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**Foreign Policy/Foreign Aid Nexus: Aims,  
Goals, and Means of Greece's Development  
Assistance to Palestine**

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### **«Δήλωση μη Λογοκλοπής και ανάληψης προσωπικής ευθύνης»**

Δηλώνω ότι η εργασία που παραδίδει είναι αποτέλεσμα πρωτότυπης έρευνας και δεν χρησιμοποιώ πνευματική ιδιοκτησία τρίτων χωρίς αναφορές. Επίσης δηλώνω ότι αναλαμβάνω όλες τις νομικές και διοικητικές συνέπειες που δύναται να αντιμετωπίσω σε περίπτωση που η εργασία του αποδεχθεί ότι αποτελεί προϊόν λογοκλοπής.

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## **Abbreviations**

<b>DAC</b>	Development Assistance Committee
<b>EMU</b>	Economic and Monetary Union
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>GUPS</b>	General Union of Palestinian Student
<b>MPSO</b>	<i>Mediterranean Progressive Socialist Organisation</i>
<b>ND</b>	New Democracy
<b>ODA</b>	Official Development Assistance
<b>OECD</b>	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
<b>PA</b>	Palestinian Authority
<b>PASOK</b>	PanHellenic Socialist Movement
<b>PLO</b>	Palestine Liberation Organisation
<b>PNA</b>	Palestinian Authority

## **NOTE ON TRANSLATION**

Unless otherwise noted, all translations from Arabic and Greek are my own.

## **Abstract**

This paper will examine the motivational factors of Greece's development assistance to Palestine, under the prism of the foreign aid/foreign policy nexus. This paper will use ideational frames that will serve as a link between the national identity, foreign policy discourse and foreign aid policy, in order to conceptualise and better understand the motivation variables in the development assistance of Greece to Palestine. This paper will argue that the foreign aid policy of Greece traversed three different frames, which were informed by ideals reflecting both the national identity and the foreign policy discourse; namely, reputation and self-assertion, obligation and duty and finally, enlightened self-interest. Contrary to the widely held view, this paper will argue that the changes in the Greek discourse and practices were driven by agency rather than from structural imposition.



## 1. Introduction

*It is difficult for foreigners to understand our policy toward the Arabs,  
a policy based on a traditional friendship and long-term interests*  
**Panayotis Kanellopoulos**

This dissertation shall examine the aims, goals, and means of the development assistance of Greece to the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), under the prism of the nexus between foreign-aid policy and foreign policy. The conceptualisation of foreign aid may be considered a microcosm of states' foreign policies; 'for every donor, a different story can be told about the use of aid as an agent of national interest' (Veen, 2011: 12). This study examines the years 1980-2014, focusing on the period Oslo peace process period (1993-2000), as the PLO returned from exile to Palestine. During this period, Palestine was receiving large flows of development assistance from the international community, including Greece. Yet, little attention has been given the foreign aid policy of Greece. This paper will try to present the conceptualisation of Greece's foreign aid. The period of Oslo, is crucial both from Greece and Palestine, in regards to the foreign aid/foreign policy nexus, as Greece was undergoing drastic changes. Thus, in order to understand the conceptualisation of Greece's foreign-aid policy in 1990s, it is required to reference the process of Europeanisation. More particularly, the study will examine the extent to which the foreign-aid/foreign policy nexus of Greece was affected by the Europeanisation process. The peak of the process is considered to be the accession of Greece to the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in 2000, as stimulated a series of Europeanisation policies that affected every aspect of the economic and political realities of Greece. The dissertation aims to trace the shifts that occurred in the development aid policy of Greece and the foreign policy during the Europeanisation process. Subsequently, this shall elucidate the dynamics of the foreign-aid/foreign policy nexus.

The broader questions that this dissertation poses are: a) how does a relatively small country of the European Union such as Greece engage with the conceptualisation of foreign aid and its practices as a donor?; b) how did Europeanisation affect foreign aid policy, and by extension foreign policy? These questions shed light on the foreign aid/ foreign policy nexus.

## **1.1. Literature Review**

This paper draws from two broad scholarly fields. On the one hand, the foreign aid field, which is in itself multidimensional and has different subfields; and on the other, the Europeanisation of foreign policy and foreign aid policy. The conventional literature that engages with the motivation of foreign aid is mainly framed in a debate between those who argue that foreign aid is an act of altruism and those who regard it as a matter of national interest. Pratt (1989) dubs these two camps international realism versus humane internationalism. The altruist camp draws on the liberal idealist or Wilsonian school of thought, which argue that aid should take the form of philanthropy within the realm of foreign policy. This school of thought posits that the objective of development assistance is to reduce poverty and create sustainable development in poorer countries (Zimmerman, 2007: 3-11). For donors, as (Blunt et al) postulate, ‘the crescendos of such discourse are the international meetings held periodically in places like Monterrey (2002), Rome (2003), Marrakech (2004), Paris (2005) and Accra (2008) [... where] altruistic intentions and motivations concerning development assistance are taken at face value’ (p. 179). There is a growing critique from within the proponents of altruism regarding the limited efficiency of aid in confronting poverty. Browne (2006), for example, argued that ‘aid is still poorly matched to need... [because] the content and terms of aid are strongly influenced by the needs and interests of suppliers rather than recipients’ (p. 137). Nevertheless, altruism have been rather dominant in the foreign aid literature (Ohlin: 1966; Wittkopt: 1972; Holdar: 1993; Lumsdaine: 1993; Gounder: 1995), refuting, directly or indirectly, the notion of donors gain.

In contrast, according to an international political realist perspective, states are primarily driven by the desire for military and economic power. Yet, there are many scholars such as Meier, (1974); Todaro, (1981); Maizels and Nissanke, (1984); Griffin, (1986) that warn of donors self-interest. Particularly, Murshed (2009) and Moyo (2009) have continued the critique, arguing that aid is designed principally to provide economic benefits for donors and to serve ‘domestic special interests’. Wright and Winters (2010, p. 63) who asserted that ‘we know’ that ‘significant amounts of aid ... [are] given to governments for geopolitical reasons’ and that ‘recipient country need is only one factor among many strategic interests for donor countries’. Likewise, the survey of Abouassi (2010) on non-governmental organisations found evidence that aid is always linked to the donor’s national interest or political agenda. This is in accord with White (2006), who suggests

that, although both altruism and self-interest are motivations for giving foreign aid, donor interests dominate.

Nevertheless, the notion of self-interest, among aid motivation scholars, is solely framed and related to material and/or military gains. It may be argued that there is a Manichean rhetoric created by the binary of motivations (self-interest or humanitarian concerns). Some scholars even posit that the literature is ‘trapped in something of an intellectual vacuum’ (Schrader, Hook & Taylor (1998: 295). The inconsistencies that occur in the vast literature of aid motivation, is best described by Veen (2011: 2):

‘The factors shaping foreign aid remain ill-understood, more than half a century after Morgenthau first described the policy as ‘baffling’. Aid levels rise and fall without obvious causes. Explanatory factors that appear important in one case are insignificant in another. And case studies of different aid programmes frequently explain similar empirical patterns using incompatible models. One of the best recent studies on foreign aid frankly concludes that ‘There are too many interacting variables to justify a model that would be both parsimonious and insightful...’

Furthermore, most of the literature tends to limit its analysis to super-powers or strong nations with a colonial past, such as the US, Germany, Russia, Britain, France and so on. This renders the theories almost inadequate to theorize and analyse foreign aid policy of weak or small countries. As a result, countries like Greece which are not great powers and do not have colonial pasts are excluded *a priori* from these studies. This occurs even in highly popular case-studies such as PLO/Palestine that usually attract scholarly attention. Hence, while there is a rich literature on the foreign aid of countries such as the US and Britain to Palestine, there is almost none on small countries such as Greece. Arguably, this gap, particularly among the realist school of thought, occurs as a result of focusing overly on categorizing motivation as aiming at material and/or military gains, which might be not as pronounced among small countries.

Under this prism, in order to avoid this Manichean pattern that tends ‘to assume the dominance of one particular category of goals over all others’ (Veen, 2011: 2), I shall base my argument on the ideational factors of aid policy and the non-economic gains that occur and motivate foreign aid policy. The nuance here is that the motivation of such a policy does not have to be either a matter of altruism or of economic and material gain. Instead, the motivation of foreign aid policy may rest on non-material gains.

On the other hand, motivations and capacity for independent foreign policy are framed and restricted within the context of bilateral, regional and international obligations and norms. More particularly, regional organisations that favour policy harmonization tend to co-opt and influence

the foreign policy of individual states. This is particularly evident in the case of the EU that is one of most integrated regional organisations. Europeanisation theories (Ladrech: 1994; Anderson and Eliassen: 1993; Seers: 1979, 1981) usually revolve around a structure/agency debate giving pre-eminence to the former. Naturally, this effect is stronger for smaller countries that have limited resources and influence. Hence, Greece as a small member state within the EU is subjected to structural pressures that leave limited space for agency. This intensified with Greece's effort to conform to the EMU requirements during the 1990s. Nevertheless, while Europeanisation literature usually tends to assume a structural superiority over the agency of member states, this paper does not intend to delve into a structure-agency debate. On the contrary, the paper shall examine the margins for independent foreign aid policy under structural pressures. Hence, the paper will focus on the agency of Greece in its foreign aid policy formation, during the process of Europeanisation.

## **1.2. Methodology**

The methodology I shall employ is based mainly on primary sources. I have conducted 12 interviews with people involved both in the economic and political aspects of Greek-Palestinian relations. The interviews were open-ended in order to investigate possibly unknown elements and influences on the formulation of foreign aid policy. Thus, the questions posed to the interviewees changed according to their experience. More details on the set of questions asked throughout the field research and the background of the interviewees may be found in the appendices section. In addition, the paper relies on secondary sources; namely, data from official documents from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Greece- particularly from the department of Hellenic Aid, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the State of Palestine, and some documents from the files of some pundits in the Embassy of the State of Palestine in Athens, Greece and records of the Greek Parliament. The dissertation draws from the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) reports from the official websites of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and other financial institutions. A discursive analysis will be employed on the aforementioned material, which shall enable the examination of how the conceptualisation of foreign aid policy is reflected in the orientation of foreign policy.

In order to demonstrate the effect of Europeanisation on Greek foreign policy and its development assistance policy, the study will follow a chronologic and thematic structure. As Hans

Morgenthau (1960, as cited in Veen 2011: 5) has posited, the ‘baffling nature of aid policy is explained by the fact *that different ideas about aid have been dominant at different times* and in different donor states’ (emphasis added). By the same token, in order to understand the goals, aims, and means of development assistance of Greece to Palestine during the Oslo years, the study shall purposely focus on how the Greek foreign aid policy evolved over time; the 1980s, 1990s and finally up to the 2000s. By viewing the conceptualisation of foreign aid policy across time, the paper will be able to shed light on the foreign aid policy during the Oslo period by comparing and contrasting the period that proceeded and followed. The Oslo period is chronologically as extending from 1993 and the formation of the Palestinian interim-self-government in 1995 until the breakout of the Second Intifada in 2000.

Parallel to the chronological axis, Greek foreign policy has evolved in thematic terms. The two main themes that occur are: first, the motivation engendered in foreign aid/foreign policy nexus, which will focus more on the ideational frame that will be used in the paper; and second, the Europeanisation process, which marks the shift of the foreign aid/foreign policy nexus vis-à-vis the development assistance of Greece to Palestine

Although in similar studies the issues of corruption and aid efficiency are central, this paper will assess this only superficially given that the focus is not on the effect of the foreign aid policy of the recipient country but rather on the motivation that informs foreign aid policy in the first place. Furthermore, the study will focus primarily on the bilateral aid donation rather than multilateral aid donation. This is due to the very nature of multilateral. As observed by Veen (2011: 19) the multilateral aid is hardly evident and ‘less straightforward’, and it is generally viewed ‘as more humanitarian’; while it is ‘channelled through EU agencies as regarded as an obligation associated with their EU membership’.

Both the strength and the weakness of this study lie on the selection of the case-study. Greek-Palestinian relations have received little attention in academia in the last decade and have been replaced by either Israeli-Greek relations in light of the newly established cooperation of the two and/or EU-Palestinian relations. On the other hand, the weakness of a signal case-study can hardly engender a general theory of understanding the foreign aid/foreign policy nexus. Yet, the asymmetry of the case-study given the fact that the PLO/PA is a typical recipient of foreign aid, while Greece is one of the poorest donors (as opposed to other EU countries), may provide some insight and divergence from the conventional literature. For the same reasons, Greece has not been

examined vis-à-vis the foreign aid/foreign policy nexus. Even within the European studies, the foreign aid policy of Greece has received little attention. Consequently, this dissertation shall attempt to contribute to the scarce literature by emphasising the development assistance/foreign policy nexus of small states, as well as presenting the deep and traditional relations between Greece and Palestine that are very much underestimated in both the European and Middle Eastern literature.

Having said that, in order to trace and delve into the changing patterns of development assistance vis-à-vis the foreign policy of Greece towards the PLO, the next chapter will provide the theoretical framework that will draw mainly from the motivation aid literature. The main theory that shall be used is the frame-based theory of Veen (2011), which serves as a link to national identity, foreign policy discourse and foreign aid policy in order to conceptualise and better understand the motivation variable in the development assistance of Greece to Palestine. Secondly, it will be able to link Europeanisation as a variable rather than a process so as to provide agency to Greece. The third chapter will present the motivation and dynamics between Greece and the PLO and will analysis the foreign policy tendencies of Greece during the 1980s. This will allow a less abrupt transition from the conceptual outline to the empirical evidence. Chapter four, will present the empirical evidence acquired from the field research to demonstrate the changes that occur in the 1990s in foreign policy and the practices of foreign aid policy as development assistance of Greece to Palestine. Finally, the fifth chapter will present concluding remarks and attempt an assessment of foreign aid during the aforementioned period.

## 2. Theoretical Framework: The conceptualisation of development assistance of Greece

*As military policy is too  
important a matter to be left to the generals, so is foreign aid too important a matter to be left to  
the economists'*

Hans Morgenthau

At the heart of my approach to development assistance lies an understanding of foreign aid policy as a tool of foreign policy based on an ideational framework that does not counter nor contest the arguments that donors have self-interest. The ideational framework will examine the motivations of the donor states under the prism of interest; however, the motivations that inform the policy are not necessarily of material or military nature. Instead, it is the ideas that derive from the politics that informs foreign aid policy. According to Veen (2011), these ideas derive from different frames, which are 'organizing units that serve to make sense out of incoming data. They help interpret, prioritize and classify information' (p. 5). Specifically, the frames serve as a link between ideas (beliefs and values) and choices and orientation, but also to dissect the correlation between national identity, foreign policy discourse, and finally foreign aid policy. While Veen (2011) uses legislation of foreign aid policy to create the frame and explain the outcome, this paper will use a discursive analysis from the interviews and the foreign policy tendencies of Greece to create the various relevant frames and explain the motivation of foreign aid policy. These ideas that are based on beliefs and values portrayed in foreign policy discourse, are understood to encompass the broad identity of the nation, its purpose, as well as the way it perceives itself and the way it seeks others to perceive it. The analysis is not limited to the specific historical background and political tendencies of the donor state itself, as Veen (2011) suggests, but it also includes the relations and traditional ties between the donor and the recipient country.

Veen classifies these frames into seven broad categories in the realm of foreign policy choices; namely, security, power or influence, wealth, enlightened self-interest, reputation or self-affirmation, obligation/duty, and humanitarianism. While the frames of security, wealth/economic interest and humanitarianism are rather self-explanatory and are not compatible with the present case study, the frames that will be used to incorporate the different ideas of foreign policy orientation of Greece's development assistance to Palestine are: *power/influence*, which is defined as the increase of leverage over others, wining allies and positions of influence in international fora; *reputation/self-affirmation*, which establishes and/or expresses a 'certain identity in

international relations, improves international status and reputation; *obligation/duty*, which is understood as a ‘historical [obligation] or [as] associated with [its] position in the international system’; and finally, *enlightened self-interest*, which is a pursue of global public goods in terms of peace, stability, environmental health, population control, etc.; (Veen, 2011: 10). Given the limitations on the PLO to deliver material or military gains to its donors, the frames that shall be used are the ones of non-economic determinants by emphasizing the ideas and politics that inform foreign aid policy.

The frames of power and influence, enlightened self-interest, self-affirmation and reputation and obligation are non-material determinants, yet equally significant in engendering development assistance motivation. The significance of aid that has no material gains has been emphasised by other scholars such as Morgenthau (1962), who posits that despite the economic rhetoric, the end-goal has a diplomatic dimension. In his words,

‘[f]oreign aid for economic development ... has a very much smaller range of potentially successful operation than is generally believed. Its success depends in good measure not so much upon its soundness in strictly economic terms as upon intellectual, moral, and political preconditions, which are not susceptible to manipulation from the outside at all’ (p. 307).

Similarly, by examining the motivation in terms of political benefits rather than economic ones, this paper will underline the changes in Greece’s development assistance to Palestine. The different motivations, reflect different frames, and in turn pursue different development assistance policies. The notion of time is not constant as the ideational factor affects politics differently across time. The ideas, and by extension the frames, motivation and foreign policy, are never static. Hans Morgenthau (1960, as cited in Veen 2011: 5) has posited that ‘the ‘baffling’ nature of aid policy is explained by the fact *that different ideas about aid have been dominant at different times and in different donor states*’ (emphasis added). Accordingly, these frames are compatible with the beliefs holding together the elements of national identity, in order to become widely accepted. Yet as the national identity changes, so do the ideas. I shall use Veen’s (2011) frame-based theory, which argues that ‘frames have a powerful causal impact on policy choice, by clarifying and defining goals and interests’ (p. 22).

Furthermore, this paper will also draw on Lancaster (2007), who, similarly to Veen (2011), considers ideas – shared and re-produced by *domestic political forces*- be to a central variable that affects the motivation of foreign aid policy. Lancaster argues that as the international situation



changes, and the domestic political forces react, thus the purposes of aid change accordingly (ibid, p.18). Lancaster states that the traditional purposes of foreign aid include diplomatic factors, amongst others, and are a result of the interactions between the domestic political forces that include not only ideas that shape ideology and principles, but also *political institutions* such as the parliament, *interests* such as NGOs, public interests and associations with specific countries, and finally the *organisation* of aid. In her compilation of case studies, she observes a number of differences in the domestic political forces affecting aid, most notably the varying influences of the different ideas and institutions which shape the purposes of aid. Lancaster's broad analytical framework captures many of the aspects concerning the role of aid in politics. In this sense, the domestic political forces of Greece will be examined in order to observe how it affected the ideas and shaped the frames mentioned above.

In the study of the role of Greece's domestic political forces on the nexus of foreign policy and development assistance, the process of Europeanisation cannot be unheeded. Even among specialists on Greek affairs such as Kevin Featherstone (1998:38, see also Ioakimidis 1999; 2000) believe that 'it is almost impossible to understand the nature of the changes underway in the Greece political system in the 1990s without reference to [...] Europeanisation'. Nevertheless, unlike most of Europeanisation literature, this paper shall argue that the causal impact is not caused by Europeanisation *per se* but how Europeanisation (as a main variable) affected the ideational factors. In other words, how Greece perceived the process of Europeanisation, perceived itself, and how it seeks to be perceived via its foreign policy discourse and foreign aid practice, and in turn how it affected and shifted Greece's motivation for development assistance. The interviews conducted during the research clearly demonstrate the different discourses of Greece which reflected the orientation of Greek interests during different periods. The emphasis on agency is important. By examining Greek national identity in different national, regional and international developments vis-à-vis Palestine, the paper will encapsulate the changes into ideational frames. Consequently, this will allow a better understanding of the Greek agency in its foreign policy and national discourse. The essence of the argument does not rest on how international and local developments affect the ideas, but how these developments are perceived and transform the ideas that re-evaluate national identity and re-orientate foreign aid policy. Despite, the developments on national, regional and international level the shifting policies of Greece were not structurally imposed, but rather a product of agency.

The most dominant and determinative development was Europeanisation. The term Europeanisation was coined by Ladrech (1994: 69) who defines it ‘as an incremental process reorienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organisational logic of national politics and policymaking’. Other definitions focus on the ‘adaptation to the (western) European norms and practices’ (Featherstone and Kazamias, 2001: 4). There seems to be a tendency of understanding the process as ‘largely as a description of the EU’s *own* processes and impacts’ (Ibid: 5, emphasis added). Arguably, there is a tendency of structural domination – as opposed to agency- when referring to Europeanisation. Similarly to foreign aid policy where actors are subjected to the structural constraints that shape their policy, Europeanisation is viewed as a process that changes the national structures and gives little attention to the agency of states in the process. Furthermore, in regards to the dialectic of Europeanisation and foreign policy, it is viewed to have a rather top-down dimension that is subject to pressure and stimuli (Muller: 2012), despite some who assume that there is already a European dimension in the foreign policies of EU countries (Manners and Whitman 2000, Wong and Hill 2011). Having said that, this paper will not delve into Europeanisation literature and will not contest whether Europeanisation had a structural domination; instead, the paper shall present the empirical data from an agency perspective of the Greece in the process of Europeanisation, and how it was compatible with the ideas that informed its foreign aid policy towards Palestine.

Another definition that requires clarification before proceeding with the case-study, is that of development assistance. Generally, development assistance is understood by WB, UNDP, IMF and other international organisations through the definition provided by OECD. To be exact, the development assistance is referred to as Official Development Assistance (ODA) by the members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC)-OECD which is defined as the ‘*those flows to countries and territories on the DAC List of ODA Recipients and to multilateral development institutions which are: i. provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or by their executive agencies; and ii. each transaction of which: a) is administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective; and b) is concessional in character and conveys a grant element of at least 25 per cent*’ (OECD official website). Thus, given the fact that Greece was considered a recipient country, the aid offered to Palestine until at least 1996 – when under the government of Costandintos Simitis (PASOK), expressed the desire for a seat at the ‘table of donors’ among DAC/ OECD- Greece had

no official development assistance records. Thus, any aid in form of development assistance is not necessarily stated as such, given the fact that Greece's record for ODA (official Development assistance) commenced in 1999, with the formation of the Hellenic Aid, whose reports date back to 2003. Nonetheless, this dissertation will consider as evidence of development assistance initiatives that ascribe to the logic of development assistance, even though they have not been recorded as such.

This paper claims that the motivation of Greece in regards to its choice of aid policy reflects how it perceives its bilateral relations with Palestine. These bilateral relations – along with Greece's foreign policy discourse– unfolded along three different phases, as Greece re-evaluated its national identity, and reconfigured the priorities of its foreign policy. The frames capture both the ideas and motivations expressed in the foreign policy discourse that in turn establish national interests and the means to obtain them. Thus, each frame represents different ideas and motivations that inform the foreign policy discourse accordingly. Hence, I argue that during the 1980s, the frame based on the ideational and political discourse at the time, seems closer to the *reputation/self-affirmation* frame which establishes and/or expresses a 'certain identity in international relations'. However, as the identity transformed, so did the foreign policy discourse, leading to a certain set of aid donation practices in the early 1990s. Thus the development assistance of Greece, in the early 1990s, is best expressed with the *obligation/duty* frame, which is understood as a 'historical [obligation] or associated with position in international system'. The two frames during 1980s and early 1990s, respectively, may be argued to have elements from a third frame; namely of the *power and influence* frame, which aims at increasing leverage over others and create allies in the international and regional fora. However, due to the limited development assistance, the third frame was not clearly established as a conceptualisation of Greek foreign policy discourse. In the period that follows (from 1996-1999 and into the 2000s), these frames are replaced by motivations informed by ideas of *enlightened self-interest* in an effort to pursue global public goods in terms of peace and stability, as encouraged by the Europeanisation process.

In order to offer an explanation to the shifting frames that address the development assistance of Greece to Palestine, the first level of analysis of the paper will present the main factors that established the motivation of the bilateral relations. On a second level of analysis, the paper will analysis how the process of Europeanisation was perceived and how it affected the

foreign policy. In the case of the development assistance of Greece to Palestine, there are specific particularities that result from and accrue from both domestic and regional tendencies. The parallel analysis of the foreign policy and the empirical evidence of how development assistance was implemented at different times, will elucidate the pattern and shifts of foreign aid policy. As ideas inform foreign aid policy which is a tool of foreign policy itself, in order to frame the policies, the following chapter will proceed with a discourse analysis of foreign policy of Greece to Palestine, and the bilateral links and traditions that established the motivation of foreign aid of Greece to Palestine.

### 3. The motivation of the development assistance of Greece to the PLO

No issue area stands alone, and multiple different goals  
and motivations may be relevant at any given time.  
Maurits van der Veen

The ideas- beliefs and values- shared by Greece and the PLO that shapes their national identity, are portrayed in Greece's foreign policy discourse. This is due to the traditional bilateral ties between Greece and the PLO. Given the fact that the Palestinian Question lies at the heart of Arab and Middle Eastern affairs, the relations of Palestine and Greece also reflects the relations between Greece and the broader region. The Middle East clearly has a geographical importance to Greece due to its geographical proximity, which carries socio-political and economic implications. In the course of modern history, the relations that Greece developed with the Palestinian Authority and the former's stance on the Palestinian Question since 1950s onwards, creates a direct and crucial dynamic between the foreign relations of Greece and the Middle East. The main factors of the Greek-Arab relations and particularly the Greek-Palestinian relations was best depicted by Professor Sotiris Roussos -in an interview with the author (23/3/2015)- who framed the relations from two angles: *'the Israeli-Arab conflict and the Greek Arab relations'*. Stemming from a realist stand-point, he posited that

'the Greeks needed the votes in the 1950s and 1960s... [onwards] of the Arab block in the UN. Thus Greece sided with the Arab countries in all the major issues in the Arab world, including the Palestinian Issue, which was, at the time, the biggest issue. So, it was a matter of alliances in the frame of the UN. Second, it's because the Palestinian issue is a matter of occupation and settlements, it was correlated closely with what happened with Cyprus [where] we had again invasion and settlements and so it was a parallel case. Greece could not easily abandon the Palestinian case and, let's say, take another stance jeopardizing its stance on Cyprus. Third, it was the case for the left and the center left political parties, the Palestinian struggle was a symbol for the general anti-imperialist anti-colonial struggle so it was in the agenda of the socialist and communist parties and likewise social movements. It's these three reason why Greece has always and most of the time sided with the Palestinians and the Palestinian issue.'

The last two factors pointed by Prof. Sotiris Roussos (2015), are of major importance for the ideational framework. The national identity of Greece after the fall of the Military Junta was perceived as being the 'under-dogs' who have been 'subjected to the machinations of Great Powers' (Agnantopoulos, 2006: 17). This perception engendered a discourse that found common values and beliefs with the Palestinian Cause. This identification was also traced in common

historic experiences, of injustice stemming the international community.<sup>1</sup> The common experience rhetoric is expressed even among the political elite,

‘the drama of the Palestinian people brings memories from the drama of the refugees from the Asia Minor catastrophe, the political refugees during the *junta*, the Cypriot refugees who were forced to leave their fatherland by the Turkish irredentism and Attila’ (Greek Parliament 1/2/1991, as cited in Agnantopoulos, 2006:16).

This discourse commenced strongly after the fall of the Greek Military Junta in 1974. The two main parties of Greece (PASOK and New Democracy *ND*) did not necessarily have the same stance on the Palestinian issue. Yet, both had, to some extent, relations with either the Palestinian leadership (PASOK) – which had many political implications- or Palestinian businessmen – which was void of any political implications (ND). Consequently, the peak of Greek-Palestinian relations was during the rule of PASOK (1981-1989). However, the influence of discourse and practices set by PASOK had a long-standing impact, leading to a tradition close ties between Greece and Palestine. During most of the years in the 1980s, it is argued that ideational frame that may explain the foreign aid/foreign policy nexus is the *reputation/self-affirmation* frame which focuses more on expressing the national identity and prestige. The 1980s was an era that required the expression of national identity of Greece after the fall of the Junta, leading the PASOK government into proactive practices of foreign policy to position the newly Greek national identity in the international arena.

The ties between PASOK and the PLO may be traced also in their socialist ideals and values. According to Mr Stefanidis, the International Relations consultant of PASOK, already from 1974, PASOK – initially as an anti-colonial, and socialist movement in Greece and later in 1981, as a political party- had relations with the PLO. This also meant that Greece was one of the few countries in the Western world to not recognize Israel at the time. In contrast, Greece recognized PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people and supported a Palestinian state, and greeted Yasser Arafat as head of a state from the early 1980s. It is not a coincidence that the ‘best period of Greek-Palestinian relations’ was during the 1980s. Indeed, the onset of the Greek solidarity with the Palestinian cause was the assistance of Greece, by the request of the Prime

<sup>1</sup> As Agnantopoulos points out (2006: 15), the identification of Greece with Palestine have a positive connotation- as opposed to a negative one which might be related to anti-Semitism- was based on this common perception.

Minister Andreas Papandreou (Stefanidis, interview: 2015), in evacuating President Arafat and the rest of the leadership from Beirut in 1982, covering all the logistics (Floredis, interview: 2015). It is worth mentioning that – as reported by New York Times (1982) – the spokesperson of President Yasser Arafat in Beirut, at the time, said:

‘Mr Arafat chose Greece instead of an Arab country as his first stop as a deliberate gesture to criticize all the Arab leaders for their stand during the siege of Beirut... [he] wants to show that all the Arab leaders are not worthy of respect, for during the most difficult days of our ordeal, the Greek Government showed more interest than any other’

The foreign policy of Greece was established upon a discourse based on the socialist rhetoric with the aim to position itself in the international arena and in order to cultivate a certain reputation. This national identity discourse, which was translated into the foreign policy, was largely informed by anti-Western discourse in Greece that stemmed from the perceived injustice Greece suffered from Western powers. Athens was active in advocating and expressing its national identity, reflecting both foreign policy discourse and practice. PASOK participated in the creation of MPSO – *Mediterranean Progressive Socialist Organisation*- which was funded by Libya. The summit usually took place in Malta (Stefanidis: interview: 2015). Such initiatives would provide a certain reputation and self-affirmation in its foreign policy. Moreover, Mr Stefanidis pointed out that PSOM was part of the main effort to legitimize the PLO and the right of the Palestinians to a State, despite, the widespread depiction of the PLO as a terrorist organisation during the 1970s and 1980s, which repercussions on Greece (Pakgalos, Stefanidis: interviews: 2015). Nevertheless, PASOK was persistent in supporting Palestine in its foreign policy rhetoric and practices as a reflection of its national identity.

Further, the pro-Palestinian discourse was not limited to the level of foreign policy. On the contrary it had a deep influence on the domestic political and social scene. According to Mr. Floredis, during the 1980s, various political parties in Greece established a joint consultation committee with the aim of supporting the Palestinian cause. Head of the Committee was Giannis Degiannis,<sup>2</sup> one of the most prominent political figures in Greece, also known as the National Judge. In a sense, this effort may be considered the first act of Greek-Palestinian solidarity that

<sup>2</sup> Giannis Degiannis was the judge in the tribunal that put on trial the Greek Junta in 1975.

came both from top and bottom echelons. Thus, the pro-Palestinian stance was not a matter of foreign policy alone, but it also reflected the core values of the Greek national identity at the time.

One of the most passionate pro-Palestinian interviewees, Mr George Floredis, who was part of the international relations department in the late 1980s, claimed that the solidarity was a matter of ideology, which indicated the ideational variable in the foreign policy rhetoric and national identity. However, the interviewees seem to highlight,<sup>3</sup> apart from historical and traditional values and beliefs, also the personal friendship between Andreas Papandreou and Yasser Arafat as a driving force behind the close relations of the two countries, which extended to good relations with the Arab World. Many interviewees suggested that there was an additional factor that informed the close relation. As several Greeks and some Palestinians of those interviewed claimed, the PLO offered financial assistance to Andreas Papandreou for his 1981 successful election campaign. There is serious doubt regarding the provision of funds from the PLO directly, given its limited resource extraction capacity and its donation-based finance. Nonetheless, the PLO would most likely have mediated with other Arab countries to fund PASOK.

The foreign policy discourse in the first half of the 1980s started to inform the orientation of foreign aid policy. The first development assistance from Greece to Palestine - in the form of imputed student costs – started in the 1980s, despite the fact that Greece was still a recipient of aid itself until 1995. The Minister of National Economy, Gerasimos Arsenis, requested from the Ministry of Education and Religion to grant the Palestinian students in Greece, free education. With a ministerial decision signed in 21/2/1985 (document 1.), the Deputy Education Minister Stelios Papathemelis relieved the Palestinian students from paying any fees. In fact, until the 1990s, all foreign students in Greek universities had to pay fees as opposed to Greek students who had free education. It is noteworthy that the decision was not a result of an agreement on the level of political leadership or national delegations; instead, the demand was advanced by the General Union of Palestinian Student in Athens (GUPS) Union.

In terms of development assistance, the decision of Papathemelis is considered imputed student costs. It is noteworthy to mention that the Secretariat of DAC initially did not consider student cost ‘reportable as a DAC flow’ until 1980s (Hynes and Scott, 2013: 9). The rationale was that the imputed student costs were not of a direct nature as they did not go to the territories of the

<sup>3</sup> It is worth mentioning that the friendship between the two leaders as an offset of the relation of the two countries was mentioned in every single interview.



DAC recipient members and thus ‘costs of training visiting students could not [...] be claimed to be development motivated’ unless the students returned to the country of origin, making it difficult to measure the ‘development impact’ (ibid). There is little contestation to the relation between education and development. Even among Greek pundits, imputed student costs were intended for development. Specifically, as the former deputy of Foreign Affairs of Greece Mr. Theodoros Pagkalos put it, ‘some thousands Palestinians at the time found their way to Greece’ – especially during the early 1980s due to their exodus from Beirut and some from Palestine- ‘where they were able to flourish both academically and professional wise’ (interview: 2015). Later, imputed students costs were even higher as Greece offered scholarship for many foreign students, including Palestinians. The imputed student costs were also directed and motivated by a solid foreign policy discourse. A report from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (up-dated to 2014/2015) stated that the goals and aims of the scholarships to students ensure ‘the projection of Greek culture abroad and cultivate a general pro-Greek environment, which is in the best Greek interests’ (sic).

The ideational frame that may be used here is self-assertion as it clearly indicates that the lever of Greece’s aid and foreign aid policy is informed by its national identity and foreign policy discourse. Yet, by 1989 the momentum of PASOK was lost in light of the domestic political turmoil. The foreign policy element of the Greek government of PASOK at the time was on the expense of economic considerations. According to Theodore C. Kariotis (1997), Andreas Papandreou, in spite of being a renowned economist, avoided, in his capacity as a Prime Minister, to have a direct involvement in the economic policy of Greece, particularly during the 1980s. Papandreou, according to Kariotis, was more focused on foreign affairs. This led to a severe setback in the economic situation of the country and the return of New Democracy to the centre stage to the Greek politics.

The next section will demonstrate how the domestic political forces during 1989-1993 directed the frame from *self-assertion* towards *obligation/duty* which is understood as a ‘historical [obligation] or associated with position in international system. This frame is a transitional frame before *enlightened self-interest*, which is was largely informed by the ideational factors of Europeanisation. The reconfiguration of the domestic political forces will illustrate how the new frames came to replace and re-direct the foreign aid/foreign policy nexus of Greece to Palestine.

### **3.1. Towards a new frame: From reputation and self-assertion to obligation and duty**

The ideational frame of self-assertion was not constant nor was it espoused by all the political forces. The change of the government in Greece signalled an endorsement of a different set of ideas. The elements and ideas that constituted the national identity and foreign policy of Greece were gradually replaced and informed by the new domestic and regional developments. The foreign aid policy of Greece was redirected towards a different rhetoric, while it re-evaluated fundamental elements of its national identity. The following period served as a transitional platform for the Greek political discourse that gradually changed ideas and world views re-informing and thus re-directing foreign aid policy.

The country entered the 1990s with political instability as it took three consecutive elections for the conservative party of ND to form the government, headed by Kostantinos Mitsotakis. The new Prime Minister of Greece shunned the pro-Palestinian policy of his predecessor, despite that fact that ND during its previous rule (1974-1981) right after the fall of the Greek Military Junta, had established links with Palestinians in Greece. More specifically, it consented to the relocation of the headquarters of the Palestinian-owned construction company named, Consolidated Contractors Company (CCC) in 1976, which until today is the largest construction company in the Middle East and ranks among the top 25 international contractors with a revenue of 5.3 billion USD in 2013 (CCC: official site).<sup>4</sup> While the company actively supports the Palestinians in Greece and various student activities, they are far from a lobbying power in Greece that could influence the Greek foreign policy towards the Palestinian Cause. In the 1990s, the government of Kostadinos Mitsotakis pursued a more balanced policy; consequently, granting a *de jure* recognition of Israel in 1992. During this era, there seems to be no activity in the realm of foreign aid policy.

When PASOK came to power in 1993, Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou also demonstrated a tendency towards a more ‘balanced’ foreign policy rhetoric. Admittedly, according to Mr. Stefanidis (interview: 2015), Mr. Papoulias in his capacity as a Minister of Foreign Affairs in the late 1980s, already intended to recognize Israel, in order to also ‘balance’ Greece’s stance. It should be mentioned that during the early 1990s, there was a difference of opinion in PASOK,

<sup>4</sup> The founders and chairmen of CCC are Palestinians, and they used to have their offices in Beirut, but relocated as a result of the civil war.

as only few agreed with the new ‘balanced’ tendency, which can explain the gradual instead of drastic change in discourse. Mr. Stefanidis posited that this was in agreement with the widespread belief at that time that the Palestinian Question could be only addressed through negotiations.

Almost all interviewees’ discourse changed when referring to the Greek-Palestinian relations during 1990s as opposed to the 1980s. There were two constant themes that the interviewees proposed as defining for the gradual change. The first one referred to the process of Europeanisation and its impact on the perspectives of the domestic political forces. The second was the Oslo Accords. These two themes pose a significant question on the structure/agency debate. Undoubtedly, both themes have contributed to the shifting relation between the two countries. However, most of the interviewees were quick to attribute this change to the structural pressures that the Europeanisation process and the Oslo Accords brought upon Greece. These themes were perceived as turning points that were seen as justification to the gradual distancing of the Greek-Palestinian relations. In different degrees, the speakers reallocated this responsibility towards the EU policies and conditionality.

During the Europeanisation period, Greece endured vital structural and financial adjustments in order to meet the requirements of the Maastricht Treaty and join the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Yet Greece’s debt record was increasing. In order to address this, the government of Andreas Papandreou launched the Convergence Plan which would keep Greece on the EMU track. In 1994, the statements of the Greek Prime Minister showed a clear turn towards a more European conceptualisation of the local economy. He proposed a 5-year program which as he mentioned it ‘... reflects the government's determination to keep Greece in line with the course of the European Union’, according to which ‘the public debt which represents 112 percent of GDP in 1994 will be restricted to 103.4 percent in 1999’ (Press Conference: Papandreou: 1994).

Nonetheless, it is observed that Greece’s debt was increasing steadily from 69.9% to 109.5% of the GDP, in 1989 and 1997, respectively. To be more precise, public debt increased tremendously from \$400 million in 1980 to \$6.7 billion in 1997. Based on the data on Greece’s economy during the aforementioned period, Greece was actually receiving EU transfers. And despite of some ‘policy failures’, since 1994 Greece had devoted most of the EU funds ‘to infrastructure projects with positive supply-side effects on growth’ (Bank of Greece: 2001). The EMU was an inevitable and necessary route for Greece with positive implications, in the view of most politicians. They posited that the EMU required a general convergence of policies not only

on the domestic economy but also in foreign affairs.<sup>5</sup> Thus, Athens had to comply with the EU policy towards the Palestinian Issue.

Another justification that seemed very popular in explaining the shift was the Oslo Accords. The core of these Agreements was the recognition of Israel by the Palestinian leadership, and Yasser Arafat as the President of the Palestinian people. The Agreements would bring the PLO back to Palestinian Territories from exile and would supposedly offer Yasser Arafat the administration of the West Bank and Gaza and establish a *modus vivendi* between the two parties. Economically, the PLO would receive large amounts of development assistance from the EU – mostly- and various international organisations. On the other hand, the political implications of the Oslo Agreements was that all the Palestinian allies were now “free” to recognize Israel and develop diplomatic relations, since the PLO recognised had already done so. According to Prof. Sotiris Roussos (interview: 2015), when Greece recognized Israel in 1992 it was portrayed - with a tone of cynicism – as the last ‘*Arab country* to recognize Israel... [only] a couple of months before the Oslo Agreements [and], more or less after the Madrid [Conference] which was a direct *-de facto-* recognition of Israel by the Arabs’. From a Greek perspective, for many, the issue of the Oslo Agreements were ‘in a sense passed unnoticed in the public opinion and also in the foreign policy’ since Greece ‘was preoccupied with the Macedonian issue’ (interview: Roussos: 2015).

The Oslo Agreements arguably did not justify the change in Greek foreign policy, but rather it relieved Greece, as it was able to keep a safe distances by being in the middle between the two parties and to follow the line of the EU without taking sides (interview: Roussos: 2015). This indicates the gradual shift had an agency. Contrary to the common belief, Greece has an active agency not only in the foreign policy but also in foreign aid policy. Despite the domestic and regional challenges in the 1990s, the political elites in Athens were caught up between the ideational obligations and the new orientation that Greece was in process of achieving. Within the new frame of obligation, Greece offered the most generous development assistance hitherto and took political initiatives in regards to Palestine, which is evidence of the active agency as opposed to a passive and reactionary stance defined by structural impositions.

In 1994, in the context of the new Palestinian Administration, the Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou offered to Yasser Arafat ‘the first start-up money’ to implement the Gaza-Jericho

<sup>5</sup> However, some such as Mr Floredis considered the implications of the EMU on the Greek foreign policy as negative because the latter was not based anymore on Greek interests but rather on EU ones.

Agreement (interview, Roussos:2015). This was the largest aid ever offered by Greece to Palestine. The President of the PNA Yasser Arafat requested from the newly elected Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou to lend him 15 million USD from Bank of Greece. It should be mentioned that this was not made very public, even among the deputies and delegations. According to Mr. Dimidis who was a Consul in Jerusalem at the time, in a meeting with other diplomats, President Arafat openly thanked him for Greece's financial assistance, of which Dimidis was not aware. Greece changed the terms of the loan, effectively turning it into development assistance, in 1999, following a visit of the Palestinian Minister of Finance Mr Nashashibi in Greece, where he met with the Greek deputy Minister of Finance Nikos Christodoulakis (Alawneh, interview:2015). This came as a result of Yasser Arafat's request to postpone the payment- after the first 600.000 USD- due to the dire situation in the Palestinian Occupied Territories (Sabri, Interview: 2015).<sup>6</sup> The development assistance of Greece did not indicate that the structural changes prohibited Athens from its agency.

The obligatory frame of the development assistance was also translated into foreign policy initiatives. These initiatives demonstrated Greece's vacillation between an independent foreign policy based on the traditional ties cultivated up to the 1980s and a foreign policy filtered through the 'Europeanized' ideas. Hence, while Athens often acted as a conveyor of European positions at the same time, it initiated independent initiatives that built upon the bilateral relations with Palestine. For example, when Arafat met with Giannos Kranidiotis Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, in Athens around 1996, the latter put pressure on Arafat to refrain from unilateral actions, employing the leverage of conveying the European stance. On the other hand, Greece organised initiatives such as the Athens Meetings (1997-1999) that took the form of mediation between Palestine and Israel in one of its most critical moments in the peace process hitherto, as the two had reached an impasse.

The Athens Meetings/Summit were proposed by the Consultant General Mr. Dimidis to Giannos Kranidiotis.<sup>7</sup> They were officially announced in 1997. In Giannos Kranidiotis words, '*the*

<sup>6</sup> The gesture of Greece was very appreciated by the PLO given the dire political and economic situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. In the autumn of 2000, the breakout of the Second Intifada, was evidence of the failing of the Oslo Agreements. Nevertheless, Greece was rather pressuring to receive the money, when the PA was delaying the payments. There is documentation of the letters that were sent from the Ministry of Finance to the Embassy of the State of Palestine.

<sup>7</sup> Mr Dimidis stated that this was barely his idea. A Jewish friend in Israel had proposed this to Mr Dimidis. His friend was genuinely interested in the co-existence of the two side and convinced Mr Dimidis. In turn, Mr Dimidis convinced Giannos Kranidiotis and

*initiative realised a pledge the ministry had undertaken during a recent visit to Israel and the Palestinian Self-Rule Areas, in the framework of Greek efforts to assist contacts between the two sides, promoting a just and viable solution to the Middle East problem*'. There were three meetings between 1997 and 1999; the first was in Asteras Vouliagmenis, the second in Rhode and the last in Pendelikon Hotel. All the expenses and logistics were fully-covered by Greece. The meetings were attended by political figures across the political spectrum from both sides, including figures that were not usually present in the negotiations before (Dimidis, Roussos: 2015) or have ever met each other before (Dimidis: 2015). Unfortunately, there are no common communiqués nor records of the meetings, except for the fourth meeting. This reflected the very purpose of the meeting, so the attendees would 'feel free' as the persons may express views not aligned with their countries policy. In addition, the absence of any record of the talks would also keep them distant from the media; Kranidiotis was also absent on many occasions (Sabri: 2015).

The talks ended in 1999 with the accident and death of Kranidiotis. According to Prof. Sotiris Roussos, 'Papandreou had no real appetite to preserve and continue it' and it was not long before the breakout of the Second Intifada '*which when it started all the channels collapsed between the two parties [...] the whole thing revealed the fragility of these kind of projects [however] ... pouring money to such initiative, although sometimes [is] important, influential and have an added value, they are always vulnerable to the political situations which we cannot really control*'. When the new Prime Minister Simitis took over he was less interested in the Middle East and did not address the Palestinian issue at all. Instead he was more focused on the EMU. The justification of this apathy from the new Prime Minister Simitis- at least in the understanding of Mr. Stefanidis (2015), was that '*they [Palestinians and Israelis] get each other*' plus 'the Quartet is now involved and we are too small to play a role'.

Despite the generous development assistance, the Palestinian political elite posits that, 'from the moment of Oslo in 1993 and on, the relations took another shape', and 'there was an important change' (Interview: Sabri, 2015) in which until the 2000s 'the factors were more or less depending on governing party in Greece and the relation to the PLO and the financial needs of the PLO' (Alawneh: Interview, 2015). But the change in the foreign aid/foreign policy nexus was

proceed with the Athens Summit. It should be noted that some suggested that these meeting were a result of Arafat's visit in the mid-1990s. Even though, it seems less likely to be a determinant factor, Arafat asked for help and it was offered to him.

crystallised in the 2000s. The development assistance from Greece to Palestine, in the 2000s, increased both on a bilateral and multilateral level; albeit the motivation to provide development assistance was informed by its desire to conform to EU discourse and practices, diverging from the obligation/duty frame towards a frame of enlightened self-interest.

#### 4. The shifting policy of development assistance and Europeanisation

*"[w]hen you don't have a foreign policy, talk about development!"*  
Kissinger

The foreign aid policy of Greece started to become more institutionalized, in an attempt to conform to the global and European aid trends, affecting the foreign policy/foreign aid nexus that was redirected towards the frame of enlightened self-interest. The frame that represents the motivation of the development assistance during the aforementioned period is concerned with the 'image' of the country to other countries and/or regions of geopolitical interest and the 'positioning' of the country in terms of humanitarianism, promotion of peace and stability. This frame may also reflect the rationale of EU's foreign policy/foreign aid nexus. The motivation of Greece is not so much informed by the Greek-Palestinian relations, instead the aid towards the PA had a symbolical value and the status it entails in the European conceptualisation of aid. Even though the EU motivation of funding Palestine is not going to be analysed here, it is worth mentioning that according to Roy H. Ginsberg (2001) the EU is 'by far the largest donor of aid to the Palestinian Authority (more than \$2 billion) almost half of what the Palestinians have received' and posits that it was part of the effort of the EU 'to influence the Middle East Peace Process' (p. xiii). As part of the Europeanisation process, Greece would 'participate in various committees and councils in the European development co-operation, at the same time co-financing the relevant activities either via the General Budget of the European Union, or the European Development Fund' (Miligos: 2002) in order to support the recipient countries and territories and to promote economic, social and human development, as well as regional cooperation. The institutional transformation of the foreign-aid policy of Greece coincided with the efforts of Greece towards a more Europeanised conceptualisation of its finances in order to join the EMU, which came hand in hand with its foreign policy and the general political rhetoric of Greece towards Palestine.

The main political discourse in the 1990s 'referred, implicitly or explicitly, to the theme *modernisation*', which is a term that usually identified with Europeanisation, meaning the 'European norms and practices, but [with] an emphasis on market economics, technocratic administration and a liberal state' (Featherstone, 1998: 23). The theme of modernisation informed and transformed the Greek discourse of foreign policy and national identity and by extension the foreign aid policy. This seems in line with most statements of the Greek political delegations and



scholars that the author interviewed, the road that Greece has to follow was the one in the EMU along with its implications.

The starting point of Europeanisation was the Treaty of Maastricht (1992). Yet, even after the signing of the Treaty of the European Union, the development policy of the member states of EU, as Carbone (2007: 2) puts it, ‘was characterized by ... impasses’ in regards to the foreign aid conceptualisation; namely, the fact that the EU member states did not abide by the principles of co-ordination and complementarity regarding aid, which was established in the Treaty of Maastricht (1992). It can be argued that the peak of integration of the member states was reached with the EMU. Particularly, Greece made great efforts to attain that integration. Arguably during this decade, Greece was rearranging its development assistance priorities based on tendency of Europeanisation as well as regional and international changes that were taking place. Ironically enough, the period after 1996 witnessed the most active development assistance from Greece. This was, first, a result of Greece being an official donor and, second, Greece’s attempt to emulate a Europeanised foreign aid policy that would reflect its emerging national identity and foreign policy discourse.

Greece became officially a donor country when with Greece’s membership in DAC/OECD (development assistance committee) in 1999, of which Greece was a member since 27 September 1961, a year after the inception of the organisation. The handling of development assistance moved from the Ministry of National Economy (now the Ministry of Development) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where the department of Hellenic Aid (ΥΔΑΣ) was established. Thus, the intention was to render the issue of development assistance a matter of state policy rather than ‘party’ policy, as the Hellenic Aid became the *‘competent national authority, which shapes and coordinates Greek development policy’*, under the umbrella of the Ministry of Foreign affairs (Official site of Ministry Foreign Affairs). Up to 1995, Greece was considered a recipient country, despite the fact that the Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou was actively donating to Palestine. In 1996, Greece expressed the will to participate in DAC-OECD. It is for this reason that the records regarding Greece’s development assistance are almost non-existent prior to 1996; while from 1996 until the beginning of the 2000s there are very few. From then on, the Hellenic Aid has been issuing annual reports dating from 2003 (see the Official site of Hellenic Aid).

By 1996 Greece reserved 0.15% GDP for development assistance, in other words, 186 million USD to development assistance; from which 84% was multilateral while 16% was bilateral

(Miligos, 2001). Some scholars such as Miligos posit that 1996 is a key year for the development cooperation policy of Greece as the polity of Greece became more systematic and coordinated in regards to the development assistance. Particularly, that year Greece planned to enhance its strategic coordination by assigning specific amounts to various countries arranged by sector for years 1997-2001; for instance, technical cooperation, financial assistance and/or humanitarian assistance. The problem of the Greek economy extended to the aid donation. According to Houliaras (2003), during the period 1996-2002:

*‘[t]he development assistance of Greece ha[d] many weaknesses, such as the lack of registration of the donations, the vagueness in the international economic policy of the country, lack of assessment of results’.* (p. 91)

Given the enlargement of debt, as part of the program established by the government to ‘keep in track with EMU’, the establishment of the Hellenic Aid was aiming precisely to adjust these problems. The mission report of the Hellenic Aid- which seem to be in sync with the aims of DAC, states that its aim is to co-ordinate the aid out of development national budget, submit proposals on the national development strategy to the Inter-Ministerial Committee for the Organisation and Coordination of International Economic Relations, to co-ordinate, implement, promote and monitor humanitarian and development projects and activities to the recipient countries, represent Greece, in matters of international development, in various international fora and organisations such as the EU, OECD/DAC and other international organisations and funds of global or regional character, and compile statistical data on bilateral and multilateral official development assistance and prepare annual reports for the Hellenic Parliament and the DAC/OECD and most importantly evaluate the humanitarian/development project proposals submitted thereto, by NGOs and other institutions, and monitors their implementation. As will be demonstrated below the issue of corruption of the NGOs constituted a large problem for both the PLO and the Greek government for the development assistance projects. Its responsibilities also lay on reporting and collaborating with authorities not only in the public but also in the private sector, in order to maximize the effectiveness and efficiency of the administration the complementarity of projects and activities and the coherence of national policies. It also has the ability to propose development policies, in the context of the EU framework on development by focusing and elaborating on essential development issues (such as innovating sources of financing, the achievement of the MDGs, aid effectiveness, and human security) and submits the relevant findings and recommendations to the

Minister for Foreign Affairs. These are all requirements of DAC who has a total of 29 countries that must have particular criteria such as ‘the existence of appropriate strategies, policies and institutional frameworks that ensure capacity to deliver a development co-operation program; an accepted measure of effort; and the existence of a system of performance monitoring and evaluation’ (OECD-DAC). The membership in DAC required that the national development policy should be aligned with the guidelines and reference documents of DAC and ‘pledge to implement forthwith the Recommendations adopted by the DAC’ (OECD: DAC: official site).

The development aid –both multilateral and bilateral- had and still has a major goal, which is to maintain financial sustainability for the PNA by helping in the development of the main sectors of the Palestinian economy and to strengthen the capacity of the Palestinian authority over its territory. The main sectors which received the most high development assistance was education, healthy, electricity, water and sewage water, roads and local governments as well as social safety net and social security. This shows that the development aid aims to build the material and immaterial infrastructure of the Palestinian society. A few bilateral development project were very constructive. According to Sabri (interview: 2015), the Greek Minister of Health Kostas Gitonas (1996-1998) aided the PA in providing high-cost medicines for Thalassemia. In 2000, a couple of months before the outbreak of the Second Intifada, in the framework of bilateral development assistance, the Palestinian side accepted a Greek donation of US\$ 150,000 for the building of various monuments in the Holy City, while Arafat requested Athens' assistance for a Palestinian center for Thalassemia (Alawneh: Interview, 2015). An established annual contribution of \$200,000 from the Greek health ministry continued this year also, in addition to a donation from the Onassis Foundation for the creation of a library and data bank at a Palestinian physiotherapy center (Athens News Agency: 2000). There were various Greek-Palestinian centers that were established such as the Macedonia Center and Hippocrates Center for Thalassemia in Ramallah.


The bilateral development of Greece also came in other forms. Many politicians had held on the old rhetoric regarding Palestine. Many efforts were made within Greece’s capacity in the framework of the EU. Greece had used its power within the EU for Palestine at times. An indicative example was when Arafat asked Greece for help to convince the EU on agricultural aid. Indeed, Greek Minister of Agriculture Mr. Tzoumakas in 2003 mediated for Palestine and was successfully delivered at the cost of over 10 million Euros (EU project) (Sabri: Interview, 2015).

The multilateral assistance was not problem-free as there were several instances of corruption and misallocation of funds. There was a mushrooming of NGOs- as part of the development assistance - in general but also specifically for Palestine. Even though, the paper will not elaborate on the issue of corruption, it will suffice to mention- as reported by a representative of a relevant committee that shall remain anonymous- corruption affected all stages and levels of the development assistance projects; Palestinian and Greek as well as European. The first wave of NGOs was a disaster.<sup>8</sup> The Palestinian and Greek side tried to control and supervise the projects as much as possible. On the other hand, there were a few impressive and constructive projects such as the TAX Seminars, where employees of the public sector of Palestine attended courses in Athens regarding the management of taxation. Yet some projects seem to be worth mentioning; namely, in 1997, where the PA received an amount of 497.000.000 Drachma for the reparation of the urban roads of Qalqilya, and a further budget support of 285.000.000 Drachma (Documents II).

Since the establishment of the Hellenic Aid corruption was rampant. The breakout of scandals scarred the foreign-aid policy of Greece. One way to deal with corruption was to keep detailed files on the projects and the amount of funds allocated. These detailed reports reveal that from 2003, the foreign aid of Greece (in total, not only towards the PLO) experienced a steady increase, until the crisis in 2010 (See graph I below). By 2004, Greece was donating 0.23% of its GDP – 464.3 million USD- of which 65.45% was bilateral assistance while 34.6% was multilateral (Miligos: 2002). The steady increase of the development aid activity of Greece started to change with the financial crisis.

<sup>8</sup> An example of which was the proposal of an NGO for ‘cemetery adjustments in Palestine’, which according Palestinian interviewees was a disgrace. The corruption in the NGOs during this time was scandalous.

## NET ODA: TRENDS IN VOLUME AND AS A SHARE OF GNI, 2003-13, GREECE



Graph 1 (from OECD)


Even though Greece still provides aid, it is limited to emergency aid only. In the aftermath of the Gaza war in the summer of 2014, Greece offered 1 million Euros to assist the Palestinians in Gaza (interview: Kyriakopoulou, 2015). Despite the Greek debt crisis, Hellenic Aid officials stated the importance of Greece's presence in international organisation indexes. Hence, the inability of Greece to actively participate as a DAC member has hurt the image of Greece abroad and has implications on the foreign aid/foreign policy nexus. In order to compensate the limited budget, the Hellenic Aid tries to work through the institutional framework within the DAC. For instance, Greece in its capacity as a DAC member has explored options to advance further the already existing debate regarding the European and DAC aid to Palestine that is 'indirectly destroyed' by the Israeli forces. In the interview, Mrs. Kyriakopoulou posited that such an effort would contribute to the Palestinian Cause but at the same time it will keep a safe distance from the political entanglements. By the same token, the Hellenic Aid as an authority of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has omitted the politicized aspect of foreign aid in relation to Palestine. The foreign aid/foreign policy nexus at this stage of the Greek development assistance in enlightened self-

interest but it does not address the Greek-Palestinian relations. Instead, the frame is informed by the image Athens to project based on the notions of ‘Europeanized aid’ to promote peace and stability.

DESCRIPTION OF AID BY SECTOR	YEARS					SUM
	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	
Education	1.60	2.97	3.03	2.31	2.33	12.24
Health	0.00	1.51	1.62	1.54	1.67	6.34
Policy and management of water resources	0.07	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.08
Governance and society	0.20	0.15	0.15	0.00	0.00	0.50
Construction policy of peace, deterrence and conflict resolution	0.12	0.03	0.03	0.00	0.00	0.18
Other social infrastructure and services	0.35	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.37
Human rights	0.07	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.07
Information communication and technology (ICT)	0.05	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.06
Agriculture	0.07	0.39	0.32	0.00	0.00	0.78
Environment	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.03
Services of entrepreneur support	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.02
General budget support	2.00	2.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	4.00
Humanitarian Aid	0.08	0.58	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.66
Alimentary assistance	0.10	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.10
Culture	0.09	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.09
Promotion of information for development	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.02
Undefined sectors	0.11	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.12
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>4.94</b>	<b>7.70</b>	<b>5.17</b>	<b>3.85</b>	<b>4.00</b>	<b>25,66</b>

The above table demonstrates that most of the donations have more humanitarian than developmental nature at least on a bilateral level. Development assistance projects have generally been halted, as Greece could not engage in such economic activities after 2010. The amounts presented above are possibly imputed costs. Based on AidWatch report (2014) there have been no bilateral assistance since 2011 (see graph below). The Hellenic Aid states that the ‘Greek government took very tough decisions on public spending, which certainly affected the financing of development assistance projects. Our country is seeking to restart its economy and its growth process, parameters that will constitute the indispensable basis for implementing the aid programme’ (p.40).

### Greek aid, genuine and inflated (in € million at constant prices, 2012)



(Aidwatch; 2014, p. 40)

Based on the Palestinian data, Greece ODA to Palestine from 2004-2014 (see Table 1) was 52.36 million USD. During the period of 2008-2012, the aid of Greece to Palestine – based on the data of Hellenic Aid- amounts to 25.66 million EUR. It is noticed that the figures are similar, indicating a high-level of transparency, given that these data were compared and contrasted by two different, official authority, sources. Palestinian sources mentioned that most of the Greek aid is of humanitarian nature.

Type of Aid	Greece ODA									
Year	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Total Aid in USD (in Millions)	5.64	1.81	5.77	3.17	7.13	10.72	6.85	5.35	5.14	0.78

(Table 1: State of Palestine: *Ministry of Planning and Administrative Development*- given to the author of this paper)

The table (see table 2) of the Hellenic Aid regarding the development assistance to Palestine, shows that most popular sectors of the aid are health and education, while sectors such as development aid, human rights, and services of entrepreneur support are the least funded.

Despite the current halt of development assistance, Greece had previously an overall dynamic participation in DAC. In the peak of the Greek Europeanisation with its accession in the EMU and forth, Greece perceived itself and yearned to be perceived as a European country. The foreign policy discourse and foreign aid policies of Greece informed the frame of enlightened self-interest evoking ambiguous arguments conforming to the EU's motivation of aid. The establishment of the Hellenic Aid marked the beginning of this frame, as it moved away from the previous frames that had informed its foreign aid policy. Hence, reputation and self-assertion and obligation and duty were sacrificed in the name of Greece's European path. This sacrifice was undoubtedly assisted by the structural changes, but arguably it was also guided by its own decisions stemming from a reevaluated national identity.



## 5. Conclusion

I do not have a model ... There are too many interacting variables to justify a model that would be both parsimonious and insightful.

Carol Lancaster

This paper examined the motivation of development assistance under the prism of foreign aid policy as a tool of foreign policy. The vast literature on determinants of foreign aid that has Manichean tendency trapped in the binary of either altruism or self-interest, and falls short in addressing smaller countries such as Greece. Though, the concept of the donor's self-interest is not countered nor contested, this paper presents how the motivation and the determinants of foreign aid policy may be viewed and conceptualised beyond the material and/or military gains. The motivational factors that engendered Greece's development assistance are encapsulated into an ideational framework. The ideas (value and beliefs) that derive from the politics, inform foreign aid policy. It is argued that as ideas change, so does the foreign aid policy in accordance to its foreign policy discourse and in the process of re-evaluating its national identity. In order to trace the changing pattern of Greece's foreign aid policy, the paper presented organising units (frames) that serve to comprehend and to interpret, prioritise and classify information. In addition, these frames serve as a link between ideas (beliefs and values) and choices and orientation, but also to dissect the correlation between national identity, foreign policy discourse, and finally foreign aid policy.

This paper based the interviews conducted by the author of politicians and academics directly involved in the Greek-Palestinian relations. The discursive analysis of the interviewees offered abundant material in the context of the ideational framework. The interviewees presented various themes that affected the foreign aid/foreign policy nexus of Greece to Palestine; namely, the EMU process and the Oslo Agreements amongst other. By the same token, the paper analysed the foreign aid/foreign policy nexus, under the prism of how Greece perceived these developments. Greece's changing pattern resulted into different foreign aid policy that may be framed into the *reputation and self-assertion*, *obligation and duty* and finally, into *enlightened self-interest* during the period of the 1980s to 2010.

The foreign aid/foreign policy nexus of Greece's development assistance was largely affected by domestic, regional and international changes. The changes in foreign aid policy were not necessarily a result of structural changes. Instead, this paper argued that the changes derived

from how Greece's political elite perceived itself, and how it wanted to be perceived in the international arena at different times throughout the aforementioned period. This carves space for agency in understanding its foreign aid policy. The main developments that were examined is how Greece preserved itself and the national identity in the last decade of the Cold War. In the 1980s, Greece identified with the Palestinian cause, and despite Athens limited resources, the foreign aid policy was largely informed by a foreign policy discourse driven by an anti-Western conceptualisation and an active foreign policy orientated towards the Middle East. Thus, identifying with the Palestinian cause and assisting the PLO in pursue of the Palestinian State, Athens was trying to assert itself in the international arena as a country with socialist beliefs.

The second phase of the foreign aid/foreign policy nexus, initiates in the beginning of the 1990s. This period cannot disregard the Europeanisation process, and particularly the EMU as the most crucial part of the process. It is generally assumed that the Europeanisation process resulted in a structural changes that imposed and dictated policies. Yet, by examining how Greece's dealt with its foreign aid policy, it is demonstrated that Athens agency was present in the foreign aid policy formation towards the PLO as it pursued to participate in the Europeanisation process. This re-orientated the foreign policy discourse from the East towards a more balanced discourse. It is argued that this balance was a result of domestic political developments of dire economic situations that required Europeanised change in order to live up to the changes of the interdependent global economy. Given these changes, the obligation and duty frame informs how Athens balanced its foreign aid policy in accordance with a more Europeanised path. In an attempt to a more balanced orientation, the Greek government offered high amounts of financial and political assistance to the PLO.

The final phase that is examined initiated with the formation of the Hellenic Aid, as it become an official member of DAC/OECD, channeling the development assistance into Europeanised norms *in toto*. As a result, the 2000s marked a *de jure* foreign policy discourse and practices. The shift does not insinuate the de-politicisation of foreign aid policy. Instead, the shift towards an enlightened self-interest frame, demonstrated that the foreign aid/foreign policy nexus is informed by the image Athens to project based on the notions of 'Europeanized aid' to promote peace and stability, rather than the Greek-Palestinian relations. Even though it is noteworthy to mention that the Greek-Palestinian relations are further overshadowed by the warming up of the Greek-Israeli relations, which was another recurrent theme among the interviewees. Guided by

expectations of economic and geostrategic benefits, this rapprochement has undoubtedly affected the Greek foreign policy towards Palestine.

To some extent discussing Greece's foreign aid/foreign policy nexus today is inapt, given that Greece's foreign aid policy has kneeled in light of the debt crisis. Based on the interviews, there is an attempt to sustain a certain repute among the other members of DAC, even though the development assistance has totally halted and foreign aid policy is limited to emergency and humanitarian aid. In this sense, Greece foreign aid policy has been overshadowed by the crisis, and the austerity measures, which deprive it of its agency in the formation of policy making and its capacity to be proactively involved in regional and international developments. This dissertation demonstrated how the foreign aid policy of Greece and by extension its foreign policy was involved in issues such as the Palestinian cause that has received global attention both politically and economically. All in all, Greece's foreign aid policy, notwithstanding its limitations, was conceptualised on the basis of its perception of self-interest, which despite not baring material and/or military gains, it projected Greece's agency in the orientation and formation of foreign policy.



## **Appendices**

### **Appendix 1**

#### **Interviewees** (*in alphabetical order*)

**Alawneh, Atef**, Special Adviser to the Board of the Bank of Palestine, Former Deputy Minister of Finance of PNA (1994-2004)

**Athanassiou, Sotiris**, Ambassador in the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs

**Bakatsianos, George**, Head of development assistance department - Hellenic Aid

**Constantineas, Vasilis**, Expert in the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1994-1997)

**Dimidis, Themistoklis**, Consul General in Jerusalem 1993-1997

**Floredis, George**, political analyst and currently at the Ministry of Press of Greece

**Kyriakopoulou, Paraskevi**, Associate Director in the Hellenic aid department of emergency and humanitarian aid in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

**Pagkalos, Theodoros**, former deputy Prime Minister of Greece (2011-2012), and Former Minister of Foreign Affairs (1996-1999)

**Roussos, Sotiris**, associate professor in the University of Peloponnese, Corinth, and he the head of unit in Centre for Mediterranean, Middle East and Islamic Studies (*CEMMIS*).

**Sabri, Ismat**, First –Secretary of the Embassy of Palestine in Greece, during the 1990s

**Stefanidis, Kostas**, international relations expert of PASOK

**Toubassi, Marwan**, Honorable Ambassador of the State of Palestine (2014- present)

## Appendix 2

ΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΗ ΔΗΜΟΚΡΑΤΙΑ  
ΥΠΟΥΡΓΕΙΟ ΕΘΝ. ΠΑΙΔΕΙΑΣ & ΘΡΗΣΚ./ΤΩΝ  
ΔΙΕΥΘΥΝΣΗ σπουδών 2 φοιτ. μέριμνας  
ΤΜΗΜΑ φοιτ. μέριμνας  
Μητροπολεως 15  
101 85 ΑΘΗΝΑ

Πληροφορίες: Ρ. Γεωργούλα  
Τηλέφωνο: 3235860

Θ Ε Μ Α: Απαλλαγή από τα  
τέλη εγγραφής και φοίτησης.

Να διατηρηθεί μέχρι.....  
Βαθμός Ασφαλείας.....

Αθήνα 21-2-1985  
Αριθ. Πρωτ. Βαθμός Προτεραιότητας  
2.14.1.6/33/849

ΠΡΟΣ: ORGANISATION DE  
LIBERATION DE LA PALESTINE  
MISSION DIPLOMATIQUE  
P.L.O  
Ενταύθα

Σε απάντηση της επιστολής σας προς τον κ. υπουργό, σχετι-  
κά με την απαλλαγή από τα τέλη εγγραφής και φοίτησης των Παλαιστι-  
νίων φοιτητών Α.Ε.Ι σας γνωρίζουμε ότι με υπουργική απόφαση που  
βρίσκεται στο υπουργείο Οικονομικών για συνυπογραφή, εξαιρούνται  
της καταβολής των διδάκτρων όλοι οι Παλαιστινιακής καταγωγής αλ-  
λοδαποί-αλλογενείς φοιτητές των Α.Ε.Ι.

Ο Υφυπουργός  
ΣΤΥΛ. ΑΓΓ. ΠΑΠΑΘΕΛΕΑΝΗΣ

Βαμτ. διανομή  
1. γρ. κ. υφυπουργού  
2. τμ. φοιτ. μερ.

Document I

## Document II

Υπουργείο Εξωτερικών	Χώρα	Κωδ. Βοήθ.	Περιγραφή Βοήθειας	Αιτιολογία	Δαπάνες	Ημερομηνία
Υπουργείο Εξωτερικών	ΝΟΤΙΑ ΑΦΡΙΚΗ	114	Τριτοβάθμια εκπαίδευση και άνω	Υποτροφίες	800.000	31/12/1997
Υπουργείο Εξωτερικών	ΝΟΤΙΑ ΑΦΡΙΚΗ	114	Τριτοβάθμια εκπαίδευση και άνω	Υποτροφίες	10.860.000	31/12/1997
Υπουργείο Εξωτερικών	ΝΟΤΙΑ ΑΦΡΙΚΗ	122	Υποδομή Υγείας	Ανίχνευση Νοσοκομείου. Βάσει της Σύμβασης μεταξύ Ελλάδας και Ν. Αφρικής δόθηκε το ποσό αυτό μέσω της Ελληνικής Πρεσβείας για την ανέγερση Παιδιατρικής Κλινικής στην Πραιτόρια	27.800.000	31/12/1997
Υπουργείο Εξωτερικών	Ο.Δ. ΓΙΟΥΓΚΟΣΛΑΒΙΑΣ	114	Τριτοβάθμια εκπαίδευση και άνω	Υποτροφίες	1.600.000	31/12/1997
Υπουργείο Εξωτερικών	ΟΥΓΚΑΝΤΑ	114	Τριτοβάθμια εκπαίδευση και άνω	Υποτροφίες	800.000	31/12/1997
Υπουργείο Εξωτερικών	ΟΥΚΡΑΝΙΑ	114	Τριτοβάθμια εκπαίδευση και άνω	Υποτροφίες	1.200.000	31/12/1997
Υπουργείο Εξωτερικών	ΟΥΚΡΑΝΙΑ	114	Τριτοβάθμια εκπαίδευση και άνω	Υποτροφίες	13.440.000	31/12/1997
Υπουργείο Εξωτερικών	ΠΑΛΑΙΣΤΙΝΗ	114	Τριτοβάθμια εκπαίδευση και άνω	Υποτροφίες	32.400.000	31/12/1997
Υπουργείο Εξωτερικών	ΠΑΛΑΙΣΤΙΝΗ	121	Γενική Υγεία	Ιατροφαρμακευτική περίθαλψη (Γιατροί του κόσμου, Έλλην Αντίρροια)	70.000.000	31/12/1997
Υπουργείο Εξωτερικών	ΠΑΛΑΙΣΤΙΝΗ	720	Εκτακτη (πλήν επισιτιστική)	Οικονομική ενίσχυση παλαιστινιακού καταυλισμού για προμήθεια ειδών πρώτης ανάγκης	2.140.000	31/12/1997
Υπουργείο Εξωτερικών	ΠΑΛΑΙΣΤΙΝΗ	210	Μεταφορές & αποθήκευση	<del>Συνεισφορά στο Ταμείο για Εξοπλισμό</del> Πρόγραμμα της Παγκόσμιας Τράπεζας (World Bank). Αποκατάσταση οδικού δικτύου πόλεως Κακίλντς και ανακατασκευή της οδού στη Βηθλέεμ (Milk Grotto - Νόος Γεννήσεως Σπηλαίο)	497.000.000	31/12/1997
Υπουργείο Εξωτερικών	ΠΑΛΑΙΣΤΙΝΗ	410	Περιβαλλοντική Προστασία	Χρηματοδότηση συντήρησης ψηφιδωτών, αγιογραφιών, τοίχων, δαπέδου Βασιλικής Γεννήσεως στη Βηθλέεμ (μέσω Πατρίχειου Ιεροσολύμων, Υπ. Πολιτισμού)	57.000.000	31/12/1997
Υπουργείο Εξωτερικών	ΠΑΛΑΙΣΤΙΝΗ	530	Στήριξη εισαγωγών, προϋπολογισμού, ισ	Στήριξη προϋπολογισμού (δημιουργία αποθεματικού)	285.000.000	31/12/1997
Υπουργείο Εξωτερικών	ΠΑΝΑΜΑΣ	114	Τριτοβάθμια εκπαίδευση και άνω	Υποτροφίες	400.000	31/12/1997
Υπουργείο Εξωτερικών	ΠΟΛΩΝΙΑ	720	Εκτακτη (πλήν επισιτιστική)	Οικονομική ενίσχυση πλημμυροπαθών	14.500.000	31/12/1997

Δευτέρα, 27 Δεκεμβρίου 2010

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