 13, 1954, NARA, Washington D.C.; "Draft Permanent Staff Regulations (Revised Suggested Texts)," Seventh Session of the ICEM, MC/W/31, April 21, 1954, NARA, Washington D.C.; "Draft Staff Regulations for Officials: Suggested text for Chapter 3," Eighth Session of the ICEM, MC/W/36, November 23, 1954, NARA, Washington D.C.; "Staff Regulations for Officials. Adopted at the First Session of the Council in accordance with Resolution No. 83 (I)," First Session of the Council of the ICEM, MC/104, December 6, 1954, NARA, Washington D.C.; "Resolution No. 152 (VII): Amendment to the Staff Regulations for Officials (Adopted by the Council at its 59th meeting on 9 October 1957)," Seventh Session of the Council of the ICEM, MC/269, October 15, 1957, NARA, Washington D.C. See "Permanent Staff Regulations. Report of the Director," Fifth Session of the ICEM, MC/5, 17/02/1953; "Draft Permanent Staff Regulations: Comments Received from Member Governments" (Revised Compilation)," Seventh Session of the ICEM, MC/W/24/Rev.1, (April 13, /04/1954); "Draft Permanent Staff Regulations" (Revised Suggested Texts)," Seventh Session of the ICEM, MC/W/31, April 21, 1954; "Draft Staff Regulations for Officials: Suggested text for Chapter 3", Eighth Session of the ICEM, MC/W/36, (November 23, 1954); "Staff Regulations for Officials." (Adopted at the First Session of the Council in accordance with Resolution No. 83 [I], First Session of the Council of the ICEM, MC/104, December 6, 1954; "Resolution No. 152 (VII): Amendment to the Staff Regulations for Officials" (Adopted by the Council at its 59th meeting on 9 October 1957)," Seventh Session of the Council of the ICEM, MC/269. October, 15, 1957, NARA, Washington D.C.

[49] See "Proposed Staff Regulations for Employees," Seventh Session of the ICEM, MC/W/28, April 9, 1954, NARA, Washington D.C.; "Proposed amendments to the Draft Staff Regulations for Employees (submitted by the Delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany for consideration under item 7 of the agenda of the Executive Committee)," Second Session of the Council of the ICEM, MC/L/21, April 23, 1955, NARA, Washington D.C.; "Draft Staff Regulations for Employees: First Revised Text," Second Session of the Executive Committee of the ICEM, MC/EX/6/Rev.1, June 23, 1955, NARA, Washington D.C.; "Draft Staff Regulations for Employees: Counter-proposals submitted by the French Government," Third Session of the Executive

According to their preamble, "Staff Regulations embody the fundamental conditions of services and the basic rights, duties and obligations of employees of the ICEM who are the personnel employed by the Committee to carry out clerical and manual work."[51] These regulations were also applied in the case of local offices.[52] Staff regulations governed a series of questions regarding officials and employees, such as recruitment and termination of service, leave, appeals, pensions, contracts, probation, salaries and allowances, promotion, medical examination, gainful employment, adjudication of appeals. Employees were contracted under regular or special contracts, the former being an indefinite appointment and the latter having a predetermined time limitation. The director had the responsibility to settle disputes between employees and the Administration. A Joint Administrative Review Board was established in order to advise the director; an Appeal Board was also set up in order to adjudicate cases unresolved by the director, applying the ICEM's internal administrative law.

The activities and the goals of the ICEM were implemented by the organs and the administration based in Geneva, but also through local missions in various countries. By 1962, there were liaison missions, offices or representatives in several cities in eighteen of its member countries: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Brazil, Chile, Belgium, Colombia, Germany, Greece, Italy, Paraguay, Hong Kong, USA, Norway, Paraguay, Uruguay, South Africa, Spain and Venezuela.[53] Operational rules and staff regulations were common to headquarters and local missions.

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Committee of the ICEM, MC/EX/17, September 20, 1955, NARA, Washington D.C.; "Draft Staff Regulations for Employees: First Revised Text and comments of Governments thereon," Third Session of the Executive Committee of the ICEM, MC/EX/16, September 22, 1955, NARA, Washington D.C.

[50] "Staff Regulations for Employees (Adopted at the Third Session of the Council in accordance with Resolution No. 111 [III])," Third Session of the Council of the ICEM, MC/161/Rev.1, November 1, 1955, NARA, Washington D.C.

[51] Ibid., p.1

[52] For example, see "Staff regulations for the employees at the Office in Greece," March 1961, IOM-GR, Athens.

[53] "Ten years of ICEM," leaflet published by the ICEM, 1962, IOMCH, Geneva.

The ICEM Staff: National or International Civil Servants?

The Administration, according to the ICEM Constitution, should be independent from any influence exerted by member states,[54] and member states should refrain from any action which might reflect on the position of the Committee's staff as international officials. Moreover, "efficiency, competence and integrity [should] be the necessary consideration in the recruitment and employment of the staff which, except in special circumstances, [should] be recruited among the nationals of countries whose Governments are Members of the Committee, taking into account, as far as possible, their geographical distribution."[55]

Despite this alleged insistence on neutrality, efficiency and even national and geographic distribution of the staff, which aimed at enhancing the authority of the Committee by creating an image of expertise, rationality and impartiality, the ICEM was in fact a highly politicized organization led by the United States.[56] As we mentioned above, when it came to the choice of its Director, member states accepted that he would be a United States citizen proposed by the American government. The United States in their turn accepted that the European Pierre Jacobsen, who had been in charge of the IRO's Resettlement Office, would become the Deputy Director of the ICEM.

When Gibson died, Jacobsen was proposed by France, Germany, Italy and Greece as the new director of the ICEM.[57] During discussions between the United States officials of the Department of State, Jacobsen candidature was rejected:

> [George Warren noted that] the Department thought it wise to propose an American as Director who might enjoy the confidence of the US Congress as well as that of the other governments.[58]

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[54] "ICEM Constitution," op. cit., article 18.

[55] Ibid., article 18, paragraph 3.

[56] The data at our disposal on the Committee's staff recruiting procedures and its staff being rare, we can only say that the first members of its staff were recruited from the IRO with its dissolution.

[57] «Απόδημος Ελληνισμός. Μεταναστευτικά Ζητήματα. ΔΕΜΕ και άλλοι Οργανισμοί»/ "Greeks abroad. Migration issues. ICEM and other Organizations," Letter of Hadjivasileiou to GMFA, IAYE, Φ.Κ. Υπ. 1955 2.1., January 3, 1955, AGMFA, Athens.

[58] Department of State, "Election of a Director of the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM)," Memorandum of Conversation between Mr. Phedon A.

Among several candidates, Harold H. Tittman, the favorite of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, was, according to the Greek ambassador in Washington, imposed as Director.[59] Tittman was a career diplomat but, in contrast to Gibson, he lacked experience in humanitarian or refugee issues.[60] As a result, during his tenure as Director, Jacobsen continued to actually be in charge of operations.

In the early 1950s there was a prevalent double fear in Washington that Soviet agents had infiltrated the United States administration and that refugees and migrants, suspected of serving communist powers and subversive aims, constituted a potential threat to national security. The monitoring of personnel working in international organizations and the screening of prospective immigrants became, therefore, primary United States concerns.[61] References to direct transfers from the State Department to the ICEM concur with the view that the former tried to interfere in the Committee's affairs by using the assigned quotas of American employees, a recurrent method of powerful states to influence decision-making processes. Thus, at the peak of the Hungarian refugee crisis, Gregory Esgate, chief of the ICEM mission in Vienna, who had previously served with UNRRA and the IRO, was notified that he would be transferred to another post and replaced by an officer appointed by the State Department, against the wish of the Austrian government.[62] Some assumed

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Cavalierato, Counselor, Greek Embassy and Mr. George L. Warren, SCA, February 2, 1955, NARA, Washington D.C.

[59] «Απόδημος Ελληνισμός. Μεταναστευτικά Ζητήματα. ΔΕΜΕ και άλλοι Οργανισμοί»/ "Greeks abroad. Migration issues. ICEM and other Organizations," Letter of Hadjivasileiou to GMFA, IAYE, Φ. Κ. Υπ. 1955 2.1., Sections 2, Section 1. April 4, 1955, AGMFA, Athens.

[60] The United States underlined, as in Gibson's case, that "because of his many years of service in Europe and Latin America he had acquired an understanding of the economic and political problems of those two areas, which are of primary interest to the Intergovernmental Committee." The United States administration continued to consider Latin America as the priority area of Displaced Persons' resettlement, although this did not prove to be the case during the previous years. For more information: "US government's press release of March 19, 1955" and "Memorandum of the US High Commissioner in Germany," February 25, 1955, NARA, Washington D.C.

[61] *The New York Times*, February 7, 1952.

[62] During one of the more tenuous periods of the Cold War this event could be problematic. The Austrian government was concerned that a direct appointment would jeopardize their claim to the Soviets that the ICEM staff was "independent of national control."

that the United States government wanted to "recall 'undesirable' Americans holding executive positions in international organizations and replace them with regular Foreign Service Officers" in order to exert greater control.[63] Esgate considered himself as a member of an "International Civil Service" and therefore believed that his removal undermined "the whole concept of valid internationalism". Although the United States government denied any role in his replacement, a memorandum did mention that "many of the employees transferred from predecessor organizations, have lost contact with their home countries and governments by extended absences abroad."[64] Similar concerns were expressed by Australian officials who complained that their permanent Delegate to the European Office of the UN and to the ICEM "has been partly won round to ICEM's way of thinking".[65]

Nevertheless, during the Tittman period (1955–1958), the ICEM's staff slowly started to resist United States intervention in the internal affairs of the Committee. ICEM employees expressed their displeasure that appointment to certain positions was related to nationality and not to merit and pointed out the inconsistency between the intervention of their home countries and their obligations as international civil servants, leading a significant number of employees to resign. In 1956 alone, 21 out of 124 had resigned, a number that amounts to 17 percent of the ICEM's staff.[66]

Insecurity due to the temporary nature of the ICEM and dissatisfaction with their working conditions, had led several employees to resign even before 1956. Those with long-term experience and considerable skills in the field moved to other international organizations. In a 1957 memorandum, the ICEM Staff Association declared their belief "that ICEM staff members are no less qualified, no less efficient and no less devoted than their colleagues in other international agencies. They should therefore receive the same conditions of

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[63] "Esgate's report," October 20, 1956 and "Assignment of Foreign Service Officers to Replace Other Americans on International Organizations," November 8, 1956, NARA, Washington D.C.

[64] "Gregory Esgate, chief of Mission in Austria," November 3, 1956, NARA, Washington D.C.

[65] "Report of the Australian Delegation to the Second Session of the Council," NAA, Canberra.

[66] "Esgate's report," op. cit.

service, modified only in the direction of further compensating for the insecurity of service with ICEM."[67] The Committee's functionaries specifically claimed that member states should accord them all the privileges of "international civil servants," since, according to the staff regulations, they were recognized as such. Their claim was based on their "qualifications, efficiency and devotion," equivalent to those of other international agencies' staff. Although the employees had complained in the past about specific staff regulations, it was the first time, according to available sources, that ICEM employees manifested a sort of *esprit de corps* and officially demanded to be considered as a group with specific skills.

This technocratic vision that focused on expertise and efficiency was dominant within the international organizations of the period, both in the objectives and in the means to achieve them. This approach is eloquently described in a confidential memorandum exchanged between officials of the United States Department of State:

> ICEM is engaged in the highly technical, complicated and political operation of moving migrants. This involves particularly the successful development and administration of cooperative arrangements between governments of emigration and immigration. The interests of all member governments must be served impartially by the international organization. The technical services which ICEM supplies are still in an exploratory stage and must be developed with objective regard for the obligations which member governments should assume and for the gaps in service which may appropriately be supplied by an international organization.[68]

The highly political issue of migration, that had created so many international tensions after the Second World War , was approached as a technical question that could be dealt with impartially through correct management strategies implemented by people with the necessary expertise. Questions of power and interests were hidden under a technical type consensus.

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[67] "Memorandum from the Staff Association," Sixth Session of the Council of the ICEM, MC/227, March 19, 1957, NARA, Washington D.C.

[68] "Gregory Esgate, Chief of ICEM Mission in Austria," Confidential Memorandum of Loy Henderson to George Warren, November 13, 1956, NARA, Washington D.C.

The ICEM, other International Organizations and NGOs

From its establishment onwards, in common with most of the other agencies (former or contemporary) constituting the international machinery set up to deal with social and economic issues, the ICEM cooperated closely with other international agencies and with voluntary associations. It worked together with other stakeholders of various character and scope, national and international, (inter)governmental and non-governmental, that were involved in any way with migrants or refugees:[69] The United Nations, the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees, the International Labour Office, the Council of Europe, the Organization for European Economic Co-operation, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Confederation of Christian Trade Unions, the Conference of Non-Governmental Organizations interested in Migration, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions and the Standing Conference of Voluntary Agencies.[70] In the following years other organizations would be added to its network, such as the Food and Agriculture Organization, the United Nations Expanded Technical Assistance Program, the Economic Commission for Latin America, the World Health Organization, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, as well as financial institutions, such as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Export-Import Bank in Washington and the Italian Credit Institute for Labor Abroad.[71]

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[69] ICEM Constitution incorporated specific provisions on this matter: "the Committee [might] invite any international organization, governmental or non-governmental, concerned with migration or refugees to be represented at the meetings of the Council [...]. No representative of such an organization [should] have the right to vote." "ICEM Constitution," op. cit., article 27. Moreover, "the Committee [might] take over from any other international organization or agency the purposes and activities of which lie within the purpose of the Committee such activities, resources and obligations as [might] be determined by international agreement or by mutually acceptable arrangements entered into between the competent authorities of the respective organizations." Ibid., article 31.

[70] Report on the First Session of the Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe (Adopted during the Second Session at the Ninth Meeting on February 18, 1952), Brussels 6 December 1951 – 8 December 1951," Second Session of the PICMME, PIC/22/Rev.1, February 20, 1952, pp. 1–2, NARA, Washington D.C.

[71] Financial institutions, such as these, were considered of great importance by ICEM officials and member states delegates. The establishment of an agricultural colony, for example,

To the same end, the ICEM systematically collaborated with NGOs, state-based or international and with religious organizations playing a very significant role in assisting refugees and migrants. The IRO had already established a fruitful cooperation with numerous NGOs.[72] Following this path, a Conference of Non-Governmental Organizations interested in Migration had been held at the European Office of the United Nations in March 1951. There, the representative of the Director-General of the ILO, Chester W. Hepler, had underlined the importance of NGOs in migration issues:

> Official measures to aid migrants, however well-conceived and applied, cannot always provide the personal contact with the migrant, the warm human interest in his particular problems, which the personnel of non-Governmental organizations can bring to their work. By their understanding and help, these people prevent many a prospective migrant from becoming discouraged and deciding against emigration, help many an immigrant to settle down happily in his new country and prevent unnecessary repatriation. In these and in other ways, non-Governmental organizations help to increase the flow of migration.[73]

Therefore, the ICEM followed the example of its predecessor and fellow organizations in establishing close relations with NGOs. Sharing the humanitarian, but also the financial aspect of the ICEM's work, NGOs participated

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required infrastructure and a series of interventions. For this reason, and because receiving countries could not solely bear the economic burden, the Director of the ICEM proposed a four-partite scheme of financing consisting in the establishment of a colonization company, with the following allocation of sources: 30 percent from the immigration country, 30 percent from the emigration country, 20 percent from the movement agency (in our case, the ICEM) and 20 percent from external sources, e.g. the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Export-Import Bank in Washington or the OEEC as far as European governments were concerned. For more information: "Technical Aid and International Financing for the Encouragement of Migratory Movements form Europe. Report of the Director submitted in accordance with Resolution No. 24," PIC/72, October 2, 1952, paragraphs 67–70, NARA, Washington D.C.

[72] For a full list, see "List of Voluntary Societies Assisting in IRO field Operations," GC/166, 1951, AILO, Geneva.

[73] "Introductory Statement to Conference of Non Governmental Organizations interested in Migration. By the representative of the Director General, International Labour Office, Chester W. Hepler, Chief Manpower Division, I.L.O., 6–22 March 1951," PM/39, March 15, 1951, AILO, Geneva.

wherever needed in arranging the resettlement of migrants in one continuous process from registration to placement. Following this logic, the Director held discussions from the beginning "with a number of the principal voluntary societies associated with the program of the Migration Committee."[74] The assistance of NGOs was considered especially necessary or valuable in diffusing information, in processing and documentation, as well as in the promotion and placement of migrants.[75]

In 1953, the ICEM and Voluntary agencies proceeded to a General Agreement, which was the basis of their working relationship henceforth.[76] This agreement, of course, was bound also by a financial aspect, determined by the Revolving Fund Agreements, established in 1952, in order "to secure a continuation of the joint IRO/agencies individual migration program which came to an end on 31 January 1952."[77] All in all, according to a "Report of the Voluntary Agencies/ICEM Working Group" submitted in 1959, "under the Revolving Fund Agreement, 101,635 migrants have been moved overseas from February 1952 through 1958. This represents 12 percent of the total ICEM movements; if to these figures are added the United States Escapee Program involving 84,000 and the fully reimbursable movements plus movements from the Far Eastern countries, as well as movements represented in the Special schemes mentioned above [special member-states' migration programs],[78] it is estimated that the Voluntary Agencies have been directly involved in at least 40 percent of the total number of cases moved by ICEM and partially involved in a higher percentage."[79]

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[74] "Technical Aid and International Financing for the Encouragement of Migratory Movements from Europe…," op. cit.

[75] Ibid., paragraph 56, p. 23.

[76] "Report of the Voluntary Agencies / ICEM Working Group," op. cit., Annexes B and C, including the suggested revision.

[77] Ibid., p. 9.

[78] Refers to the Resettlement of European Refugees from the Far East, the United States Displaced Persons Act, the United States Refugee Relief Act, the United States Public Law (pp. 85–316) and the United States Special Public Law (pp. 85–892). Ibid., p. 15.

[79] Ibid., p. 16.

NGOs, particularly religious ones,[80] in parallel with the specific, above-mentioned schemes promoted by the United States government, often dealt with specific cases, such as that of Greeks who fled Egypt after the consolidation of the Nasser regime and the nationalization of many industries (1957–1962).[81] In this and in other similar cases, refugees and migrants were moved overseas under ICEM auspices, namely through the Revolving Fund, the bulk of which was steered by the World Council of Churches.[82]

Continuities and Ruptures within the Post–Second World War International Order

Although it embodied ideas and efforts that were initially institutionalized in the 1920s and revived during and after the Second World War , the ICEM also marks a rupture with previous endeavors. In common with the IRO that shared a partly similar mandate, the ICEM was a States-conceived-and-driven project, while it became, on many occasions, e.g. in the Far East and the Hungarian refugee crises, a tool for American foreign policy and propaganda within the Cold War framework. Throughout the 1950s, the decisive role in designing priorities and policies was held by governments and, more specifically, by a few major receiving countries amongst which the United States played the major role, rather than by international civil servants. Nevertheless, as the ICEM acquired a more permanent character, its staff, many of whom had already served in UNRRA and the IRO, felt that they constituted a group with expertise and skills in the management of refugee flows and migration, gradually increasing the dependence of states' delegates on their know-how. This shift marks the gradual transformation of the ICEM staff from disparate

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[80] Such as the American Joint Distribution Committee / United HIAS Service, the International Catholic Migration Committee, the Lutheran World Federation, the National Catholic Welfare Conference and the World Council of Churches.

[81] See "Summary and recommendations of meeting with Mrs. Ioannidis, Mr. Sapieha and Mr. Tsakiris, February 17, 1960, concerning matters relating to the Brazil programme," February 17, 1960, IOMGR, Athens, Greece.

[82] "Voluntary Agencies' Revolving Fund," MC/INF/69, October 19, 1959, NARA, Washington D.C.

national subjects controlled by their home states to members of an international civil service gradually acquiring more agency in the Committee's affairs.

In the following decades, changing circumstances, i.e. Europe's economic recovery and the development of a sort of international professional identity among officials and employees, would have in turn an impact on the functioning of the Committee, modifying its margins of autonomy *vis-à-vis* the constituting forces that established the organization, i.e. the hegemonic United States and the governments of other nation-states. The ICEM's operations in the field contributed to this slow but steady transformation: they were transnational, involving both sending and receiving countries; they implicated a series of different players, governmental and non-governmental, national and international in ways that government interventions could not but become more and more nuanced and selective. During the first decade of the ICEM's existence, the influence of the United States and other governments over the decisions and policies of the Committee was not seriously undermined by this tenuously emerging transformation. The foundations, however, were set for the Committee's increasing initiatives in shaping decisions and implementing policies in the field of regulation of human mobility. As Bob Reinalda (2015) puts it:

> [E]stablishing an IGO is one thing, but running it another. This is also true for the ICEM, where the Directors-General were more ambitious than the initiators, with the special situation that the two key figures in US refugee and migration politics at the time, Walter and Warren, were also US representatives to the ICEM Council. As good 'parents' they reminded the Directors-General of the original objectives and took care that the budgets were not growing too much. As representatives of US foreign politics, they also introduced new policies when foreign policy had changed […]. However, from the beginning the organization had slowly moved away from the ideas of those who had initiated and created it by expanding its mandate.

Imbalances in Decision-Making Processes: Commonwealth versus Latin American Countries

Ioannis Limnios-Sekeris

T he *Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration* (ICEM) comprised three formally distinct groups of member states: emigration, immigration and sympathizing countries. The first group consisted of European countries that faced economic difficulties, high unemployment rates and population pressures. On the other hand, most immigration countries suffered from a lack of population and/or workforce. The last group, the sympathizing nations, was made up of countries interested in migration issues from a political, economic or humanitarian aspect. When interests in population movements and different migration policies divided these three groups, conflicts amongst them often arose.

Contrastingly, the United States, due to its global hegemonic position, did not face strong objections from other ICEM member states in the pursuance of its objectives. Although all other immigration countries were well aware of United States policy redirecting migrants away from its shores, and despite being frustrated by this policy, they did not oppose it.[1] Even when Washington pressured other receiving countries to increase their intakes of migrants, believing that some emigration countries still faced high unemployment and were thus vulnerable to communist tendencies, their governments did not take any actual steps

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[1] Patric Shaw reported G. Warren's comments regarding the Italian migration to South America, "the more [...] who went to that part of the world, the fewer would be knocking on [our] gates," see on P. Shaw, "Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration. Fifth Session Executive Committee and Council. Report of Australian Delegation," Confidential [1956], A446, 1966/46164, ICEM, Fifth Session of Executive Committee and Council, Geneva 1956, NAA, Canberra.

against US policy and did not even voice their objections at the ICEM sessions.[2]

Nevertheless, the governments of the other ICEM member states did attempt to influence the decision-making processes through their participation in the organization's policy bodies, such as the Executive Committee. Especially economically developed countries with high stakes in migration, like Australia, sought to be represented in this body and to ensure that the receiving countries maintained a majority over those sending migrants overseas. Additionally, the Commonwealth members tried to secure that the voting power of the Latin American group did not exceed their own.[3] In fact, from 1955 to 1959, immigration countries represented in the Executive Committee were more than the emigration countries (four versus three); the countries of Europe were equal to the ones overseas (four versus four); and the Commonwealth group of countries was represented by two members each year, as was the Latin American group.

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[2] Australian officials remarked in their internal correspondence "though the United States is clearly pressing other immigration countries to accept an increasing number of migrants, it is not itself taking substantial steps for receiving more migrants into the country." See A.H. Loomes, "Report of the Australian Representative to the Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe. Third Session, Washington, 10th–13th June, 1952," Confidential, June 26, 1952, A446, 1966/46194, ICEM, Third Session Washington 1952, ICEM, First, Second, Third Session 1951 to 1952, NAA, Canberra.

[3] For the continuance of Australia's policy regarding the Executive Committee and the members it supported, "Brief for Australian Delegation to ICEM Executive Committee and Council Commencing 20th September, 1956 and 1st October, 1956 at Palais des Nations, Geneva," Restricted, September 13, 1956, A446, 1966/46164, ICEM, Fifth Session of Executive Committee and Council, Geneva 1956, NAA, Canberra; "Brief for Australian Delegation to I.C.E.M. Executive Committee and Council Commencing 26th September, 1957 and 7th October, 1957 at Palais des Nations, Geneva," Confidential, Restricted, September. 20, 1957, A446, 1966/46168, ICEM, Ninth Session of Executive Committee and Seventh Session of Council, Geneva 1957, NAA, Canberra; H.J. Grant to E.L. Charles, "ICEM Executive Committee," 58/66224, August 21, 1958, A446, 1966/46170, ICEM, 11th Session of Executive Committee and Ninth Session of Council, Geneva 1958, NAA, Canberra. In 1955, Canberra instructed its delegation to "lessen the influence of Italy and of those countries likely to support Italy," see "Brief for the Australian Delegate to the Third Session of ICEM, Executive Committee and Council commencing 6th and 17th October, 1955, at the Palais des Nations, Geneva," [1955], A446, 1966/46162, ICEM, Third Session Executive Committee and Council, Geneva 1955, NAA, Canberra. The reason for Australia's position was that, by that time, Italy was pressuring Canberra for more favourable terms of financial assistance towards the Italians emigrating to Australia, equal to those applying to Northern European migrants, see, Del Bo (Secretary of State of Foreign Affairs) [Italy] to [Tittman], Confidential, August 23, 1955, A446, 1966/46162, ICEM, Third Session Executive Committee and Council, Geneva 1955, NAA, Canberra.

TABLE 1. Membership on the ICEM Executive Committee

1952	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959
Belgium	Argentina	Australia	Argentina	Australia	Argentina
Brazil	Australia	Brazil	Australia	Belgium	Australia
Canada	Canada	Canada	Canada	Brazil	Brazil
France	France	Chile	Colombia	Canada	Canada
FRG	FRG	France	Denmark	FRG	FRG
Italy	Italy	FRG	FRG	Italy	Italy
USA	Netherlands	Italy	Italy	Netherlands	Netherlands
	USA	Netherlands	Netherlands	USA	Sweden
	Venezuela	USA	USA	Venezuela	USA

Sources: The National Archives of Australia, Canberra: ACGG to DEAC, 32, (Cable, Restricted), ICEM First, Second, Third Session (1951 to 1952), Geneva. A446, 1966/46194 (Feb. 25, 1952) / H.J. Grant to E.L. Charles, "ICEM Executive Committee." ICEM 11th Session of Executive Committee and Ninth Session of Council, Geneva. 58/66224, A446, 1966/46170. (Aug. 21, 1958) / "Report of the Australian Delegation," ICEM Eleventh Session of the Executive Committee (and) Ninth Session of the Council," ICEM 11th Session of Executive Committee and Ninth Session of Council, Geneva. A446, 1966/46170. (Nov. 1958).

Coalitions were more likely to occur among members who shared similar political institutions and culture, as well as similar labor demands. As a result, the group of immigration countries was further divided into two distinct subgroups: the Commonwealth and the Latin American countries. Divergences between them became more evident from 1955–1956 onwards, when both groups increased their ICEM members, while the amelioration of the economic situation in Western Europe progressively modified the Committee's role. Both groups were also supported by emigration countries: the Netherlands sided mainly with the Commonwealth states, where many Dutch emigrants headed;[4] Spain supported the Latin American group; and, Italy, with important emigrant flows to countries of both groups,[5] adjusted its position according to its fluctuating interests.

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[4] More specifically, between 1952 and 1961 the Commonwealth countries members of the ICEM had admitted 82,385 Dutch migrants: Australia had admitted 67,452 of them; Canada 876; New Zealand 8,903 and South Africa 5,154. For the same period the Latin American countries had admitted only 2,009 Dutch migrants through ICEM. See Table "ICEM emigration from the Netherlands," deliverable 2.2: Tables and Diagrams https://activetextbook.com/active_textbooks/6972?new_book=true#page86

[5] Between 1952 and 1961, 54,840 Spaniards migrated to Latin American countries through

Australia was a long-standing immigration country; in the 1950s, this country disposed of an elaborate migration administration both within and across its borders. Participation in the ICEM permitted Australia to counter the geographical distance from its traditional migrant sources, namely Europe, and to benefit from the supply of carriers in a period of great shortage of transport means. The lack of shipping also instigated Canada's participation in the Committee, as this country faced difficulties in supporting its immigration program. Australia and the other Commonwealth countries—Canada, New Zealand, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (FRN), and the Union of South Africa—received more than 45 percent of the total number of migrants moved under the Committee's auspices.[6] Amongst them, Australia was the ICEM's major receiving country, accepting nearly 30 percent of the migrants moved by the Committee between 1952 and 1960. During the same period, the percentage of migrants admitted to Latin American countries through the ICEM did not exceed 25 percent. Although they too had a long tradition as receiving countries,[7] their governments sought not only migrant intakes, but also administrative, reception and placement services from the ICEM in order to cover and improve the shortcomings in their migration infrastructure. Throughout the 1950s, Australia and Canada defended the transportation character of the Committee, while the Latin American countries, together with Spain and Italy, tried to promote the expansion of the ICEM auxiliary migrant services.[8] As both functions of the Committee involved important expenses, when the ICEM faced financial difficulties and cut backs were deemed necessary, conflicts became more acute.

ICEM and only 2,913 to Commonwealth members states of the Committee. Respectively for Italy, 197,667 headed to ICEM members from Latin America and 86,333 to Commonwealth countries. See tables "ICEM emigration from Spain, 1952–1961" https://activetextbook.com/active_textbooks/6972?new_book=true#page8 and "ICEM emigration from Italy (including Trieste)," https://activetextbook.com/active_textbooks/6972?new_book=true#page83

[6] Canada and Australia were founding members of the Committee. New Zealand, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (FRN) joined ICEM in 1955, and the Union of South Africa in 1956. FRN withdrew from the Committee in 1960.

[7] The Latin American member states of ICEM during the 1950s were: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Uruguay, Paraguay, Venezuela.

[8] Preselection, financing passages, placement, language and vocational training, information orientation and promotional activities in immigration countries.

The Latin American countries accused Australia of being the reason for the deficits in the Committee's operational budget, since the journey to Australia was more expensive due to its remote location and the absence of important return traffic. In fact, the ICEM did contribute larger amounts of subsidies for passages to Australia; nearly double those allocated for Brazil, and about triple in comparison with Argentina.[9] The Latin American countries characterized emigration to Australia as a loss for the Committee and proposed a reduction in these costly movements, in favor of more economical ones to less distant destinations. Additionally, in 1956, this group asked the Committee to even out its activities for the 1957 program,[10] demanding a larger share of ICEM resources.[11] They also claimed that savings from switching to more profitable Latin American transport should be used to provide them with additional services.[12] Their aim was a redirection of both migrant flows and the Committee's financing.

On the other hand, Australia never publicly accepted the accusations of being the cause for ICEM deficits,[13] and attempted to show that the net average

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[9] Between 1953 and 1956, the cost of passage to Australia was about $310, while this same cost was $164 and $167 for Brazil and Argentina respectively. Regarding the ICEM subsidies, in 1955 the Committee was contributing $140 per migrant going to Australia, $83 for Brazil and $54 for Argentina. See, "ICEM Sub-Committee on Finance, Report of Australian Delegation to Fourth Session, Venice, 8th to 10th October, 1953," [1953], Report, A446, 1962/66437/ICEM, NAA, Canberra; Sixth Session Venice 1953, "Analysis of the Cost of Movements to Australia, Argentina and Brazil in 1955 Showing the Source of Revenue and the Amount of Committee Participation," [1955], A446, 1966/46161, ICEM, Second Session Executive Committee and Council, Geneva 1955, NAA, Canberra.

[10] ACGG to DEAC, 323, Restricted, Priority, Cable, October 3, 1956, A446, 1966/46164, ICEM, Fifth Session of Executive Committee and Council, Geneva 1956, NAA, Canberra.

[11] Patrick Shaw, "Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration, Fifth Session Executive Committee and Council, Report of the Australian Delegation," Confidential [1956], Report, A446, 1966/46164, ICEM, Fifth Session of Executive Committee and Council, Geneva 1956, NAA, Canberra.

[12] ACGG to DEAC, Cable, Restricted, Priority, January 3, 1957, A446, 1966/46165, ICEM, Sixth Special Session of Executive Committee and Council, Geneva 1957, NAA, Canberra.

[13] Brief for Australian Delegation to ICEM Executive Committee and Council Commencing 20th September, 1956 and 1st October, 1956 at Palais des Nations, Geneva," Report, Restricted, September 13, 1956, A446, 1966/46164, ICEM, Fifth Session of Executive Committee and Council, Geneva 1956, NAA, Canberra; ACGG to DEAC, 323, Cable, Restricted, Priority, October 3, 1956, A446, 1966/46164, ICEM, Fifth Session of Executive Committee and Council, Geneva 1956, NAA, Canberra; Patrick Shaw, "Intergovernmental Committee for European

cost of migration and supporting services for Australia was lower than that for other receiving countries, including some Latin American countries.[14] At every opportunity, Australia mentioned that the country did not need any promotional or technical assistance services, except for those not provided by the countries sending migrants to Oceania.[15] Australian delegates tried to ward off attacks from Latin American countries by underlining the expenditures made by the Committee for services rendered in the latter. Australia did not use ICEM services, while Latin American countries benefited the most from them, especially regarding the creation and organization of reception and placement facilities. As Australia noted, these countries did not contribute to the ICEM towards this end, and Canberra felt that it was forced to bear a disproportionate cost for ICEM services, which benefited Latin American countries in the long run.

When ICEM vocational training emerged as an issue in 1955, Canberra opposed its expansion, claiming that Australia would not recruit migrants as skilled or semi-skilled based only on a short-term vocational training provided by the ICEM in sending countries.[16] The Deputy Director of the ICEM, Pierre

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Migration, Fifth Session Executive Committee and Council, Report of Australian Delegation," Report, Confidential [1956], A446, 1966/46164, ICEM, Fifth Session of Executive Committee and Council, Geneva 1956, NAA, Canberra.

[14] R. Harry, "ICEM Report of the Australian Delegation to the Second Session of the Council," [1955], Report, A446, 1966/46161, ICEM, Second Session Executive Committee and Council, Geneva 1955, NAA, Canberra; Harry to Heyes, RLH/JR, 9/3/19/1, June 13, 1955, Letter, A446, 1966/46161, ICEM, Second Session Executive Committee and Council, Geneva 1955, NAA, Canberra; Driver-CMO in Australian Embassy Cologne to Heyes, A/10277, Letter, Personal, Confidential, November 3, 1955, A446, 1966/46162, ICEM, Third Session Executive Committee and Council, Geneva 1955, NAA Canberra.

[15] Such as preselection services and embarkation facilities. [Department of Immigration in Canberra], for the Immigration Planning Council. "The Fifth Session of ICEM," 70/1956, September 1956, A446, 1966/46164, ICEM, Fifth Session of Executive Committee and Council, Geneva 1956, NAA, Canberra.

[16] The main reason for Australia's negative position was the strong position of the trade unions and their agreement with the Australian government regarding the migrants admitted in the country. R. Harry (Australian Representative), "Interim Report of the Australian Delegation to the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (Meeting of the Executive Committee)," April 1955, A446, 1966/46161, ICEM, Second Session Executive Committee and Council, Geneva 1955, NAA, Canberra.

Jacobsen, intervened in favor of the ICEM promotional services for Latin American countries, mentioning that if they were not implemented, migration to Latin America would cease. Additionally, Jacobsen tried to promote the usefulness of the ICEM vocational training program to Australia, by referring to the shortage of skilled-willing-to-migrate workers in Europe.[17] However, Australia continued to insist that the Committee's primary role was to act as a transport agency; and that, although ICEM could assist governments to establish or improve their migration administration, it could not resolve state bureaucracies' inefficiencies.

In a paternalistic manner, Australia invited a senior officer from Brazil to study the methods of migrant recruitment and resettlement at the Department of Immigration in Canberra in 1958.[18] Adopting a similar attitude in 1959, the ICEM Administration, in cooperation with Canada, established a pilot project for the training of migration officials from the periphery on topics of migration theory and practices of migrant reception, placement and integration. The majority of the participants came from Brazil, while officials from Italy, Greece and Spain also participated. Canada was selected, since this country had "an efficient immigration and placement service" and could "second lecturers and provide opportunities for practical work."[19]

However, conflicts among ICEM receiving member states, especially during the second half of the 1950s, were not limited to those between the Latin American and Commonwealth groups. Discords also existed within the Commonwealth countries. Thus, when Australia managed to secure an American subsidy through the ICEM for Danes willing to migrate to Australia in order to overcome the shortage of "desirable" Northern European migrants,

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[17] Tacobsen to Heyes, Confidential, September 17, 1955, Letter, A446, 1966/46162, ICEM, Third Session Executive Committee and Council, Geneva 1955, NAA, Canberra.

[18] "Statement by Australian Delegation in ICEM Council, 8th May," [1958], A446, 1966/46169, ICEM, Tenth Session of Executive Committee and Eighth Session of Council. Geneva 1958, NAA, Canberra.

[19] ICEM Executive Committee, Tenth Session, "Pilot Project to Increase the Absorptive Capacity of Immigration Countries (Presented by the Director)," Restricted, MC/EX/66, April 16, 1958, 10th Session of the Executive Commission of ICEM, Geneva, April 28 – May 13, 1958, NARA.

Canada raised objections. The United States had agreed to contribute to the Danish scheme, partly because Australia had committed to recruit more Hungarian refugees, Greek and Italian migrants, as long as the United States would assist their movement financially.[20] Australia had also made an additional contribution to the ICEM Special Fund, in order to persuade the United States and the ICEM to support the Danish scheme.[21] Canada objected to ICEM participation in this scheme considering the movement of Danes unconstitutional, because Denmark was not a country suffering from "overpopulation" problems. As Canada had been recruiting Danes without ICEM participation, the proposed scheme created a situation of unfair competition; the Danes would be able to emigrate to Australia under more favorable terms, receiving both ICEM assistance and United States funding. Thus, Canada considered that ICEM involvement openly favored Australian immigration, something that could not be accepted.[22]

Australia immediately took action through its representatives in Ottawa, requesting that Canada demonstrate its solidarity as a Commonwealth member;

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[20] Verbatim Record, 86th Meeting of the Executive Committee, 10 October 1957 p.m., "General Assisted Passage Migrants from Denmark to Australia," [1957], A446, 1966/46168, ICEM, Ninth Session of Executive Committee and Seventh Session of Council, Geneva 1957, NAA, Canberra; "Administration's telegram to Washington of 7th September, 1957," Annex C, [1957], A446, 1966/46168, ICEM, Ninth Session of Executive Committee and Seventh Session of Council, Geneva 1957, NAA, Canberra.

[21] DEAC to ACGG, 306, Cable, Confidential, Immediate, September 30, 1957, A446, 1966/46168, ICEM, Ninth Session of Executive Committee and Seventh Session of Council, Geneva 1957, NAA, Canberra; "Australian Contribution," [1958], A446, 1966/46169, ICEM, Tenth Session of Executive Committee and Eighth Session of Council, Geneva 1958, NAA, Canberra. The amount of the Australian contribution to the Special Fund was a total of $500,000, of which $180,000 were directed to the unilateral Danish and German movements towards Australia.

[22] ACGG to DEAC, 321, Cable, Confidential, September 27, 1957, A446, 1966/46168, ICEM, Ninth Session of Executive Committee and Seventh Session of Council, Geneva 1957, NAA, Canberra; ACGG to DEAC, 328, Cable, Confidential, Immediate, September 28, 1957, A446, 1966/46168, ICEM, Ninth Session of Executive Committee and Seventh Session of Council, Geneva 1957, NAA, Canberra. The United States approved the programme "reluctantly" and against their "better judgment," and reported that the United States participation in the scheme was a "shot-gun exercise," see, G.C. Watson (Assistant Secretary Planning & Research) to DIMC, "ICEM's 1958 Budget," September 24, 1957, A446, 1966/46168, ICEM, Ninth Session of Executive Committee and Seventh Session of Council, Geneva 1957, NAA, Canberra.

in the case "any differences of opinion" between the two countries were expressed during the following ICEM Council, Australia pleaded that these not be "ventilated publicly" by Canadian officials.[23] Extended consultations in the ICEM Council and Executive Committee followed.[24] Canada expressed its intention to withdraw objections to the Danish scheme, if the Danes were able to migrate under the same financial arrangements either to Australia or Canada.[25] Finally, Canada agreed to the continuance of Danish emigration to Australia as an exception for 1958 and 1959.[26]

Despite the fact that some conflicts were actually resolved in the ICEM decision-making bodies, as an Australian delegate pointed out, "the general direction of the proceedings of ICEM remains largely in the hands of the United States, the ICEM Administration and Australia, in descending order of importance, no matter who is holding office."[27] The political and economic leverage of each country proved to be more important than participation in the Executive Committee. Moreover, the most important decisions were not taken during the formal Executive Committee or Council Sessions, but during private discussions and meetings. A system of informal governance (Stone, 2013) largely

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[23] Heyes to DEAC, 351, September 30, 1957, A446, 1966/46168, ICEM, Ninth Session of Executive Committee and Seventh Session of Council, Geneva 1957, NAA, Canberra; Heyes to DEAC, 303, September 30, 1957, A446, 1966/46168, ICEM, Ninth Session of Executive Committee and Seventh Session of Council, Geneva 1957, NAA, Canberra.

[24] ACGG to DEAC, 354, Cable, Restricted, Immediate, October 7, 1957, A446, 1966/46168, ICEM, Ninth Session of Executive Committee and Seventh Session of Council, Geneva 1957, NAA, Canberra; "Ninth Session of the Executive Committee and Seventh Session of the Council of ICEM", November 1957, Report, A446, 1966/46168, ICEM, Ninth Session of Executive Committee and Seventh Session of Council, Geneva 1957, NAA, Canberra.

[25] "The Question of ICEM Assistance for Danish Migration to Australia," [1957], A446, 1966/46168, ICEM, Ninth Session of Executive Committee and Seventh Session of Council, Geneva 1957, NAA, Canberra.

[26] Laval Fortier (Deputy Minister of Citizenship and Immigration Canada) to Heyes, March 26, 1958, Letter, A446, 1966/46169, ICEM, Tenth Session of Executive Committee and Eighth Session of Council, Geneva 1958, NAA, Canberra.

[27] Patrick Shaw, "Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration, Fifth Session Executive Committee and Council, Report of Australian Delegation," Confidential, [1956], A446, 1966/46164, ICEM, Fifth Session of Executive Committee and Council, Geneva 1956, NAA, Canberra.

prevailed in ICEM decision-making processes with the Committee's policies often being set in private informal meetings, in which participants varied, although the United States' and Australian delegates were always present.[28]

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[28] Indicatively: The Danish scheme was decided upon in a meeting including only Australian, United States, Danish delegates and the ICEM Administration. Other member states objected when it was later presented to them. Nevertheless, the scheme was implemented, see on "Verbatim Record, 86th Meeting of the Executive Committee 10 October 1957 p.m., 'General Assisted Passage Migrants from Denmark to Australia'," A446, 1966/46168, ICEM, Ninth Session of Executive Committee and Seventh Session of Council, Geneva 1957, NAA, Canberra; "The Question of ICEM Assistance for Danish Migration to Australia," [1957], A446, 1966/46168, ICEM, Ninth Session of Executive Committee and Seventh Session of Council, Geneva 1957, NAA, Canberra. In 1959 a meeting took place in San Francisco with the only United States, Australian, Canadian, Brazilian, Dutch and Italian delegates present, where, in absence of the ICEM Administration and of other members of the Committee, many issues concerning financial and administrative matters of the Committee were decided upon: "Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration Fairmont Hotel, San Francisco, March 17–20, 1959," A446, 1958/67356, Meeting of Permanent Heads of Major ICEM Countries, San Francisco, March 1959, NAA, Canberra. See also in this volume, "Australia and the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration: Racial Exclusion and Ethnic Discrimination in an Era of Universal Human Rights," pp. 191–215.

Who Pays: Financing and Budget of the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (1952–1960)

Alexis Franghiadis

The present chapter is a short presentation of the financing and expenditure of the *Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration* (ICEM) in the 1950s and focuses on the following issues: (a) the contributions of different countries and groups of countries (b) the structure and main trends of the ICEM budget and the main items of expenditure, and (c) the overall economic and financial rationale of the ICEM.

The ICEM was conceived as an organization that would be "small, flexible, efficient and *economical*."[1] During 1952, the year it started to function, the organization was financially assisted by the *International Refugee Organization* (IRO) to transport refugees who had been granted visas prior to the latter's dissolution; ICEM was also provided with 12 vessels to accomplish this task (Holborn, 1956, p. 565).

The ICEM's total budget was divided into the administrative and operational parts; this distinction concerned both revenues and expenditures. The Committee had divided the budget in this way, thinking that the governments benefiting from ICEM services would reimburse them and thus, payback a significant proportion of the organization's operational expenditure (Holborn, 1961, pp. 8–11). The administrative budget was almost exclusively financed by ICEM member contributions. As stipulated in the ICEM Constitution (MC 55, article 23, paragraph 2), contributions to the administrative expenditure of the Committee were to be agreed on by the Council and the member governments

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[1] Report on the Migration Conference, Brussels, 26.11.1951 – 5.12.1951, 25.2.1952, (MCB/12), p. 7, (emphasis added), IOM, Geneva.

concerned. This expenditure included: staff salaries and other staff costs, travel costs, communications, general office costs, contractual services, purchase and maintenance of vehicles, representation costs and conference costs.

The operational budget concerned the programs implemented by the ICEM. The major part of the operational expenditure concerned the cost of moving the migrants and refugees to receiving countries; but, there were also costs for processing, reception, initial placement and settlement. The operational budget was financed by contributions from member governments, other governments, organizations and/or individuals. According to the ICEM Constitution (MC 55, article 23, paragraph 3), these contributions "shall be voluntary and any contributor to the operating fund may stipulate the terms and conditions under which its contribution may be used." As ICEM's operational budget depended heavily on voluntary contributions by its member governments—and mainly the United States—, its policies and expenditures were largely determined by state priorities.

The main sources of information on the revenue and expenses of the ICEM for the period 1953–1959 are the official annual financial reports of the organization.[2] Another useful reference is the ICEM Handbook 1962, which presents the contributions of individual countries to the operational and administrative budgets for the years 1952–1961.[3] It should be noted that ICEM financial

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[2] Financial Report for the Year 1953: (a) Financial Statements, including Reports of the External Auditors, and (b) Status Report of the Director on the Budget and Plan of Expenditure (Submitted by the Director after consideration by the Sub-Committee on Finance), (MC/66); Financial Report for the Year 1954: (a) Financial Statements, including Reports of the External Auditors, and (b) Status Report on the Budget and Plan of Expenditure (Submitted by the Deputy Director), (MC/129). Financial Report for the Year 1955: (a) Financial Statements, including Reports of the External Auditors, and (b) Status Report on the Budget and Plan of Expenditure (Submitted by the Director), (MC/197). Financial Report for the year 1956: (a) Financial Statements, including the report of the External Auditors, and (b) Status Report on the Budget and Plan of Expenditure (Submitted by the Director), (MC/252/Rev.1). Financial Report for the year 1957: (a) Financial Statements, including the report of the External Auditors, and (b) Status Report on the Budget and Plan of Expenditure (Submitted by the Director), (MC 285). Financial Report for the Year 1958: (a) Financial Statements, including the reports of the External Auditors, and (b) Status Report on the Budget and Plan of Expenditure (Submitted by the Director), (MC 355). Financial Report for the Year 1959: (a) Financial Statements, including the report of the External Auditors, and (b) Status Report on the Budget and Plan of Expenditure (Submitted by the Director), (MC/416). NARA, Washington D.C.

[3] *ICEM Handbook 1962*, Geneva, pp. 37–38.

reports are not always very clear on details about individual items of the budget; moreover, the structure of the budget presents significant changes from one year to the next, as far as the format and level of aggregation are concerned for both contributions and expenditure. Data collection, analysis and aggregation were obviously painstaking processes that did not always achieve the desired degree of accuracy. However, sufficiently reliable conclusions about the main characteristics and trends of the ICEM finances can be drawn.

1. Who Pays?

As mentioned previously, the financing of the ICEM administrative budget was totally separate from the financing of the operational budget, therefore completely different rules were followed. As a result, these are first analysed in two different chapters. A third chapter follows, addressing the comprehensive financing of the ICEM.

1.1 *Financing of the Administrative Budget*

Revenue of the ICEM administrative budget for the years 1953–1959 is presented in table 1. The table presents the contribution of each member government for the years 1953–1959 separately. "Other income" includes mainly carry-overs from previous years, as well as miscellaneous income (sales of equipment, investment and bank interest, profit on exchange, etc.).

Tables 2 and 3 present the country contributions to the administrative budget, aggregated by type of country-member, for the years 1953–1959. "Other income" is not taken into account in this case. The groups of countries are the following: (a) the United States, the major contributor by far; (b) emigration countries: Austria, Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Spain;[4] (c) "sympathizing" European countries, i.e. countries that normally did not send migrants overseas: Belgium, Denmark, France, Luxembourg, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland; (d) non-Latin American countries of immigration: Australia (the most important migrant destination), Canada, Israel, New Zealand, the Union of South Africa, Rhodesia and Nyasaland

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[4] Spain became an ICEM member in 1956.

TABLE 1.

Contributions of member governments to the administrative budget, 1953–1959 (US$)

MEMBER GOVERNMENTS	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959
Argentina	101,983	90,326	90,357	109,883	110,476	134,595	122,961
Australia	143,634	127,388	127,431	154,970	155,805	189,830	173,540
Austria	32,420	28,758	28,768	34,985	35,173	42,855	39,243
Belgium	60,116	53,264	53,282	64,797	65,146	79,360	72,672
Brazil	101,983	90,326	90,357	109,883	110,476	134,595	122,961
Canada	194,518	172,349	172,408	209,665	210,796	256,492	234,584
Chile	23,188	20,658	20,665	25,131	25,266	30,792	28,196
Colombia	6,250	20,658	20,665	25,151	25,266	30,792	28,196
Costa Rica	3,005	2,632	2,633	3,202	3,219	3,809	3,488
Denmark	26,408	23,493	23,501	28,580	28,734	34,919	31,975
France	194,518	172,349	172,408	209,665	210,796	256,492	234,584
FRG	194,518	172,349	172,408	209,665	210,796	256,492	234,584
FRN			10,333	12,565	12,633	15,237	13,953
Greece	32,420	28,758	28,768	34,985	35,173	42,855	39,243
Israel	11,594	10,329	10,333	12,565	12,633	15,237	13,953
Italy	194,518	172,349	172,408	209,665	210,796	256,492	234,584
Luxembourg	4,723	4,253	4,254	3,202	3,219	3,809	3,488
Netherlands	60,116	53,264	53,282	64,797	65,146	79,360	72,672
New Zealand			20,665	25,131	25,266	30,792	28,196
Norway	16,532	14,581	14,586	17,738	17,834	21,587	19,767
Panama							3,488
Paraguay	9,662	8,506	8,509	10,348	10,403	3,809	3,488
Spain				32,398	65,146	79,360	72,672
Sweden	60,116	53,264	53,282	64,797	65,146	79,360	72,672
Switzerland	45,301	40,100	40,114	48,782	49,046	59,997	54,940
Union of South Africa				24,391	49,046	59,997	54,940
USA	715,595	634,308	634,525	771,647	775,807	944,705	863,632
Uruguay		10,329	10,333				
Venezuela	23,188	20,658	20,665	25,131	25,266	30,792	28,196
TOTAL	2,256,306	2,025,249	2,056,940	2,543,719	2,614,509	3,174,412	2,906,868
OTHER INCOME	269,184	582,281	557,057	243,969	156,270	92,307	208,175
GRAND TOTAL	2,525,490	2,607,530	2,613,997	2,787,688	2,770,779	3,266,719	3,115,043

Source: See footnote 2.

TABLE 2.
Contributions to the administrative budget, 1953–1959, by groups of countries (US$)

COUNTRY GROUP	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959
USA	715,595	634,308	634,525	771,647	775,807	944,705	863,632
Non-Latin American immigration countries	349,746	310,066	341,170	439,287	466,179	567,585	519,166
Latin American immigration countries	269,259	264,093	264,184	308,729	310,372	369,184	340,974
Emigration countries	513,992	455,478	455,634	586,495	622,230	757,414	692,998
"Sympathizing" countries	407,714	361,304	361,427	437,561	439,921	535,524	490,098
TOTAL	2,256,306	2,025,249	2,056,940	2,543,719	2,614,509	3,174,412	2,906,868

Source: See footnote 2.

TABLE 3.
Contributions to the administrative budget, 1953–1959, by groups of countries (%)

COUNTRY GROUP	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959
USA	32	31	31	30	30	30	30
Non-Latin American immigration countries	16	15	17	17	18	18	18
Latin American immigration countries	12	13	13	12	12	12	12
Emigration countries	23	22	22	23	24	24	24
"Sympathizing" countries	18	18	18	17	17	17	17
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: See footnote 2.

(FRN); and (e) Latin American countries of immigration. Table 2 presents the contributions of each group of countries in US dollars and table 3 presents the contributions of each group of countries as a percentage of the total contributions. Chart 1 displays the evolution of the contributions for each group of countries in US dollars from 1953 to 1959. Chart 2 displays the share of each group of countries as part of the total country contributions to ICEM administrative expenses from 1953 to 1959.

CHART 1.

Evolution of contributions to the administrative budget, 1953–1959 (US$)

United States of America

Non-Latin American immigration countries

Latin American immigration countries

Emigration countries

"Sympathizing" countries

Source: See footnote 2.

CHART 2.

Shares of participation of country groups to the administrative budget, 1953–1959

United States of America — 31%

Non-Latin American immigration countries — 17%

Latin American immigration countries — 12%

Emigration countries — 23%

"Sympathizing" countries — 17%

Source: See footnote 2.

1.2 *Financing of the Operational Budget*

Revenue of the ICEM operational budget for the years 1953–1959 is presented in table 4. The table presents the contribution of each member government for the years 1953–1959 separately. United States contributions also appear separately, as they concern a variety of different programs. Once again, the available data present inconsistencies from one year to the next and is thus, not always easy to comprehend. United States contributions appear in a more synoptic form for 1953–1954 and 1958–1959. Budget lines that did not appear in some of the years examined, were eventually included in other more aggregate budget lines. For instance, there is no doubt that the *United States Refugee Relief Act* (RRA) contributed to the budget of the ICEM both before and after 1957, but the ICEM reports present this contribution separately only for 1957.

Table 5 and table 6 present the country contributions to the operational budget, aggregated by type of member country for the years 1953–1959. Grouping of countries is the same as in the previous set of tables. Table 5 presents the contributions of each group of countries in US dollars and table 6 presents the contributions of each group of countries as a percentage of total contributions. Chart 3 displays the share of each group of countries as part of the total country contributions to ICEM operational expenses from 1953 to 1959.

TABLE 4.

Contributions of member governments to the operational budget, 1953–1959 (US$)

MEMBER GOVERNMENTS	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959
Argentina	257,699	1,032,301	629,376	451,172	899,186	454,841	368,981
Australia	382,482	1,564,638	3,149,361	2,981,375	3,489,106	2,590,360	3,792,698
Austria	31,170	94,120	210,070	347,649	378,493	362,997	199,696
Belgium	100,000	150,000	80,000	68,500	68,000	–	–
Brazil	253,379	327,318	88,647	243,489	441,840	262,320	331,320
Canada	1,097,798	321,101	26,491	687,044	4,237,889	396,527	154,596
Chile	–	–	2,048	49,000	64,361	26,360	30,560
Colombia	–	–	850	12,869	46,050	8,450	19,080
Costa Rica	–	2,340	2,340	1,388	6,504	4,440	2,129
Denmark	–	30,000	–	20,000	10,000	–	32,614
France	–	–	–	85,714	79,000	–	–
FGR	1,161,440	1,554,080	1,172,260	1,934,180	1,208,380	794,286	714,286
FRN	–	–	21,457	98,068	69,898	69,806	21,032
Greece	75,950	380,138	469,308	524,482	453,412	301,476	381,113
Holy See						500	
Israel	26,895	55,180	58,730	292,000	557,240	591,735	685,955
Italy	1,249,215	3,053,594	3,427,295	2,933,751	2,866,464	1,427,174	1,805,700
Luxembourg	2,000	–	–	5,000	5,000	6,900	3,000
Netherlands	564,180	209,844	2,172,958	1,767,892	1,568,053	1,621,614	1,933,494
New Zealand	–	28,000	54,236	180,992	271,978	91,336	59,486
Norway	–	13,993	–	28,000	49,000	–	42,532
Spain	–	–		2,700	531,300	573,500	582,750
Sweden	–	22,400	8,314	6,798	49,526	5,297	19,000
Switzerland	–	93,458	17,523	77,102	223,377	35,047	44,841
UK	–	–	–	84,459	–	105,750	129,085
Union of South Africa	–	–		36,554	92,232	76,640	51,783
Venezuela	–	–	–	30,000	25,440	48,080	40,680
TOTAL (not including the US contribution)	5,202,208	8,932,505	11,591,264	12,950,178	17,691,729	9,855,436	11,446,411
US Free contribution	6,073,995	7,509,872	8,974,218	10,978,963	12,728,001	7,047,877	8,500,306
US Escapee Program	662,138	1,116,521	783,471,00	2,267,118	3,568,229	1,486,126	1,879,148
US for Far East		–		–	125,000	610,000	386,463
US Escapee Prog. for Far East		232,650	88,650	128,700	–	–	–
US for RRA		–		133,481	–	–	–
US for Austrian Program[5]		–		250,000	–	–	–
RRA Special Program					225,910	–	–
US for Italian Program[6]					298,000	–	–
TOTAL US CONTRIBUTION	6,736,133	8,859,043	9,846,339	13,758,262	16,945,140	9,144,003	10,765,917
GRAND TOTAL	11,938,341	17,791,548	21,437,603	26,708,440	34,636,869	18,999,439	22,212,328

Source: See footnote 2.

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[5] See Financial Report for the Year 1956, op. cit., p.15: "The Committee received the contribution of $250,000 under the Austrian Refugees Special Program from the U.S. Government

TABLE 5.
Contributions to the operational budget, 1953–1959, by groups of countries (US$)

COUNTRY GROUP	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959
USA	6,736,133	8,859,043	9,846,339	13,758,262	16,945,140	9,144,003	10,765,917
Non-Latin American immigration countries	1,507,175	1,968,919	3,310,275	4,276,033	8,718,343	3,816,404	4,765,550
Latin American immigration countries	511,078	1,361,959	723,261	787,918	1,483,381	804,491	792,750
Emigration countries	3,081,955	5,291,776	7,451,891	7,510,654	7,006,102	5,081,047	5,617,039
"Sympathizing" countries	102,000	309,851	105,837	375,573	483,903	153,494	271,072
TOTAL	11,938,341	17,791,548	21,437,603	26,708,440	34,636,869	18,999,439	22,212,328

Source: See footnote 2.

TABLE 6.
Contributions to the operational budget, 1953–1959, by groups of countries (%)

COUNTRY GROUP	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959
USA	56	50	46	52	49	48	48
Non-Latin American immigration countries	13	11	15	16	25	20	21
Latin American immigration countries	4	8	3	3	4	4	4
Emigration countries	26	30	35	28	20	27	25
"Sympathizing" countries	1	2	0	1	1	1	1
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: See footnote 2.

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on the understanding that this sum would be fully utilized in 1956 on certain construction and other projects in Austria. Because of the Hungarian crisis, however, this was not possible […] the remaining balance of the contribution received, has been included under obligations for services, supplies, etc. […] to cover the estimated cost of completing the projects concerned in 1957."

[6] See Financial Report for the Year 1957, op. cit., p. 58. This program was also destined to develop infrastructure in Italy. See also Plan of Operations and Budget and Plan of Expenditure for 1958: Revised Estimates, MC/EX/73, p. 9, ICEM 1958, 11th Session of the Executive Committee, Geneva, November 4–19, NARA, Washington D.C.

CHART 3.

Shares of participation of country groups to the operational budget, 1953–1959

Source: See footnote 2.

1.3 *Financing of the Comprehensive Budget of the ICEM*

Table 7 and table 8 present the country contributions to the comprehensive (administrative and operational) budget, aggregated by type of member country for the years 1953–1959. The grouping of countries is the same as for all previous tables. Table 7 presents the contributions of each group of countries in US dollars and table 8 presents the contributions of each group of countries as a percentage of total contributions. Chart 4 displays the share of each group of countries as part of the total country contributions to the comprehensive expenses of the ICEM from 1953 to 1959.

The main characteristics of the ICEM financing are the following:

(a) The overwhelming participation of the United States, something that proved to be the crucial factor guaranteeing the actual operation of ICEM. As a matter of principle, emigration and immigration countries were supposed to share the costs of movements of migrants and refugees. If the United States abided by this principle, (where 15 percent of the total of ICEM-assisted migrants and refugees emigrated), then this country should have contributed to about seven point half percent of the ICEM comprehensive budget. In other

words, the actual contribution of the United States was more than six times higher than what should have been its "normal" share.[7] It should moreover be mentioned that the cost of transport from Europe to the United States was below the average cost of ICEM movements, as opposed to the higher than average cost of movements from Europe to Australia and New Zealand; therefore, the expenses that the United States should have covered for their immigrants were even lower.

(b) If contributions from the United States and the "sympathizing countries" (about 51 percent of the total) are removed, it appears that the remaining costs were practically shared between emigration and immigration countries: 26 percent was paid by emigration countries (mainly Italy with 11 percent, followed by the Netherlands and the FRG with six percent each), compared to 23 percent that was paid by immigration countries (not including the United States), mainly Australia with 17 percent and Canada with five percent.

(c) The distribution between the two major groups of immigration countries, i.e. Latin American and non-Latin American ones, appears to be somewhat biased in favor of the Latin American countries: The latter received almost a third of immigrants moved by the ICEM, though their contribution was about a fifth of the contributions of immigration countries (not including the United States).

(d) Non-Latin American countries contributed slightly more. However, the cost of transport from Europe to Australia, the main country of reception of ICEM-assisted emigrants was much higher than that for all other destinations. In any case, most ICEM expenses concerned transport costs (as explained further below); therefore, there is no doubt that Australia, the most important member of the non-Latin American group, received services that costed much more than its contribution. This fact is acknowledged even in Australian official correspondence.[8]

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[7] See also table 10.

[8] See "Relations between Australia and Canada within ICEM" by Tasman Hudson Eastwood Heyes to David Hay regarding the Australian approach to ICEM activities, as compared to the Canadian approach, April 12, 1961 NAA, Canberra.

TABLE 7. Contributions to the comprehensive (administrative and operational) budget, 1953–1959, by groups of countries (US$)

COUNTRY GROUP	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959
USA	7,451,728	9,493,351	10,480,864	14,529,909	17,720,947	10,088,708	11,629,549
Non-Latin American immigration countries	1,856,921	2,278,985	3,651,445	4,715,320	9,184,522	4,383,989	5,284,716
Latin American immigration countries	780,337	1,626,052	987,445	1,096,647	1,793,753	1,173,675	1,133,724
Emigration countries	3,595,947	5,747,254	7,907,525	8,097,149	7,628,332	5,838,461	6,310,037
"Sympathizing" countries	509,714	671,155	467,264	813,134	923,824	689,018	761,170
TOTAL	14,196,600	19,818,751	23,496,498	29,254,115	37,253,335	22,175,809	25,121,155

Source: See footnote 2.

TABLE 8. Contributions to the comprehensive (administrative and operational) budget, 1953–1959, by groups of countries (%)

COUNTRY GROUP	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959
USA	52	48	45	50	48	45	46
Non-Latin American immigration countries	13	11	16	16	25	20	21
Latin American immigration countries	5	8	4	4	5	5	5
Emigration countries	25	29	34	28	20	26	25
"Sympathizing" countries	4	3	2	3	2	3	3
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: See footnote 2.

CHART 4.

Shares of participation of country groups to the comprehensive (administrative & operational budget, 1953–1959

3% "Sympathizing" countries

Emigration countries 26%

United States of America 48%

5% Latin American immigration countries

18%

Non-Latin American immigration countries

Source: See footnote 2.

TABLE 9.
Immigration through ICEM, 1953–1959

COUNTRY OF IMMIGRATION	1953–1959	%
Australia	257,105	29
Canada	140,516	16
USA	136,704	15
Argentina	101,826	11
Brazil	70,915	8
Others - European	52,018	6
Israel	51,754	6
Venezuela	41,662	5
Uruguay	10,004	1
Others - Overseas	9,281	1
Union of South Africa	8,827	1
New Zealand	8,125	1
Chile	4,657	1
Colombia	2,262	0,3
TOTAL	895,656	100

Source: ICEM Handbook 1962, op.cit., p. 44.

TABLE 10. Average operational contribution of immigration countries per immigrant, 1953–1959 (US$)

COUNTRY OF IMMIGRATION	OPERATIONAL CONTRIBUTION PER IMMIGRANT (US$)
USA	556
New Zealand	84
Australia	70
Canada	49
Israel	44
Argentina	40
Colombia	39
Chile	37
Union of South Africa	29
Brazil	27

Source: See footnote 2 and table 9.

2. What is Paid?

The budget of ICEM administration expenses was totally separate from the operational budget, as was the case with revenues. As a result, these expenses are firstly analyzed in two different chapters. A third chapter is dedicated to the question of services provided to the migrants and a fourth one to the mobilization of the ICEM during the failed Hungarian Revolt of 1956.

2.1 *Administrative Expenses*

The administrative expenses of the ICEM in US dollars for the years 1953–1959 are presented in table 11. Table 12 presents ICEM administrative expenses for the years 1953–1959, aggregated in major categories, as a percentage of the totals. Chart 5 displays the distribution of ICEM administrative expenses from 1953 to 1959 in major categories. Table 13 presents the administrative expenditure as a percentage of ICEM total expenditure, from 1953 to 1959.

Most of the administrative expenses (about three fourths) were staff costs. There is nothing particular about this: Travel and communications are of a relatively high cost (12 percent), but this is normal if the nature of ICEM operations is taken into account. The relation between administrative and

TABLE 11. Administrative expenses of the ICEM, 1953–1959 (US$)

CATEGORY	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959
Staff salaries	1,082,200	1,169,595	1,500,947	1,619,301	1,603,470	1,697,145	1,629,355
Other staff costs	298,224	337,740	303,752	381,836	409,215	778,267	584,118
Travel costs	133,078	142,594	151,428	182,028	175,041	174,532	169,553
Communications	128,690	128,031	143,082	150,513	194,265	134,817	114,889
General office costs	122,419	125,978	142,740	145,751	157,345	188,490	177,702
Contractual services	63,068	53,812	51,352	53,453	54,752	70,948	74,000
Purchase & maintenance of vehicles	45,768	45,744	30,864	27,928	27,902	24,845	21,647
Representation costs	17,088	18,281	39,139	44,210	39,984	41,230	42,753
Conference costs	76,419	62,115	74,785	74,464	108,673	85,421	86,941
Contingency reserve	3,348						
TOTAL	1,970,302	2,083,890	2,438,089	2,679,484	2,770,647	3,195,695	2,900,958

Source: See footnote 2.

TABLE 12. Administrative expenses of the ICEM, 1953–1959 (%)

MAJOR CATEGORY	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959
Staff	71	73	76	76	74	79	78
Travel & communications	13	13	12	12	13	10	10
General office & vehicles	9	8	7	6	7	7	7
Contractual	3	3	2	2	2	2	3
Conference	4	3	3	3	4	3	3
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: See footnote 2.

CHART 5.

Distribution of administrative expenses of the ICEM, 1953–1959 (by major category)

Source: See footnote 2.

TABLE 13. Admninistrative expenses as a percentage of ICEM's total expenditure, 1953–1959

	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959
Administrative expenditure	1,970,302	2,083,890	2,438,089	2,679,484	2,770,647	3,195,695	2,900,958
TOTAL expenditure (US$)	20,308,611	30,182,762	33,647,190	37,604,963	49,017,824	27,929,737	31,156,899
Administrative expenditure as % of total expenditure	10%	7%	7%	7%	6%	11%	9%

Source: See footnote 2.

total expenditure of ICEM was between seven percent and 11 percent, seven point eight percent on average; this can be considered fairly moderate, which is probably due to the relatively low number of staff employed and the nature of the operations undertaken by the Committee. As explained below, operations mainly involved the transportation of migrants and refugees to destination countries.

2.2 *Transport*

The main operational program of the ICEM between 1953 and 1959 was the *European Program*, which concerned the transfer of economic migrants and refugees from Europe overseas. A *Far East Special Program*, which concerned migration of refugees from China and Hong Kong, was also implemented. This was originally financed by a trust fund created with remaining IRO financial resources, after the IRO was liquidated.[9]

Expenditure is analyzed by money spent for the movement of migrants and refugees (by sea, air and rail), and by directly related expenses (such as port charges, baggage and insurance, escort costs, subsistence *en route*) on the one hand, and by money spent for services (such as information dissemination, processing and preselection, language training, vocational training, reception and placement) on the other hand. For part of the expenditure, the financial reports do not offer sufficient information, so this is referred to in the tables as "undefined."

Expenditure does not include "services by member governments," an item that appeared in ICEM financial reports and balance sheets for 1953–1957 as both revenue (in kind) and expenditure (also in kind). This item was excluded from the reports and the balance sheets since 1958, following a Resolution of the Council.[10] It is excluded retrospectively in this chapter for the years after 1953, both for reasons of comparability with the years 1958 and 1959 and

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[9] See *Financial Report for the Year 1953* op. cit., pp. 27–28.

[10] Resolution No. 141 (VI), 16.4.1957, MC/247. NARA, ICEM 1957, Sixth Session of the Council, Geneva, April 8–12. See also, Financial Report for the year 1957: (a) Financial Statements, Including the Report of the External Auditors, and (b) Status Report on the Budget and Plan of Expenditure (Submitted by the Director)" (MC 285), p. 2, ICEM 1958, Eighth Session of the Council of ICEM, Geneva, May 8–14, 1958, NARA, Washington D.C.

also because this item inflated the balance sheets without reason: These services were neither provided for, nor financed by the ICEM.

The operational expenses for the European Program in US dollars in the years 1953–1959 are presented in table 14. The operational expenses for the Far East Special Program in US dollars in the years 1953–1959 are presented in table 15. Table 16 presents the total operational expenditure of the ICEM for the years 1953–1959. Table 17 presents the distribution of the operational expenses for the European Program for the years 1953–1959, as "expenses for movement of migrants and refugees" and "expenses for services." Table 18 presents the distribution of the operational expenses for the Far East Special Program in the years 1953–1959, as "expenses for movement of migrants and refugees" and "expenses for services." Table 19 presents the distribution of the total operational expenses in the years 1953–1959, as "expenses for movement of migrants and refugees" and "expenses for services." The distribution of total ICEM operational expenses from 1953 to 1959 are displayed in chart 6 as "expenses for movement" and "expenses for services." Chart 7 displays the distribution of aggregate ICEM expenditure (administrative and operational) from 1953 to 1959.

TABLE 14. Operational expenditure of the European Program, 1953–1959 (US$)

	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959
Movements	12,207,491	23,434,198	27,339,145	29,468,569	37,810,861	19,744,999	23,145,443
Services	1,876,737	1,181,123	1,624,591	1,646,176	3,262,148	2,537,560	3,016,717
Undefined	2,612,015	2,538,007	1,817,035	2,846,854	3,289,332	1,050,600	1,109,300
TOTAL	16,696,243	27,153,328	30,780,771	33,961,599	44,362,341	23,333,159	27,271,460

Source: See footnote 2.

TABLE 15. Operational expenditure of the Far East Special Program, 1953–1959 (US$)

	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959
Movements	1,336,783	751,935	291,232	874,422	1,173,874	790,957	528,302
Services	282,283	193,609	124,188	89,4580	653,722	566,946	427,359
Undefined	23,000	—	12,910	—	57,240	42,980	28,820
TOTAL	1,642,066	945,544	428,330	963,880	1,884,836	1,400,883	984,481

Source: See footnote 2.

TABLE 16. Total operational expenditure, 1953–1959 (US$)

	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959
Movements	13,544,274	24,186,133	27,630,377	30,342,991	38,984,735	20,535,956	23,673,745
Services	2,159,020	1,374,732	1,748,779	1,735,634	3,915,870	3,104,506	3,444,076
Undefined	2,635,015	2,538,007	1,829,945	2,846,854	3,346,572	1,093,580	1,138,120
TOTAL	18,338,309	28,098,872	31,209,101	34,925,479	46,247,177	24,734,042	28,255,941

Source: See footnote 2.

TABLE 17. Operational expenditure of the European Program, 1953–1959 (%)

	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959
Movements	73	86	89	87	85	85	85
Services	11	4	5	5	7	11	11
Undefined	16	9	6	8	7	5	4
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: See footnote 2.

TABLE 18. Operational expenditure of the Far East Special Program, 1953–1959 (%)

	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959
Movements	81	80	68	91	62	56	54
Services	17	20	29	9	35	40	43
Undefined	1	0	3	0	3	3	3
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: See footnote 2.

TABLE 19. Total operational expenditure, 1953–1959 (%)

	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959
Movements	74	86	89	87	84	83	84
Services	12	5	6	5	8	13	12
Undefined	14	9	6	8	7	4	4
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: See footnote 2.

CHART 6.

Distribution of total operational expenditure, 1953–1959

Undefined   Movements
Services
7%   85%
8%

Source: See footnote 2.

CHART 7.

Distribution of aggregate expenditure (administrative & operational), 1953–1959

Administrative   Movements
Undefined
Services   8%   78%
7%
7%

Source: See footnote 2.

The main conclusion of the analysis of the ICEM operational expenditure is that the overwhelming part of the ICEM operational budget (85 to 90 percent), was spent for moving the migrants and refugees. Other activities of the organization represented a very limited part of the total expenditure. Even if we take into account the administrative expenses as well, the overall picture does not change: For the period from 1953 to 1959, movement (by sea, air and rail) represented more than 80 percent of total expenditure (administrative and operational).

The evolution of operational expenditure over time (from 1953 to 1959) for the European Program is displayed in US dollars in chart 8. The evolution of operational expenditure for the Far East Special Program in US dollars is displayed in chart 9. Chart 10 displays the evolution of the ICEM operational expenditure in total.

CHART 8.

Evolution of operational expenditure for the European Program (US$)

Source: See footnote 2.

CHART 9. Evolution of operational expenditure for the Far East Special Program (US$)

CHART 10. Evolution of total operational expenditure (US$)

Source: See footnote 2.

2.3 *The Question of Services*

Emigration countries, as well as Latin American immigration countries that did not possess adequate administrative structures for the reception and effective placement of migrants, pressed for the development of pre-emigration and post-immigration supportive services by the ICEM.[11] The response of the Committee, however, was faint. There were, of course, some limited initiatives, such as language teaching and training targeted to the needs of labor markets in immigration countries, planning of land settlement schemes and other pilot projects. But these initiatives concerned a limited proportion of the migrants moved by the ICEM.[12] In any case, in the course of the 1950s, the percentage of budget spent for services did not show any tendency for growth. Committee documents, moreover, do not leave any doubt concerning the intended distribution of funds; for instance, in 1958, measures were taken to reduce the non-transport expenditures "into a more balanced relationship with transport expenditures."[13]

It should be noted that the very engineering of ICEM finances did not favor the development of supportive services. The financial contribution of the ICEM member states to the operational budget was calculated on the number of people moved and, therefore, the administration was under continuous pressure to increase migrant numbers. This pressure became increasingly important by the middle of the 1950s. Rapid economic growth in Europe, and especially in West Germany, increased the demand for labor and reduced the number of prospective emigrants from Europe. Supportive services might have improved

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[11] See the contribution by Dimitris Parsanoglou in the research project "Migration Management and International Organizations: A History of the Establishment of the International Organization for Migration," 2686, MIMIO, *ICEM Services for the Reception, Placement and Professional Integration of Immigrants in Receiving Countries*, chapter "Training": No more than 5,700 migrants, over several years, had enrolled in ICEM programs of language teaching; in 1954, 17,500 migrants out of 121,222 moved with ICEM assistance took advantage of the training facilities before the embarkation or on board ships (pp. 9–10).

[12] See the contribution by Ioannis Limnios-Sekeris in the research project "Migration Management and International Organizations: A History of the Establishment of the International Organization for Migration," 2686, MIMIO, *Australia and ICEM*, chapter: "ICEM Services," pp. 49–53.

[13] See *Financial Report for the Year 1958*, op. cit., p. 6.

the efficiency of immigrant placement by the ICEM and might have offered the Committee a more distinct role in the management of international migration flows. In the midterm, improved placements might even have attracted a larger number of migrants and produced a larger number of movements. But, although the importance of supportive services for the efficient settlement of migrants was theoretically acknowledged, the required funds for their massive provision were never allocated. On the contrary, the reduction of the number of migrants moved provoked a drastic cutback in ICEM finances. This trend is clearly evident in chart 10.

It should also be mentioned that the development of supportive services required appropriate organizational structures and experienced staff, which the ICEM seemed to lack. Early ICEM Directors, Deputy Directors and other senior staff were usually men of action, former military officers and diplomats. Besides, the implementation of projects offering supportive services to migrants required a permanent structure, able to undertake multiannual operations. The ICEM was instead a provisory structure, and its mandate was renewed every year. As a result, the ICEM had difficulties in going deeply into the provision of supportive services to the migrants.[14]

As mentioned above, ICEM policy was heavily influenced by the United States and Australia. In what concerns the issue of movements versus services, the prevalence of movements matched the Australian strategy perfectly, a strategy that mainly aimed at financing the expensive transportation of European migrants to distant Oceania. It is somewhat more complex to comprehend or analyze the positioning of the United States. The United States was definitely interested in keeping ICEM in place, even at times of heavy criticism concerning the purpose of its existence; there was a marked insistence, however, in renewing its mandate on an annual basis and not for longer periods. This was a way to avoid long-term commitments and to keep the ICEM under the total control of the United States government.

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[14] See Warren George Sr., "The Development of United States Participation in Intergovernmental Efforts to Resolve Refugee Problems," Memoir submitted to the Department of State, Unpublished Manuscript, Papers of George L. Warren, Box I., [Mimeo, 1967?], p. 169, Harry S. Truman Library, Missouri.

2.4 *Dealing with the Failed Hungarian Revolt of 1956*

The aborted Hungarian revolution of 1956 against the Soviet-backed regime, offered the ICEM a unique opportunity to prove its usefulness. In fact, during 1956–1957, the ICEM apparatus managed to move several tenths of thousands of refugees who flowed from Hungary into Austria quickly and efficiently. It is characteristic that after that date, all references to the usefulness of the ICEM mentioned the role played by the Committee in facing the Hungarian crisis. Henceforth, the ICEM was usually described as being a "standby organization which can be of service in a time of emergence (e.g. the Hungarian crisis of 1956)."[15]

The emergency funds required for facing the Hungarian crisis were provided through the extraordinary use by the Committee of its own funds and assets, funds from member governments, other international organizations, the United States Escapee Program (USEP) and the Irish Red Cross. The Committee even responded positively to Yugoslavia's demand for help, in order to show the willingness of the ICEM to help the Hungarians, who had fled to this non-member country; this particular country, moreover, had a communist government, even if it was not in the Soviet Union's orbit.

3. The Resources Available to the ICEM Put in Perspective

The resources available to the ICEM in the 1950s can be viewed in perspective by comparing its budget to those of other international organizations. As mentioned above, comparing the budget of the ICEM between consecutive years is a feat in itself; one can only imagine the difficulty of putting the figures for every other international organization onto a common, fully comparable basis. The budget of some organizations is a mixture of administrative and operating expenses; various items are accounted for in different ways, etc. The figures therefore obviously indicate only very rough orders of magnitude.

From July 1, 1947 to December 31, 1951, the IRO had received $430 million, funding which was four times the United Nations budget at that time,

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[15] See the letter from Tasman Hudson Eastwood Heyes to David Heyes dated 1961, mentioned in footnote no. 7.

half of which was provided by the United States.[16] At the other end of the spectrum, the *United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees* (UNHCR), an organization that was not supported by the United State in the early 1950s, initially had an annual budget of $300,000.[17] The *International Labour Organization* (ILO) budget in 1954–1960, ranged from six and a hald to nine million dollars, i.e. it was on average about a fifth of the ICEM budget for the same period; however, the ICEM budget, as shown earlier, peaked in 1957. It was then reduced, whereas the ILO budget exhibited a tendency to increase.[18] The *World Health Organization* (WHO) in 1955 disposed less than a fourth of the ICEM budget and in 1960, about half of the respective figure.[19] The budget of the *Food Agricultural Organization* (FAO) of the United Nations in 1956 and 1957 was close to that of the ILO.[20]

As is apparent from the above comparisons, the resources available to the ICEM in the 1950s were many times greater than those of other important international organizations. Edward Marks, one of the Committee's high officials, admitted in 1957 that ICEM had one of the largest operating budgets amongst international organizations (Marks, 1957, p. 485). However, it is true, that most of these resources were allocated for the expenditure of migrant and refugee transportation and that the limits put to the ICEM in formulating its budget were very narrow.

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[16] R. Bernhardt (dir.), *Encyclopedia of Public International Law*, vol. 5: *International Organisations in general. Universal International Organisations and Cooperation*, Amsterdam, Elsevier Science Publications, 1983, p. 172.

[17] http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c1a.html (August 17, 2015)

[18] See Ghebali V.Y., Ago, R. & Valtikos N. (Eds.). (1989). *The International Labour Organisation. A Case Study on the Evolution of UN Specialised Agencies*. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, p. 169.

[19] See World Health Organization. (1958). *The First Ten Years of the World Health Organization*, Geneva: WHO, 1958, pp. 118, 124.

[20] See FAO's budgets for 1956 and 1957. Retrieved from http://www.fao.org/docrep/x5575e/x5575e0b.htm#d

4. The Role of Voluntary Organizations

A distinct characteristic of ICEM's operation was the close collaboration with selected international voluntary organizations involved in the support of migrants and refugees. This collaboration enabled the Committee to maximize its impact without increasing the volume of its permanent structures, by mobilizing voluntary organizations' resources and infrastructures.

The Committee collaborated with voluntary organizations in the establishment of a *Revolving Loan Fund*. Voluntary organizations undertook the collection from the migrants of at least part of the expenditure for their transportation, after their successful settlement in the country of destination; this had been offered to them by the ICEM in the form of a loan without interest. Reimbursable support to the migrants was used to build revolving funds with the voluntary organizations, and the latter guaranteed that revolving funds would stay intact. In some cases, they had to reimburse the revolving funds in advance and so, bridge the time lapse until the actual reimbursement of the loans by the migrants.

Some countries, such as the Netherlands (or Australia, to a certain degree)[21] opposed the system of reimbursable advances to the migrants, on the grounds that reimbursement was a financial burden for the newly established migrant and might reduce his chances of successful integration in his new homeland. However, this system was perfectly consistent with the target of maximizing the number of migrants moved, a fact that was central to ICEM policy.

5. The End of the 1950s and the Future of ICEM

Rapid growth in Europe during the 1950s, and particularly in Germany, as already stated, gradually reduced the number of prospective overseas emigrants. Outmigration from Europe had started to lose momentum already by the middle of that decade. But the reduction was particularly felt after 1957, the peak year of ICEM activities.

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[21] Australia was rather interested in securing that reimbursements by the emigrants would be equal, irrespective of the country of destination, in order to avoid penalization of its own immigrants, due to high transportation costs.

CHART 11. Evolution of operational expenditure for the normal European programs and the Hungarian programs, 1953–1959 (US$)

Sources: see footnote 2.

Meanwhile, the ICEM had to devise an everyday role for itself. Although the Hungarian crisis accounted for most of the increase of ICEM activities in 1956–1957, the trend of its 'normal' operations continued to be positive until 1957, as shown in chart 11. From 1958 onwards, due to the increasing demand for labor in Western Europe, the number of prospective overseas emigrants was decreasing.[22] By the end of the decade, the very concept of "overpopulation" in Europe had lost its sense. Unprecedented growth proved that "overpopulation" is a very relative notion; it does not depend on static ratios between land and population, but on dynamic relations between labor markets, invested capital and the level of technology.

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[22] It should be added that 1958 was a year of temporary recession of the World Economy, and particularly in the United States and most of Europe. Regarding the temporary slowdown in Germany, Italy, and Austria, see chart 12.

CHART 12. GDP growth by groups of countries, 1950–1962, (1950=100)

Source: FEB Penn World Table, International comparisons of production, income and prices (version 8.0).
Output-side real GDP at chained PPPs (2005 US$). Retrieved from: www.rug.nl/research/ggdc/data/pwt/pwt-8.0

In the early 1960s, the focus of ICEM became "to make organized migration an effective instrument for the economic growth and social progress of developing countries, particularly those in Latin America."[23] The idea of moving qualified workers from Europe to 'underdeveloped' areas in order to foster development was widespread. This plan did not succeed because, in the context of rapid growth in Europe, qualified workers willing to emigrate from Europe, and especially to less developed countries, were hard to find.[24]

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[23] See Report of the Director on the work and finances of the Committee for the year 1960, MC/450/Add.1, p. 24. NARA, ICEM 1961, 14th Session of the Council of the ICEM, NARA, Washington D.C.

[24] Baron C.H. von Platen, Swedish observer at the 14th (Special) Session of the Executive Committee of ICEM reported that: "As was pointed out by our Colombian colleague, skilled workers for example, usually find good jobs in Europe. Unskilled workers are usually not needed in a great number of the immigration countries." See: I.D. Emerton (of the Australian

Furthermore, as migration's contribution to development was a controversial issue, the justification of ICEM's existence proved an embarrassing task: As United States Delegate and creator of ICEM George L. Warren, stated at the thirteenth session of the Council, in November 1960:

> The difficult[y] is that we need specific evidence on the contribution that migration makes to economic development. Now, it is significant that when you talk to those in the field of economics about migration and its possible contribution to economic development, you do not get much response. They say that economic development results from so many factors in terms of trade, natural resources, and so on. There are so many factors which contribute to economic development that the role of migration in economic development is very difficult to identify and, therefore, there are no conclusions at least by the scientists on that score. *The economists with which we have to deal are quite convinced that, when you consider the economic development of an underdeveloped country, there are much higher priorities than migration*, such as provision of electric power, development of roads, external capital investment and so on.[25]

From the beginning of ICEM activities, there were constant operational budget deficits, which provoked serious difficulties to the organization's function and planning and uncertainties amongst its officials and staff. From 1955 to 1958, although ICEM faced increasing financial problems, it failed to reach an acceptable revision of contributions. Nevertheless, a first step was attained when a *Special Fund* was organized to cover the gap between resources and costs (Holborn, 1961, p. 12). In 1958, a consensus was provisionally reached on the issue of an equitable sharing of costs. Subsequently, ICEM contributions to the cost of transport would have to be supplementary to resources provided by governments; government contributions would be proportional, as far as possible, to the costs of the services received; ICEM would demand a $40 minimum payment for each migrant moved from both sending and receiving

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Department of Immigration, Canberra) to B. L. Murray, "The importance of ICEM (and through it migration) as a stimulus to the economic development of migrant receiving countries," Report, March 15, 1961, pp. 4–5, The Future of ICEM and Australia's Role (Part 1), NARA, Washington D.C.

[25] Ibid., p. 3 [emphasis added].

countries; migrants would have to contribute as largely as possible towards their movement (Holborn, 1961, pp. 12–13). Sharp differences between governments that believed that economically advantaged countries should bear more burdens and those that held that benefiting states should participate more in the cost of operations continued to divide the member states (Bouscaren, 1963, pp. 44–45). In 1959, Director Marcus Daly, while presenting a deficit budget, warned member governments that he would have "to close the shop," if they did not accept to contribute more to the ICEM operational budget.[26] In spite of these warnings, in 1960, the United States announced that, from the following year onwards, it would not pay more than 40 percent of the total of government contributions and that it intended to gradually reduce its contribution to the operational budget to 33 percent (Bouscaren, 1963, pp. 44–45). However, despite the financial problems, the conflicts they provoked, and persistent uncertainty concerning the Committee's role, the ICEM had more member states by 1960 than eight years before, it had attained a more permanent character and, after the efficiency it had demonstrated during the Hungarian crisis, it enjoyed an internationally recognized standing.

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[26] ICEM, Council, 11th Session, December 1959, (MC/C/SR/95), Annex II, p. 30, ICEM 1959, 11th Session of the Council of the ICEM, Geneva, November 12–20, NARA, Washington D.C.

The Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration and the Transport Business (1952–1960)

Ioannis Limnios-Sekeris

Close relations between states, steamship companies and migration already existed in the late nineteenth century. When international organizations started intervening in the transfer of refugees overseas, they formed one more link in the chain of factors influencing human mobility. After the Second World War, during a period when means of transport were scarce, internationally organised migration depended largely on the state and availability of the transportation sector. The *International Refugee Organisation* (IRO) was able to fulfill its mission under these circumstances, due to its ability to provide its own means of transport as it controlled a fleet of ships. With the upcoming dissolution of the IRO in 1951, this fleet would have had to return to its pre-war activities and original owners. In fact, one of the reasons that led the United States to pursue the establishment of the *Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe* (PICMME) was the continuation of the use of the IRO fleet for the transportation of Europeans overseas. As it turned out, PICMME worked with sixteen ships, five owned by the United States Army, five by the United States Navy and six under charter, all at an operational cost of $20 million for the first year.[1] In any case, this was seen simply as a provisional solution.

Western governments, well aware of the numerous difficulties implied in mass migration and, amongst them specifically in the domain of transportation, established the PICMME/ICEM in 1951 in order "to make arrangements for

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[1] ACGG to DEAC, 241, Cable, Restricted, October 31, 1951, A446, 1962/66432, ICEM/PICMME, Establishment of Organisation Part 1, NAA, Canberra. Some of the sixteen ships were previously used by the IRO, mainly those owned by the United States Forces.

the transport of migrants."[2] Naturally, close relations developed between the Committee and private business interests in the domain of transportation from its establishment onwards. On the one hand, ICEM heavily depended on shipping companies and their competition for the accomplishment of its mission. On the other, migration was a fertile ground for business opportunities and large profits. Furthermore, in contrast to older forms of spontaneous mobility, ICEM offered the transportation business an opening to the market of organized mass migration ensuring it numerous passengers in scheduled ocean voyages; a stable documented clientele that they did not risk to have to return on their own charges to Europe; an opening of new routes with fewer risks and a greater possibility to plan economically viable passages.

Conflicts Concerning Security on Board

Since its creation, the ICEM had established a *Sub-Committee for the Coordination of Transport*.[3] The planning of migrant movements was not an easy task. The ICEM had to take into account the availability and condition of transport means, the number of emigrants ready for embarkation, the receiving countries' preferences concerning the timing of arrivals, the carriers' interests, the balances among national, commercial and chartered carriers, and much more. The Sub-Committee's role was to advise the ICEM on transport matters, to investigate and prevent problems, to study the conditions on ships, and to assess air movements.[4] It also had to coordinate the different transport needs and government preferences. The effectiveness of this body was often questioned, with some governments declaring that it "is an ineffectual body of doubtful value" and that it was a "little out of touch of the thinking of Member Governments generally."[5]

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[2] Migration Conference, Brussels (November 26 – December 5, 1951), Annex I, "Resolution to Establish a Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe (Adopted at the 13th Meeting, December 5, 1951)."

[3] Ibid.

[4] PICMME First Session, "Memorandum on the Formation of an Intergovernmental Sub-Committee for the Coordination of Transport," PIC/5/Rev.2, December 14, 1951, First Session of the PICMME, Brussels, December 6–8, 1951, NARA, Washington D.C.

[5] "Report of the Australian Delegation. ICEM, Tenth Session of the Executive Committee

In fact, the Sub-Committee was not always very efficient in assessing the worthiness of the transport means used by the Committee, and the ICEM Administration admitted to using ships that were not suited for transferring passengers under proper health and safety conditions.[6] The *International Convention for the Safety at Sea*, signed in 1948 in London, had installed regulations regarding the construction of the vessels, their configuration and their life saving appliances.[7] Moreover, the welfare of migrants during their voyage to their new homes was a serious matter, which concerned not only the ICEM, but also the national governments, as well as other organisations and agencies. It should not be forgotten that, on certain routes, the voyage lasted more than 25 days. Nevertheless, life-saving means on board ships used by the ICEM were often proven to be defective (Limnios-Sekeris, 2015, pp. 107–108).[8] Migrants often complained about the lack of air-conditioning on vessels or flights and the lack of drinking water or milk for children on board; on a particular flight from Germany to Australia, it was reported that three passengers had no seats.[9] Even serious incidents, which put migrants' lives at risk, occurred; one such example was the sinking of the vessel *Skaubryn* in April 1958, carrying ICEM migrants from Germany to Australia, when a fire broke out in the engine room of the vessel in the middle of the Indian Ocean. The migrants were transferred on lifeboats to other ships that were called in to assist the passengers (Plowman, 2006, p. 95).[10]

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and Eight Session of the Council," Restricted, May 1958, A446, 1966/46169, ICEM, Tenth Session of Executive Committee and Eighth Session of Council, Geneva 1958, NAA, Canberra.

[6] ICEM Council Fifth Session, "Report of the Sub-Committee on the Coordination of Transport," MC/206, October 1, 1956, Fifth Session of the Council and the Executive Committee of ICEM, Geneva, September 20 – October 6, 1956, NARA, Washington D.C.

[7] "International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1948," London, 1948, http://www.imo.org/KnowledgeCentre/ReferencesAndArchives/HistoryofSOLAS/Documents/SOLAS%201948%20UK%20Treaty%20Series.pdf

[8] ICEM Council Fifth Session, "Report of the Sub-Committee on the Coordination of Transport," MC/206, October 1, 1956, Fifth Session of the Council and the Executive Committee of ICEM, Geneva, September 20 – October 6, 1956, NARA, Washington D.C.

[9] For complaints, ICEM Council Fourteenth Session, "Report of the Sub-Committee on the Coordination of Transport," MC/464, May 11, 1961, 14th Session of the Council of the ICEM, Geneva, May 11–17, 1961, NARA, Washington D.C.; C. Booth (Clerk N.E. Section) to [C.M.O. Sydney], December 19, 1955, C3939, N1959/75176, Immigration, Information Officers on Dutch and ICEM Vessels, NAA, Sydney.

[10] DEAC to Australian Embassy Rome, 107, Immediate, Cable, April 2, 1958, A463, 1956/569

Another similar case was that of the Spanish vessel *Montserrat*, carrying migrants from Spain and Greece to Australia in May 1959: Due to recurring problems with the vessel's engines, the journey lasted 55 days instead of 21 (Limnios-Sekeris, 2015, p. 109). The ICEM, especially after these two incidents in 1959, strove to ensure the sea-worthiness and air-worthiness of the means of transport it used. The problems on the ships and aircraft used had resulted in negative publicity for immigration to Australia and had had severe repercussions on the Committee's fame and reliability.

The Committee tried to eliminate such incidents by applying pressure on the ship-owners to improve the safety standards of their vessels,[11] by both conducting more frequent inspections on ships and aircraft and appointing ICEM escort staff to accompany the migrants for part of their voyage and report back about the conditions on board.[12] However, on several occasions, ICEM Administration admitted that "vessels of lower quality"[13] or "ships not designed for so long a voyage through the tropics"[14] were used in order to meet the

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Part 2, Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration. (ICEM) 1957–1959, NAA, Canberra; DEAC to Governor Aden, EX.147, Immediate, Cable, April 5, 1958, A463, 1956/569 Part 2, Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration. (ICEM) 1957–1959, NAA, Canberra; Australian Migration Office Cologne to DEAC, AC.82, Cable, April 2, 1958, A1838, 932/9/1 Part 1, ICEM, Movements of Migrants to Australia, NAA, Canberra.

[11] For the reconversion of ships under ICEM initiative, ICEM Council Fifth Session, "Report of the Sub-Committee on the Coordination of Transport," MC/206, October 1, 1956, Fifth Session of the Council and the Executive Committee of ICEM, Geneva, September 20 – October 6, 1956, NARA, Washington D.C.; ICEM Council Sixth Session, "Report of the Director on the Work of the Committee for the Year 1956," MC/223/Rev.1, April 1, 1957, Sixth Session of the Council and Seventh Session of the Executive Committee of ICEM, Geneva, March 28 – April 12, 1957/ICEM Council Documents MC/Sixth Session (First Copy), NARA, Washington D.C.

[12] ICEM Council Fourth Session, "Report of the Sub-Committee on the Co-ordination of Transport," MC/180, February 20, 1956, Fourth Session of the Council and the Executive Committee of ICEM, Geneva, February 14–26, 1956, NARA, Washington D.C.; ICEM Council Sixth Session, "Report of the Director on the Work of the Committee for the Year 1956," MC/223/Rev.1, April 1, 1957, Sixth Session of the Council and Seventh Session of the Executive Committee of ICEM, Geneva, March 28 – April 12, 1957/ICEM Council Documents, MC/Sixth Session (1st Copy), NARA, Washington D.C.

[13] ICEM Council Fourth Session, "Report of the Sub-Committee on the Co-ordination of Transport," MC/180, February 20, 1956, Fourth Session of the Council and the Executive Committee of ICEM, Geneva, February 14–26, 1956, NARA, Washington D.C.

[14] ICEM Council Fourth Session, "Report on the Work of the Committee for the Year 1955. Submitted by the Director in accordance with Article 20 of the Constitution," MC/177, January

program requirements. The ICEM compromised and used vessels of lower standards in order to meet deadlines set by receiving countries. It seems that the ICEM often weighed the interests of shipping companies and immigration countries to be more important than the welfare of the migrants under its care.

Pressure was also applied on the Committee by maritime countries, which tried to avoid the implementation of strict regulations or stricter and more frequent inspections on ships. If those receiving countries that were less involved in the transportation business promoted the toughening of inspections, others with fleets strived to maintain ship inspections under their own control. In 1960, during the discussions concerning the ICEM Administration proposal to appoint a Safety Inspection Officer to inspect the vessels and aircraft used by the Committee, certain member-countries disagreed fiercely: Namely, Spain, Italy, Greece and France were severely opposed to such an appointment. Backed by Germany and the Netherlands, these countries supported the idea that safety certificates should be issued by the national governments under the provisions of the Safety at Sea International Convention of 1948 and this, and nothing further, should be considered sufficient. The Italian delegate adamantly stated that his government would only accept the proposed system, if the ICEM were to regard additional inspections as "supplementary" to the national certificates issued under the London Convention. Australia, on the other hand, underlined the deficiencies found during recent inspections of vessels and the moral obligation of the ICEM and its member-governments to ensure migrant safety. It also pointed out that the proposed inspection system had already been applied to the vessels of three countries. Australia, backed by Canada, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, New Zealand and the United States, supported the Administration's proposal to permit inspections by ICEM officials. Disagreement led to the postponement of a decision on this matter, much to Australia's disappointment.[15]

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26, 1956, Fourth Session of the Council and the Executive Committee of ICEM, Geneva, February 14–26, 1956, NARA, Washington D.C. Corresponding references also in: ICEM Council Third Session, "Report on Progress Since the Second Session of the Council covering the period 1 May – 15 August 1955. Submitted by the Director," MC/152, September 9, 1955, Third Session of the Council, Geneva, October 17–22, 1955 and the Ex. Comm., October 6–22, 1955, NARA, Washington D.C.

[15] ICEM Council Twelfth Session, "Report of the Sub-Committee on the Co-Ordination of Transport," MC/396 (E), May 6, 1960, 12th Session of the Council of the ICEM, Naples, May

The amelioration of safety and living conditions on vessels during the 1950s was also hampered by the shortage of transport means, as the building of new ships was slow. In fact, in 1956, shipyards were booked with orders for three or four years in advance, even though the cost involved was very high.[16] Moreover, newly built ships were used primarily for tourist traffic, as the number of tourists also increased during this decade. Often, the ICEM was not able to find space for migrants due to increased tourist traffic,[17] so, in combination with the absence of newly built ships serving migrant transport, the ICEM's only alternative was to use refurbished older ships. Tourist traffic was more profitable than the transportation of migrants, since it could easily absorb fare increases; as a result, the ship-owners committed their best vessels to the tourism sector. On the other hand, however, the Committee also depended on the expansion of tourist traffic, since one of its main problems during the first years of its existence was the high cost of vessels returning to Europe without passengers. In contrast, when ships transporting migrants could also be used by tourists travelling in the opposite direction, the fares decreased. Consequently, this beneficial combination of movements maintained the interest of the carriers and the uninterrupted service of certain routes.

5–13, 1960, NARA, Washington D.C. For the Australian position to the discussion: I.D. Emerton (Australian Delegation to ICEM), Naples to R.E. Armstrong (DIMC), 5, Personal, Confidential, May 11, 1960, A446, 1966/46174, ICEM, 15th Session of Executive Committee and 12th Session of Council, Geneva 1960, NAA, Canberra; "Report of the Australian Delegation to the Fifteenth Session of the Executive Committee and Twelfth Session of the Council of ICEM," April/May 1960, A446, 1966/46174, ICEM, 15th Session of Executive Committee and 12th Session of Council, Geneva 1960, NAA, Canberra.

[16] ICEM Council Fifth Session, "Report of the Sub-Committee on the Coordination of Transport," MC/206, October 1, 1956, Fifth Session of the Council and the Executive Committee of ICEM, Geneva, September 20 – October 6, 1956, NARA, Washington D.C.

[17] ICEM, Eighth Session, "General Report of the Director for the Period 1 May – 30 September 1954," MC/91, October 20, 1954, Eighth Session of the ICEM and First Session of the Council and the Ex. Comm. of ICEM, Geneva, 11/30/54; 11/30-12/4/54 and 12/4/54 respectively, NARA, Washington D.C.; ICEM Council Second Session, "Report on the Work of the Committee for the Year 1954. Submitted by the Deputy Director," MC/128, Mar. 11, 1954, Second Session of the Council and the Executive Committee of ICEM, Geneva, April 21 – May 4, 1955, NARA, Washington D.C.; ICEM Council Fifth Session, "Report of the Sub-Committee on the Coordination of Transport," MC/206, October 1, 1956, Fifth Session of the Council and the Executive Committee of ICEM, Geneva, September 20 – October 6, 1956, NARA, Washington D.C.

Conflicting Interests in Internationally Funded Transportation of Migrants

Apart from the difficulties ICEM faced in planning the movements and securing the safety of migrants travelling overseas, transportation issues often provoked other conflicts of interests between the member governments and between governments and the Administration. Some of the ICEM member states had long-established transport companies and wanted to ensure that the movement of their nationals under the Committee's auspices would be undertaken by their own national carriers, so as to increase revenues and counter the competition from carriers under foreign flags. Reasons of national prestige and the welfare of potential migrants were also contributing factors, since the migrants would be traveling on carriers where the crew spoke their language and the food served would be more familiar and agreeable.

Under the *Refugee Relief Act* (RAA) of 1953, the United States refused the transportation of alien-holders of visas (under this Act) to its shores on carriers of foreign flags.[18] This provision concerned all the aliens for whom the cost of transfer was undertaken exclusively or partly by the United States. Italy, a traditional maritime country, imposed restrictions on the use of charter ships[19] and commercial or charter aircraft[20] for the transfer of Italian emigrants through ICEM, thus promoting the use of carriers under the Italian flag. The Netherlands, another traditional maritime country, signed an agreement with the ICEM, ensuring that the transportation of all Dutch emigrants would be provided by the Dutch fleet, which had lines heading to all destination countries.[21]

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[18] Scott McLeod (Administrator, Bureau of Inspection, Security and Consular Affairs) to Hugh Gibson (ICEM Director), July 27, 1954, Records of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, ICEM 1953–1956, NARA, Washington D.C.

[19] "Memorandum in Discussions with Mr. T.H.E. Heyes Held at ICEM Headquarters, Geneva, on Thursday 28th May, 1959," [1959], A446, 1962/65076, ICEM General Part 1, NAA, Canberra.

[20] ICEM Council Twelfth Session, "Report of the Sub-Committee on the Coordination of Transport," MC/396 (E), May 6, 1960, 12th Session of the Council of the ICEM, Naples, May 5–13, 1960, NARA, Washington D.C.

[21] ICEM Council Eleventh Session, "Report of the Sub-Committee on the Coordination of Transport," MC/361, November 13, 1959, 11th Session of the Council of the ICEM, Geneva, November 12–20, 1959, NARA, Washington D.C.; DIMC, "The Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration in Relation to Australia's Immigration Policy and Programmes," June 23, 1958, A446, 1962/67291, ICEM, Australian Attitude, NAA, Canberra; ICEM, Fifth Session,

This agreement was upheld throughout the 1950s. In 1956, the fleets under flags of these three countries—the United States, Italy and the Netherlands—were receiving nearly 70 percent of ICEM payments.[22]

Naturally, the prospect of economic benefits did not only cause frictions, but also led member governments to collaborate in order to support their common interests. For example, Germany requested Australia's support for the use of the ports in Bremen and Hamburg by ICEM for German migrants, instead of the Northern Italian ports. This request meant a greater cost for the Committee; even so, Australia thought of replying positively, since Canberra hoped to secure larger inflows in exchange, at a time when the number of German migrants was sharply decreasing.[23] Common interests also prompted Italy to seek the assistance of Greece in opposing the use of aircraft for migrant transport (Limnios-Sekeris, 2015, p. 104).

"Report of the Director on Progress to Date and Prospects for 1953," MC/9/Rev.1, April 28, 1953, Fifth Session of the ICEM, Geneva, April 16–24, 1953, NARA, Washington D.C.

[22] The case of Panama, which was not a member of ICEM for most of the 1950s, is different. Panama, as is well known, offered (and still does) lower taxes and a more lenient inspection system for ships under its flag. Consequently, the share of Panama in table 1 actually depicts a "flag of convenience" system, as it was the Greek, United States and ship-owners of other nationalities who registered their vessels under Panamanian flag. It is also important to note that the percentage of Panama represented in table 1 largely refers to chartered ships. Panama joined the ICEM at the end of 1958, probably in an effort to secure more profits from the transportation business, since the Committee's trend to prefer national commercial carriers had placed the continuance of such high revenues under threat. For Panama's adherence to the Committee, see: ICEM Council Ninth Session, "Resolution No. 175 (IX) Admission of the Government of the Republic of Panama as a Member of the Committee," MC/323, November 27, 1958, Ninth Session of the Council of ICEM, Geneva, November 13–19, 1958, NARA, Washington D.C. To comprehend the range of revenues of that period, the sum paid by the ICEM to Italian carriers between 1956 and 1959 was $35,498,319, whereas the Dutch national carriers received $17,121,965, see "Comparison of Payments to ICEM by Italy and the Netherlands, and Committee Payments to carriers of those countries 1956–1959," [1960], A446, 1966/46175, ICEM, 16th Session of Executive Committee and 13th Session of Council, Geneva 1960, NAA, Canberra.

[23] ICEM Council Fourth Session, "Report of the Sub-Committee on the Co-ordination of Transport," MC/180, February 20, 1956, Fourth Session of the Council and the Executive Committee of ICEM, Geneva, February 14–26, 1956, NARA, Washington D.C. For the Australian position to the German request, E.L. Charles to Heyes, OL.26, March 6, 1956, A446, 1966/46163, ICEM, Fourth Session Executive Committee and Council, Geneva 1956, NAA, Canberra; Ralph Harry (Australian Delegation to the European Office of the United Nations in Geneva) to Heyes, March 8, 1956, A446, 1966/46163, ICEM, Fourth Session Executive Committee and Council, Geneva 1956, NAA, Canberra.

The economic opportunities arising from migrant transportation was one of the reasons that led several "sympathizing" countries, such as France, Norway and Sweden, to become and remain members of the Committee. This group of countries, not directly involved in overseas emigration, enjoyed quite a number of financial benefits: Most had transport companies under state control or supported private companies under their national flag. As the French delegate stated in 1958 during a discussion on the reduction of transport costs, although he respected the humanitarian work of ICEM, "too heavy [a] sacrifice" should not be imposed on ship-owners since they were facing "increased operational costs." He stressed, that "in some cases, sacrifices for reducing rates should be supported by the Governments concerned rather than by the individual ship-owners, as they are unable to bear further burdens."[24] The economic gains involved partly explain why the sympathizing countries were represented on the Sub-Committee for the Coordination of Transport, as well as on the Executive Committee; this is also one of the reasons these countries contributed to ICEM budgets. On the other hand, the ICEM Administration was also in need of their continued participation, since carriers under the flag of these countries often offered valuable space for the transfer of migrants.

With the gradual recovery of transport means in the 1950s, competition between carriers under different flags, and even amongst those sailing under the same flag, became more acute. Thus, the Dutch government offered reduction on the fares paid by the Committee for each non-Dutchman travelling on Dutch vessels.[25] The *Greek-Australian Line*, launched in 1959, was obliged to deal with the fierce reaction of several well-established shipping houses on the Australian route that prohibited travel agencies in Australia and New Zealand from using this new line, threatening them with sanctions (Limnios-Sekeris, 2015, p. 102).[26]

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[24] ICEM Council Ninth Session, "Report of the Sub-Committee on the Coordination of Transport," MC/322, November 12, 1958, Ninth Session of the Council of ICEM, Geneva, November 13–19, 1958, NARA, Washington D.C.

[25] Ralph Harry-Australian Representative, "ICEM Report of the Australian Delegation to the Second Session of the Council," [1955], A446, 1966/46161, ICEM, Second Session Executive Committee and Council, Geneva 1955, NAA, Canberra.

[26] Additionally, Canada managed to achieve the withdrawal of ships from the Australian run, and their routing on the North Atlantic run in a period of great difficulties on the route

TABLE 1.

Distribution of traffic by flag of commercial & chartered ships under ICEM, since February 1, 1952 (%)

Mar.	Italy	Panama	USA	Argentina	France	Sweden	Norway	Greece	Netherl.	Canada	Others				Total
1955	31.8	22.8	13.7	7.7	6.3	5.1	4.1	3	2.5	2.2	0.8				100
Oct.	Italy	Panama	USA	Sweden	Argentina	France	Norway	Netherl.	Greece	Canada	Others				Total
1955	31.4	20.2	13.1	7.5	7.2	6	4.8	3.6	3.6	1.8	0.8				100
Feb.	Italy	Panama	USA	Sweden	Argentina	France	Norway	Netherl.	Greece	Canada	Others				Total
1956	31.2	19.4	13.3	6.8	7	5.9	5.1	4.9	3.9	1.6	0.9				100
Sep.	Italy	Panama	USA	Sweden	Argentina	Netherl.	France	Norway	Greece	Canada	Others				Total
1956	30.5	17.6	14.1	7.4	6.9	5.9	5.6	4.9	4.5	1.4	1.2				100
Feb.	Italy	Panama	USA	Sweden	Argentina	Netherl.	France	Norway	Greece	Canada	FRG	Others	UK	Spain	Total
1957	30.8	16.2	15.2	6.4	6.6	6.3	5.3	4.7	4.7	1.2	0.2	1.7	0.6	0.1	100
Aug.	Italy	Panama	USA	Argentina	Holland	Sweden	France	Greece	Norway	UK	Spain	Canada	FRG	Others	Total
1957	32.2	15.1	14.4	7	6.3	5.7	5.2	4.6	4.4	0.7	1.3	1.1	0.3	1.7	100

Source: ICEM Council Second Session, "Report of the Sub-Committee on the Coordination of Transport,"
MC/132, Apr. 25, 1955, 2nd Session of the Council and the Executive Committee of ICEM, Geneva, April 21 –
May 4, 1955, NARA, Washington D.C.; ICEM Council Fourth Session, "Report of the Sub-Committee on the
Coordination of Transport," MC/180, February 20, 1956, Fourth Session of the Council and the Executive
Committee of ICEM, Geneva, February 14–26, 1956, NARA, Washington D.C.; ICEM Sixth Session Council,
"Report of the Sub-Committee on the Co-Ordination of Transport," MC/235, April 6, 1957, Sixth Session of the
Council and Seventh Session of the Executive Committee of ICEM, Geneva, March 28 – April 12, 1957/ICEM
Council Documents MC/Sixth Session (First Copy), NARA, Washington D.C.; ICEM Council Seventh Session,
"Report of the Sub-Committee on the Co-ordination of Transport," MC/259, October 5, 1957, Seventh Session
of the Council of ICEM, Geneva, October 7–12, 1957, NARA, Washington D.C.

Another source of friction concerned the use of commercial or chartered means of transport by the Committee. Towards the second half of the 1950s, when the deficits of ICEM budgets were inflated, the Administration sought larger margins to plan transport and tried to obtain substantial reductions in travel costs by chartering ships and aircraft to a greater extent. Countries without great stakes in the transportation business, like Australia, supported the ICEM claiming that "all possibilities of transport" should be explored.[27] However, more member states undermined this effort. Based on Resolution No. 99 (II), adopted by the Committee in 1955, the Italian delegate insisted

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towards Oceania, see ACGG to DEAC, 15, Restricted, Cable, January 9, 1957, A463, 1956/569 Part 1, Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM) 1952–1957, NAA, Canberra.

[27] For the opinions of different member states, ICEM Council Eleventh Session, "Report of the Sub-Committee on the Co-Ordination of Transport," MC/361, November 13, 1959, 11th Session of the Council of the ICEM, Geneva, November 12–20, 1959, NARA, Washington D.C.

TABLE 2.

Distribution of traffic by flag of aircrafts under ICEM, since February 1, 1952 (%)

Mar.	USA	Netherlands	Belgium	Scandinavia	Others					Total
1955	74.3	17.1	4.7	2.9	1					100
Oct.	USA	Netherlands	Scandinavia	Belgium	Others					Total
1955	73.5	19.4	2.5	3.6	1					100
Feb.	USA	Netherlands	Scandinavia	Belgium	Others					Total
1956	73.2	19.5	3.1	3	1.2					100
Aug.	USA	Netherlands	Belgium	Scandinavia	Rhodesia	France	Others	Canada	South Africa	Total
1956	80	12.2	1.9	1.8	1.2	0.9	0.8	0.7	0.5	100
Feb.	USA	Others	Netherlands	Scandinavia	Belgium	South Africa	France	Rhodesia		Total
1957	71.1	15.9	7	2.6	1.3	0.8	0.7	0.6		100
Aug.	USA	Others	Netherlands	Canada	Scandinavia	Belgium	France	South Africa	Rhodesia	Total
1957	72.5	11.7	5.3	4.1	2	2	1	0.9	0.5	100

Source: ICEM Council Second Session, "Report of the Sub-Committee on the Coordination of Transport," MC/132, April 25, 1955, Second Session of the Council and the Executive Committee of ICEM, Geneva, April 21 – May 4, 1955, NARA, Washington D.C.; ICEM Council Fourth Session, "Report of the Sub-Committee on the Coordination of Transport," MC/180, February 20, 1956, Fourth Session of the Council and the Executive Committee of ICEM, Geneva, February 14–26, 1956, NARA, Washington D.C.; ICEM Council Fifth Session, "Report of the Sub-Committee on the Coordination of Transport," MC/206, October 1, 1956, Fifth Session of the Council and the Executive Committee of ICEM, Geneva, September 20 – October 6, 1956, NARA, Washington D.C.; ICEM Council Seventh Session, "Report of the Sub-Committee on the Coordination of Transport," MC/259, October 5, 1957, Seventh Session of the Council of ICEM, Geneva, October 7–12, 1957, NARA, Washington D.C.

on the utilisation of "commercial facilities to the maximum extent that they are available and adequate" and pointed out that the "chartering of ships and planes should be resorted to [only] when regular services were not available." Italy stated that the use of chartered means of transport "would disturb the normal pattern of trade [and] would stir competition," and, moreover, that "ICEM [...] should not be guided strictly by economic considerations [...] and should not take advantage of the present shipping crisis to create more and more difficulties for shipping lines." Italy was supported by Greece, Spain and the Netherlands—all maritime countries—with the latter pointing out that "it would not be wise to adopt the cheapest means of transport simply because of the present financial position" of the Committee.[28] Thus, although the use of

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[28] For the opinions of different countries, ICEM Council Eleventh Session, "Report of the Sub-Committee on the Co-Ordination of Transport," MC/361, November 13, 1959, 11th Session

chartered carriers intensified competition with established lines, the conflicting interests of its member states countries did not permit the Committee to take full advantage of this competition. According to the ICEM Director, the Committee *could* have saved one million dollars in 1959, if the Administration had been left to select the cheapest means of transport.[29]

TABLE 3. Payments made to the flags participating in the ICEM traffic (US$)

FLAG	1956	%	Jan.–Jun.1957	%	Jan.1956–Jun.1957
Argentina	858,668.50	3.1	894,044.59	4.6	1,752,713.09
Canada	53,483.20	0.2			53,483.20
France	803,486.32	3	557,356.69	2.9	1,360,843.01
FRG	167,534.85	0.6	144,388.08	0.7	311,922.93
Great Britain	470,553.06	1.7	368,573.69	1.9	839,126.75
Greece	1,550,880.70	5.7	106,631.71	0.6	1,657,512.41
Israel	457,832.90	1.6	459,752.00	2.4	917,584.90
Italy	6,440,212.60	23.6	4,141,887.20	21	10,582,099.80
Netherlands	4,339,449.90	15.8	1,509,406.14	7.8	5,848,856.04
Norway	1,160,374.20	4.2	647,203.32	3.3	1,807,577.52
Panama	2,731,104.64	10	1,548,508.34	8	4,279,612.98
Sweden	115,982	0.4			115,982.00
USA	7,859,303.56	28.7	7,753,170.80	40	15,612,474.36
Spain			826,340.79	4.3	826,340.79
Others	372,606.84	1.4	398,010.11	2.1	770,616.95
TOTALS	27,381,473.27	100	19,355,273.46	100	46,736,746.73

Source: ICEM Sixth Session Council, "Report of the Sub-Committee on the Co-Ordination of Transport," MC/235, April 6, 1957, Sixth Session of the Council and Sixth Session of the Executive Committee of ICEM, Geneva, March 28 – April 12, 1957/ICEM Council Documents MC/Sixth Session (First Copy), NARA, Washington D.C.; ICEM Council Seventh Session, "Report of the Sub-Committee on the Co-ordination of Transport," MC/259, October 5, 1957, Seventh Session of the Council of the ICEM, Geneva, October 7–12, 1957, NARA, Washington D.C.

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of the Council of the ICEM, Geneva, November 12–20, 1959, NARA, Washington D.C. For the Resolution No. 99 (II), ICEM Council Second Session, "Resolution No.99 (II). Resolution on the Report of the Sub-Committee on the Coordination of Transport," MC/139, April 28, 1955, Second Session of the Council and the Executive Committee of ICEM, Geneva, April 21 – May 4, 1955, NARA, Washington D.C.

[29] ICEM Council 12th Session, "Report of the Sub-Committee on the Coordination of Transport", MC/396 (E), May 6, 1960, 12th Session of the Council of the ICEM, Naples, May 5–13, 1960, NARA, Washington D.C.

Transportation by Sea or Air

The most disadvantageous route for the ICEM was the Australian one. The long distance between Europe and Australia and the nature of migrant traffic (only one way ran in full capacity), created several availability issues on this route. Even more difficulties emerged during the Suez Crisis: The closure of the Suez Canal, between October 1956 and March 1957, meant longer hauls for the ships traveling to Oceania, leading to a fare increase of approximately four percent on vessels from Northern Europe and 12–15 percent on those leaving Southern Europe.[30] Under these circumstances, many ships withdrew from the Australian run and were diverted to more advantageous routes, such as the North Atlantic one,[31] where the profits were higher. This created an opportunity for the augmentation of air movements towards Australia.[32] Up to that time, flights to Australia were only preferred either when the cost was competitive to the fares on ships[33] or when groups considered to be vulnerable were involved (i.e. families, elderly persons, women carrying children, pregnant or unaccompanied women),[34] or when sea travel was not

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[30] ICEM, Sixth Session, "Report of the Director on the Work of the Committee for the Year 1956," MC/223/Rev.1, April 1, 1957, Sixth Session of the Council and Seventh Session of the Executive Committee of ICEM, Geneva, March 28 – April 12, 1957/ICEM Council Documents MC/Sixth Session (First Copy), NARA, Washington D.C.

[31] ICEM, Sixth Session, "Report of the Director on Transport Covering Performance from 1 September 1956 – 28 February 1957 and Prospects. Working Paper on the Coordination of Transport," MC/W/40, April 2, 1957, Sixth Session of the Council and Seventh Session of the Executive Committee of ICEM, Geneva, March 28 – April 12, 1957/ICEM Council Documents MC/Sixth Session (First Copy), NARA, Washington D.C.

[32] H.J. Grant to T.H.E. Heyes, "ICEM Shipping: Australian Movements," Confidential, January 23, 1957, A446, 1966/46165, ICEM, Sixth Special Session of Executive Committee and Council, Geneva 1957, NAA, Canberra.

[33] Richard R. Brown (Adviser United States Delegation) to Scott McLeod (United States Representative), "Sub-Committee on Shipping," November 30, 1954, Records of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs. ICEM 1953–1956, NARA, Washington D.C.

[34] Examples of "vulnerable" migrants moved by air, Promigrant Geneva to Promigrant Bonn; Berlin; Bremen; Frankfurt; Hamburg; Hannover; Munich; Vienna; Salzburg; Linz; Rome; Genoa; Naples; Milan; Trieste; Athens; Director of Emigration Malta; Chief Migration Officer Rome; Cologne; Athens; the Hague. "Charter Flights; Australia; General Operating Instructions (Revised)," 7/40/26, Telex, December 17, 1954, A10034, 9/3-1, Non-United Nations Organizations ICEM General, NAA, Canberra; ICEM Geneva, "Press Statement by the Department of Immigration. Air Lift for German Migrants," 47/58, June 20, 1958, A463, 1956/569 Part 2,

available.[35] From 1957 onwards, Australia tried to participate more actively in migrant transportation by establishing a migrant air service by Qantas company from Europe to Australia and requesting a fair share of this business (Limnios-Sekeris, 2015, pp. 103–106). However, until at least the end of the 1950s, and even later, as sea movement from Europe towards Australia remained cheaper than air fares,[36] transportation by air to Australia amounted to only five percent of the overall traffic to the continent, compared to 50 percent over the Atlantic.[37]

Air movements during the 1950s were not an unusual means of transport for ICEM. As a matter of fact, a large part of movements to the United States involved air travel. In 1957, an ICEM official pointed out that 50 percent of the Atlantic migrant and tourist traffic was implemented by air.[38] The Hungarian Crisis in 1956 led to greater use of air movements to all destinations where refugees under ICEM were transferred.[39] The ICEM Administration showed an increasing interest in air travel during the second half of the 1950s, but faced the opposition of member states with a maritime tradition. Italy refused

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Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration. (I.C.E.M.) 1957–1959, NAA, Canberra; Australian Embassy Rome to DEAC, 40, Confidential, Cable, February 26, 1959, A463, 1956/569 Part 2, Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration. (I.C.E.M.) 1957–1959, NAA, Canberra.

[35] ICEM Council Second Session, "Report on the Work of the Committee for the Year 1954. Submitted by the Director," MC/130, April 1, 1955, Second Session of the Council and the Executive Committee of ICEM, Geneva, April 21 – May 4, 1955, NARA, Washington D.C.

[36] ICEM Council Fourteenth Session, "Report of the Sub-Committee on the Co-Ordination of Transport," MC/464, May 11, 1961, 14th Session of the Council of the ICEM, Geneva, May 11–17, 1961, NARA, Washington D.C.

[37] ICEM, Sixth Session, "Report of the Sub-Committee on the Coordination of Transport," MC/235, April 6, 1957, Sixth Session of the Council and Seventh Session of the Executive Committee of ICEM, Geneva, March 28 – April 12, 1957/ICEM Council Documents MC/Sixth Session (First Copy), NARA, Washington D.C.

[38] ICEM, Sixth Session, "Report of the Sub-Committee on the Coordination of Transport," MC/235, April 6, 1957, Sixth Session of the Council and Seventh Session of the Executive Committee of ICEM, Geneva, March 28 – April 12, 1957/ICEM Council Documents MC/Sixth Session (First Copy), NARA, Washington D.C.

[39] ICEM, Sixth Session, "Report of the Director on the Work of the Committee for the Year 1956," MC/223/Rev.1, April 1, 1957, Sixth Session of the Council and Seventh Session of the Executive Committee of ICEM, Geneva, March 28 – April 12, 1957/ICEM Council Documents MC/Sixth Session (First Copy), NARA, Washington D.C.

to use flights for Italian migrants and approached Greece, in order to work together against air travel during the ICEM Session in 1960. Greece canceled many ICEM scheduled flights with migrants heading to Australia when the "Greek-Australian Line" was established (Limnios-Sekeris, 2015, p. 104). Despite these negative reactions, the use of aircraft for migrant transport gained ground during the second half of the 1950s. Thus, in 1958, the Department of Shipping and Operations at the ICEM Headquarters in Geneva was renamed Department of Operations and Transports.[40] The elimination of the word "shipping" was a clear indication of the increasing importance of air travel, as was the appointment of the former KLM Director of Migrant Flights as adviser to the ICEM Director's Office.[41] During the 1960s, important growth of air travel was recorded, and in the 1970s, sea movements almost stopped.

Up to the First World War, employers, contractors, migrant networks, and shipping companies—encouraged by the governments' laissez-faire attitude—had all facilitated the mass migration of Europeans overseas. In the radically different conditions that characterized the years following the end of the Second World War, with traditional receiving countries strictly regulating the numbers and the composition of inflows, with expanding migration bureaucracy and scarcity in means of transport, with disrupted migrant networks, ICEM undertook the task of instigating anew European labor immigration to overseas countries of the Western world in a regulated way. It mediated between employers, governments, transportation companies, and prospective migrants expanding the formers' capacity to control the characteristics of their foreign workers as well as the timing and pace of their arrival, by opening markets for private interests, and enhancing emigrants' opportunities to travel abroad relatively assured about gaining a living. By simultaneously providing services to governments and their countries' labor markets, ensuring economic benefits for transportation businesses, and recruiting prospective migrants,

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[40] ICEM Council Ninth Session, "Report of the Sub-Committee on the Coordination of Transport," MC/322, November 12, 1958, Ninth Session of the Council, Geneva, November 13–19, 1958, NARA, Washington, D.C.

[41] "Report of the Australian Delegation, ICEM, Twelfth Session of the Executive Committee and Tenth Session of the Council," April 1959, A446, 1966/46171, ICEM, 12th Session of Executive Committee and Tenth Session of Council, Geneva 1959, NAA, Canberra.

ICEM both facilitated and controlled movements. This spanning borders connection between the demand and the supply of labor implied a range of governmental, intergovernmental and private actors acting in concert to overcome the deficiencies in migration infrastructure[42] in the early postwar era, and to manage migration flows more effectively in the following years.

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[72] For the term "migration infrastructure," see Xiang B. & Lindquist J. (2014), Migration Infrastructure, *International Migration Review 48*, 122–148.

Overall European Overseas Outflows and Internationally Assisted Movements (1945–1960): Who Was Helped to Move? Where To?

Yannis Papadopoulos and Nikos Kourachanis

Following the massive uprooting of populations during the Second World War , the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) was responsible for the care of refugees in both Europe and Asia. However, with the dissolution of UNRRA and the emerging Cold War, the United States, hegemonic in the postwar world, focused on the situation in Europe; thus the international organizations created after 1946 in order to care for refugees saw their mandate limited to European populations. Although the number of refugees in Asia was equally large in 1945 and grew over the following years as a result of war and decolonization processes, the Western world and the international organizations it led ignored their fate. The Eurocentrism of the dominant postwar refugee regime resulted in the exclusion of all non-Europeans from internationally assisted mobility (Madokoro, 2012; Munck, 2008, p. 1234; Amrith, 2011, p. 245).

In Europe, there were an estimated 30 million refugees in 1945 (Hoerder, 2002, p. 478) and in addition, between 1945 and 1950, about 12 million ethnic Germans, expelled from Eastern European countries and the Soviet Union found refuge in Germany, and to a lesser extent in Austria.[1] Thus, refugees made up 30 percent of West Germany's population in 1950 (Munz, 1996, p. 2013). More than seven million Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, Ukrainians and Balts were also uprooted after the war and another three million East Germans had fled to West Germany by 1961 (Mazower, 1999, p. 215; Sassen, 1991, p. 138).

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[1] Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations Secretariat, *International Migration from Countries with Economies in Transition: 1980–1999*, 2002, p. 12.

Millions of Displaced Persons (DPs) and other refugees were repatriated by the Allied army forces with the help of UNRRA during 1945–1946. According to many analysts in the West, the presence of DPs and refugees would aggravate the economic and social problems that European countries faced and could lead to political instability. The United States was afraid that poverty and instability would render people in Western Europe more receptive to communist propaganda. Since the countries of Western Europe were considered as unable to absorb them, the United States and its allies came to believe that the only viable solution would be the organized transfer of refugees to overseas countries. This transfer would relieve European countries from the burden of the resettlement and integration of refugees, while it would offer overseas countries suffering from labor shortage the necessary manpower for their developing or expanding economies.

As difficulties in the world's transportation system caused by the war remained acute there was a need for a centralized regulation of this effort. The *International Refugee Organization* (IRO) was supposed to achieve the goal of resolving the problem of DPs while taking into account the demands of receiving overseas countries for workers from specific ethnic, age and occupation groups. The government of the United States was willing to cover most of the expenses relating to the transport of refugees but wanted to ensure that the majority of them would be channeled to other overseas countries. The IRO thus introduced a "global system of humanitarian-based population transfer" in order to relieve Western European countries from the burden of refugees and prevent potential economic, social and political unrest (Holleufer, 2002, p. 133). From 1948 to 1951 the IRO managed to resettle 755,400 DPs and other refugees in overseas countries. Among them, there were Poles (240,000), Balts (141,100), Russians and Ukrainians (128,200) with Yugoslavs, Czechoslovakians and Hungarians following. The United States received the most, with almost half of the refugees transported overseas by the IRO going there, and was followed as a destination by Australia, Canada and various Latin American countries (mainly Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela). However, when the IRO reached the end of its four-year term, many uprooted persons were still living in Europe, and the related problems remained largely unresolved. The 500,000 refugees remaining in camps and, more importantly, the German

refugees and expellees from Eastern Europe, continued to constitute a heavy burden for both governments and taxpayers.[2]

Furthermore, the immediate aftermath of the Second World War found Europe in total distress and disarray. Destruction of basic infrastructure and means of production, along with scarcity of resources accompanied by high unemployment or underemployment levels characterized most European countries. Thus, the question of the "overpopulation" of specific areas of Europe dominated the discourse of several Western governments as well as that of international organizations. "Overpopulation" was considered to be one of the main problems undermining the smooth passage of many European countries towards postwar social peace and economic prosperity. In this spirit, emigration of both refugees and jobless Europeans was actively encouraged. The decision of the sending countries to export labor was motivated by their perception of the requirements of economic development and the fear of social agitation. They adopted emigration as a safety valve against unemployment, aiming at the same time to reduce the deficits in their balance of payments with the migrants' remittances, and to prevent the social unrest which could be a consequence of extreme poverty and inequality. On the other hand, some receiving countries relaxed migration restrictions promoting influxes of "desirable immigrant stock" through regulated and assisted movements (ILO, 1959, p. 268).

Of the significant number of Europeans, i.e. more than six and a half millions, who moved in search of economic opportunities both inside the continent and overseas from 1946 to 1957, almost half left two countries: the United Kingdom and Italy. The United Kingdom alone saw one point half million of its inhabitants leaving the country during this period, while in Italy the number of emigrants reached almost one and a half million. Other significant sources of emigration were Spain (569,000), the Netherlands (564,000), the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) (482,800) and Portugal (318,800) (see table 1 and chart 1).

The majority of these European emigrants went to North America. Between 1946 and 1957, the United States received 1,435,000 persons, mainly refugees (see table 2 and chart 2), while Canada received 1,465,000 refugees and migrants

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[2] George L. Warren, "The Development of United States Participation in Intergovernmental Efforts to Resolve Refugee Problems, 1933–1961," Report Submitted to the Department of State, 1972, Papers of George L. Warren, Box I, Harry S. Truman Library, Missouri.

TABLE 1.

Gross emigration from Europe (in thousands), 1946–1957

COUNTRIES	1946	1947	1948	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	TOTAL
United Kingdom	171.6	126.5	168.1	152.6	136.4	169.5	181.8	155.2	148.4	128.0	140.9	162.9	1,841.9
Italy	7.2	61.9	115.2	159.5	145.4	143.9	133.4	112.6	142.4	147.8	137.2	105.7	1,412.2
IRO	—	28.9	115.0	275.3	180.7	145.6	9.9	—	—	—	—	—	755.4
Spain	7.5	15.2	20.9	44.8	59.1	61.3	63.0	50.7	59.3	67.6	57.0	62.5	569.0
Netherlands	14.3	41.9	52.1	45.4	38.6	55.6	68.4	54.2	49.6	45.0	50.9	49.8	564.9
FRG	8.0	9.0	12.0	15.0	35.0	61.0	59.0	59.8	60.6	47.1	66.0	50.3	482.8
Portugal	8.3	12.8	12.3	16.8	21.6	33.6	46.8	39.3	40.4	28.7	26.1	32.1	318.8
Greece	1.6	4.9	5.4	4.0	5.7	15.4	7.8	9.6	20.0	23.5	27.4	17.2	142.5
Belgium	..	..	6.8	8.7	8.9	16.9	12.9	12.1	9.8	8.7	12.2	10.4	107.4
Austria	..	..	..	..	..	..	11.1	5.5	6.4	12.3	26.5	41.9	103.7
Denmark	2.3	3.4	5.0	4.3	4.5	7.3	5.4	4.3	4.1	4.7	7.9	12.0	65.2
Ireland	1.3	3.2	6.5	8.5	5.1	3.4	4.5	5.5	6.3	5.4	6.3	5.6	61.6
Sweden	1.8	2.5	4.9	7.2	5.4	8.7	4.4	4.7	3.5	2.9	3.8	4.4	54.2
Malta	0.4	0.9	2.3	4.3	7.5	6.4	4.1	2.8	9.8	7.1	3.3	2.3	51.2
Switzerland	1.8	2.6	3.6	2.9	2.7	3.4	3.6	2.7	2.3	2.1	2.3	1.9	31.9
Norway	1.0	1.5	2.4	2.7	2.3	2.9	3.0	2.5	2.8	2.6	2.6	2.8	29.1
Finland	0.2	0.3	0.7	1.5	0.9	5.8	1.2	1.4	1.1	1.1	1.9	4.3	20.4
TOTAL	227.3	315.5	533.2	753.5	659.8	740.7	620.3	522.9	566.8	534.6	572.3	565.2	6,612.2

Source: Statistics published by the various governments, the ILO and ICEM; AILO, Geneva, 1959, p. 165.

from Europe (see table 3 and chart 3) (ILO, 1959, pp. 188, 191). During the same period, fewer refugees and migrants settled in South America (see table 4 and chart 4): Argentina received 610,000, Brazil around 420,000 and Venezuela 255,000 (ILO, 1959, pp. 192–195). Oceania attracted a considerable number of refugees and migrants, despite the distance from Europe. In total, 900,000 Europeans settled in Australia (see table 5 and chart 5) and 120,000 in New Zealand (ILO, 1959, pp. 201, 204). Few immigrants settled in Africa with the majority of them (155,000) moving to the Union of South Africa and the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (FRN) (ILO, 1959, pp. 198). Israel, from its foundation in 1948 until 1960, received more than one million Jewish refugees, mainly from European and Arab countries (Bouscaren, 1963, p. 155). The ICEM transported a significant percentage of these refugees and immigrants.

CHART 1.

Gross emigration from Europe, 1946–1957; major emigration countries

Source: Statistics published by the various governments, the ILO and ICEM; AILO, Geneva, 1959, p. 165.

The available data about the demographic and socio-economic character-istics of the emigrants are insufficient and less credible than the information concerning the overall numbers and the directions of the population outflows from Europe. However, some general trends can be noted. There were overall more men than women emigrating from Europe between 1945 and 1960. On the other hand there were more women (51 percent) leaving Ireland than men and there was a relatively higher rate of women emigrating from the North-Western and Central European states such as Germany (49 percent) Finland (47 percent), the Netherlands (46 percent) and the United Kingdom (43 percent) than from the Southern states such as Spain (41 percent), Italy (37 percent) or Portugal (35 percent) (see table 6). In relation to the occupation of the emigrants, the divide between the North-Western and Central European

TABLE 2.

United States: Migration from and to Europe, by countries of origin and destination (in thousands), 1946–1957[1]

YEAR	Australia[2]		France		FRG[2]		Greece		Ireland		Italy		Netherlands		United Kingdom		Other[3]		Total for Europe		Overall Total	
	Im.	Em.	Im.	Em.	Im.	Em.	Im.	Em.	Im.	Em.	Im.	Em.	Im.	Em.	Im.	Em.	Im.	Em.	Im.	Em.	Im.	Em.
1946	0.6	0.0	9.0	1.3	5.8	0.2	1.3	0.3	0.9	0.4	6.9	1.3	1.2	0.6	45.6	2.7	11.0	3.8	82.3	10.7	149.0	22.0
1947	2.4	0.1	6.8	0.9	21.3	0.3	2.6	0.5	3.6	0.3	17.8	1.7	4.0	0.3	27.3	2.3	16.6	3.5	102.4	9.9	169.6	21.1
1948	2.6	0.1	5.1	1.2	25.8	0.3	2.0	0.3	5.8	0.3	14.7	1.5	3.8	0.4	25.5	3.3	21.2	2.3	106.5	10.5	170.4	21.8
1949	11.8	0.1	4.7	1.1	120.3	1.0	1.5	0.5	6.7	0.3	11.5	1.5	3.0	0.4	19.5	3.6	17.1	3.0	196.1	11.6	249.0	26.6
1950	12.7	0.1	4.1	1.1	91.3	1.4	1.4	0.5	3.7	0.5	9.7	1.6	3.3	0.3	12.2	3.8	12.9	3.2	151.3	12.5	203.4	27.9
1951	15.5	0.1	5.0	1.1	98.4	1.2	9.0	0.4	2.3	0.3	12.2	1.4	2.8	0.3	20.6	2.8	13.6	3.6	179.4	10.4	238.3	23.4
1952	13.4	0.1	4.6	1.2	63.6	1.2	2.3	0.5	3.0	0.3	8.6	1.3	3.1	0.4	20.6	2.5	14.7	2.7	133.9	10.2	219.2	22.3
1953	1.7	0.2	3.9	1.8	29.2	1.4	1.0	0.7	3.5	0.4	9.0	1.3	3.3	0.5	17.2	3.3	13.4	3.9	82.2	13.5	184.3	26.9
1954	2.2	0.3	4.4	2.1	30.9	1.8	3.2	0.7	4.4	0.3	25.0	1.1	3.3	0.7	17.8	3.8	13.0	4.7	104.2	15.5	225.8	35.0
1955	7.0	0.2	4.9	1.5	37.0	1.7	8.7	0.6	4.4	0.6	33.5	1.2	4.0	0.5	17.7	3.6	13.7	3.9	130.9	13.8	275.9	24.6
1956	10.4	0.2	6.8	0.9	55.3	1.7	10.6	0.6	5.3	0.3	34.8	1.0	9.5	0.5	21.4	2.7	23.5	3.1	177.6	11.0	347.7	23.1
1957	3.3	0.1	5.2	0.3	41.4	0.6	1.8	0.2	8.1	0.1	11.9	0.3	9.9	0.3	27.8	1.0	15.4	1.2	124.8	4.0	269.5	12.2
TOTAL	83.6	1.5	64.4	14.6	620.4	12.6	45.5	5.8	51.8	4.2	195.4	15.1	51.1	5.2	273.2	35.5	186.3	39.3	1,571.7	133.7	2,702.0	286.9

[1] Immigrants and foreign residents leaving for good.   [2] The figures of 1947–1952 include a large proportion of refugees who immigrated from countries of Eastern Europe.
[3] Including Norway (26,400), Sweden (25,400), Belgium (25,000), Switzerland (13,800) and Denmark (12,800).

Source: ILO (1959), International Migration, *Geneva, p. 189.*

CHART 2.

Immigration to the United States, 1946–1957

Source: ILO (1959), International Migration, *Geneva, p. 189.*

states and the Southern states is once again vivid: Most emigrants leaving the former are skilled or semi-skilled, while the vast majority of those emigrating from the latter are unskilled rural populations (ILO, 1959, pp. 337–345).

The *Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe* (PICMME)/ *Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration* (ICEM) was, in a sense, conceived as a successor to the IRO. It took over the IRO's fleet and during the first year of its operations focused on the resettlement of a limited number of the remaining DPs in Europe (Marrus, 2002, p. 365).[3] However, in contrast to the IRO, the ICEM was also vested with the mandate to deal with the issue

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[3] "Progress Report of the Deputy Director Covering the Period 1 February 1952 to 30 April 1952," PIC/47, May 23, 1952, ICEM, First, Second, Third Session, 1951 to 1952 / ICEM, Third Session, Washington 1952, NAA, Canberra.

TABLE 3.

Canada: European immigration by country of origin (in thousands), 1946–1957

YEAR	Austria	France	FRG	Italy	Nether-lands	United Kingdom	Eastern Europe[1]	Other European countries[2]	Total European countries	Overall Total
1946	0.1	0.4	0.5	0.0	0.2	50.5	0.6	3.8	56.1	71.7
1947	0.0	0.5	0.3	0.1	3.2	35.6	7.8	2.3	49.7	64.1
1948	0.6	1.3	2.5	3.2	7.0	42.7	49.3	5.6	112.2	125.4
1949	0.8	1.2	2.9	7.7	6.8	20.8	38.0	5.3	83.6	95.2
1950	0.6	1.4	3.8	9.0	7.2	12.7	21.3	15.9	61.9	73.9
1951	4.3	8.3	29.2	23.4	19.3	31.7	37.1	25.9	179.1	194.4
1952	3.9	5.4	25.7	20.7	21.1	45.3	7.1	15.6	144.6	164.5
1953	6.8	4.0	34.2	23.7	20.3	46.8	0.7	13.1	149.9	168.9
1954	6.0	3.7	28.5	23.8	16.2	43.4	0.6	13.5	135.6	154.2
1955	2.9	2.9	17.6	19.1	6.8	29.4	0.7	11.3	90.7	109.9
1956	4.3	3.8	26.1	27.9	7.8	50.4	4.8	20.4	145.5	164.9
1957	5.7	5.9	28.4	27.7	11.9	109.0	33.5	35.3	257.4	282.2
TOTAL	36.1	38.7	199.7	186.2	127.7	518.1	201.6	168.0	1,466.4	1,669.3

[1] Including Poland (81,400), Hungary (46,100), the USSR, including the Baltic States (42,700), and Yugoslavia (16,500).
[2] Including Belgium (26,700), Greece (25,200), Denmark (4,900) and Ireland (17,700) and persons whose place of origin was not stated.

Source: ILO (1959), International Migration, *Geneva, p. 191.*

of "surplus population" in Europe by facilitating emigration overseas, simultaneously contributing to the development of receiving countries.

A significant number of those Europeans ready to emigrate overseas were encouraged and assisted by the ICEM and other organizations (see chart 6). From 1952 to 1961, under the auspices of the ICEM, 307,251 emigrants left Italy and Trieste heading mainly to Latin American countries, but also to Australia and Canada. In the same period, 228,850 people left Germany and another 171,095 left Austria destined for the United States, Australia and Canada, while a very few individuals were transported from these two countries to Latin America. Another 99,966 emigrants left the Netherlands mainly for Australia (67,452), the Unites States and New Zealand. 58,168 Spaniards left their country to resettle mainly in Latin American countries, while 76,101 emigrated from Greece, mainly to Australia (52,382), with a much smaller

CHART 3.

European immigration to Canada, 1946–1957

Legend:
- United Kingdom
- Eastern Europe
- FRG
- Italy
- Other Europeans
- Netherlands
- France
- Austria

Source: ILO (1959), International Migration, *Geneva, p. 191.*

number heading for Brazil, the United States and Canada. Most of the emigrants from Central Europe resettled in the United States; most of those from the Netherlands and Greece in Australia while the majority of those leaving Italy and Spain headed to Latin American countries (ICEM, 1962, pp. 41–43).

From 1952 to 1960, ICEM transported 1,059,000 persons. Roughly 60 percent (596,000) were migrants and the rest were refugees (see table 7 and chart 7) (Holborn, 1961, p. 17); People leaving Germany during the first three years following the creation of the PICMME/ICEM were mainly refugees, as were those transferred from Austria in 1956 and 1957 after the Soviet repression of the Hungarian uprising. Refugees from Germany and Austria were resettled

TABLE 4.

European immigration to Latin America (Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, Uruguay), 1950–1956

YEAR	Total for Europe	Italians	Spaniards	Portuguese	Germans	Yugoslavs	Poles	Other Europeans
1950	215.9	106.2	61.5	21.9	5.1	0.6	0.8	19.8
1951	207.4	83.1	61.3	33.1	5.4	0.5	0.4	23.6
1952	205.1	76.5	56.9	46.2	4.7	0.4	0.4	20.0
1953	187.7	72.5	48.6	40.2	4.5	0.4	0.3	21.2
1954	197.4	80.3	53.7	38.7	3.8	0.6	0.2	20.1
1955	187.4	70.0	65.6	30.1	3.2	0.4	0.2	17.9
1956	146.0	48.2	54.4	22.7	2.1	0.3	0.2	18.1
TOTAL	1,346.9	536.8	402.0	232.9	28.8	3.2	2.5	140.7

Source: ILO (1959), International Migration, *Geneva. (elaborated by the authors).*

CHART 4.

European immigration to Latin America (Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, Uruguay), 1950–1956

Legend:
- Germans
- Italians
- Poles
- Portuguese
- Spaniards
- Yugoslavs
- Other Europeans

Source: ILO (1959), International Migration, *Geneva. (elaborated by the authors).*

mostly in the United States, Canada and Australia. From 1958 onwards emigration from Germany and Austria decreased. ICEM-assisted outflows from Italy, the Netherlands and Greece also peaked between 1953 and 1957 and decreased after 1958, but they were mainly composed of economic migrants and their families heading to Latin American countries, Australia and Canada.[4] Refugees constituted the majority of ICEM-assisted persons who settled in the United States (167,000, 90.3 percent) and Israel (67,000, 98.6 percent) and half of those who were moved to Canada (77,000, 49.4 percent). The other major immigration countries received mainly migrants: Australia (232,000, 74.2 percent), Argentina (104,000, 97.2 percent), Brazil (74,000, 83.2 percent) and Venezuela (47,000, 94 percent) (see table 7).

In the United States, Canada and Australia the largest part of overall population inflows were economic migrants from the United Kingdom and refugees from Germany and Austria of various nationalities and ethnic backgrounds. The common pattern of economic immigration in these three countries is due to quota systems, preference for migrants from Anglo-Saxon countries and long-established traditions and migrant networks. However, United States immigration policies excluded mass inflows from most European countries during this period, and strictly limited the ways their citizens disposed of to enter the country legally, i.e. through family reunification or as a refugee under various emergency laws and programs such as the *Refugee Relief Act* (RRA) or the *United States Escapee Program* (UPEP). Thus, the vast majority (90 percent) of Europeans who were transported to the United States under the auspices of the ICEM during the 1950s were in fact refugees, mainly from Germany and Austria. On the contrary, both Canada and Australia during this period had a policy of populating their territories and linked their relatively large inflows of both refugees and migrants to their economic objectives and their labor market needs. In the case of Canada, refugees made up almost half of the people transferred by the ICEM, notably after the Hungarian crisis in 1956, when the inflow of Hungarians from Austria led to a peak in the country's

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[4] Most of those transported from Italy (248,000, 85 percent), Netherlands (89,000, 99 percent), Greece (59,000, 85 percent) and Spain (45,000, 100 percent), under ICEM's auspices, were migrants.

TABLE 5.

Australia: Migration from and to Europe, by countries of origin and destination (in thousands), 1946–1957

YEAR	Austria[1]		Federal Republic of Germany[1]		Greece		Italy		Netherlands		United Kingdom		Other[2]		Total for Europe		Overall Total	
	Imm.	Em.	Imm.	Em.	Imm.	Em.	Imm.	Em.	Imm.	Em.	Imm.	Em.	Imm.	Em.	Imm.	Em.	Imm.	Em.
1946	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.2	1.9	9.0	6.5	0.6	0.5	9.9	8.9	18.2	29.8
1947	0.1	0.0	1.1	0.3	1.1	0.0	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.5	14.6	4.8	2.3	0.5	19.9	6.5	31.8	19.6
1948	0.1	0.0	9.5	0.1	1.3	0.1	2.6	0.4	0.4	0.1	31.7	5.6	4.8	1.6	50.3	7.8	65.7	17.3
1949	6.9	0.0	52.8	0.0	1.4	0.1	13.0	0.4	1.1	0.0	53.6	8.9	21.9	0.6	150.8	9.9	167.7	18.5
1950	4.7	0.0	57.3	0.0	1.9	0.1	16.6	0.6	9.6	0.1	52.5	11.5	13.3	0.6	156.0	12.9	174.5	20.9
1951	2.8	0.0	11.0	0.0	2.0	0.1	19.4	0.5	12.2	0.1	57.4	11.9	10.6	0.6	114.5	13.3	132.5	22.2
1952	0.8	0.0	8.0	0.1	1.8	0.2	29.0	1.6	14.8	0.4	50.6	14.1	8.1	1.6	113.1	18.1	127.8	30.4
1953	0.4	0.0	8.3	0.3	2.7	0.1	14.7	2.5	9.2	0.6	25.2	14.1	3.6	1.3	64.0	19.0	74.9	32.0
1954	1.6	0.0	13.1	0.4	9.7	0.2	15.9	2.5	11.1	0.8	28.3	16.6	11.0	1.2	90.7	21.8	104.0	35.4
1955	5.0	0.1	9.9	0.5	10.4	0.2	27.5	2.8	13.1	0.8	35.8	15.2	13.1	1.3	114.7	20.9	130.8	35.5
1956	4.2	0.1	6.3	0.7	10.9	0.3	28.0	3.5	11.8	1.4	35.8	14.4	8.5	1.6	105.4	21.9	123.8	37.7
1957	4.2	0.2	5.8	1.1	6.5	0.4	18.2	4.0	7.9	1.3	37.3	12.7	18.5	2.2	98.8	22.1	118.7	41.1
TOTAL	31.2	0.5	183.1	3.7	49.8	1.8	185.1	19.2	91.6	7.9	430.8	136.3	116.3	13.6	1,087.9	183.0	1,270.6	340.3

[1] Mostly displaced persons from Eastern Europe between 1947 and 1951.   [2] Including 34,000 persons from Eastern Europe and some 30,000 from Malta.

Source: ILO (1959), International Migration, *Geneva, p. 202.*

CHART 5.

Immigration to Australia, 1946–1957

Legend:
- United Kingdom
- Italy
- FRG
- Others - Overseas
- Others - European
- Netherlands
- Greece
- Austria

Source: ILO (1959), International Migration, *Geneva, p. 202.*

intake of refugees travelling with the Committee's help. Australia was much more dependent on inflows backed by the ICEM because of the high cost of travel to the continent; thus, a higher and more steady number of refugees and migrants travelled there under ICEM's auspices during the 1950s. As the number of immigrants from the United Kingdom decreased, both these countries were obliged to diversify their pool of economic migrants and to accept a growing number of Southern Europeans.

Latin American countries, which also accepted a portion of refugees from Europe, received economic migrants mainly from Italy, Spain and Portugal. However, during the 1950s, European migrants travelling to Latin American countries under the auspices of the ICEM were mostly Italians, since Spain

TABLE 6.

Emigration countries: Gender distribution of adult migrants during the postwar period (in thousands)

| COUNTRIES | Emigration | | | | | Immigration | | | | |
| | ABSOLUTE FIGURES | | | PERCENTAGES | | ABSOLUTE FIGURES | | | PERCENTAGES | |
	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women
FRG [1,2]	100.4	95.1	195.5	51.0	49.0	-	-	-	-	-
Finland [3,4]	27.3	24.1	51.4	53.0	47.0	-	-	-	-	-
Ireland [4,5]	25.3	26.3	51.6	49.0	51.0	5.3	4.8	10.1	52.5	47.5
Italy [5,6]	699.6	408.0	1,107.6	63.0	37.0	176.5	61.7	238.3	74.0	26.0
Malta [7,8]	25.2	12.6	37.8	67.0	33.0	-	-	-	-	-
Netherlands [4,5]	299.1	254.5	553.6	54.0	46.0	238.1	226.8	464.9	51.0	49.0
Portugal [5,6,7]	155.0	80.1	235.1	65.0	35.0	-	-	-	-	-
Spain [2,4]	283.0	197.4	480.1	59.0	41.0	95.2	50.3	145.4	65.5	34.5
United Kingdom [2,4]	523.2	699.4	1,222.4	43.0	57.0	252.1	318.8	570.8	44.0	56.0

[1] Period covered: 1953–1957   [3] Period covered: 1947–1957   [5] Period covered: 1946–1957   [7] Period covered: 1950–1957
[2] Persons over 20 years of age   [4] Persons over 15 years of age   [6] Persons over 14 years of age,   [8] Persons emigrating for the first time
but over 15 for 1955–1957

Source: *ILO* (1959), International Migration, *Geneva, p. 325.*

CHART 6.

Distribution of migrants assisted by ICEM, according to destination, 1952–1961

Source: *ICEM Handbook 1962, p. 44.*

joined the Organization in 1956, while Portugal became a member-state even later. This pattern of economic immigration is due to the preference of these countries for migrants with a catholic background from South European countries as well as long-established traditions and migrant networks. These countries were not always successful in the implementation of their immigration policies, because, amongst other reasons, they were less attractive destinations for Europeans in comparison to the Anglo-Saxon overseas countries, which were more economically developed and had a higher income level.[5] Latin America was a more tempting destination for Southern Europeans during the first half of the 1950s, when the more developed Commonwealth countries were not keen on receiving them. However, as Latin America did not show strong indices of economic development, the number of migrants heading to the continent with the ICEM's help gradually decreased and, even more importantly, was composed mostly of family members of those who were already settled there. After receiving relatively large numbers of unskilled workers, Latin American countries tried to attract more skilled labor but with limited success.

Soon spectacular economic development and the growing demand for labor in the industrially developed Northwestern European countries changed the direction of migration flows. The expanding labor markets of the economically developing areas of the European continent absorbed their native unemployed and underemployed populations during the first half of the 1950s thus reducing their motivation to emigrate. Furthermore, these countries soon started recruiting immigrant workers, becoming a more promising destination than overseas destinations for the majority of those willing to leave the poorer South European countries (B. Thomas, 1962, p. 81). European overseas migration in general, and more specifically overseas movements under the auspices of the ICEM, did not cease in the 1960s and 1970s. However, promising working and living conditions in countries closer to their homelands, as well as regulation through bilateral migration agreements and the expansion of the welfare state, led to an enormous increase in intra-European movements; a tendency that had a severe impact on the numbers of those willing to move to overseas countries.

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[5] White Paper on Migration, June 7, 1950, ICEM Background (1946–1951), IOM Geneva.

TABLE 7.

Migration movements organized by the ICEM: People resettled by ICEM from February 1952 to December 1960

COUNTRIES OF EMIGRATION	Refugees	Migrants	TOTAL
Austria	132,000	22,000	154,000
Federal Republic of Germany	130,000	92,000	222,000
Greece	10,000	59,000	69,000
Hong Kong	15,000		15,000
Italy	44,000	248,000	292,000
Netherlands	1,000	89,000	90,000
Spain		45,000	45,000
Others	131,000	41,000	172,000
TOTAL	463,000	596,000	1,059,000

COUNTRIES OF IMMIGRATION	Refugees	Migrants	TOTAL
Australia	81,000	232,000	313,000
United States of America	167,000	18,000	185,000
Canada	77,000	80,000	157,000
Argentina	3,000	104,000	107,000
Brazil	15,000	74,000	89,000
Israel	67,000	1,000	68,000
Venezuela	3,000	47,000	50,000
Others - Europe	40,000		40,000
Uruguay		11,000	11,000
New Zealand	2,000	8,000	10,000
Union of South Africa	2,000	8,000	10,000
Chile	2,000	4,000	6,000
FRN		6,000	6,000
Others - Overseas	3,000	1,000	4,000
Colombia	1,000	2,000	3,000
TOTAL	463,000	596,000	1,059,000

Source: Holborn, L. W. (1956), "Intergovernmental Partnership for Planned Migration," Migration, 1(2), p. 17.

CHART 7.

Summary of ICEM movements to immigration countries, 1952–1961

Source: ICEM Handbook 1962, p. 44.

Moving from Europe Overseas from 1945 to 1960: State Policies

I. Sending Countries

GERMANY AND AUSTRIA. After its defeat, Germany was divided into four occupation zones by the Allied powers. The country's infrastructure had been destroyed during the war and most major cities were in ruins. Under these circumstances, local authorities had to deal with reconstruction and take care of the indigenous homeless as well as the numerous refugees arriving from Eastern Europe. After the capitulation of Germany, during the Potsdam conference, the Allies had decided to transfer the Germans who lived east of the Oder– Neisse line, that is the former German provinces that were later annexed by Poland and the Soviet Union (*Reichsdeutsche*), as well as the German minority of Czechoslovakia (*Sudeten*) and the ethnic Germans who lived in other countries of Eastern Europe, to the four occupation zones of Germany. The number of *Heimatvertriebene* ("homeland displaced persons") is estimated at between 12 and 14 million (Schulze, 2011, pp. 51–52). Of those 8,000,000 settled in the British, French and United States zone (that in 1949 became the Federal Republic of Germany) and 4,300,000 in the Soviet Occupation zone (that became the German Democratic Republic) (Ahonen, 2005, pp. 3, 6).

Initially, the victorious powers had decided to apply a harsh occupation policy and dismantle Germany's industry. Soon, however, as the distance between the Western powers and the Soviet Union widened, the United States, Britain and France reconsidered this policy. After 1947 they shifted their priorities towards contributing to the reconstruction of Germany and the creation of a stable state. Germany became the frontline of the Cold War conflict, one of the main grounds where the deterioration of relations between the Western and the Soviet Union blocs was played out. After the creation of the two German states in 1949, the Federal Republic of Germany, backed by the United States, became the frontline of the West and the showcase of its liberal values and quality of life. Therefore, a solution had to be found for the DPs and the German expellees from Eastern Europe who had found refuge there and between 1947 and 1951, thousands of them migrated through the IRO, mainly to overseas countries (ILO, 1959, p. 180).

The Allied Powers had initially decided that local authorities should deal with the problem of German refugees alone and that ethnic Germans would receive no humanitarian relief or assistance to emigrate. Nevertheless, after 1948 this policy was revised and in the course of the next three years a large number emigrated to other continents. The majority of them settled in North America (45 percent in the United States, 36 percent in Canada), 11 percent moved to Australia and a smaller percentage to South Africa and Latin America (ILO, 1959, p. 179).

As far as inflows are concerned, from 1949 to 1961 the Federal Republic of Germany received about two point six million East Germans (Bouscaren, 1963, p. 66). Notwithstanding the continuous pressure from the refugee inflow, the German government did not favor emigration as a solution, considering that any reduction of the active population would impede the rate of its economic recovery; it preferred the absorption of refugees into the West German economy (Velikonja, 1958, p. 463). The Minister of Refugees underlined that, since the work of unskilled workers depended on the guidance of skilled ones, the emigration of the latter, who were those in demand in receiving countries overseas, would actually increase unemployment (Citroen, 1951, p. 38).

Austria was also divided into occupation zones after the war, but, as it was considered to be a victim of German expansionism, it received more lenient

treatment. The number of Austria's residents who emigrated from 1945 to 1957 did not exceed 105,000; many of them were ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe who had found refuge there after the Second World War. After the suppression of the Hungarian revolt by the Soviets in 1956, Austria received the majority of Hungarian refugees. Unable to bear this financial and social burden and fearing the impact of the refugee issue on its neutral status, Austria sought international assistance. The UNHCR and the ICEM organized the transfer of most Hungarian refugees from Austria to other European or overseas countries.

SOUTHERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. Mass overseas emigration from Italy, Greece and Spain started during the last quarter of the nineteenth century (Hoerder, 2011, pp. 336, 339–342). Chronic underdevelopment or uneven development, economic crises, labor surplus and indebtedness of agricultural workers were the main push factors while the wage gap between sending and receiving countries was the main pull factor (Papastergiadis 2000, pp. 36–37, 47–48; Hatton & Williamson, 1993, p. 13). The restrictionist legislation, adopted during the Interwar period by the main receiving countries put a halt to this wave. From 1945 to 1950, the countries of the region, while still facing severe financial problems, were also ravaged; as a result of the Second World War in the case of Italy, the Civil War in the case of Spain, or both the World War and a Civil War in the case of Greece. Emigration appeared, once more, as a safety valve for the war victims, the refugees and the unemployed, although each country adopted different emigration policies.

Italy was the first country in the region to adopt a coherent emigration policy in the late nineteenth century (Douki, 2006, pp. 96–96). Unable or unwilling to address the problems of rural areas and at the same time fearing the spread of socialist ideas, the Italian government recognized the advantages of emigration, but at the same time wished to protect its nationals moving abroad from exploitation and deception (Gabaccia, 2000, pp. 55–56; Dore, 1968, p. 112). The elaboration of a more consistent emigration policy was also driven by the will to supplant non-state agents (church and socialist organizations) and private organizations (*patronati*) dealing with migrant problems and to promote a unified perception of Italy and its culture among immigrants in view of shaping an "informal Italian Empire" (Gabaccia, 2000, pp. 137, 139). In 1888, the

government passed a law that tried to control the activities of migration agencies and in 1901 it created the General Commissariat of Emigration with the aim of preparing international agreements, preventing the spread of false information, informing and inspecting the emigrants before their departure, taking care of them during the journey and supervising working conditions in receiving countries (Cometti, 1958, pp. 821–822; Cosmo, 2014, p. 72). Moreover, before the First World War, Italy had already signed bilateral migration treaties with France, Brazil, Holland, Germany and other receiving countries (Noiriel, 1988, p. 114; Gabaccia, 2000, p. 140). During the Interwar period, the Fascist regime discouraged emigration. At the same time the *Department of Italians Abroad*, an institution that was founded to deal with the issue, tried to channel prospective emigrants to the Italian colonies in Africa (Del Boca & Venturini, 2003, p. 9; Cosmo, 2014, p. 74).

This policy was reversed in the post–Second World War period when the country faced the loss of its colonies and had to deal with a considerable number of unemployed unskilled workers and pauperized agricultural laborers who, according to dominant views, could not be absorbed in the national economy, notwithstanding the considerable state initiatives and the development rate (Cometti, 1958, p. 829). A refugee wave of more than half a million persons from the territories and colonies that the country had lost and escapees from neighboring communist countries, who continued to arrive during the 1950s, was added to the local mass of unemployed after the Second World War (Bouscaren, 1963, p. 73). Given the strength of the Italian communist party, emigration was seen as a safety valve in order to prevent social and political unrest (Maccari-Clayton, 2004, p. 596).

After 1946, the Italian government not only encouraged emigration, but also organized the *Department of Emigration*, that replaced the Department of Italians Abroad with the aim of organizing selective emigration, and guiding and protecting the emigrants abroad (Del Boca & Venturini, 2003, p. 9; Cometti, 1958, p. 832). For this purpose, Italy signed several bilateral migration agreements with European and overseas countries (Bouscaren, 1963, p. 73). Through these treaties Italy sought to guarantee the rights of its citizens abroad and ensure that receiving countries would take care of their health and pension costs, even if they returned to Italy at a later stage (Gabaccia, 2000, p. 157). At the

same time, Italian governments promoted a multilateral solution to the problem of emigration and encouraged international efforts that led to the creation of the PICCME. Therefore it is not surprising that almost one and a half million Italians emigrated to overseas countries during the 15 years following the end of the Second World War. Overseas emigration remained important until 1960, with more than half of the Italians going to Latin America and the rest to United States, Canada, Australia, although intra-European migration had already surpassed it (ILO, 1959, p. 182).

In Greece, during the first half of the twentieth century the issue of emigration was not dealt with systematically. Emigration was considered either as a safety valve against socioeconomic problems or as a threat that deprived the country of necessary workforce and soldiers. During the Greek Civil War (1946–1949), successive Greek governments looked unfavorably upon emigration for military and security reasons and introduced various obstacles to impede Greeks from leaving the country. Emigration assumed larger dimensions only after the end of the Civil War in 1949, when the Greek army demobilized. In the early 1950s the country faced the double problem of internally displaced civilians expelled from their villages during the Civil War, and refugees from communist countries of Eastern Europe. The number of homeless as a result of the Civil War was estimated at between 600,000 and 700,000, while the number of refugees, many of Greek ethnic origin, from the countries of Eastern Europe is estimated to have been 50,000. (Marks, 1957, p. 481). The influx of refugees of Greek or foreign origin added to the existing rate of unemployment and could not be easily assimilated into an economy which had been disrupted for several years.[6] In total, the number of unemployed or underemployed exceeded one million, 80 percent of whom were agricultural workers.[7]

The Greek government in 1951 emphasized the need to sign bilateral agreements with receiving countries in order to "organize and channel emigration towards countries where conditions are propitious for the Greek element"

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[6] "Robert B. Memminger, (American Embassy of Athens) to the Department of State, Washington, Confidential, 31/10/1951, Records relating to the IRO and the DP Commission 1944–1952, Box 1, NARA, Washington D.C.

[7] Ibid.

(Franghiadis, 2007, pp. 166–167).[8] The adoption of this policy coincided with the foundation of the PICMME/ICEM and in 1952 the Greek Government signed an agreement with the Committee that envisaged the latter's assistance in the transport of migrants and refugees who were already in the country or who would arrive in the future.[9] Until the end of the 1950s, most of the 150,000 Greek emigrants settled in North America—30 percent in the United States and 17 percent in Canada—while 33 percent settled in Australia (ILO, 1959, p. 188).

Massive outflows from Spain started at the end of the nineteenth century with emigrants heading almost exclusively to Latin American countries. The political elite considered emigration to be a threat because the country was losing its workforce and men of military age (Sánchez-Alonso, 2000, p. 732). However, in 1902 Spain abolished the requirement for travel authorization from local authorities and in 1907 a law relegated sole responsibility for migration to the Superior Council of Emigration (*Consejo Superior de Emigración*) (González-Rothvoss, 1949, p. 94; Tabanera, 1988, p. 102; Sánchez-Alonso, 2000, p. 733). The Spanish emigration law of 1924 reiterated the right to emigrate, underlining the importance of protecting Spanish citizens abroad and the state's obligation to help them to repatriate (Tabanera, 1988, p. 103; Fernández Vicente, 2005, p. 84). During the 1930s, however, the number of Spaniards settling in Latin America fell as a result of the restrictive policies adopted by the governments of that continent (Tabanera, 1988, p. 132).

In 1939, the defeat of the Democrats in the Civil War triggered a large wave of refugees towards France and Latin America. Initially, the Franco regime tried to limit emigration for security reasons by refusing to issue travel documents to prospective emigrants (ILO, 1959, p. 215; González-Rothvoss, 1949, p. 78; Fernández Vicente, 2005, p. 87). However, from 1946 onwards, as a result of the reopening of maritime traffic and the growing demand for labor in the developing economies of Latin America, emigration rates started to increase. In the postwar years, the Spanish Ministry of Labor focused on controlling and planning emigration. It supported the emigration of unemployed

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[8] The United States Mutual Security Agency in Greece expressed the same view in 1953.

[9] Agreement between the Greek Government and the PICMME, signed on April 17, 1952, Agreements and Annexes, IOM-Greece.

and unskilled workers in the belief that their remittances would balance the loss of workforce (Fernández Vicente, 2005, p. 89). Spain tried to channel emigrants towards Latin America, beginning with the adoption of a bilateral emigration agreement with Argentina in 1948 (Vicente, 2005, pp. 90–91; Velikonja, 1958, p. 471). From 1946 to 1957, about 570,000 Spaniards emigrated, mainly to Latin America.

In 1956, the regime began to adopt more liberal policies in order to break the country's isolation and integrate the Spanish economy into the international market. The authorities focused more on development and revised former restrictions on emigration. The Spanish Institute of Emigration stressed that emigration would relieve the country of its surplus workforce and that migrants' remittances would constitute an important source of finance for economic development (Fernández Vicente, 2005, p. 93). This shift in policy led Spain to join the ICEM in 1956.

NETHERLANDS. The Netherlands was already a sending country in the nineteenth century. However, the Dutch state adopted an active emigration policy only after the Second World War, envisaging an outflow of 60,000 persons per year (van Dalen, 2007, p. 41). High birth rates, population density and the lack of arable land created fears that, despite economic growth, chronic unemployment would hamper development prospects (ILO, 1959, p. 260; Petersen, 1952, p. 5; Velikonja, 1958, p. 470). Furthermore, as a result of decolonization, 300,000 Dutch from Indonesia arrived in the Netherlands (van Ours & Veenman, 1999, p. 4). From 1945 to 1960, 350,000 Dutch emigrated to overseas countries, while the Netherlands had the lowest returnee rate than any other emigration country (two percent) (Bouscaren, 1963, pp. 82–83). Canada and Australia, where salaries were higher in the 1950s, absorbed the majority of Dutch emigrants. Even before the country's economic recovery, several scholars underlined that the Netherlands' emigration policy was based on misconceptions (Vendalen, 2007, p. 44). Soon, however, industrial expansion and the growth of exports provided employment for the surplus workforce (ILO, 1959, p. 259).

II. Receiving Countries

The Interwar period was marked by the adoption of restrictive migration poli-
cies by most overseas receiving countries. Up to 1929 at least, these measures
were driven mainly by prejudices against specific ethnic groups and fears about
the spread of leftist ideas. In receiving overseas countries the notions of migra-
tion controls and immigration restrictions were inextricably linked to embedded
racial theories, reflecting a desire to exclude certain racial or national groups
from the international migration system without responding to a "logical and
structural necessity" (McKeown, 2008, p. 3; Madokoro, 2012, p. 5). People
from Asia and immigrants from Eastern and Southern Europe were thus unwel-
come in most Western overseas receiving countries.[10]

The global depression after 1929 strengthened the view that the economies
of immigration countries had a limited absorption capacity. Migration contin-
ued during the 1930s, although in reduced numbers. The United States favored
the settlement of migrants from Northwestern Europe, the countries of the
British Commonwealth aimed at attracting people from the United Kingdom
in order to retain their British character, while the Latin American states, which
preferred agricultural laborers, opted for migrants from Italy, Spain and
Portugal who were also considered more assimilable. These preferences con-
tinued after the Second World War, influencing the ICEM policies. Although
overt racial discourse was discredited by the extermination policies of the
National Socialist regime, racial and ethnic prejudices permeated postwar
immigration policies, reformulated in cultural terms. As a result of continuing
racial discrimination, Chinese refugees fleeing the communist regime in their
homeland remained stranded in Hong Kong, as Australia and other western
countries were unwilling to accept them, (Madokoro, 2012; Peterson, 2012,
p. 335; deBergh Robinson 2012, p. 345; Carruthers, 2005, p. 928) and immi-
gration policies were framed in such a way as to exclude certain migrants

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[10] In 1936, the Indian economist Radhakamal Mukerjee proposed the creation of an inter-
national migratory code, under the supervision of the League of Nations, with the aim to organ-
ize the migration of surplus "oriental laborers" in idle areas of the world in order to boost
agricultural development. Nevertheless, since immigrants from Asia were unwelcome in most
receiving countries this project did not materialize (Peterson, 2012, p. 335).

according to racial and ethnic criteria (Munck, 2008, p. 1234; Amrith, 2011, p. 245). Although some Western scholars questioned this view before the end of the end of the Second World War (Lasker, 1944, p. 14), the overseas countries of the "Free World" only relaxed their exclusionist policies towards refugees and immigrants from Asia after 1960.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. As we have seen in previous chapters, the growing xenophobia in the United States, during and after the First World War, led to measures aiming at restricting the entrance of immigrants from Eastern and Southern Europe. After the National Socialists came to power in Germany and began to persecute Jews, many Jewish American and humanitarian organizations tried, to no avail, to convince the Congress to relax restrictions for refugees. Even after the publication of information on the Holocaust, anti-Semitism did not diminish in the United States, while the growing influence of the Soviet Union over Eastern Europe strengthened the position of those who wished to insulate the country from the spread of Communism, and were thus unwilling to relax migration restrictions. In this context, the 1952 *Immigration and Nationality Act* (McCarran-Walter Act) perpetuated the quota system that restricted the numbers of Eastern European refugees settling in the United States, as they were still considered by many as racially inferior and politically suspect (Loescher & Scanlan, 1986, pp. 26–27). President Truman vetoed the bill, but the Congress overturned the presidential veto (Bon Tempo, 2008, p. 30). However, as we will see later on in this chapter, several thousands of European refugees were allowed to settle in the United States in the late 1940s and during the 1950s through emergency legislation, such as the *Displaced Persons Act*, the *Escapee Program* (USEP) and the *Refugee Relief Act* (RRA).

COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES. After the Second Wolrd War, in contrast to the United States, Canada and Australia were willing to receive a certain number of immigrants, without however abandoning their preferences for specific ethnic groups. Large underpopulated areas and economic development in both countries, with the accompanying demand for an increased labor force, were the primary reasons for attracting more immigrants. Both countries had long-standing discriminatory immigration policies favoring immigrants of British origin or Northwestern Europeans. However, as the inflows of these preferred

ethnic groups decreased, they began to accept a considerable number of immigrants from Southern Europe.

Australia tried to attract immigrants of "good British stock" (Coldrey, 1999), providing them with incentives and subsidized passage to the country. After the end of the Second World War, as a result of economic but also strategic priorities, Australia adopted a more lax immigration policy. The objectives were to augment its population, improve its defense capacity and broaden its internal market in view of stimulating industrialization, without revising its White Australia Policy (Bouscaren, 1963, p. 105; Kay, 1995, p. 154; Holborn, 1961, p. 9).[11] Although the government favored British immigrants, more than 60 percent of postwar immigrants were of "non British stock" (Gatrell, 2011b, p. 44). In general, Australia, contrary to other receiving countries, preferred the immigration of whole families than of isolated workers (ILO, 1959, p. 228).

In comparison with Australia, Canada, receiving a more regular supply of capital from the United States which contributed significantly to its development (B. Thomas, 1956, p. 233), was wealthier and situated much closer to Europe. Moreover, the government believed that there was a need to increase the population in order to sustain a growing economy. During the post-Second World War period, development in sectors such as mining, construction, durable goods, public utilities and transport led to an increase in demand for male manual workers and the acceptance of foreign workers (ILO, 1959, p. 240). Despite this, and in line with other Commonwealth countries, Canada continued to implement a set of preferences concerning the nationality of desirable immigrants, aiming to retain its British character (ILO, 1959, p. 221; Bouscaren, 1963, p. 141). Nevertheless, immigrants from continental Europe could settle in the country, while relatives of Canadian citizens were accepted if sponsored (ILO 1959: 222; Bouscaren, 1963, p. 142). Unlike the United States, where the Congress regulated immigration, the Canadian government had the right to issue visas according to its economic forecasts (ILO, 1959, p. 221). Immigration to the country only decreased after 1958, as a result of unfavorable economic conditions (Bouscaren, 1963, p. 143).

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[11] ICEM, Australian attitude, "Statement by Australian Delegation to ICEM Council," May 8, 1958, on the Australian immigration policy, NAA.

Latin America. The idea that Latin American countries, perceived as sparsely populated and economically and politically underdeveloped, could benefit from the influx of European settlers was well-established long before the Second World War. During and after the end of the Second World War many suggested that Latin American "empty space" could absorb the refugees and the "surplus population" from the Old World. It was considered that the import of agricultural and skilled workers could accelerate economic development. After the war, the United States and other allied countries hoped to solve the problem of "overpopulation" and unemployment in Southern and of Eastern European refugees, by channeling the undesirable by the core receiving countries migrants towards Latin America. Migrants from Southern Europe were seen as apt to contribute to the development of Latin American countries.

All the same, many Latin American countries also had long-established criteria of age, education, ethnic origin or occupation in order to exclude certain categories of immigrants. After the war, quotas for foreign workers were also established in order to protect the local workforce (Sánchez-Alonso, 2009, pp. 67–68). The measures adopted by various countries were not identical, but, in general, immigration policies favored skilled immigrants, agricultural workers who would colonize idle land, potential investors and certain ethnicities (Tabanera, 1988, pp. 128–129). Most South American countries preferred Italian, German and Spanish immigrants and excluded those from Asia (Gatrell, 2011b, p. 44; Bouscaren, 1963, p. 147; ILO, 1959, p. 224).

The main receiving countries in Latin America were Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela. In the immediate post-Second World War period, Argentina sought to attract immigrant workers for its expanding industry. In 1946, it opened migration offices in Italy that helped both Italians and Germans who wished to settle in the country. Peron's government made a special effort to facilitate the immigration of German technicians and scientists who could contribute to industrial development (Meding, 1992, p. 405). However, due to the lack of foreign investments in the secondary sector, during the following years priority was given to agricultural settlement and the reunification of families. Although land settlement projects were largely supported by the governments and by the ICEM, immigrants themselves were "much more attracted by the large cities of immigration countries than by the vast opportunities offered by the rural

areas." Thus in the Argentinian case, as in that of other Latin American countries, the role of agricultural colonization in the effective absorption of European immigrants was less important than expected (Damilakou, 2004, pp. 50–52).

Brazil followed a quota system, according to which two percent of the total number of every nationality that had settled in the country from 1884 to 1933 could enter the country annually (ILO, 1959, p. 223) Unlike Argentina, immigration in Brazil increased after 1954 as a result of an improvement in the balance of trade and the increase in foreign investments (ILO, 1959, p. 223).

Venezuela enjoyed a period of considerable growth during the post-Second World War era as a result of foreign investments in the petroleum industry and exports of minerals and agricultural products. Development in the manufacturing and construction sectors as well as the growing demand for agricultural laborers led to the adoption of a liberal immigration legislation and to an increase in immigration (ILO, 1959, p. 244).

The ICEM planned mass settlement of DPs and European "surplus population" in Latin America. However, despite the expressed wish of Latin American governments for agricultural workers, the majority of immigrants preferred, after a short stay in the agricultural colonies, to settle in the cities (Bouscaren, 1963, p. 149). Another major problem was the high rate of return migration, which in some cases, such as Venezuela, amounted to two thirds of the incoming immigrants.

ISRAEL. From its creation in 1948, Israel became a refuge for all Jews persecuted in other countries. Israeli governments favored the immigration of all Jews willing to settle in the new state. The majority of immigrants were DPs from camps in Germany and Austria as well as Jews who arrived directly from Eastern Europe, Northern Africa and the Middle East (Bouscaren, 1963, p. 89). These inflows were facilitated in order to strengthen the new state's military position, but also to reinforce its workforce and develop its economy (Peterberg, 2008). However, many immigrants faced difficulties since the Israeli migration policy was based more on a nation-building project and less on concrete economic grounds. After the initial euphoria, it became obvious that the economy could not absorb all the immigrants and that funds for the aged and invalid refugees were limited. Urban immigrants, who were encouraged to become

agricultural laborers, often left for countries of Western Europe or America where they could find better occupations (Bouscaren, 1963, p. 89). As a result of economic growth, from 1955 to 1958, this trend was reversed, while a new wave of immigrants arrived, mainly from Egypt, other countries of the Middle East, and Poland when its government relaxed the ban on the emigration of Jews (Bouscaren, 1963, p. 90).

ICEM Programs: Organizing Selective Migration

According to its constitution, the ICEM was mandated to "make arrangements for the transport of migrants for whom existing facilities are inadequate" and to "promote the increase of the volume of migration from Europe by providing, at the request of and in agreement with the governments concerned, services "international organizations are not in a position to supply." Thus, the ICEM started providing a series of services that facilitated migration movements: It disseminated information to prospective emigrants about the demands of receiving countries and the occupation possibilities there; it streamlined the selection process (health exams, security screening, etc.) and organized language and vocational training courses for prospective immigrants; it decided on the percentage of the travel costs that migrants were to pay and allocated them with funds according to various financial schemes, covering the whole fare for the neediest; it organized the maritime and air transfer to the receiving countries and, depending on the country, helped them with job placement and integration in the host society.

Since the Committee's budget was limited, the movements to be prioritized and the allocation of funds were issues that caused friction during the meetings of the Executive Committee and the Council. One of the main problems that the ICEM faced was how to combine the needs of the emigration countries for managing what they considered as "surplus population" with the demand of the immigration countries for specific categories of immigrants. The majority of the immigrants transported through ICEM were included in the *European* or *Normal Program*. The countries that received them were the countries of the British Commonwealth—mainly Canada and Australia—and of Latin America, mainly Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela (see table 7). The inflows to

each receiving country varied each year depending on changes in legislation, the economic situation and the reactions of public opinion on the issue of immigration.[12] Large-scale immigration towards Canada and Australia started only in 1954, but thereafter flows were regular and return rates low.[13] On the other hand, the flows towards Latin America were unstable, due mainly to high inflation, low salaries and bad working conditions, while the percentage of repatriation was high.

The Committee's expenses and migrants' transportation costs were largely covered by member states' contributions. However, in 1955, a deficit in the ICEM's budget led the Committee to adopt a *Migrant Contribution Plan*, i.e. a scheme where immigrants contributed to their transportation expenses.[14] Although the plan was implemented, the budget deficit was not covered and the ICEM increased the contributions from its members during the following years. In 1958, it was reiterated that immigrants should contribute, either in advance or after their placement in the receiving country, a part of the transportation costs and, furthermore, it was agreed that government contributions to the Committee's expenses should be relative to the services provided to them by the ICEM (Holborn, 1961, p. 13). This decision coincided with a shift from overseas to intra-European migration. At the same time, receiving countries in Latin America abandoned their policy of admitting unskilled immigrants in an effort to attract skilled workers who could contribute to their industrial development. Consequently, ICEM decided to introduce vocational training programs and reception-placing services in these countries in the late 1950s and migration schemes for skilled workers in the 1960s (Thomas, 1971, p. 23; Holborn, 1961, p. 9).

At this point, the views on the mission and the priorities of the Committee diverged. Some countries, under the new circumstances, even questioned the

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[12] George L. Warren, "The Development of United States Participation in Intergovernmental Efforts to Resolve Refugee Problems, 1933–1961," Report Submitted to the Department of State, 1972, p. 182, Papers of George L. Warren, Box I, Harry S. Truman Library, Missouri.

[13] Ibid., p. 175.

[14] "Migrant Contribution Plan," Geneva January 1, 1954, 1955, 4, 1 /ICEM/MIG/184, AGMFA, Athens; "Migrant Contribution Plan. Report of the Director," December 2, 1959, MC/EX/95, ICEM, 14th Special Session of the Executive Committee, January 5, 1960, NARA, Washington D.C.

need for encouraging emigration, and Canada abandoned the ICEM, preferring to organize foreign labor recruitment through bilateral agreements.[15] On the other hand, Australia, the country that depended most on the ICEM in order to cope with the high cost of transporting migrants from Europe, insisted that the subsidies for the transport of immigrants should continue to be the first priority in the Committee's budget. Conversely, Latin American countries, Italy and Greece were in favor of expanding vocational and language training in order to augment the number of prospective skilled immigrants.[16]

ICEM Migration Schemes

The main aim of the ICEM, according to its founders, was to regulate the transport of indigent people from states with a "surplus population" to countries in need of manpower for their rapidly growing economies. In this process, the Committee's aim was to minimize transport costs and transfer the maximum number of people. Emigration and immigration countries alike contributed a part of the transport costs but, as a result of the priority given to the "decongestion" of Europe from refugees and surplus population in the context of the Cold War, the United States also made a contribution for each individual transported by the Committee, irrespective of his/her destination (Marks, 1957, p. 489). The cost and supply of transport were major issues that the ICEM had to face since its foundation (Holborn, 1961, p. 8). Since the ICEM's budget was not sufficient to cover the costs of all transports, voluntary organizations were called upon to contribute financially by finding sponsors for individuals or specific groups of migrants.

During the first decade of its operations, the ICEM introduced various schemes that aimed at fulfilling the demands of receiving countries for specific categories of workers, e.g. domestic workers and agricultural laborers, or at facilitating the integration of immigrants through family reunification. The

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[15] George L. Warren, "The Development of United States Participation in Intergovernmental Efforts to Resolve Refugee Problems, 1933–1961," Report Submitted to the Department of State, 1972, p. 183, Papers of George L. Warren, Box I, Harry S. Truman Library, Missouri.

[16] Ibid., p. 183.

Committee distinguished the Europeans it transported into: (a) "spontaneous" migrants, (b) migrants assisted by its funds, (c) relatives, (d) those assisted by voluntary organizations, and (e) those sponsored by receiving countries, which constituted the majority (ILO, 1959, p. 293). These categorizations often overlapped with the distinction between "individual migration" and "mass migration schemes" and in any case, the division between "individual" and "mass scheme" plans was not that sharp. In many cases, individual migration of specific groups became the matrix for new mass programs (Marks, 1957, p. 486).

Mass migration programs were mainly the product of bilateral agreements that aimed at the recruitment of workers fulfilling the specific criteria required by receiving countries with regards to age, occupation, health and family composition (ILO, 1959, p. 293). The ICEM acted as an intermediary between emigration and immigration countries, receiving government contributions for planning the movements and assisting in the transportation of migrants. Commissions sent by receiving countries had the final word in the selection of immigrants who had been preselected by ICEM officials. The Committee collaborated with other international organizations for various tasks within its operations, such as the ILO for issues of vocational training and job placement, the *World Health Organization* (WHO) for medical matters, the *Food and Agriculture Organization* (FAO) for land settlement issues, and the *United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization* (UNESCO) for language training programs (Marks, 1957, p. 493).

Sponsored individual migration implied finding, mainly through the *World Council of Churches* (WCC) or other voluntary organizations, sponsors in receiving countries who would guarantee the cost for the transport of specific migrants. In the case of "sponsorships by promotion," voluntary agencies prepared files for potential migrants in order to locate a sponsor willing to cover the expenses or an employer who would hire them in overseas countries. Sponsored individual migration also included women and dependents. The *Family Reunion Scheme* aimed at reducing return migration and the burden that divided families implied for both sending and receiving countries. Since many immigrants could not cope with the travel expenses of their families, the ICEM proposed to the governments of receiving countries to take in charge the transport of first-degree relatives. Initially, the ICEM focused on Italians

living in Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela who wished to bring their families to Latin America (Ducasse-Rogier, 2001, p. 33).[17] In 1954, the Committee had already resettled more than 60,000 dependents in Latin America alone.[18] During that year, the family reunification program amounted to 30 percent of the total movements accomplished by the ICEM.[19] During the second half of 1954, the success of the scheme led to its extension to other sending countries, such as Germany, Austria and Greece, and other receiving countries such as Australia and Uruguay.[20] Immigration countries also benefited from the movement of relatives by enlarging their labor force, since many of them were "immediately below working age."[21] Later, the ICEM introduced a "dependents scheme" that aimed at facilitating the emigration of non-first-degree relatives, including immigrants' fiancé(e)s. In 1954, the ICEM launched a program for the migration of single women who would work as domestics in Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Women from Italy, Greece, Germany, Trieste, Austria and Spain were recruited as part of the "single women schemes."[22]

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[17] "Progress Report of the Deputy Director Covering the Period February 1, 1952 to April 30, 1952," May 23, 1952, PIC/47, ICEM, First, Second, Third Session 1951 to 1952 / ICEM, Third Session Washington 1952, NAA, Canberra.

[18] "Speech of the Director on the General Report for the Period 1 May – 15 November 1954," MICEM/27/54, ICEM 1954, Eighth Session, Geneva, November 30, 1954, NARA, Washington D.C.

[19] "General Report of the Director for the period 1 May – 30 September 1954" & "Supplement Covering the Period 1 October – 15 November 1954," MC/91, October 6, 1954, ICEM 1954, Eighth Session, Geneva, November 30 1954, NARA, Washington D.C. "Report by Avigdor Shoham on the First Session of the Council of the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration, Geneva, November 30 – December 4, 1954 (Adopted During the Second Session at the 11th Meeting, on 28 April 1955)," April 29, 1955, MC/124/Rev.1, ICEM 1954, First Session of the Council, Geneva, November 30 – December 4, 1954, NARA, Washington D.C.

[20] "Report on the Work of the Committee for the Year 1954 (Submitted by the Deputy Director)," March 11, 1955, MC/128, NARA, ICEM 1955, Second Session of the Council and the Executive Committee, Geneva, April 21 – May 4, NARA, Washington D.C.

[21] "Report of the Director on the work of the committee for the year 1957," March 6, 1958, MC/283, ICEM 1958, Eighth Session of the Council of ICEM, Geneva, May 8–14, 1958, NARA, Washington D.C.

[22] Harry A. Bland (Secretary Department of Labour and National Service in Melbourne) to Australian Department of Immigration, "Recruitment of Migrant Domestics," December 8, 1953, 3033 (73), Admission of Greek Nationals Under ICEM Auspices, A445, 197/1/9, NAA, Canberra.

Finally, land settlement programs were initially promoted by the ICEM for migrants heading to Australia and Latin America. The receiving countries were called upon to present pilot land settlement projects. In 1953 a special meeting of experts on this issue took place land Florence to discuss the criteria for the successful implementation of land settlement projects.[23] However, land settlement never became a major way of managing international migration through the ICEM.

Programs for Refugees

Refugees comprised 40 percent of the individuals transported by the ICEM in the 1950s. Immediately after commencing operations the Committee had to deal with the DPs remaining in Germany and Italy after the dissolution of the IRO. During the following years the refugee wave from communist countries of Eastern Europe continued to grow, culminating in the exodus after the Hungarian Uprising in 1956. The ICEM was also accredited to deal with the issue of European refugees in Egypt and China.

I. Refugees from Eastern Europe and United States Foreign Policies

Among those transferred to the United States by the ICEM, the vast majority were refugees: 48 percent came through the Refugee Relief Act of 1953, 21 percent were expelled ethnic Germans, whereas five percent were other Europeans accepted through the Displaced Persons Act of 1948 and its amendments, eight percent arrived through the USEP, whereas only seven percent were revolving fund cases and two percent individual cases (see chart 8).[24]

After the end of the Second World War, one of the primary objectives of United States foreign policy was the political and economic stabilization of Europe. The presence of one million refugees in DP camps, mainly in Germany,

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[23] Rafael Rísquez-Iribarren, "Medical Services in Land Settlement Work," September 21, 1953, LSF/3, ICEM September 1953, Land Settlement Meeting, Florence, NARA, Washington D.C.

[24] "Migrants transported by the ICEM from February 1, 1952 to March 31, 1957 by Country of Immigration and Scheme," April 1957, Statistics on Migrants Transported by the ICEM (1955–1957), NARA, Washington D.C.

CHART 8.

ICEM immigration
to the United States
by scheme, 1952–1957

RRA Assurances:
Quota cases **0.4%**

RRA Assurances:
Quota orphans cases **0.2%**

EMAD orphans **0.1%**

Individual cases **2%**

Refugee Relief Act
of 1953: Orphans **0.5%**

Refugee Relief Act
of 1953: USEP

US Escapee Program

8%   **8%**

Revolving Fund cases

7%

21%   DPs Act of 1948:
Ethnic Germans

48%

5%   DPs Act of 1948: DPs

Refugee Relief Act
of 1953: Refugees

Refugee Relief Act
of 1953: Relatives **0.3%**

*Source: ICEM, Migrants transported by the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration, January 1 –
March 31, 1957 (With Cumulative Total from February 1, 1952), NARA, Washington D.C.*

Austria and Italy, supposedly threatened this process. But the refugee problem
was not limited to the people displaced during the war. As the Soviet influence
over Eastern European countries grew, the refugee flow towards Western
Europe increased. Therefore, the United States administration set the objective
of resettling a part of these DPs in overseas countries. The *Displaced Persons
Act*, adopted by the United States Congress on June 25, 1948, permitted the
settlement of 202,000 persons who were persecuted in their country of origin.[25]
The issue of refugees from the communist countries became one of the pillars
of the United States propaganda strategy during the Cold War, which aimed
at undermining the regimes of Eastern Europe (Carruthers, 2005, p. 911).

On the other hand, the US government had difficulties in convincing the
Congress of the necessity of receiving a part of these refugees in their country.
In the Congress the view that immigrants from Eastern Europe were inassimilable

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[25] 80th Congress, Second session. Ch. 647, June 25, 1948.

and bearers of seditious ideas dominated. However, despite protests by the restrictionist circles, successive United States administrations managed to pass emergency bills that opened loopholes in the quota laws in favor of a broad category of "refugees."

The Acts adopted by the United States Congress facilitated the entrance of refugees from Eastern Europe and aimed, not only at discrediting communist regimes, but also at recruiting personnel for United States propaganda and covert security or intelligence operations. During the early 1950s, the Congress authorized the admission of more "escapees" fleeing communist controlled areas of Eastern Europe, who "could promote national security" or "further the national intelligence mission" (Carlin, 1989, p. 39; Loescher & Scanlan, 1986, p. 22; Carruthers, 2005, p. 911).

In March 1952, United States President Harry S. Truman, acknowledging the problem that Western European countries faced regarding the reception and relief for "escapees" from Eastern Europe, asked the Congress to contribute to alleviating the problems of the "victims of Communism" and to permit the immigration of 300,000 escapees and DPs to the United States.[26] Under the provisions of the Mutual Security Act of 1951, he instructed the Director of Mutual Security to proceed in assisting the refugees from communist countries.[27] This initiative led to the implementation of the USEP in April 1952, which aimed at providing aid for the reception, care and maintenance of escapees and assisting their emigration to overseas countries. The program served more as a means permitting the United States administration to contribute financially to the relief and migration of escapees to other countries, rather than as a mechanism to facilitate their massive entrance into the United States (Carruthers, 2005, p. 926). Using this program as a propaganda tool, the United States mainly sought to encourage flight from Eastern Europe, while also being able to accept any defector "if he is deemed by proper authorities to be of special interest to the United States Government because of his potential contribution to

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[26] Message of the President to the Congress, March 24, 1952, Department of State Bulletin 36.667, pp. 551–555.

[27] George L. Warren, "The Development of United States Participation in Intergovernmental Efforts to Resolve Refugee Problems, 1933–1961," Report Submitted to the Department of State, 1972, p. 172, Papers of George L. Warren, Box I, Harry S. Truman Library, Missouri.

United States intelligence, operational or psychological objectives" (Carafano, 1999).[28] From 1952 to 1958, under the provisions of the USEP, the United States helped a total of 84,000 refugees from Eastern Europe to resettle overseas and assisted 32,000 more in Europe and the Middle East (Gatrell, 2011a, pp. 20–21). The State Department requested the ICEM to take charge of the transportation of the fugitives from Eastern Europe under the USEP.[29]

In 1953, new legislation, the *Refugee Relief Act* (RRA), was passed. This measure emerged to assist 214,000 aliens, of whom 186,000 were refugees or escapees from communist persecution while the rest were mainly relatives of immigrants from Greece and Italy (Battisti, 2012, p. 37).[30] Under the terms of the Act, the ICEM was put in charge of helping those who received visas and required financial or other assistance. Moreover, it was agreed that international voluntary agencies would "advance passage loans, collect repayments on behalf of the Committee, make loans for inland transport costs and other

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[28] Circular Airgram No. 1785, March 15, 1953 and No. 869, June 8, 1953, cited in "The U.S. Escapee Program", October 29, 1957, Hungarian Refugees (1956-61), Loose Material, NARA, Washington D.C.; George L. Warren, "General Narrative Statement," April 16, 1956, ICEM General, 1953–1956, NARA, Washington D.C.

[29] "USEP-ICEM Agreement and Addendum, Contract number PO-GE 99," May 1954, ICEM, Seventh and Eight Session 1954 / ICEM, Seventh Session Geneva 1954, NAA, Canberra; Circular Airgram No. 1785, March 15, 1953 and No. 869, June 8, 1953, cited in "The U.S. Escapee Program," October 29, 1957, Hungarian Refugees (1956–61), Loose Material, NARA, Washington D.C. cited in "The U.S. Escapee Program," October 29, 1957. As such was defined the "national of a European satellite of the USSR (except ethnic Germans) or Yugoslavia, who has escaped since January 1, 1949 or of the USSR irrespective of the date of escape or of Communist China or the Asian satellites, on a very selective basis […] who has fled from and/or is unwilling to return to such country, does not possess another citizenship, and has not been integrated into the economy of the country of present residence."

[30] "General Report of the Director for the period 1 May – 30 September 1954" & "Supplement covering the period 1 October to 15 November 1954," MC/91, October 6, 1954, ICEM 1954, Eighth Session, Geneva, November 30, NARA, Washington D.C. "Report on the First Session of the Council of the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration, Geneva, November 30 – 4 December 1954 (Adopted during the Second Session at the 11th Meeting, on April 28, 1955)," April 29, 1955, MC/124/Rev.1, ICEM 1954, First Session of the Council, Geneva, November 30 – December 4, NARA, Washington D.C. "Report on the Second Session of the Council of the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration, Geneva, April 27, 1955 – May 4, 1955 (Adopted at the 20th Meeting, 17 October 1955)," October 17, 1955, MC/148/Rev.1, ICEM 1955, Second Session of the Council and the Executive Committee, Geneva, April 21 – May 4, NARA, Washington D.C.

incidental costs where necessary."[31] In addition, a common orientation and language training program was agreed for persons taking advantage of the provisions of the RRA to migrate to the United States. The ICEM would be in charge of these activities on board ship, whereas voluntary agencies would organize these activities before the embarkation and after the arrival of the immigrants in the United States.[32] From the end of 1954, when the movement was streamlined, until its completion by the end of April 1957, the Committee transported 84,937 persons under the RRA.[33]

Nevertheless, as a result of the reluctance of the Congress to accept large numbers of refugees from Eastern Europe because of the perceived security threat, the majority of escapees languished in refugee camps, a fact that had a clear demoralizing effect on further exodus from communist countries. In some cases, as a result of bad treatment in the countries of asylum, escapees were convinced to repatriate and this threatened the United States propaganda strategy, which idealized the willingness of the "free world" to grant asylum (Loescher & Scanlan, 1986, p. 46).[34] It was obvious that every effort should be made in order to counter the efforts of the escapees' countries of origin to convince them to repatriate. By 1955, it became evident that the USEP had not produced the results its originators had expected (Carruthers, 2005, p. 930). Soon, however, the wave of Hungarian refugees provided the USEP a renewed *raison d'être*.[35]

The Hungarian uprising of 1956 was an earth shattering event that convinced Congress to reconsider its stance on the issue and to finally accept that

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[31] "Report on the work of the Committee for the year 1954 (Submitted by the Deputy Director)," March 11, 1955, MC/128, ICEM 1955, Second Session of the Council and the Executive Committee, Geneva, April 21 – May 4, NARA, Washington D.C.

[32] Ibid.

[33] "Report of the Director on the work of the committee for the year 1957," March 6, 1958, MC/283, ICEM 1958, Eighth Session of the Council of ICEM, Geneva, May 8-14, 1958, NARA, Washington D.C.

[34] "Earl Blake Fox, Chief U.S.E.P. to Ray H. Thurston, Counselor of the U.S. Embassy in Athens," May 31, 1955, Records of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs. Refugee Relief Program at Foreign Service Posts, 1953–1958, Box 2, NARA, Washington D.C.

[35] "Report to Congress on the Mutual Security Program (For the six months ended December 31, 1957)," March 20, 1958, US Foreign Assistance Agencies, Hungarian Refugees, Loose Papers, NARA, Washington D.C.

the United States should relax immigration restrictions and permit the entrance of considerable numbers of escapees, in order to exploit this issue as a propaganda tool against the Soviet Union and the regimes under its influence in Eastern Europe (Loescher & Scanlan, 1986, p. 212; Bon Tempo, 2002, p. 70). Moreover, it highlighted the role of the ICEM as an instrument in the United States' Cold War policy, since the Committee efficiently organized the transfer of Hungarians from Austria and Yugoslavia to overseas countries.

II. Hungarian Refugee Program

The Hungarian uprising of 1956 played a major role in the consolidation of the ICEM. At a conjuncture when many governments had started to question the utility of such an organization, the Hungarian Refugee Crisis provided the necessary arguments to convince its critics and prove its effectiveness in regulating refugee flows.[36]

The United States, accused of encouraging the Hungarian insurgents through Radio Free Europe, moved swiftly to organize the transfer of refugees from Austria to other countries in order to prove the West's will to help the "freedom fighters" (Borhi, 2004, pp. 342–343; Carlin, 1989, p. 43; Gémes, 2007, p. 168). Moreover, since their flight was seen to prove the West's moral superiority, the United States and its allies considered it a priority to offer them refuge, adopting a loose interpretation of the Geneva Convention (Gémes, 2007, pp. 174, 176). The United States and its allies also undertook the transfer of these refugees to overseas countries through the ICEM fearing that their presence in Austria could destabilize the country (Cohen, 2011, p. 158).

The UNHCR was charged with the Hungarian refugees' relief and legal while the ICEM took over the responsibility of organizing their registration and migration to overseas countries (Ducasse-Rogier, 2001, p. 38; Gémes,

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[36] "Long-hand report from William Hallam Tuck to Mr. Vorhees, Hotel Vier Jahreszeiten – Restaurant Walterspiel," December 10, 1956, Hungarian Refugee Relief, ICEM Statistics, NARA, Washington D.C. "Our conviction is that ways should be found to keep ICEM in finances and in the picture. It is a fine expression of U.S. participation at the earliest date in this urgent problem. In this matter of finances (for the US) George Warren of McLeod's office is the engine room man, and in touch with Congress and the Budget. ICEM is the outstanding 'professional' organization with well trained operators."

2007, p. 177). During the Hungarian Refugee Crisis, the ICEM introduced the "refugee migrant catalogue," an anonymous list that contained a description of the refugees' skills and qualifications in order to boost their resettlement prospects (Ducasse-Rogier, 2001, p. 40). Thus Hungarian refugees were presented as a human stock that could contribute to the development of the host countries.[37]

Many Hungarian refugees settled in other European states, but most left for overseas countries that had agreed to accept them. The United States received them under the provisions of the Refugee Relief Act. President Eisenhower smartly used a loophole in the Act that permitted the Attorney General to temporarily "parole" aliens in the United States "for emergent reasons or for reasons deemed strictly in the public interest" (Loescher & Scanlan, 1986, p. 50). The aliens admitted to the United States under this program had no visa, therefore no official immigrant status, and could remain in the United States only at the Attorney General's discretion. They could not acquire citizenship, although President Eisenhower later managed to regularize them (Bon Tempo, 2002, pp. 70, 84). On the other hand, one of the main aims of the United States was to finance the resettlement of Hungarian refugees in other overseas countries.[38] Canada and Australia received the largest numbers, while the United States administration tried to convince Latin American countries as well that Hungarians could contribute to their economic development. For this reason, Representative Emmanuel Celler visited several countries in South America.[39]

In total, 157,405 Hungarian refugees migrated through Austria, 16,603 through Yugoslavia and 17,969 through other European countries. The ICEM transported 85,223 from Austria, 10,763 from Yugoslavia and 14,209 from other European countries. Moreover, it provided migration services and helped in scheduling rail and air transport for another 55,225 refugees from Austria,

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[37] "Reporting on Hungarian Refugees in Austria, December 1956," Hungarian Refugee Relief, ICEM Statistics, NARA, Washington D.C.

[38] "General Comments on Resettlement," Memorandum by William Hallam Tuck, December 20, 1956, Hungarian Refugee Relief, ICEM Statistics, NARA, Washington D.C.

[39] "Hungarian refugees in Ecuador," Records of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs. Refugee Relief Program at Foreign Service Posts, 1953–1958, Box 22, NARA, Washington D.C.

2,443 from Yugoslavia and 2,151 from other European countries, whose travel costs were covered by the immigration countries.[40] These refugees were settled in various countries: 38,000 in the United States, 37,000 in Canada, 21,000 in the United Kingdom, 15,000 in the Federal Republic of Germany, 13,000 in Switzerland, 13,000 in France, 11,000 in Australia, 7,000 in Sweden, 6,000 in Belgium and 2,000 in Israel.[41]

III. *Trieste Special Program*

After the Second World War Yugoslavia annexed the former Italian regions of Istria and Venezia Giulia. This resulted in the exodus of the majority of the Italian population of the two regions by the mid-1950s. It is estimated that about 250,000 people left Yugoslavia for Italy from the end of the war until 1956 (Corni, 2011, pp. 71, 84). The IRO managed to resettle a number of them in overseas countries, but the inflows continued after its dissolution and the ICEM took over the task of organizing the resettlement of some of them.[42]

When the Trieste Special Program started in 1953 there were 4,341 refugees in Trieste, the majority of whom were aged, suffering from chronic illnesses or handicapped.[43] Since they did not belong to the more desirable migrant stock, a special fund was created to help the ICEM to "accomplish resettlement overseas and relief and rehabilitation preparatory to resettlement of refugees in Trieste or Italy."[44] It was the first time that the organization had to deal, not only with the transportation, but also with the resettlement of a group (Ducasse-Rogier, 2001, p. 35). During the next few years many new refugees arrived in Trieste, but since they were young and able to work, they were

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[40] George L. Warren, "The Development of United States Participation in Intergovernmental Efforts to Resolve Refugee Problems, 1933–1961," Report Submitted to the Department of State, p. 180, 1972, Papers of George L. Warren, Box I, Harry S. Truman Library, Missouri.

[41] Ibid., p. 180.

[42] "Confidential report by the IRO," January 4, 1951, p. 553, Geneva Consulate, IRO 1948–1953, NARA, Washington D.C.

[43] "Report on Trieste Special Fund, covering the period March 1, 1953-1931 December 1954," January 1, 1955, ICEM/mig/232. Hq 858, ICEM Report on Trieste, Special Fund, 1954. NARA, Washington D.C.

[44] "Telegram by John Foster Dulles to George Warren," February 20, 1953, State Department, General Records, ICEM 1954, NARA, Washington D.C.

"resettled in mass emigration schemes with little or no aid from the fund."[45]

The ICEM collaborated with international voluntary agencies which had already established an infrastructure for refugee resettlement both in Europe and in overseas countries.[46] Whereas the transportation costs were financed by the ICEM on a loan basis from the Committee's IRO Trust Fund, voluntary agencies were charged with the sponsorship, selection, processing, reception and placement of refugees, on a case-to-case basis.[47] Australia accepted the largest number of Trieste refugees under the Australia Assisted Passage Scheme, without taking into account their health status or occupation.[48] The United States also received a considerable number of them, after relaxing the provisions of the Refugee Relief Act. Thus, the program was concluded successfully in the middle of 1957.[49]

European refugees in the Near and Far East

One of the first tasks the ICEM undertook was to explore solutions to the problem of refugees of European origin who remained outside Europe, mainly in China and the Near East, after the dissolution of the IRO.[50] They or their ancestors had settled in these regions in the past, but had to abandon them

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[45] "Report on Trieste Special Fund, covering the period 1 March 1953 – 31 December 1954," January 1, 1955, ICEM/mig/232. Hq 858, ICEM Report on Trieste, Special Fund, 1954. NARA, Washington D.C.

[46] Ibid.

[47] "Service to Refugees. A Draft Memorandum on Migration by Edgar H. Chandler," January 2, 1956, Services to Refugees General 1952–1956, WCC-A, Geneva.

[48] "Tasman Hudson Eastwood Heyes to George Warren," July 7, 1957, Australian attitude towards ICEM, NAA, Canberra. "Australia's Contribution to the Relief of the Problem of Refugees," September 25, 1959, Australian attitude towards ICEM, NAA, Canberra.

[49] "Report on Trieste Special Fund, covering the period 1 March 1953 – 31 December 1954," January 1, 1955, ICEM/mig/232. Hq 858, ICEM Report on Trieste, Special Fund, 1954, NARA, Washington D.C. "John F. Thomas to Pierce J. Gerety, Deputy RRA Administrator at the US Department of State," October 8, 1956, Refugee Relief Program, ICEM 1953-1958, NARA, Washington D.C. "Report of the Director on progress since the sixth session," July 31, 1957, MC/253, ICEM 1957, Seventh Session of the Council, Geneva, October 7–12, NARA, Washington D.C.

[50] "Refugees of European Origin Resident outside Europe. Report of the Director," September 17, 1952, PIC/69, PICMME, 1952, October 13–21, Fourth Session, Geneva, NARA, Washington D.C.

due to political events that followed the Second World War. The ICEM organized their resettlement in overseas countries.

I. Near East Program

The majority of refugees in the Middle East after the war were Eastern Europeans who had been stranded in the region at the time and did not wish to return to their countries of origin, where Communists were now in power. Soon, however, the Committee also had to deal with the emigration of Europeans fleeing from Egypt after the Free Officers' military coup in 1952 and the Suez crisis of 1956.[51]

The ICEM developed a scheme for the emigration of residents of mainly Jewish, Italian and Greek origin from Egypt with the collaboration of the World Council of Churches and the Tolstoy Foundation (Marks, 1957, p. 492).[52] Many of the migrants leaving Egypt under the ICEM's auspices emigrated to overseas countries after a passage through their countries of origin,[53] while the majority of Jews travelled to Israel via Greece as part of the "Operation Exodus." The cost of this movement was covered by the Jewish Agency for Palestine, while the travel expenses of the rest were covered by the Revolving Fund.[54]

II. Far East Program

During the nineteenth and the early twentieth century a number of Europeans of various ethnic origins settled in China. Their number increased through the

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[51] "Report of the Director on the work of the committee for the year 1957," March 6, 1958, MC/283, ICEM 1958, Eighth Session of the Council of ICEM, Geneva, May 8–14, 1958, NARA, Washington D.C.

[52] "Refugees of European Origin Resident outside Europe. Report of the Director," September 3, 1953, MC/36, ICEM 1953, Sixth Session, Venice, October 12–21, NARA, Washington D.C.

[53] "Information Paper on Refugees from Egypt," April 8, 1957, MC/EX/INF/3/Rev. 1, ICEM 1957, Seventh Session of the Executive Committee, Geneva, March 28 – April 10, NARA, Washington D.C.

[54] "Information Paper on Refugees from Egypt," April 8, 1957, MC/EX/INF/3/Rev. 1, ICEM 1957, Seventh Session of the Executive Committee, Geneva, March 28 – April 10, NARA, Washington D.C. "The question of refugees from Egypt," April 8–12, MC/229, ICEM 1957, Sixth Session of the Council, Geneva, March 26, 1957, NARA, Washington D.C.

influx of 130,000 refugees during the Russian Civil War following the October Revolution and as a result of the rise of the Communists to power in Russia (Gatrell, 2011b, pp. 69–70). To these were added Jews from Germany and Austria who settled in Shanghai after 1933.[55]

After the end of the Second World War, the occupation of Manchuria by the Soviet Union and the advance of communist forces in China led the Russians, the Jews and the other Europeans living in these areas to consider leaving.[56] From July 1948 to January 1952, the IRO registered 29,000 persons for assistance (Peterson, 2012, p. 328). At the end of its mandate, 4,500 registered and 18,300 unregistered refugees still remained in China.[57]

After the dissolution of the IRO, the ICEM took over the task of organizing the emigration of the Europeans who remained in China to countries willing to receive them. The transfer of the refugees was made possible mainly due to the capital available from the IRO Trust Fund.[58] In 1957, as a result of the exhaustion of the IRO Trust Fund, participating governments had to contribute to facilitate the transfer of the remaining Europeans from China (Carlin, 1989, p. 75).[59] The UNHCR was in charge of the refugees who were in transit in Hong Kong, while the ICEM dealt with their transport to host countries (Peterson, 2012, p. 330).[60] The ICEM collaborated with the CIA, via the State

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[55] "Refugees of European Origin in the Far East (Submitted by the Director)," September 12, 1957, NARA, ICEM 1957, Ninth Session of the Executive Committee, Geneva, September 26 – October 12, Washington D.C.

[56] Records relating to the IRO and the DPC, 1944-1952, Box 4, NARA, Washington D.C.

[57] "Refugees of European Origin in the Far East (Submitted by the Director)," September 12, 1957, ICEM 1957, Ninth Session of the Executive Committee, Geneva, September 26 – October 12, NARA, Washington D.C.

[58] "Resolution No. 61: Resolution on refugees of European origin resident outside Europe (Adopted at the 62nd Meeting, 21 October 1953)," ICEM 1953, Sixth Session, Venice, October 12–21, NARA, Washington D.C.

[59] "Resolution No. 5 (VIII), Refugees of European origin in the Far East," August 14, 1957, ICEM 1957, Eighth (Special) Session of the Executive Committee, Geneva, August 12–14, NARA, Washington D.C. "UNHCR/ICEM operations to Hong Kong," February 25, 1964, ICEM, United Nations, UNHCR, UNESCO, IOM Geneva.

[60] George L. Warren, "The Development of United States Participation in Intergovernmental Efforts to Resolve Refugee Problems, 1933–1961," Report Submitted to the Department of State, 1972, p. 171, Papers of George L. Warren, Box I, Harry S. Truman Library, Missouri.

Department, to check applicants for emigration when there was "a reason to suspect a criminal or security background."[61]

The majority of the 20,000 refugees transferred from China from 1952 until 1969 migrated to Australia and one quarter to Brazil (Peterson, 2012, p. 331). Those resettled under ICEM auspices also settled mainly in Australia and Brazil (ICEM Handbook, 1962, p. 44).

Conclusion

The ICEM was mandated to relieve certain European countries by transferring a part of the refugees living on their territory and of their "surplus population" to overseas countries in order to relieve social pressures in sending countries and contribute to the development of receiving countries. The ICEM was not the neutral non-political, international agency that it claimed to be, but rather an effective tool in the Cold War strategy of the United States. Its aim was, on the one hand, to prove the ability of the "free world" to provide refugees from Eastern Europe with better living conditions, and, on the other hand, to resolve the problem of unemployment in Europe through emigration to overseas countries. Therefore, the Committee had to accommodate the interests of both sending and receiving countries. Whereas most prospective emigrants from Europe preferred to settle in the United States, Canada or Australia, Commonwealth countries preferred immigrants from Britain and Northern Europe considering that they were racially superior and could be assimilated easier. Thus, immigrants from Southern Europe were encouraged, in vain, to settle in Latin America. Canada, as a country closer to Europe that did not depend totally on the ICEM's services, was more able to apply a policy of exclusion of Southern Europeans, and indeed the majority of those who settled there came from Germany and Austria. Australia, as a result of its distance, and consequently the high cost of travel to the continent, was more dependent on inflows backed by the ICEM. It thus received a much higher and steadier number of refugees and migrants travelling under the ICEM's auspices during

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[61] "Richard Helms and Robert F. Cartwright to Scott McLeod," September 25, 1956, Records of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, ICEM 1953–1956, NARA, Washington D.C.

the 1950s and reluctantly accepted a larger share of Southern Europeans. European migrants travelling to Latin American countries under the ICEM's auspices were mostly Italians, as Spain only joined the Organization in 1956, while Portugal did not become a member of the Committee in the 1950s. Latin America was a more tempting destination for South Europeans during the first half of the 1950s, when the more economically developed Commonwealth receiving countries were reluctant to receive them. However, as Latin America did not show strong indices of economic development, the number of migrants heading to the continent with the ICEM's assistance gradually decreased and, even more importantly, was composed mostly of family members of those who had already settled there.

The Hungarian Refugee Crisis marked a turning point in the activities of the Committee. By effectively and rapidly organizing the movement of these refugees, the Committee proved its necessity as an emergency mechanism in the United States Cold War strategy. At the same time, as the economic conditions in both sending and receiving countries started to change, the ICEM had to reconsider its strategies and invent a new operations plan. Towards the end of the 1950s, economic development in Western Europe reduced unemployment in the region and even created employment opportunities for immigrants from Southern Europe. Thus, Commonwealth overseas countries had to reconsider their stance towards Southern Europeans. At the same time Latin American countries started to demand skilled immigrants who could contribute to their development. In this context, at the end of the decade the Committee put more emphasis on vocational training in emigration countries and on reception-placement services in immigration countries.

PART III Selecting Migrants, Guiding States,
Narrating Development

Australia and the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration: Racial Exclusion and Ethnic Discrimination in an Era of Universal Human Rights

Ioannis Limnios-Sekeris

Australian Postwar Immigration Policy

Immigration was a long-established practice in Australia. Nevertheless, the end of the Second World War found the country sparsely populated and deeply concerned about its future: The Japanese invasion of Singapore and New Guinea during the war, combined with the bombing of the Australian northern coasts, had demonstrated the vulnerability of Australia's national defense and the possibility of an invasion by its northern neighbors. This fear led to the inauguration of a new massive immigration program in the first postwar years, under the catchy phrase "Populate or Perish."[1] Australia hoped that immigration would also strengthen its economic development and allow the country to become more industrialized.

After the war, official plans set goals for a population increase of two percent annually; half of this increase was to result from the augmentation of Australia's annual birth rate, while the other half from immigration (Kunz, 1971, pp. 68–70). In fact, between 1945 and 1960, population gain through migration was 0.86 percent, very close to the one percent.[2] From 1945 to 1960, Australia's population increased by approximately 3,000,000, out of which

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[1] According to the 1947 Australian Census, the population totaled 7,579,238 persons, of which only 744,187 had been born outside Australia. Of these, 651,606 had been born in Europe, with 541,267 in the United Kingdom. Another 33,632 had been born in Italy; 14,567 in Germany; 12,291 in Greece; 6,573 in Poland; 5,866 in Yugoslavia; 4,219 in Austria; and, 2,174 in the Netherlands. Furthermore, a total of 24,096 had been born in Asia, 7,537 in Africa and 11,630 on the American continents. For the 1947 Census, see document, Census 1947, 2109.0, Volume I, Part XII, Birthplace, http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/DetailsPage/2109.01947?OpenDocument

[2] Kunz (1971), Table 1, p. 69.

1,200,000 was due to immigration.[3] Australia's postwar immigration program was thus highly successful in the accomplishment of its aims. Through its immigration policy, Australia managed not only to increase inflows, but even more importantly, to control the composition of its new population that came to be known as the "New Australians." This success was largely due to the agreement among all the main political parties and trade unions on the need for immigration in order to increase Australian population and labor force. This consensus allowed for a cohesive policy regarding immigration, which was implemented throughout the 1950s. The powerful Australian trade unions made sure that severe regulations for entry in each trade were imposed and that immigrants were employed under the same conditions and entitled to the same rights and obligations as the native workforce (Murphy, 2008, pp. 140–141; Richards, 2008, p. 231).

Australia's place amongst the allies during the Second World War and in the anti-communist camp during the Cold War led to its economic support from the United States; American support included aiding Australia's industrial development and providing assistance in the field of migration. The *International Bank of Reconstruction and Development* granted a loan to Australia in order to support its economic development and, through this, to boost its immigration-absorbing capacity. The loan provided Australia access to $150 million from 1950 to 1952[4] in order to develop its insufficient economic infrastructures

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[3] Australia's population in 1945 was 7,430,197; 8,307,481 in 1950; 9,311,825 in 1955; 10,391,920 in 1960. According to the 1961 Australian Census, the Australian population amounted to 10,508,186 persons, of which 1,778,780 had been born outside Australia: A total of 1,596,174 in Europe, out of which 718,256 in the United Kingdom (and 556,413 of these in England); a total of 79,088 had been born in Asia; 28,559 in Africa; and 19,029 in the American continent. Compared to the numbers of 1947 Australian Census, the success and the diversification of the Australian programme is evident. For Australia's population in 1945, see table 1.1, Population (a) (b) by sex, states and territories, 31 December, 1788 onwards, in Australian Bureau of Statistics, *3105.0.65.001 Australian Historical Population Statistics, 2008*, 1. Population Size and Growth, http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/DetailsPage/3105.0.65.0012008? OpenDocument; Table 8.1 "Net Overseas Migration, Australia(a), year ended December 31, 1925 onwards," in Australian Bureau of Statistics, *3105.0.65.001 Australian Historical Population Statistics, 2008*. Available at: Ibid., 8. Migration. For the 1961 Census, see document: 1961 Census, Bulletin No. 28, Birthplaces of the Population of Australia by States and Territories, http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/DetailsPage/2107.01961?OpenDocument

[4] "50 Million-Dollar Loan for Australia," *Sydney Morning Herald*, July 10, 1952.

and allow the country to face its workforce shortage. Australia's population and workforce demands were also met through a set of policies which involved the country's participation in international agencies specialized in the settlement of refugees and migrants, the signing of bilateral migration agreements and the existence of unassisted migration.

The *White Australia* dogma, a stronghold against the millions of neighboring Asians wanting to flee their countries, remained the cornerstone of all immigration policies in the postwar era up to 1973. In accordance with dominant racist beliefs, this dogma initially held that Australia's new population should be of Anglo-Saxon origin. During the pre-war period, the country had implemented a vast immigration program, which assisted mainly Britons to settle there. Arthur Calwell, the immediate postwar Minister for Immigration (1945–1949), stated that 90 percent of the yearly migrant intakes should continue to be British (Price, 1998, p. 121). However, it soon became clear that the United Kingdom could not provide such large numbers of migrants. Consequently, the diversification of Australia's immigrant pool was a one-way solution. The Menzies' government (1949–1966) reset the goal for British migrants to constitute 50 percent of the annual migrant intakes, which, though a more realistic target, was still not always attained.[5] Thus, while Asians continued to be excluded from the country, Australia was obliged to widen the scope of populations included in the preferred "white" category and include other nationalities of European descent. Along with the most preferred Britons, other Western Europeans, such as the Germans, Dutch and Scandinavians, were soon admitted. These groups, it was believed, shared a cultural affinity and could be assimilated more easily in the prevailing Australian Anglo-Saxon culture. Southern Europeans, such as Italians and Greeks, were at the bottom of the preference list, as they came from what was seen as an underdeveloped region of Europe—deficient in cultural, educational, professional and physical terms.[6]

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[5] Lambros to GMFA, 1911/Δ/7/M, November 17, 1955 (in Greek), 1955/3/3/1, Australia. Greeks Abroad. Migration Issues. AGMFA, Athens; Vergis to GMFA, 1686Δ/7/M, October 5, 1956 (in Greek), 1956/61/1/2/2, Australia. Greeks Abroad. Migration Issues, AGMFA, Athens; Christodoulou to GMFA, 234/ /7, February 8, 1958 (in Greek), 1959/1/1/2/1, Australia. Greeks Abroad. Migration Issues, AGMFA, Athens.

[6] T.H.E. Heyes, Permanent Secretary of the Department of Immigration in Canberra

Australia thus continued to exclude all those considered as non-Whites and discriminated between European populations according to their perceived proximity to Anglo-Saxon culture.

Nevertheless, even if other European nationalities were admitted, the Britons still received preferential treatment. In 1946, Canberra signed an agreement with the United Kingdom, inaugurating a migration scheme for ex-servicemen followed by their dependents, and another for Britons who were able to travel with the low passage cost of only ten British pounds, with all other expenses shared by the Australian and the British governments (Richards, 2008, pp. 160, 172; Sherington, 1987, p. 129). Migrants from the United Kingdom and Ireland were the largest migratory group in yearly intakes between 1945 and 1961 (except for 1949–1950), recording average intakes exceeding 40,000 persons per annum. Overall, 86 percent of British migrants to Australia were assisted in their movement between 1947 and 1974; this constituted a much higher percentage than that of any other migratory group (Richards, 2008, pp. 205).

Australia also signed bilateral migration agreements with other European countries in order to ensure its migrant intakes during a period of intense competition for manpower among receiving countries. The Germans constituted one of the most preferred non-British migrant groups and Australia signed a bilateral agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in 1952; as a result, Australia welcomed more than 230,000 German migrants (Richards, 2008, pp. 190, 218). The Dutch were also a preferred migrant group and a migration agreement with the Netherlands was signed in 1951 (Peters, 2012, pp. 51–53). The Germans and the Dutch represented 14 percent and 18 percent of non-British migration, whereas 73 percent and 61 percent respectively of these two national groups were assisted (Pennay, 2011, p. i). The German and Dutch migrants went to Australia under a two-year contract and were placed

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(DIMC), in a personal and confidential letter to George L. Warren of the Department of State in Washington, referred to the preference of the Australian immigration program, first to Britons, while the "second preference in selection of migrants" were migrants from Northern Europe, last on the list were Southern Europeans and refugees. This preference was justified on the basis of their professional skills. In relation to this preference, Heyes mentioned that he did not "like to be quoted publicly on this point," Heyes to Warren, Personal, Confidential, July 19, 1957, A446, 1962/67291, ICEM, Australian attitude, NAA, Canberra.

TABLE 1. Australian migrant intakes (in thousands), October 1945 to June 1961

Country of last residence	Oct 1945 – June 1947	1947 – 1948	1948 – 1949	1949 – 1950	1950 – 1951	1951 – 1952	1952 – 1953	1953 – 1954	1954 – 1955	1955 – 1956	1956 – 1957	1957 – 1958	1958 – 1959	1958 – 1960	1960 – 1961	TOTAL
UK & Ireland	15,048	21,649	49,653	52,166	53,341	59,011	36,757	26,011	36,281	37,293	36,024	41,439	41,623	37,851	38,296	582,443
Italy	161	940	6,362	17,197	19,007	23,201	21,906	15,252	20,395	31,841	20,974	15,131	16,524	16,126	18,360	243,377
FRG	236	4,830	26,169	63,982	32,055	9,949	5,944	10,980	12,435	7,850	6,221	5,517	7,843	9,406	9,861	213,258
Netherlands	116	310	1,095	3,175	15,473	9,327	13,759	9,641	11,332	13,862	9,528	6,582	8,311	9,328	6,299	118,118
Greece	439	1,383	1,303	2,040	1,646	2,065	1,605	5,089	12,527	10,287	8,768	5,789	5,510	6,214	7,619	72,284
Malta	61	405	2,137	5,249	4,109	3,011	1,852	3,332	10,303	4,914	1,451	1,670	2,222	1,818	2,056	44,590
Austria	64	150	2,612	6,805	4,116	1,471	478	753	3,303	5,244	4,798	3,189	3,593	2,025	1,754	40,335
USA	2,570	2,162	1,654	1,398	1,651	1,246	1,409	1,501	1,780	1,805	1,942	1,808	2,442	779	885	25,032
Yugoslavia	13	74	635	1,403	285	875	415	556	583	1,027	1,483	2,328	1,752	6,319	5,896	23,644
Poland	218	467	2,963	5,464	101	479	124	26	43	106	177	1,028	1,703	1,836	5,028	16,762
Hungary	0	0	0	0	75	302	82	30	167	209	8,813	2,587	282	991	786	14,324
France	414	591	796	1,290	2,285	1,447	478	329	365	430	384	1,108	765	208	228	11,118
Finland	3	7	31	68	94	173	70	52	60	69	144	497	2,492	1,935	515	6,210
Denmark	13	143	123	476	415	96	77	61	34	463	1,912	541	481	410	406	5,701
Switzerland	65	154	186	864	862	378	196	187	210	338	323	306	322	520	552	5,463
Spain	4	4	29	47	65	106	93	51	101	151	122	85	428	535	1,465	3,286
Sweden	32	69	149	186	196	136	126	76	47	122	102	159	174	385	196	2,152
Norway	30	48	76	118	76	508	122	48	66	120	111	170	136	182	145	1,956
TOTAL	19,487	33,386	95,673	161,928	135,832	113,781	35,473	73,955	110,082	116,131	103,277	89,933	96,603	96,865	97,347	1,430,053

Source: Australian Government, Department of Immigration and Border Protection. Historical migration statistics retrieved from: http://www.border.gov.au/about/reports-publications/research-statistics/statistics/live-in-australia/historical-migration-statistics

in jobs selected by the Australian government (Commonwealth Department of Immigration, 1953, p. 169). Under the Australian *General Assisted Passage Scheme* (GAPS), emigrants from the United States, Finland, Switzerland, Sweden, Norway and Denmark were also assisted to travel to Australia from 1954 onwards (Atchison, 1984, p. 12). However, apart from emigration from the Unites States, migrant intakes from these countries were insignificant. In 1948 and 1956, Australia also signed agreements with Malta, another country sharing a Commonwealth past. Finally, in 1952, Australia secured that migrant intakes from Austria would be realized under ICEM operations (Murphy, 2008, pp. 128, 150, 156; Commonwealth Department of Immigration, 1953, p. 169).

As far as Southern European countries were concerned, Australia signed a bilateral migration agreement with Italy in 1951.[7] Italy was the most important

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[7] This agreement was suspended from 1952 to 1954 and was reintroduced after 1955.

non-Anglo-Saxon country to supply Australia with migrants. However, migration from Italy was mostly self-supported and self-financed (Richards, 2008, pp. 217–218).[8] More specifically, although Italians represented 39 percent of non-British immigration during 1945–1966, only 15 percent of them were assisted in their movement to Australia (Pennay, 2011, p. i). In the case of Greece, another important Southern European migratory supplier for Australia, no bilateral agreement was signed, despite constant Greek requests for one during the 1950s. Consequently, Greek emigration to Australia was initiated either by the migrants themselves or, after 1952, through ICEM operations. The Greek migratory pattern was similar to the Italian one, as most of the migration occurring was unassisted. Further discriminatory measures were implemented in 1956–1965, when nominations from Southern Europe were restricted to just a few categories of dependents, so that emigration from these countries would decrease. During that same period, Australia increased migrant intakes from Western Europe, providing them with greater financial assistance and leaving their nomination scheme untouched (Limnios-Sekeris, 2013, pp. 35, 92–94).

Receiving Countries' Participation in International Organizations: Securing no Interference in Immigration Policies

During the first postwar years, the *International Labour Organization* (ILO) demonstrated greater will to become more involved in migration matters at an international level. In 1951, the ILO established a plan for the management of European emigration and organized a conference in Naples from October 2–16, 1951 to present this plan to interested countries (Karatani, 2005, p. 532).

A few months before the Naples Conference, in July 1951, the Australian Consulate General and Permanent Delegate to the European Office of the United Nations in Geneva, Patrick Shaw, had held a meeting with George Warren from the United States Department of State. Warren had asked for the Australian views concerning the possibility of the continuance of some sort of international organization for European migration following the dissolution

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8 "Australian Migration Plan Leaves Italians Indignant," *Christian Science Monitor*, August 19, 1952, 1952/81/4/1, UN Migration-Labour Issues, Central Service, AGMFA, Athens; Politis to GMFA, 3312, September 5, 1952 (in Greek), UN Migration-Labour Issues, AGMFA, Athens.

of the International Refugee Organization (IRO). The United States was interested in solving Europe's so-called "overpopulation" problem, but stressed that the ILO plan proposing the annual emigration of 800,000 persons from Europe was "unrealistic." Warren had also pointed out the difficulties of the ILO project, as this was an organization which included countries from Eastern Europe and Asia as members. He had also mentioned that the United States was examining the establishment of a new intergovernmental agency, with membership exclusively from friendly immigration–emigration states and countries interested in the population problems of Europe. He stressed that the United States intended to endow this agency with funds from the *Economic Co-operation Administration* (ECA).[9] Warren had further underlined "that the participation of Australia is vital to the success of the proposal," which "might be abandoned if Australia did not take part in the initial discussions."[10] On his part, Shaw had confirmed Australia's interest in European migration and agreed with Warren's negative attitude towards the ILO's involvement in migration affairs.[11] Australia had welcomed Warren's proposals and the invitation to a forthcoming conference to discuss the matters raised by the United States.[12]

During a meeting in Canberra between the *Departments of Immigration* (DIMC), *External Affairs* (DEAC) and the *Treasury*, the ILO and United States proposals regarding the problem of European migration were discussed. There, the ILO plan was characterized as unattractive and inefficient by the DIMC. Moreover, the DEAC stressed that Australia would face an embarrassing situation if Asian countries admitted to the ILO initiated public discussion on the country's *White Australia* policy, or if the organization intervened "in the negotiation of agreements and in the resettlement of migrants."[13] As the DEAC

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[9] Patrick Shaw to DEAC, 6/10/1, 159, July 18, 1951, A446, 1962/66432, ICEM/PICMME, Establishment of Organisation Part 1, NAA, Canberra.

[10] Australian Embassy in Washington to DEAC, 1456, Cable, Restricted, August 16, 1951, A446, 1962/66432, ICEM/PICMME, Establishment of Organisation Part 1, NAA, Canberra.

[11] Patrick Shaw to DEAC, 6/10/1, 159, July 18, 1951, A446, 1962/66432, ICEM/PICMME, Establishment of Organisation Part 1, NAA, Canberra.

[12] T.H.E. Heyes to DEAC, August 22, 1951, A446, 1962/66432, ICEM/PICMME, Establishment of Organisation Part 1, NAA, Canberra.

[13] G.C. Watson, "Inter-Departmental Discussions on International Aid for European Migration," August 30, 1951, A446, 1962/66432, ICEM/PICMME, Establishment of Organisation

noted, "pressure in the ILO for 'universality' and 'non-discrimination' are likely to […] expose governments whose selection standards are high to criticism on grounds of discrimination."[14] Australia, being well aware of the discrimination aspect of its immigration policy that faced criticism even among other Commonwealth countries (Richards, 2008, pp. 236–237),[15] preferred the establishment of an independent and temporary inter-governmental agency which would ensure no interference in its immigration policy or its selection criteria.

Overall, the United States/Warren plan seemed much more attractive. Consequently, the Australian delegation to the Naples Conference stated that there was no need for any specialized agency for migration, and that it was more concerned about shipping services for the transportation of migrants.[16] The problem of participation of communist countries in the ILO was also mentioned, as a matter contrary to Australian foreign policy.[17]

One month after the failure of the Naples Conference, the United States invited interested countries to participate in another conference in Brussels from November 26, 1951 to December 5, 1951, in order to discuss the possible establishment of an agency to succeed the IRO. Since Australia had already agreed to support the United States plan,[18] it accepted the invitation. Three days before

Part 1, NAA, Canberra; Secretary to Minister, "I.L.O. Conference at Naples Commencing 2nd October, 1951," September 13, 1951, A446, 1962/66432, ICEM/PICMME, Establishment of Organisation Part 1, NAA, Canberra.

[14] DEAC to High Commissioner's Office in London, 5153, Cable, Immediate, Restricted, September 5, 1951, A446, 1962/66432, ICEM/PICMME, Establishment of Organisation Part 1, NAA, Canberra.

[15] India criticized the *White Australia* policy at ECOSOC, see DEAC to Australian Embassy Washington and ACGG, 984, Cable, Restricted, Immediate, August 24, 1951, A446, 1962/66432, ICEM/PICMME, Establishment of Organisation Part 1, NAA, Canberra.

[16] Australian Legation in Rome to DEAC, 274, Cable, Restricted, October 7, 1951, A446, 1962/66432, ICEM/PICMME, Establishment of Organisation Part 1, NAA, Canberra; "Statement made by Australian Delegation (Mr. Shaw) in Plenary of Conference on 16th October 1951, on Report of Programme Committee," October 16, 1951, MIG, File n.1009-2-501-1, Registry/203882, International Migration Conference (Naples, October 1951), Programme Committee, Verbatim, AILO, Geneva.

[17] "New Migration Plan Rejected," *Mirror* (Sydney, NSW), October 5, 1951, A446, 1962/66432, ICEM/PICMME, Establishment of Organisation Part 1, NAA, Canberra.

[18] T.H.E. Heyes to DEAC, August 22, 1951, A446, 1962/66432, ICEM/PICMME, Establishment of Organisation Part 1, NAA, Canberra; "Interest of Australian Government in Expediting action for Calling of Conference to Establish Ad Hoc Arrangements for Movement of

the formal opening of the discussions at the Brussels conference, the United States invited the most important participants to preliminary discussions, Australia included. At this meeting, clarifications about the Warren plan were given and contacts between the United States and the other delegations were made.[19]

At the Brussels conference, Canada and Australia cooperated closely, since both countries were major immigration nations with similar interests and discriminatory immigration policies. Canadian and Australian common interests included their desire to retain complete control over selection criteria, medical and age standards, and numbers and types of admitted migrants under the new agency.[20] Patrick Shaw, the chief Australian delegate, highlighted his government's positions on the under-establishment agency, as well as the country'sn wish to retain the first say on selection criteria and numbers of admitted migrants. He linked migration to the economic situation of immigration countries and stressed that "migration must be regarded from the perspective of the receiving countries."[21] He noted that Australia's immigration program fluctuated every year, according to the country's economic situation; consequently, his government could not promise a standard intake of migrants. He revealed that Australia's priority was the intake of workers and not family units. Workers constituted a productive power, whereas families coming to Australia would bring about inflationary tendencies, since they created needs without contribut-

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Migrants," Restricted, September 13, 1951, Migration, Naples Instructions, Department of State, NARA, Washington D.C.

[19] The other participants to the preliminary discussions were, apart from the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Italy, Germany, Switzerland and the Netherlands. See Patrick Shaw, "Report of Australian Representative at Intergovernmental Migration Conference Brussels 23rd November – 8th December 1951," December 17, 1951, A446, 1966/46194, ICEM, First Session Brussels 1951, ICEM, First, Second, Third Session 1951 to 1952, NAA, Canberra.

[20] DEAC to Australian Delegation, Migration Conference, Atlanta Hotel Brussels, 3, Cable, Secret, November 27, 1951, A446, 1962/66433, ICEM/PICMME, Establishment of Organisation Part 2, NAA, Canberra; Australian Delegation to Migration Conference Brussels to DEAC, 3, Cable, Confidential, November 28, 1951, A446, 1962/66433, ICEM/PICMME, Establishment of Organisation Part 2, NAA, Canberra; DEAC to Australian Delegation to the Migration Conference, 10, Cable, Restricted, Immediate, December 5, 1951, A446, 1962/66433, ICEM/PICMME, Establishment of Organisation Part 2, NAA, Canberra.

[21] "Annex to Summary Record of Fourth Meeting, November 27, 1951. Statement by Mr. Patrick Shaw, (Australia)," Annex B, MCB/SR/PROV/4/Annex 3, A446, 1966/46194, ICEM, First Session Brussels 1951, ICEM, First, Second, Third Session 1951 to 1952, NAA, Canberra.

ing to production. The Australian delegate acknowledged the European population problem and mentioned that Australia would be ready to contribute more towards its solution, when its economy became strong enough to assimilate the admitted migrants. Shaw stressed that Australia would join the new agency only if it was able to offer shipping services in full force and if the services it provided produced substantial savings, compared to the expenses incurred through Australia's bilateral agreements. Finally, the expenditures regarding the selection and reception of migrants were to be considered as part of immigration countries' contribution to the agency's operational budget.

The new agency was named *Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe* (PICMME) and included in its establishing resolution a provision stating that "each country of reception will retain control of standards of admission and the number of immigrants to be admitted"; this came as a disappointment to emigration countries, Italy in particular, which hoped that the new agency would exert pressure on the immigration countries to accept more migrant categories.[22] As a result, Australia became a founding member of PICMME, agreeing to contribute six point two percent of its administrative budget.[23]

ICEM's Assisted Immigration Schemes to Australia: Implementation of Ethnic Discrimination

Australia, through its participation in ICEM, benefited from the intake of migrants selected under strict criteria in terms of nationality, political beliefs, occupation, sex, age and physical condition, and under a two-year contract for jobs decided upon by the Australian government.

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[22] Patrick Shaw, "Report of Australian Representative at Intergovernmental Migration Conference Brussels 23rd November – 8th December 1951," Secret, December 17, 1951, A446, 1966/46194, ICEM, First Session Brussels 1951 ICEM, First, Second, Third Session 1951 to 1952, NAA, Canberra.

[23] ACGG to DEAC, 296, Cable, Restricted, December 12, 1951, A446, 1962/66433, ICEM/PICMME, Establishment of Organisation Part 2, NAA, Canberra; H. Beale, Acting Minister for Immigration to Cabinet "Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe (PICMME) – Setting up of Organisation and Australian Participation," 41, Secret, A446, 1962/66433, ICEM/PICMME, Establishment of Organisation Part 2, NAA, Canberra.

Between 1952 and 1960, Australia was the main receiving state among ICEM members, admitting approximately 29 percent of all migrants transported overseas by the Committee; a total of 313,372 migrants came to Australia under the auspices of ICEM during this period (see tables 2 and 3). This fact provided an excellent argument to exert pressure on the United States and the ICEM Administration in order for Australia to gain more benefits from the Committee's operations or to maintain the status quo of the operations. Australia was well aware of its importance for the ICEM, knowing that, without the resettlement opportunities it offered, the Committee "would not be in existence"[24] for long and would "have found it somewhat difficult to justify its existence."[25] Australia offered ICEM not only the largest possibilities for migrant recruitments, but was also the only country that accepted large numbers of unskilled workers.[26]

As the United Kingdom was not a member of the ICEM up to 1961, Britons could not be recruited under ICEM's programs. Thus, Australia concentrated on the admission of other Northern European nationalities. Its officials made it clear that its immigration programs needed to be balanced, which meant that the percentage of Southern Europeans and refugees (mainly unskilled) admitted by the Australian government through the ICEM needed to correspond to the intakes from Northern Europe (generally considered skilled immigrants). This position resulted in occasional frictions with the ICEM Administration, the United States Delegations to the ICEM and the emigration countries affected.

On the other hand, Australia was keen on attracting the largest possible numbers of immigrants through the ICEM, since its operations were more economical, compared to migration through bilateral agreements. Moreover, as

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[24] ACGG to DEAC, 323, Cable, Restricted, Priority, October 3, 1956, A446, 1966/46164, ICEM, Fifth Session of Executive Committee and Council, Geneva 1956, NAA, Canberra.

[25] "Notes for Inclusion in Brief for the Australian Delegate to the Fifth Session of I.C.E.M. Sub-Committee on Finance to be Held in Geneva on Friday, 23rd April, 1954," Confidential, A446, 1966/46196, ICEM, Seventh Session Geneva 1954, ICEM, Seventh, Eighth Session 1954, NAA, Canberra.

[26] "Brief for the Australian Delegate to the Third Session of ICEM Executive Committee and Council commencing 6th and 17th October, 1955, at the Palais des Nations, Geneva," A446, 1966/46162, ICEM, Third Session Executive Committee and Council, Geneva 1955, NAA, Canberra.

TABLE 2. Summary of ICEM movements to immigration countries (in thousands), 1952–1960

	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	TOTAL
Argentina	470	9,023	29,309	15,208	8,723	18,052	12,637	8,874	4,522	106,818
Australia	15,547	13,327	37,773	53,777	41,061	43,654	28,004	39,509	40,720	313,372
Brazil	9,784	12,718	16,353	8,920	5,977	11,300	7,300	8,347	8,257	88,956
Canada	8,671	36,928	21,294	8,858	11,294	46,453	9,890	5,799	7,400	156,587
Chile	1,327	776	814	1,033	426	814	366	428	472	6,456
Colombia	24	107	128	42	195	926	367	497	654	2,940
Israel	762	2,389	1,037	1,220	6,301	14,185	12,537	14,085	15,075	67,591
New Zealand	401	48	22	785	1,733	2,102	1,912	1,523	1,355	9,881
South Africa	149	244	242	199	262	2,901	2,662	2,317	1,246	10,222
USA	38,125	6,367	7,233	20,522	54,340	27,164	7,276	13,802	10,329	185,158
Uruguay	46	116	360	2,790	1,674	2,279	1,496	1,289	838	10,888
Venezuela	1,490	3,922	5,307	4,973	4,923	8,620	6,278	7,639	6,563	49,715
Others Overseas	361	851	465	710	2,238	2,539	1,917	561	485	10,127
Others European	507	718	890	1,402	33,085	13,167	1,690	1,066	1,883	54,408
TOTAL	77,664	87,534	121,227	120,439	172,232	194,156	94,332	105,736	99,799	1,073,119

Source: ICEM Handbook 1962, p. 44.

TABLE 3. Percentage of total ICEM movements to immigration countries, 1952–1960

	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	TOTAL
Argentina	0.61	10.31	24.18	12.63	5.06	9.3	13.4	8.39	4.53	9.95
Australia	20.02	15.22	31.16	44.65	23.84	22.48	29.69	37.37	40.8	29.2
Brazil	12.6	14.53	13.49	7.41	3.47	5.82	7.74	7.89	8.27	8.29
Canada	11.16	42.19	17.57	7.35	6.56	23.93	10.48	5.48	7.41	14.59
Chile	1.71	0.89	0.67	0.86	0.25	0.42	0.39	0.4	0.47	0.6
Colombia	0.03	0.12	0.11	0.03	0.11	0.48	0.39	0.47	0.66	0.27
Israel	0.98	2.73	0.86	1.01	3.66	7.31	13.29	13.32	15.11	6.3
New Zealand	0.52	0.05	0.02	0.65	1.01	1.08	2.03	1.44	1.36	0.92
South Africa	0.19	0.28	0.2	0.17	0.15	1.49	2.82	2.19	1.25	0.95
USA	49.09	7.27	5.97	17.04	31.55	13.99	7.71	13.05	10.35	17.25
Uruguay	0.06	0.13	0.3	2.32	0.97	1.17	1.59	1.22	0.84	1.01
Venezuela	1.92	4.48	4.38	4.13	2.86	4.44	6.66	7.22	6.58	4.63
Others Overseas	0.46	0.97	0.38	0.59	1.3	1.31	2.03	0.53	0.49	0.94
Others European	0.65	0.82	0.73	1.16	19.21	6.78	1.79	1.01	1.89	5.07
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: See table 2 above.

TABLE 4. Australian migrant intakes through ICEM, 1952–1960

	Austria	Federal Republic of Germany	Greece	Italy (Trieste Included)	Netherlands	Spain	Others	TOTAL Yearly Migrant Intakes
1952	394	4,953	84	493	8,969		352	15,245
1953	423	7,834	2,107	509	1,762		222	12,857
1954	2,029	14,227	9,038	5,465	574		6,131	37,464
1955	4,919	6,627	10,813	10,641	11,394		9,207	53,601
1956	4,286	6,109	6,771	7,559	10,845		3,943	39,513
1957	3,703	4,492	5,494	6,157	6,617	1	2,624	29,088
1958	2,566	4,519	3,090	3,636	7,339	163	3,955	25,268
1959	2,975	9,666	4,545	6,973	8,114	578	4,541	37,392
1960	1,775	5,953	4,406	5,464	7,789	1,013	2,274	28,674
TOTAL	23,070	64,380	46,348	46,897	63,403	1,755	33,249	279,102

Source: ICEM Council, Sixth Session, "Report of the Director on the Work of the Committee for the Year 1956", MC/223/Rev.1, April 1, 1957, Sixth Session of the Council and Seventh Session of the Executive Committee of ICEM, Geneva, March 28 – April 12, 1957/ICEM Council Documents MC/Sixth Session (First Copy), NARA; "Report of the Director on the work of the Committee for the year 1957. Corrigendum. Replaces Page 28 of Document MC/283," MC/283/Corr.2, May 2, 1958, Eighth Session of the Council of ICEM, Geneva, May 8–14, 1958, NARA; ICEM Council, Twelfth Session, "Report of the Director on the work of the Committee for the year 1959," MC/384, March 10, 1960, 12th Session of the Council of the ICEM, Naples, May 5–13, 1960, NARA; ICEM Council, Fourteenth Session, "Report of the Director on the work of the Committee for the year 1960," MC/450, March 10, 1961, 12th Session of the Council of the ICEM, Naples, May 5–13, 1960, NARA; ICEM Council, Second Session, Deputy Director, "Report on the Work of the Committee for the Year 1954", MC/126, Mar. 11, 1955, Second Session of the Council and Executive Committee of ICEM, Geneva, April 21 – May 4, 1955, NARA; ICEM, Seventh Session, "Annual Report of the Director for 1953", MC/61, February 27, 1954, Seventh Session of the ICEM, Geneva, April 26 – May 1, 1954, NARA, Washington D.C.

immigration under the auspices of the ICEM was assisted, the admittance of migrants was more selective. Migration to Australia through the ICEM did not follow the same pattern with general migration to the country (table 1). More specifically, for the period 1951–1961, whereas the largest non-British migrating nationality in yearly intakes was that from Italy (followed by the Netherlands, Germany and Greece), migrant intakes through the ICEM ranked Germany first, followed by the Netherlands, and then by the Southern European countries, namely Italy and Greece.

Initially, the postwar Australian economy was largely based on the primary sector. Livestock and agricultural production constituted the two main sources of the country's wealth. Moreover, the increasing population created greater needs for rural production. Thus, since the first years of ICEM operation,

Australia recruited agricultural workers from Europe. In 1952–1953, 500 experienced rural workers from Greece were selected, followed by another 4,000 along with their family members, in 1953–1954 (Limnios-Sekeris, 2013, pp. 74–75). Experienced rural workers were also recruited from Austria, Germany and Italy.[27] Before their emigration, Greek rural workers attended tractor driving lessons for a month's period or lessons to familiarize themselves with other agricultural tools; these courses were provided by the ICEM Mission in Athens and the Greek Ministry for Agriculture. Some of the workers took English lessons as well (Limnios-Sekeris, 2013, pp. 74–75).[28] These provisions aimed at facilitating immigrant adaptation to agricultural-working practices and culture in Australia.

Soon, however, the rapid industrialization of the country increased the demand for both skilled and unskilled male workers, who were admitted as either single or married without their families, and later on, as part of family units. During the early years of the ICEM, preference was given to single male workers, since there was an acute shortage of accommodation. Compared to families, the housing of single workers was easier, since they could be accommodated in workers' hostels or other lodgings offered by the government. The proportion of skilled workers admitted determined the percentage of

[27] For more information on Austria: Holt to Jacobsen, September 29, 1952; Heyes, "Recruitment of 500 Austrian and 500 Greek Nationals under ICEM Arrangements," 49, February 23, 1953, A445, 197/1/5, ICEM, Admission of Greek Nationals, NAA, Canberra. For Germany: DEAC to ACGG, 113, Cable, Restricted, Priority, August 8, 1952, A1838, 80/1/3/2 Part 1, Europe, General Relations with Australia, Immigration, General, NAA, Canberra; in 1952, there was provision for the movement of 2,975 German rural workers: 950 single and 700 married, along with their dependents (1,325). See, DEAC to Australian Migration Office Cologne, 126, Cable, Confidential, June 7, 1952, A1838, 80/1/3/2 Part 1, Europe, General Relations with Australia, Immigration, General, NAA, Canberra. For Italy: 100 persons for rural employment, Heyes to Leadbeatter (Chief of ICEM Mission Canberra), October 12, 1953, A445, 197/1/9, Admission Greek Nationals under ICEM Auspices, NAA, Canberra. For small intakes from Italy of rural workers (300 in 1958–1959), see Australian Embassy Rome to DEAC, 176, Cable, Sept. 2, 1958, A463, 1956/569 Part 2, Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration. (ICEM) 1957–1959, NAA, Canberra.

[28] A.R. Driver (CMO Rome to DIMC), "Selection and Movement to Australia of 500 Migrants from Greece," R53/19227, ARD/JCG, Confidential, May 20, 1953, A445, 197/1/5, ICEM, Admission of Greek Nationals, NAA, Canberra; for the subsequent increases to the Greek Program, A.L. Nutt to A.R. Driver, "Greek Programme, 1953/54 Financial Year," Mar. 16, 1954, A445, 197/1/9, Admission Greek Nationals under ICEM Auspices, NAA, Canberra.

unskilled migrants. Any disruption of this balance meant that the Australian immigration program needed to be rescheduled, with a possible suspension of intakes from any outnumbered group or category. Skilled migrants were more available among the Dutch and Germans, consequently assisted emigrants from the Netherlands and Germany exceeded those coming from Italy and Greece, where unskilled workers prevailed.

The age criterion for single male workers and married couples without children was set at a maximum of 35 years, while for married couples with children each spouse could not be older than 50 years old. All of the migrants underwent medical examinations and were rejected in the case they suffered from tuberculosis, infectious diseases, trachoma, physical disabilities, a high degree of myopia or even when they were shorter than 1.55 meters and weighed less than 54 kilos (Limnios-Sekeris, 2013, pp. 59-60, 72).[29] Male workers migrating to Australia through the ICEM in the mid-1950s undertook language courses and orientation classes before their embarkation, in order to be prepared for Australian practices and a new type of life. English courses were implemented in Greece, Italy, Germany and Spain.[30]

From 1955–1956 onwards (tables 1 and 4), the intakes from Germany and the Netherlands progressively declined as employment rates in these countries

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[29] The aforementioned criteria were applied to all applicants on ICEM schemes towards Australia and to those who migrated individually.

[30] In Austria and the Netherlands, English was already a formal subject in schools, so language courses were not considered necessary. For English lessons in Greece, see Limnios-Sekeris 2013, p. 76; for Italy, Austria and the Netherlands, "Notes on Discussion with I.C.E.M. Pilot Projects for Language Training," Annex K, November 14, 1958, A446, 1966/46170, ICEM, 11th Session of Executive Committee and Ninth Session of Council, Geneva 1958, NAA, Canberra. For Germany, ACGG to DEAC, 107, Cable, Restricted, April 4, 1959, A446, 1966/46171, ICEM, 12th Session of Executive Committee and 10th Session of Council, Geneva 1959, NAA, Canberra. For Spain, "Report of the Australian Delegation to ICEM, Thirteenth Session of the Executive Committee and Eleventh Session of the Council," November 1959, A446, 1966/46172, ICEM, 13th Session of Executive Committee and 11th Session of Council, Geneva 1959, NAA, Canberra. The language and orientation lessons for ICEM male workers were continued on board the ship by Australian officers at Australia's expenses, see, "Brief for Australian Delegation to ICEM Executive Committee and Council Commencing 20th September, 1956 and 1st October, 1956 at Palais des Nations, Geneva," Restricted, September 13, 1956, A446, 1966/46164, ICEM, Fifth Session of Executive Committee and Council, Geneva 1956, NAA, Canberra; "Statement of Australian Delegation. Migration Services," Annex 4, [1956], A446, 1966/46164, ICEM, Fifth Session of Executive Committee and Council, Geneva 1956, NAA, Canberra.

rose. Consequently, Australia faced a shortage of skilled migrants. In 1955, the ICEM, in an attempt to respond to this shortage, proposed the implementation of short-term vocational training programs for unskilled and semi-skilled migrants in Southern Europe.[31] Australia rejected this proposal citing the "impracticability [...] of attempting to produce skilled workers from unskilled applicants." It refused to accept migrants as skilled or semi-skilled tradesmen based on short-term vocational training courses, mainly because of the strict criteria imposed by trade unions concerning the apprenticeships, experience and qualifications of tradesmen.[32] Italy and Greece acted as a reservoir for unskilled labor and recruitment there was promoted mainly when the numbers of Northern Europeans were insufficient.

Thus, the balance of migrant intakes between Northern and Southern Europe was attempted with the development of new programs in 1955 and 1956. Talks concentrated on the emigration of Danes, although Denmark was not considered an "overpopulated" country, and normally their transport could not be sponsored by the ICEM. The Danes had been included in the *General Assisted Passage* (GAP) scheme for migration to Australia from 1954 onwards, something which entailed movement assisted by the Australian government to a certain extent, while the remaining expenses were paid by the migrants themselves. In 1957–1958, Australia sought the participation of the ICEM regarding the movement of Danes to Australia under the GAP scheme by ensuring an extra ICEM/US subsidy,[33] and thus, making this move-

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[31] Jacobsen to Heyes, Confidential, September 17, 1955, A446, 1966/46162, ICEM, Third Session Executive Committee and Council, Geneva 1955, NAA, Canberra.

[32] "Brief for Australian Delegation to ICEM Executive Committee and Council Commencing 20th September, 1956 and 1st October, 1956 at Palais des Nations, Geneva," Restricted, September 13, 1956, A446, 1966/46164, ICEM, Fifth Session of Executive Committee and Council, Geneva 1956, NAA, Canberra; "Statement of Australian Delegation. Migration Services," Annex 4, [1956], A446, 1966/46164, ICEM, Fifth Session of Executive Committee and Council, Geneva 1956, NAA, Canberra; Heyes to DEAC, "ICEM: Third Session of the Executive Committee and the Council," 55/66672, September 30, 1955, A446, 1966/46162, ICEM, Third Session Executive Committee and Council, Geneva 1955, NAA, Canberra.

[33] A.W. Clabon (Acting Chief of ICEM Mission in Australia to Heyes), "Movements of G.A.P.S. Danish Migrants under assisted passage arrangements," 2452, AUS/M/16, September. 13, 1957, A446, 1966/46168, ICEM, Ninth Session of Executive Committee and Seventh Session of Council, Geneva 1957, NAA, Canberra; Australian Embassy in Washington to DEAC, 1103,

ment more financially attractive for the potential migrants from Denmark.[34]

When the migrant flow from Germany decreased and the German government raised barriers to the emigration of its nationals, Australia inaugurated special unilateral recruitment programs for Germans that involved a greater contribution from the Australian government in the form of an additional contribution to the Special Fund of the ICEM; these funds were directed to support the German recruitment program.[35] A migration program similar to that of the Danish scheme was initiated for Germans from 1957 onwards.

In the mid-1950s, Australia faced the consequences of its previous preference to male worker intakes. The imbalance of sexes became intense and both the migrant communities and the local press raised the issue. There were voices demanding the admittance of female migrants from all ethnicities represented in Australia.[36] The Australian government decided on female migration mainly in order to stabilize its migrant population by balancing out both sexes (Limnios-Sekeris, 2013, pp. 159–160). It also took into consideration the decrease in the number of household workers in Australia. The postwar domestic service sector was an unpopular occupation due to live-in conditions; this was also the least organized working sector.[37]

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Cable, Confidential, September 11, 1957, A446, 1966/46168, ICEM, Ninth Session of Executive Committee and Seventh Session of Council, Geneva 1957, NAA, Canberra; Heyes for DEAC (External Communication Division), September 30, 1957, A446, 1966/46168, ICEM, Ninth Session of Executive Committee and Seventh Session of Council, Geneva 1957, NAA, Canberra.

[34] For more on this scheme, see Ioannis Limnios-Sekeris, "Imbalances in Decision-Making Processes: Commonwealth versus Latin American Countries" in this volume (pp. 87–96).

[35] G. C. Watson-Assistant Secretary Planning & Research to DIMC, "ICEM's 1958 Budget," September 24, 1957, A446, 1966/46168, ICEM, Ninth Session of Executive Committee and Seventh Session of Council – Geneva 1957, NAA, Canberra; "Australian Contribution," [1958], A446, 1966/46169, ICEM, Tenth Session of Executive Committee and Eighth Session of Council, Geneva 1958, NAA, Canberra. Australia contributed $100 per German recruited, as was the normal amount paid at that time, for all migrants through ICEM, except for the Dutch. Additionally, Australia paid $60 more from its Special Fund contribution to ICEM for the unilateral recruitments.

[36] Regarding the Press, Reuters Geneva to Reuters Bern, Cable, June 11, 1955, A10034, 9/3-2, Non United Nations Organizations, ICEM, General [Part 2], NAA, Canberra; *Έξω Ελληνισμός / Hellenism Abroad* (March 15, 1955; June 15, 1955; October 15, 1955; December 1, 1955).

[37] Heyes to CMO Sydney, 55/67936, March 8, 1956, C3939, N1959/75176, Immigration, Information Officers on Dutch and ICEM Vessels, NAA, Sydney. In 1939, prior to the outbreak of the war, 125,000 persons were occupied in domestic services in Australia; 51,000 in 1943;

TABLE 5. Australian migrant intakes through ICEM as a percentage of the total, February 1952 to December 1960

Austria	Germany	Greece	Italy (& Trieste)	Netherlands	Spain	Others	TOTAL
8.27	23.07	16.61	16.8	22.27	0.63	11.91	100

Source: See table 4.

The migration of single female workers was primarily organized through the ICEM programs for domestic workers implemented in sending country members. The ICEM programs for migration of domestics to Australia started in 1952, with a scheme for a small number of single Italian women implemented on an experimental basis. This scheme continued its operations all through the 1950s.[38] Other similar schemes were implemented in Germany and Greece (from 1953), Trieste (from 1954),[39] Austria and Spain,[40] although

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50,000 in 1944; and, approximately 56,000 in 1946, see, E.J. Holloway (Minister for Labour and National Service in Canberra) to Milder Fairchild (Chief of the Section of Women's Work and Protection of Young Workers) in ILO Geneva, 702/12/11, November 17, 1947, MP579/1, 702/12/11, ILO Information Gov, ILO Domestic Workers in Australia, NAA, Melbourne.

[38] H.A. Bland (Secretary of the Department of Labour and National Service in Melbourne to DIMC), "Recruitment of Migrant Domestics," 3033 (73), December 8, 1953, A445, 197/1/9, Admission Greek Nationals under ICEM Auspices, NAA, Canberra; Australian Embassy in Rome to DEAC, 176, September 2, 1958, A463, 1956/569 Part 2, Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration. (I.C.E.M.) 1957–1959, NAA, Canberra.

[39] For Greece, H.A. Bland (Secretary of the Department of Labour and National Service in Melbourne to DIMC), "Requisitions for Greek Migrants," October 29, 1953, A445, 197/1/9, Admission Greek Nationals under ICEM Auspices, NAA, Canberra; for Germany, "Notes on Meeting with Chief Australian Migration Officers, Cologne and Rome on Thursday, July 16, 1953, at Geneva," A445, 145/4/10, Meeting between ICEM representatives & CMOs in Geneva July 16 1953, NAA, Canberra; for Trieste, Heyes to Driver (CMO Rome), "Adjustment to 1953/54 Immigration Programme," 256/1/4, January 19, 1954, A445, 197/1/9, Admission Greek Nationals under ICEM Auspices, NAA, Canberra; T.R. Sweeney-Assisted Division, "Escort on the "Fairsea" ex Genoa 24/2/56 at Sydney 28/3/1956," C3939, N1959/75176, Immigration, Information Officers on Dutch and ICEM Vessels, NAA, Sydney.

[40] "Memorandum on Discussions with Mr. T.H.E. Heyes. Held at ICEM Headquarters, Geneva, on Thursday 28th May, 1959," A446, 1962/65076, ICEM General Part 1, NAA, Canberra; Australian Embassy Rome to DEAC, 176, Cable, September 2, 1958, NAA/A463, 1956/569 Part 2, Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration. (ICEM) 1957–1959, NAA, Canberra.

not uninterruptedly. The success and scope of these schemes was not the same for all the emigration countries implicated.

In Greece, the program for the domestics was implemented on a more consistent basis in 1956 and constituted one of the most extensive schemes regarding migration to Australia through the ICEM: The Committee's local mission established schools in seven different cities of Greece that were provided with ample personnel and several services. The application prerequisites for the program were the young age of the applicants (between 21 and 35 years of age), single marital status, no children and knowledge of reading and writing (Limnios-Sekeris, 2013, pp. 51–52, 78–79).[41] Greek women had to attend a four-month training course on domestic work, such as cleaning, washing, mopping and ironing, while they were also taught rules of behavior and personal hygiene, in order to meet Australian household standards and know what to expect of their new life. Additionally, they took English language and orientation lessons, acquiring general knowledge about the country that would become their new home (Limnios-Sekeris, 2013, p. 78). This scheme was the only program for Greeks going to Australia through which the emigrants received short-term vocational training.

Even so, family reunification remained the main way of balancing the number of male and female immigrants and stabilizing migrant communities. The immigration of dependents, apart from a method of increasing the population, was also considered a way to stimulate the economy by "promoting internal markets."[42] On its part, the ICEM, following the widespread importance accorded to the family and the prevailing human rights discourse, responded to receiving countries' wishes for the reunification of migrant families by establishing the *Nominated Dependents Scheme*. This scheme provided assisted passage arrangements to Australia for spouses, minor children, fiancés and

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[41] The age limits differed slightly for each of the emigration countries where domestic schemes were implemented. In Germany in 1953, the age limit for domestics increased from 30 to 40 years of age, see, "Notes on Meeting with Chief Australian Migration Officers, Cologne and Rome on Thursday, 16 July, 1953, at Geneva," A445, 145/4/10, Meeting between ICEM representatives & CMOs in Geneva July 16, 1953, NAA, Canberra.

[42] Phrase attributed to the Australian Minister for Immigration, Harold Holt, see "Italian and Dutch Intake Reduced" *The Canberra Times*, July 9, 1952, A1838, 80/1/3/2 Part 1, Europe, General Relations with Australia, Immigration, General, NAA, Canberra.

fiancées, parents, unmarried sisters and, to a lesser extent, unmarried brothers of the preceded worker. At a later stage, it also included dependents irrespective of the type of migration of the breadwinner, i.e. whether he had been assisted or not.[43] Such schemes were implemented from the onset in all the emigration countries Australia recruited migrants from, under ICEM's auspices.[44] Family reunions formed the bulk of assisted intakes and this fact was always underlined by the Australian delegations to ICEM Sessions.[45] The importance of one-step migration of family units, (as compared to two-step migration with the breadwinner preceding his/her dependents), was acknowledged by the Australian government towards the second half of the 1950s. After this, Australia preferred the migration of the family as a whole. During the 1960s, this preference led to the establishment of schemes for family groups.[46]

In order for the ICEM to assist a larger proportion of the potential migratory population (and not only those eligible for migration under mass schemes), contracts were signed with several voluntary agencies. Through these agencies,

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[43] Concerning the migration through ICEM of dependents of non-assisted migrants in 1953: Heyes to Leadbeatter, October 12, 1953, A445, 197/1/9, Admission Greek Nationals under ICEM Auspices, NAA, Canberra.

[44] For Germany, Holland, Italy, Greece: Heyes to Driver-CMO Rome, "Adjustment to 1953/54 Immigration Programme," 256/1/4, January 19, 1954, A445, 197/1/9, Admission Greek Nationals under ICEM Auspices, NAA, Canberra; for Greece, see Limnios-Sekeris, (2013, pp. 86–96); for Italy, Heyes to CMO Australian Legation Rome, "Recruitment Programme for the First Six Months of 1953," December 3, 1952, A445, 197/1/5, ICEM, Admission of Greek Nationals, NAA, Canberra; for Italy and Austria, Heyes to Leadbeatter, October 12, 1953, A445, 197/1/9, Admission Greek Nationals under ICEM Auspices, NAA, Canberra.

[45] "Report of the Australian Delegation, ICEM, Tenth Session of the Executive Committee and Eighth Session of the Council," Restricted, May 1958, A446, 1966/46169, ICEM, Tenth Session of Executive Committee and Eighth Session of Council, Geneva 1958, NAA, Canberra; DEAC to ACGG, 452, Cable, Restricted, October 29, 1958, A446, 1966/46170, ICEM, 11th Session of Executive Committee and Ninth Session of Council, Geneva 1958, NAA, Canberra; "Speech made by Mr. L.J. Arnott, Representative of Australia, at the 113th Meeting of the Council," Annex 4, MC/C/SR/PROV/113, [April/May 1960], A446, 1966/46174, ICEM, 15th Session of Executive Committee and 12th Session of Council, Geneva 1960, NAA, Canberra.

[46] "Summary of Discussions with Sr. D. Carlos María Rodríguez de Valcárcel, Director General of the Spanish Institute of Emigration, at the Department of Immigration, Canberra, 25th November, 1960", A446, 1966/46175, ICEM, 16th Session of Executive Committee and 13th Session of Council, Geneva 1960. Regarding the Family Groups schemes, see Limnios-Sekeris, (2013, p. 88).

individuals not meeting the criteria for selection under the mass migration schemes to Australia (i.e. age, health, and/or occupational criteria) and lacking the necessary funds, could be assisted to migrate by receiving a loan from the *Revolving Fund*, which was established in 1952 by the ICEM andvoluntary agencies. The beneficiaries had to repay the loans within a two-year period after their arrival and thereafter, these funds were used to finance other prospective migrants in the same way. The ICEM contributed toward the fares of these migrants and provided space on its chartered means of transport. Immigration countries, however, did not contribute to the costs of their transport (Limnios-Sekeris, 2013, p. 84).[47] Thus, the assistance from voluntary organizations was of much value to Australia, since the country received a migrant population at no cost.

During this period, Australia also received refugees through ICEM. The main intakes were more than 15,000 Hungarian refugees that arrived between 1956 and 1959. Priority was given to those who already had relatives and friends in Australia, so that they would be more easily accommodated and placed in jobs upon their arrival.[48] Australia also accepted the greatest part of European refugees from the Far East, admitting 5,763 between 1952 and 1960 (see table 6). Finally, in 1960, Australia, while participating in the international effort to resettle refugees (inaugurated during the *World Refugee Year*), extended the age limit for admitted refugees by ten years, increased the intakes of refugees (11,500 in that one year) and, admitted many "hard core cases" (as they were named), in other words, handicapped refugees who would not be easily assimilated.[49] However, in total, the number of refugees admitted was still relatively

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[47] ICEM, "Report of the Voluntary Agencies/ICEM Working Group," Eleventh Session, MC/INF/68, Oct. 5, 1959, Tenth Session of the Council of ICEM, Geneva, April 7-10, 1959, NARA, Washington D.C.

[48] Heyes to DEAC, February 28, 1957, A446, 1966/46165, ICEM, Sixth Special Session of Executive Committee and Council, Geneva 1957, NAA, Canberra; "Brief for Australian Delegation to I.C.E.M. Executive Committee and Council Commencing 26th September, 1957 and 7th October, 1957 at Palais des Nations, Geneva," Confidential, Restricted, September 20, 1957, A446, 1966/46168, ICEM, Ninth Session of Executive Committee and Seventh Session of Council, Geneva 1957, NAA, Geneva.

[49] [Speech of the Australian Representative, L.J. Arnott at the 13th Session of the Executive Session and 11th Session of ICEM Council, regarding the World Refugee Year], [November 1959], A446, 1966/46172, ICEM, 13th Session of Executive Committee and 11th Session of

TABLE 6. Australian refugee intakes through ICEM, February 1952 to December 1960

	Austria		FRG		Greece		Italy (Trieste included)			Nether-lands		Spain		Others				TOTAL / Year	Far East	Other Areas (IRO Trust Fund)	TOTAL Yearly Refugee Intakes
	Hungarian Program	Refugees	Hungarian Program	Refugees	Refugees ex Middle East	Refugees	Hungarian Program	Refugees ex Middle East	Refugees	Hungarian Program	Refugees	Hungarian Program	Refugees	Hungarian Program	Hungarian Refugees ex-Yugoslavia	Refugees ex Middle East	Refugees				
1952																		0	295	7	302
1953																		0	462	8	470
1954																		0	298	11	309
1955																		0	164	12	176
1956	1,119																	1,119	365	64	1,548
1957	8,336		9		612		606	102		6				1,730	1,495	35		12,931	1,612	24	14,567
1958	607		12		397		20	168		34				369	8	114		1,729	1,004	6	2,739
1959	240		49		82		19	73		8		2		539	4	34		1,050	1,055	11	2,116
1960		1,407		4,457		159			2,721		26						2,754	11,524	508	15	12,047
TOTALS	10,302	1,407	70	4,457	1,091	159	645	343	2,721	48	26	2		2,638	1,507	183	2,754	28,353	5,763	158	34,274
	11,709		4,527		1,250		3,709			74		2		4,145 183 2,754 — 7,082							

Sources: See Table 4. Differentiation on the categories of refugees listed is owed to the different statistical categories of ICEM for refugees during the aforementioned years.

TABLE 7. Total Australian refugee and migrant intakes through ICEM, February 1952 to December 1960

	Refugees	Migrants	TOTAL	Refugees %	Migrants %
1952	302	15,245	15,547	1.94	98.06
1953	470	12,857	13,327	3.53	96.47
1954	309	37,464	37,773	0.82	99.18
1955	176	53,601	53,777	0.33	99.67
1956	1,548	39,513	41,061	3.77	96.23
1957	14,567	29,088	43,655	33.37	66.63
1958	2,739	25,268	28,007	9.78	90.22
1959	2,116	37,392	39,508	5.36	94.64
1960	12,047	28,674	40,721	29.58	70.42
TOTAL	34,274	279,102	313,376	10.94	89.06

Sources: See Table 4.

low; it was the immigrants who offered larger margins in their selection, according to nationality, political beliefs, age, health and employment skills.

Receiving Countries' Immigration Policies, Racial Exclusion and Ethnic Discrimination in an Era of Universal Human Rights

Australia, because of its clearly delineated aims and its cohesive migration policies, profited largely from its participation in the ICEM. Due to its strong position amongst the receiving countries, it also often managed to exploit the frictions between ICEM member states to its own advantage. Benefitting from ICEM's services, Australia received a new population willing to be placed in jobs that were not popular amongst the local workforce at low costs. The Committee provided Australia with a substantial number of cheap workers selected under strict criteria and later contributed to the resolution of the imbalance of sexes among the migrant population. Furthermore, through its participation in the ICEM, Australia, along with other receiving countries that had all signed the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* in 1948, managed to continue implementing immigration policies based on racial exclusion and ethnic discrimination. The exclusion of Asians was well concealed through Australia's participation in the ICEM, since the Committee's mandate was limited to facilitating overseas emigration from "overpopulated" European states. The ICEM, being an international organization, offered the governments of its receiving member states the necessary legitimacy to continue their racist immigration policies, in an era when overt discriminations were delegitimized by human rights discourse.

Moreover, through Australia's doctrine of "balanced intakes," the transport and settlement of Northern European immigrants, in comparison to that of Southern Europeans, was far easier and assisted to a much larger degree throughout the 1950s. Both Italy and Greece, the main countries affected by Australian discriminatory practices, formulated their objections to this differ-

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Council, Geneva 1959, NAA, Canberra; "Speech by Mr. L. J. Arnott, Representative of Australia at the 110th meeting of the Council," Annex 2, MC/C/SR/PROV/110, [April/May 1960], A446, 1966/46174, ICEM, 15th Session of Executive Committee and 12th Session of Council, Geneva 1960, NAA, Canberra.

ential treatment within the ICEM decision-making bodies. Italy, in particular, accused Australia of discrimination against its nationals, citing both the larger number of intakes and the greater financial assistance offered to Northern Europeans. However, just as the governments of the excluded Asian countries, those of Southern European sending states, even though they were members of the ICEM, also lacked the means to unravel these policies and their objections to discrimination were rarely publicized. To make matters worse, the political elites of these countries often shared a similar contempt for their less well-off compatriots and sought to identify themselves with the economically developed "West." This contempt often made their governments blind to equally important and pervasive indirect discriminatory practices: Thus, for example, the Greek authorities never objected to or even took notice of the "civilizing" courses offered by ICEM to women intending to migrate as domestics overseas. Both the Greek state officials and the Greek personnel who prepared and offered these courses considered it normal that these women were not only taught how to use "modern" houseware or vacuum cleaners, but were also given lessons on personal hygiene and body care. These prospective migrants were thus explicitly and implicitly called upon to believe that they had to get rid of their "rough" habits and cultivate "civilized" manners, in order to migrate to a "modern" country. Thus, ICEM officials, receiving and sending countries' governments, as well as local instructors contributed to the diffusion of specific models of "civilized" behaviour, conceptions of "modernity" and the reproduction of multiple hierarchies between peoples, cultures and social groups.

Though the *Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration* (ICEM), an organization born out of United States Cold War priorities, was created with the explicit aim to exclude the Communist Bloc from membership and use of its services, it also performed the equally important implicit function of excluding Asians and Africans from immigration to the economically developed Western world. This intergovernmental coalition of liberal states, in which all countries were nominally equal, actually helped advance the cohesion of the "West" and facilitated the smooth perpetuation of United States hegemony and the multiple power imbalances amongst its member-states: between receiving and sending countries, Anglo-Saxon and Latin American receiving countries, and Northern and Southern European sending countries. In an era when

straightforward references to racist and other discriminations were reprehensible and references to human rights and the "freedom of movement" were used in the West's ideological struggle against Communism, the exclusion of Asians and Africans from organized migration to the West and the large asymmetries amongst Western countries with a stake in population movements, were embodied and thus perpetuated in a well-disguised manner within the ICEM.

Guiding the Migration Apparatus in Peripheral States of the "Free World"

Giota Tourgeli and Lina Venturas

Introductory Remarks

The role of international organizations in diffusing hegemonic Western political, social, economic and cultural scripts in the postwar world has been extensively researched. Many studies have documented the dissemination by international agencies of ways of articulating, ordering and knowing social worlds produced by the hegemonic Western powers; these agencies identify policy problems, diagnose their causes and prescribe solutions for them. By controlling information and financial resources, by using their recognized authority to measure, analyze and compare, and by socializing or co-opting state representatives and local elites, they influence decision making and engineer change within their member states (Barnett & Finnemore 1999; Bilgin & Morton 2002; Broome & Seabrooke 2012; Joseph 2009; Larner & Walters 2004; Scott 2001).

Up to now, most relevant research on these issues has concentrated on the extremely asymmetrical relations between influential international organizations led by the global North, and states of the global South, where economic and development policies were largely dictated by the former. This chapter aims to explore two relatively different cases and the relations between: On the one hand, ICEM, a United States-led postwar intergovernmental organization, which was created to regulate international migration, with a minor impact on world affairs; and, on the other hand, states which, although considered part of the Western world, were relegated to its periphery, being relatively poor and powerless in the international sphere. As ICEM was established to regulate refugee and labor mobility, the chapter investigates the organization's interactions, on the one side, with Greece, a member state sending emigrants overseas,

and, on the other, with receiving member countries in Latin America.[1] It analyzes the interactions between an international organization with a restricted mandate and budget, and countries with a long history of foreign interventions by powerful Western states. It focuses on a specific historical conjuncture, the 1950s, during which both Greece and Latin American countries and their policymakers largely depended on the globally hegemonic United States, in military, economic, political and cultural respects. The chapter seeks to explore the following question: How was the governance of a specific policy issue, namely international migration, articulated and practiced in Greece and Latin American countries during the 1950s, through the synergy of their state apparatus with an international organization? On a broader level, it aspires to explore aspects of the "profound transnational character" of state governmental mechanisms and policies, by focusing on the role of international organizations in national state-building and policymaking.

I.   ICEM–Greece Interactions: Organizing Emigration

1.   Postwar Greece

The Civil War between political and military forces of the left and the right-wing government ended in 1949 with the defeat of the Communists. The victory of the governmental forces, which was achieved with the assistance of the United States that "supplanted the former Great Powers of Europe as Greece's patron," resulted in Greece being tied to the Western Bloc (Gallant, 2001, p. 178). As for the United States, even after the defeat of the communist forces, the country continued to be threatened by the Soviets and their local satellites. This threat, along with the significance accorded to Greece's strategic location, led the United States to send massive amounts of aid, as the country's reconstruction became a high priority in the early Cold War: "US aid of all kinds averaged six point six percent of Greece's annual GNP in the years 1948–1956, though by the latter date it had declined" (Close, 2002, p. 33). After contributing decisively

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[1] While we use the generic term "Latin America," in fact we only refer to ICEM's member states in South America.

to the Greek government's military victory over the Communists and to the country's economic recovery, the United States—through its official delegations in Greece—gained extended power in many domestic affairs; Greek policy-makers had to have their policies approved by the United States before they could be implemented, whereas American officials also dictated reforms (Close, 2002, p. 35).

With the end of the Civil War in 1949, more than 50,000 political refugees left for Eastern bloc countries, thousands of leftist Greeks were sent to prison or exile, while over 700,000 internally displaced peasants—the so-called "guerilla-stricken"—became dependent on government and international organization relief programs. These were high figures for a country with a population of about 7,500,000 (Close, 2002, p. 37–39). Simultaneously, Greece had to deal with a significant refugee problem. The influx of refugees of Greek or foreign ethnic origin from communist states to the north, not only added to the existing state of unemployment and poverty, but also invigorated fears of communist infiltration within the context of the Cold War. Data concerning the number of refugees in Greece were incoherent, but figures published abroad estimated that there were about 22,000 foreign refugees in Greece in 1953, whereas the ethnic Greek refugee population amounted to a total of about 12,000, with the largest group being the 5,000 members of the Greek minority of Albania who had fled this neighboring country after 1941.[2]

Furthermore, even as late as in the mid-1950s, there were more than 1,100,000 (27 percent of the active population) who were either unemployed or worked only a few days a month, out of a labor force of slightly less than 4,000,000. The state estimated that 180,000 persons living in urban areas, another 800,000 engaged in agriculture and about 100,000 in the liberal professions, were unemployed or underemployed. Many were living on less than five US dollars a month.[3] According to Emke-Poulopoulou, "unemployment,

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[2] Nancy Crawshaw, "The Refugees in Greece," *Manchester Guardian*, February 5, 1953, A445, 197/1/9, Admission Greek Nationals under ICEM Auspices, NAA, Canberra.

[3] A memorandum on migration" (submitted by Edgar H. S. Chandler), Geneva, January 2, 1956, Services to Refugees/General 1952–1956, WCC-A, Geneva; "Assisted Migration: Its Influence on the Problems of Over-populated European countries and Underpopulated Overseas countries,"

underemployment, limited job opportunities and low and unequally distributed incomes among sectors, regions and classes were the prevailing traits for most of the post-war era" (Emke-Poulopoulou, 1986, p. 147).

Overall, Greek postwar emigration formed part of a broader rural exodus from the Mediterranean countries to transoceanic and European countries with a strong and expanding secondary sector (Venturas, 2002). Apart from extensive unemployment and the feeling of insecurity caused by the precariousness and instability of income, rural populations were initially driven to the Greek cities because of the lack of opportunities for education, deficient transport and communications, inferior housing and healthcare, as well as political oppression (Close, 2002, pp. 17, 60–61). For many of these internal migrants, emigration abroad constituted a familiar strategy as well as the only feasible alternative, since urban areas could not absorb this "surplus" population in the absence of planning by the state (Sutton, 1983; Close, 2002, pp. 61–62).

2. Towards the Establishment of an International Agency for Refugees and Migrants: The Greek Position

The *United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration* (UNRRA) and the *International Refugee Organization* (IRO) had assisted refugees arriving in Greece after the war, until the dissolution of the latter organization in 1951. Moreover, the *World Council of Churches* (WCC) established a branch office in Athens in 1951, in order to assist refugees.[4] However, the Greek authorities in the early 1950s were still urgently seeking a solution to the dual problem of refugees and "surplus population." Espousing international organizations' earlier framing of both the problem and the solution, and based on the liberal view of emigration as a safety valve for structural Greek economic problems, state officials resorted to promoting population outflows in order to reduce unemployment, acquire foreign currency, control social conflict and promote

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April 24, 1954, MC/W/INF/2, pp. 13–16, Seventh ICEM Session, Geneva, April 26 – May 1, 1954, NARA, Washington D.C.

[4] M.C. King, "Report on the work in Greece of the Service to Refugees of the WCC in 1954," Athens, 1954, Services to Refugees General 1952–1956, WCC-A, Geneva.

rapid modernization. Therefore, they decided that as many of the foreign and ethnic Greek refugees as possible should leave the country, while they also estimated that there should be a rate of 30,000 unemployed emigrating yearly during the next decade.[5] These goals prompted Greece to participate in international forums on migration and in the foundation of ICEM.

A number of international conferences and meetings of state officials were organized in the late 1940s and in 1950–1951 to discuss Europe's "surplus population" problem. Among the international organizations, the ILO was by far the most active in this field. Having dealt with migration since its creation in 1919, the ILO was entrusted with the promotion of programs aiming to facilitate "the training and the transfer of labor, including migration for employment and settlement" by the Declaration of Philadelphia. Progressively, the ILO took initiatives that aimed at extending its traditional activities to covering all aspects of migration (Karatani, 2005).

In April 1950, the ILO invited delegates from twenty-nine countries directly concerned with migration and relevant international organizations to the Preliminary Migration Conference of Geneva. The ILO regarded this conference as an opportunity for an exchange of views on the present state of migration, the factors restricting its development and the planning of economic development through migration. Six months after the Conference, the ILO requested that participant countries send information on the actions taken to put into effect the conclusions of the Preliminary Conference, as well as a report on the progress made during this short period.[6]

The Greek government's reply to the ILO questionnaire depicted a completely negative picture of state policies in the field of migration and a lack of coordination among the various Ministries involved.[7] Greece officially admitted

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[5] Anastassios Bacalbassis, "Report of the Greek Delegation at the International Conference of Naples," November 8, 1951, 1952 133.2, Sections 4/Section 2 [Greeks Abroad: Proceedings of Sessions. Migration Conference], AGMFA, Athens.

[6] "Action to Give Effect to the Conclusions of the Preliminary Migration Conference. The Questionnaire of ILO," 1951, MIG 1009-1-1404-1, Preliminary Migration Conference. Questionnaire to Governments and Replies, AILO, Geneva.

[7] It is indicative that a Committee on Migration Policy, which is vaguely referred to in the reports of this period, consisted of representatives from seven Ministries: the Ministries of Coordination, Foreign Affairs, Labor, Interior, Agriculture, Industry and Welfare.

what previous confidential reports had outlined—the state's ineptitude in migration administration and policy making.[8] More specifically, the information given to prospective migrants on emigration possibilities and conditions in receiving countries was considered vague, incomplete and sometimes inaccurate. The demographic and occupational characteristics of would-be emigrants were unknown, as no statistics were compiled. Administrative procedures for the issuance of passports remained complicated and expensive, mainly due to security concerns. Greece had not signed any agreement with receiving countries, and therefore there were no provisions for the transfer of funds, assets or social security rights of emigrants, nor provisions for the protection of family units. The Greek state also pointed to the refugee problem stressing its inability to handle it by its own means. Greece needed international assistance to organize migration operations, financially support prospective emigrants and arrange their orderly transfer overseas.[9]

In October 1951, the ILO organized a second Migration Conference in Naples. In the face of the imminent closure of the IRO, the ILO recommended international cooperation under its leadership. The Greek Delegation was favorable to the ILO plan, as were the representatives of all other European countries that recorded high unemployment rates. The head of the Greek mission clearly stated that Greece urgently needed international assistance, both financial and operational, to solve its acute overpopulation and refugee problem. He vividly described the large number and the bad living conditions of the "guerilla-stricken" victims of the war against Communism, trying to persuade the other participants that these internally displaced peasants should be considered refugees. The Greek delegate welcomed any initiative for international cooperation, under the condition that the benefits would be substantially greater than the country's financial contributions.[10]

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[8] Intervention of D.I. Pappas at the 159th meeting of the Council of Political Affairs of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, June 28, 1949, Confidential, 1949126/3, AGMFA, Athens.

[9] "First Item on the Agenda: Action taken by Emigration and Immigration Countries to Give Effect to the Conclusions of the Preliminary Migration Conference," 1951, C.Mig/I/2, Naples, Migration Conferene, 1951, IOM-SW, Geneva.

[10] Pierre Jacobsen to H.A. Citroen, "Report on the ILO Migration Conference," 1951, ICEM Background (1946–1951), IOM-SW, Geneva; "Discours du chef de la délégation hellénique," October 1951, MIG 1009-2-501-1, Naples. Program Committee.Verbatim, AILO, Geneva.

The presence of the Greek Delegation in Naples, a basic emigration port, allowed for contacts with Italian authorities, inspection of migration agencies and collection of on-site information on the structuring of the Italian services. Italy was the country with the highest rate of emigration in Europe; besides, it was a pioneer in the design of legislation and comprehensive state policies tackling both emigration issues and the retention of expatriates' loyalty (Tintori, 2010). Upon returning to Greece, the members of the Delegation made specific recommendations to the Greek government inspired by the Italian model. They proposed the following: The drafting of coherent legislation on migration; the reorganization of migration services; the collection of accurate data on migration trends; the initiation of bilateral agreements with receiving countries; the request of aid from foreign experts; and strong support of the plan for the creation of a permanent international migration organization.[11]

3. The Brussels Conference: Greece joins the PICMME

Although the ILO plan was abandoned because of the negative stance of the United States, it nevertheless hastened the process of establishing an institutional setting (Karatani, 2005). One month after the Naples Conference, the United States convened another conference in Brussels, which resulted in the creation of PICMME/ICEM. At the Brussels conference, held from November 26 to December 5, 1951, discussions centered on the proposal submitted by the United States concerning a "plan to facilitate the movement of surplus populations from countries of Western Europe and Greece to countries affording resettlement opportunities overseas." This plan foresaw the establishment of a Migration Committee with the exclusive membership of democratic countries, a provisional life span and a limited mandate and scope.[12] Within a period of twelve months, the new agency would manage the overseas movement of

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[11] Anastassios Bacalbassis, "Report of the Greek Delegation at the International Conference of Naples," November 8, 1951, 1952133.2, Sections 4/Section 2 [Greeks abroad. Proceedings of Sessions. Migration Conference], AGMFA, Athens.

[12] "A plan to facilitate the movement of surplus populations from countries of Western Europe and Greece to countries affording resettlement opportunities overseas," 1951, MCB/3, Brussels Migration Conference, NARA, Washington D.C.

115,000 Europeans, consisting of "surplus" workers, refugees, and displaced persons remaining in the Old World after the dissolution of the IRO. This new entity, initially named *Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants of Europe* (PICMME), but soon renamed *Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration* (ICEM), would be responsible for the processing and transport of migrants, profiting from the experience and resources of the IRO, as well as American funds (an annual subsidy of ten million dollars). The governments involved would proceed to sign bilateral agreements complying with their migration legislation.

Greek intervention at the Brussels conference was restricted to requests for immediate international assistance and an increase in the number of emigrants to be moved from the country. The Greek delegation, disappointed with the small number of Greek emigrants the plan envisaged, tried, once again, to impress powerful participants by outlining the numbers and the types of people in need of emigration, since they could not be absorbed into the economy of the country at that time or in the near future. More specifically, "by reason of its geographical position and against its will" the country had received more than 40,000 refugees from communist countries; there was, moreover, an annual surplus of 30,000 unemployed workers. Finally, there were still over 150,000 "guerrilla-stricken" internally displaced citizens.[13] The Greek delegates objected to the general stance that the resettlement of the internally displaced was a problem to be resolved by Greece itself.[14] In fact, in response to Greece's demand for international assistance for the emigration of its internally displaced citizens, the participants called upon the 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the *Status of Refugees*, which stated that refugee status could be granted only to a person "who [...] is outside the country of his nationality" or who, not having a nationality, finds himself "outside the country of his former habitual residence" (Cohen, 2011, p. 33; Karatani, 2005, p. 519). They thus made it quite clear that the "guerilla-stricken" did not qualify for refugee status and international aid (Bouscaren, 1963, p. 85). However, despite these legally

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[13] "Summary record of the third meeting: Statement of the Greek Delegate," December 20, 1951, MCB/SR/3, pp. 23–24, Brussels Migration Conference, NARA, Washington D.C.

[14] "Note submitted to the Conference by the Greek delegation," November 27, 1951, MCB/5, Brussels Migration Conference, NARA, Washington D.C.

valid objections and through the "back door," a limited number of "guerilla-stricken" Greek nationals were granted visas by the United States, under the *Refugee Relief Act* (RRA) of 1953; they were consequently assisted by the ICEM and voluntary organizations to move overseas.[15]

4. The Agreement between PICMME/ICEM and Greece

Greece became one of PICMME's sixteen founding members and soon succeeded in increasing the numbers of emigrants to be moved under the auspices of this new intergovernmental body. As the Greek state had not developed a system of handling mass migration schemes, it requested the Committee's assistance in the planning and processing of emigration. To this end, an agreement between the Greek government and PICMME was signed on April 17, 1952.[16] The agreement specified the terms of cooperation between Greece and PICMME. Specifically, 20,000 individuals would be assisted to emigrate in two stages: the first 8,000 in 1952 and the remaining 12,000 at a later stage. The Committee would assist Greek nationals, foreign and ethnic Greek refugees already in the country, as well as those that might seek refuge in Greece in the future (Article 1, sections 2–3). The Greek state would be responsible for the per capita reimbursement of all costs incurred prior to embarkation, and the provision of all medical and office equipment, transport means and other facilities necessary for the processing of prospective migrants. The government was also expected to facilitate the issuing of certificates of birth, marriage, good conduct, criminal record and military discharge, exit visas and travel documents, and to prepare these documents either free of charge or at nominal cost. Each

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[15] The United States Refugee Relief Act of 1953 enabled a total of 17,000 Greeks to immigrate to the United States beyond the normal immigration quotas set up by the McCarran Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. More precisely, the measure affected 2,000 persons of Greek ethnic origin, who had first-degree relatives in the United States and 15,000 refugees of Greek ethnic origin residing in Greece on the date of the enactment of the above Act, among them: i) "guerilla-stricken" Greek refugees, ii) homeless victims of the recent Ionian earthquake of 1953, and iii) Northern Epirots, Greek Romanians, and other postwar refugees of Greek ethnic origin. See analytically: USA/Refugee Relief Act of 1953, IOM-GR, Athens.

[16] "Ratification of the Agreement between the Greek Government and ICEM," Proceedings of the Greek Parliament, October 2, 1953, Agreements and Annexes, IOM-GR, Athens.

migrant would also be allowed to leave the country carrying a sum of foreign currency for his shipboard and landing expenses (Annex, Articles 9–10).

The services undertaken by PICMME at the request of the Greek government were the following (Annex, Article 7): (a) Dissemination of information regarding receiving countries, in cooperation with the Greek authorities. (b) Recruitment of candidates for emigration, in accordance with the specific requirements of each receiving country. (c) Registration and pre-selection of persons wishing and eligible to emigrate. (d) Documentation processes: collecting, verifying and translating migrant documents required by Greek and the receiving country's authorities. (e) Complete medical examinations. (f) Arrangements for the migrants' trade accreditation. (g) Presentation of processed migrants to receiving country missions for the final selection. (h) Organization of migrant embarkation: booking of passage, preparation of shipping and/or flight schedules, informing and instructing migrants regarding embarkation, handling baggage, final medical examinations and clearance. (i) Compilation of statistical data on the migrants' age, sex, trade, place of residence and country of destination. (j) Selection, training and employment of the personnel involved in processing migrant applications.

5. ICEM Council Sessions and Greek Positions

During the 1950s, Greece was represented at all ICEM Council meetings by its permanent delegation to the United Nations and other International Organizations in Geneva. The ICEM Mission of Athens confidentially advised the government that the participation of a Minister in ICEM sessions would help promote the country's interests, but state officials probably did not consider ICEM or the issue of migration important enough to dispense a high official for its sessions and/or subsidize his travel expenses.[17] In general, the Greek

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[17] See the relative suggestion of P. Gibson to Dim. Makris, Confidential, March 12, 1957, Relations with the Government/Ministry of Interior/1952–1958, IOM-GR, Athens. It is worth noting that the Italian government was always represented by the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, a fact Greek reports refer to as an indication of the intense Italian interest in the proceedings of the Committee. A. Yerocostopoulos, "Report of the workings of the 11th ICEM Council Session," November 1959, p. 7, Memoranda, IOM-GR, Athens.

mission interventions, pertaining exclusively to issues of Greek interest, were relatively scarce and modest, as delegates carefully avoided disrupting the political balance within the Committee. The delegation was apologetic regarding the restrictive measures imposed by the Greek government with regard to the eligible categories of emigrants, and committed to ensure the future cooperation of state authorities.[18] Throughout the 1950s, Greece's mission mainly requested an increase of the number of Greek migrants admitted to the Commonwealth Countries.[19] But any decline in immigration rates in countries overseas incited criticism, with the mission arguing, unsuccessfully more often than not, in favor of the increase of ICEM-assisted outflows from Southern Europe. Greece's interests coincided with those of other Southern European emigration countries, as they had similar needs and shared objectives. As a result, alliances aiming at counterbalancing those of the wealthier and more powerful immigration countries were formed.[20] In 1958, Greece objected to ICEM funding the emigration of Danes to Australia, in an attempt to apply pressure to Australia to increase migrant intakes from Greece; this aim, however, was not achieved and Greece simply accepted Australia's promises to further investigate the matter. After that, Greek flows to Australia actually shrank rapidly.[21]

In the mid-1950s, the Greek mission expressed concerns about the receiving states' demand for skilled migrants, something which would negatively affect outflows from Southern European countries. In this context, the Greek mission appealed for a different type of assistance, requiring further cooperation among

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[18] "Statement by Mr. Nic. Hadjivassiliou, Head of the Greek delegation, at the 14th Meeting of the Migration Committee," 1950, MICEM/34/35, Second Session of the Council and the Executive Committee, Geneva, April 21 – May 4, 1955, NARA, Washington D.C.

[19] A. Yerocostopoulos, "Report of the workings of the 11th ICEM Council Session," 11/1959, pp. 20–21, Memoranda, IOM-GR, Athens.

[20] For example, in the late 1950s, in an attempt to ensure the construction of a Migration Center at ICEM's expenses in Athens, the Greek mission in Geneva was given instructions to support Italy on migrant social security rights and Spain to elect a representative on the Executive Committee. A. Yerocostopoulos, "Report of the workings of the 11th ICEM Council Session," 111959, pp. 8, 20, Memoranda, IOM-GR, Athens.

[21] Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Ministry of Interior, "Greek Government views on subjects set in agenda of ICEM Session Council," Athens, 29/04/1958, ref. No. 20279, Memoranda, IOM-GR, Athens. For the Danish scheme, see Limnios-Sekeris, "Imbalances in Decision-Making Processes: Commonwealth versus Latin American Countries" in this volume, pp. 87–96.

the ICEM, the ILO and other agencies for the implementation of vocational training programs; Greece also exerted pressure for additional ICEM technical services, something which would boast emigration to Latin America.[22]

Furthermore, Greece pursued minimizing its financial obligations and opposed ICEM administration requests for larger contributions to meet budget deficits: The argument presented was that Greece was the country with the greatest needs and the least resources among member states. Although Greece finally agreed to pay all contributions, what was initially requested was that each country contributed according to its ability to pay, irrespective of ICEM services received.[23]

The Greek delegation was well aware of its weak position within the Committee. Their country was small, diplomatically weak, disregarded by other member governments, and unable to contribute to ICEM's budget in a significant way. Thus, Greece did not manage to find supporters to back its demand for a seat in the Executive Committee.[24] The Greek delegates were equally aware that relations were enforced and projects were decided upon during mingling among powerful state missions and unofficial meetings of high-ranking officials, to which they were not invited. Small-scale bargaining successes included the statements of understanding made by the American delegate in response

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[22] "Statement by Mr. Nic. Hadjivassiliou, Head of the Greek delegation, at the 14th Meeting of the Migration Committee," 1950, MICEM/34/35, Second Session of the Council and the Executive Committee, Geneva, April 21 – May 4, 1955, NARA, Washington D.C.; A. Yerocosto-poulos, "Intervention concerning Pilot Projects (No. 9 of the Agenda of the Tenth Session)," February 9, 1959, Memoranda, IOM-GR, Athens.

[23] A. Yerocostopoulos, "Intervention concerning Pilot Projects (No. 9 of the Agenda of the Tenth Session)," February 9, 1959, Memoranda, IOM-GR, Athens.

[24] It is indicative that in 1960 in an effort to promote its candidature for membership on the Executive Committee in 1961, the Greek Permanent Delegate in Geneva requested Australia's support. Nevertheless, the Australian mission chose to support the German candidature. The latter had not sought re-election for 1960, so that Spain might have the opportunity of serving on the Executive Committee during that year. Since Germany manifested a new interest for the Executive Committee of 1961, its allies, such as Australia, could not but support it, leaving Greece out of the diplomatic game. T.H.E. Hayes to the Department of External Affairs, October 25, 1960; A. Vlachos to L.J. Arnott (Australian Permanent Delegate in Geneva), September 27, 1960; R.L. Harry (Secretary of the Department of Australian Migration) to L.J. Arnott, October 31, 1960, A446, 1966/46173, ICEM, 14th Special Session of Executive Committee, Geneva 1960, NAA, Canberra.

to Greek protests on the suspension of the European program for 1956–1957, because of the Hungarian crisis, or on the Commonwealth countries' intentions to reduce emigrant intakes from Southern Europe, though these "successes" were actually proven to be quite ineffective.[25]

6. The Distribution of Responsibilities

6.1 *The ICEM Liaison Mission in Athens*

The ICEM Liaison Mission was given the necessary legal capacity to exercise its responsibilities and carry out its objectives in Greece. It had its headquarters in Athens and maintained a suboffice in Thessaloniki, in the North of Greece, from 1953 onwards. Field teams were sent to the provinces jointly with representatives of receiving countries, in order to recruit candidates. The Mission was directed by non-Greek high ranking officials arriving directly from the headquarters in Geneva or other international posts and entitled to the privileges and immunities accorded to the staff of the United Nations specialized agencies.[26] The ICEM policy to transfer its senior officials from sending to receiving countries and to alternate them in different Liaison Missions, contributed not only to the coordination of emigration and immigration programs, but also equally to the transmission of information on migration issues and administrative practices to Greek officials (Limnios-Sekeris, 2013, pp. 38–39).

Apart from the foreign high-officials, two Greek female social workers, probably trained through programs organized by the United States,[27] played an important role in managing emigration issues for three decades: Alexandra

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[25] Con. Rallis to George L. Warren, Athens, 5/10/1957, Statement of Mr. Warren at the 55th Meeting of the Council, April 12, 1957, Memoranda, IOM-GR, Athens.

[26] See Supplement to the Agreement, Article 8: "Agreement between the Greek Government and the PICMME, signed on 17 April 1952," Agreements and Annexes, IOM-GR, Athens. In the 1950s, the following individuals consecutively served as Head of the Greek Office: Edward B. Marks (1952–1954), who was the last Chief of the IRO Office in Greece, Peter Gibson (1954–1959), subsequently Chief of the Mission in Australia and New Zealand (1959–1961), and Charles O. Wendling (1959–1964), former Chief of the ICEM Mission in Italy (1952–1954), Australia (1954–1957) and Brazil (1957–1959).

[27] Greek social workers at the time had no other option than following courses organized by the American Pierce College or the Young Women's Christian Association mission in Greece. (Kallinikaki, 1998, pp. 107–108).

Ioannides-Thiakaki, appointed Deputy Head in the 1950s (1952–1959), and Charoula Alexandraki, who initially succeeded the former (1960–1974), and later became Head of the Greek Mission from 1974 to 1980.[28] These two Greek ICEM officials—even though they could not act autonomously—combined a high American-style professionalism with an idealistic humanitarian stance; they sought to balance the priorities of both sending and receiving countries with the directives of their headquarters in Geneva, without disregarding migrant needs. Several other Greek civil servants worked at the ICEM Liaison Mission carrying out the pre-embarkation services. They were carefully selected on the basis of training, knowledge of the English language, experience in the handling of migration issues, as well as on their conservative political positions. By selecting them according to high professional standards, the Greek government aimed at preparing to staff a specialized migration service in the future, one that would replace the ICEM when it stopped functioning in Greece; this aspiration, however, did not materialize even in the subsequent decade.

6.2 *Greek Governmental Agencies*

No specific Ministry was accorded the responsibility of developing migration policies in the early stages of ICEM operations in Greece. Rather than a sole entity, there were departments for migration matters scattered in various ministries. As a result, the ICEM found itself having to deal with the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Social Welfare and the Migration Council. In 1953, however, the Ministry of the Interior was designated as the official government agency responsible for the development of migration policy and its implementation, in cooperation with the ICEM.[29] The ICEM Liaison Office in Greece operated within the jurisdiction of this Ministry.

The Ministry of the Interior was responsible for the implementation of the ICEM/GreeceAgreement through its Department of Emigration and Travel Abroad and the local Prefectures. It reimbursed the ICEM for preselection

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[28] For a short bio of Charicleia Alexandraki see: Anna Amera (2012), "Litsa (Chariklia) Alexandraki (1918–1984)," *Social Work & Society, 10*, p. 1.

[29] See Cabinet Decision Ref. No.15 (February 4, 1953). Al. Ioannides, "Some Aspects of Our Early Relations with the Greek Government," 1960, p. 6, Relations with the Government/ Ministry of Interior/1952–1958, IOM-GR, Athens.

expenses after collecting the sums from prospective emigrants, undertook the costs of inland transportation and contributed financially to overseas transportation, as well as to the training and refugee migration programs. ICEM programs and transport means were approved annually, while the number of emigrants and their selection was closely monitored, with the Ministry designating the categories of eligible emigrants.[30]

In recognition of the need for a single entity that would ensure coordination, coherent policies and the support of migration services, the Greek government resolved to create a Migration Council.[31] The ICEM/Greece Agreement had also provided for its establishment. The Council was to be headed by an independent Chairman and migration was to be dealt with as a whole, in cooperation with all the ministries involved. The Council consisted of representatives from different ministries. A representative from the ICEM Liaison Office in Athens[32] was frequently present at the Council meetings, as were ILO experts.[33] The Migration Council maintained direct correspondence and contacts with all related authorities in Greece and abroad, and was mandated to: (a) elaborate a general emigration program taking account of the country's economic, social and demographic needs, which was to be submitted to the government for approval, and (b) decide on all matters ensuring favorable migration terms, although its decisions were subject to approval by the relevant ministries.[34]

The ICEM/Greece Agreement also provided for the establishment of a Joint Working Group, consisting of representatives from the relevant Greek departments and the Chief of the ICEM Liaison Mission in Greece. This Working

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[30] "Emigration Trends and Migration Policy of European and Overseas Countries," p. 43, Migration Policy, IOM-GR, Athens.

[31] "Act No.36 of the Cabinet: Establishment of the Council of Migration," January 15, 1952, Migration Council Meetings, IOM-GR, Athens.

[32] For example, see the presence of both Edward Marks (Chief of the Athens Office) and Pierre Jacobsen (Deputy Director of PICMME) at the Second Migration Council Meeting, 22/1/1952 and of Hugo Gibson (Director) at the 17th Meeting."Minutes of the Migration Council Meetings," 1953114.4, Sections 1 [Migration Issues. Migration Council. Minutes], AGMFA, Athens.

[33] See the presence of the ILO expert Le Vernoy at the 28th Migration Council Meeting, November 11, 1952, "Minutes of the Migration Council Meetings," op. cit.

[34] The Council was convened once a week for regular meetings, though there were also extraordinary meetings held at any given time, if summoned by the Chairman.

Group was entrusted to ensure coordination, consider all aspects of emigration from Greece and implement the migration programs efficiently and at the lowest possible cost. The Joint Group decided on all matters pertaining to the implementation and review of the Agreement and was mandated to recommend and draft any supplementary agreement deemed necessary.

Finally, in an effort to further pursue Greece's interests overseas and increase emigration through bilateral agreements, the Greek government was advised by ICEM to work towards establishing strong diplomatic missions in the main receiving countries.[35] In fact, a legation was established in Australia in 1952[36] and the pre-existing Honorary Consulate of Brazil was provided with salaried diplomats and more staff.

6.3   *Plans for the Establishment of a National Migration Service*

The Agreement of 1952 stated that "the Government has the ultimate intention of gradually developing an appropriate state agency, [but] until such an agency is established, it requests the Migration Committee to undertake, on its behalf, [all] the pre-embarkation services [required]" (Annex, Article 3).[37] However, even in the 1960s, the Greek government had not yet organized such a permanent agency, nor had it developed a comprehensive migration policy. The Deputy Director of the Migration Council in 1953 admitted that "the Greek government had failed the migration test" (Limnios-Sekeris, 2013, pp. 45–46) and, even in 1968, a government official stated that Greek migration policy remained an "unfenced backyard."[38]

As far as the United States and the international organizations were concerned, Greek administration was characterized by an irrational distribution of functions between governmental departments and an ineffective coordination

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[35] Note of Edward Marks to the Ministry of Interior, March 17, 1953, Relations with the Government/Ministry of Interior/1952–1958, IOM-GR, Athens.

[36] The Greek Embassy operated in Canberra, while a salaried Consul was appointed in Sydney. *Ἔξω Ἑλληνισμός/Hellenism Abroad*, February 15, 1955.

[37] "Ratification of the Agreement between the Greek Government and ICEM," Proceedings of the Greek Parliament, October 2, 1953, Agreements and Annexes, IOM-GR, Athens.

[38] Memorandum of Panos Pamboukis to the Minister of the Interior Stylianos Pattakos, September 6, 1968, Greek National Migration Service (from 1953), IOM-GR, Athens.

among them. These views were also shared by high Greek state officials, who had a set of idealized Western standards in mind. The existence of under-qualified civil servants working within an administration system that lacked basic infrastructure was also regarded as a contributing factor for the repro-duction of the bureaucratic labyrinth. All of the above were considered struc-tural features of the entire Greek state administration (Close, 2002, pp. 88–90). The ICEM Mission in Athens was no exception, as it advised the government with respect to the method of transferring the Mission's functions to a state agency, specifically established for policy-making on migration issues. In 1956, Peter Gibson, the head of the Liaison Mission in Greece at the time, offered detailed suggestions for the organization of such an agency. He proposed the establishment of a financially self-supporting autonomous unit, assisted by an advisory body comprised of representatives of the relevant ministries. Its Director General should possess linguistic abilities, outstanding qualifications and experience in both migration issues and international relations; the unit should be staffed with highly-skilled officials and civil servants with adequate training. This government entity would gradually take over the ICEM opera-tions of pre-selection, registration, documentation and medical examinations; it would also design and oversee the implementation of the state's migration policy and supervise spontaneous migration, so as to prevent migrant exploita-tion by travel agencies.[39] In 1957, an ICEM official, while emphasizing the "built-in" competition between the Ministries of the Interior and Labor on migration issues, proposed preventive measures to avoid conflicts and to elim-inate overlapping mandates.[40]

Despite the fact that the contracting parties of the ICEM/Greece Agreement of 1952 foresaw that Greece would gradually organize its own competent state agency and that it soon would be able to operate migrant processing activities on its own, the country did not manage to achieve these goals, even to a partial extent, during the 1950s. Any advice by ICEM officials had been given in vain and the Greek state continued to depend on the Committee's costly services.

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[39] Peter Gibson, "Outline proposals for the establishment of a Greek Migration Service (draft)," Greek National Migration Service (from 1953), IOM-GR, Athens.

[40] Jane Moody to Peter Gibson, "Greek Migration Service," August 1, 1957, Relations with the Government/Ministry of Interior/1952–1958, IOM-GR, Athens.

7. Emigration from Greece Under ICEM Auspices

7.1 *The Eligible Categories*

A guiding principle on which all sending countries based their emigration policy was the strict delimitation of eligible groups according to perceived national interests. The Greek government restricted emigration assistance to that section of the country's population it considered to be in excess, while attempting to prevent the departure of those thought to be "useful" to the nation or the economy (ILO, 1959, pp. 269–270). Consequently, promotional measures implemented affected: (a) refugees of foreign origin from communist countries accorded temporary refuge or residence permits in Greece, (b) refugees of ethnic Greek origin, (c) "guerilla-stricken" internally displaced persons, (d) any dependents, (e) landless farmers, underemployed or unemployed individuals, and, in general, destitute persons.[41] Prospective emigrants had to present an indigence certificate, which was an indispensable prerequisite for ICEM-assisted migration. Only those designated as "indigent" by the Ministry of Social Welfare were entitled to the Committee's assistance.

According to the ICEM/Greece Agreement, the movement of indigent persons was to be performed within the framework of specific schemes, soon crystallized into two interdependent and interrelated types: *mass migration* and *individual migration* schemes. The first were implemented through intergovernmental arrangements, whereas the latter were sponsored directly by ICEM or voluntary organizations (Marks, 1957, p. 486; ILO, 1959, p. 293). Persons eligible for *mass migration* schemes were further required to meet the specific criteria of age, occupation, health and family composition that were set up by the receiving country. The final selection was carried out by the latter's appointed commissions that thoroughly examined the prospective emigrants provisionally selected by the ICEM.

The *individual migration* scheme permitted movement on a loan basis[42] to any overseas country (whether a member of ICEM or not) of persons for whom

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[41] Edward Marks, "Note to the Minister of Interior," March 17, 1953, Relations with the Government/Ministry of Interior/1952–1958, IOM-GR, Athens.

[42] The loans fell within the following groups: Revolving Fund loans, WCC loans, ICEM loans and RRA loans. See analytically: "Service to Refugees: Travel Loan," Services to Refugees General 1952–1956, WCC-A, Geneva.

visas could be obtained. The WCC and other voluntary agencies assisted the migrants and ICEM, in obtaining sponsors and visas and in providing arrangements for the reception of newcomers in overseas countries. In the course of time, the voluntary agency had to collect the costs of the journey from the migrant or his sponsor. This scheme mainly targeted dependents of emigrants already settled in overseas countries. The facilitation of the reunion of families separated by emigration was a cardinal point of ICEM policy. As many immigrants were unable to earn enough money to support themselves, defray family expenses at home and save the money necessary for their dependents' passage,[43] they often requested ICEM's assistance for the transport of their relatives.[44]

7.2 Restrictions on Emigration

During the 1950s, the ICEM pressured the Greek government to be more liberal in the application of its overall emigration policy,[45] as Greece's demographic, security, political and economic concerns had resulted in the imposition of various further exclusions from the eligible categories.

In the case of foreign and ethnic Greek refugees from behind the Iron Curtain, who were considered as burden and politically dangerous, most were granted travel documents and were eligible for ICEM assistance.[46] However, the members of the Greek minority of neighboring Albania who had found refuge in

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[43] These cases were numerous given the high cost of ocean transportation for a four-member family; in the case of Australia in 1953, this amounted to at least to 36,000,000 (old) drachmae, an extremely unbearable sum for a breadwinner. Jane Moody to Mr. Macropoulos, August 19, 1953, Special Matters, IOM-GR, Athens.

[44] Ed. Marks to the Chairman of the Greek Government Migration Council, June 16, 1952; Ed. Marks to the Minister Plenipotentiary of Foreign Affairs (D. Arghyropoulos), June 25, 1952; Jane Moody to Mr. Makropoulos, August 19, 1953; P. Gibson to I. Nikolitsas, August 20, 1954, Special Matters, IOM-GR, Athens.

[45] To this end, the assistance of the Greek Permanent Delegate in Geneva, N. Hadjivassiliou, was very important, since he was an official with knowledge and experience in the processes and practices of international organizations. N. Hadjivassiliou reminded the Greek government of its international engagements and induced Greek officials to adopt flexible policies and be accountable to their counterparts. N. Hadjivassiliou to St. Stefanopoulos, September 4, 1954, 19552.1, Sections 2/Section 1 [Greeks abroad. Migration issues. ICEM and other Organizations], AGMFA, Athens.

[46] Top-Secret Minutes of the Greek Intelligence Service, April 2, 1955, 19552.1, Sections 2/Section 1 [Greeks abroad. Migration issues. ICEM and other Organizations], AGMFA, Athens.

Greece were not allowed to emigrate and were consequently excluded from all assistance to do so. The Greek stateheld that the reduction of their numbers could ultimately prejudice Greek claims to territory in Southern Albania.[47]

The outflow of certain categories of Greek citizens was also regulated by discriminatory measures that changed during the 1950s. The government, fearing its neighboring communist states and the depopulation, or "denudation" as it was called, of its northern borders, made it very clear to the ICEM Mission that it would not allow mass emigration from regions of northern Greece, such as Thrace, Macedonia and Epirus.[48] The ICEM pointed out that the Greek Ministry of the Interior was discriminating against its population, favoring the outmigration of nationals from specific geographical areas and impeding outflows from northern regions, equally suffering from underemployment/unemployment.

In 1955, under the pressure of local authorities and the ICEM, a more liberal policy was adopted: ICEM-assisted emigration from the northern regions of the country was permitted, but strict annual numerical restrictions were imposed.[49] Inconsistent discriminatory restrictions on emigration applied specifically to the members of minority populations living in these northern regions; some managed to evade these restrictions by profiting from ICEM's schemes. At times, the Greek state encouraged the exodus of Slavic-speaking personsliving in the north, while at others, it impeded it. Among the relatively few members of the Slavic-speaking minority who remained in Greece after the Civil War, many had family ties overseas due to older migration waves, and profited from the family reunification programs implemented by receiving countries and the Committee.[50]

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[47] Nancy Crawshaw, "The Refugees in Greece," *Manchester Guardian*, February 5, 1953, A445, 197/1/9, Admission Greek Nationals under ICEM Auspices, NAA, Canberra.

[48] Al. Ioannides, "Some aspects of our early relations with the Greek Government," 1960, pp. 3–4, Relations with the Government/Ministry of Interior/1952–1958, IOM-GR, Athens.

[49] For example, for the city of Florina, emigration could not exceed 1,500 persons per year; 1,500 for the city of Kastoria, and 1,000 from the city of Kozani. I. Nikolitsas to P. Gibson, 20/09/1954, ref.no.38038, 19552.1, Sections 2/Section 2 [Greeks abroad. Migration issues. ICEM and other Organizations], AGMFA, Athens.

[50] In contrast, the Muslim minority of Thrace, which lacked networks overseas, could not take advantage of the fact that emigration of its members was tolerated by the state until the final years of the 1950s (see G. Mavrommatis, Emigration of the Minority of Western Thrace," 2013).

TABLE 1. ICEM emigration from Greece, 1952–1961

COUNTRIES	TOTAL	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961
Argentina	885	94	59	79	54	41	183	173	142	38	22
Australia	52,382	84	2,107	9,038	10,813	6,770	6,107	3,487	4,627	4,565	4,784
Brazil	7,314	257	1,243	1,507	690	451	659	632	643	491	741
Canada	5,756	16	368	881	940	963	772	576	497	416	327
Chile	77	_	4	20	16	21	4	_	3	7	2
Colombia	44	4	5	2	6	1	_	_	18	7	1
Israel	147	_	35	12	1	27	38	6	_	9	19
New Zealand	310	10	20	19	20	32	76	31	37	17	48
Union of South Africa	798	4	14	15	2	8	20	46	131	184	374
USA	6,109	18	18	107	1,313	3,024	179	454	430	259	307
Uruguay	50	_	_	1	24	11	2	2	8	_	2
Venezuela	202	2	15	40	34	32	23	30	13	8	5
Others - Overseas	980	_	50	51	126	423	143	67	36	67	17
Others - European	1,047	_	158	3	17	92	440	100	151	62	24
TOTAL	76,101	489	4,096	11,775	14,056	11,896	8,646	5,604	6,736	6,130	6,673

Source: ICEM Handbook 1962, p. 42.

TABLE 2. Migration from Northern areas, 1952–1958

YEAR	DESTINATION				Total from Northern Greece	Total from all the country
	Australia	Brazil	Canada	Others		
1952–1954	4,166	427	129	52	4,774	16,485
1955	816	87	1	19	923	11,720
1956	583	41	2	250	876	10,332
1957	650	187	34	46	917	8,089
1958	329	138	6	27	500	5,008
TOTAL	6,544	880	172	394	7,990	51,634

Source: A. Ioannides to the Greek Minister of Interior, 28/01/1959, ref. no. ES/1781, Northern Greece, General, IOM-GR, Athens.

In 1954, the state, fearing depopulation, limited the number of family units emigrating to ten percent of the total movements, whose bulk was initially composed of the male heads of family or single men. Additionally, by prohibiting the emigration of family units, authorities aimed at attracting remittances by strengthening the links between emigrants and the homeland. Single women under 35 were also prohibited from emigrating under domestic work schemes, unless they were accompanied or sponsored by a close relative. There were not only demographic concerns behind this prohibition: It was feared that unmarried women traveling alone or living abroad without male protection would also be extremely vulnerable to various types of abuse.[51]

Just when ICEM started to move a larger number of emigrants faster, it had to deal with the state's shifting priorities and their repercussions on the emigration programs.[52] The ICEM officials in Greece had not been prepared to deal with these kinds of restrictions, which seriously disrupted its migration programs and shipping arrangements, and felt trapped by the unilateral decisions of the Greek government. In 1954, several thousand prospective emigrants being processed fell within the restricted categories.[53] The mission made formal complaints to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, objecting to these restrictions which led to serious financial losses. It outlined that considerable sums of money for the processing and training of applicants had already been spent by the ICEM, and results could only be expected if they were allowed to depart. ICEM officials also mentioned the discriminatory character of the measures and their incompatibility with the character of an international organization. They stressed that the ICEM had been mandated to help reunite scattered families and that Greece had also declared its commitment to the principle of family reunification. The ICEM made efforts to persuade the authorities to lift these restrictions, with the Head of the Field Office in Athens, Peter Gibson,

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51 Al. Ioannides, "Some aspects of our early relations with the Greek Government," 1960, pp. 4–5, Relations with the Government/Ministry of Interior/1952-1958, IOM-GR, Athens.

52 Dim. Lambros to the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Canberra, 6/7/1955, 1068/D/7/M, 19552.1, Sections 2/Section 2 [Greeks abroad. Migration issues. ICEM and other Organizations], AGMFA, Athens.

53 See formal letters of protest to the Ministry of Interior from Peter Gibson, 1954, Special Matters/Families restriction during 1954, IOM-GR, Athens.

specifically underlining the benefits of state welfare programs, if dependents facing economic problems due to the absence of the breadwinner were allowed to emigrate. He also stated that these restrictions could create misunderstandings in destination countries, being incompatible with their immigration programs, and could lead these countries' authorities to deduce that Greece was not really interested in outmigration. In fact, these restrictions were not fully implemented, and one year later, in 1955, the appointment of a new Minister of the Interior led to their withdrawal.[54]

The Greek ministries objected to ICEM-assisted individual migration schemes, for different reasons. In 1954, when the Greek government started contributing to the cost of overseas movements, it decided to exclude several sponsored cases from ICEM programs, claiming that this scheme was not compliant with the terms of the ICEM/Greece Agreement.[55] ICEM Liaison Office officials protested, insisting on the importance of sponsored migration; they pointed out that special programs, such as the Refugee Relief Act of 1953, were carried out on the basis of an individual "assurance" or sponsorship approved by United States authorities. They stressed that sponsored individual migration required much heavier expenditures than mass migration and additional staff work for documentation; consequently, they saw no ground for a different financial arrangement. Finally, they tried to convince state officials not to differentiate between *mass* and *sponsored* migration.[56] Until the end of the decade, both programs were finally carried out without the Greek government objecting to its financial obligations. Nevertheless, indications that the state intended to re-examine its contributions to the cost of sponsored migration at the first opportunity were always present.

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[54] I. Triantafyllis to the Ministry of Interior, 25/11/1955, Decision ref. no. 74377, 19552.1, Sections 2/Section 2 [Greeks abroad. Migration issues. ICEM and other Organizations], AGMFA, Athens; I. Triantafyllis, "Migration under the auspices of ICEM," 20/10/1955, Decision ref. no. 66585, 19552.1, Sections 2/Section 2 [Greeks abroad. Migration issues. ICEM and other Organizations], AGMFA, Athens.

[55] See: "Legal Resolution No. 1113/December 2, 1954 (issued by the State Legal Council)," Special Matters, IOM-GR, Athens.

[56] P. Gibson to I. Nikolitsas, 5/02/1955, ES/429, Special Matters, IOM-GR, Athens; P. Gibson to I. Nikolitsas, 7/05/1955, ES/534, Special Matters, IOM-GR, Athens; Al. Ioannides to the Minister of Interior, 30/06/1955, ES/605, Special Matters, IOM-GR, Athens.

7.3 *Migration Services*

In compliance with the ICEM/Greece Agreement, the Mission assumed direct responsibility for providing complete technical assistance for emigration. Some of its services were addressed to all prospective emigrants, while others distinguished between national migrants and refugees, male and female emigrants, or according to the receiving country they were heading to. For example, refugees planning to migrate to the United States required financial guarantees in order to receive a visa, whereas women travelling overseas to work were subjected to a long training and preparation process. Those travelling to Australia received only language training, while those emigrating to Latin American countries were additionally offered vocational training and placement facilities.

7.3.1 PROCESSING. The ICEM undertook full responsibility for all pre-embarkation processing until the Greek government could establish adequate national services. In general, five to six months were normally required to carry out the preselection, documentation, presentation and embarkation procedure in a sending country. In Greece, this period was longer than in other sending countries, because of difficulties in transportation and communications within the country and the delays involved in dealing with state authorities. Thus, consultations with government officials concerning the criteria and numbers of immigrants required by receiving states had to take place many months in advance for the projected migration program to be carried out in time.[57]

For the preselection process, ICEM field missions traveled to the Greek provinces together with representatives of receiving countries in charge of the final selection. All those interested in emigrating were informed in advance about these visits through notices in the local press, wall posters and public announcements in the churches. The Greek Prefectures and the local Labor Exchange Offices were responsible for the dissemination of the information material and the provision of adequate offices for ICEM operations.[58] These field trips also aimed at dissuading non-eligible categories from applying and sparing them unnecessary expenses and travel. The services rendered to prospec-

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[57] A. L. Nutt, "Selection of migrants from Greece," 7/05/1954, A445, 197/1/9, Admission Greek Nationals under ICEM Auspices, NAA, Canberra.

[58] Al. Ioannides to the Ministry of Interior, 2/02/1959, ES/1881, Fieldtrips, IOM-GR, Athens.

tive emigrants included counseling and interviewing in order to inform them about the advantages, disadvantages, problems and opportunities of emigration; offer them guidance on procedures and formalities; and provide them with basic information on the working and living conditions in the receiving country. During their trips, those participating in the field missions were obliged to deal with various obstacles due to the limited infrastructure of provincial Greece as far as accommodation and transport were concerned. Their reports also referred to the lack of medical equipment and facilities for the health examination of the applicants, even though Greece had committed to provide appropriate buildings and to outfit the necessary laboratories. Australian personnel working in the Peloponnese stressed the unsatisfactory standards of the X-ray machines and the frequency of non-valid medical certificates presented by candidates. They refused to conduct examinations in rooms serving multi-purpose functions and accused the local authorities of negligence.[59] The strict medical criteria established by the foreign missions initially led to the rejection of a high number of applicants. This outcome was attributed to the poor health conditions of the inhabitants living in the provinces.[60]

It seems that the ICEM also encountered communication problems with its "target group," the potential migrants, at least initially. Its field missions visiting the provinces had access to remote areas, but they only operated for limited periods. Therefore, dissemination of information about ICEM programs depended mainly on personal networks and the Greek press. In the late 1950s, an ICEM official, having noticed the often negative articles in many newspapers, suggested that the Mission initiate a publicity and public relations campaign, in order to change public opinion against emigration.[61] The campaign promoting ICEM schemes seems to have soon had positive effects.[62]

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[59] V.D.P. McInnes to P. Gibson, 20/08/1954, A445, 197/1/9, Admission Greek Nationals under ICEM Auspices, NAA, Canberra.

[60] Al. Ioannides to the Mayor of Kalymnos (Mavrikakis), 5/4/1954, ref. no.137, Spongedivers, IOM-GR, Athens.

[61] G. Maselli to A. Driver, "Migration services in Greece," October 1958, Geneva 1952–1962, IOM-GR, Athens.

[62] See, for instance, the shift of attitude of the newspaper: Ἔξω Ἑλληνισμός [Hellenism Abroad] towards the operations of ICEM at the end of the 1950s.

The documentation of prospective emigrants required the issuance of passports, a process that included political screening. These security controls were a request of the receiving countries, and especially of the United States, that wanted to exclude the entrance of "subversive elements" onto their soil. Theoretically, sending countries also wished to control the outflow of nationals likely to create trouble, fearing that the bad reputation of their citizens would result in a future curtailing of immigration by receiving countries. In Greece, which had a "sound screening system," according to the ICEM Office in Athens, surveillance was driven more by political and ideological motives linked to the recent Civil War.[63] Screening also affected much larger categories of citizens, as the term "subversive element" in Greece did not exclusively refer to unrepentant Communists, but to anyone deemed to be "disloyal" to the regime. A massive bureaucratic infrastructure, which included the police, the military, security agencies and a broad network of informers, was set up in order to locate and exclude the "disloyal" from various rights, one of which was the right to leave the country. The *civic-mindedness certificate* certified loyalty to the regime and was crucial for all state-citizen relations, including the issuance of passports (Samatas, 2005).

Applicants were also required to submit a clean criminal record, a certificate documenting military service, an indigence document (when applicable), proof of literacy and a family status certificate. All these documents were exempt from stamp duty and were issued and translated with the assistance of the ICEM at its expense. Moreover, those willing to emigrate through schemes addressed to skilled or semi-skilled workers had to prove knowledge of their trade and were often required to pass a trade test.[64]

7.3.2 TRAINING. Greece had entered "the international migration arena" with a delay because of the Civil War that followed the Second World War, and had consequently missed many opportunities available to other sending countries. Furthermore, as many Greek emigrants lacked linguistic and technical

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[63] Confidential letter of P. Gibson to the Minister of the Interior I. Nikolitsas, November 11, 1954, Relations with the Government/Interior Ministry 1952–1958, IOM-GR, Athens.

[64] Prefect of Florina to all Public Services, "Informative material," March 9, 1956, Florina, IOM-GR, Athens; Ministry of the Interior, "Information," Translations 1952–1961, IOM-GR, Athens.

skills and had difficulty adjusting to life and work in economically developed countries, they were tempted to return to their homeland.[65] The ICEM undertook to remedy these deficiencies by offering extra services to foster the rates of Greek outflows, improve the situation of the immigrants abroad and reduce the percentage of return migration (Ducasse-Rogier, 2001, p. 27). Apart from orientation courses and language and vocational training, ICEM also strived to "reform" and "civilize" rural prospective emigrants, who, as Alexandros Ioannides reported, were usually "more malleable" than qualified urban workers: they were younger, fresher in outlook and more easily influenced than persons with greater maturity and experience, though less flexible with regard to their habits and desires.[66]

ICEM furnished prospective emigrants with information and orientation material; it printed pamphlets and leaflets, prepared slides and films, and provided further orientation during interviews or in special group meetings. Materials produced usually covered a short history of the receiving country and information on its customs, way of life and climate, medical services, education, housing and rents, cost of living, trade unions, social security benefits, wage levels, leisure activities, procedures for sending remittances and family reunion processes.[67]

Candidates selected for participation in a mass scheme were obliged to attend language courses,while some attended vocational training classes for a specific period. The ICEM attached great importance to language training, as it became apparent to its officials that failure to speak the language of the receiving country seriously undermined the lifespan of migration schemes. Its first intensive language programs in Portuguese and English began in 1952–1953 for male workers emigrating to Brazil and Australia. Courses were also

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[65] Peter Gibson to I. Nikolitsas, May 17, 1954, Relations with the Government/Interior Ministry 1952–1958, IOM-GR, Athens.

[66] Al. Ioannides to G. Maselli, February 28,1958, Brazil, IOM-GR, Athens; Al. Ioannides to C.O. Wendling, March 24, 1958, MIG 33,Brazil, IOM-GR, Athens.

[67] See information material in various folders of the archives of the IOM-GR in Athens: indicatively, "Instruction for the family reunion process in Argentina," "Where and who you can migrate"/ Folder: Argentina; "Information and Instructions for those wishing to migrate to the USA according to the provisions of the 'Refugee Relief Act 1953'"/ Folder: USA.

offered to nominated dependents and later, to domestic workers. Prospective migrants could enroll in language classes that took place initially only in large cities like Athens, Thessaloniki and Patras, and later, in various provincial towns as well. Courses often continued on board during the long ocean voyage. Gradually these courses became better organized and lasted longer (Ducasse-Rogier, 2001, pp. 29–30).[68]

Initially, organized vocational training courses were offered only to males heading to Latin American countries, especially Brazil. The vocational programs weredesigned by ICEM experts based on research previously conducted in Latin America, and were constantly reformed to correspond to the manpower needs of receiving countries. Furthermore, there was a pooling of the Committee's experience in Italy and Greece, since both countries were developing training programs for emigrants.[69] These courses aimed at increasing the technical skills of the emigrants, thus facilitating their placement and enabling them to secure better-paid employment. The Brazilian program, a program of rapid instruction in mechanical trades that were in demand in Brazil, was initiated in 1956 by the ICEM Mission, in cooperation with the *Greek Employment and Unemployment Insurance Institute*. This program was one of the most coherent of those implemented in the 1950s and was progressively extended to emigrants heading to other Latin American countries. Courses lasted six months and took place in technical schools operating in Athens and Thessaloniki. All applicants for these vocational training programs were examined by a joint committee of the Greek Ministry of Labour and the ICEM, and had to succeed in order to be accepted. Their attendance and progress was observed very carefully and, in order to receive their certificate of attendance, they had to pass a final test. All trainees received a small daily allowance, while those coming from the provinces were also given their travel expenses.[70]

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[68] Al. Ioannides to the Minister of the Interior, "Training of Migrants," April 21, 1959, Finances 1952–1960, IOM-GR, Athens.

[69] Antonio Robert to Fernard Camboulive, "Notes pedagogiques. Cours accelerés pour emigrants de Grèce," 18/12/1957, IGO 022-1004, Meeting on Vocational Training. Geneva 1957, AILO, Geneva.

[70] Paul Sapieha to W. G. Fuller, December 13, 1957, MIG 16, Brazil, IOM-GR, Athens; Al. Ioannides to A. Corcos, Confidential, March 31, 1958, Brazil, IOM-GR, Athens; Ministry of the Interior, "Information," Brazil, IOM-GR, Athens.

7.3.3   THE WOMEN'S PROGRAM. When Canada, Australia and New Zealand initiated programs for the emigration of women, mainly as domestic workers, to a lesser extent, for employment in the clothing industry, vocational and preparation courses were organized for single women (Alexandraki, 1981, p. 229). From 1956 onwards, the ICEM Mission established and equipped several training centers for women in various parts of the country through donations from voluntary organizations: Initially, these centers were located in Athens, Thessaloniki and Patras, and later in smaller provincial cities.

TABLE 3. Single migrant women trained
by ICEM/Greece Mission, 1956–1961

YEAR	Enrolled	Graduated	Embarked
1956	210	152	122
1957	905	587	570
1958	712	541	526
1959	1,128	586	578
1960	1,158	976	969
1961	970	797	818
TOTAL	5,083	3,639	3,583

Source: Alexandraki, 1981: 233.

Most of the women trained by ICEM had lived in remote rural villages and were members of large families of farmers; they had little or no land or other resources in their possession. However, the Greek state did not support the female trainees with allowances, such as those granted to male trainees coming from the provinces. This is indicative of the state's refusal to promote their exodus. According to official views, rural women did not belong to the "active labor force"—they were not breadwinners—and their emigration would thus not contribute to relieving the Greek labor market or to maintaining families left behind. Abiding by gender prejudices, authorities were reluctant to permit the departure of single unmarried women of prime reproductive age, considering them "vulnerable"; state officials also feared that these women would be "lost" for the Greek nation through mixed marriages with non-Orthodox men. "Moral" sexist concerns merged with nationalist obsessions (Tastsoglou, 2009, pp. 94–95).

As no allowance was offered to them, female candidates had to make their own living arrangements. This prevented a large number of young women from villages and small towns, who lacked the financial means, from attending the courses (Alexandraki, 1981, pp. 229–230). Those that managed to live away from their home, survived with considerable sacrifices by their families, often stayingwith relatives or friends and schoolmates in extremely overcrowded conditions.[71] Applicants were required to pass a literacy test. Most trainees did not have any experience in the way of life in urban centers or of the problems encountered in large cities. Their homes lacked the equipment and basic facilities of urban houses and they often ignored the existence of electrical appliances,which were extremely scarce in the rural areas of Greece in the 1950s. Consequently, training courses gave them the opportunity to acquire an idea of urban life and acquaint themselves with the running of a "modern" home, not only facilitating their placement, but also shortening the period of adaptation to living conditions in the receiving countries. The training lasted six months with classes in home economics and the English language. The curriculum covered such subjects as general orientation with respect to life in urban industrialized areas; training in the care and maintenance of a modern home and the use of electrical appliances and equipment; preparation and serving of food typical of the country of resettlement; instruction in baby care; and, planning of personal and family budgets and shopping. Trainees were also given lessons on personal hygiene and good behavior (Alexandraki, 1981, pp. 230–232).

The ICEM experts that designed the training programs implemented in Greece were largely influenced by dominant Western perceptions of race, class and gender that aimed at imbuing Greek emigrants with "superior" Western technical skills and cultural values or behavioral patterns. Courses prepared emigrants for their entrance in the low-skilled and low-paid jobs that the receiving country's indigenous population and skilled immigrants discarded.

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[71] An ICEM research (1959) concerning women trainees in Athens and listing various socio-economic features, demonstrated that out of a total of 221 young females, 173 originated from the Peloponnese (an overwhelming majority), 23 from the Greek islands, only 4 from Athens and the remaining 11 from other areas. ICEM Liaison of Athens, "Poll for domestic trainees in Athens," April 15, 1959, Women Training, IOM-GR, Athens.

Inflows were directed to the labor market in a gendered pattern: Industrial jobs for most men and domestic service for nearly all the women.

7.3.4 Transport Services. Organizing the transport of emigrants overseas was one of the ICEM's main tasks. All eligible emigrants were entitled to Government and ICEM assistance (both financial and services in kind), until their departure. As the only pre-embarkation center operating in Greece was in Piraeus, all selected migrants for assisted schemes were transferred there by means of public transport,[72] three or four days before sailing; they were accommodated in embarkation camps or staging hostels and were documented by the ICEM specialized personnel in cooperation with national authorities and shipping agents. The embarkation formalities included the checking of documentation, the preparation of nominal rolls, a final medical inspection, currency exchange and the registering of heavy baggage. During the sea voyage, ICEM escort staff was assigned to ensure the migrants' welfare and provide counseling and language training.[73]

8. Greek Government Financial Obligations Towards ICEM

Greece was by far the most privileged member country in regard to its financial obligations to ICEM. Its significance to the United States during the Cold War and the dramatic situation of its economy, further worsened by the earthquakes in the Ionian Islands in 1953, all played their role in this economic arrangement. However, the Greek government also bargained intensely on its contribution to the Committee's budget and managed to reduce it to the minimum. Initially, Greece contributed to ICEM's administrative budget one point two percent of its annual expenditures and only a symbolic sum (which actually was never reimbursed), to its operational budget for the transportation of the

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[72] Inland transportation costs within Greece for persons moving within the Family Reunion Scheme, self-payers and fully reimbursable cases were borne by the migrants themselves. The government reimbursed the cost for all ICEM-assisted cases by granting them one round trip ticket to Athens for processing and a one-way ticket from a person's residence to the port of embarkation. Al. Ioannides to W.G. Fuller (Chief of ICEM Mission of Brazil), January 22, 1959, Brazil, IOM-GR, Athens.

[73] "Services provided by ICEM Mission of Greece to prospective migrants for their language and vocational training and their embarkation to overseas countries," Brazil, IOM-GR, Athens.

first 8,000 ICEM-assisted migrants. For all additional migrants transported, the issue of the country's contribution would be re-examined according to the ICEM/Greece Agreement.[74]

When, in early 1954, the number of 8,000 emigrants was attained, the Committee requested from Greece a contribution of 30 US dollars per capita for transport, less than 15 percent of the total cost. The Committee stressed its operational budget deficit, as well as the overall high cost of ocean transportation from Greece to Australia, where the majority of emigrants were transferred.[75] The fact that the contributions requested were in direct proportion to the results achieved (an immediate relief of acute unemployment and a long-term economic boost through immigrant remittances) was also pointed out. Furthermore, the Committee's shipping handling was presented as a type of further assistance to the Greek government: In 1954, ICEM had heralded the establishment of a line from Piraeus to Australia which, as it noted, would increase state income, offer employment to Greek seamen and encourage trade. Finally, Greece agreed to contribute $25 per migrant transferred.[76]

The Greek government was also responsible for all costs incurred prior to migrant embarkation; these expenses formed part of the state's contribution

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[74] By 1954, Greece had contributed a total of $94,205 for the ICEM administrative budget and was exempt from any contribution for the operational budget. In contrast, it had received ICEM services for which the Committee had spent more than two million dollars. N. Hadjivassiliou to St. Stefanopoulos, 4/09/1954, 1955 2.1, Sections 2/Section 1[Greeks abroad. Migration issues. ICEM and other Organizations], AGMFA, Athens.

[75] It should be noted that the cost of ocean transportation to the Migration Committee averaged $200 to $210 from all other parts of Europe for all destinations. In order to further substantiate its request, the Committee listed the contributions from other emigration members states of the Committee: Germany and Italy paid $60 per capita, Austria $30, while the Netherlands reimbursed the full cost of ocean transportation for its migrants. Furthermore, contributions to the operational fund were anticipated from other European countries not directly participating in overseas migration such as Belgium, Luxembourg and Switzerland. Letter of Peter Gibson to the Minister of Interior, April 16, 1954, Finances 1952–1960, IOM-GR, Athens.

[76] Peter Gibson to I. Nikolitsas (Minister of Interior), 5/03/1955, ref.no.ES/480, Finances 1952–1960, IOM-GR, Athens; Peter Gibson to I. Nikolitsas, 8/06/1955, ES/580, Finances 1952–1960, IOM-GR, Athens; I. Nikolitsas to P. Gibson, 30/06/1955, ref.no. 38662, Finances 1952–1960, IOM-GR, Athens; P. Gibson to the Minister of Interior, 16/01/1956, ref.no.ES/842, Finances 1952–1960, IOM-GR, Athens; P. Gibson to D. Makris, 13/06/1956, ref.no.ES/1039, Finances 1952–1960, IOM-GR, Athens.

to ICEM's operational budget. Greece's financial obligations could be partially waived, if facilities, goods and services necessary to the work of the Committee were offered to it free of charge, but also if adequate personnel for the Athens Liaison Office were provided. Moreover, expenditures incurred for the pre-embarkation services provided by the Mission, were reimbursed by the government at a fixed per capita amount, which was jointly determined and periodically revised.[77]

In 1956, the growing ICEM deficit owing to the expansion of its programs, the increase of the number of migrants moved to costly destinations and the restriction of American aid, led the ICEM to request a readjustment of financial obligations from all its member states. The Greek government was asked to increase its contribution for ocean transportation and pre-embarkation expenses andto pay a lump sum equivalent to half its annual contribution to the administrative budget.[78] Greece was also asked to participate in the cost of the training programs. From 1952 up to 1955, ICEM had undertaken the expenditure of the short-term vocational and language training programs provided to Greeks.[79] Given the increasing international demand for skilled workers, ICEM insisted that training programs needed to be better organized, expand to more geographical areas of the country and cover more eligible migrants.[80] Since the Greek state relied on the technical training of its citizens in order to increase the numbers of its emigrants, it accepted to contribute to the expenses of these

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[77] Moreover, the government would have to finance the Committee in advance for migration preparatory work with the amount of 300,000,000 (old) drachmae, which would then be deducted from the reimbursement amounts given to the Committee for pre-embarkation expenses. "Annex to the Agreement between the Greek Government and PICMME signed on April 17, 1952," Agreements and Annexes, IOM-GR, Athens.

[78] "Minutes of the 64th Meeting of Migration Council,"February 2, 1956, Migration Council Meetings, IOM-GR, Athens.

[79] The cost for these services amounted to $48,688 for the vocational training and $42,094 for the language courses. Peter Gibson to Konstantinos Tsatsos (Minister to the Prime Minister), 18/07/1956, ref. no. OIK./1084, Finances 1952-1960, IOM-GR, Athens.

[80] In contrast, in Italy, a country where ICEM had also organized training programs for migrants, it was the government that undertook the entire cost of the relative services, whereas the Committee reimbursed $60 for each Italian trainee emigrating. Al. Ioannides to I. Triandafyllis (Minister of Interior), 7/12/1955, ref. no.ES/788, Finances 1952–1960, IOM-GR, Athens.

courses. In the late 1950s, ICEM also demanded contributions for the extremely costly training of domestic workers.[81]

9. Migrants' Contribution Towards Pre-Embarkation Costs

The Greek state immediately transferred part of the economic burdens of ICEM-assisted migration programs to the emigrants themselves. According to a joint Decision of the Ministries of Social Welfare and Finance, dating October 1952, pre-embarkation expenses would be borne by the migrants themselves, as a partial contribution to their migration costs.[82] Only foreign or ethnic Greek refugees under the care of the Ministry of Welfare, the Ionian earthquake victims, orphans pending adoption and inmates of juvenile institutions were exempt from this obligation.[83]

The Committee disagreed with this decision, since its mandate was to assist the most deserving and indigent persons to emigrate. Experience demonstrated that many prospective emigrants were so poor, that they were unable to pay pre-embarkation costs themselves: Even when they managed to gather the required sum by selling their belongings, they were then left with no money for the sea voyage and lacked the sum required for settlement. The ICEM had received reports depicting the difficulties encountered by Greek immigrants

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[81] According to the Committee, these services were not mentioned in Article 7 of the Annex to the Agreement of April 17, 1952 as one of the services to be performed by the organization. Although they could be considered "unforeseen services" under clause J, they finally were not included given their heavy cost. D. Zessopoulos (Secretary General of the Ministry of Interior) to the Greek ICEM Liaison Office, August 1, 1959; Peter Gibson to D. Zessopoulos, August 7, 1959, Finances 1952–1960, IOM-GR, Athens.

[82] With the Decision ref. no. 95116/ October 10, 1952, every migrant, irrespective of age, sex or migration scheme, would have to visit one of the Public Payment Offices and pay 500,000 (old) drachmae. Only if was able to present the obtained receipt of payment, would he actually be allowed to embark. It should be noted that in April 1953 the drachma was devalued by 50 percent against the US dollar. Moreover with the monetary reform of May 1954, a "new" drachma was introduced (as equal to 1,000 "old" drachmas). The decision to remove three zeros from all monetary values played a crucial role in the weakening of inflationary.

[83] Ministerial Decisions ref. no. 27981/October 21, 1953 and ref. no. 3/963, June 29, 1956. See related documents in: Processing Costs (Pre-embarkation Costs) 1952–1972, IOM-GR, Athens.

arriving in Brazil without any funds to meet their initial personal needs. As a result, ICEM officials expressed the concern that receiving countries might reject Greek migrants, fearing they would become a public burden.[84] Nevertheless, the Greek government insisted on its decision and agreed to exempt only the most indigent, in percentages fixed at seven percent of urban and ten percent of rural migrants in 1954.[85] As far as paupers were concerned, a committee with representatives from the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Social Affairs and the ICEM was responsible for selecting the neediest ICEM-assisted migrants to be deemed exempt from these costs.

TABLE 4. ICEM Expenditure in Greece (US$)

YEAR	ICEM Expenditure in Greece	Reimbursement by the Greek government
1952	59,753	12,333
1953	107,487	75,950
1954	232,520	195,200
1955 (estimate)	301,396	165,200
TOTAL	701,156	448,683

Source: Peter Gibson to Ioannis Triantafyllis (Minister of Interior), 7/01/1956, ES/829, Processing Costs (pre-embarkation costs) 1952–1972, IOM-GR, Athens.

In 1956, the ICEM also reported that the amount determined in the main ICEM/Greece Agreement was not adequate to cover the Greek Mission's operational budget. Since 1952, the Mission's expenses had always exceeded its reimbursement, leading to a growing deficit, even in years of large outmigration, such as 1954 and 1955.

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[84] J. A. Danisch to Edward Marks, January 7, 1953, Pre-embarkation costs - Processing costs 1952–1972, IOM-GR, Athens.

[85] Initially, the Ministries of Interior and Finance could exempt up to 10 percent of urban and 20 percent of rural potential migrants for a mass migration scheme without sponsorship. Later in that same year, the percentages were increased to 20 percent for urban migrants and 30 percent for rural migrants. Note of Edward Marks to Makropoulos (undated), Processing Costs (Pre-embarkation Costs) 1952–1972, IOM-GR, Athens; Peter Gibson to I. Nikolitsas, 5/07/1954, Processing Costs (Pre-embarkation Costs) 1952–1972, IOM-GR, Athens.

The Liaison Office's request was accepted by the Greek government, while a new decision allowed for yet another increase in 1961.[86] These amounts were intended to cover the processing expenses of cases rejected by the receiving countries' representatives, as well as the cases of prospective emigrants who had either changed their mind and abandoned the idea of leaving the country or had chosen to travel to a different destination on their own means and expenses. In 1958, under pressure from the Mission that was attempting to minimize the misuse of its services, the government decided that applicants not emigrating after having prepaid pre-embarkation fees would, under no circumstances, be entitled to reimbursement.[87] Later, in 1961, Greece agreed to establish a non-refundable "registration fee."[88] The Greek state was also obliged to reimburse the ICEM for the processing costs of candidates who, though in an advanced stage of preparation, were unable to leave the country on account of measures taken by the government without informing the Mission in time (Article 11 of Supplement Agreement).

10. Migrants' Contribution Towards Ocean Transportation

In 1954, ICEM's increasing deficit led it to consider implementing a Migrant Contribution Plan; the idea was presented at the Third Session of the Council in October 1955.[89] The Contribution Plan would yield appreciable revenue for

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[86] With the Cabinet resolution 715/May 3, 1956 migrants had to pay 600 (new) drachmae and with the Decision ref. no. 75980/March 24, 1961, the amount increased to 800 (new) drachmae. See: Pre-embarkation costs - Processing costs 1952–1972, IOM-GR, Athens; Al. Ioannides, "Some aspects of our early relations with the Greek Government," April 1960, Relations with the Government/ Interior Ministry 1952–1958, IOM-GR, Athens.

[87] Peter Gibson to the Secretary General of the Ministry of Interior, 14/12/1957, ref. no. ES/1524, Pre-embarkation Costs-Processing Costs 1952–1972, IOM-GR, Athens; K. Rallis to ICEM, 27/01/1958, ref. no. 7115, Pre-embarkation Costs-Processing Costs 1952–1972, IOM-GR, Athens.

[88] More precisely, out of a total of 800 (new) drachmae (the re-adjusted amount) paid by migrants as pre-embarkation costs, 200 drachmae would be given to the ICEM directly as an advance for medical expenses; the remaining 600 drachmae would be paid to the government. Decision ref. no. 75980/March 24, 1961, Pre-embarkation Costs - Processing Costs 1952–1972, IOM-GR, Athens.

[89] See analytically: "Migrant Contribution Plan," Geneva, January 1, 1954, ICEM/MIG/184, 1955/4/1, AGMFA, Athens; "Migrant Contribution Plan. Report of the Director," December 2,

the Committee on a sufficiently stable basis, and would permit the extension of migration programs. It would also help avoid increasing the financial contributions of the member states. Furthermore, according to the reasoning behind the proposal, all migrants should contribute to the cost of their transport for psychological, moral and financial reasons. If the migrant had to contribute for his transfer to a country that provided greater opportunities for prosperity for himself and his family, it was likely that he would make a greater effort to succeed. In summary, reimbursements of 25 percent of the average ocean transportation cost would be payable by all national migrants, except those moving to countries thatparticipated in the expenditures, such as Canada, or those travelling either under revolving fund arrangements or the RRA and the USEP programs.[90]

Migrants were called upon to prepay a minimum amount that varied among sending countries, and to sign promissory notes for the payment of the balance within three years following their establishment overseas. The reimbursement they had to pay after resettling was based on: The average saving capacity and the social security benefits in the receiving country; the cost of transportation; their family situation; and, the amount they had already paid. The plan was flexible in its application, in order to avoid undue hardship. Prepayments were not meant to discourage migration, nor were reimbursements meant to hamper resettlement. Reimbursements would be payable three to six months after arrival in the receiving country, at a fixed monthly amount from five to fifteen US dollars per month.[91] All rates had to be agreed upon following consultation with the governments concerned.[92] Greece, like all other sending countries, was in favor of the plan. The government preferred transport expenses

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1959, MC/EX/95, ICEM, 14th Special Session of the Executive Committee, January 5, 1960, NARA, Washington D.C.

[90] "Migrant Contribution Plan.Report of the Director," MC/EX/95, op.cit.

[91] Ibid.

[92] In the case of Greece, the minimum prepayment was five US dollars for single persons over 18 years and heads of families, one US dollar for others (except for children who had not had their fifth birthday at the time of embarkation) and a maximum of ten US dollars per family unit. In special cases, prepayment could be waived and reimbursement postponed; moreover a discount of 10% could be deducted for any amount in excess of the minimum prepayment from the total amount of the contribution.

to be transferred to the potential migrants. Greek migrants started paying prepayments on August 1, 1955, while reimbursement came into effect only after January 1956. The contribution plan was soon revised, establishing new prepayment rates and relieving migrants of reimbursement in the receiving country, as the ICEM had not managed to impose a uniform system of collection after arrival overseas. In addition, Australia, New Zealand and the Netherlands had already raised objections to the plan.[93]

11. Regulating the Migration Machinery of a Sending State

Deeply imbued with hegemonic discourses and cultural hierarchies produced and disseminated worldwide by the rich and powerful Western elites, Greek policymakers perceived the outflow of population within the dominant conceptual framework of Greece's overall deficiency *vis-à-vis* the West, its economic underdevelopment and cultural backwardness. During the 1950s, the Greek governments aimed at increasing the number of emigrants and at maximising their positive contributions to the homeland, while minimising the negative consequences of outflows. Nevertheless, the Greek state, in the context of asymmetrical international relations and the pressing economic conjuncture, had limited opportunities to direct its "surplus" citizens to desired destinations during this decade. Successive governments were reluctant to send emigrants to overseas distant Anglo-Saxon countries, where they feared they would soon become fully assimilated; even so, there seemed to be no other alternative. State officials were afraid that the poor, uneducated Greek emigrants of rural origin, when settling in countries they perceived as not only more powerful and wealthier, but also as technologically and culturally superior, would soon cut their ties with their homeland, being lost forever to the nation (Venturas, 2013). Consequently, the Greek governments only half-heartedly endorsed the opening of emigration to countries overseas.

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[93] See analytically: George L. Warren, "Migration from Europe in 1960: Fourteenth and Fifteenth Sessions of Executive Committee and Twelfth Session of Council of the ICEM," May 1960, p. 4, A446, 1966/46174, 15th Session of Executive Committee and 12th Session of Council - Geneva 1960, NAA, Canberra; Al. Ioannides to K. Rallis, 10/01/1958, ES/1535, Migrant Contribution Plan, IOM-GR, Athens.

Moreover, the Greek state apparatus was bound up with power and social control in ways that eclipsed what is stereotypically considered as "Western rationality" and "efficiency" (Barnett & Finnemore, 1999, p. 706). Most high state officials shared and valued these conceptions of "rationality" and "efficiency," but often their everyday practices followed different, covert and often non-conscious, patterns of "rationality" and "efficiency." At the same time, employees lower in bureaucratic hierarchies often resisted any change. As a Greek Representative observed in 1954, "an organization like ICEM imbued with new ideas and using new methods in its work arouses the diffidence of the administrative authorities, over-conservative by nature."[94] Moreover, civil servants, in both the central state apparatus and its local branches, predictably frequently resisted or undermined the implementation of what they saw as unjust policies, as imperatives enforced on the nation by foreigners or because of other such views.

Finally, the Greek governments had to take into account that the Press, some political parties and many members of Parliament were bitterly set against emigration.[95] The issue of emigration and the misfortunes of the migrants recurred in public debate several times after the war, with politicians and the Press exploiting what was a sensitive matter for Greek society. The extensive use of a nationalistic rhetoric, racist or emotionally charged terms, metaphors and expressions to describe the phenomenon of emigration is evident: A selection exclusively from the Parliamentary proceedings from 1950 to 1967, demonstrates that "emigration" is all too often referred to as a "curse," a "tragedy," "bleeding," a "danger for the biological character of the Nation," a "danger for the future of the Greek Race," a "cause for the disintegration of the Greek Nation" or a "slave trade."

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[94] N. Hadjivassiliou to the Prime Minister of Foreign Affairs St. Stefanopoulos, 4/09/1954, 19552.1, Sections 2/Section 1 [Greeks abroad. Migration issues. ICEM and other Organizations], AGMFA, Athens.

[95] As a result, the Minister of Interior had to continuously reassure the Greek Parliament that mass migration assisted by ICEM constituted an organized movement which was under governmentcontrol with positive financial results. Hellenic Parliamentary Proceedings, June 27, 1955: Nikolitsas' response to the interpellation of Deputy Katsilambros, 1955 2.1, Sections 2/Section 1[Greeks abroad. Migration issues. ICEM and other Organizations], AGMFA, Athens; Alexandra Ioannides, "Some aspects of our early relations with the Greek Government," April 1960, Relations with the Government/Ministry of Interior/1952–1958, IOM-GR, Athens.

While the right-wing Greek governments were busy establishing specific measures to promote emigration, their spokesmen were more often apologetic rather than assertive in their own rhetoric. For example, in 1955, the Minister of Domestic Affairs claimed the following:

> Greece adopted emigration as a necessity in the face of extraordinary circumstances, and as a welfare measure to which the Greek governments were forced to resort, under such terms that threaten neither the future of the nation, nor the economy of the country. [...] We are not heedless of the disadvantages of collective emigration, hence we do not fully applaud what, as I said, we accepted as a temporary measure. [96]

This type of frequently defensive position stemmed from other principles of the Greek governments that, just as in other countries after the war, accepted and condoned the objectives of economic growth and full employment. Unemployment and underemployment were seen as indicators of underdevelopment, and all political parties agreed that economic growth was necessary in order to deal with them. Moreover, it was difficult to counter the charges concerning the demographic problem and the desolation of the areas near the Greek borders, both of which were described as dangerous phenomena for the nation. Hence, state intervention was mostly restricted to the implementation of "protectionist" restrictive measures concerning the age, gender, geographical origin and political loyalty of the migrants.

Right-wing politicians used all sorts of arguments in their attempts to legitimize emigration and their migration policies: As with other ideologically charged domains, the country's alleged natural poverty and the age-old traits of the "race" were invoked to justify emigration. Unemployment and the lag in economic development were attributed to war and the ensuing "communist uprising;" and, it was claimed that these would be eliminated through the economic policy and the projects that were under way. However, until the economic measures could pay off, emigration was presented as a necessary evil. Politicians also cited the examples of other sending countries—Italy, in

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[96] Speech by Domestic Affairs Minister Ioannis Nikolitsas, *Parliamentary Proceedings* June 27, 1955; emphasis added.

particular—to justify the necessity of their own policy. There was also talk of the "right to emigrate," a right every liberal country ought to grant.[97]

The Greek press was often not only hostile to emigration, but also critical towards ICEM. The organization was accused of lacking openness and transparency with respect to the eligible cases: It not only denied justifying rejected cases, but also misled and misinformed potential migrants as to their real financial obligations overseas.[98] Distrust in the international character of the organization was expressed, the Greek Field Office was criticized of the highly administrative costs and the effectiveness of its operations was questioned. The Greek Governments' policy options, such as the agreement it signed with ICEM, were equally opposed by strong private interests, like the travel agencies that controlled the postwar "migration ocean economy," frequently at the detriment of the migrants moving individually. Strongly affected by ICEM operations in Greece, the travel agencies tried to discredit ICEM's work through negative publicity in newspapers.[99]

Unsurprisingly, from 1952 to April 1960—when ICEM celebrated the one millionth migrant moved under its auspices—Greece had received ICEM assistance for only 66,000 emigrants including 10,000 refugees.[100] This number was low in comparison to both the rates of Greeks emigrating overseas individually, and to outflows from other ICEM sending countries. Although Greece, being an extremely poor country, paid its financial contributions, however minimal, to the ICEM with difficulty, the country never succeeded in making the best use of the ICEM programs or achieving the target set at 10,000 emigrants leaving the country annually. Moreover, by not signing bilateral agreements with receiving countries, Greece never secured the maximum of benefits for its emigrants either. Actually, when the first emigration programs

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[97] Speech by G. Lychnos, MP, *Parliamentary Proceedings* June 1, 1960; Speech by P. Kanellopoulos, Vice-President of the Greek government, *Parliamentary Proceedings*, May 12, 1962; *Parliamentary Proceedings* June 27, 1955, February 16, 1959 and May 6, 1963.

[98] Indicative critical articles in: *Έξω Ελληνισμός* [Hellenism Abroad], December 1, 1952, November 1, 1953, August 15, 1954, September 1, 1954, September 15, 1954.

[99] *Έξω Ελληνισμός* [Hellenism Abroad], January 1, 1953, January 15, 1953, April 1, 1953.

[100] Extract from ICEM Bulletin No. 4, "Breakdown by Country of emigration and immigration of the 1,000,000 ICEM-assisted migrants," 24/06/1960, A446, 1962/65076, ICEM General Part 1, NAA, Canberra.

were initiated, the Greek government drafted agreements with receiving coun-
tries, on the patterns of the Italian agreements and with the assistance of the
ICEM.[101] However, receiving countries were reluctant to create contractual
obligations before testing the qualities and adaptability of Greek immigrants,
while the Greek state, fearing the financial obligations that might arise, never
actually committed to an official document. As a result, both interested parties
met their needs with a minimum of commitments. Receiving countries imple-
mented selective migration programs on their own terms (Limnios-Sekeris, 2013,
pp. 90–91) and Greece managed to achieve the emigration of a limited number
of its unemployed under ICEM auspices, with a minimum of contributions.[102]

TABLE 5. Breakdown by Country of emigration and
immigration of the 1,000,000 ICEM-assisted migrants

Countries of emigration		Countries of immigration	
Austria	150,000	Argentina	105,000
FRG	213,000	Australia	289,000
Greece	66,000	Brazil	84,000
Italy	279,000	Canada	152,000
Netherlands	81,000	Chile	6,000
Spain	38,000	Colombia	3.000
Hong-Kong	15,000	FRN	6.000
Others	158,000	Israel	58,000
		New Zealand	9,000
		Union of South Africa	10,000
		USA	179,000
		Uruguay	10,000
		Venezuela	46,000
		Others - Overseas	4,000
		Others - Europe	39,000
TOTAL	1,000,000	TOTAL	1,000,000

Source: A446, 1962/65076, ICEM General Part 1, NAA, Canberra.

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[101] "Draft Agreement between Greece and Australia," Old Bilateral Agreements, IOM-GR,
Athens.

[102] "Report of the ICEM Field Office in Greece," pp. 12–13, May 1960, Migration from
Greece to Australia, IOM-GR, Athens; Edward Marks to the Ministry of Coordination, January
29, 1953, Relations with the Government/Ministry of Interior/1952–1958, IOM-GR, Athens.

Thus, it is again not surprising that, as soon as the opening of the European labor market allowed for another alternative, Greece reconsidered its migration policies. Intra-European migration appeared to be far more attractive than resettlement overseas: it was more organized than the ICEM-flows overseas and it was intended to be temporary. Migrant wages and living standards, as well as labor rights and social benefits, were ensured by bilateral migration agreements.[103] More significantly, according to the beliefs prevailing at the time, the shorter distances involved would facilitate the control of the Greeks abroad and permit closer ties between the homeland and its migrants; they, sooner or later, would return with new skills to assist Greece's industrialization, after receiving an *in situ* training in the modern industries of Western Europe (Venturas, 2013, p. 341).

Regardless of the Greek governments' stance, the Committee undertook the processing of emigrants and retained Greece's financial contributions to a minimum. Moreover, ICEM did assist categories of Greek citizens that would not have emigrated otherwise due to the high cost of ocean fares or the lack of sponsors. Even though migration under ICEM auspices was not free of charge, the emigrants' travel expenses, administrative formalities and processing services were partially covered. Voluntary organizations working with ICEM subsidized many passages, while some receiving countries granted loans. In the case of destitute persons, families and dependents in a country encountering pressing needs in the immediate postwar years, the financial assistance provided by ICEM was indisputably very important. ICEM family reunion schemes were equally of great significance for the migration of complete family units or for family reunification achieved after relatively short periods. Moreover, ICEM assisted in the progressive disbandment of the refugee centers by moving refugees to countries overseas. It offered the refugees the opportunity to escape from the hard living conditions and the despair of the camps and relieved Greece of the burden of their care. ICEM also included in its migration programs victims of unforeseen events, such as the Ionian

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[103] As part of this policy, Greece signed migration agreements with several European countries: with France in 1954, Belgium in 1957 and Germany in 1960.

earthquake of 1953 or the Greeks fleeing from Egypt after the Nasser regime assumed power in the country.[104]

The exodus of women to countries overseas as labor migrants constitutes a special chapter in the history of ICEM-assisted policies. Labor migration was, up to then, predominantly male-led, with females more often than not, following males in the context of family reunification chains (Tastsoglou, 200, p. 85). ICEM initiated schemes of contract-based migration exclusively for women workers. Under its assistance, several Greek women of rural background were given the opportunity to migrate, and to work and live abroad alone. Of course, they were offered the kind of menial work considered appropriate for women, which local women did no longer wish to do. They worked mainly as domestics, but mostly under prearranged contracts with specified wages and relatively bearable living conditions; this first step later enabled them to make new employment choices and to sponsor the migration of their own relatives from Greece.

There is no doubt that the preliminary orientation and the elementary language courses offered before sailing or on board ships provided emigrants with practical information and basic communication skills facilitating their adjustment, while the vocational training programs that were provided to some of them, later enabled them to find better employment and to broaden their options in life. The Greek governments, which had requested aid from ILO experts to organize technical and vocational training after the war,[105] took advantage of ICEM–ILO cooperation in this field, not only in preparing its unemployed to emigrate, but equally in enhancing its technical education.

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[104] Since 1953, the ICEM Liaison Office in Athens, acting jointly with the WCC, "unofficially" undertook the assisted emigration of the indigent or unemployed Greeks of Egypt to Australia. The WCC involvement was an alternative solution because of the existing ICEM restriction to provide assistance exclusively to European countries. The ICEM acted as an intermediary by coordinating the migration process from the Athens Office and ensuring the means of transport and the landing permits for the migrants, while the WCC subsidized the applicants through a revolving fund orsought sponsorships overseas.Following ministerial legislation, the "Egyptian" group of ethnic Greeks was officially included in the five percent of ICEM-assisted Greek emigration (estimated to actually involve about 550 migrants annually). From 1952 to 1961, the ICEM assisted the movement of 2,630 Greeks from Egypt to Australia (Dalachanis, 2012; Limnios-Sekeris, 2013).

[105] G. Kassimatis to the Director of ILO, Geneva 25/04/1952, 195271.8, Sections 1 [Third ICEM Session, Washington], AGMFA, Athens.

ICEM ensured that migration was carried out in an organized fashion, while the welfare of the migrants both during their ocean travel and after their settlement in the receiving countries was not ignored. Misinformation was indeed rarer amongst those travelling under ICEM auspices, than in the cases of spontaneous migration. The Committee protected prospective migrants, to a certain degree, from being exploited by travel agencies, compatriots or other third parties.[106] Migrants moving under ICEM auspices enjoyed a much higher degree of legal and institutional protection, as well as support in their placement in the labor market and a smooth integration in the destination countries.

Of course, these positive aspects do not mean that many ICEM-assisted migrants did not have negative experiences. On the contrary, there were many complaints from passengers about the health and safety conditions on old and overcrowded vessels sailing from Piraeus to Australia, the frequent ship damages, the lack of basic comforts or the cohabitation difficulties onboard between foreign and Greek emigrants (Limnios-Sekeris, 2013, pp. 124–132). Immigrants in countries overseas often suffered from insufficient placement services, unemployment, and low wages with regard to the respective cost of living in each country. Migrants frequently described their adventures in Brazilian cities or in Australian reception camps with the darkest colors, and often expressed their frustration about insufficient information on the economic conditions in receiving countries, inadequate training and other misfortunes.[107] Unemployed workers in utter desperation, sponsored women being deceived by their fiancés, domestics in a state of panic asking for their repatriation, are just some of the cases that not only substantiate the bad planning and malfunction of many ICEM programs, but also the frequent near-cynical attitude of some its officials when dealing with the emigrants' ignorance of living conditions in foreign countries and their urgent need for income. Naturally, the ICEM cannot be solely accountable for the success or failure of any scheme, the development or abandonment of a migration route or the hardships of migration and the fate of all the migrants moving under its auspices. Results and experiences depended on many factors, which varied from placement opportunities and

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[106] Al. Ioannides to G. Kapsambelis, October 20, 1956, Argentina, IOM-GR, Athens.

[107] See relative material in: Translations 1952–1960, IOM-GR, Athens.

the efforts of receiving states to preestablished migration networks, the existence/or lack of a sufficiently staffed Greek diplomatic mission overseas and many other factors.

As the organization's most important founding members and its main source of funding were the receiving states, it could only be expected that their priorities prevailed in the Committee's policies; ICEM-assisted programs for both men and women inescapably reproduced race, class and gender inequalities. The *White Australia* policy, the quotas of the United States and the formal or informal racial policies of other receiving countries were not questioned by ICEM. It was because these states set the terms of the eligible migrant categories, that the ICEM migration schemes followed the receiving countries' preferences for Northwestern European migrants and reproduced their discriminations against the "non-assimilable races." The selection processes conducted by the ICEM mission reproduced the racial and political biases of receiving countries against Southern European migrants. ICEM officials often shared the contemptuous attitude of Western elites towards Greece and its inhabitants in their discourses and practices. Rural Greeks were considered as backward feeble people: Their "primitive ways," illiteracy, lack of skills, and even their "culture," hindered a productive entrance into labor markets and their adjustment to life in developed "civilized" receiving countries. Furthermore, given the legacy of the recent Civil War, they were suspected of engaging in "subversive" political activities and were submitted to a thorough examination in order to be eligible for immigration to "democratic" destination countries. As the Committee's employees equally embraced the internationally powerful and prestigious receiving countries' preconceptions and stereotypes, the orientation and language courses, the vocational training programs and the printed material they designed, based on these presumptions, aimed exactly at "modernizing" and imbuing Greek migrants with the "superior western" cultural values and behavioral patterns that would prepare them for life in "modern" and "democratic" receiving societies. Thus, the ICEM also contributed to the further dissemination of Western-derived ideas about civilized conduct, healthy life and productive work in Greece.

II. ICEM-Latin America Interactions:
Organizing Settlement and Placement

Introductory Remarks

According to views dominant in the 1940s, Latin America with its "empty spaces" offered huge opportunities for the resettlement of refugees and Displaced Persons (DPs), as well as of migrants from Europe. South America, closely linked to United States geostrategic interests, was at the center of American plans for organized population redistribution since Franklin D. Roosevelt, in the early 1940s, had coined the secretive *M Project*, an ambitious plan aiming at ensuring postwar world order through the massive relocation of DPs (Cohen, 2011, pp. 102–103). Conveners of international meetings on refugee and migration issues after the Second World War demanded Latin American countries to send representatives and actively sought their support for the creation of international agencies dealing with human mobility.[108]

This sub-chapter will shed light on the specific place that Latin American countries occupied in the migration and development plans of the Western world in the early Cold War era by describing the technical assistance services provided by ICEM, an American-led migration agency. It will focus on the way ICEM policymakers understood Latin American states' differences from the ideal type of *the* Western state and the means by which they tried to reform them according to this model. For the ICEM planners, impregnated with views established before the organization's creation, Latin America constituted the ideal outlet for European "surplus population." However, in order to materialize their projects they had to face Latin American countries' reluctance to permit an international organization to intervene in their sovereign right to decide on their immigration policies, just like that of other traditional receiving countries. Latin American governments thus had to be persuaded and/or pressured to join the ICEM and to remain members of the organization. Furthermore, in the eyes of the main decision-makers in the Committee, Latin

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[108] "Missions in Latin America in view of the Naples Conference," 2/07/1951, MIG 1009-2-1, Naples Preliminary Mission to Latin America, ILO-A, Geneva.

American states, unlike those of the Commonwealth, did not possess an efficient machinery for the handling of the international movements.

1. Migration patterns in Latin America

North and South America responded in parallel ways, but with different outcomes, to the mass European immigration of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Between 1850 and the Second World War, when nearly 40 million persons moved to the United States, about 12 million headed to Latin America. The majority of immigrants reaching Latin America were Spaniards (four million), Italians (four million) and Portuguese (two million) (Robbins, 1958, p. 103). Immigrants settled in just a few countries, such as Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Chile, while the percentage of returnees was large, notably for Argentina where only 52.65 percent of immigrants remained, while in Brazil this percentage was over 66 percent (Neiva & Montenegro, 1965, p. 125).

With the worldwide recession of the 1930s and the rise of nationalism, Latin American governments, just like those of other traditional receiving countries, enacted restrictive immigration policies. The nationalistic policies implemented during the Interwar period and fears about the assimilation of foreigners, left their traces in the aftermath of the Second World War. Public opinion was against the resettlement of European refugees and DPs with a different ethnic and social background (Fischel de Andrade, 2011, pp. 75–76; von Holleuffer, 2002, p. 135). Thus, Latin American countries received less than ten percent of the total number of refugees resettled by IRO between 1947 and 1951 (Neiva & Montenegro, 1965, p. 127). Even if some Latin American countries signed the charter of the IRO and accepted a small number of European DPs, most governments avoided official commitments with regard to their national immigration program, made recruitment arrangements through bilateral agreements,[109] and showed no great interest in the creation of an international

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[109] Such was the case of Argentina, a country pursuing active immigration policies in the aftermath of the Second World War. Argentinian governments chose as main instruments for the promotion of European immigration—even after having joined the ICEM—the bilateral agreements signed with Italy (1947, 1948, and 1952) and Spain (1958) (Albarracin, 2004, pp. 66). Similarly, Brazil signed a bilateral agreement with the Netherlands in 1950 for a small-scale land scheme (Robbins, 1958, pp. 106-107).

migration agency.[110] Some projects of planned agricultural settlements popu-
lated by foreigners had succeeded in the past, such as the Japanese colonization
in São Paulo, the German in Chile, the Polish in Paraná, but geographical and
climatic obstacles and the system of landed estates hindered large scale immi-
gration to rural areas. After the Second World War, even fewer European farm-
ers were tempted by frontier colonization. Thus, Latin America was not a first
choice destination for most of the 2,400,000 Europeans moving overseas
between 1946 and 1952—not even for the refugees and DPs who were trans-
ferred in an organized way (Robbins, 1958, pp. 102, 104–105). Economic
recession and political instability soon made immigration to Latin America even
more undesirable. On the other hand, although some Latin American states
promoted land settlement projects, they were no longer so keen on undertaking
the high costs involved in implementing them. Ideas on rural development which
initially impeded the arrival of workers interested in establishing themselves
in cities,[111] were soon abandoned since the emerging economic model was grad-
ually shifting attention to industrial expansion (Damilakou, 2014, p. 143).

   With the exception of Argentina, the population of Latin American coun-
tries was growing as was internal migration towards urban areas. Demographic
growth ensured that a large reservoir of manpower and high urbanization rates
led to competition for unskilled employment opportunities, housing, education,
health and transport services (Bastos de Ávila, 1957, pp. 33–34, 36–37, 42–43).
Furthermore, migration flows of unskilled workers between Latin American
countries had already started contributing to labor market saturation. In this
context, unskilled European laborers could not compete with internal migrants
with lower expectations. Therefore, in the early 1950s, European immigration

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[110] M.A. Citroen to P. Jacobsen, "Report of the IRO delegation on the ILO Migration
Conference in Naples," October 26, 1951, ICEM Background 1946–1951, IOM-SW, Geneva.

[111] Venezuela for instance discriminated against industrial immigrant workers with the "75
percent–25 percent" Labor Law which required all employers to keep the number of foreigners
on their payrolls down to 25 percent (vam Holleuffer, 2002, p. 147). Similarly, Brazil had main-
tained restrictionist clauses in its immigration law such as a quota system (much more flexible
than that of the United States), according to which only two percent of the total number of
every nationality that had settled in the country from 1884 to 1933 could enter the country
annually. Argentina with the decree of 1952 had placed severe restrictions on the issuance of
immigration visas for the Buenos Aires area. (ILO 1959, p. 223)

started to decrease anew despite the attempts of many Latin American countries to implement more flexible migration policies.

In Argentina, after the 1949 admissions peak of about 151,000, immigration from Europe started to fall considerably due to the devaluation of currency, serious inflation and the slump in foreign investment. Besides, after Perón had been deposed by a violent military coup in 1955, military regimes dominated in the politics of the country. The Brazilian economy showed more dynamism, but up to the mid-1950s the country encountered serious inflationary problems and the devaluation of the currency deterred immigrants who had to send funds to relatives back in Europe. Venezuela had a stable and strong currency, however, neither its economy, based on the export of petroleum, nor its public work program favored permanent settlement. Political instability in countries such as Paraguay, Bolivia, Colombia and Peru influenced population inflows negatively, because it discouraged prospective migrants, since frequently changing administrations hindered the implementation of coherent immigration policies (Bastos de Ávila, 1957, pp. 32–33, 37–42).

2. The IRO and ILO Immigration Infrastructure in Latin America

Interested in attracting manpower to implement government plans for economic development, Latin American countries welcomed the financing and arrangement of migrant transportation from Europe and agreed to international action in this domain. But, like state officials in other traditional receiving countries, they strived to ensure their sovereign rights in determining migration quotas and selection criteria and expressed reservations when asked to contribute financially to a competent international agency.[112]

Many Latin American countries acquired valuable experience with assisted immigration through their collaboration with postwar refugee organizations: the *Intergovernmental Committee for Refugees* (IGCR) and the *International Refugee Organization* (IRO). Even though IRO had only achieved modest results with regards to the total number of refugees settled in Latin America,

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[112] See the speeches of Latin American delegations in the Naples Conference, Third/Fifth/Eighth Sittings of the Migration Conference in Naples, 3/10/1951, C.Mig/I/FS/PV.3, MIG 1009-2-103, International Migration Conference. Naples. Minutes of Sittings, ILO-A, Geneva.

its practices set patterns which would soon be followed in the organization of mass migration schemes. The IRO had assisted national authorities in activities such as the reception and classification of workers, data processing, publicity and funding (Fischel de Andrade, 2011, pp. 81–82). On their part, governments had reorganized their administration machinery, simplified formalities and immigration regulations, taken care of the reception of newcomers and signed bilateral agreements. In order to foster the smooth adaptation of newcomers, they had collaborated with already established ethnic communities and voluntary organizations (von Holleuffer, 2002, pp. 140–153). Thus, the resettlement of DPs was considered to have offered receiving countries valuable expertise for running the selection, transportation and reception process of new and diverse immigrant groups.

The resettlement of DPs had also built up valuable international expertise in the organization of migration services. The IRO, especially, had contributed to the redistribution of refugees overseas by adopting a model of "placement on the basis of qualifications" (Cohen, 2011, pp. 111–112). In order to increase acceptance rates by government missions, this organization had produced reliable descriptions of refugees' occupational background, developed its own preselection process and implemented retraining programs for rejected candidates. The *Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration* (ICEM) relied on IRO's work and infrastructure in Latin America (field offices, mixed subcommissions, personnel and resources), took account of the difficulties the DP project had faced and profited from the network of voluntary organizations, ethnic communities and governmental authorities' with which the IRO had collaborated for the integration of new settlers. Latin America was thus not an uncharted field for ICEM. Its officials were aware of the geographical characteristics, the tropical climate, the political instability, the competitive cheap native workforce, the budgetary constraints and the highly selective immigration policies of Latin American governments. They also had been informed about the states' will to match immigrant skills to national labor market demands and to implement an adequate selection process (van Holleuffer, 2002, p. 155).

ICEM also profited from the *International Labour Organization* (ILO) operations on the continent. A *Migration Information Center* had been established at ILO Headquarters, which produced technical literature to guide the

activities of national agencies and other organizations, such as the *World Health Organization* (WHO), the *Food and Agriculture Organization* (FAO) and the ICEM. This material included an international standard classification system of occupations, a guide for the vocational training of migrants, recommendations for the medical selection criteria for certain occupational categories and manuals for immigrants' placement. Moreover, the ILO participated in the meetings of the Economic Commission for Latin America and contributed to research on the relationship between European immigration and the continent's economic development.[113] The organization had already started to build a technical mechanism in Latin America, in the context of the *United Nations Expanded Program of Technical Assistance* (Maul, 2012, pp. 121–151). The ILO established a *Manpower Field Office* in São Paolo of Brazil, with a special migration unit, staffed by experts specialized in vocational training and employment services. The Office offered technical advice to all interested national authorities in regard to manpower and migration problems. It assessed manpower resources and needs upon request and on the basis of formal agreements. In the early 1950s, such requests were made by Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru and Brazil. ILO technical assistance also included fellowships for officials to travel abroad in order to study and compare methods of handling the reception and placement of immigrants.[114]

3. Latin American Countries Join the ICEM

Only three (Brazil, Bolivia and Chile) of the nine Latin American states which participated in the Brussels Conference signed the Resolution which gave birth to the *Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe* (PICMME) and only two more (Paraguay and Venezuela) joined the new organization immediately.[115] Latin American countries' hesitation and

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[113] "ILO Report of the Sub-Committee on Technical Questions," C.Mig/I/CP/D.1, Naples, October 1951, MIG 1009-2-501, International Migration Conference of Naples. Program Committee. Reports, ILO-A, Geneva.

[114] "Action taken by the ILO to implement the conclusions of the Preliminary Migration Conference (draft paper)," C/Mig/I/3/1951, Naples, October 1951, MIG 1009-2-401, International Migration Conference of Naples. Conclusions of PMC, ILO-A, Geneva.

[115] These states where: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Guatemala, Paraguay, Peru and Venezuela. Apart from the three countries voting for the resolution, Colombia and

ambivalence towards the Committee was a major concern for the organization's planners. They thus appointed an American, Hugh Gibson, with deep knowledge of the continent and useful connections there, as the first Director General of the Committee. Once elected, the Director began a six-week tour in Latin America to ensure new outlets for European migrants.[116] The restrictions imposed by other traditional immigration countries, such as the United States, Canada and Australia, made it imperative for ICEM to seek the expansion of its operations in South America. With constant incentives by the Committee, by 1960, the number of ICEM Latin American member-states had risen to nine (ICEM Handbook, 1960, p. 6).[117]

Between 1952 and 1964 ICEM transferred 311,029 Europeans to Latin America, 284,209 of whom were migrants and 26,820 refugees (Neiva & Montenegro, 1965, p. 128). Migration to Latin America rose to a peak in 1954 with a yearly average of 166,000 and then followed a substantial decline reaching only 89,000 immigrants in 1959.[118] Most immigrants came from Southern European countries and settled in Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela (Bouscaren, 1963, p. 149). These three seaboard countries, favored by travel facilities, had preestablished migration and cultural links with Southern Europe. The quick decline in European immigration was due to a combination of factors such as: unstable economic and political conditions, difficulties in absorbing unskilled workers, obstructive immigration laws towards the admission of qualified immigrants and competition from more attractive labor markets.[119] Commonwealth

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Guatemala abstained from the vote, Argentina and Peru were recorded as observers and Paraguay and Venezuela were absent at the vote. Warren George, "Confidential Report on Conference on Migration held at Brussels," 17/01/1952, Brussels Migration Conference, NARA, Washington D.C.

[116] "Memorandum concerning past and current efforts of the United States Government to increase the flow of migrants and refugees from Europe to Latin American countries," January 5, 1953, US Foreign Assistance Agencies ICEM, NARA, Washington D.C.

[117] ICEM Latin American Members were: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Panama, Paraguay and Venezuela.

[118] Memorandum from T.H.E. Hayes to Marcus Daly, August 22, 1960, A446, 1962/65076, ICEM General Part 1, NAA, Canberra.

[119] Warren George L., "The Development of United States Participation in Intergovernmental Efforts to Resolve Refugee Problems, 1933–1961," Report submitted to the Department of State. 1972, pp. 189–190, Papers of George L. Warren, Box I, Harry S. Truman Library, Missouri.

countries initially, and Western European countries from the late 1950s onwards, offered prospective migrants better wages and working conditions, social security previsions and also guaranteed the transfer of their remittances to dependents left behind (Bastos de Ávila, 1957). As Latin America was not attractive to new workers, the vast majority of migrants transferred by the Committee were dependents of individuals who had already settled there in the aftermath of the Second World War (ILO 1959, pp. 356–358). However, even though migrant intakes in Latin America were not those desired by ICEM, they monopolized discussions in the organization during the second half of the decade and absorbed most of its technical programs.

Pressed by high unemployment rates in some European countries and the need for immediate openings for immigration overseas, ICEM initially focused on the provision of basic immigration services in Latin America, undervaluing the significance of the continent's economic and labor market circumstances. Besides, as it was initially expected that the ICEM would complete its work in three to five years, the organization could not undertake costly long-term operational activities. Soon, nevertheless, the decline of migrant flows to Latin America and the high rates of returnees obliged the ICEM to allot more resources to the running of its Latin American program.[120]

For ICEM to accomplish its mission of fostering increased levels of emigration from Europe, it had to make resettlement overseas a success, as the two processes were mutually reinforcing. The high number of disillusioned migrants returning home discouraged further potential migrants to choose the Latin American destination and be enrolled in an ICEM scheme. In the mid-1950s the organization lacked qualitative analyses of the returnee phenomenon. Nevertheless, there was evidence that not all the returnees had failed and furthermore that spontaneous migrants encountered bigger problems in their

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[120] The number of returnees was especially worrying in the case of Italian migrants. From 1950 to 1955 Italian returnees represented a rate of 39 percent of overall immigration to Venezuela and 27, 26, and 20 percent of the incoming migrants to Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay, respectively. Spain, which sent 98.8 percent of its emigrants to Latin America, had a 19.7 percent returnee rate from 1955–1959, and Portugal, 82.9 percent of whose emigrants had gone to Latin America, had a 12 percent returnee rate from 1946–1960 (Neiva & Montenegro, 1965, p. 128).

TABLE 6. Total migration Europe – Latin America, 1950–1959

YEAR	MAIN IMMIGRATION COUNTRIES					Others	TOTAL	TOTAL Returnees
	Argentina	Brazil	Chile	Uruguay	Venezuela			
1950	125,7	31,7	1,9	5,5	31,4	3,7	199,9	31,2
1951	95,6	56,4	1,8	6,9	28,4	4,7	193,8	34,6
1952	62,3	79,9	1,9	6,1	31,8	3,5	185,5	31,3
1953	33,5	70,8	1,8	5,7	41,1	2,5	155,4	37,5
1954	42,7	62,7	1,4	5,4	51,4	2,2	165,8	35,4
1955	28,9	45,5	1,8	8,6	58,3	2,1	145,2	37,2
1956	16,8	34,3	0,4	6,3	56,1	3,4	117,3	36,2
1957	25,9	40,5	0,7	5,1	57,5	3,2	132,9	41,4
1958	22,0	32,0	0,4	3,9	44,0	3,7	105,0	56,7
1959	16,0	33,0	0,4	2,5	34,0	3,0	89,0	44,2

Source: Memorandum from T.H.E. Hayes to Marcus Daly, August 22, 1960, A446, 1962/65076, ICEM, General Part 1, NAA, Canberra.

adjustment than those traveling under an organized scheme.[121] Thus, by the mid-1950s, ICEM policy in Latin America had already brought out all its deficiencies with regard to the selection process in Europe and the placement services overseas. Migrants assisted only with their passage overseas, lacking information about the country they were heading to, language and professional skills and perspectives for placement in the labor market had limited chances of success and no incentives for permanent settlement.[122] It was clear that the ICEM Latin American program malfunctioned and that there was a waste of funds, of private and public efforts.

ICEM officials were thus obliged to reconsider their policies and adapt programs to the needs of Latin America in a more efficient way. Many Latin

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[121] According to the statistics of the Instituto Agrario Nacional of Venezuela, from 1949 until 1954 there had been 14,276 returnees. Of those 12,580 had been spontaneous migrants and 1,496 migrants entering under organized schemes. "Summary record of the forty-second meeting," 13/11/1956, MC/C/SR/42, p. 15, Fifth Session of the ICEM Council, Geneva, October 1-5, 1956, NARA, Washington D.C.

[122] "Migration Services Program: Report of the Director," 20/09/1955, MC/154, p. 3, Third Session of the ICEM Council, Geneva, October 17–22, 1955, NARA, Washington, D.C.

American delegates shared the idea that ICEM had to put greater emphasis on supportive services that would improve the reception and placement of immigrants and that it should not limit its activities to travel arrangements.[123] There was a consensus that these services should include the stimulation of sponsorship offers and the search for employment opportunities in Latin American labor markets. Moreover, since the expanding economy of Latin American countries were thought to need qualified workers who were in shortage in Europe, ICEM's technical services had to put more emphasis on vocational training schemes.[124] Although it was not mandated to undertake the fashioning of skilled workers, the Committee should try to prepare prospective migrants properly before their departure, by informing and training them so that they would assimilate quickly into the economic and social life of the receiving countries.

Even though the economic recovery of Western Europe in the late 1950s removed the pressure for wide-scale overseas population movements, with United States fears intensifying about the expansion of Communism in Latin America in the wake of the Cuban revolution, ICEM focused anew on the region, this time by setting new goals. According to the new approach, Latin America did not any longer need large-scale immigration; it required the importation of qualified workers who would infuse their knowledge and experience to the native populations. In these circumstances ICEM tried to design measures promoting the inflow of semi-skilled or trained laborers—who could still be attracted by the prospect of emigrating—in the place of highly skilled Europeans, who could easily find employment in their own countries. A range of technical activities were implemented which aimed at channeling more trained Europeans to land settlement and industrial development projects in Latin America (Ducasse-Rogier, 2001, pp. 45–69). The attention accorded to this technical program also reflected ICEM's endeavor to satisfy Latin American countries and maintain a balance between its various members' needs and interests (Haveman, 1967, pp. 86–87). The rhetoric about

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123 "Summary record of the forty-first meeting," 13/11/1956, MC/C/SR/41& "Summary record of the forty-second meeting," 13/11/1956, MC/C/SR/42, Fifth Session of the ICEM Council, Geneva, October 1–5, 1956, NARA, Washington, D.C.

124 "Migration Services Program: Report of the Director," 20/09/1955, MC/154, Third Session of the ICEM Council, Geneva, October 17–22, 1955, NARA, Washington, D.C.

migration services was a way to reassure the ambivalent Latin American members that despite limited migrant input it was worthwhile to continue participating in the ICEM and contributing to its budget.[125]

4. ICEM Technical Assistance in Latin America

Organized assisted immigration programs covered a wide range of services: technical research, recruiting arrangements, selection, transfer, admission and settlement of the groups desirable in the immigration country. Research on the economic, demographic and social conditions in potential areas of recruitment and settlement, the assessment of job vacancies and skills required, and the exchange of information between the interested parties was a precondition for the design and implementation of adequate immigration programs. The recruitment of prospective migrants entailed the cooperation of the receiving states with an administrative structure in European countries which coordinated the selection of suitable migrants through ad hoc missions, as well as a legislative framework which determined the status and the social rights of the newcomers in the new labor market. The transfer of migrants at low-cost implied negotiations with carriers, efficient timing and organization. The reception of labor migrants, the establishment of land settlers or other categories of immigrants, the reunion of families, the supplementary training programs formed part of operations concluding the programs (ILO 1959, pp. 281–285).

To run its migration programs ICEM relied heavily on the receiving countries' administrative services. Even though the national machinery for carrying out assisted migration schemes was comparatively more elaborate in receiving than in sending countries, the range and efficiency of such services varied greatly from one receiving country to another, as well as between blocs of countries (ILO 1959, 269). United States, Australia and Canada were in a more

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[125] It was not a coincidence that before the submission of the first migration service program by the ICEM Director at the Third ICEM Council Session in 1955 the administration was informed on Brazil's plans to withdraw from ICEM. The Brazilian government considered its contributions disproportionate to the services received by the organization. "Continued Brazilian affiliation with ICEM," (submitted by the United States Embassy of Rio de Janeiro to the Department of State), Confidential, January 14, 1955, US Foreign Assistance Agencies ICEM, NARA, Washington D.C.

favorable economic and administrative position to promote desired movements. These states, either aware of the importance of immigration to their economic development, or driven by security considerations, had elaborated an imposing administrative machinery, both on their home ground and in Europe, and had dedicated significant resources to the transport and placement of migrants (Maselli, 1967, pp. 112–113).

In Latin America many states had created special autonomous agencies, with far-reaching powers, to supervise land settlement policies after the war; these agencies, which consisted of representatives of various ministerial departments, had responsibility for the admission and settlement of immigrants.[126] However, many states did not assign trained recruiting officials to emigration countries in Europe and they lacked both employment services to take care of the placement of workers in job vacancies as well as funds to support new settlers. In addition, authority in matters of immigration policy was often given to federal departments of Latin American countries—a fact that made the granting of visas to dependents a complex and time-consuming process.[127] Besides, the land settlement plans impinged on various difficulties, such as lack of capital for land distribution, provision of loans, agricultural machinery and stock installation. Undeveloped infrastructures in rural areas, in terms of roads, houses, markets and ancillary services, also discouraged potential migrants to be recruited in land schemes.[128] Thus, as both infrastructure and administrative

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[126] In Brazil the responsibility was entrusted since 1954 to a centralized agency, the *National Institute of Immigration and Settlement*. Venezuela had a more traditional system with the Ministry of Foreign Relations controlling immigration and the *National Agrarian Institute* (replacing since 1949 the Technical *Institute for Immigration and Settlement*) setting the selection criteria for the land settlement programs. In Argentina a centralized body, the *National Migration Directorate* dealt since 1949 with all problems of selection, transport, reception and final settlement in rural areas (ILO 1959, pp. 279-280). Apart from Chile where the *Standing Immigration Board* served the industrial needs of the country, all the other countries had created agencies serving mainly colonization projects, such as Colombia the *Directorate of Immigration and Colonization* and Uruguay the *National Institute of Colonization* (van Holleuffer, 2002, pp. 149, 151).

[127] Warren, George L., "The Development of United States Participation in Intergovernmental Efforts to Resolve Refugee Problems, 1933–1961," Report submitted to the Department of State, 1972, pp. 189–190, Papers of G. L. Warren, Box I, Harry S. Truman Library, Missouri.

[128] "White Paper on Migration," July 6, 1950, pp. 4–6, 8–9, ICEM Background (1946–1951), IOM-SW, Geneva.

problems played a role in discouraging desired immigrants from heading to Latin America, some countries of the continent requested ICEM to assist them in handling the migration process.

The reception, accommodation and subsistence of newcomers prior to their being forwarded to their final destinations in the receiving country, was usually the responsibility of government authorities. Immigrants were temporarily housed and fed free of charge or at a nominal cost (depending on the scheme) in Brazil, Argentina and Venezuela (ILO, 1959, p. 283). Governments also undertook the cost of inland transportation. ICEM often provided funds to meet newcomers' initial expenses, social welfare services and distributed under arrangements with the American *Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere* (CARE) tool kits to skilled industrial or agricultural workers, so that they would not incur a charge to governments.[129] Moreover, the Committee staff met the vessels on arrival and assisted migrants during the landing procedures: immigration and customs clearance, paying out of landing money to migrants, distribution of nominal rolls to government authorities and other agencies, notification of arrivals to sponsors etc.[130] To shorten the period of migrants' stay in reception centers and see to their immediate placement in jobs corresponding to their skills, ICEM was to be supported by experienced full-time personnel and competent governmental and voluntary agencies which helped with migrants' initial accommodation and social welfare assistance, as well as information regarding their rights and obligations, the various services available to them and the formal procedures for family reunification. ICEM also arranged for migrants' trade accreditation in an attempt to facilitate the selection and movement overseas of persons possessing some qualifications.[131]

In the 1950s ICEM employed three schemes in Latin America: *open placement*, *sponsorship* and *family reunion* (Maselli, 1967, p. 116; ICEM Handbook,

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[129] "Notes on the benefits to Brazil of Membership of ICEM," January 14, 1955, US Foreign Assistance Agencies ICEM, NARA, Washington D.C.

[130] Migration Services Program.Report of the Director," 20/09/1955, MC/154, Third Session of the ICEM Council, Geneva, October 17–22, 1955, NARA, Washington D.C.

[131] See such provision in the Agreement ICEM-Greece. "Ratification of the Agreement between the Greek Government and ICEM," Proceedings of the Greek Parliament, October 2, 1953, Agreements and Annexes, IOM-GR, Athens.

1960, p. 13). The *open placement scheme* was based on a list of professions in which the shortages and employment opportunities were known from surveys conducted by national authorities. Under this scheme, workers could be processed and transported without actual job contracts, but with the assurance that employment was available for their particular skills. This scheme required active placement efforts when the candidates arrived, as well as adequate lodging facilities and the availability of funds for initial expenses. On the contrary, the *sponsored* or *pre-placement* programs were based on requests made directly by employers for candidates with specific skills. This method guaranteed migrants' employment and stability since arrangements were already made before embarkation.

ICEM's initial placement work in Latin America was not considered successful. There was a lack of surveys on labor demands in receiving countries, selection methods had not been adequately designed, and social assistance to help the immigrant and his family settle down quickly and satisfactorily was insufficient. Therefore, even though employment opportunities existed, the placement of migrants proved to be difficult. Since ICEM policymakers acknowledged that the placement of workers formed the "seed migration," from which family reunion and sponsorship programs would subsequently grow, a reevaluation of the Committee's technical programs was undertaken along the following lines: pilot programs, expert missions and research surveys, field trips of ICEM senior officials, better networking of ICEM offices and closer supervision of the national services available, as well as multiagency cooperation.[132] The new technical program of ICEM required the enlargement of operations and the increase of placement offices in the industrial areas of receiving countries, the capital cities, as well as in the smaller towns of the interior. This decision was dictated by the fact that migrants going overseas were usually attracted by the major cities, where suitable jobs for them were not always available. By 1960 the organization had built a strong bureaucracy through its numerous field offices and sub-offices scattered in Argentina (Buenos Aires and Rosario), Brazil (Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, Porto Alegre), Chile (Santiago), Colombia (Bogotá), Costa Rica (San José), Panama (Panama),

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[132] See analytically: "Report of the director on migration services," 21/08/1956, MC/200, pp. 9–31, Fifth Session of the ICEM Council, Geneva, October 1–5, 1956, NARA, Washington D.C.

Paraguay (Asunción), Uruguay (Montevideo) and Venezuela (Caracas, Maracaibo) (ICEM Handbook, 1960, pp. 38–46).

In Brazil, ICEM participated in the Placement Board set up jointly with the competent Brazilian governmental agency.[133] ICEM placed subsidies, staff and a network of suboffices at the disposal of the Board and assisted Brazilian officials in setting up adequate placement facilities where no governmental structures existed. The Board carried out manpower surveys to determine the number and categories of foreign workers (agricultural and industrial) needed in Brazil and reported labor demands to selection missions in Europe. With the assistance of social workers, it placed newcomers in suitable jobs. The establishment of this placement service resulted in a decrease in the number of requests for repatriation stimulating plans for extending this modus operandi to Chile and Venezuela with the active participation of the state authorities.[134] ICEM also contributed financially to the operation of the Santa Catalina Farm School in Argentina. The school was established by the government for the training of land settlers, but it also functioned as a reception and placement center for about 700 trainees.[135]

The law in Latin American countries entitled the immigrant to come with his immediate family or to have them join him at any time, and accorded to dependents access to the national labor market. The ICEM *family reunion programs* assisted dependents to join "breadwinners" who had already been satisfactorily placed in Latin America. Since the phenomenon of families separated by migration was closely related to the premature return of the head of family and the failure of the ICEM schemes, the organization sought to facilitate family reunion and to assist persons who wished to sponsor new immigrants in Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela.[136]

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[133] The Placement Board was initially a section of the Immigration and Settlement Council and later of the National Institute of Immigration and Settlement.

[134] PICMME Immigration Program to Venezuela Report on ICEM activities, IOM-SW, Geneva; "Report on Progress since the Second Session of the Council," 9/09/1955, MC/152, pp. 19-20, Third Session of the ICEM Council, Geneva, October 17-22 1955, NARA, Washington D.C.;"Migration Services Program. Report of the Director," 20/09/1955, MC/154, p. 27, Third Session of the ICEM Council, Geneva, October 17–22, 1955, NARA, Washington D.C.

[135] "Migration Services Program. Report of the Director," 20/09/1955, MC/154, pp. 26, 28, Third Session of the ICEM Council, Geneva, October 17–22, 1955, NARA, Washington D.C.

[136] In the operation of this program, ICEM was supported by many voluntary agencies,

The ICEM *family reunion scheme* was organized more efficiently in 1954 producing satisfactory results. Nevertheless, the backlog of family reunion cases which needed clearance in Latin America constantly increased, pressing ICEM to intervene more actively in their processing. In 1956, for instance, there were between 50,000 to 70,000 Italian family cases still pending, the majority of which concerned Argentina.[137] The procedure had the following stages: The head of the family had to make an application to a consulate of his country of origin. The applications were referred to the ICEM Liaison Mission which obtained from the applicant all the necessary details regarding the family members involved, their number, address in the country of origin, etc. Subsequently, ICEM officials obtained visa clearance from the authorities of the receiving country and, upon receipt of the obligatory prepayment, they forwarded the application to the country of emigration for further processing. When dependents were of working age and required contracts before the issuance of a visa, ICEM officials helped the head of families to obtain them.[138] To ensure that immigrants dispersed throughout the receiving country could take advantage of the family reunion scheme, ICEM established suboffices in numerous cities, such as in Rosario, Mendoza and Tucumán in Argentina, Maracaibo in Venezuela, or São Paolo and Porto Alegre in Brazil. In addition, ICEM carried out information campaigns in emigration countries and surveys to determine the number of dependents remaining at home.[139]

ICEM's *family reunion scheme* was the most successful. ICEM played a substantial role in the reunification of families by persuading governments to broaden their admittance criteria for family dependents and assist in the processing and transport of nominated relatives (Ducasse-Rogier, 2001, p. 33).

such as the World Council of Churches, the Lutheran World Federation, the National Catholic Welfare Conference, the United HIAS Service, the Tolstoy Foundation, the International Rescue Committee and the International Social Service (Marks, 1957, p. 487).

[137] "Report of the Seventh Session of the Executive Committee," 19/04/1957, MC/232/Rev.1, p. 7, Sixth Session of the ICEM Council, Geneva, April 8–12, 1957, NARA, Washington D.C.

[138] "Report of the director on migration services," 21/08/1956, MC/200, p. 7, Fifth Session of the ICEM Council, Geneva, October 1–5, 1956, NARA, Washington D.C.

[139] "Report on Progress since the Second Session of the Council, covering the period May 1 – August 15, 1955 (Submitted by the Director)," 9/09/1955, MC/152, p. 17, Third Session of the ICEM Council, Geneva, October 17/22/1955, NARA, Washington D.C.

Venezuela and Argentina even helped to fund the passage of spouses and children under the family regrouping program carried out with ICEM assistance (ILO 1959, pp. 225, 284–285).

ICEM, following IRO practices, launched its own research projects seeking to design programs based on verified demographic and economic data (Ducasse-Rogier, 2001, p. 31). These researches concerned both labor market conditions overseas and the features of prospective European migrants. Specialized manpower surveys were promoted in cooperation with governments and the ILO, in order to ascertain the extent of manpower demand by trade and level of skill. Data started to be collected regarding earning power and living standards of workers at various skill levels in both receiving and sending countries. This was a necessary precondition for ensuring that migrants entering a Latin American country without a work contract would be placed quickly in jobs offering a living standard at least equal to that in sending countries for similar work. In 1955, ICEM initiated a system whereby its local Missions in Latin America had to submit updated information concerning wages and the cost of living to headquarters every two or three months.[140] This information was to be used to advise prospective migrants, as there was a strong belief that the latter would remain permanently in the receiving country only if they were well informed on the opportunities available there.

ICEM also collaborated with other international and voluntary organizations working in Latin America in the area of research. An initial joint ICEM/ILO mission of experts visited five Latin American countries in 1956 in order to assess the absorptive capacity of their labor markets.[141] Another two missions followed: an ICEM/Italian/Brazilian manpower mission investigating the possibility of specific openings for Italian immigrants, and an ICEM/Greek mission seeking sponsorships for Greek workers from the established Greek communities in Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Venezuela.[142] Research groups visited on-site industrial premises and institutes and made a broad range of

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[140] Ibid.

[141] For more, see the folder: IGO 022-7, ICEM. Joint Project Mission with ILO. Study on professional qualifications for migrants, AILO, Geneva.

[142] See analytically the folder: IGO 022-10, ICEM. Pilot Project No. 7. Experiments in Vocational Training Centers for Migrants in Latin America, AILO Geneva.

contacts including trade unionists, businessmen and managers, state officials and consular authorities. The information obtained by these missions was to be used to improve the methods of recruiting emigrants and to update the advice and guidance given to them. Knowledge about the manpower requirements of Latin America would also serve the development of new training programs and placement services.[143]

In order to increase the rates of immigration to Latin America, ICEM also worked closely with already established migrant ethnic communities and religious organizations seeking sponsorships and individual or group employment offers for newcomers. The practice had been launched by the IRO, but older networks had to be mobilized. Depending on the circumstances in each country, these networks were to be put in contact with the official national placement apparatus or operate independently and be responsible directly to the ICEM Field Mission.[144]

In the late 1950s ICEM engaged in a series of interrelated pilot projects from which the organization endeavored to learn new techniques or ascertain the validity of certain processes in order to conduct them on a larger scale.[145] All these experimental programs demonstrated ICEM's intentions of developing efficient migration services in order to increase the numbers of migrants it resettled. More precisely, the projects directly concerning Latin America included a thorough study of migration to the continent (Pilot Project No. 1); the establishment of a Farm Training and Placement Center in Argentina (Pilot Project No. 3); a six months training program for immigration and placement officials in Canada (Pilot Project No. 4); and a supplementary vocational training program for immigrants in Latin American countries (Pilot Project No. 7).[146]

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[143] "Report of the director on the work of the committee for the year 1956," 1/04/1957, MC/223/Rev.1, p. 25, Sixth Session of the ICEM Council, Geneva, April 8–12, 1957, NARA, Washington D.C.

[144] "General Report of the Director for the period May 1 – September 30, 1954," 20/09/1954, MC/91, p. 25, Eighth ICEM Session, Geneva, November 30, 1954, NARA, Washington D.C.

[145] See the discussions with regard to the meaning of "pilot projects" and the difference between them and the services already rendered by ICEM. "Report on the Eleventh Session of the Executive Committee," 21/11/1958, MC/316/Rev.1, pp. 12–13, Ninth Session of the ICEM Council, Geneva, November 13–19, 1958, NARA, Washington, D.C.

[146] "Pilot Projects to Increase the Absorptive Capacity of Immigration Countries,"

The first two projects never materialized for financial reasons. As regards the other projects, ICEM was to provide advisory technical assistance, while the receiving countries had to finance and manage them. Another activity that was piloted was the conduct of psychotechnical tests for judging whether a prospective migrant was of a stable character ie. presenting a high chance of staying overseas.[147]

In the late 1950s discussions concerning social security provisions in emigration and immigration countries were high in the ICEM agenda. Under the pressure of the more competitive intra-European migration movements, there were proposals, if cautiously formulated, for reciprocal arrangements regarding labor rights and social benefits which would provide greater security to migrants. The Italian government requested ICEM and the ILO to study the social security systems of Latin American countries and to prepare bilateral or multilateral conventions between European and overseas countries. The task was not easy since many member governments were reluctant to concede such competence to ICEM. Nevertheless, the debates during ICEM sessions highlighted migrants' social insurance as an integral part of immigration policies and as a precondition for their permanent settlement and smooth integration abroad.[148]

5. Training Policies

The initial training programs that had been organized by ICEM consisted mainly of short-term language instruction and the occasional basic vocational training courses.[149] In the late 1950s ICEM focused on the formulation of more

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10/11/1958, MC/317, Ninth Session of the ICEM Council, Geneva, November 13–19, 1958, NARA, Washington D.C.

[147] "Report on the Eleventh Session of the Executive Committee," 21/11/1958, MC/316/Rev.1, p. 4, Ninth Session of the ICEM Council, November 13–19, 1958, NARA, Washington D.C.

[148] "Social Security for Migrant Workers" (Working paper prepared by the delegation of Italy inaccordance with the request made by at the Tenth Session of the Council), Restricted, 14/09/1959, MC/W/43, ICEM-ILO Technic Collaboration. 1956–1968/IGO 022-2-1, AILO Geneva; "Summary Record of the One Hundred and Eight Meeting," 15/06/1960, MC/C/SR/108, 12th Session of the ICEM Council, Naples, May 5–13, 1960, NARA, Washington D.C.

[149] "Migration Services Program: Report of the Director," 20/09/1955, MC/154, pp. 17, 19–20, 23–24, 29–30, Third Session of the ICEM Council, Geneva, October 17–22, 1955, NARA, Washington D.C.

comprehensive training programs for Southern European migrants, closely related to their placement in Latin American countries. The Vocational Training Conference convened in Geneva in December 1957 under the auspices of ICEM, and attended by international stakeholders interested in migration and manpower questions, acknowledged the interdependence of manpower needs and promoted multilateral cooperation, exchange of know-how and the implementation of pilot projects.[150] By turning its attention to the "human quality" of migration and by intensifying its activities in this area, the ICEM confirmed its role as a development agency.

The new programs were more comprehensive, targeted and long-term. They were designed to match particular labor market demands and resettlement opportunities in Latin American countries and to foster migrants' quick integration. They were linked to orientation, practical information and language training and were supplemented with courses in receiving countries. The type and level of skills needed by Latin American countries and accessed by the ICEM programs, corresponded to the category of a semi-skilled industrial worker in the international classification system produced by ILO and were accredited through examination processes.[151] The Brazilian industrial program, which was carried out in Italy, Greece and later in Spain, contained all the above features.

The ICEM organized two different types of courses in Southern European countries. In Italy it provided preparatory courses for candidates who did not have the basic requisites for accelerated training, and qualification courses for those who had already completed a level of apprenticeship and needed additional training. It relied on infrastructures developed with the assistance of ILO, such as the residential vocational training centers in Genoa, Naples and Messina. In Greece, given that only a few trainees had some experience in

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[150] During the Conference the representatives of Argentina, Brazil, Greece, Italy and Spain, along with observers from the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), the ILO and the Council of Europe discussed the problems and the prospects of existing and future vocational training programs in the countries involved. For more see the folder: IGO 022-1004, IOs. ICEM. Meeting on Vocational Training for Migrants, Geneva December, 2–6, 1957, AILO, Geneva.

[151] "Report of the director on migration services," 21/08/1956, MC/200, p. 20, Fifth Session of the ICEM Council, Geneva, October 1–5, 1956, NARA, Washington D.C.

industrial trades, the organization focused on preparatory classes offered in technical schools in big cities (Handbook 1960, p. 30).

For the promotion of its new training program, ICEM worked with other organizations and receiving countries. In the mid-1950s a nexus of ILO officials and experts were running various projects in areas of ICEM's interest.[152] The organization was invited by ICEM to develop on a demonstrational basis a machinery for the vocational preparation of Southern European workers moving to Latin America. ILO's tasks included the design, building and equipping of vocational schools, the curricula preparation and the training of instructors and administration. Voluntary agencies, such as the American Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE), donated equipment to training schools, while Australian and Canadian experts, as well as the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) set patterns for the improvement of methods of language teaching (Portuguese and Spanish) and the writing of textbooks for migrants.[153] Moreover, countries which had immigration services that were considered efficient pooled their expertise to train officials from Latin America and Southern Europe through seminars and scholarships (Ducasse-Rogier, 2001, p. 30).

One of the most ambitious projects promoted in the late 1950s, was the establishment of the *International Training Center* for migrants in Salerno in Italy. The Center, jointly funded by ICEM and the Italian government and supervised by the ILO, provided shelter and training to carefully selected candidates from various localities and countries intending to immigrate to European or Latin American destinations. It aimed at training migrants by "giving the approved trainee the status of European worker or international worker" through the establishment of homogeneous quality training standards.[154]

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152 See analytically: "The ILO's Technical Assistance Activities in the Manpower Field (A Note Prepared by the ILO)," 30/08/1955, MC/INF/26, Third Session of the ICEM Council, Geneva, October 17–22, 1955, NARA, Washington D.C.

153 "Migration Services Program: Report of the Director," 20/09/1955, MC/154, pp. 30–31, Third Session of the ICEM Council, Geneva, October 17–22, 1955, NARA, Washington D.C.

154 "Pilot Projects to Increase the Absorptive Capacity of Immigration Countries" (Research Project No.2), 16/4/1958, MC/EX/66, pp. 11–20, Tenth Session of the ICEM Executive Committee, April 28 – May 13, 1958, NARA, Washington D.C.

Even though its international character was disputed by delegates who argued that language difficulties hindered non-Italian trainees to attend courses,[155] the Centre did disseminate training patterns internationally. Programs, methods, curricula and examination processes were adjusted to international benchmarks so that migrants could work in different labor markets.

6. Regulating the Migration Machinery of Latin American Countries

Latin America was a field of intense concern and increased multilateral intervention in the immediate postwar era, a period of United States expansionism and anticommunism. Labeled as an "underdeveloped area" and identified with a series of lacks and irrationalities, the whole continent became the ideal place for the diffusion of norms, values and practices dictated by the scientifically and economically advanced and politically liberal countries of the Western World. Committed to the development dogma, the newly formed international organizations undertook the mission of shaping Latin American's reality by implementing growth strategies. The obsession with economic growth and with quantitative indicators dominating development thought in the 1950s, often led international agencies to ignore Latin American social characteristics, issues and demands. Experts were entrusted to observe populations—predefined as poor, illiterate and backward—and design and implement measures promising the gradual achievement of industrial modernity, Western rationalism and liberal democracy. The training of populations, the pooling of expertise, the reorganization of state services, the creation of infrastructures, the provision of financial and material assistance, all aimed at assisting Latin America to achieve the level of progress attained by the developed world (Naz, 2006; Esteva, 2010).These organizations found receptive local elites, as many Latin American policymakers were already immersed in Western development and modernization discourses.[156]

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[155] "Report of the ninth session of the Council of the ICEM (adopted at the 84th meeting on April 7, 1959," 20/04/1959, MC/333/Rev.1, Ninth Session of the ICEM Council, November 13–19, 1958, NARA, Washington, D.C.

[156] The biography of two Brazilian high-ranked officials is indicative: Arthur Hehl Neiva, Counselor of the Council of Immigration and Colonization in the IRO era was the head of the Brazilian Selection Missions in Europe in 1947 (the first Latin American commissions to be

ICEM's activities in Latin America were indicative of the general stance of most international organizations working in the continent. ICEM constituted just one among the various specialized agencies operating in Latin America, focusing on specific interventions and promoting their own goals and strategies. Thus, the solution to every "problem" constructed as such by these agencies or attracting international attention, followed a different trajectory, since each organization was assigned distinct responsibilities and operated according to its own agenda and interests. Simultaneously, however, antagonism among these agencies was recurrent since many of them were involved in interlinked issues, such as training, labor, etc., while cooperation was driven mainly by financial considerations and less by concerns for a unified approach. Therefore, the fragmentation of the institutional apparatus operating in Latin America, (specialized agencies of the United Nations, intergovernmental organizations outside the orbit of United Nations and NGOs) hindered the elaboration of integrated programs encompassing the whole population and facilitating structural changes. (Esteva, 2010, pp. 10–11)

Even though there were voices pointing out that ICEM, like other international organizations, dealt with the "tip of the iceberg," as a high-ranking official put it (Maselli, 1967, p. 111), policies did not change in any significant manner. A representative of the *International Confederation of Free Trade Unions* participating in an ICEM Session in 1956 underlined that the implementation of the Committee's new technical program "would only be a drop in the ocean of technical and financial assistance which was needed by the under-developed countries of Latin America."[157] According to this view, interlinked long-term

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operational). He was then given very high positions next to the President to deal with migration problems while he was appointed as ICEM's counselor for Latin America from 1952 up to 1956. Similarly, Goncalves de Souza was in charge of various colonization programs jointly with ILO and later became President of the Institute of Immigration and Colonization."Francis Blanchard to C.W. Hepler," No.3, 31/08/1951, MIG 1009-2-1, Naples.Preliminary Mission to Latin America, ILO-A, Geneva.

[157] See the comments of the representative of the *International Confederation of Free Trade Unions* (ICFTU) on the Migration Program submitted by the Director in 1956: "Summary record of the forty-second meeting, held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Wednesday 3 October 1956, at 3 p.m.," 13/11/1956, MC/C/SR/42, pp. 7–10, Fifth Session of the ICEM Council, Geneva, October 1–5, 1956, NARA, Washington D.C.

technical activities for both indigenous and immigrants workers in Latin America was the only road to development; Latin American countries suffered from various structural problems and unless coordinated international assistance was provided on a long-term basis, these deficiencies would persist. These structural deficiencies, such as the high numbers of unemployed indigenous workers and the lack of housing and public services, affected migrants' integration. Migrants' living standards were not only determined by their wages, but also by working conditions, the provision of allowances and installation grants and the assignment of social security benefits. Thus, international interventions had to approach workers' issues in Latin America in a comprehensive manner and avoid discriminatory policies which could foster the negative stance of public opinion and of the press towards foreign workers.

But such comprehensive policies were extremely rare during the 1950s, when ICEM was taking shape, developing its structure, forming its policies and ensuring member governments' contributions. The new agency, with an uncertain future, had to proceed with considered and gradual steps, evaluate the outcomes of its operations and improvise in order to meet ever-changing needs. The majority of its technical programs had an experimental and limited character. Migration services, like almost all its activities, constituted therefore "an evolving process," with accomplishments and shortcomings under continuous review and modification.[158] Furthermore, ICEM's restricted mandate did not accord the organization with the authority to remedy what was seen as the structural deficiencies of "undeveloped" states. The development of technical assistance services in both sending and receiving countries was primarily the responsibility of the governments involved while ICEM lent this kind of services only upon request, against reimbursement and for a limited period. Even when it assisted states, the Committee's services were intended to be gradually provided entirely by the governments themselves.[159]

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[158] "Report of the Director on Migration Services," 21/08/1956, MC/200, p. 1, Fifth Session of the ICEM Council, Geneva, October 1–5, 1956, NARA, Washington D.C.; "Summary record of the forty-second meeting," 13/11/1956, MC/C/SR/42, p. 9, Fifth Session of the ICEM Council, Geneva, October 1–5, 1956, NARA, Washington D.C.

[159] "Report of the Director on Migration Services," 21/08/1956, MC/200, p. 9, Fifth Session of the ICEM Council, Geneva, October 15, 1956, NARA, Washington D.C.

Given that movements from Europe to Latin America were incurring a profit, the quantifiable increase in the volume of migration to Latin American countries, was essential for the organization's very existence and funding.[160] Driven by economic considerations and logistic priorities, the organization initially promoted less guaranteed massive *open placement schemes* to states which could not ensure the reception and placement of migrants, even though ICEM planners considered such services necessary for their successful integration into host societies. However, very soon this choice resulted in a decrease of movements to Latin America coupled with high rates of returnees. When, in the mid-1950s, the ICEM Director recommended the expansion of ICEM technical services for Latin America, the organization had an overcharged budget, the proposal faced strong reactions from Commonwealth countries and precedence was given to the handling of the Hungarian refugee crisis.

ICEM's officials and experts identified, constructed and tried to solve what they perceived as Latin America's "problems." Initially what was seen as the demographic deficiency of Latin America, correlated to European "surplus population," guided ICEM's operations. In the mid-1950s, ICEM started focusing on the lack of human resources: The continent was seen to need semi-skilled workers suitably prepared to fill the employment vacancies. During the 1960s, the Committee shifted its attention to selective and skilled migration schemes. These choices were largely influenced by the development discourse of the postwar era.

Indeed, training was promoted as a precondition for a person's right to migrate. To gain the right to migrate, workers had to acquire technical knowledge and, moreover, the certification that went with it; they had to prove that they would be productive. They were also obliged to acquiesce to their psychosocial preparation and cultural reformation. Through intensive programs they were forced to absorb an industrial work ethic and accept jobs without regard to motivation or meaning (Ullrich, 2010, p. 320; Alvares, 2010, pp. 249, 251). Vocational training activities became another way of categorizing and thus managing and controlling labor mobility in the postwar era (Barnett & Finnemore, 1999, pp. 710–711). Furthermore, in this attempt to manage

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[160] "Summary record of the thirty-ninth meeting," 8/11/1956, MC/C/SR/39, p. 14, Fifth Session of the ICEM Council, Geneva, October 1–5, 1956, NARA, Washington D.C.

international labor mobility, ICEM planners contributed to the construction and dissemination of Western classification and standardization systems. Trying to make Latin American societies internationally comparable and "legible," the ICEM-ILO implemented standardized measurement systems and techniques which influenced the kind of knowledge produced on the continent.

If, in practice, technical assistance was extremely restricted, since it absorbed a very small part of the total ICEM expenditure in the 1950s,[161] it nevertheless constituted an integral part of ICEM's development rhetoric. Since technical assistance mainly concerned migrants coming from or directed to "underdeveloped" areas, the vocational training, reception and placement activities contributed to the dissemination of development discourses, reinforced older hierarchies and legitimized Western institutional interventions. By acknowledging immigration as an important determinant of developmental activity, ICEM became one of the channels of transnational transmission of the development thinking and plans of the North for the global South during the Cold War era (Haveman, 1967, p. 82).

ICEM lacked the financial means and the human resources to survey Latin American particularities by country, geographical region, economic and social sector and offer a different type of assistance in each case. Small local missions were obliged to cover many countries in constricting timeframes,[162] while immigration infrastructures were created to serve the needs of extended geographical areas presenting different economic characteristics. But ICEM's operations in Latin America were equally influenced by the way it "saw" the societies in which it sought to intervene. By approaching Latin America as a homogeneous area, ICEM policymakers insisted on generalized analyses and generic solutions for the continent's development (Maselli, 1967, p. 109).[163] Furthermore, they

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[161] See in this volume: Al. Franghiadis, "Who Pays: Financing and Budget of the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (1952–1960)," pp. 97–126.

[162] See for instance the joint ICEM/ILO technical mission in Latin America in 1956. It was headed by two experts who had to survey on the spot five countries and made contact with an expanded network of state authorities and industrial agents during a six-month period. See analytically: "Description des tâches. Mission conjointe en Amérique. BIT-CIME," 1956, IGO 022-7, ICEM-ILO/Joint Project Mission with ILO. Study of professional qualifications for migrants, 1955–1963, AILO, Geneva.

[163] The Pilot Projects of 1958-1959 reflect the ICEM's holistic approach of Latin American

approached countries as "economic entities" which, with the suitable corrective measures, could attract European migrants, ignoring many of the political, social and cultural issues that influenced inflows (Broome & Seabrooke, 2012, p. 7).

Many of ICEM's ambitious projects in Latin America turned out with modest results, where they did not just fail outright. The land settlement schemes did not lead to any tangible results, while the total number of European workers attracted by the continent's labor markets in the 1950s was modest. Despite intentions, the technical assistance program launched in the second half of 1950s did not manage to reverse the decreasing number of European movements to Latin America. In fact, by the late 1950s, the number of European immigrants was drastically reduced, while the few entering Latin American countries consisted less of workers and mainly of dependents moving through family reunion schemes. In an appraisal of activities, ICEM officials acknowledged that the organization had not even succeeded in reuniting immigrant families in Latin America; the program was undervalued because of being approached from a humanitarian angle rather than in developmental terms (Maselli, 1967, p. 116). Moreover, the return phenomenon remained acute. Statistics for the last two years of the 1950s showed that the number of returnees amounted to one half of the yearly intake of immigrants.[164] The number of highly skilled immigrants who were moved under the ICEM selective schemes during the next two decades was equally insignificant. Nevertheless, Latin America constantly occupied a high priority in ICEM operational agenda. By contrast, efficiency, although explicitly mentioned in the ICEM Constitution, was implicitly not a high priority for the Committee, an organization that relied heavily on the United States for its financing and leadership[165] and could therefore but serve American Cold War politics and economic aims in the continent to its south.

See the comments of many Latin American delegates, such as Costa Rica, Chile and their suggestions for separate solutions to the specific requests of each country. "Pilot Projects to increase the absorptive capacity of immigration countries," 10/11/1958, MC/317, Ninth Session of the ICEM Council, Geneva, November 13–19, 1958, NARA, Washington D.C.

[164] Memorandum from T.H.E. Hayes to Marcus Daly, August 22, 1960, A446, 1962/65076, ICEM General Part 1, NAA, Canberra.

[165] It is not a coincidence that the first two ICEM Directors Hugh Gibson and Harold H. Tittmann had served as American ambassadors both in Latin American and European posts. Their deep knowledge on Latin American countries and the understanding of the political and

The ICEM and the Migration Apparatus
in Peripheral States of the "Free World"

During the early Cold War, the United States, the organization's biggest financial and political supporter, created the ICEM, amongst other institutions, with a view to impeding the advance of communism mainly in Western Europe, but also in Latin America, and to fortifying their Western allies in geostrategic regions bordering communist states. The United States supported increased European emigration overseas financially, legislatively and diplomatically; these moves were facilitated by the implementation of emergency laws voted by Congress, such as the USEP and the RRA, permitting the settlement of a limited number of Europeans in the United States; but they were mainly encouraged by the pressure Washington exerted on other traditional receiving countries in the West to increase their migrant intake.

ICEM was requested to direct European refugees and unemployed workers overseas and distribute them according to the population needs and labor demands of two basic groups of receiving countries: the Commonwealth and the Latin American countries. These two groups of receiving states had uneven bargaining power in the Committee's decision-making mechanisms, depending on their political and economic strength and their financial contribution to ICEM's budget; the Committee's involvement in spheres considered to belong to the states' domestic affairs, also differed. Even though all ICEM member states belonged to the "free world," it proved extremely difficult to form a cohesive organization and ensure high emigration levels of unequally desired European ethnicities, while coordinating movements to destinations with highly divergent economic performances and labor needs. ICEM, as a multilateral body, had to serve the particular migration needs of all its member states, accommodating the conflicting interests, goals and policies of both sending and receiving states. Most sending countries pressed for an increase of emigrant rates, while all receiving countries defended their sovereign right to determine the number of

economic problems of these two areas were considered valuable to the organization's interests and thus an advantage for the promotion of their candidature. "US Government's Press Release of March 18, 1955," Lyford' s General Correspondence. ICEM. 1955–1957, NARA, Washington D.C.

inflows and control the "standards of admission;"[166] they set their own rules not only with regard to the quantity of immigrants, but also ethnicity and eligible categories according to their legislation, their labor market demands and the reactions of domestic public opinion. Thus, "the politics of who gets what" created tensions amongst ICEM member states (Murdock, 1983, p. 68). In this context, sending countries—most of which were in a rather disadvantaged position to form a migration policy on their own terms—did, at times, profit to some degree from the competition between receiving countries and they surely took advantage of the United States financing of labor movements.

As ideological and political consensus with the principles of the "free world" was a precondition for participation in the ICEM, and as the cultural radiance of the United States in the Western world grew rapidly, the Committee's poorer and weaker member states' governments, both sending and receiving, willingly copied many of its institutions, adopted many of its organizational methods and incorporated many of its values and elements of its dominant ethos, bowing before the power, influence and opulence of America. On the other hand, during the 1950s the United States elaborated plans and expanded the necessary mechanisms and ways of further infiltrating and influencing its allies' institutions, administration, policies and public opinion. One of the ways the United States chose to strengthen and expand its hegemony in the early Cold War years was to play a leading role in international organizations. Other international organizations were far more significant and therefore had a greater impact, but ICEM also contributed to the diffusion of American models and norms abroad. The ICEM undertook the task of organizing state migration and employment administrations, teaching efficient management practices, expanding the culture and the know-how of bilateral and multilateral negotiations, helping to set up vocational training courses, establishing receiving centers and many other operations. Thus, its liberal open-economy managerial worldview was diffused to the peripheral countries of the West, which were largely dependent on the United States and, to a lesser degree, on ICEM.

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[166] "Draft Resolution to establish a Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe," December 5, 1951, MCB/2/Rev.5, p. 4, Migration Conference, Brussels, November, December 1951, IOM-SW, Geneva.

Discourses on Latin America:
The Migration–Development Nexus

Maria Damilakou and Lina Venturas

The view that Latin America, which occupied 16 percent of the planet's inhabitable land, but was inhabited by only six percent of the world's population, had a potential to receive masses of European immigrants and thus contribute to a more equilibrated distribution of manpower worldwide, continued to prevail after the Second World War (Bouscaren, 1963, p. 145). According to this view, Latin America could absorb part of the Old World's "surplus population," thus contributing to the solution of the unemployment and poverty problem of Western European countries; at the same time, the selective transfer of immigrants from Europe to Latin America could meet part of the manpower needs of the latter, create new economic opportunities in these countries and become an important developmental factor. Thus, during the 1950s and the 1960s, Latin American countries served, in many ways, as laboratories for the process of establishing international migration management mechanisms, true case studies in the migration-development debate. Various pilot projects concerning the reception, placement and training of migrants were implemented on an experimental basis in Latin America, in order not only to test their effectiveness, but also to study the nature of migration–development interactions. The *Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration* (ICEM), which adopted and further expanded the idea linking migration to development since its creation in 1951, promoted and implemented some of them.

All these projects were based on assumptions about Latin America's "underdevelopment," "backwardness" and "urgent" need for structural changes that became part of broader discourses on the region. This chapter focuses on ICEM discourses of Latin American developmental and manpower needs and seeks

to contribute to the study of the role of international organizations in the processes of production of knowledge, imaginaries and narratives about this continent in the context of the Cold War. These narratives, largely defined by the United States, became part of the hegemonic postwar development discourse that perpetuated the idea of the West's superiority and reshaped the social, economic and cultural characteristics of areas such as Latin America, which were seen as "underdeveloped."

The Postwar Inter-American System and the Development of Latin America

In the aftermath of the Second World War, the United States attained economic and military preeminence in the Western world. Its hegemony was only challenged by the Soviet Union and—to a smaller degree—by the rise of nationalism in Latin America and claims for independence in Asia and Africa. The United States further expanded its power by playing a leading role in the establishment of a whole set of new international institutions which were soon largely transformed into vehicles of the international policy agenda its governments set. These institutions employed an expanding number of experts, constantly producing and diffusing a seemingly technocratic knowledge, which contributed to the revision of representations about Latin America and other parts of the world, as well as to their institutionalization, diffusion and internalization.

Combining its international priorities with its hemispheric and regional concerns, the United States in the early postwar era sought to redefine Pan-Americanism and to reorganize Inter-American relations with two basic goals: the creation of a new hemispheric alliance against Communism and the protection of United States economic interests by liberalizing trade policies and removing barriers impeding access to Latin America's natural resources. The economic and developmental needs of Latin American countries, as a "hemispheric issue," were increasingly important to the postwar Inter-American system for security reasons. However, as became evident in the First Conference of Commissions of Inter-American Development that took place in May 1944, the United States was not yet ready to establish an economic program for Latin America based mainly on the injection of United States

public capitals; instead, the emphasis was put on "private business" and on a long-term economic collaboration between the two Americas ruled by liberal principles.[1]

The same ideas were expressed in the Inter-American Conference of Rio, in August 1947, which gave priority to the security and collective defense of the Americas (Trask, 1977, p. 278). However, the "communist threat" soon convinced the United States that the Pan-American movement needed a long-term program to improve the economy and quality of life of its southern neighbors. In this context, the Pan-American Union, an organization formed in 1890 to promote cooperation between the United States and Latin America, was reconstituted in 1948 as the *Organization of American States* (OAS) (Cook-Miller, 2009, p. 7).

Soon after the founding of OAS, the notion of "development" emerged as a domain of officially sanctioned knowledge and intervention with President Truman's inaugural address in January 1949. Although the concept of development had a long history in the Western world, having been linked to notions of progress and evolution, the era of the globalization and the institutionalization of development discourses and of a worldwide implementation of development plans only began after the formulation of the famous "Point Four" of Truman's speech (Naz, 2006, p. 72). The Cold War and the fear of Communism it incited in the West played an important role in forging this strategy of development. In "Point Four" of this speech, when Truman announced a technical assistance program for "underdeveloped" areas, he presented the augmentation of production as the "key to prosperity and peace" and emphasized the role of "inexhaustible" modern scientific and technical knowledge for economic growth. This speech introduced the term "underdeveloped areas," described their "primitive and stagnant" economic life and defined their poverty as "a threat both to them [poor countries] and to more prosperous areas"; this marked the launch of a project to eradicate poverty and aid various regions of the world to develop (Truman, 1949; Naz, 2006, p. 72).

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[1] Letter of Nelson Rockefeller, Coordinator of Inter-American affairs, to President Roosevelt, May 3, 1944: First Conference of Commissions of Inter-American Development, FDR–OF 5521–OF 5548, Inter-American Development Commission, NARA, Washington D.C.

This "development doctrine" led to the establishment of a huge institutional apparatus—a complex map of international, governmental and private development organizations—seeking to implement its axioms in other continents. United States officials and experts working for the newly created international organizations came to believe that if poor countries were not rescued from poverty, they would succumb to Moscow. They saw "overpopulation" as one of the main causes of unemployment and poverty and they associated poverty with political instability. Poverty was thus perceived as a threat to the liberal world that needed to be confronted and managed through development; development became a means of containing the spread of Communism by freeing the world from the material deprivation which would drive people and countries into the hands of Moscow. This revised concept of "development," therefore, became one of the central organizing concepts of the postwar world system (Naz, 2006, pp. 64, 77).

In this context, the funding for the promotion of Latin American development totaling less than 200 million in 1950, exceeded 600 million in 1957; however, at least until the mid-1950s, the size of these disbursements paled in comparison to the funds poured into the reconstruction of Western Europe. Working primarily through international agencies, the United States also loaned the region one and a half billion dollars between 1948 and 1955 (Baily, 1976, pp. 54–79). The Eisenhower administration initiated the *Social Progress Trust Fund*, in response to the 1958 appeal by the Brazilian President Juscelino Kubitschek for some kind of "Economic Pan America" (Ataka & Caballero, 2006, p. 9). The culmination of these development strategies was the launching of the *Alliance for Progress*, a program of economic aid to relieve poverty, foster economic growth and strengthen representative democracy in Latin America. This program, based on the idea of the community of interests of countries in various stages of development, was inaugurated by President Kennedy in 1961, in the aftermath of the Cuban Revolution which had shown that America's worst fears had good chances of being realized.

In August 1961, at Punta del Este, the United States offered to provide the major part of the 20 billion dollars Latin America required from external sources in order to meet its development needs over the next ten years. The goal of the United States was to be the largest, though not the exclusive source of

external funds for Latin America (Herrera, 1963, p. 103). Europe was expected to financially participate in this effort, but also had to continue contributing to Latin America's development by furnishing it with efficient labor. As the shortage of "modern" farmers and skilled manpower in Latin America—what was described as the continent's "deficiency" in human capital—was considered to be an important factor of "underdevelopment," the other vital contribution of European countries, as part of Western world's duty to develop the infrastructure of this region and rescue it from Communism (once again, just as in the past) was the elaboration of policies promoting the migration of farmers and skilled manpower to Latin America (Maselli, 1967, p. 113). This very idea derived from the "core" of the migration–development debate that dominated international politics since the beginning of the 1950s.

While Latin America was supposed to deal with "urgent" developmental needs, older Malthusian fears of Europe's "overpopulation" revived on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean, immediately after the Second World War; a pessimistic forecast heralding threats to efforts of reconstruction was presented. The United States State Department, United Nations agencies and other international forums presented emigration as one of the main solutions to this "problem." The narrative of "overpopulation" and its possible reduction through organized emigration fused with the dominant discourse about the political situation in Europe and the major danger of Communism posed. It was argued that migration would diminish unemployment in Europe; hence the hotbeds of Communism that unemployment gave rise to would be dismantled. Thus, in addition to being an economic concern, Europe's "overpopulation" and international migration became a major political and international relations issue (Maccari-Clayton, 2004, p. 587).

Europe's "overpopulation" and Latin America's shortages in human capital were therefore perceived as two complementary social realities, as two facets of the same problem that could partly be dealt with through the selective transfer of Europe's "surplus population" to Latin America (Robbins, 1958, p. 107; Bastos de Ávila, 1964, p. 131). In these narratives, migration formed part of a general process of social and economic progress and was seen as a factor contributing to development. Migration would contribute to a optimal allocation of human resources, freeing Europe of its unemployed "surplus

population," while at the same time providing overseas developing areas with the manpower and the highly-skilled workers their economies lacked in order to take off.

ICEM, an organization that formed part of the international institutional machinery set up after the Second World War, was endowed with the mission of proving the ability of the "free world" to resolve not only the refugee problem, but also unemployment and underdevelopment issues. These notions of "overpopulation" and "development"—ICEM's *raison d'être*—were elaborated within discourses on progress at a time when "scientific laws" were thought to govern not only the natural, but also the social world to an equal degree. Planning of social change was confided to a complex institutional apparatus staffed by a new multi-professional group of experts; this apparatus formulated policies aimed at turning the "poor" into objects of knowledge and management (Esteva, 2010, p. 5; Naz, 2006, p. 68; Bilgin & Morton, 2002, p. 59; Duden, 2010, p. 162).

This new organization functioned independently from the United Nations, under the control of the United States, its main architect and sponsor. As the United States largely dictated the debates and policies in the Western world, assisted by international agencies, discourses on migration and development largely depended on American perceptions and strategies. While different factions in the United States competed in imposing their diverging positions on various issues, a widespread consensus emerged amongst them concerning international relations and development, the problems of Europe and Latin America, as well as the threat the Soviet Union and Communism presented to their worldview and power. As both Western Europe and Latin America were largely economically, politically, ideologically and militarily dependent on the United States during the early Cold War era, this allowed for a large transnational convergence of agendas on various matters, including migration issues.

ICEM and European Migration to Latin America

Given the high and increasing importance of Latin America to United States concerns, this continent had a central place in the strategies of the ICEM since its creation. The first director of the Committee, Hugh Gibson, who was

a former United States diplomat and a collaborator of President Hoover, was partly selected because of his good knowledge of Latin America and was assigned, among other things, the promotion of the cooperation of Latin American countries with the ICEM (Marks, 1957, p. 483). At that time, both foreign and Latin American experts and policymakers, "updating" long-established ideas, perceived European immigration as the best solution, at least, to the economic problems of the continent, if not to its demographic ones.

Fomenting European immigration to Latin America became part of ICEM's "crusade": Since ICEM pictured itself as an organization that "embodied the living ties between Europe and the overseas nations which adhered to Western culture and its concepts of life," its migration programs were supposed to "bridge the gap in prosperity between the Americas and between Latin America and Europe" (Wouter-Haveman, 1967, p. 85). The transfer of human capital from Europe was conceived as a "permanent movement for development" and as "the last great chance" for the West to help in ameliorating Latin America's living standards, while simultaneously achieving a better distribution of demographic potential (Bastos de Ávila, 1964, p. 131).

In all these views European migrants were seen as important agents of change and innovation. They were expected to bring knowledge and entrepreneurial attitudes and to contribute to the spatial diffusion of modernization in Latin American countries. Several analyses stressed the valuable contribution of the different migrant communities in the progress of Latin American societies since the last decades of the nineteenth century: Migrant communities, such as those of the Germans, were considered pioneers in the establishment of small and medium industrial units; among other things, they had helped to increase productivity, diversify economic activity and arouse a demand for higher standards of living (Zañartu, 1963). These representations only partially revised older essentialist approaches that, since the mid-nineteenth century considered the European immigrant as an "agent of civilization."

Despite Latin America's given "inferiority" in comparison to Europe, when compared to Africa or Asia, that continent was contrastingly favorably depicted. Latin American countries were classified within the category of "intermediate" or "developing" countries, above the emerging African and Asian nations. Such assessments made Latin America a possible destination

for the reserves of European population that were searching for solutions to their unemployment and poverty problems. These discourses evidently reproduced older global classifications and hierarchies and were infused with identity matters: Latin American countries had opened their doors to massive European immigration in the past and were thus considered to be part of European culture and civilization, an extension of Europe, a much more "familiar" region than African and Asian countries (Herrera, 1963, p. 104; Bastos de Ávila, 1964, pp. 82, 171).

Although ICEM considered industrialization as the cornerstone of Latin America's economic modernization, it saw the development of rural zones as a prerequisite of growth. Because of the rural character of almost all Latin American societies, ICEM's officials believed that industrialization without the modernization of agricultural production was unsustainable, and that the stability of political regimes could not be attained without the formation of a rural middle class (Diegues, 1963, pp. 107–113; Bastos de Ávila, 1964, pp. 27–29, 96–115). Obviously, the gravity of the "overpopulation problem" in Europe and the "urgency" to channel the "surplus" of European agricultural families to overseas destinations was equally reflected in this prioritization of needs in ICEM strategies.

The Committee adopted the idea of agricultural colonization and called on Latin American countries to present specific land settlement projects since its very first steps. A mixture of old myths about Latin American "open spaces" and more recent realistic calculations formed the basis of ICEM argumentation. Several Latin American countries responded to ICEM's call and agreed to supply their quota for the financing of colonization plans. At the end of the Fifth Session of ICEM in April 1953, Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela and Chile announced that they were ready to work on land settlement projects in order to resettle European farmer migrants.[2] The role of ICEM in these colonization projects was limited to that of a mediator: The Committee would not assume direct financial responsibility, but could rather act as a "catalytic agent" offering assistance at the request of governments in the preparation of plans and their

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[2] ICEM Press Release No. 27 and No. 28, April 24, 1953, Fifth Session of the ICEM, Geneva, April 16–24, 1953, ICEM, Movements of Migrants to Australia, NAA, Canberra.

presentation to international banking institutions.[3] In 1955, when ICEM intensified its assistance services to Latin America, further land settlement projects were presented by Costa Rica, Bolivia and Colombia.[4] In the next years, the decision of the United States to participate in the financing of colonization plans in Latin America gave new force to these projects: During the period 1957–1960 ICEM submitted several of them to the *International Cooperation Administration* (ICA) of the United States Department of State.[5] The basic argument of these proposals was that as agricultural settlement could no longer occur spontaneously, the United States should also assume "leadership" in this field by provoking the action of the governments concerned.[6]

In all related texts, beyond their technical vocabulary, ICEM officials focused on the rural structures of the continent, which were perceived as totally archaic, marked by the absence of a rural middle class and the division of its extended land between unproductive latifundia and non-viable small properties; these were managed by "primitive" farmers who were against any innovation. According to these views, a small minority of absentee landlords controlled a great part of the arable land and made use of large numbers of cheap farm laborers (Robbins, 1958, p. 105). This duality—idle latifundia and holdings that were too small—could be corrected by the "injection" of European immigrants assisted by ICEM into the prevailing rural structures of the Latin American countries. These immigrants would transplant the valuable European rural traditions among the "semi-nomadic" native peasants, especially in relation to their strong bonds with their land. But the most important contribution of the European rural immigrant would be the diffusion of the "family farm concept" (Tuinman, 1967, p. 19): This idea, which certainly ignored the communitarian structures of the indigenous peoples who composed an important

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[3] Report on Land Settlement (presented by the Director), October 12, 1953, p. 1, ICEM, Sixth Session of the ICEM, Venice, October 12–21, 1953, NARA, Washington D.C.

[4] Note on Land Settlement, October 14, 1955, pp. 4–8: ICEM, Third Session of the Council, Geneva, October 17–22, 1955, NARA, Washington D.C.

[5] Land Resettlement Projects in Latin America, Memoranda and Internal Correspondence of US Department of State, October 2 to December 30, 1957: ICEM, Land Settlement Costs, NARA, Washington D.C.

[6] Letter of Harold Tittmann to John Foster Dulles, US Secretary of State, 20 September 1957, p. 2: ICEM, Land Settlement Costs, NARA, Washington D.C.

percentage of the population of some Latin American countries, perceived the familial land property as a preponderant value. It created a feeling of security, order and prosperity, and it was a "factor of patriotism" and a "protector" against all forms of "extremism" (Diegues, 1963, p. 109).

European rural immigrants were generally regarded as agents of dynamic change in Latin American societies (Torrado, 1979, p. 428). Several studies published by the ICEM and other international organizations considered European rural settlers—especially German and Dutch—as pioneers in this modernizing project (Diegues, 1963; Tuinman, 1967). By creating "model" farms, the dynamic European farmer could, by his very example, become the main vehicle for Latin America's agrarian modernization. Along with the modernization of the methods of agricultural production, these immigrant agrarian settlements would contribute to the diffusion of new values and "better" ways of living and working: cleanliness and order, more advanced sanitary habits, new consumption standards, better food, the creation of schools, medical services, bus lines, recreational centers and churches, the gradual disappearance of illegal unions in favor of legal marriages, the diffusion of a dynamic conception of life, all these were considered to be part of the beneficial influence of the agrarian immigrants from Europe on the native populations of Latin America (Bastos de Ávila, 1964, pp. 27–29).

These long-established ideas alternated with other more 'updated' ones, true to the ideological context of the 1950s and 1960s. ICEM officials underlined the need of Latin American countries to diversify their agricultural production, cultivate suitable "new lands" and increase their food production by putting emphasis on horticulture. The semi-desert areas should be transformed into "gardens" and the coffee or sugar plantations should leave space for the production of fruits and vegetables. These recipes echoed the consensus on the urgent need for the reduction of Latin America's dependence on exports of a limited number of primary products, something that made them extremely vulnerable. They also reflected the "population bomb" debate, which occupied an important place in international politics during the 1960s, in the context of which the "explosive growth" of the world's population and food shortage were associated with political instability (Robertson, 2012, pp. 126–151). In this context, European agricultural colonies were expected to function as

"development poles," correcting both the disproportion between industrial and agricultural production, as well as high urbanization rates (large cities of Latin America were seen as potential centers of social disturbance).[7]

These new priorities were reflected in the land settlement projects that the Latin American countries elaborated, with the assistance of ICEM, during the late 1950s. The Brazilian project for the expansion of Dutch families' settlement in the state of Parana was supposed to demonstrate modern production techniques on "ideal type" commercial family farms to the rural population of a relatively poor area; moreover, the settlement would increase the supply of various foods, notably milk and dairy products, rice, potatoes, as well as pork, in which Brazil was deficient.[8] The Argentine colonization project "Estancia Chica" envisaged the planning of small holdings and the creation of green belts around urban agglomerations and in semi-desert areas, which could be easily irrigated and become main centers for fruit, vegetable and other diversified agricultural production both for home consumption and export.[9]

These later plans were based on a more cohesive approach that tried to link agricultural production to local markets and the industrial needs of Latin American countries. For example, the Argentine pilot program for the establishment of a farm training and placement center in the southern province of Rio Negro, presented in 1959 and elaborated with the assistance of ICEM, was based on the idea of the integration of agriculture and industrial development. This center would take into account the alimentary needs and the rational provisioning of the new working communities that were being formed by the new industrialization plans—in the oil, mining and metallurgical sectors, among others. Similar plans had been promoted by the Argentine government of that period in remote, but promising areas, such as Patagonia.[10]

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[7] Idem, p. 4.

[8] Memorandum on Carambei/Castrolanda Settlement Project, United States Department of State, International Cooperation Administration, June 9, 1958, p. 4, ICEM, Land Settlement Costs, NARA, Washington D.C.

[9] Melchor Romero, Colonization Plan "Estancia Chica," Province of Buenos Aires, January 1957, p. 4, ARG/III80, NARA, Washington D.C.

[10] Addendum to Pilot Projects: Further Proposals of the Director, 10 March 1959, Appendix I, p. 4: ICEM, MC/EX/83, 12th Session of the ICEM Executive Committee, April 2–10, 1959, NARA, Washington D.C.

Despite the optimism for land settlement projects that could be an effective tool of migration management, their results were rather limited. Even in the case of Brazil, the country that developed the largest land settlement projects, only 13.9 percent of the immigrants that were transported to the country through the ICEM during the years 1952–1957, had actually migrated through agricultural schemes (Parsanoglou 2014).

Apart from land settlement schemes and in accordance with the ideas for development of the 1950s and 1960s, emphasis was placed on the immigration of technicians from countries with a long industrial tradition; they would be able to teach "industrial techniques to the local workers" while "showing them the value of this work" (Bastos de Ávila, 1964, p. 90). However, channeling skilled manpower to Latin America was not easy, as the majority of prospective emigrants from Europe preferred to settle in the United States,, Canada or Australia. In the years between 1952 and 1959, ICEM transferred some 245,000 immigrants to Latin America, of whom only 80,000 were workmen, while the remaining 165,000 were dependents (Bastos de Ávila, 1964, p. 238). The main receiving countries were Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela, though Brazil and Argentina absorbed a much smaller number of migrants than what the ICEM had initially estimated. The majority of immigrants transferred to Latin America by ICEM came from Italy and Spain, countries in which most of the prospective migrants were unskilled (Bouscaren, 1963, p. 149). The ethnic composition of the migrant groups transferred to Latin America was mainly the result of older migrant networks and traditional cultural bonds that existed between Latin America and certain Mediterranean countries, but was also due to the Committee's family reunification programs. At the same time, the informal division of the international "migrant labor market" along ethnic criteria was also reflected: Commonwealth countries preferred immigrants from Britain and Northern Europe, considered to be racially superior and more easily assimilated, whereas the "lower-ranked" immigrants from Southern Europe were encouraged by the ICEM and other international organizations to settle in Latin America.

Furthermore, ICEM's estimates about the relatively low migrant-attraction-capacity of Latin America depicted the continent as a second-class destination, characterized by high inflation, political instability, low salaries and bad working

conditions and living standards. ICEM officials often referred to the mal-administration and the general incapability of Latin American governments. A letter from an Australian high official regarding ICEM land settlement schemes in Latin America, sent after American financing had been secured, is quite eloquent: "Now that the money is there, it is not very likely that any of them will be able to produce an acceptable and effective scheme […] [T]hey are not terribly good at government anyway." George L. Warren, sharing these ideas on the 'backwardness' of Latin American countries, stated that their governments "had so far proved incapable of establishing the administrations required for the reception and absorption of migrants."[11] Several reports stressed the high percentages of return migration from Latin America, in some cases reaching 50 percent of those who had arrived.[12] The potential migrants were warned of the smaller saving capacity that Latin American countries would offer them, in comparison to other overseas immigration countries. It was recognized that, unless the immigrants had a certain degree of skills, they were unlikely to achieve a higher standard of living than the one attainable at home.[13] All this information served as proof of Latin America's structural weaknesses, placing its countries in a clearly inferior position in comparison to Anglo-Saxon overseas destinations; and, although this was not the intention, it did not contribute to the encouragement of European migrant flows to this continent.

From the late 1950s onwards, as ICEM put more emphasis on the industrialization of Latin America, it concentrated its efforts on migration programs for skilled workers. This shift took place in a different conjuncture: At the end of this decade, the spectacular economic development in Western Europe

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[11] Greenhalgh (CMO Rome) to Heyes, GVG/MM, Personal, Confidential, October 11, 1956, Letter, A446, 1966/46164, ICEM, Fifth Session of Executive Committee and Council, Geneva 1956, NAA, Canberra; Patrick Shaw, "Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration, Fifth Session Executive Committee and Council, Report of Australian Delegation," Confidential, [1956], A446, 1966/46164, ICEM, Fifth Session of Executive Committee and Council, Geneva 1956, NAA, Canberra.

[12] ICEM General part 1, Memorandum from T.H.E. Hayes to Marcus Daly, August 22, 1960, NAA, Canberra.

[13] Migration Services Program: Report of the Director, September 20, 1955, p. 12, ICEM 1955, Third Session of the Council, Geneva, October 17–22, NARA, Washington D.C.

reduced unemployment and even created employment possibilities for immigrants from Southern Europe. As a result, the old continent's "overpopulation problem" lost its importance. At the same time, the governments of the largest Latin American countries, having already embraced developmental models inaugurating an industrialization fever, increased their demands for skilled immigrants who could further contribute to their development. In this new context, the Committee focused on vocational training programs that could provide larger numbers of skilled migrants. The vocational training meeting held in Geneva in December 1957 recognized the "essential" need of Latin American countries for qualified workers, essential for their economic and demographic development.[14] In 1958, it was decided to send a joint ILO–ICEM mission to Argentina and Brazil to study the possibilities of organizing vocational training for European immigrants in these two countries.[15] In 1964, the organization introduced a *Selective Migration Program* targeting the immigration of qualified Europeans towards Latin America (J. F. Thomas, 1971, p. 24). From 1960 onwards, the ICEM resolved to systematize its technical assistance to Latin American member governments and to intensify its efforts for the economic development of Latin American countries.[16] These new directions in ICEM's strategies were based on the conviction that, as a reciprocal relationship existed between migration and development, the programs promoting immigration should be integrated in a general development plan, and that the amelioration of the economic and social conditions in Latin America was a prerequisite for the achievement of a competitive position on the international labor market for skilled manpower (Maccotta, 1962, p. 19).

From 1964 to 1975, 16,681 Europeans, of which 43 percent were professionals with degrees, 30 percent para-professionals and 27 percent highly skilled workers, were transferred to Latin America (mainly to Chile and Colombia)

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[14] Falchi Giovanni, "Report of the Vocational Training Meeting," December 1957, p. 3, MICEM/62, ICEM-ILO Vocational Training Meeting Geneva, December 2–6, 1957, AILO Geneva.

[15] "Joint ILO-ICEM mission in Argentina and Brazil concerning the vocational training of migrants," Inter-official Minute sheet, August 24, 1959, IGO 022-10, AILO Geneva.

[16] Resolution No. 224 (XII), Provision by ICEM of Technical Assistance to Latin American Member Governments, December 14, Thirteenth Session of the Council, ICEM, MC/439, NARA, Washington D.C.

with the assistance of ICEM's Selective Migration Program (Torrado, 1979, p. 432). Despite the fact that Latin American governments had begun to focus their immigration policies on the transfer of human capital and, despite the implementation of selective migration programs, the number of highly skilled immigrants who were moved to the continent by ICEM was insignificant. This failure was attributed to the gap in the living standards between Europe and Latin America and to international competition for skilled manpower, as other traditional immigration states, such as Australia and Canada, offered better living standards. Australia and Canada, regarded as model countries, had a great capacity of absorption of highly qualified immigrants and were using immigration as a powerful tool for fostering development (Maselli, 1967, pp. 112–113; Bastos de Ávila, 1964, pp. 81, 217).

Narratives of the Journey from Tradition to Modernity

Though the number of immigrants transferred by ICEM to Latin America was relatively small, the organization concurred to the construction of mainstream scientific and political discourses on the continent in a more decisive way. The optimistic view that greater agricultural productivity and fast progress towards industrialization were possible in Latin America, as seen in ICEM texts, was actually based on the assumption that the region *was* underdeveloped and on specific conceptions of development. By conducting investigations and surveys, publishing detailed reports on the peculiarities and potentialities of Latin American countries and acting as an intermediary between Latin American governments and officials in Washington, the Committee contributed to the diffusion not only of specific perceptions of development and migration, but also of representations of the continent's peoples and countries (Bastos de Ávila, 1964, pp. 242, 249).

Latin America's "traditional" characteristics and alleged backwardness were commonplace and conventional century-old truths. With the use of a quasi-scientific terminology, statistics and tables (in other words, via the production and diffusion of a seemingly technocratic knowledge by the ICEM and other international institutions), these truths were further interiorized, globalized and legitimized (Kratochwill & Ruggie, 1986, pp. 758, 773). One of the

main tenets of this narrative was the distinction between the United States command of technology and rationality and the unproductive and irrational patterns that supposedly characterized Latin America and other underdeveloped societies. While most modernization theorists of the 1950s and 1960s had stopped describing Latin Americans and other people as uncivilized and racially inferior, they nevertheless perceived them as constrained by traditional cultures, which led to the irrational use of resources and impeded them on the journey to modernization (O' Brien, 2007, pp. 186, 206).

In ICEM narratives, Latin America was mainly perceived as a large traditional area, trapped between its fast growing population and its low production (Beijer, 1966, p. 28). The whole continent was presented as a "land of farm hands and simple craftsmen;" its manpower as "masses" of over-abundant and poorly paid unskilled labor, accustomed to low productivity and inadequate for the functioning of modern industry (Maselli, 1967, p. 113). Latin America had "failed" to follow the successful North American model, that consisted in rapid frontier settlement by independent farm families, followed by extensive industrialization and capital investment, followed by mass immigration to cities, followed by assimilation and upward mobility of most of the immigrant groups (Robbins, 1958, p. 103). The complementary side of this picture was the image of Latin America as a huge, unexploited "land of promise" where nature dominated. References to the "immense natural resources of the Amazonas, Orinoco and La Plata River" (Beijer, 1966, p. 33) underscored the opportunities the region offered to creative entrepreneurship and the relative advantage of Latin America over countries that lacked or had already exploited their reserves (Robbins, 1958, p. 174).

According to ICEM officials, the "traditional" character of Latin America was palpable in its social and economic structures, its archaic social hierarchies, the absence of sizeable middle classes, its static conception of life, and the mentality of its people who lived passively accepting social conditions that were transmitted from generation to generation (Robbins, 1958, p. 105; Bastos de Ávila, 1964, p. 84). In all these analyses, Latin America was perceived as a homogeneous whole. This picture was only slightly nuanced by references to Argentina and Brazil, countries considered to be relatively more developed. Argentina, in particular, was frequently treated as a "special case" due to its

high urbanization and low rate of illiteracy. It was considered to be the only Latin American country possessing an adequate educational system.

The largely state-controlled economy of Latin American countries was believed to be another obstacle to modernization and was seen as a symptom of their "immaturity": In these views the strong presence of a paternalistic and interventionist state in every productive activity prevented the integration of Latin America into the community of countries with free economies ruled by liberal principles. These images largely reflected the United States' discontent with Latin American economic nationalism: during the 1930s and the 1940s, the governments of the biggest countries of the region—Mexico, Brazil and Argentina—had nationalized strategic economic sectors, abandoned the export-led model and promoted an inward-looking development based on import substitution industrialization (Bulmer-Thomas, 2003, p. 270–279). Especially in Brazil and Argentina, the populist governance understood economic development as a national and mainly a state matter and linked it to national sovereignty. This nationalist shift that strongly challenged the traditional economic and political relations of Latin American countries with Great Britain and the United States was perceived by the latter as a threat to the Western world's liberal values. At the same time, Latin America was considered to be in a doubly dangerous situation, as the continent was vulnerable not only to nationalism, but also to communist propaganda.

Despite its "deficiencies," Latin America was believed to be taking off in its struggle against underdevelopment; it had entered the first "stages of economic growth," according to the widely diffused modernization theory elaborated in Rostow's *Non-Communist Manifesto* (Rostow, 1960). In these approaches, which were rooted in evolutionary views, it was claimed that this was the historic moment for less developed countries, like those of Latin America, to tread the path Western societies had followed, as they were transformed from traditional to modern. These mainstream ideas about the "right path" sometimes alternated with other more heterodox views. Father Bastos de Ávila, a professor of sociology in the Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro, presented the "fever of nationalism" in Latin America as "the symptom that immediately precedes this phase of the overcoming of backwardness" in a study on immigration in Latin America that he undertook for ICEM.

He pleaded for the United States to cooperate with "legitimate nationalism" to help the continent "become immune to subversive infiltrations." He also condemned "economic colonialism" and stressed the need of Latin American countries to escape from the long established model of exporting primary materials (Bastos de Ávila, 1961, pp. 24–26, 31). These ideas echoed the thoughts of the *United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America* (ECLA), the main source of the Latin American developmentalist theories that supported a sort of state-directed Capitalism oriented towards industrialization.

Since the late 1940s, the team of Latin American economists who became the soul of ECLA, gave birth to an original theory of development which had a strong influence throughout the "Third World" during the 1950s and 1960s; it became the most important alternative variation of mainstream development patterns (Sikking, 1997, p. 228). Raul Prebisch's *El desarrollo de America Latina y sus principales problemas* (The Economic Development of Latin America and Its Principal Problems), first published in Spanish in 1949, is considered to be the ECLA's "manifest" (Hirschman, 1961, p. 13). Prebisch, an Argentine economist and President of the Central Bank of Argentina, presented a structuralist approach to Latin American economies that reversed the notion of "mutual benefit" that was essential to the hegemonic concept of development (Cooper & Packard, 1997, p. 10). He distinguished between a world economic *center* producing manufactured goods and a *periphery* producing primary goods and argued that the terms of trade for the latter tended over time to deteriorate their position in world economy (Prebisch, 1950; Love, 1980; Devés Valdés, 2003, pp. 31–33). Questioning the reasons behind Latin America's underdevelopment, the economic staff of ECLA strongly supported the intensification of industrialization, economical planning and the promotion of regional integration. ECLA's intervention was not limited to the theoretical level: During the 1950s and 1960s, this Commission became very influential in some Latin American countries and played an important role in economic policy-making in some of its states, such as Brazil (Love, 2005).

Gradually, while the continent's governments began to abandon economic nationalism in favor of Keynesian models and mixed economies, ICEM and other international organizations became more open to the Latin American developmentalist ideas on industrialization and planning. However, the idea

that the gradual achievement of modernization depended on the willingness of Latin American peoples to adopt the values of modern liberal societies remained central in ICEM's discourses. It was in this domain that the contribution of external agents, such as European immigrants, was considered of capital importance. The imperatives of the Cold War mingled with the West's traditional missionary paternalism and its teleological understandings of history in constructing representations of Latin America and other parts of the world as areas in need of guidance on their way to development. With the aid of the West, Latin America and other "undeveloped" regions could be led through the stages that would bring them from a condition characterized by the reign of tradition and poverty to modernity, liberal democracy and economic growth (Berger, 1996, p. 52). In this way, American and European state agents, corporate executives and professionals reformulated the "civilizing mission" of the West in developmental terms during the 1950s and 1960s (Symons, 2011).

The above ideas, reproduced and diffused by the ICEM and other international organizations, created strong representations about Latin America, fostered self-images of "underdevelopment" and became part of the hegemonic development discourse that homogenized "Third World" cultures and people and modeled reality. The "Third World" as a whole, abstracted from history and the sphere of asymmetrical international relations, was perceived as a child in need of adult guidance and defined by what it was not, by its intrinsic "deficiencies" that needed to be remedied through development. The development discourse of the 1950s and 1960s, produced under conditions of unequal power, not only perpetuated the hegemonic idea of the West's superiority, but also determined the social production of space, the construction of the "First" and the "Third World," the creation of new subjects defined as "developed" and "underdeveloped," the production of new self-images reflecting the interiorization of dominant representations (Naz, 2006, p. 75; Bilgin & Morton, 2002, p. 63). These selectively produced narratives and discourses, expressed in a seemingly technocratic vocabulary and diffused in various international forums, shaped the way international and domestic issues were perceived by governments and other actors. They legitimated political decisions and the way power was exercised, confusing development, humanitarian concerns and security agendas (Geiger & Pécoud, 2010). Through the dominant forms of

knowledge that referred to it and the system of power that regulated it, this hegemonic discourse colonized social reality to the extent that it seemed quite impossible to conceptualize it in any other terms (Escobar, 1995). Furthermore, through the actions of these international organizations, the West's "knowledge" about the "Third World" in general, and Latin America more specifically, became a factor loaded with consequences, as plans and reforms were implemented and growth strategies were operationalized. As a result, the social, economic and cultural characteristics of "underdeveloped" areas, such as Latin America, were gradually reshaped, even if these regions did not achieve the goal of "development" as was defined by the hegemonic powers of the time.

Conclusion: Rationales for Steering European Outflows and the Migration Apparatus of Peripheral States in the Early Cold War

Lina Venturas

During the 1940s, within just one decade, the United States moved from isolationism to internationalism, and then to the circumscribed multilateralism of the "free world." With the war over, the United States, already in possession of unprecedented global military, economic and political power, began to develop the project of strengthening its hegemony through international institution-building, targeted social, economic and cultural engineering, and through the elaboration of narratives legitimating the view of its governing elites about the future and their country's preeminence in the world (Patrick, 2009, pp. ix–x; Mazower, 2012, pp. xvii, 215). Nevertheless, despite its power, the United States was circumscribed in the international arena by the actions and the adversarial ideology of the Soviet Bloc, by the aspirations of the anti-colonial and nationalist movements in what was soon to be labeled the "Third World," and by the diverging interests of its European allies and a labor movement which had become powerful in several countries. In the domestic sphere, the State Department was also constrained by conflicting economic and political interests, by Afro-Americans and other ethnic groups turning its liberal universalist rhetoric against it, by turf wars between agencies, and by many other factors. Last but not least, in responding to the challenges of a rapidly changing and uncertain environment, the United States was hindered by the legacies of its past, i.e. by older institutions, long-standing political traditions and by socio-cultural scripts and routines which ruled out alternatives.

Within this wider context and in view of the reasoning elaborated in the previous parts of the volume, the first question this concluding chapter addresses

is why the United States resorted to multilateral collaboration in the domain of migration in the early postwar Western world. In more specific terms, it examines the various processes that came together at this specific historical conjuncture for the initiative by the United States of establishing the *Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe* (PICMME) in 1951 purporting to encourage and support, while steering and regulating, movements of refugees and migrants from Europe to overseas countries, and to maintain the organization through the 1950s. Secondly, this chapter investigates the role of this organization in the steering of the migration apparatus of subordinate states of the "free world" in the early Cold War era.

The early Cold War conjuncture, its stakes and perceived imperatives, as much as the fears it generated, determined the creation of ICEM and its maintenance during the 1950s, as the chapters of this volume have demonstrated. But why and how was the issue of human mobility entangled with early Cold War politics, and why would the United States administration want to regulate outflows from Europe in the midst of the Korean War, when military objectives were prominent? To answer these questions this chapter will attempt to point out the importance the United States attached to four interrelated issues at this specific historical moment: firstly, to economic policies in international relations and national security; secondly, to building mechanisms to promote cohesion in the Western "free world"; thirdly, to the dissemination of propaganda and the construction of legitimizing discourses; and finally to guiding peripheral states of the West towards their further integration into the "free world."

Intergovernmental collaboration in the field of migration grew out of the legacy of international concern for refugees generated by the two World Wars and the international mechanisms put in place to assist them both for humanitarian reasons and for the sake of international security and economic recovery, which they were seen to threaten. After these two confrontations, population movements in Europe acquired a new significance in international relations, leading to the establishment of international bureaucratic and legal frameworks, alongside traditionally implied national administrations, legislations or bilateral treaties, to regulate them (Reinisch, 2011, p. xvii, Gatrell, 2011, p. 30). In the post-Second World War, the *International Refugee Organization* (IRO), created in 1946 to relieve Displaced Persons in Europe and resettle them

overseas, managed to relocate over one million refugees in its short lifespan. Initiating the race-based exclusion of millions of Asian refugees from international assistance implicit in its mandate being limited to Europeans, the IRO strived to match labor supply in Europe to demand overseas, largely functioning as an international employment agency for refugees (Karatani, 2005, p. 530).

The idea of establishing an international agency to assist states in regulating the international labor market and labor migration also had a history going back to the interwar period. The issue had been debated at international conferences of trade unions and population experts during the 1920s (Rosental, 2006, p. 118). In the immediate postwar years, the *International Labour Organization* (ILO), which had long promoted this idea in various international forums (A. Thomas, 1983), had well-founded hopes of receiving the mandate to lead such an agency. So the idea was not new—the ILO had elaborated it extensively and the IRO had proved its practical advantages. Nonetheless, as the United States distanced itself from the liberal internationalism embodied by the United Nations system and started to establish multilateral agencies of the "free world," with limited duration and mandates, under its budgetary and political control, it decided against both prolonging the lifespan of the IRO and mandating the ILO with the organization of international refugee and labor movements.

The era of the so-called "free movement" of individuals had been over for more or less two decades, and after 1945 almost noone advocated its resuscitation (Citroen, 1951, p. 32); major traditional receiving countries continued older policies of accepting a more or less limited number of Europeans, selected on stringent criteria. No Western state, and least of all the United States where the restrictionist bloc retained a strong majority in Congress, was willing to receive immigrants without determining their numbers and their qualitative characteristics. United States officials, extremely anxious about Europe's future, knowing that most Europeans willing to move abroad dreamed of reaching America's shores,[1] accorded high priority to diverting refugees and migrants to other Western receiving states and to centralizing bureaucratic and

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[1] Cox to Morgan, 31/12/1952, EP, File 2, Harry S. Truman Library; Senator Pat McCarran, Congressional Record, 2/3/53, p. 1518.

health examination procedures and security screening against communist infil-trators.[2] Therefore, in the late 1940s and early 1950s, the United States aimed at encouraging outflows from Europe, while steering them to other parts of the Western world and controlling the categories and features of those moving. To that effect, in 1951 it opted for the creation and funding of a new multilat-eral operational agency, the PICMME/ICEM, under its own strict control. This new agency was accorded a broader mandate than the one the United States had refused to assign the recently established the *United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees* (UNHCR): The ICEM was to assist in the trans-portation overseas of both refugees and migrants from Europe. Moreover, neither the organization's founding Resolution, nor its Constitution later on defined the categories of individuals covered by these two terms. With the UNHCR's jurisdiction being restricted to the legal protection of refugees, the United States, which in any case did not ratify the 1951 Geneva Convention, ensured there would be no international interference in the process of granting a restricted number of visas for America to those considered useful in the strug-gle against Communism; more generally, it maintained control over interna-tionally assisted outflows from Europe.

When creating this new agency, United States policymakers were mainly concerned with finding ways to serve the state's overt and covert foreign policy goals that would not be blocked by the powerful domestic restrictionist bloc nor overburden American taxpayers, while augmenting support amongst ethnic groups of European origin in electoral strategies. With the establishment of the PICMME/ICEM, United States foreign policymakers strived at relieving West Germany, a country vital in the stakes of the Cold War, by reducing the burden which the refugees placed on its still fragile economic and political situation. They also aspired at curtailing unemployment in other European countries, such as Italy, where communist parties had a substantial political

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[2] Memorandum from Jack K. McFall (Assistant Secretary of State) to David P. Lloyd, "Comments of the Department of State on Draft Presidential Message to Congress Calling for a Special New Immigration Program and Aids to Iron Curtain Refugees," Paragraph 2, 7/3/1952; Telegram from John W. Gibson (Chairman, US DP Commission), to Richard E. Neustadt (Special Assistant in the White House), n.d., both documents in David D. Lloyd Collection, Box 2, File: H-Immigration, Harry S. Truman Library, Missouri.

influence. The organization of work was at the center of many postwar projects of economic and social reform, and the optimal spatial allocation of labor was taken into account when drawing development plans (Marglin, 2001, p. 21; van Hear & Nyberg Sørensen, 2003, pp. 36–37). In 1948 sociologist Eugene Kulischer, who had worked for President Roosevelt's *M-Project* during the war, called for a "rational redistribution of working power" regulated by an international planning authority.[3] In these early Cold War years, when the United States considered raising the standard of living in Europe and elsewhere as the cornerstone of its anti-communist propaganda and as an "antidote" to social and political disorder (Engerman & Unger, 2009, p. 42), "the labor question shoehorned into the development question" (Cooper 1997: 67). Economic recovery, development and the raising of standards of living demanded interventionist policies. Not surprisingly, the "close relationship between economic development and immigration" was underlined in ICEM's founding resolution. Finally, having elaborated a strategy of encouraging defection from the Eastern Bloc for propaganda and intelligence purposes, which, as they were well aware, could provoke grave tensions with the Soviet Union,[4] they opted for the creation of an international agency—independent from the United Nations—which, free of sovereign diplomatic responsibilities, would provide the necessary political cover for these plans (Carruthers, 2005, p. 918; Marrus, 2002, p. 365).

However, persuading other receiving countries to participate in an international agency which would regulate migration required reassuring them and providing incentives. Despite their fears of communist expansion, the other traditional receiving states in the Western world were more concerned with economic growth and labor demands. They were not ready to accept the resettlement of all kinds of Europeans: They mainly hoped to attract a supplementary workforce with specific characteristics—for which they knew they had to compete—with a view to contributing to their productivity (Bon Tempo, 2008,

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[3] Kulischer E. M. and Jaffe A. J. (1962). "Notes on the Population Theory of Eugene M. Kulischer," *Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly* 40: 2, pp. 187–206, as cited in Mazower 2009: 115.

[4] Joyce to Webb, 29/1/1952, Lot file 62D333, PSB Working File, 1952-53, RG 59, Box 2, as cited in Carruthers (2005, p. 918).

p. 37). To persuade receiving states with antagonistic interests in migration issues to participate in an international agency, the United States had to assuage sovereignty and security concerns, ensure effective selection processes and guarantee countries that were not preferred by prospective migrants that its operation would enhance their ability to attract categories of aliens in high demand in the international labor market.

On the other hand, in the view of the governments of these countries, higher productivity, the buzzword of the postwar era, required, amongst other measures, matching labor demand to supply. In several traditional receiving states, demand for labor could not be met as easily as in the past or at the required pace by "spontaneous" individual movements, since migrant networks had been interrupted for decades by interwar restrictionist policies and the war. Furthermore, in Europe, which was the continent they strived to recruit labor from, many prospective emigrants lacked the financial and transportation means to realize their plans. Argentina, Australia and other overseas countries, aware of these difficulties, sent missions to Europe to sign migration agreements and start recruiting migrants. Government officials in receiving countries knew it was necessary to provide access to resources in order to spark initial migration movements and to cover the gap between aspiring migrants and those who could actually move. What is more, Latin American countries, whereto the United States wanted to steer a large number of Europeans, did not even offer prospective migrants realistic possibilities for the reimbursement of their passage costs from wages and the financing of family reunion. Finally, certain traditional European sending states, like Italy, Spain or Greece, were not considered to be in a position to recruit, filter and manage prospective emigrants efficiently. Therefore, in this phase of planned economic expansion in overseas countries, according to dominant views, efficient recruitment and selection mechanisms had to be installed in Europe and transportation sponsored for immigration to take off. As at the time national planning in economic and social fields was often combined with some international cooperation, ICEM was presented as a necessary link between national programs of both emigration and immigration countries, "making possible concerted action for mutual advantage" (Holborn, 1961, p. 14). Several Western receiving countries opted for a model of organized and controlled migration schemes instead of movements

initiated and undertaken individually, even if this meant a burden on their budgets, believing in the capacity of management and planning to attain economic growth and avert disorder. As an ILO 1959 document commented: In order to match supply to demand in the postwar international employment market, governments were forced to go beyond traditional regulatory functions, embarking on planned promotional schemes and providing assistance to migrants, and to rely less on private initiative (ILO, 1959, pp. 264–268).

Notwithstanding the difficulties in recruiting labor, receiving countries championed their sovereign rights, feared long-term engagements and costs implied in the participation in international agencies and preferred to settle issues through bilateral agreements with European sending countries. Reluctance to join in multilateral cooperation was overcome mainly because the United States proposed a *provisional* international agency, led by the hegemonic Western state, which, apart from facilitating the conclusion of bilateral agreements, was mandated to provide services such as the recruitment, preselection, processing and transportation of immigrants without encroaching upon their sovereignty; furthermore, United States-funding of PICMME/ICEM promised to mitigate financial and administrative burdens.

Governments, however, were not the only stakeholders in labor mobility issues, nor the sole actors American policymakers were concerned with. In the early Cold War years, the United States aimed at strengthening non-communist trade unions and at imbuing labor organizations in the Western world with their idea of harmonious industrial relations based on collective bargaining; decision-makers were aware that trade unions, empowered in many Western countries during the war, had obtained assurances that labor migration would not be allowed to endanger their wages and social rights (Carew, 1987; Bohning, 2012, p. 4). The United States negative stance to ILO's plan of organizing international migration indicated, amongst other things, that they did not wish trade unions to have a strong say in labor mobility, but if the "free world" was to enlist labor's support in the struggle against Communism, it had to at least assure workers in major receiving countries that immigrants would not endanger the employment and social rights they had acquired. Moreover, the principle of full employment, largely agreed upon during the war, had modified the perceptions of excess labor and approaches to managing it.

At a moment when new attitudes toward the role of governments in economic and social matters were gaining ground and welfare state mechanisms were expanding in many countries, the issues of full employment, social security and sustained growth were important in engaging the loyalty of labor in the Western world (ILO, 1959, p. 300; Carew, 1987; Maul, 2012). What is more, the United States saw economic policy as an integral part of its foreign policy considering economic recovery and growth vital for international security. The demonstration of the economic and cultural superiority of the West was the cornerstone of the United States strategy for winning the hearts and minds of the populations in Western, Eastern and Third World countries. Capitalism had to show that it had "better tools for improving the lives of the world's poor" (Mazower, 2012, p. 274).

The effectiveness of the *International Refugee Organization* (IRO) caused it to be used as a blueprint by the institutional designers of ICEM, although the latter was meant to be an experimental, less costly and surely more flexible organization (Cohen, 2011, pp. 56, 103; Murdock, 1983, p. 39). Just like IRO, ICEM was not to intrude on sovereign rights, its founding Resolution under-lining that it would strictly adhere to the migration policies of its member-states. The new organization was meant to continue to facilitate the movement of the remaining wartime refugees in Europe and of European Jews to Israel, but there were other more important groups targeted by its initiators, described by its founding Resolution in vague enough terms, so that they could be adjusted to the needs and fluctuations of United States policies (Murdock, 1983, p. 40; Elie, 2010, p. 359). In the early 1950s the groups targeted were mainly the poor unemployed citizens of certain European countries and the "escapees" fleeing communist states (Loescher & Scanlan, 1986, p. 42; Carruthers, 2005).

In order to fully understand why prospective emigrants from certain European countries came to be of interest to the United States, we need to turn to perceptions of the intimate link between issues of "overpopulation" and poverty. Poverty after the war was a straining feature not only in the colonial world but in several Western Europe countries too, while long before the Second World War and up to the early Cold War years, neo-Malthusian visions of Europe's "surplus population" were prominent (Citroen, 1951, p. 31; Holborn, 1961, p.7; Maul, 2012, p.131; Marrus, 2002, p.365; Bashford, 2007, pp.172–173).

The Old Continent's population density ratios, linked to pressures for land and expansion, had been directly related to the outbreak of war (Bashford, 2008, pp. 330–336). After 1945, poverty in Europe, attributed in the Malthusian tradition, to the imbalance between resources and population mainly, came to be seen as an imminent threat to the "free world," also because of its association with the spread of Communism. As democracy's existence was predicated on a basic level of economic well-being, and the security of the "free world" on the economic reconstruction and growth of Europe, the interconnected issues of "overpopulation" and poverty had to be addressed. After the launching of the Marshall Plan, it was also feared that overpopulation in Europe could have a negative impact on its military defense and the development efforts amply funded by the United States (Citroen, 1951, pp. 1–3; Cohen, 2011, pp. 118–122; Loescher & Scanlan, 1986, p. 42; Bon Tempo, p. 32). In the words of one United States official:

> We are endeavouring to improve the defence capabilities of these countries [Germany, Italy, Austria and Greece]. Efforts to this end will be severely handicapped, lacking concurrent efforts to enlarge the opportunities of people who now are unproductive and who cannot see any hope of improving their lot. Furthermore, these idle people are extraordinarily susceptible to propaganda designed to undermine our influence upon and help to these countries. [...] Whatever, therefore, can be done to diminish the magnitude of the problem by way of emigration contributes that much to the objectives toward which our Foreign Aid Program is being directed.[5]

President Eisenhower was even more emphatic declaring in 1953 that "a solution of Europe's overpopulation problems would be worth as much as several divisions in strengthening the West in the face of the Communist Threat."[6] The Cold War transformed Europe's refugee and "overpopulation" crisis into an issue that transcended humanitarian or economic considerations, as it explicitly linked the social and political impact of unemployment

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[5] Document 76. 840.411/7-551. Memorandum by the Special Consultant on Migration Affairs (West) to the Secretary of State. Washington 19/6/1951. USA Government Printing Office 1985, p. 179.

[6] *New York Times*, April 23, 1953.

to international security (Clayton, 2004, p. 587). However, even if fears were on the rise in this era of the Red Scare, most Americans believed that misery could be reduced through planned economic policies.

The legacy of the New Deal and the concerted war efforts made officials in the most affluent and powerful state in the world confident about the possibilities for growth offered by a wise combination of open economy and moderate state planning, and even more optimistic about the capacity of science and technology to solve economic and social problems. The elimination of poverty and unemployment required planning, concerted intervention, the active promotion of economic growth and population redistribution (Ekbladh, 2011, pp. 1–13; Webster, 2011; Berger, 1996). Many economists pointed to the importance of labor migration underlining that economic growth, seen as the result of expanded productivity and free trade, depended largely on one of the main factors of production, i.e. labor. Labor migration would contribute to a more optimal spatial allocation of manpower by matching supply with demand, by balancing unemployment and labor shortages. The redistribution of workers between areas with unemployment and those with manpower shortages was seen as imperative for the acceleration of economic takeoff (Bashford, 2008; Cohen, 2012, p. 124; Bashford, 2014b, p. 78; Mazower, 2009, p. 115; Reinalda, 2009, p. 411). Moreover, migration was considered as a variable that states were more or less able to regulate and that would contribute to the development of both sending and receiving countries (Rosental, 2006, p. 112). Emigration would diminish both "overpopulation" and unemployment in Europe, and the hotbeds of Communism that unemployment gave rise to would be dismantled (Olsson, 1954). On the other hand, mass immigration could simultaneously boost the productivity and the internal markets of rapidly developing but underpopulated countries, such as Australia and Canada. In "undeveloped" overseas countries, such as those in Latin America, where the training of locals for engaging in intensive rural development and industrialization was a long-range process, inflows of experienced rural and industrial workers from Europe could help accelerate the pace of growth and spread skills and positive attitudes towards development. United States Department, United Nations agencies and other international forums, following proposals formulated before the war, presented labor migration as a decisive factor in solving

the postwar problems of Europe and the "free world" (Rosental 2006, pp. 111, 125–126). These positions became conventional wisdom, disseminated and legitimized via the release of several reports undertaken by experts, hailing from these international agencies.[7]

The early 1950s in the United States, the era of McCarthyism and the war in Korea, were equally a period of multiple transitions and hesitations in Cold War politics. It was a moment when, although the United States had come to appreciate the importance of the "undeveloped" world, and of Asia more specifically, it still considered Europe as the main battlefield for the containment of communist forces (Patrick, 2009, pp. 214, 288). The United States had embarked upon its development policies after President Truman's inaugural speech in 1949, but it had scaled down its wartime support to self-determination in the colonial world, as the economic, political and military strengthening of strategic allies in Europe was seen to be more crucial in confronting the Soviet Union (Anderson, 2006, p. 273). In the late 1940s and early 1950s, apart from Europe's economic recovery, cementing cohesion among its European allies was seen by the United States as one of its top priorities. This aim had been pursued, but not altogether achieved, by means of the insistence of the United States that European countries receiving American aid had to work together, and also by the creation of the North Atlantic Alliance and other measures. Nevertheless, the specific objective of integrating West Germany into the European economy and the Western world's political and military alliances was still resisted by other allies, and the divergent interests of the Western European states had not been satisfactorily accommodated (Patrick, 2009, pp. 218–222; 330). When the Korean War began, United States officials realized that the objective of cohesion had to be pursued more vigorously, and that it

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[7] For example, in the period of the Greek civil war (1946-1949), during which emigration from Greece was forbidden due to military considerations, reports by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the International Labour Organization (ILO), suggested that Greece had a "overpopulation" problem which could only be addressed by emigration: FAO, *1947 Report of the FAO Mission for Greece*, Washington D.C., March; ILO, *1948 Report of the Mission to Greece*, Geneva, March 11. Such recommendations were renewed after the end of the Civil War by J. F. Barrett, Apprenticeship and Manpower Specialist ECLM in his Restricted Report "Recommendations for Mission Policy on Problems of Greek Surplus Manpower and Emigration" of February 24, 1950. Archives of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Athens 1950 156 3.

was also important to actively engage allies in the Pacific in the common struggle against not only the Soviet Union and its European allies, but equally against the new communist regime in China. The active implication of Australia and New Zealand in this struggle was given more consideration than before once the threat of communist expansion in Asia made itself felt with more urgency with the outbreak of the Korean War following Mao's victory in China (Patrick, 2009, p. 223).

Despite the fact that the Western "free world" was united by the perception of a common enemy and that of belonging to a single population group of European descent with a common civilization, these shared perceptions alone could not compensate for the geographical dispersion, the economic asymmetries, the divergent interests and the cultural differences and hierarchies within it. Extending from North and South America to Western Europe and Oceania, the goal of strengthening the internal cohesion of the "free world" demanded continuous initiatives, persistent institutional efforts, economic incentives and a defined environment in which they could cooperate as well as the elaboration of narratives underpinning commonalities and shared objectives. Thus, the incentive to create an institution to bring both immigration and emigration countries of the "free world" to the same table, also aimed at providing them with a common goal, that of regulating refugee and labor movements in order to boost economic development. Discourses linking migration to development were mobilized to federate immigration and emigration countries that had largely diverging interests. Efforts to enhance ties in the "free world" were supported by discourses on its integration through development and modernization (Engerman, 2007, p. 610). In this transitional period therefore, United States officials were interested in trying out, on a limited and experimental basis, an intergovernmental organization incorporating a large number of these disparate Western countries in an attempt to federate them and underpin their common interests in a way that was also aligned to the United States' long-term objective of creating a worldwide open economy. What is more, although there were large asymmetries between prospective member countries, this loose and provisional intergovernmental organization could help cultivate a feeling, or rather an illusion, of sovereign states cooperating on equal terms (Duara, 2011, p. 467).

Apart from obtaining the consensus of governments and trade unions in Western countries when creating the PICMME/ICEM, United States officials also targeted defectors from Eastern Bloc countries. In the early 1950s, an era with great expectations from psychological warfare, when propaganda and intelligence had just recently been fully integrated into national security policies, the United States focused on those fleeing Eastern European states and the Soviet Union. "[U]nlimited and indiscriminate encouragement of defection" from the Eastern Bloc countries became an official policy in April 1951.[8] On the one hand, the flight of these "escapees," as they were named, from communist countries was seen to be the best proof of mass dissatisfaction and of the hardships imposed by totalitarian regimes, thus promoting identification with the "free world" in both the West and the East.[9] On the other hand, the Western world had to be seen as ready to support the escapees "voting with their feet" if it was to encourage their continued exit to the "free world" and to prevent them from returning home or turning against the capitalist system (Rees, 1959, p. 9). Moreover, several escapees were recruited by the United States propaganda apparatus, such as the radio stations broadcasting from Western European countries whose programs were addressing the inhabitants of communist countries. Others were useful to the CIA for gathering intelligence, while a few were even trained with a view to sending them back to their countries on special missions. The multiple possibilities for instrumentalization presented by the escapees had preoccupied officials since 1948 (Hixson, 1997, pp. 13–18; Carruthers, 2005, p. 917), but the Congress only voted for the instigation of a special program for them—the US Escapee Program—a few months after the establishment of the ICEM. The establishment of ICEM and the USEP ensured both the funds and the mechanism necessary for the transport of a relatively limited number of escapees to overseas countries, while the latter

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[8] Enshrined in NSC 86/1, April 1951. Alien Enlistment Act of 1950, P.L. 81-597 (64 Stat. 316), 30/6/1950; PSB D-18/a, "Psychological Operations Plan for Soviet Orbit Escapees," 20/12/1951, Executive Secretariat, PSB Working File, 1951–53, Lot File 62D 333, RG 59, Box 2. NSC 86/1 remains classified, as cited in Carruthers (2005), p. 919.

[9] PPS 54, "Policy Relating to Defection and Defectors from Soviet Power," 28/6/1949, Record of the PPS, RG 59, Microfiche 1171, 62. Such plans began in 1948 with PPS 22, "Utilization of Refugees from the Soviet Union in US National Interest," 5/2/1948; RG 59, Records of the PPS, Microfiche 1171, 23, as cited in Carruthers (2005) p. 911.

provided the assets necessary for the amelioration of the living conditions of a greater number. In this specific conjuncture, the United States officials aimed at fully instrumentalizing not only the escapees, but ICEM as well (Hixson, 1997; Carruthers, 2005; Loescher & Scanlan, 1986, pp. 42, 48; Carafano, 1999).

In this era of mass media expansion, while higher importance was increasingly accorded to public opinion internationally, fierce ideological divides grew between the "free world" and "totalitarian" regimes. In a binary and simplistic manner, democracy, human rights and freedom, including the "freedom of movement," were pitted against economic and social equality, solidarity and collective rights. On top of this, overt racism had been delegitimized by the Nazi regime, and other forms of discrimination by the universal human rights rhetoric. Moreover, racism in America and the colonial world was one of the weapons used by the Soviet Union in its propaganda against the West (Hixson, 1997, pp. 129–130). The United States had therefore to reconcile racial, ethnic and other social inequalities and discriminations with a universal human rights discourse and to persuade the world's socially disadvantaged that it possessed more effective means for improving their lives than those offered by the Communist Bloc. Thus, when Eastern Bloc countries imposed severe restrictions on the emigration of their citizens, the propaganda potential of the liberal belief in "freedom of movement" was greatly exploited by the United States. "Freedom of movement" was not only inscribed in ICEM's founding Resolution and in its Constitution, but was also the sole eligibility criterion for membership. The principle of the "freedom of movement" was understood by states worldwide solely as the right to leave and return to one's country and not as the right to enter a foreign state's territory—as this impinged on sovereignty, a principle sacrosanct of the postwar era—it therefore became a convenient and powerful tool to be used against communist countries in order to influence perceptions both behind the Iron Curtain and in the Western world. Neither the United States nor its Commonwealth allies were prepared to abandon immigration restrictions that excluded racial, ethnic and other categories of people deemed, if not inferior, certainly undesirable; hence, the establishment of this organization with a mandate strictly circumscribed to outflows from Europe in fact permitted receiving member countries to continue to limit inflows to those considered desirable, while avoiding accusations of racism and discrimination.

If immigration laws traditionally restricted the entrance of particular populations without actually naming them, the ICEM provided even more effective "face-saving means of discriminating between humans in a world that found exclusions intolerable" (Bashford, 2014a, pp. 32–36, 46). In an era of universalist rhetoric and criticism against race-based immigration restrictions, the ICEM offered receiving countries the cover they needed to go on selecting immigrants exclusively from what they saw as a racially white continent, discriminating between the workers desiring to enter their territory on the basis of ethnic origin, class, occupation and gender, and receiving only the politically desirable among the young and healthy.

In the elaboration of its development plans the United States meshed Cold War imperatives with its long-established missionary paternalism and with liberal teleology, assuming that other people needed guidance and reform to advance towards Western liberal democracy and capitalist industrial development (Berger, 1996, pp. 52–57; Solovey, 2012, p. 4). Furthermore, the Western world in the 1950s being highly heterogeneous and asymmetric, needed its cohesion to be continually cemented and its internal hierarchies disguised by various means, one of which was to establish international organizations of the "free world." Another was to present the West as radically different and superior to the Eastern Bloc and the Third World, and to disseminate this image worldwide through the creation and activities of these and other international organizations. On the other hand, membership in postwar refugee and migration organizations of the relatively poor and politically powerless Western countries, signified and furthered their integration in the Capitalist Bloc, even if they occupied a subordinate position in it. Their participation proved their willingness to follow new practices initiated in the "developed" world, such as multilaterally organized and assisted labor mobility; at the same time, it demonstrated that their elites and at least some of their citizens shared the dominant Western rhetoric on economic growth and the means to accelerate its pace. Shared beliefs, values, objectives and practices—ranging from the ideal of "national sovereignty" to the goal of "development" and faith in "planning" and "management"—constructed a common matrix, despite significant differences between and within the hegemonic United States, other Western states and their citizenry.

The "profound transnational character" of national state-building, policy-making and of the construction of conceptions and meanings in the Western world had been shaped long before the creation of post-Second World War international organizations and had been achieved without their intervention; these processes had taken place both *outside* and *alongside* nation states long before the Cold War (Gupta & Ferguson, 2002, p. 995). The very idea that the future could be controlled integrated into development discourses, was based on older notions of progress (Naz, 2006, p. 72). Many social, economic and political concerns preoccupying international organizations in the postwar era had a long history preceding the Cold War and its stakes (Robin, 2001, p. 5); postwar multilateral agencies did not invent most of these concerns, but they did institutionalize and internationalize them to a much larger degree (Finnemore, 1997, pp. 204, 220).

In the early Cold War era, struggles for or against Communism and between colonial and anticolonial forces were intertwined with developmental and modernization issues (Cullather, 2000, p. 651), as superpower rivalry entailed mastering future changes and the range of conceivable alternatives (Duara, 2011, p. 479). Powerful international organizations managed to disseminate ideas effectively because they distributed resources and were at the center of communication networks (Cooper & Packard, 1997, p. 21). In the 1950s, subordinate Western countries came to rely even more on foreign expertise, imported technology and capital from abroad. What is more, United States officials were authorized by their governments to intervene in the elaboration and implementation of military plans, economic policies and in many other fields. There were also many international and private organizations operating in these countries led by the United States of which ICEM was only one.

The ICEM was mandated to "rationalize" the international distribution of population and manpower, but its role varied from state to state; in peripheral countries it was also accorded the authority to modernize state administration and decision-making processes on migration and to ameliorate the "quality" of migrants leaving or entering. ICEM officials working in these peripheral Western countries commented widely on the "deficiencies" of their state apparatus, which they proposed to remedy through "rational" planning. Specific ideas about what a state should be and do, as well as models for "rational"

state organization, "efficient" administration and "development" were handed over to receptive elites (Joseph, 2009, p. 425; Broome & Seabrooke, 2012). United States-led international organizations often intervened in the internal affairs of certain states, although in a highly uneven way. At other times, they guided them in a more indirect manner through agenda- or trend-setting (Scott, 2001; Barnett & Finnemore 1999; Larner & Walters 2004).

Simultaneously, by acknowledging the need for assistance in handling issues such as unemployment or labor immigration, issues which were considered as pressing by both international institutions and governments of peripheral states, the latter accepted and confirmed the inferior placement of their countries by the more powerful and prestigious states within the affluent, hegemonic and "developed" *First* World. Their governments recognized that their countries depended on states they saw as being at the core of the "developed" world, and the international agencies created within it, not only for overall military and economic assistance, but equally for information and organizational models on specific policy issues. The ICEM, for instance, provided information about labor needs in other countries, the characteristics of prospective migrant workers living abroad, as well as its know-how in planning and organizing migrant processing, selection, training, mobility and placement.

In the 1950s, the governments and officials of these subordinate states may have occasionally managed to manipulate the principles or resources of international organizations in order to enhance their own legitimacy, promote their own interests, dominate in domestic turfs or to undermine alternative social and political visions. They may have occasionally managed to take advantage of dissent or competition between the more powerful, and they may have formed alliances or elaborated strategies to enhance what their decision-makers saw as being in their interests. Still, their agency was largely limited by their restricted resources, their perceived range of alternatives, and the specific historical circumstances of the early Cold War era. These disadvantaged actors were well aware of the fact that their military, political and economic support depended on their alignment with the ideas and interests of more powerful allies (Scott, 2001, p. 199). Moreover, more often than not, policymakers and elites in these peripheral states placed themselves in what they perceived as the more "civilized" Western world and strove to be recognized by the latter as

belonging to it. In tandem with their belief in the superiority of the West, and its relative affluence and technological progress, they often disregarded whatever in their home milieu was considered as not belonging to it.

In this specific historical conjuncture, international organizations provided scientific, technical or managerial expertise to states, elaborated common systems of measurement and benchmarking standards and prescribed institutional changes and the norms defining what constituted legitimate state behavior; they also functioned as transnational conveyor belts of cognitive and cultural scripts or repertoires which shaped, partially at least, the way national government officials thought about the population living in their countries. As nation-states became more deeply immersed in a global cultural order from which they drew legitimating models of what states are and how they work, they came to share intersubjective understandings of cause and effect that framed their decision-making (Martin, 2008, p. 86; Scott, 2001, pp. 130–135; Geiger & Pécoud 2010, p. 5; Barnett & Finnemore, 1999; Broome & Seabrooke, 2012). More and more states became subjects of reforming efforts aiming at transforming them into "predictable actors of a normalized international arena" (Joseph, 2009, p. 423).

The role of international organizations—even of those with a specific and highly restricted mandate like the ICEM—in embedding and fixing partly shared worldviews, conceptions and meanings in the periphery of the Western world during the second half of the twentieth century was important: These organizations played their part in disseminating conceptions of social and economic "problems" and their relative significance, as well as ideas about "solutions" to these "problems," their "efficacy" and legitimacy. They transferred priorities, policies and practices from one context to another; they constructed and imposed standards of comparison; they monitored and sanctioned activities; they also turned into commonsense knowledge the connections they had established between migration, development and security issues. As the technology and expertise they offered, or—according to the jargon of the time—their "technical assistance," were elevated into catalysts of modernization (Webster, 2011, pp. 252–253), they contributed to depoliticizing power relations and poverty by recasting social and economic problems as technical ones that could and should be eliminated by rational planning and expert knowledge

(Frey & Kunkel, 2011, p. 221). In the specific context of the early Cold War, they influenced the decision-making processes of peripheral states in the Western world invigorating the transnational character of their governance and enlarging the scope of issues administered both *outside* and *alongside* nation states.

However, although both the policymakers and elites of peripheral states had been long implicated in the common matrix of the hegemonic Western world to which they aspired to belong, their immersion did not lack ambiguities, contradictions and uncertainties. What is more, what appeared to be commonsense to them was not as evident to a large proportion of the people living in these countries: Other political forces, certain state employees, rural populations or the unemployed, had to be persuaded to adopt at least some of the views elites took for granted; they had to bend the objections of a significant part of their citizenry about the beneficial effects of emigration or immigration. Last but not least, the management of migration by a specialized international organization with all its efforts for orderly and low-cost transportation and for the smooth settlement and integration of migrants abroad, were, naturally, never able to anticipate the personal strategies of individuals or fully accommodate migrants' initiatives. Thus, in a period of economic growth with expanding labor demands in the Western world, quite a few migrants took advantage of the ICEM services, either before their embarkation in their homelands or after their disembarkation in the receiving countries, and chose to take up employment opportunities other than those they were recruited or transferred for; some chose to flee to another city or even another country (Tastsoglou, 2009, pp. 98–100, 106; Limnios-Sekeris, 2013, p. 78). Better employment conditions or the attractions and advantages of other types of work lured the newcomers into other occupations, upsetting the receiving countries' policies, as well the Committee's logistic and financial arrangements.[10] However, whatever the internal conflicts, contradictions and uncertainties in peripheral societies and notwithstanding the agency of migrants, international institutions in the early Cold War reinforced global and local structural asymmetries and restricted the range of perceived alternatives.

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[10] Sotirios Agapitides, "Report on the Greek migration to Latin America," August 31, 1963, p. 2, Latin America, IOM-GR, Athens; Folder: Sponge Divers, IOM-GR, Athens.

In its struggle against the Communist Bloc and its attempt to steer the future first of Europe and then of developing countries, the United States, still the uncontested hegemonic power of the Western world in the early Cold War era, through the manipulation of international organizations along many other means, managed to construct the "free world" and cement its cohesion obscuring the economic inequalities within it, and to project a plan of economic convergence for the "Third World" (Romero, 2014, pp. 689–690, 702; Cullather, 2000, pp. 642, 653). But postwar modernization was a dynamic project that was contested not only between blocs but also within them (Engerman & Unger, 2009, pp. 377, 380). Soon, therefore, both international organizations and the concept of development were also mobilized by actors that were in a subordinate position; these actors, appropriated both the universalist language of the time and its discourses on modernization asserting in international forums and elsewhere "that people of all races could lay claim to a globally defined standard of living" (Cooper & Packard, 1997, p. 30; Cooper, 1997, pp. 75, 84).

From the Interwar period onwards, attempts to manage human mobility led to a proliferation of national and international laws, official regulatory practices, techniques of surveillance and identification, and of state and inter-governmental bureaucracies to enforce and implement them; nevertheless, up to now all this has sustained nation-states as the primary units of political organization (Gamlen, 2011, p. xx). International migration management up to today seems to have been a political strategy elaborated in order to bring together state and trans-state levels of political power, with a view to enhance the control and filtering of human mobility while retaining state sovereignty (Stenum, 2011). Although migration management became increasingly international during the twentieth century, this internationalization did not undermine sovereign control over mobility or the delimitation of insiders/outsiders (Geiger & Pécoud, 2012, p. 6; Geiger & Pécoud, 2013, p. 5). In this context, the PICMME/ICEM/ICM/IOM, from its creation onwards, elaborated proactive steering policies organizing, guiding and delimiting migration; it formulated strategies which combined control with the encouragement of some forms of mobility (Geiger & Pécoud, 2010, p. 15), in an attempt to turn migration into a more orderly, predictable and manageable process mainly to the benefit of the more powerful sovereign states. The PICMME/ICEM/ICM/IOM managed,

on the one hand, to endure by constantly reinventing its role and functions (Geiger & Pécoud, 2013, p. 6), but on the other hand it survived and expanded its scope because of one of its constant features, i.e. that it was and continues to be a service organization operating mainly on behalf of powerful Western receiving states (Hansen, Koehler & Money, p. 133).

From the early Cold War era onwards, both state and trans-state migration management institutions defined, sorted and channeled particular categories of people, elaborating uneven processes of documenting, differentiating and filtering populations in order to enhance or impede their possibilities of movement (Gamlen, 2011, p. xvi). These procedures did not only rely on coercion; protection and persuasion were equally developed as mechanisms of control distinguishing between the desirable and the undesirable (Geiger & Pécoud, 2012; Geiger & Pécoud, 2013, p. 2). Ordering migration implied a continuous process of categorization of migrants, with each category deserving distinct treatment, reproducing the segmented character of the global labor market which discriminates along racial, ethnic, class and gender lines (Munck, 2008, p. 1234; Pécoud, 2015, p. 83). At the same time, by assuming that migrants existed as a group of their own that shared no common characteristics with non-migrants, migration management agencies, and the discourses they emitted, never envisaged a situation in which migrants and nationals could share interests because of their social position (Pécoud, 2015, p. 118).

Eventually, while claiming to benefit all parties, the narratives on migration developed by these international agencies were the product of power games in which weak actors had to articulate their positions in the dominant framework in order to be heard and funded (Pécoud, 2015, p. 64). Migration policies in weak sending or receiving countries were thus shaped in a way that fitted into the powerful receiving states' interests, while seemingly also serving the needs of the less developed countries (Geiger & Pécoud, 2013, p. 6). Their triple-win discourses, with their apparent consensual nature, by claiming to conciliate irreconcilable political objectives and to transcend political dilemmas, negated the existence of divergent interests and conflicts, eliminated power issues and naturalized inequalities (Geiger & Pécoud, 2010, p. 11; Geiger & Pécoud, 2013, p. 13; Pécoud, 2015 pp. 121–122).

Epilogue: The Visible and Invisible Hands of "Migration Management"

Dimitria Groutsis

Introduction and Overview

In reflecting on the recent past, the epilogue to this volume provides a springboard from which to embark on future research in the largely contested terrain of "migration management." Framed and informed by the emergent themes around the transforming history of "migration management"; the role of international organizations and state regulatory bodies who shape the agenda; and, the role of various stakeholders in the governance of migration, this chapter positions the significance of a network governance approach to "migration management." The context under consideration includes the role of private and commercial interests amongst other non-state actors as critical agents in the structure, approach and relations defining migration governance today. While there is little dispute surrounding the presence of such agents throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, there is at best a partial scholarship documenting their role in the regulation of migration, particularly when compared to the role and relevance of macro-level stakeholder arrangements, which occupies the bulk of the scholarship.

Departing from such a tradition, Cook-Martin (2008) for instance, forensically traces the transition from the "free movement" of migrants who were assisted by transport providers, recruitment agencies and church groups, among others, to what became state-administered regulations supported by bureaucratic red tape. His examination of migration from Italy and Spain to Argentina from the late nineteenth century into the early twentieth century provides a unique insight into how non-state agencies became subsumed by the state in both the sending and receiving countries. Cook-Martin's (2008) examination of the transition from relatively free mobility to a state administered approach

to migration regulation indeed lays important foundations for our understanding of the complexities surrounding mobility and the stakeholders coordinating this process. While so, there is a third site of investigation, which, one can argue, has emerged as a result of another historical turn, set within the context of market liberalization.

This context brings to bear the interplay and reciprocal influences between non-state agents and the state; and, between free mobility and bureaucratic control. This "third way" captures the intersecting influences between state and non-state actors and is informed by earlier approaches to migration regulation where similarly to conditions in the early 1900s: "Concrete interests motivate mobile workers, employers, transportation entrepreneurs and government officials, but laws, bureaucracies and administrative practices define and change these very motivations" (Cook-Martin, 2008, p. 28). Using such inferences as a springboard for exploration, this chapter embraces a new scholarly lens to elaborate: (a) the role and presence of the binary and reciprocal relationship, between state and non-state actors, (b) the context that has proliferated this relationship, and (c) potential implications.

In light of space constraints, the chapter does not aim to catalog the breadth and depth of non-state agents and their unique relationship with various stakeholders, nor does it aim to examine the actions and implications of these agents in different geographical settings. Rather, the purpose of the chapter is to place these agents on the map as central players in the regulation of migration.

Following attention to arrangements contextualizing the regulation of migration are questions surrounding the implications for the "management of migration" and what this means within a context that operates along vertical and horizontal lines and within multiple levels. This chapter seeks to commence an important conversation around these issues, setting the foundations for further inquiry.

Foregrounding this conversation are the preceding chapters in this volume, which provide an historical examination of the role, responsibility and actions of various stakeholders. Notably, the spotlight is placed on the state and international organizations and the approach to and "management" of migration by these bodies in the early Cold War period. As signaled above, a number of key themes are drawn out from the volume's contributions including: the historical

transformation in the "management" of migration; the role of international organizations in shaping the agenda; the centrality of state sovereignty in the regulation of migration; the discourse on migration regulation; and, relations between and within key stakeholders in the process of migration regulation. Together, these threads form an important contribution to our understanding of the complex and dynamic nature of regulations underscoring migration governance in the second half of the twentieth century and into the twenty-first century.

To distil these issues further, the chapter considers two key features of migration governance which have characterised the twentieth and twenty-first centuries: first, the centrality of state sovereignty and the shift from multi-level migration governance to a network governance approach; and second, within this context the chapter turns to questions surrounding the discourse of "migration management."

From Multilevel Migration Governance to Network Governance

To shed light on transitions from multi-level migration governance to a network governance approach this section begins with an examination of a number of examples, using a politico-economic lens combined with insights from the governance scholarship. As noted earlier, the chapter does not endeavor to provide an exhaustive insight into the breadth of examples from around the globe; it rather draws attention to the importance of considering the process of "migration management" through the lens of a network governance model, by turning to discrete cases. Let us turn first to a brief snapshot of Australia as a case in point, before reflecting on the European Union's approach to migration governance.

Throughout the post-Second World War period, Australia's immigration policies have been inextricably linked to servicing the needs of an expanding labor market in times of labor shortage (Collins, 1988; Jupp, 2007) while also facilitating family reunification and refugee and asylum seeker settlement (Jupp, 2003; Neumann, 2015). Australia's federalist history has set the context for various levels of policy-making. It is a structure that has resulted in often contradictory influences on the approach to migration policy and the governance

of migration. Although the federal arm of the state has largely assumed responsibility for migration policy throughout the period following the Second World War, the various states' bargaining strength has certainly informed and influenced national decision-making and agenda setting (Groutsis, 2003; Jupp, 2007). Also, complicating the path to policy formation has been the different party politics between the various tiers of the state (i.e. State and Federal), whereby the policies themselves have been shaped by the political hue of the government of the day (Groutsis, 2003; Jupp, 2007). The state thus functions "like a constellation of competing interests" (Witz, 1992).[1] Add to this the voice, resources and influence of employers (and the labor market more broadly), trade unions and non-government organizations and the varied contributions to migration governance: Be they formal or informal, direct or indirect, are very real.

Varying interests and influences located at multiple levels have similarly characterised the European Union approach to migration regulation. According to Zincone and Caponio (2004), this results in stakeholders exercising their power through a vertical line of negotiation and decision-making, involving a delicate balance between the uniquely national considerations coupled with and guided by European Union-level arrangements. These arrangements are complicated by the length of time that the member state has been part of the European Union. Zincone and Caponio (2004) define multi-level governance as incorporating a two directional approach to decision-making and regulatory outcomes around "migration management." The first is a top-down direction, which involves the formal machinery or "higher level institutions," which they describe as the parliament, bureaucracy, and the state. The second is a bottom-up direction which they separate into two categories, one involving decisions emerging from lower level government enforcing their interests on higher layers

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[1] A variety of theoretical approaches set an explanatory framework of the state's role. A thorough study of the statist approach can be found in the work of: Skocpol (1985), Alchian and Demsetz (1972), Williamson (1975), Moe (1984), and Perrow (1986), who examine the neoclassical approach; Bell and Head (1994) and Bell (1997), who examine the pluralist and institutionalist approach; Offe (1972, 1974, 1975), who follows the classical Marxist perspective; Connell (1977), who examines the ruling class perspective; Poulantzas (1972, 1973, 1976, 1978), who examines the neo-Marxist model; Betts (2013), who examines regime theory.

of the bureaucracy; and the second involving informal stakeholders representing the interests of particular groups while negotiating outcomes by influencing lower and higher level formal institutional actors.

While such insights have provided an important contribution to forming an appreciation and understanding of the flow and lines of decision-making in migration governance, they essentially capture a linear direction to migration regulation. This linear pathway means that we overwhelmingly neglect to consider the horizontal arrangements, resources and powers and relations coupled with visible and less visible actors in what is a far more complex network approach to governance (de Haas, 2010).

Indeed, relations between and within non-state and commercial agencies alongside the state machinery have been as evident in many Western sending and receiving countries throughout the post-Second World War period, as they were in the early part of the twentieth century. However, the changes in the context underscoring these relations have been profound, particularly over the course of the last three decades. Against a backdrop of market liberalization, since the late 1980s we have witnessed a "hollowing out" and decentering of state mobilised services, support and infrastructure in a variety of different publicly administered areas, including migration (Groutsis et al., 2015). Following this, we have seen a related redistribution of such services and arrangements to commercially driven and non-state agents (Goodin, Rein & Moran, 2006; Rhodes, 2007; Geddes et al., 2012a; Geddes et al., 2012b). This trend has been notable throughout the Western world with a convergence of practice to a more diffuse network of agents operating either independently of the state and/or working with it in the process of "migration management." Therefore, what is new and different about the current arrangements to the past is the context within which such arrangements are played out, where a market-based approach, in the main receiving countries, has embedded the "migration industry" alongside the state machinery for migration regulation (Geiger & Pécoud, 2010; Geiger & Pécoud, 2012; Geiger & Pécoud, 2013; Geiger & Pécoud, 2014; Gammeltoft-Hansen & Nyberg Sørensen, 2013; Spener, 2009).

Rhodes (2007, p. 1251) notes that "the history of governance during the 20th century appears as a shifting balance between government and governance." Drawing and expanding on the work of Rhodes, the work of governance

scholars certainly provides a solid foundation from which to build a framework for understanding the fracturing of macro-level arrangements in the regulation of migration (Rhodes, 1997; Rhodes, 1998; Triandafyllidou, 2003; Rhodes, 2007). Constructing a more complex framework can help us conceptualize the emergent strengths and weaknesses of network arrangements, allowing us to make sense of the consequences of a network governance model for migration regulation and, more specifically, the explicit and implicit intentions of and relations between the stakeholders within this process. Indeed, understanding this nuanced structure to "migration management" raises a challenge to the "normative goals that one believes migration governance should fulfil" (Betts, 2013, p. 59; Betts, 2011).

Supporting the devolution of migration regulation has been a demand-driven approach to migration popularised by the main receiving countries such as Canada, Australia, the United States and New Zealand, and more recently adopted in countries such as Sweden and Norway. In contrast to permanent migration pathways, temporary and demand-driven migration arrangements have become the privileged approach to migration (Wright, 2012; Groutsis & Venturas, 2015; van den Broek et al., 2015). This is certainly not a new migration pathway, but it has been expanded in countries that traditionally sourced migrants for permanent settlement (Gonos, 1997; Groutsis & Venturas, 2015). This transition has seen to a tighter and more direct link between employer/labor market demand (meso-level interests and arrangements) and migration to satisfy immediate labor market needs (the micro-level) (Groutsis & Venturas, 2015; Wright et al., 2015). While the state continues to determine migration regulations, the interests of employers, recruitment agents and the labor market more broadly, have come to play a critical role—fusing together state and non-state interests, while "skilled" and job-ready migrants have come to feature as the dominant group to attract (Groutsis et al., 2015). Such a context raises questions about the role of migration intermediaries in the regulation of migration.

Migration intermediaries or migration brokers intervene at critical junctures in the process of migration and have come to play a *de facto* role in migration regulation. These intermediary operators can include: (a) legally legitimate and publically recognised formal and informal bodies, such as government agencies,

recruitment and migration agents located in the sending and receiving countries; professional associations; employers; ethno-specific networks and, ethno-specific organizations; and (b) bodies located in the shadows, such as traffickers and people smugglers (Groutsis et al., 2015).

While these agents remain largely invisible in academic scholarship, policy documents and the media, they have been and continue to be key actors in their own right determining the facilitation, "management" and process of migration regulation. Notably, the patchy literature that does exist tends to focus on a discrete group of intermediaries, such as traffickers of irregular migrants, and those assisting migrants at the mid- to low-skilled end of the labor market. In contrast, little is known about the relationship of agents servicing the needs of skilled migrants (Castles & Miller, 2009; Jokisch, 2007; Moreno-Fontes Chammartin, 2005; Katseli et al., 2006; van den Broek et al., 2015; Wright et al., 2015; Groutsis et al., 2015). Empirical investigations in this area therefore provide fertile ground for future investigation.

It can be argued that the centrality of multiple stakeholders in the regulation of migration provides migrants, be they skilled or low-skilled, with choice in terms of services and access to information regarding the approach to and regulation of migration. Multiple agents may for instance be drawn on in tandem at different points in the migration and integration process (such as migration agents and recruitment agents), or may in fact operate as a partnership (such as, for instance and paradoxically, government authorities and traffickers). In contrast, migrants may also rely on the services of only one agent in the initial stage of migration (for instance a migration agent) and post arrival draw on the services of another agent (professional association) in isolation of the pre-migration phase. So, while the services of these stakeholders may be drawn on randomly and in no specific order, when taken together they form a complex network of assistance for the migrant who is within such a context also responsible for "managing" the process of migration themselves: commencing with the pre-migration phase, moving into the process of mobility and ending in the post-migration integration phase (Geiger & Pécoud, 2014).[2]

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[2] Geiger and Pécoud note the neglect of the individual and household level in the examination of migration management.

Recent evidence has brought to light the growing responsibilities of migration intermediaries in the "management" of the migration process with their services ranging from minimal or no fee, to significant costs to the migrant for assistance (Castles & Miller, 2009; Groutsis et al., 2015; van den Broek et al., 2015). Importantly, the transactional exchange between the migrant and the intermediary has come to shape the relationship between the parties involved, and therefore the expectations and behaviors of these parties. In addition to this, such relations also shape the outcomes for different groups in the migration process. For instance, in drawing on the work of Forde and Mackenzie (2011, p. 33), Groutsis et al., (2015) note that "a business case logic to employment agency operations [in the process of migration] has served to consolidate race, gender and class divisions and therefore labour market segmentation along these lines" (see also Agunias, 2012; Rahman, 2011; van Hear et al., 2012). Indeed, the intended and unintended consequences of what is a more complex process to "migration management," dependent on and motivated by a variety of different actors, requires careful and deeper investigation.

In sum, the spread and fragmentation of service delivery and support structures to a diffuse suite of stakeholders while not a new phenomenon has gained momentum. The devolution and deregulation of public services and the subsequent re-regulation of such services and arrangements, which has fused together multiple stakeholders, has laid the groundwork for the expansion of such agents. As noted above, in contrast to state-based and macro-level arrangements a variety of different stakeholders share power and resources in the "management of migration": shaping and determining which migrants enter the country and on what terms. In addition to this, responsibility for the process of migrant settlement and integration has also shifted to the individual and meso-level. The lines of decision making in this model of migration governance are therefore horizontal and vertical; and, formal and informal, creating a network structure to migration regulation, which is both transparent and opaque. Notably, the argument here is that the presence and influence of non-state actors is important in the present migration landscape (Groutsis et al., 2015; Salt & Stein, 1997; Geiger & Pécoud, 2013). Within the current context, their shape, nature, role and contribution to migration processes and regulations have changed and they have emerged as a key stakeholder in the

migration process, ensuring that their interests are met in the determination of migration outcomes.

There are both pros and cons to this network structure. Migrants can potentially access greater sources of information about and services surrounding the process of migration (de Haas, 2010). Consequently, such support and services expedite the migration process and facilitate positive outcomes for the migrant once they settle in the receiving country. In contrast, migrants may be exposed to misinformation, greater restrictions and (potentially) exploitative and indentured conditions. The expectation of a financial exchange between the migrant and the agent managing the process of migration, in addition to the devolution of responsibility to a disparate and largely unmonitored group of stakeholders, means that the migrant's access to quality and quantity resources about the process of migration presents significant challenges. As noted, much of the onus is placed on the migrants themselves to navigate their way through the process while they rely on the goodwill of the stakeholder coordinating and facilitating the process (Groutsis et al., 2015). Within such a context, what does migration regulation mean? And who is "managing" the process? Does the deregulation and re-regulation of "migration management" in the context of network governance raise new sites of investigation? The following section poses some preliminary ideas.

Network Governance: A New Context for Migration Management

While coordinated, regulated or "orderly" migration has been the preferred approach to mobility in the second half of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, the term "migration management" which was coined by Bimal Ghosh in 1993 is relatively new to the lingua franca of migration regulation (Ghosh, 1993; Ghosh, 2000; Ghosh, 2012). The notion of "migration management" signals that migration is a well-coordinated process: That is, it does not happen by accident. Signaling the importance of coordinated migration, Ghosh's reports and scholarly works emphasized the potential negative consequences transpiring from a lack of order, providing justification for an infrastructure to "manage" international migration. His three-pillar model recommended that "migration management" should be driven by transparent principles

involving shared objectives, monitoring processes and convergent norms, whereby migration is informed by an economic or demand-driven imperative (Ghosh, 1993; Ghosh, 2000; Ghosh, 2012). In spite of what can best be described as a sanitised and business-like notion of mobility, the term "migration management" was discredited in 2005 when the *Global Commission on International Migration* rejected the term as a result of concerns that it evoked a restrictive and controlled approach to migration. Migration governance was offered as the alternative term to "migration management," with the former term seen as a response to a unidirectional imagery of controlled migration. Instead, migration governance was seen to knit together the desires of migrants to leave the sending country, the importance of responding to humanitarian needs and the importance of ensuring that the demands of the destination/receiving countries are met, instead of Ghosh's neoclassical lens which saw the management of migration as creating a win-win based on supply and demand equilibrium (Kalm, 2012). Is the distinction between these terms real or imagined? Does migration governance not prescribe particular rules for controlled, coordinated and orderly migration? Are there not similarities therefore between the terms "migration management," "migration governance" and "migration regulation," where all are implicitly informed by a power dynamic privileging particular groups such as those with skills, from particular countries and with financial capital for instance?

The literature on the discourse of "migration management" largely focuses on macro-level stakeholder arrangements and can be placed into two categories. The first presents a normative/prescriptive take on the discourse of migration management (Ghosh, 2012); the second is informed by a critical perspective (Geiger & Pécoud, 2011). While both categories of scholarship make a useful contribution, the extant literature overlooks the many stakeholders involved in constructing and regulating the migration process, including stakeholders within supranational and national agencies, government and non-government agencies, commercially driven intermediaries, informal family and kinship networks and individuals. Migration governance (or management) therefore needs to be understood at various and intersecting levels of analysis. Importantly, the many theories of migration provide us with different considerations about where the decision to migrate is located and how the process

of migration is coordinated and "managed." But there is no composite and complete understanding, which makes room for the importance of a discourse lens to migration governance.

To illustrate this point further, let us consider whether or not "migration management" is shaped and understood by: (a) politico-economic dynamics, and therefore understood by examining and interpreting political and policy-driven discourse, (b) societal/industry/group dynamics, and therefore understood by interpreting the voice and policy prescriptions emerging from trade unions, professional associations, industry groups, workers more generally and other special interest groups (pro or anti-migration) or (c) individual/household dynamics, and therefore understood by making sense of the management of migration at the household level, placing the narrative of individuals at the center of the analysis?

While interpreting the significance and weight of the various policies, slogans and terms in the "management of migration" has provided some useful insights, when interpreting the nuances surrounding "migration management" within a single level conceptualization and context means we are missing out on important cues in our understanding of migration governance with particular facets of this story therefore neglected—temporally and spatially. Notwithstanding, important institutional and organizational dynamics and frameworks that shape migration governance, identity characteristics (including migration status, country of origin, ethnicity and gender) also shape the perceptions and experiences of the process of migration and provide us with vital indicators or prompts on how the process of migration has been regulated. Too often we neglect to engage with the insights of the migrant men and women whose experiences are directly shaped by and who simultaneously construct their own narrative of their experience of the process of migration governance. Particularly silent have been the voices of migrant women (Donato & Gabbacia, 2015).

In order to address these shortcomings, the work of a number of scholars provides useful insights. Simpson and Lewis (2007), Phillips and Hardy (2002), van Djik (1993) and Fairclough, Mulderrig and Wodak (2011) all challenge the normative and unidimensional approaches to understanding inclusionary and exclusionary patterns of discourse through feminist and critical discourse analysis. Importantly, their works draw attention to making the invisible visible

while also taking into consideration multiple and intersecting levels of analysis.

Driven by a social constructivist epistemology, Simpson and Lewis (2007) establish a parsimonious binary categorization, which consists of surface and deep level approaches of analysis (Phillips & Hardy, 2002). The surface level includes observable discourse pathways constructed over time, which are supported by conventions, rules, regulations and laws, clearly visible in the physical manifestation of the bodies that determine how migration is regulated. This is combined with the deep level analysis, which captures less visible or hidden discourse pathways and includes for instance the processes and people that construct the surface pathways. Without an examination of the deep level we neglect the processes that reinforce and reproduce the pre-existing norms and structures, which ensure that "certain issues" (and certain groups of migrants) remain "hidden from view" (Simpson & Lewis, 2007, p. 7). Importantly, the surface and deep level categorization brings to light the inclusive/exclusive, internal/external, formal/informal dimensions of "migration management" and begins to shed light on who is in fact regulating the process of migration. At the heart of this analysis is an analysis of the context, text and discourses surrounding migration regulation. As Kress (1995, p. 122) notes: "Texts are the sites of the emergence of complexes of social meanings, produced in the particular history of the situation of production, that record in partial ways the histories of both the participants in the production of the text and of the institutions that are "invoked" or brought into play, indeed a partial history of the language and the social system, a partiality due to the structurings of relations of power of the participants." An analysis of such multi-scale dynamics is critical in order to understand how migration regulation has changed over time and whether or not "migration governance" offers an alternative to "migration management," how it differs and why it differs. Following on from this, such a lens affords us the ability to establish who is contributing to the construction of migration regulation/s.

In short, examining the discourse of migration management allows us to interpret and make sense of what are largely hidden aspects of "migration management" around identity, power, ideological and policy agendas. We are able to do so at multiple levels of analysis by "connecting texts to discourses, locating them in a historical and social context, by which we refer to particular actors,

relationships, and practices that characterize the situation under study" (Phillips & Hardy, 2002, p. 4). Discourse is the purveyor of the production, reproduction and reinforcement of both explicit and implicit power and control, granting particular groups, countries, and agencies power and control while rendering others powerless. These features of the process and social construction of migration governance provide an important basis for future research.

Conclusion

The presence of various interconnected and at times unrelated stakeholders in the "management of migration" throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries highlights the social construction of the migration landscape. The collection of papers in this volume draws attention to: (a) hidden and explicit political, ideological and economic power plays between and within international organizations representing the interests of a coalition of country interests; (b) state sovereignty, with an emphasis on creating a delicate balance between protecting country borders, security and a steady stream of migrants to fill labor market vacancies while not creating a dangerous labor market reserve; and (c) the presence of a network of stakeholders who challenge the structure and nature of migration regulation, raising questions about "who" is regulating the process and the implications of the disparate network arrangements determining migration outcomes (Fassmann et al., 2005).

The essentially centrally coordinated effort defining the migration governance in the post-Second World War period has been disrupted and dismantled since the 1990s with the rising importance and presence of multiple stakeholders, driven by a business-case approach to "migration management." The growing commercialization, professionalization, expansion and development of migration intermediaries, has resulted in the consolidation of a thriving industry in the "management of migration" (van Hear et al., 2012). In short, the largely fee-driven exchange between the migrant and the intermediary; a devolution of authority to the localised level coupled with negotiations at the national and supranational level; and, a disparate, (un)coordinated and largely unmonitored array of interconnected stakeholders raises important questions about the process of migration more broadly and the implications

of the approach to regulating migration for all involved: the migrants themselves, the sending and receiving countries and for the various stakeholders. The complex model of network governance raises what are unexplored consequences for all involved in the process of migration (Wright et al., 2015), and as such provides a fertile site for future research.

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