PANTEION UNIVERSITY OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL SCIENCES

SCHOOL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND HISTORY

The Politics of Citizenship in Greece. European integration, research and policy developments from 1990 to 2015

DOCTORAL DISSERTATION

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Athens, 2019

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Part of the research for this doctoral dissertation was conducted in Maastricht University, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Department of Political Science within the framework of the "Mobility scholarship program for short-term training of PhD students or post-doc researchers of Greek universities and research centres in accredited scientific/research centres abroad", funded by the State Scholarship Foundation.

Abstract

This thesis deals with liberalising change on citizenship policy. The aim is to identify the sources of policy change and test the effects of European soft mechanisms of policy diffusion in domestic developments. The main assumption is that knowledge produced in European research networks can influence domestic political outcomes by encouraging the critical theoretical development of migration research and evidence-based policy-making (Geddes 2005; Geddes & Achtnich 2015; Scholten & Verbeek 2015).

To explain the process of interaction between transnational and domestic ideas the reform of the Greek nationality law is analysed. Two alternative, but eventually complementary, hypotheses are investigated through the method of process tracing. The first hypothesis attributes causal effects to changes in knowledge production and the relation between research and policy-making (Scholten & Timmermans 2010). Mobilisation of EU knowledge and expertise is expected to have an instrumental function with evidence being used as a key source for policy-making. The second hypothesis attributes causal effects to changes in government and the ideological orientation of the party in power (Howard 2009; Goodman 2012). It presumes a symbolic role for EU soft framing mechanisms which are used to legitimate predetermined policy choices and electorally rewarding policy objectives.

According to the analysis of the Greek case, the sources of the inclusive policy change are found in domestic concerns and political competition instead of European forces. However, European soft framing mechanisms played a crucial role in the process of institutional change. New data and new theoretical models communicated in European research networks were used instrumentally but also symbolically empowering domestic policy entrepreneurs to set citizenship on the political agenda; to mediate political conflict by influencing perceptions of problems and solutions; to engage policy-makers in the process of learning; and eventually to reach political consensus on a civic turn on immigrant integration.

Keywords: citizenship policy, immigrant integration, policy diffusion, institutional change, politics, expert knowledge

Acknowledgements

In this rewarding but equally frustrating process of writing this PhD dissertation I was more than lucky to have quite a few inspirational people by my side. I would like to take this opportunity and thank them.

Starting with my supervisor, I would like to express my gratitude to Dimitris Christopoulos. This PhD dissertation would not have been possible without him accepting my proposal, listening to my ideas, reading my drafts and providing thorough feedback. Dimitris was always eager to share information and offer guidance without acute intervention, encouraging or discouraging me when necessary.

I am particularly thankful to Maarten Vink, who supervised my six-month training as a Junior Visiting Fellow at the Maastricht Centre for Citizenship, Migration and Development of Maastricht University. Maarten willingly contributed on my work with valuable comments and offered me the opportunity to participate in thought-provoking courses and workshops. I would also like to thank Costica Dumbrava who took the time to discuss my subject and method providing helpful advice as well as Gerard- René de Groot who offered me the chance to attend and present my work in the Nationality Law Workshop organised by the Faculty of Law of Maastricht University and receive constructive feedback.

I am grateful to Andreas Takis and Angelos Syrigos for the important contribution to data collection through interviews. I am also indebted to Krystallia Christoloudaki for offering advice regarding the organisation of the endeavour of writing this dissertation, for being motivating and reassuring.

Besides academics, I would like to acknowledge the constant support from my family and friends: Spyros, Andriana, Evaggelia, Thomas, Eleni A., Eleni E. and Zoe. This journey wouldn't be the same without them on my side listening to my concerns. Special gratitude is owed to my yoga teacher, Eskil. Last, I owe a great deal to my parents, Miltiades and Eleni, for their constant support and trust. Yet, the greatest thanks go to Giorgos, for the encouragement, comfort and care that he unconditionally offered during the last three years. I dedicate this dissertation to him.

Abbreviations

ACIT: Access to Citizenship and its Impact on Immigrant Integration

ANELL: Independent Greeks (Ανεξάρτητοι Έλληνες)

CoE: Council of Europe

CSCE: Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe

DIKKI: Democratic Social Movement (Δημοκρατικό Κοινωνικό Κίνημα)

ECJ: European Court of Justice

ECN: European Convention on Nationality

ECtHR: European Court of Human Eights

EDTO: Special Identity Card for Homogenis (Ειδικό Δελτίο Ταυτότητας Ομογενούς)

ELIAMEP: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy

EMD: European Migration Dialogue

EU: European Union

EUDO citizenship: European Democracy Observatory on citizenship

GD: Golden Down (Χρυσή Αυγή)

GNC: Greek Nationality Code

HLHR: Hellenic League for Human Rights

ICJ: International Court of Justice

IMEPO: Migration Policy Institute (Ινστιτούτο Μεταναστευτικής Πολιτικής)

IOM: International Organisation of Migration

KEMO: Minority Groups Research Centre

KKE: Communist Party (Κομμουνιστικό Κόμμα Ελλάδος)

LAOS: Popular Orthodox Rally (Λαϊκός Ορθόδοξος Συναγερμός)

MIPEX: Migrant Integration Policy Index

NCHR: National Commission for Human Rights

ND: New Democracy (Νέα Δημοκρατία)

NGO: Non-Governmental Organisation

OSCE: Organisation for the Security and Co-Operation in Europe

PASOK: Pan Hellenic Socialist Movement (Πανελλήνιο Σοσιαλιστικό Κίνημα)

SYN: Coalition of the Left (Συνασπισμός)

SYRIZA: Coalition of the Radical Left (Συνασπισμός Ριζοσπαστικής Αριστεράς)

TCN: Third Country Nationals

UN: United Nations

USSR: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

WWI: First World War

WWII: Second World War

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1. Introduction

1.1. Immigrant integration models and citizenship policy change

This thesis is driven by the empirical puzzle resulting from the observation of trends of citizenship policies in European Union (EU) states. Comparative studies conclude that certain aspects of nationality law, such as provisions concerning the naturalisation of long-term residents or the (re-)acquisition of nationality by diaspora and co-ethnics, converge as they are amended in conformity with international norms. However, despite convergence with respect to the direction of reforms, there is still great variation with respect to the form and type of requirements that downgrade the extent of policy change (Bauböck, et al. 2006b; Bauböck, et al. 2006c). The political process and outcome of reforms also vary as initial proposals for the introduction of new principles in nationality law are often rejected, compromised or infused with contradictory elements (Howard 2009).

This puzzling observation is particularly evident in reforms regarding the highly politicised issue of ius soli citizenship. An increasing number of countries incorporate provisions of ius soli citizenship in their legal order addressing the need for the integration of the 2nd and 3rd generation of immigrants. The variation in elements that affect the inclusive effect of these provisions though, such as the forms of ius soli, the requirements and procedures, is striking (Honohan 2010). As the results of the project Acquisition of Nationality in EU Member States: Rules, Practices and Quantitative Developments (the NATAC project), comparing nationality laws in European states, indicate "[T]here is no overall 'European model' of citizenship legislation, nor is it immediately possible to group several countries into internally coherent clusters with similar citizenship regimes" (Bauböck, et al. 2006a, p.20). This conclusion generates two questions. In the absence of binding supra-national law what are the forces driving the liberalisation of nationality laws? In the background of common immigration pressures and problems of integration what makes differences in domestic citizenship policies persist? How can we explain the common trends towards provisions of civic integration but also the divergence in the scope and forms of policy change across Europe?

A theoretical puzzle follows the aforementioned empirical observations. The increasing adoption of discourses and instruments of civic integration by states with exclusionary policies and ethno-cultural conception of nationhood in combination with

the adoption of demanding requirements for the inclusion of long-term residents by states with multicultural policies challenged the traditional typology of citizenship regimes. The distinction between ethnic and civic integration models as well as the concomitant path dependent process of citizenship policy development, established in migration and citizenship literature by Brubaker in 1992, has been widely contested both theoretically and empirically.

One the one hand, driven by empirical observations, scholars argued that citizenship policies depart from the ideal types that the model perspective suggests and that previously opposing models now converge. Not only states with ethnic-exclusionary conception of nationhood adopt liberal discourse and policy but also states retreat from multicultural policies (Soysal 1994; Jacobson 1996; Joppke 2007b; Joppke, 2007c; Joppke & Morawska 2003). On the other hand, the analytical and methodological value of the national models' perspective is questioned. The view that citizenship models are not antagonistic but rather becoming fuzzier gains increasing acceptability in literature (Bertossi & Duyvendak 2012; Vink & Bauböck 2013). Recent comparative studies argue that although certain aspects of nationality law are becoming more liberal the thesis of liberal convergence must be qualified. National policies still display significant variation with respect to cultural interpretations and reactions to broadly similar challenges (Goodman 2014; Favell, 2001; Mouritsen 2012). These developments raise a number of questions. Which factors structure variation in citizenship policies? What are the factors that shape and the mechanisms that maintain distinctive interpretations of national identities and in what ways they affect the process of institutional change? Which mechanisms trigger reform imperatives and which conditions enable radical shifts in policy goals?

Early citizenship and migration literature has been sceptical about the European sources of domestic politics (Checkel 2001a; Checkel 2001b;Vink 2005; Vink, 2010; Maatsch 2011). Scholars pointed to correlations of power and party politics as the main factor affecting policy outcomes. Left-wing parties are interested in the inclusion of immigrants while right-wing parties are concerned with maintaining links with expatriates and co-ethnics (Joppke 2003; Howard 2009; Goodman 2014). Nevertheless, interest-based policy-making does not always permit the legitimisation and endurance of a citizenship law reforms unless accompanied by matching supporting arguments based on scientific knowledge. The increasing politicisation of ethnicity and migration has been escorted by a growing contestation of the validity of scientific research.

Constructivist literature has emphasised not only the specific role of social scientists in shaping policies but also the varying relation between national institutions and the production and utilisation of expertise. The relation between research and policymaking may be marked by sharp boundaries or may entail the active involvement of researchers in both the formulation of the content of policies and their establishment. In the latter case, scientists may influence policies as much as policymakers may shape the production of knowledge (Boswell 2009; Boswell, et al. 2011; Timmermans & Scholten 2006; Entzinger & Scholten 2015; Scholten & Verbeek 2015).

The term 'methodological nationalism' has been employed to describe the restriction of social research within the boundaries of the nation-state, the political shaping of research agendas along predefined governmental actors' concerns and to underline the need for more independent knowledge and transnational data production as well as evidence-based policy designs (Wimmer & Glick Schiller 2002; Favell, 2003; Bommes & Thränhardt 2010; Vink 2017). Hence, along with the politicisation of immigrant integration, the internationalisation of knowledge, the production of new data and the communication of new policy ideas has been assumed to change the established relationship between knowledge production and knowledge utilisation in policy design and decision-making. In this regard, developments in the EU have also influenced the type of knowledge produced as well as domestic research and policy developments and the way the two fields interact (Boswell 2008; Geddes, 2005; Scholten, et al. 2015a). This thesis looks thoroughly into the effects of transnational policy coordination in domestic policy and decision-making in the field of citizenship under the conditions of politicisation of migrant integration and internationalisation of knowledge by examining the developments in the Greek citizenship policy during the last twenty-five years.

1.2. The reform of the Greek nationality law

The Greek Nationality Code (GNC), the principal legal text regulating acquisition and loss of nationality, has been marked by long continuity and stability. The principle of decent has been the main mode of nationality acquisition from 1856 to 2010 and the state maintained excessive discretionary powers to decisions of nationality acquisition and loss. Along with an ethnocentric official discourse focused on national unity and ethnic homogeneity, citizenship policy has constantly privileged co-ethnics, albeit these privileges involved different degrees and modes of inclusion for different groups, while

at the same time remained particularly restrictive and suspicious towards third country nationals (TCN) and ethnic minorities. Despite the stability of regulations embodied in the GNC, the rules and practices employed were frequently modified by circulars or ministerial decisions producing inconsistencies between policy goals and practice. The provisions concerning nationality law were incorporated to the GNC in 1955, following the territorial integration of the country, and in 2004, marking the recognition of the permanent nature of immigration in Greece by the political elites. Shortly after the second codification though, a new reform was introduced involving fundamental changes to the goals and instruments of the Greek citizenship policy.

The codification of provisions concerning acquisition and loss of nationality in 2004 did not bring fundamental changes to the regime developed during the 1990s. To the contrary the reform of 2010 changed drastically the GNC. New modes of citizenship acquisition for the 2nd and 3rd generation of immigrants on the basis of ius soli were introduced and access to citizenship rights on the basis of ius domicilii was strengthened; naturalisation requirements became more inclusionary, administrative discretion in naturalisation decisions was significantly limited; and voting rights in local elections were attributed to TCN who are long-term residents. According to scholars, the deeply entrenched ethnic conception of the Greek nation has undoubtedly contributed to the foundation of an enduring ius sanguinis tradition; yet, it is not considered as the main source of policy development. Instead, structural factors and interest-driven considerations are put forward to explain policy stability and change. Ideas about the nation were selectively employed in conformity to foreign policy, national security considerations and contingent geostrategic interests (Christopoulos 2006a; Anagnostou 2011; Vogli & Mylonas 2009; Triandafyllidou 2014b). Domestic sources, such as political interests and political party dynamics are equally stressed, as both two main parties prevailing in the political scene campaigned and searched votes among co-ethnic population. Despite inner party variation between xenophobic, nationalistic views and more moderate positions supporting the civic integration of TCN, the development of citizenship policy has traditionally been a consensual political process. The exclusion of TCN from the political community is therefore predominantly attributed to lack of political will to trigger policy change in the opposite direction (Ibid.; Gropas & Triandafyllidou 2009; Anagnostou 2011).

The reform that took place in 2010 is considered a critical turning point in the evolution of the Greek citizenship policy given the fact that by that time issues of

acquisition and loss of nationality by TCN of non-Greek origin were understood as issues of national security instead of issues of immigration policy and were excluded from the political agenda. The political processes turned out to be particularly controversial and divisive, revealing an unprecedented breach in the consensus between centre-right and centre-left political parties regarding the conception of national identity and the qualifications of the Greek citizen. The change in policy is seen by certain scholars as a gradual and incremental process of change in the views of the political elite of the socialist party, starting from 2004 after the change in the party's leadership. These changes in political concerns and interests, inducing internal party developments and facilitating the introduction of the reform when the socialist party won the elections of 2009, are attributed predominantly to external developments, such as the end of war in former Yugoslavia and the stabilisation of the situation in the Balkans, but also to sociodemographic changes in the interior of the country. The long-term settlement, socioeconomic integration and mobilisation of immigrants raised awareness on the permanent nature of immigration. Furthermore, by virtue of consecutive regularisation programs a large number of immigrants would fulfil the residence requirements for naturalisation stipulated in the GNC. The contribution of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) promoting immigrants' rights and proponents of human rights with expert knowledge, placed in critical positions in the executive by the socialist government, is also acknowledged as a factor contributing to the liberal direction of policy development. (Triandafyllidou 2014b; Anagnostou 2011; Anagnostou 2016).

Besides domestic sources and considerations of change, scholars have confirmed the effects of soft Europeanisation in the process of policy reform. Principles and policy guidelines of the Council of Europe (CoE) and the EU constituted a decisive input in policy design and facilitated the legitimisation of the reform in the parliament and public opinion. Along with references to instances of the Greece's historical past to support a civil national self-understanding, the amendment of the GNC was presented as necessary for a European country like Greece. Explicit refences were made to the European human rights tradition and the practices of EU member-states of Southern Europe with similar immigration experiences (Anagnostou 2011; Triandafyllidou 2014a; Triandafyllidou 2014b). According to Triandafyllidou (Ibid.) European influences remain relevant even after the compromise of the 2010 law that took place after its adoption, "in indirect ways, thought the left-wing camp arguments in favour of a more open definition of Greek citizenship" (p. 418). The mobilisation of anti-

immigrant public opinion by the extreme-right was largely inconsequential for the adoption of the law in the parliament in 2010. Yet, the provisions on ius soli citizenship and local voting rights for TCN were deemed unconstitutional by the state's highest administrative court, the Council of State. The intervention of the Council of State, prompted by associations engaged in patriotic action and related with actors of the extreme-right, postponed the implementation of the law and obliged the next left-wing government, that searched to amend the ius soli citizenship provisions in 2015, to accept compromises (Christopoulos 2017; Anagnostou 2016; Triandafyllidou 2015).

The first decision of the 4th Chamber of the Council of State severely limited policy options, by elevating the exclusive application of ius sanguinis citizenship to a constitutional principle in the detriment of a civic and voluntaristic conception of citizenship. However, the Courts' Plenary rendered a significantly more moderate judgement with a considerable dissenting minority, restricting ius soli at birth and providing for additional requirements of integration through education. The new, mitigated provisions of ius soli were eventually adopted in 2015 with a large consensus among right and left-wing political parties, with the exception of the extreme right. Anagnostou (2016) argues that the intra-court interaction and dissent reflected in the court's Plenary reasoning "had important consequences, allowing for the relaunching of policy reform for nationality acquisition by second-generation migrants" (p. 602). Besides intra-court dynamics that mitigated the extreme position of the 4th Chamber in favour of European standards, the author points to external political constraints as factors influencing the Council of State, namely the reaction and criticism that was publicly advanced by political actors and the academic community (Ibid.).

Despite acknowledgements of the role of non-state actors bearing scientific knowledge in policy developments, the contribution of experts in the design of policy change, in mediating the political conflict on citizenship and searching for a durable consensually adopted policy solution, during the period of 2010-2015, has not been examined in detail yet. Moreover, changes in ideas and in domestic knowledge production have not been systematically studied. Neither has policy-oriented action undertaken by non-governmental actors, involved in international venues of scientific research, been associated with soft mechanisms of Europeanisation. This thesis argues that, along with domestic political considerations, the fragmentation of knowledge since the end of the 1990s and the institutionalisation of close relations between researchers and policy-makers since 2009 have been decisive in the liberalisation of

citizenship policy in Greece. Against this background, European soft framing mechanisms have significantly influenced the policy-making process.

1.3. Research questions

This thesis is concerned with the relationship between transnational policy coordination and domestic policy development and explores the role of ideas in the generation, continuity and change of citizenship policy paradigms. Drawing from Skogstad and Schmidt (2011), two literatures in the social sciences are brought together to generate the research questions employed to explain the timing, process and scope of paradigmatic policy change. First, the literature pointing on the diffusion of policy ideas in the context of European integration, developed in the domain of international relations. Second, political science scholarship, empirical studies of political economy and comparative politics emphasising the limitations in the diffusion of ideas as well as the role of norm entrepreneurs in shaping national political outcomes.

The main research question is:

In the absence of supra-national binding legislation can soft framing mechanisms of policy diffusion in the context of European integration affect domestic developments in citizenship policy and how?

This question is going to be answered by exploring the following sub-questions with respect to policy and research developments in Greece:

What is the role of ideas in citizenship policy continuity and change?

Why and how do ideas become embedded in collective identities and institutions in national contexts and with what effects for policy and research development?

Under which circumstances can new ideas reorient public policy and action on the basis of new principles and norms?

What is the role of expert knowledge and advocacy networks in the process of policy change?

1.4. Literature review

In the literature of citizenship and migration, ideas related to national immigrant integration models have been considered to affect policy in three distinct ways. Historical institutionalist approaches conceptualise the role of ideas in policy-making as structures imposing constrains on political actors and delimiting legitimate and feasible options. Taken-for-granted norms and beliefs entrenched in institutionalised national models of immigrant integration shape the construction of problems and

responses and limit the range of actors' alternatives (Brubaker 1992; Howard 2009; Goodman 2012; Goodman 2014; Mouritsen 2012). Instrumentalist approaches depict ideas as tools deployed by strategically minded political actors participating in the policy process to manipulate the political agenda and mobilise support in order to advance their policy preferences and achieve their policy objectives (Bleich 2003; Favell 2001). Both approaches have been used to explain how the development of citizenship and immigration policies has been bounded to power asymmetries and nationally specific idealised integration models permitting only incremental secondary changes on policy instruments. The direction and the extent of these changes is relevant to the ideological orientation of the party in power (Joppke 2003; Howard 2009; Howard 2010; Schain 2006; Goodman 2014) as well as the way the issue is defined and the institutional venue where debate takes place (Hansen & Koehler 2005; Guiraudon 2000b).

A third, structuralist-constructivist approach integrates these insights and suggests that although actors are constrained by deeply entrenched ideas they still retain some autonomy in the selection and combination of ideas that underlines policy action and can persuade actors to reconsider their goals and preferences. Ideas do not only constrain but they are also open to interpretation resulting to shifts in organisational structures and patterns of action (Hall 2009, pp.216-217; Campbell 2004, p.17). Policy entrepreneurs can influence policy change by sustaining or radically modifying existing public philosophies or programme ideas through socialisation and learning (Boswell, et al. 2011). Institutional development is punctuated by short periods of rapid change, relevant to changes in problem definitions and shifts in scientific venues of agenda setting (Guiraudon 2000a; Joppke, 2001) or changes in the relation between research and policy (Timmermans & Scholten, 2006; Scholten & Timmermans, 2010; Scholten, 2011a) and the production and utilisation of knowledge (Entzinger & Scholten 2015; Boswell 2009; Scholten & Verbeek 2015). Whether such changes result to shifts in policy frames and policy instruments or more fundamental changes regarding the values and goals of policy depends on the scope of frame reflection (Scholten 2011a).

The notion of learning acquires a prominent role in approaches that regard changes in ideas as a central factor in understanding policy change. Whether describing occasional instrumental adjustments or more radical changes in the overall goal of policy, learning has been associated with uncertainty, policy anomalies or political crisis brought about when dominant representations are no longer sufficient to interpret

the development of a social field in a satisfactory way and therefore no longer capable to structure and legitimate state action. The subsequent questioning and loss of confidence in the dominant reference point creates favourable conditions for a (substantial) re-evaluation of the principles underlying the policy model (Bennet & Howlett 1992; Surel 2000). In the context of European integration the following developments have been considered to contribute to the contestation of national models of immigrant integration at the national level: the involvement of the EU in the research area of migration; the development of various international networks conducting comparative research; and the production of new data along with new theoretical models and common definitions for policy analysis (Scholten, et al. 2015a; Geddes 2005). In the literature of citizenship studies, scholars have examined the European sources of domestic politics; the focus, however, has been predominantly on the effects of positive or negative mechanisms of policy diffusion (Hansen 1998; Hansen & Weil 2001; Checkel 2001a; Checkel 2001b; Vink 2005; Vink 2010; Maatsch 2011). The effects of EU soft framing mechanisms in citizenship policy coordination are yet to be profoundly explored (Vink 2017, pp.233-235).

1.5. Research Objectives

The purpose of this thesis is twofold: first, to test the hypothesis on the effects of soft framing mechanisms of Europeanisation on domestic citizenship policies (Geddes 2005; Geddes & Achtnich 2015) and second, to test the theory attributing causal effects to expert organisations as venues of agenda setting (Scholten, et al. 2015a; Entzinger & Scholten 2015; Scholten & Verbeek 2015;Scholten & Timmermans 2010; Timmermans & Scholten 2006; Scholten, 2011a) in the case of Greece. Do changes in the relations between research and policy-making account for changes in citizenship policy? If yes, under which conditions? What is the role of ideas and knowledge produced at the European level in the process of domestic policy change?

The study focuses on the effects a specific type of knowledge regarding citizenship policy change; that is scientific knowledge produced within the framework of the 2004 Common Basic Principles of Integration and the 2009 Stockholm Common Integration Agenda, the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX), the European Migration Dialogue (EMD) and the European Democracy Observatory on citizenship (EUDO citizenship) research network. The analysis adopts a single case-study design and examines the changes in the GNC and the role played by the domestic academic

research community and advocacy networks in the process of policy change. In the Greek literature, the topic of citizenship has been predominantly the object of legal studies examining issues of nationality law and minority rights. At the beginning of the 21st century, policy-oriented research proliferated, along with criticism to past political choices and contestation of established elite narratives. Through comparative or within-case analyses, scholars examined the effects of structural factors and elite interests as well as the impact of Europe on immigration and citizenship policy. Anagnostou (2005) acknowledged the indirect effect of normative pressures stemming from international organisations to governmental and political actors in a critical amendment in 1998. Triandafyllidou (2014b; Triandafyllidou 2014a) included non-state actors in her research and confirmed the effects of soft Europeanisation, in the form of policy discourses and symbolic references, in the policy change of 2010. However, the character of knowledge production and the actual relationship between scientific research and policy-making has rarely been the object of analysis (for exceptions see Stratoudaki 2009; Varouxi 2008; Georgarakis 2009).

This thesis expands the scope of analysis to include the academic community and research networks, especially those involved in transnational research projects. Policy experts are seen as actors participating in research networks, interacting and exchanging ideas with other transnational experts in venues located at the European level. Social interaction is expected to affect policy development at the domestic level. The main assumption is that soft mechanisms of Europeanisation influenced the formulation and legitimation of the nationality law reform in Greece not only by means of public discourse but also though changes in the relation between research and policy. At the centre of analysis is the research produced and the action undertaken by experts on behalf of the independent authority of the Greek Ombudsman and the Hellenic League for Human Rights (HLHR), an NGO advocating for human rights. The aim is to shed light in how ideas generated in transnational research networks, and the actors carrying them, interact with domestic institutional, cultural or discursive structures and uncover the role of state and non-state actors in the process of policy-making and policy change.

The effects of Europeanisation, however, should not be overestimated as ideas produced at the European level might be rejected, compromised or localised (Skogstad & Schmidt 2011; Campbell 2010). The possibility that 'endogenous processes within the national political systems' (Vink & Graziano 2008, p.16) may account for policy

change should also be taken into account. To establish the indirect effects of Europeanisation on national political outcomes an alternative hypothesis providing a competing interpretation is examined through counterfactual reasoning and systematic process tracing. The alternative explanation is related to domestic concerns of political actors, such as geopolitical interests, demographic factors, issues of social cohesion or societal pressure (Checkel 2001a; Checkel 2001b; Vink 2005; Vink 2010; Maatsch 2011). Relevant form this perspective is the ideological orientation of the party in power and changes of government; left-wing governments are more likely to facilitate the naturalisation of TCN and the introduction of ius soli citizenship while right-wing governments are more likely to see citizenship as a prize to be acquired at the end of the integration process (Joppke 2003; Howard 2009; Goodman 2014). The main objective is to explore whether changes in the Greek citizenship policy were the result of Europeanisation or domestic incentives as well as to make explicit which aspects remained the same and why (Vink & Graziano 2008, pp.15-17).

1.6. Outline of the study

Chapter 2 introduces the concept of citizenship as membership in a political community. It illustrates the modes of acquisition of the status and the respective norms developed at the international and European level. It further explores the recent trends on domestic citizenship policies in Europe to reach the conclusion that while certain aspects of nationality laws converge, their particular attributes vary significantly. The main questions asked is whether the process of European integration may account for convergence of certain aspects of national policies and why other aspects are resistant to change. The rest of the chapter delineates the mechanisms of policy coordination and the variables that mediate the diffusion process.

Chapter 3 investigates the factors that might hinder, distort or facilitate the process of European integration at the domestic level by scrutinising the process of emergence, consolidation and demise of citizenship policy models. The theories explaining continuity and change of migration and citizenship policies, and their shortcomings, as well as the role of normative ideas and scientific knowledge are profoundly explored in order to draw the theoretical framework and formulate the main hypotheses tested in the case study of Greece. The chapter ends with the design of the research and methodological remarks.

Chapters 4, 5 and 6 comprise of the content analysis. Chapter 4 starts with an outline of the GNC that sets the scene for further developments. It focuses on the politics of citizenship and scrutinises the problems that emerged during the demographic changes of the 1990s. It analyses how problems were defined by political elites when migration became politicised; which issues were dealt with publicly, and when, and which were not; how they were framed and in which venues they were discussed; as well as which actors were deemed appropriate to participate in policy design and the decision-making process. The chapter puts emphasis on entrenched ideas and the practices that persevere throughout the years and concludes that the policy paradigm of ethnic homogeneity that was constructed during the 20th century under the imperative of national unity was reproduced without reflection on its internal consistency. Correspondingly citizenship policy is inconsistent, ethnically selective but also discriminative and exclusionary, as the priority for policy choices is to serve political goals.

Chapter 5 sheds light on developments on national research and its relation to policy-making and looks for changes in the structure and relationship of the two domains induced by processes of European integration. These changes concern the character of knowledge production, the orientation of research and venues of communication and interaction. Academic literature, the reports of the Greek Ombudsman and the interventions of the HLHR and civil society organisations are in the centre of the analysis. The focus is particularly on the sources of ideas developed since the middle of the 1990s that led to the condemnation of established ideology on the homogeneity of the nation and the contestation existing policy by highlighting the internal inconsistencies of the citizenship policy paradigm. The aim of the chapter is to make explicit the role of European integration in structuring the relation between migration experts and policy-makers and in communicating ideas for policy change to state actors.

Chapter 6 comprises of the analysis of the process of policy change and the assessment of the transformation of the Greek policy paradigm on citizenship. The dynamics of the interaction of political actors and MPs with the expert community and the decision of the Council of State are at the centre of the inquiry. The extend of paradigmatic change, involving change both at the goals of policy and the policy instruments as well as the effects of soft mechanisms of European integration are assessed in the last part of chapter.

2. The puzzle: citizenship policies across Europe

2.1. Introduction

Citizenship represents the legal bond between the individual and the state. It functions as an allocation mechanism that ensures that every person is a citizen of at least one state and determines to which state each person belongs (Vink & de Groot 2010a, p. 3; Bauböck 2006).[1] Historically, the French revolution affected decisively the development of modern citizenship. The status of the citizen was institutionalised as a membership status; state sovereignty was legitimised as popular sovereignty and political rights were recognised to all persons who are subject to state power. The civil liberties and duties of the citizen were based on equality before the law and were constitutionally protected (Weil 2005, pp.23-52; Brubaker 1992, pp.39-49). The formalisation and codification of citizenship has been articulated with the establishment of the nation-state. The centrality of citizenship in the administrative organisation and the political culture of the nation state provided the essential context for the political activation and social integration of the citizenry (Brubaker 1992; Bendix, 1977).

Besides a sovereign territory and an effective centralised bureaucracy, mutual civic bonds had to be shaped to raise political awareness and establish solidarity among the population. The construction of a common political identity that would inspire loyalty and instil civic virtues to citizen was necessary to sustain the self-government. Therefore, the concept of citizenship extended beyond the legal status conferring individual rights to a common sentiment of belonging shared by members of the nation (Habermas, 1996; Bauböck 2006). The nation is self-defined and bound by a consciousness of common political destiny and the will to shape a common future. While the mutually recognised sentiment of solidarity is grounded historically in a glorious past citizenship-based membership ensures the continuity of the nation to present and future generations (Habermas 1996; Bauböck 1998).

As a membership status citizenship is described by Brubaker (1992) as 'a powerful instrument of social closure' (p.x) that is 'internally inclusive' and 'externally

[1] A terminological clarification however should be made in advance. In international law the term nationality is used to denote the status of citizenship, the legal relation between the individual and the state. The connotations of nationality with national identity render the term suitable for the international, external aspects of this bond in contrast with the term citizenship that is relevant to the internal aspects of democratic membership, the right and duties as well as the virtues of citizens. In this study however, the two terms will be used as synonymous and complementary (Bauböck 2005, p.4). For a discrete use of the terms see Bauböck, et al. (2006a), p.17.

exclusive' (p.21). The inclusive aspect of citizenship applies within the borders of the national political community and is associated with equality and claims of disadvantaged groups to progressive full access to civic, political and social rights. On the edges of the polity, the exclusive aspect of citizenship is associated with the administrative capacity to control entry and residence of foreigners and state authority to persons present in the territory. Only nationals are entitled to unconditional admission and residence in the territory and diplomatic protection abroad. Aliens are subject to restrictions of border control and residence requirements. Additionally, aliens are excluded from franchise in general elections, protection from arbitrary violence and other aspects and opportunities of social life, such as public office and military service (Hailbronner 2006, pp.71-81).

This study deals with the issue of citizenship as membership and focuses in the formation of rules that regulate the attribution of nationality, in the background of increased mobility and high politicisation of the issue of migrant integration. The chapter introduces the concept of citizenship and the rules regulating the attribution of nationality. It discusses the changes in national citizenship policies and assumes that, although nationality laws have become more complex and diverse, the process of European integration may account for the civic turn observed in immigrant integration. The hypothesised process of policy diffusion concerns indirect mechanisms of policy coordination and more specifically soft framing mechanisms of policy diffusion involving socialisation and learning.

2.2. The status of citizenship: modes of acquisition

The regulation of access to citizenship had been strongly affected by historic experiences of immigration as source or receiving countries. In overseas settler states like the United States, Canada and Australia immigration was seen as permanent settlement and immigrants' transfer of allegiance and access to citizenship was part of the broader process of assimilation to the dominant culture of the host society. In the industrializing Western Europe, with the exception of the return of former colonial subjects to their motherlands, immigration from the South took the form of temporary recruitment of guest-workers who had no option to citizenship as they were expected to maintain their bonds with the country of origin. Nevertheless, political developments and structural changes in the middle of the 20th century altered migration patterns

undermining previous perceptions on the nature of immigration (Castles 2002; Castles & Davidson 2000).

The autonomy of the nation-state to regulate social and economic relations as well as to control movements across borders on the basis of its territorial sovereignty has been eroded by the institutionalisation of supra-national decision-making. At the same time, international migration challenged the function and quality of democracy in the system the nation states. The ethnic heterogeneity of societies produced new forms of belonging encouraging diaspora ties and transnational modes of identification. Modes of inclusion emerging at the local or transnational level differentiated the meaning of membership in the polity of citizens, in the cultural community of the imagined nation and the society comprised of the resident population, which had been unified in the singular concept of membership in the nation-state (Bauböck, 1998; Kivisto & Faist, 2007; Castles et al. 2014). Correspondingly, immigration alters the relation between the nation and state. As the population of the state gets disconnected from its territory, the exclusive association of citizenship with the nation-state is undermined and considered contingent and historical (Habermas 1996; Bosniak 2006).

Since the '80s, however, permanent immigration combined with economic recession and persisting inequalities shifted the mode of immigration politics. Immigration policy entered the public arena replacing decisions based on client politics involving negotiation between bureaucratic agents and groups with economic or humanitarian interests outside public view (Freeman 1995; Joppke 1998). Access to citizenship is considered a means for the integration of immigrants and became also politicised. Subsequently, symbolic and particularistic identities based on ethnicity, religion or region revive as an opposition to abstract universalism (Castles, et al. 2014, pp. 296-316, Koopmans, et al. 2005; Vink & de Groot, 2010b). Today, in Europe, nationalism remains a social resource of public mobilisation and citizenship attribution remains the 'last bastion of state sovereignty' (Brubaker 1992, p.180). Yet, the politicisation of immigration and integration posed new challenges for citizenship-based membership, the role of the state and the definition of national identity in liberal democracies (Bauböck 1994a; Bauböck 1994b; Faist 2000).

To ensure the intergenerational continuity of the permanent population, one of the constitutive elements of states, and its reproduction in time and space, states set explicit criteria and ascribe the status of citizenship at birth (Vink & Bauböck 2013, p.622). Two main modes of nationality acquisition have been developed; nationality is

acquired by descent from a national or by birth in the territory of a state. Grounded on a presumption of developing close attachments, these practices have been codified in the legal principles of ius sanguinis and ius soli respectively. In Europe, automatic ius sanguinis at birth is the predominant rule for the determination of nationality.[2] With the exception of the United States of America where a pure form of ius soli is applied, ius soli is applied in states' practice as complementary rather than a substitute of ius sanguinis. To avoid accidental or intentional acquisition of nationality and ensure a sufficient link with the state, nationality laws provide for additional requirements for *ex lege* ius soli at birth, such as specific length of residence or specific residence permit by one of both parents at the time of birth as well as parent's birth in the territory for double ius soli.[3] Ius soli citizenship is also acquired after birth, at a minor age or at majority, automatically, by means of declaration of option or registration.[4] Further requirements may apply, such as continuous residence, schooling and good conduct, and the degree of state discretion may vary (Hailbronner 2006; Waldrauch 2006a Vink & de Groot 2010a; Honohan 2010).

Foreigners who have built up links with a state after a certain period of residence can voluntarily acquire the nationality of this state by naturalisation. Entrenched in the tradition of ius domicili, naturalisation is a formal act that requires application by the person involved and an act of granting by state authorities. As citizenship policy is inextricably linked with immigration control and integration policy only persons that are already formally accepted as immigrants are eligible for residence-based naturalisation. The procedural conditions vary from state to state. The granting of nationality by naturalisation is implemented as an entitlement, subject to the fulfilment of certain conditions and concluded by declaration of option, or as a discretionary act of the executive, parliamentary or judicial authorities who are responsible for the final decision. The material conditions, such as years of residence, financial or employment situation, knowledge of the language may also vary. Facilitated access to citizenship is provided to persons with family relations such as spouses of nationals and children of naturalised aliens as well as to persons with special achievements, in sports, arts or

[2] After birth, ius sanguinis citizenship is acquired *ex lege*, by declaration or registration in the cases of adoption, legitimation or recognition of children born out of wedlock.
[3] Foundlings and children who otherwise would be stateless constitute an exception.
[4] France is the unique exception. Nationality is acquired *ex lege* at the age of 18 conditional to 5 years residence after the age of 11.

science, or persons in public service. Immigrant minors who have been raised in the state may also be entitled to declaratory access to citizenship based on socialisation. The age limit ranges from the age of eighteen to some years after, accompanied by further requirements such as residence, knowledge of language, education and absence of criminal record (Waldrauch 2006a; Hailbronner 2006).

2.3. Biotic ties, cultural affinity and the attribution of citizenship rights

In post-war Western European states, the attribution of social rights to TCN was part of the settlement policy of migrant workers.[5] The need for the reconstruction of Europe and the development of the mass production system generated high demand for foreign labour. The temporary stay of workers and the 'anti-populist norm', that according to Freeman (1995) prohibited political parties from seeking to win votes by exploiting racial, ethnic or immigration fears unless support was related to expansive immigration policy decisions, kept labour migration policy out of public involvement, consultation and parliamentary debate. Since 1973, the economic recession provoked by the oil crisis urged governments of receiving states to restrict immigration flows. However, a great number of immigrants never returned to their homelands but settled permanently in the destination state. The second wave of post-war migration inevitably comprised of family members and dependants of the first generation economic immigrants (Messina 2007, chap.2).

During the 1980s, irregular migration intensified as a result of the previous restrictive policies. Furthermore, after the political developments in the post-communist Eastern Europe, great numbers of refugees seeking asylum joined the streams entering Western Europe turning immigration an issue of high politics. The permanent presence of ethnic minorities incited ethnic-based mobilisation and the organisation of the public to anti-immigrant and pro-immigrant movements of interest groups, supporting immigrants' claims to humanitarian and social protection. Conservative or extremist xenophobic parties endorsed concerns of anti-immigrant groups on the incapability of states to control immigration, the sustainability of the market and welfare state, the cultural identity and public order. The norm of proper discourse has been often violated by creating subjective threats in a pursuit to attract votes (Messina 2007, chap.2; Freeman 1995). Despite public opposition, the territorial character of the welfare state provided the institutional incentives for the proliferation

[5] European Convention on Establishment 1955, ETS No19, in force since 1965.

of core civil and social rights, such as equal access to labour market, housing, education, entitlement to health services and benefits. In accordance to provisions of liberal constitutions, bureaucrats and independent courts enforced protection to persons present in the territory on the basis of long-term residence and enabled family reunification (Freeman 2004; Guiraudon 2000a).

The recognition of collective cultural rights has been a response to the segmented socio-economic integration of immigrants and their difficulty to assimilate in the dominant culture. Nevertheless, non-discrimination policies and special social programmes for ethnic minorities have been insufficient to treat pre-existing inequalities of race, class or gender and led to their marginalisation and the association of social problems with immigration. Official policies of multiculturalism have often served as a form of social control. In emigration countries that refused to accept the permanent nature of immigration, such as Germany, special social and educational regimes aimed at the return of guest-workers rather than their integration. Since the 1990s, policies of cultural recognition declined after claims of supposed threats to social cohesion, the integrity and solidarity of the nation-state and national security. (Castles & Davidson, 2000, chap.5). Long-term residents remain excluded from full membership given the fact that they were still deprived of political rights, external citizenship rights and a right to return from abroad (Bauböck 2009).

Hammar (1990) uses the term denizenship to describe the status of aliens with a legal right to permanent residence, free access to the labour market, and similar or equal social and civil rights with citizens. The status of denizenship is granted after prolonged residence in the country. The enjoyment of rights is closely linked with participation in the labour market and no full protection against expulsion is afforded. Although some states grant political rights, such as local voting or employment to government service, denizens have to go through the process of naturalisation in order to cross the boundary and acquire full membership and protection (Groenendijk, 2006b). Still, migration patterns were hardly governed by impersonal labour market forces but rather by political motives grounded on entrenched historical relations. Former colonies of European states constituted a great source of post-war immigration. In contrast with guest-workers, immigrants arrived with their families in the first place and were granted privileges and rights since their arrival irrespective of the length of residence (Messina 2007, chap.2; Castles & Davidson 2000, chap.5). Groenendijk (1996) uses the term quasi-citizenship to describe the status of settled immigrants that

"are granted the same rights as citizens of the host state in almost all fields of social life" (p.7). The status entails full protection from expulsion and may include voting rights at local or national level and access to public office (Groenendijk 2006a).

During the process of decolonisation, the privileged status was attributed to nationals of former colonies who were given a residence right by former colonisers.[6] In these cases, the status constituted a transitional measure with limited temporal scope, aiming primarily at the promotion of the integration of persons who could not be deported neither could acquire automatically the citizenship of the host state. As following generations get more easily integrated and naturalised, very few persons hold the status today. Besides post-colonial relations, the status of quasi-citizenship was attributed for political reasons or ethnic proximity. With respect to the former, protection under the status was afforded to alien former prisoners in post war Germany, who could not be repatriated due to restrictions of the Cold War. In Greece the status was attributed to co-ethnics from the Greek minorities in Albania and Turkey who were persecuted during the 1940s and the 1950s respectively until the end of the 1990s. In these cases, voting rights were withheld from the status (Groenendijk 2006a; Groenendijk 1996). [7]

Cultural or ethnic affinity has also been the reason for privileged treatment in the form of extended rights to persons conceived to belong to the larger national community. In Portugal the status is open-ended and attributed on the basis of reciprocity to Portuguese speaking nationals already admitted in the country. Currently the status is applied to Brazilian nationals who are however subject to immigration laws. In Ireland British nationals settled in the country have voting rights in national elections, and in Italy persons with Italian origin enjoy electoral rights and access to public office. In the two last cases no special status and no protection from expulsion is afforded. In other cases, the status provides reduced residence requirements. France grants facilitated access to citizenship on the basis of cultural affinity to francophone persons with French education as well as persons of former colonies who can apply for naturalisation immediately after taking up residence in the country. In Spain nationals

[6] Examples of persons attributed the status are nationals of the old commonwealth countries in United Kingdom or nationals of Iceland in Denmark in the context of the 1918 Danish-Icelandic Federation. The case of former Indonesian nationals, transported to the Netherlands, who were struggling for the independence of the Moluccan islands while stateless, is another example characterised by humanitarian incentives for the attribution of the status (Groenendijk 2006a).

[7] In the case of Moluccans voting rights were also withheld.

of Latin American states are entitled to facilitated naturalisation. Furthermore, privileged treatment with regard to rights or facilitated access to citizenship is granted to citizens of European Union (EU), Nordic and Benelux countries on the basis of regional cooperation, reciprocity and cultural proximity (Groenendijk 2006a; Waldrauch 2006c).

Ethnic criteria are particularly evident in cases where a privileged status was attributed in order to rectify persecution or undue deprivation of nationality for political reasons or changes of borders. It concerns either former nationals and their descendants or nationals of specific states and entails the automatic acquisition of citizenship upon arrival. In this way enhanced protection compared to refugees is afforded and the opposition with the native population is mitigated. After the end of the WWII, citizens of the Soviet Union who were forcibly sent back to Russia from Western Europe or immigrated to Russia from states formerly part of the USSR acquired citizenship by declaration until the end of 2000. Persons of German ethnic origin who were collectively expelled from the communist Eastern and Central Europe were considered as resettled (aussiedler) and were granted the German citizenship shortly after arrival. After the end of the Cold War, Greece considered as returnees (pallinostoudes) the Pontic Greeks who fled from Russia and the region of the Black Sea. In the cases of Greece and Germany, until the restriction of access to the status the 1990s and 2000s respectively, no language or other objective requirements were required. Until today, no temporal limit to the generations entitled to the status and no residence requirement has been implemented. Furthermore, the status of quasi-citizenship is afforded without the requirement of repatriation to minorities of co-ethnic descent who came under the authority of another state during the establishment of independent states in Central and Eastern Europe. But also in Western and South European states, privileged conditions for the re-acquisition of nationality by former nationals have been extended to descendants of former nationals living abroad even though they face no threat of expulsion (Groenendijk 1996; Groenendijk 2006a; Dumbrava 2010; Dumbrava 2014, pp. 47-58).

2.4. International norms

International law has traditionally acknowledged that nationality law belongs to the exclusive jurisdiction of states. The 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws provides in article 1: “It is for each State

to determine under its own law who are its nationals. This law shall be recognised by other States in so far as it is consistent with international conventions, international custom, and the principles of law generally recognised with regard to nationality." According to article 2: "Any question as to whether a person possesses the nationality of a particular State shall be determined in accordance with the law of the State." The 1965 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination provides in article 1(3) that "[N]othing in this Convention may be interpreted as affecting in any way the legal provisions of States Parties concerning nationality, citizenship or naturalization, provided that such provisions do not discriminate against any particular nationality," explicitly prohibiting 'negative discrimination' which targets directly specific ethnic groups. According to article 1(4) special measures of 'positive discrimination' addressed to certain racial and ethnic groups in order to ensure equality "shall not be deemed racial discrimination, provided, however, that such measures do not, as a consequence, lead to the maintenance of separate rights for different racial groups and that they shall not be continued after the objectives for which they were taken have been achieved."

The globalisation process and economic liberalism favoured the approximation of governments and cooperation at supra-national level as well as the permeability of territorial borders. Advanced communication and transportation enhanced the sustainability of networks between countries of origin and countries of settlement. Guest workers eventually remained in the state of destination, obtained access to rights and reunited with their families. By the end of the Cold War, the fall of communism and the breakup of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia lead to increasing cross-border mobility of immigrants and emigrants and the development of transnational spaces of economic, societal and cultural interaction (Castles 2002; Castles & Davidson 2000; Joppke 2007a). Migration has produced external citizens living abroad and foreign citizens living within the borders (Bauböck 2010, p. 298). Bauböck (2006) uses the term 'transnational citizenship' to describe the "overlapping memberships between separate territorial jurisdictions" (p.28) and defines it as the "triangular relation between individuals and two or more independent states in which these individuals are simultaneously assigned membership status and membership-based rights and obligations" (Bauböck 2007, p. 2395).

Besides the need to coordinate the relations of sovereign states, human rights concerns were added to the legal norms addressing questions of nationality thereby

constraining state policies (Hailbronner 2006). After the Second World War (WWII), the institutionalization of the international system of human rights protection guaranteed to individuals and groups judicially enforceable rights and refugee protection on the basis of personhood of the individual regardless of their relationship with the state they are in. These limitations regard the United Nations (UN) conventions regarding the protection against statelessness (1961 Convention on the reduction of statelessness), the duty to facilitate the naturalisation of refugees (1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees), the principle of sexual equality with regard to the nationality of married women (Agreement on nationality of married women) and protection of the rights of the child (1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child). Article 15(1) of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights stipulates that 'everyone has a right to a nationality'. Under paragraph (2) 'no one shall be arbitrarily deprived nor denied the right to change nationality.' Nevertheless, neither this provision nor customary international law prescribes the necessary conditions for an entitlement to a specific nationality or an individual right to choose or change nationality (Hailbronner 2006).

The International Court of Justice described the foundation of nationality as 'a social fact of attachment, a genuine connection of existence, interests and sentiments, together with the existence of reciprocal rights and duties' (Nottebohm Case, Liechtenstein v. Guatemala, 1995 I.C.J. 4, 1955 WL 1, pp. 315-324, as cited in Vink and Bauböck (2013, p.631)). Yet, it was stated that it is at the competence of states to adapt access to citizenship to varying demographic conditions. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has also acknowledged the impact that an arbitrary denial of a nationality may have on private life while the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has been mainly involved in cases concerning the nationality of the EU (Hailbronner 2006; Margiotta & Vonk 2010).

The CoE has dealt with the coordination of issues pertaining to nationality law since the 1960s. In 1963 the Convention on the Reduction of Cases of Multiple Nationality and on Military Obligation was adopted. In 1993 the Second Protocol is added changing fundamentally the attitude towards multiple nationality as exceptions permitting second-generation immigrants, spouses of mixed marriages and their offspring to retain the nationality of origin were provided. The European Convention on Nationality (ECN), signed in 1997, constitutes the most recent and comprehensive instrument of international law with regard to nationality.

Pursuant to article 6, State Parties shall provide the possibility of naturalisation to persons who are lawfully and habitually on their territory. As regards the residence condition, it must not exceed the period of ten years (article 6(3)). Besides spouses, adopted and stateless children, the acquisition of nationality shall be facilitated for the 2nd and 3rd generation of immigrants who were born or raised in the territory and have been lawful and habitual residents during childhood. Neither the required period of residence nor the age of attribution of nationality is specified in the text though (articles 6(1), (2), (4)). The term facilitation implies a duty of states to recognise that the legal status of citizenship is fundamental and crucial for the aforementioned persons and to provide favourable conditions for its acquisition (Explanatory Report to the ECN, p.8). Furthermore, the Convention prohibits discrimination between citizens by birth and by naturalisation and sets exhaustive grounds for nationality withdrawal (articles 5,7). Aspects of individual rights' protection oblige states to ensure that decisions relating to the acquisition and loss of nationality are open to administrative or judicial review, processed in reasonable time and adequately justified (articles 10,11,12). Signatory states are also committed to accept dual citizenship when two nationalities are acquired automatically at birth (article14). Yet, no specific administrative rules or rules on facilitation have been evolved, either in this Convention or in customary law (Hailbronner 2006).

Despite the fact that harmonisation of nationality laws falls outside the scope of political integration within the EU, the status of European citizenship raised additional constraints to the discretion of member-states. According to the ECJ, the fundamental freedoms of movement and residence granted under Community Law after the acquisition of the nationality of a Member State should not be restricted by additional requirements imposed by other Member States (Case C-200/02 – Chen v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ECR 2004, I-3887, as cited in Bauböck, et al. 2006a, p.16, note 1) The EU has also been actively involved with the promotion of integration of non-EU nationals. Since 1999 and the Tampere Presidency Conclusions (European Council, 15-16 October 1999) it has been widely accepted that access to citizenship is an important step in the process of full integration of immigrants into receiving societies and should be part of the common strategies of Member-States. The concept of civic citizenship was introduced in 2000 accompanied by a series of Council Directives on the status of TCN such as the Racial Equality Directive (2000/43/EC), the Employment

Equality Directive (2000/78/EC), the Family Reunification Directive (2003/86/EC) and the Long-Term Residence Directive (2003/109/EC).

Outlining the basic guidelines for a holistic approach to integration in 2003 the Commission stated that:

> On the premise that it is desirable that immigrants become citizens, it is reasonable to relate access to citizenship to the length of time they have been living in the country concerned and to apply different principles for 1st and 2nd/3rd generation immigrants. For the latter, citizenship laws should provide automatic or semi-automatic access whereas it is reasonable to require the first generation to make a formal application for citizenship. Naturalisation should be rapid, secure and non-discretionary. States may require a period of residence, knowledge of the language and take into account any criminal record. In any case, criteria for naturalisation should be clear, precise and objective. Administrative discretion should be delimited and subject to judicial control (European Commission 2003, COM/2003/336 final, pp.22-23).

Furthermore, the Commission explicitly refers to the actors that should be involved in policy-making: "while governments should take the lead, collaboration around policies should involve Social Partners, the research community and public service providers, NGOs and other civil society actors, including immigrants themselves" (European Commission 2003, COM/2003/336 final, p.23).

In addition, a number of non-binding, soft governance measures have been adopted. The Common Basic Principles on Immigrant Integration, adopted by the Justice and Home Affairs Council in 2004 after exchange of information and roundtables with representatives by the member-states, defined integration as "a dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents of Member States" (Council of the EU, Justice and Home Affairs 2004, Council Conclusions, p.17). In 2009 the European Council invited the Commission to support the development of a coordination mechanism to improve structures and tools for European knowledge exchange as well as the development of core indicators in a number of policy areas for monitoring the results of integration policies, increase comparability and reinforce the European learning process (European Council 2010, The Stockholm Programme, p.30).[8] Research projects conducted by international research networks have produced a number of systematic and comparative examinations of citizenship and integration policies as well as the development and

[8] Under Regulation 862/2007 member-states have the obligation to provide to the European Office of Statistics statistical information on the acquisition of nationality of member-states by immigrants, see Regulation (EC) No 862/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on Community statistics on migration and international protection and repealing Council Regulation (EEC) No 311/76 on the compilation of statistics on foreign workers [2007] OJ L 199, pp.23-29.

analysis of policy indices that help explain policy and practice (for an overview see (Goodman 2015). Systematic and comparative examination of citizenship has not only boosted further case-study research across space and time but also the emergence of generalisable inferences about the direction of developments in citizenship policy as well as hypotheses to be tested regarding the mechanisms of policy change. Criticism of the national models of immigrant integration and the rise of post-nationalists or transnationalist perspectives has also been part of this new direction of research (Goodman 2015; Scholten, et al. 2015a).

The most comprehensive, expansive and updated set of indicators with respect to nationality law has been developed by the EUDO citizenship research network. An exhaustive typology of modes of acquisition and loss of nationality has been developed and supplemented by information about substantial and procedural conditions, the impact of citizenship laws on acquisition rates and integration policies offering authoritative databases, profound comparative analyses and practical guidelines to evaluate effective practices (Bauböck, et al. 2006b). A standard for evaluating and improving national legislation (Access to Citizenship and its Impact on Immigrant Integration (ACIT) Standard) was developed in response to national laws and practices (Bauböck, et al. 2013). The main goal of the proposed reforms is to serve both the interest of member states, in maintaining the privilege to regulate access to EU citizenship under their domestic nationality laws as an expression of sovereignty and self-determination, and the common interest of the EU and its member states,

> in promoting full integration of long-term immigrants and their descendants through naturalisation and ius soli, in order to prevent that settled foreigners are deprived of secure residence and political representation and to promote a sense of shared membership among both native and immigrant origin populations (Bauböck, et al. 2013, p.38).

To ensure equal treatment, equal participation and a shared sense of belonging developed by all persons settled in a country the legal requirements for the acquisition of citizenship by immigrants should be based on criteria that are common and reasonably expected by the citizens of the country; birth in the country, knowledge of the official language and basic facts about the political system and constitution, respect of law and civic responsibilities. The 2nd and 3rd generation of immigrants share with native citizens the fact of birth in the territory and similar childhood experiences. A naturalisation procedure renounces their belonging by birth and socialisation, stigmatises them as foreigners reinforcing anti-immigrant stereotypes and breeds

resentment against the institutions of the country considered their only and permanent home. Taking into account states' concerns on problematic incentives created by unconditional ius soli at birth, the standard provides for ius soli acquisition based at birth or socialisation conditional upon the lawful residence of a parent prior to the person's birth or conditional upon lawful residence and five years of compulsory education in the country (Bauböck, et al. 2013, pp.37-58).

Furthermore, the creation of a conditional right to ordinary naturalisation is endorsed to build greater consensus and trust to naturalisation requirements; to encourage potential applicants; and establish the perception among the general public that the state has an interest that immigrants who meet the legal requirements and have developed effective links with the country become full and equal citizens. The indicated period of lawful residence is five years, the required level of language knowledge should match the level provided in state-subsidised language course and the fees must be reasonable. As regards the procedures for the acquisition of nationality the ACIT Standard provides explicit administrative and judicial review measures to eliminate discretion and guarantee that naturalisation is a legal entitlement for everyone who meets the legal requirements. These procedural provisions shall be monitored by the National Ombudsman (Bauböck, et al. 2013, pp.37-58).

The naturalisation procedure is less, bureaucratic, more consistent and quicker when decision-making takes place within an authority responsible for justice and citizens' rights such as a judicial body or a specialised branch of the civil service instead of procedures involving parliamentary, ministerial or presidential decisions. One specialised and highly-trained nationality unit is therefore responsible for the final decision, examines the application and checks each requirement according to the required documentation and interpretive guidelines which are binding and publicly available. Applicants have the right to be informed on the progress of their application and receive written notification of the decision no later than six months from the date on which the application was lodged. Rejecting decisions shall be reasoned, specifying the specific grounds of rejection and standing on solid evidence. With respect to the right to an administrative review and an independent judicial appeal, national courts shall have the power to examine not only procedural and substantive aspects but also change the decision in merit. (Bauböck, et al. 2013, pp.37-58)

Concluding, states still retain their autonomy in determining the requirements to be fulfilled for naturalisation, the conditions for citizenship ascription at birth and

the retention, loss or recovery of nationality in case of acquisition of another. No right based on individual choice to acquire the nationality of the state of residence has established (ECN, articles 3 and 15; Explanatory Report to the ECN, p.8; Hailbronner 2006). The right to a nationality, the 'right to have rights' in Hannah Arendt's terms (1967, p.269), is considered a right of membership in an organised community, safeguarding an individual right against statelessness and the arbitrary deprivation of nationality as well as a right to renounce a given nationality when a new one is acquired. The determination of who is entitled to acquire a specific nationality remains an area of exclusive competence of the sovereign state (ECN, articles 4,7; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, articles 13,15).

In practice, state membership is defined in a formal, abstract and enduring way. The rules governing the acquisition and loss of nationality are typically laid down in specific nationality laws or codes. Relevant provisions may be found, however, in higher or lower laws such as the constitution or administrative decrees. Fairly short laws, adopted after independence or regime change, set out the fundamental principles for the determination of nationality at birth while the process of naturalisation as well as the conditions for loss of nationality are left in the discretionary power of administrative authorities. While the former is rarely subject to review, amendments and refinements of the latter are becoming increasingly frequent (Bauböck, et al. 2006a, p.21; Vink & de Groot 2010b, p.714).

2.5. Trends of citizenship policies in European states

Nowadays, there is little disagreement about the fact that domestic citizenship policies have evolved considerably. Whether they have become more civic and liberal or not, however, remains an open question.[9] In the background of international migration European states have a common interest in maintaining ties with expatriates while promoting full integration of long-term residents and a feeling of shared membership among citizens of both native and immigrant origin (Vink & Bauböck 2013). Nevertheless, despite the adoption of international rules and common practices, states continue to be reluctant to transfer power to European institutions. The right to self-determination hinders any political initiative for harmonisation. At national level, immigration is a highly politicised issue and citizenship policies across Europe are

[9] The term liberal is used to designate norms of political membership substantiated in the light of liberal and democratic values as in Dumbrava (2010, p.3).

increasingly challenged by political parties. Against the backdrop of uncertainty regarding the effectiveness of previous strategies of integration in relation to social cohesion and public security certain aspects of nationality laws become more similar. At the same time though it is precarious to speak of an overall convergence of domestic citizenship policies. The following section illustrates the main trends in nationality laws since the end of the 1990s. The puzzling outcome of this concise comparison constitutes the starting point of this thesis.

Although a detailed comparison of nationality laws across Europe falls outside the scope of this study, this section draws from the results of the NATAC project in order to outline the general policy trends in EU member-states (Bauböck, et al. 2006b; Bauböck, et al. 2006c). The main developments in citizenship policies since the 1990s can be divided in three categories: the facilitation of integration of long-term residents; the liberalisation of laws regulating state relations with emigrants, former nationals or persons with cultural and ethnic affinity; and the relaxation of provisions regarding gender equality, the loss of nationality as well as the tolerance of multiple nationalities (De Hart & van Oers 2006; Vink & de Groot 2010b).

2.5.1. Gender equality, multiple nationalities, loss of nationality

The components of this category are considered interconnected and strongly influenced by international law. The recognition of gender equality has strongly affected the nationality of marriage partners and the nationality of children. In most EU countries married women do not automatically acquire the nationality of their spouse but retain their nationality. The possibility to acquire the nationality of marriage partners is provided by an option right or through facilitated naturalisation. Moreover, in compliance with the prohibition of gender discrimination, both parents can pass their nationality to their children (De Hart & van Oers 2006, pp.340-346).[10] The status of dual nationality emerges from the combination of the effects of ius sanguinis in the country of origin and of naturalisation and ius soli in the country of settlement. After the establishment of gender equality, the dual status occurs also by the equal transmission of citizenship to children of mixed marriages (ECN, articles 14,16; 1949 Convention on the Nationality of Married Women; 1979 Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women) (Vink & de Groot 2010a, pp.4-6). Although

[10] However, amendments of nationality laws were not always granted a retroactive effect; in various cases amendments were initially limited to provide for a transitional period for children to opt for the nationality of the mother.

questions of nationality are a reserved domain, the right of each state to determine its jurisdiction is also delimited by other states' rights over their nationals (Bauböck 2005). The 1963 Convention on the Reduction of Cases of Dual Citizenship and Military Obligations addressed these conflicts of national laws with regard to dual nationals (Hailbronner 2006). In case of conflicting claims on jurisdiction, the criterion of effective or dominant nationality sets as the reference point for the obligations and protection of the individual the state of habitual residence, that is the state in which the individual is subject to sovereignty and has developed continuing links (Hailbronner 2006, pp.71-78).

The limitation of dual citizenship though has been abandoned as an increasing number of states considered citizenship either as a means for immigrants' integration or a means for maintaining links with expatriates. Nevertheless, individual choice on dual citizenship or loss of citizenship of origin is restricted as states seek to prevent interference with their sovereignty incited by multiple loyalties (Second Protocol amending the Convention on the Reduction of Cases of Multiple Nationality and Military Obligations in Cases of Multiple Nationality; ECN, article 15). Concerns over national interests and duties opt-outs authorise the state of origin to withdraw the nationality at its initiative and accept renunciation only by nationals habitually residing abroad (ECN, articles 7,8). At the same time, concerns of host states over political mobilisation along ethnic or religious interests constitute reasons for making naturalisation conditional to the renunciation of previous nationality (Hailbronner 2006; Bauböck 2005).

Consequently, despite being perceived as one of the features of liberalisation of citizenship policy, the degree of tolerance of multiple nationalities among EU states varies considerably. While some countries have been indifferent or implicitly accepted the issue of dual nationality, such as the United Kingdom and Greece, others maintained the requirement of renunciation of the nationality of origin when they liberalised the naturalisation process, as the case of German reform in 1999 (De Hart & van Oers 2006, pp.336-340). The ECN states that renunciation or loss of nationality shall be avoided in cases that the person concerned becomes stateless, or where such renunciation or loss is not possible or cannot reasonably be required. Exceptions from renunciation may further concern second generation immigrants, spouses of nationals or emigrants (ECN, articles 7,8,16). In state practice involuntary withdrawal of nationality is justified only when sufficient connection to the country is lost, a situation indicated with permanent

residence abroad or the acquisition of another nationality. Exceptions are Greece, Poland and Portugal where provisions on involuntary loss due to loss of genuine links are absent. Fraud in the acquisition of nationality, disloyalty or treason and military or foreign service in another country are also common reasons for loss of nationality (Waldrach 2006b; (De Groot & Vink 2010; Bauböck, et al. 2013, pp.11-13).

2.5.2. Former nationals, emigrants, persons with cultural and ethnic affinity

In the context of international mobility, the interests of states in controlling access to citizenship are not exhausted in the territorial jurisdiction over foreign nationals but extend to the personal jurisdiction over their nationals living abroad (Bauböck 2005, p.6; Joppke 2003, p. 443). For this reason, nationality laws provide explicitly for the transmission of citizenship to descendants of nationals born abroad by ius sanguinis as well as the loss of nationality in case of lack of genuine bonds (Vink & de Groot 2010a, pp.9-12). Recent trends in Southern and Northern European countries spell out that liberalising reforms focus more on expatriates or ethnic diasporas rather than immigrants. Extended residence abroad and/or acquisition of a foreign nationality do not constitute decisive factors for loss of nationality. The instruments used to retain links with expatriates comprise of the granting of voting rights to emigrants in general elections; the facilitation of reacquisition of nationality by former nationals or persons with ethnic or cultural affinity to the country and their descendants; and the retention of nationality by first generation nationals living abroad as well as their offspring through the principle of descent (De Hart & van Oers 2006, p.333-336). Restrictions concerning the application of ius sanguinis to the 2nd generation of persons born abroad are often bypassed through formal statements, as in the cases of Belgium, Germany, Ireland and Portugal, or additionally with the requirement of short residence in the country, as in the United Kingdom (Dumbrava 2015, pp.299-300).

States target different categories of persons. Access to facilitated acquisition of nationality may address: former nationals and nationals of certain foreign states without reference to their ethno-cultural background; former nationals and persons with a certain ethnic or cultural background, accompanied by the requirement of taking up residence in the country; ethnic diasporas and former nationals who have their

permanent residence abroad.[11] Another factor differentiating national policies, besides the requirement of residence, concerns the extent to which birth abroad may limit the effects of ius sanguinis. All EU states provide for the transmission of nationality to unlimited generations of descendants of nationals. However, in certain states the acquisition of nationality is automatic while in others it is conditional to declaration, registration or establishment of affiliation.[12] Finally, the toleration of dual nationality for emigrants enhances significantly the liberalising effects of adopted provisions (Waldrauch 2006a, pp.169-176).

The ECN provides that ""nationality" means the legal bond between a person and a State and does not indicate the person's ethnic origin" (article 2(a)). In article 5(1) it is stated that rules on nationality shall not contain distinctions or include practices that amount to discrimination on the grounds of sex, religion, race, colour or national or ethnic origin. Pursuant to paragraph 2 state-parties "shall be guided by the principle of non-discrimination between its nationals, whether they are nationals by birth or have acquired its nationality subsequently." Nevertheless, in the Explanatory Report to the ECN (1997) it is noted that differentiated treatment resulting from the criteria determining nationality, such as the requirement of language for naturalisation or facilitated acquisition of nationality due to descent, place of birth or membership in the EU, constitutes justified "preferential treatment on the basis of nationality and not discrimination on the ground of national origin" (p.8, paragraphs 40-44). Furthermore, the restriction of access to citizenship in the absence of genuine links, either by provisions on loss or limitation on transmission of the status, is recommended in the Explanatory Report to the ECN (1997) with regard to article 6. As Vink and de Groot argue,

> this provision does not require a State to grant its nationality to children born abroad generation after generation without limitation, when such children have no links with that State. Normally, such children will acquire the nationality of the State of birth (with which - presumably - they have a genuine and effective link) (Vink & de Groot 2010a, p.9).

[11] According to (Bauböck, et al. 2006a, p. 27) Austria, Finland, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom, comprise the first cluster, Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy and Luxembourg the second, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain the third.

[12] Austria, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden provide for unlimited automatic transmission of nationality. A declaration or registration is necessary in Belgium, Ireland and Portugal and the establishment of affiliation in Finland, Luxemburg and Spain (De Hart & van Oers 2006, pp.335-336).

In 2001, the Venice Commission examined the compatibility of preferential treatment of kin minorities abroad with the principles of international law (Council of Europe, European Commission for the Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) 2001). The Commission concluded in its report that "the circumstance that part of the population is given less favourable treatment on the basis of their not belonging to a specific ethnic group is not, on itself, discriminatory, nor contrary to the principles of international law…The acceptability of this criterion will depend of course on the aim pursued" (Ibid. p.21). The legitimacy of ethnic preference is ensured when it is 'genuinely linked with the culture of the State' and pursues the genuine aim of maintaining strong linguistic and cultural links. Additionally, differential treatment must respect the criterion of proportionality. Besides the fields of education and culture, the benefits granted by the law must be 'at any rate available to other foreign citizens who do not have the national background of the kin-state' (Venice Commission 2001, p.22).

Beyond identity group rights, the jurisprudence on human rights has established that differential treatment is discriminatory unless it is based on substantial factual differences and is founded on objective and reasonable justification (Advisory Opinion of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights on *proposed amendments to the naturalization provisions of the constitution of Costa Rica* OC-4/84 of January 1984 (Series A No. 4) and European Court of Human Rights *Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali*, v. The United Kingdom (Series A, No. 94), as cited in Ersbøll (2001, p. 200). Nevertheless, with respect to access to citizenship the permissible scope of positive discrimination and the legitimacy of justifications are not always discernible. Although selective policies are strongly related to perceived identities and common origin, they vary considerably and often refer to intrinsic characteristics of historical and cultural belonging, national origin, language, religion or ethnicity proper (Groenendijk, 2006a; Joppke 2005).

Besides the differentiated treatment in access to citizenship, reference to ethnic origin may result to differentiated treatment among naturalised foreigners and nationals by origin. Restrictions to rights of naturalised foreigners may concern the right to be elected President of the Republic, the right to hold dual citizenship and the right to family reunification or the time holding the nationality before employment in certain domains of the public sector (Waldrauch 2006c). Differentiated treatment may further

concern the loss of nationality (Dumbrava 2015, pp.304-305). Taking into account article 5(2) of the ECN, Waldrauch argues that:

> As far as rights of those who hold nationality are concerned, any differentiation between persons who have acquired nationality in different ways should be regarded as prima facie suspect since it violates the basic principle of equal citizenship for all nationals (Waldrauch 2006c, p.380).

Waldrauch (2006c) evaluates the social impact of deviations by considering the temporary or permanent character of restrictions as well as the range of liberties affected. He concludes that "[D]iscrimination of all naturalised persons from a broad range of positions is based on the assumption that foreign-born persons can never be fully trusted as loyal citizens" (p.380) neither as "full members of the political community" (p.382). This should not constitute a reasonable justification as it perpetuates a second-class citizenship for foreign nationals, a situation that affects negatively their integration and the fostering of solidarity between foreign and native-born nationals.

2.5.3. Civic integration of immigrants

The large scale and permanent nature of immigration from non-EU countries has triggered changes aiming at the integration of long-term residents. The main instruments used towards this direction appertain to the adoption of requirements of civic integration for the first generation of immigrants and the facilitation of the acquisition of nationality by the second generation of immigrants with the introduction of elements of ius soli. Changes in ordinary naturalisation requirements concern mainly the lowering of residence requirements by countries with restrictive attitudes towards naturalisation, such as Germany, Greece and Portugal. A second development is related to the rejection of practices of cultural assimilation and their replacement with requirements of civic integration such as knowledge of language, history and society, political institutions and democratic values. A countertrend is observed with respect to Western and Northern European countries that have partly revised previous liberal policies by increasing the required residence period and adopting stricter language and integration requirements.[13] In general terms, differences regarding the residence period and the types of integration requirements diminish. Yet, there is still great variation with respect to the continuity of residence and the types of residence permits, the level of language proficiency that is considered sufficient and the modes of examination of

[13] Belgium deviates from this restrictive trend.

the applicants (Waldrauch 2006a, pp.134-158; De Hart & van Oers 2006, pp.322-333; Goodman 2010a).

Besides the legal requirements for acquiring nationality the practical implementation of the procedure is an important determinant of the inclusiveness of citizenship policy. Vague and unclear provisions regarding public order or effective links, long procedures and lack of effective rights of appeal may severely restrict opportunities to acquire a country's nationality. Wide powers of discretion, as in the case of Italy, Ireland and until recently Greece, may moderate considerably the impact of civic integration requirements as access to citizenship is determined by informal administrative practices that may differ considerably across regions, offices or individual civil servants. Many countries have made efforts to decentralise and reduce the bureaucracy as well as the duration of naturalisation procedure although legal time limits are regularly exceeded. Legal requirements tend to become clearer and objective and most countries provide for judicial review. Nevertheless, there are still regional differences in implementation of nationality laws. Stronger judicial review, less bureaucratic and more rights-based procedures prevail in North and Northwest countries compared to countries from Central and Southern Europe. Less discretionary procedures are also found in countries that proceeded to reforms such as Germany, Norway, Greece, Portugal, Luxembourg, Finland and Sweden. Yet, economic resources, language and integration assessment are still among the most discretionary requirements since often there is no guarantee for judicial review for these requirements or other specific issues such as discrimination within the procedure. Furthermore, judges rarely have the power to overturn a decision rejecting a naturalisation application (Bauböck, et al. 2013).

The most striking trend of convergence concerns the facilitation of acquisition of nationality by children of immigrants that are considered already integrated (De Hart & van Oers 2006, p.320). The forms of inclusion however vary, from facilitated naturalisation on the basis of residence and socialisation to the automatic acquisition of nationality on the basis of birth in the country. Ius soli citizenship at birth is attributed by declaration to children born in the state, the 2nd generation of immigrants, on the basis of prior residence of parents or automatically to the 3rd generation on the basis of parents' birth in the country by immigrants, which is also known as double ius soli. After birth ius soli citizenship is acquired automatically or by declaration or option at some point in childhood or at majority. More than one of these forms can be present at

the same time and all are subject to additional conditions such as continuous residence, schooling and good conduct. When citizenship is not attributed automatically as an entitlement the degree of state discretion may also vary. Moreover, the inclusive effect of ius soli rests on the acceptance of dual citizenship and on discriminatory privileges (Honohan 2010). In the background of immigration pressures states that previously applied ius soli tend to restrict it with additional requirements such as unlimited residence status for parents or with the abolishment of automatic acquisition of nationality at birth and the introduction of an option right.[14] At the same time, extensions concern the introduction of double ius soli and access to citizenship for the 2nd generation of immigrants (Ibid.).[15]

In sum, nationality laws have become more complex and divergent. Acquisition of nationality may be seen as a means of integration or as the reward of a successful integration process. Nevertheless, specific trends of convergence can be found in certain modes of acquisition and loss of nationality. Ius sanguinis remains the main mode of nationality acquisition and, in most countries, rules became more inclusive. Provisions on loss of nationality have been relaxed and dual nationality is increasingly tolerated in case of naturalisation abroad although deviations and differentiations between emigrants and immigrants exist. In the background of restrictive naturalisation trends, in certain countries tolerance of dual nationality was the result of demands from expatriates. Since the late 1990s states, especially in Southern Europe, have focused on emigrants and persons with special social, cultural or ethnic relations with the country and provided for the facilitated acquisition or reacquisition of nationality by former nationals. Nevertheless, this trend of inclusive liberalisation of citizenship policies is also characterised by divergent provisions with respect to the modes of nationality acquisition, the particular kind of affiliation of the groups of interest and the additional requirements of residence and integration (Bauböck, et al. 2006a, pp. 23-28; De Hart & van Oers 2006;Vink & de Groot 2010b).

Moreover, naturalisation policies converge towards standardised requirements of civic integration but there is still variation between more or less restrictive trends regarding the specific conditions of residence, knowledge of language and society as

[14] Examples are Belgium, Germany, Netherlands, Italy, Ireland 2005 and France respectively
[15] In Belgium, Portugal, Luxemburg, Greece and Germany, Finland, Greece respectively. The Swedish law differs as it provides for unconditional access to citizenship for all minors who have lived in the country for five years.

well as in procedural aspects and the degree of administrative discretion. The most frequent changes concern ius soli provisions. Occasionally these changes have been radical but also contradictory entailing both liberalisations and restrictions (Vink & de Groot 2010b). Two compelling examples are Germany and Greece. In Germany ius soli at birth for the 2nd generation was introduced in 2000. In 2004 the eligibility criteria were tightened as the parents' required residence permit was linked to integration requirements. In Greece double ius soli and ius soli at birth for the second generation were introduced in 2010. A reform in 2015 though provided for an entitlement to ius soli citizenship only after birth and supplemented the eligibility criteria with the requirements of socialisation and schooling.

2.6. Europeanisation of public policy

The main question of this research is whether common trends of citizenship policies can be attributed to the process of the Europeanisation. In the literature of European integration, the concept of Europeanisation has been associated not only with the transfer of state sovereignty at the European level but also with

> the emergence and development at the European level of distinct structures of governance, that is, of political, legal, and social institutions associated with problem solving that formalize interactions among the actors, and of policy networks specializing in the creation of authoritative European rules (Risse, et al. 2001, p.3).

Furthermore, certain conceptualisations of Europeanisation focus on the impact of European policy-making at the national level and the processes that reformulate the 'organisational logic of national politics,' institutional and policy practices (Ladrecht,1994, p.69), while others explicitly refer to 'cognitive component of politics' (Radaelli 2003, p.30). According to Radaelli, the concept of Europeanization refers to:

> Processes of (a) construction, (b) diffusion, and (c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, 'ways of doing things', and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU public policy and politics and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identity structures, political structures, and public policies (Radaelli 2003, p.30).

The effects of Europeanisation therefore can be detected on domestic political and institutional structures, on public policy design and instruments as well as on cognitive and normative structures affecting values, perceptions of problems and solutions as well as discourses (Ibid., pp.34-36).

The use of the term Europeanisation is not restricted to adaptation to the EU; Vink and Graziano (2008) understand Europeanisation "as the domestic adaptation to

European regional integration" (p.7). Convergence can therefore be a consequence of European integration and the possibility of differential impact should not be excluded. European regional integration research is not inherently top-down; to assess the effects of Europeanisation the analysis of policy substance, institutional set-up and political behaviour at the domestic level should precede the analysis of the formulation of policies and institutions at the EU level and the determination of diffusion effects at the domestic level, paying due attention to the continuous feedback processes among the European, national and sub-national levels of governance. Critical approaches of Europeanisation research are not limited to traditional disciplines of EU intervention but extent to areas that the EU has no competence. Moreover, the concept of European integration extends beyond the EU to cooperation in the framework of regional institutions such as the CoE, which is highly intertwined with the EU in the area of human rights (Vink & Graziano 2008, pp.7-12; Risse & Sikkink 1999).

Scholars of immigration and citizenship have assessed the impact of European integration on national policies and inclusion dilemmas by looking at the effects of both direct and indirect processes of Europeanisation. Given the strong links of citizenship policy to state sovereignty and national identity, the evidence on positive Europeanisation as regards the acquisition and loss of nationality is scarce (Checkel 2001; Vink 2001; Vink 2002). However, the dynamics of soft framing mechanisms is yet to be the object of systematic research.

2.6.1. Mechanisms of policy diffusion

During the diffusion process, ideas policies and institutions spread across time and space (Börzel & Risse 2012, p.5). Drawing largely from new institutionalism in organisational analysis, suggesting that institutions located in a similar environment that permits interaction and exchange of information gradually become isomorphic (DiMaggio & Powell 1991), two types of diffusion mechanisms are identified in Europeanisation theory based on direct and indirect processes of European integration (Börzel & Risse 2012; Radaelli, 2003; Vink & Graziano, 2008). The process of positive integration entails the presence of a European policy model which is directly transferred at the national level. States have limited discretion to decide the institutional arrangements since European policies aim at market-shaping and therefore demand the reform of existing domestic provisions. Adaptational pressure operates with the mechanisms of coercion, mimetism and normative pressure based on patterns of

socialisation and learning, leading to institutional compliance and isomorphism. (Radaelli 2003; Börzel & Risse, 2012; Vink 2002).

Opposed to market-shaping policies are market-making policies (Radaelli 2003,p.42). The process of negative European integration emphasises the role of mutual recognition of an integrated market by removing national administrative barriers to trade, investment, freedom of establishment and freedom of movement. European policies contribute to challenging existing institutional equilibria at the national level without directly prescribing a distinctive institutional model but indirectly by changing interest constellations and domestic opportunity structures, providing new opportunities and constraints. Adjustment is triggered by the mechanisms of international regulatory competition and cooperation, lesson-drawing or normative emulation. Changes concern the distribution of power and resources among domestic actors. As the institutional context for strategic interaction is modified certain choices are excluded from the range of policy choices (Radaelli 2003; Börzel & Risse 2012; Vink 2002). Nonetheless, given that the regulatory objectives are not explicitly defined by a European model, the result of this process is not isomorphism but 'clustered convergence' or 'continuing divergence' depending on the scope conditions and the domestic structures facilitating policy diffusion (Börzel & Risse 2000).

Both processes of positive and negative integration aim to produce a specific outcome at the domestic policy level. Compliance takes place through the employment of hard instruments of EU public policy, such as directives and regulations, or the decisions of the ECJ and national courts who invoke community law (Radaelli 2003; Vink 2002). Soft instruments however, such as the open method of coordination, non-binding directives and guidelines about the notion of good policy and practice, and cognitive and normative frames associated with modes of governance, may also be a source of domestic politics. Despite the fact that they do not produce adaptational pressure for institutional compliance nor alter domestic opportunity structures, vague and symbolic European policies can affect national policy by changing domestic causal beliefs and expectations through mechanisms of policy framing and norm diffusion (Börzel & Risse 2000; Knill & Lehmkuhl 2002). According to Radaelli, soft framing mechanisms can create the preconditions for major policy change:

> They do so by providing legitimacy to domestic reformers in search for justifications, by 'inseminating' possible solutions in the national debate, by altering expectations about the future … The introduction of new solutions coming from Brussels can alter the perception of problems. New solutions can provide a

> new dimension to national policy problems and can trigger learning dynamics or a differential political logic (Radaelli 2003, p.43).

The role of non-governmental actors, such as political parties, pressure groups and think tanks in the case of indirect diffusion process is considered prominent (Vink & Graziano 2008, p.10).

As scholars note, the distinction between mechanisms of direct and indirect Europeanisation is analytical since empirically a mixture of mechanisms related to each other is often observed (Knill & Lehmkuhl 2002, p.257). To explain the varying impact of Europeanisation different explanatory factors and intervening variables related to domestic formal and informal institutions must be considered. A general explanation for the impact of Europeanisation put forward Börzel and Risse (2000) and Risse et al. (2001) refers to the degree of adaptational pressure and goodness of fit between processes, policies, politics at the European level and the domestic level. Empirical studies however show that European norms can only have marginal impact on national citizenship policies, either constitutive or restrictive (Checkel, 2001a; Vink 2005; Hansen 1998). This explanation is better suited for processes of positive Europeanisation. Taking into account the timing of domestic institutional change, adaptational pressure is not a necessary condition for Europeanisation to cause domestic change (Radaelli 2003, pp.44-46).

Hansen and Weil (2001) attributed the liberal convergence of dual nationality and citizenship for the second-generation of immigrants to the participation of national executives to the actives of the CoE. In their comparative study on the liberalisation of nationality law in European countries they examined the relationship of historical traditions and current nationality laws with post-war immigration. They attributed convergence of citizenship policies to domestic factors and particularly, to a "process of elite learning in which politicians have recognised that that exclusionary nationality law provisions are untenable in the context of large-scale immigration" (Hansen & Weil 2001, p.10). In conditions of large-scale immigration, stable migration patterns and stable borders European, states arrived at similar reforms in response to a common problem - the need to integrate the resident population of TCN and particularly their children. At the level of policy-making elite however,

> there is a scattered evidence of emerging epistemic policy networks in which evidence, ideas, strategies are shared among actors from different member states and enable these states to learn from each other (Ibid., p.13).

The CoE is considered a venue "for the sharing of ideas and experiences among member states" (Ibid., p.13).

The effects of European norm diffusion, especially the relevant Conventions of the CoE that promote the facilitation of dual nationality, were tested in the cases of the Netherlands (Vink 2001) and Germany (Checkel 2001a) respectively. Both countries represent the most likely cases for Europeanisation to have an impact as both have been receptive if not proactive regarding European integration. The lack of fit between domestic understandings and policies with the evolving European norms on citizenship is expected to trigger pressure for domestic change. In both cases the role of the CoE has not been decisive for the direction of the policy outcome since the preferences and identities of political elites and domestic coalitions largely remained the same. However, it has played a predominant role in altering the strategic behaviour of domestic actors by offering opportunities to societal agents to mobilise support and create pressure to political elites so as to pursue and legitimise their given ends and setting the terms of parliament discourse (Vink 2001; Vink 2010; Checkel 2001a; Checkel, 2001b).

Comparative studies further established that in the absence of precisely defined EU norms and a strong enforcement mechanism, the EU member states orient themselves towards the legal practices of other EU states (Maatsch 2011, p.145). However, states do not simply copy legislation in a mechanical manner but compare laws with existing legal standards, obtain a general overview and learn from other states' practices and experiences. References concern old European states with experience in migration but also countries with geographic proximity. Although the information regarded best practices, negative references and criticism for other countries' practices are also involved. Domestic factors, such as the country's experience with migration is seen as a source of divergence rather than convergence. Still the possibility that the process of policy emulation may have significant effects in legal technicalities should not be ignored (Maatsch 2011).

Another source of indirect negative integration is the institutionalisation of European citizenship (1992 Treaty on European Union, article 17(1) EC Treaty). In the Dutch case, the right to free movement (article 18 (ex. 8a) EC Treaty, Council Regulation 1612/68) raised concerns on possible violations of community law by domestic citizenship policy with regard to the loss of nationality and citizens residing abroad (Vink 2001, pp.889-891). The prohibition of discrimination between citizens

and Community nationals or TCN in employment is another source of limited Europeanisation. Moreover, although evidence for a spill-over of EU action into wider public debates in member-states is scarce, Geddes and Achtnich (2015) argue that modes of soft governance that seek to share information and ideas, such as European research networks, have the potential "to feed into national political system, reshape policy, and reconfigure the relationship between research and policy" (p.305). The development of new information and comparable data can render migrant integration a tractable problem, lay the groundwork for the generation of shared meanings and facilitate boundary interaction and eventually policy intervention (Ibid.).

Nevertheless, the effects of these soft mechanisms of policy coordination in scientific or bureaucratic venues at the national level, where members of European networks participate, and ideas are implemented, as well as the role of epistemic communities and local organisations, in providing the context for national debates and mediating arising knowledge conflicts regarding nationality, have not been not profoundly explored. This thesis examines the dynamics of the activities of EUDO citizenship research network into domestic citizenship policy change.

2.6.2. Intervening variables

The processes of Europeanisation and transnational policy diffusion may be related to normative and instrumental rationality or it can be part of a process of active interpretation of institutional models, communication, arguing and persuasion (Börzel & Risse 2012). The possibilities of bargaining and social interaction are not captured by the theory of the goodness of fit (Radaelli 2003, pp.44-46). The direction and the extent of change is therefore contingent on domestic mediating factors that are affected by European dynamics. These include not only macropolitical structures but also agency and policy structures (Radaelli 2003; Risse, et al. 2001).

The first group of variables is related to the characteristics of the political system and particularly the institutional capacity to produce change and the capacity of domestic actors to exploit opportunities for change. These intervening variables include veto points, formal institutions, and the political and organisational culture (Radaelli 2003, pp.46-50; Risse, et al. 2001; Börzel & Risse, 2000). The presence of multiple veto points hinders the institutional capacity to produce substantial change and only permits incremental adjustments (Tsebelis 1995). The presence of facilitating formal institutions might enable actors to overcome veto points by providing the necessary

material and ideational resources to promote change. Compatible with the 'logic of expected consequences' (March & Olsen 1998, p.951), these mediating factors are likely to prevail when actors are considered rational, utility maximisers with predefined, fixed preferences who act strategically to further advance their interests and identities (Börzel & Risse 2000; Risse, et al. 2001). In cases of high complexity and uncertainty regarding preferences and strategy options, actors might turn to their normative and cognitive environment and, following the 'logic of appropriateness' (March & Olsen 1998, p.951), redefine their interests and identities through the processes of socialisation and learning. A political culture conducive to negotiation, cooperation and consensus-building might help overcome resistance by domestic actors supporting the existing status quo while statist or conflict-ridden, competitive cultures may hinder change induced from European policies (Lijphart 1999). Differences in legal culture and tradition or prevailing collective understandings of nation-state identity might also affect the differential impact of European norms (Börzel & Risse 2000).

The institutional capacity to produce change is a necessary but not sufficient condition for actual policy change. The presence or absence of policy change further depends by factors pertaining to the policy structure and advocacy coalitions. As Radaelli argues "[T]he interaction between policy dynamics and the macropolitical structure is perhaps one of the most interesting areas of Europeanization" (Radaelli 2003, p.47). The first two factors are related with the nature of the policy issue. The ability of policy-makers to insulate from societal pressure and political divisions in policies governed by technocratic elites may produce radical change even when the country's institutional capacity to produce change is low. The 'balance between policy formulation-adoption and policy implementation' is also important since effects of Europeanisation might be undermined during the implementation process (Radaelli 2003, pp.48-49). The following factors are related with the characteristics of the agents of change. The differential empowerment of societal and other subnational actors is another factor providing actors with opportunities to surmount domestic opposition to change by interest constellations and pressure groups (Risse, et al. 2001, pp.11-12).

Europe induced structural changes might alter the distribution of resources not only in favour of national executives but also scientific communities, advocacy coalitions and other non-state actors. As Vink and Graziano (2008) remark, being part of an integrated Europe increases exchange of information and mutual learning among non-state actors such as political parties, pressures groups and think tanks (p.10). The

presence of norm entrepreneurs and respective legitimating discourses are therefore considered important mediating variables. The likelihood to challenge dominant power and policy monopolies increases with the presence and mobilisation of norm entrepreneurs who engage policy-makers in the process of social learning, formulate the policy frames or narratives that provide legitimation to policy choices and achieve consensus between opposing views. The higher the uncertainty among policy-makers regarding the cause-effect relationship in a particular policy issue the greater the need for scientific advice. (Radaelli 2003; Risse, et al. 2001; Börzel & Risse 2000; Knill & Lehmkuhl 2002). The temporal dynamics of change are therefore critical (Hall & Taylor, 1996). Additionally, the higher the impact of ideas and knowledge produced at the European level on international actors and domestic norm entrepreneurs the greater the chances for European framing dynamics to affect the process and the outcome of national reforms, even when they take place independently of adaptational pressure (Radaelli 2003; Risse, et al. 2001; Börzel & Risse 2000; Knill & Lehmkuhl 2002). The dynamics of intervening variables formulating the national policy paradigm in relation to policy continuity and change are further analysed in chapter 3.

2.7. Measuring national policy outcomes and learning dynamics

Four outcomes with respect to the domestic effects of Europeanisation are identified in the literature: inertia, retrenchment, absorption, accommodation, and transformation (Radaelli 2003, p.37-38; Börzel & Risse 2000). Inertia, the lack of change, is a situation resulting from resistance to Europe induced change, delay in the transposition or inappropriate implementation of directives. Retrenchment occurs when the Europeanisation process induces change in the opposite direction of European policies. Absorption indicates a low degree of domestic change. The adaptation of domestic structures entails a mixture of resilience and flexibility without substantially modifying the essential structures. In contrast, accommodation implies the adjustment of existing processes, policies and institutions while collective understandings, the core of policy paradigms, remain the same. Transformation, at last, designates fundamental or paradigmatic change (Ibid.).

To empirically detect the agents of change and measure the direction and extent of policy change insights from the literature of learning are incorporated in the analysis. Policy learning is defined as adjusting understandings and beliefs related to public policy as a result of social interaction, experience or evidence-based analysis (Dunlop

& Radaelli 2013, p.600; Moyson, et al. 2017, p.162). The process of learning is related to power and politics since the management of ideas is considered as a form of power exertion limiting available choices (Moyson, et al. 2017). Policy knowledge is considered socially embedded and human rationality is bounded to the actors' social or organisational environment. Scholarship on social learning involves governments, bureaucrats and state officials as well as social non-state actors such as policy networks and cooperative informal institutions, pressure groups, academics and researchers. They are located in the policy sub-system acting individually or in groups. Change may be a less conscious activity in reaction to societal forces or a deliberate endeavour of governments to adjust policy goals and techniques in light of past experience and new information (Haas 1990a; Bennet & Howlett, 1992; Moyson, et al. 2017).

Two types of change agents are discerned. One the one hand, advocacy or principled issue networks arise out of situations of policy failure and dissatisfaction with existing institutional arrangements. They include both state actors involved in policy formulation and implementation and journalists, researchers and policy analysts who share a common belief and value system based on common knowledge claims regarding perceived problems and common interests concerning the solutions they advocate (Sabatier 1988). Coalitions are instrumentally linked to each other and to the government by individuals occupying positions of influence, namely by policy brokers. According to Sabatier (1988), policy brokers are mainly concerned "with keeping the level of political conflict within acceptable limits and with reaching some 'reasonable' solution to the problem" (p.141). For Hall (1993), the principal agents of learning "work for the state itself or advise it from privileged positions at the interface between bureaucracy and the intellectual enclaves of society" (p.277). Whether concerning elected officials, high civil servants or officially-sanctioned experts, these individuals are considered key actors in the promotion of the learning process. The exact mediatory role of such actors in conflict resolution, however, has not been thoroughly studied (Howlett, et al. 2017, pp.235-236).

On the other hand, epistemic communities represent knowledge-based networks of experts. According to Haas:

> An epistemic community is a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within a domain or issue area (Haas 1992b, p.3).

Actors with common policy concerns and policy agendas collaborate to refine ideas and generate consensual knowledge in the absence of material interests. Whether rooted in an international organization or state bodies they share a set of professional beliefs and standards of judgement as well as a set of common practices and interests associated with a set of problems in the issue-area of competence. High uncertainty and technical complexity, emanating from the interdependence of states' policy choices in obtaining goals and the difficulty to anticipate long-term consequences of action, gives rise to demands for information. This information is the product of the community's interpretation of social and physical phenomena and the proper construction of social reality on the basis of technical information and expertise. By occupying positions in advisory and regulatory bodies in the sub-national, national and international level and by defining viable policy alternatives to be considered by decision-makers on the basis of their causal understanding of the problems addressed, epistemic communities delimit the range of options and influence policy-making (Haas 1992b, pp.12-16; Bennet & Howlett 1992, pp.281-282). The likelihood of international policy coordination is increased as the causal beliefs and policy preferences of an epistemic community influence the interdependent interests of states or by establishing and maintaining institutions that provide patterns of cooperation and guide international behaviour (Haas, 1992b, pp.16-20; Campbell 2002, pp.29-31).

Besides variation in the agents of change, variation also exist in the type of knowledge involved as well as in the process of learning. The types of learning range from learning about decision-making organisations and processes to learning about specific programs and instruments used to implement policy and learning about ideas, values and norms that define the ends to which policy is developed (Bennet & Howlett 1992, p.289; Moyson, et al. 2017, p.166). For Sabatier learning is related to ideas and information that improve and refine one's understanding on the elements considered important as well as of causal relationships internal to one's belief system. It also involves the identification and reaction to challenges. Deep core beliefs of advocacy coalitions are relatively impermeable to change and learning concerns mainly the strategies and programmes, the appropriate instruments and research to implement those programmes (Sabatier 1988; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993). The content of learning is extended by Hall to affect both the level of instruments and the policy instruments themselves but also the hierarchy of goals and the fundamental ideas and beliefs of policy-makers (Hall 1993). Relevant to this differentiation is the distinction

concerning knowledge utilisation by decision-makers. Instrumental forms of knowledge which use evidence as a key source for policy-making and substantive policy improvements are distinguished from symbolic utilisation where knowledge is used to legitimate specific policy actors and policy objectives that are electorally rewarding (Gilardi 2010).

The ability of knowledge-based experts to assume control over knowledge and information production is critical for the articulation of cause effect relationships and the framing of issues for collective debate. Decision-makers may also control the production of substantive knowledge, the content of knowledge that informs policy or/and the policy objectives to which learning is directed (Dunlop & Radaelli 2013). In the latter case, the role of epistemic communities in the policy process is restricted to legitimise established policy goals rather than shaping the intentions of decision-makers (Weiss 1977). Accordingly, when examining the effects of learning on policy change scholars distinguish minor policy changes in strategies and instruments taking place incrementally to improve the implementation of objective and norms from fundamental and often abrupt changes during which the dominant set of ideas, identities and interests over the policy objectives are questioned and past practices criticised (Bennet & Howlett 1992, pp.285-288; Argyris & Schön 1996; Checkel 2001b). Still, the possibility that organisational changes or changes in policy instrument might feedback and alter preferences and policy objective should not be precluded (Moyson, et al. 2017, pp.165-166).

2.8. Conclusion

Since the end of the 1990's citizenship policies in Europe have developed considerably. Provisions concerning the loss of nationality or dual nationality have become more inclusive and naturalisation requirements converge towards common standards of civic integration. The introduction of ius soli for the 2nd and 3rd generation of immigrants constitutes the most prominent trend of convergence. Still, however, there is wide divergence with respect to particular instruments and levels of inclusion adopted in specific national settings. This chapter asked whether the process of European integration accounts for the common trends in citizenship policies and modes of citizenship acquisition across European states.

The process of Europeanisation has been defined broadly to include both the reformulation of the organisational logic and the cognitive component of politics.

Besides direct mechanisms of policy diffusion associated with processes of positive integration and the presence of a European policy model, indirect mechanisms were also analysed. One the one hand, the process of negative integration challenges interest constellations and domestic opportunity structures providing new opportunities and constraints to domestic actors. On the other hand, soft framing mechanisms influence perceptions on problems and solutions creating the preconditions for policy change. The effects of Europeanisation, therefore, are to be detected not only on domestic political and institutional structures but also on cognitive and normative structures as well as discourses.

Furthermore, the chapter explored the domestic factors mediating European dynamics and determining the direction and extent of change. These include macropolitical structures relating to the institutional capacity of the political system to produce change, such as veto points; agency associated with the capacity of actors to take advantage of opportunities for change, such as facilitating formal institutions, and the political and organisational culture; policy structures relating to the nature of the policy issue or the characteristics of agents of change and the capacity of norm entrepreneurs to engage policy-makers in the process of learning. The mediating factors are further elaborated in the next chapter.

3. Theoretical framework: explaining continuity and change

3.1. Introduction

Overall, citizenship studies have explicitly or implicitly drawn from the neo-institutional approach to examine the relationship between structure and agency as well as the role of political institutions in structuring and shaping political preferences, behaviour and outcomes (Steinmo, et al. 1992; March & Olsen 1989). The institutionalist perspective rejects excessively general theories of individual behaviour and social structure and stresses the importance of middle-range explanation. Institutional analyses emphasise history and context, the ordered nature of social relations and political behaviour, and share a concern on how human behaviour is embedded in the institutional context (Campbell & Pedersen 2001, pp.13-14; Hay 2002, p.94). Institutions are conceptualised both as formal rules and organizations (Streek & Thelen, 2005) as well as informal rules and norms (Hall 1989a).

According to Immergut, (2006) institutionalism "is an interest in the distorting effects of the political process, in whatever form or stage of the process they may be found" (p.240). The interest lies in empirical questions, real world outcomes and meso-level analysis. In particular, the main focus is on identifying differences between national institutions and the ordering of social and political relations as well as differences in power and organization of political actors, providing explanations for variation of national political outcomes (Immergut 2006, pp.238-239). However, scholars have followed diverse approaches depending on their understanding of the relationship between institutions and behaviour as well as their explanations on the origins of institutions and the process of change. Historical institutionalist analyses relevant to citizenship research have been informed by the rational choice and organisational theory as well as ideational or discursive perspectives. Besides the distinctive theoretical roots, each approach theorises different conditions of change as well as distinct mechanisms through which change occurs (Hall & Taylor 1996; Campbell & Pedersen 2001).

Comparative citizenship literature has traditionally used the distinction between ethno-cultural and civic-political conceptions of nationhood to compare and categorise immigrant integration and citizenship policies. However, developments in migration and nationality laws triggered the questioning of both the explanatory and analytical validity of the ethnic-civic typology of integration models. The following section

presents the literature concerning citizenship regimes and integration models as well as alternative theories and the limitations on their explanatory power. Moreover, the chapter illustrates the shortcomings of using models as the starting point of research rather than the object of analysis. The interest lies on the relation between scientific research and policy-making and the focus is on the effects of knowledge produced by European research networks on domestic research and policy outcomes. The research design is discussed in the last part of the chapter.

3.2. The ethno-cultural and civic-territorial models of immigrant integration

In the 19th century the institution of the nation-state provided the social and legal framework for the political organisation of political entities. Since then the establishment of representative democracies and welfare states has been essentially achieved in territorially, politically and culturally bounded national communities. The political and territorial borders of jurisdiction of modern states are defined according to the doctrine of national sovereignty and national self-determination. Through the institution of citizenship states 'constitute and reconstitute themselves' (Brubaker 1992, p.xi). The citizenry should coincide with the permanent population and state authority is confined to the territorial borders of the state providing protection against the international environment (Zolberg 1981, p.7; Castles & Miller 2009, p.20). The distinction between ethnic and civic conceptions of nationhood and their role in decision and policy-making has its roots in studies of nationalism and reflects two contrasting views of the political community (Hutchinson & Smith 1994; Zimmer 2003). As typically assumed, ethnic nations are associated with the German romantic tradition which views the political community as an organic community genealogically defined on the basis of ethnic descent, common historical roots and common culture, religion or language. To the contrary, in the French civic tradition nations do not constitute static entities of cultural inheritance (Zimmer 2003, pp.174-177). For Renan (1882) the nation is 'a daily plebiscite' where members of the community deliberately subscribe and voluntarily commit to a set of political principles and institutions.

The dichotomous distinction between ethno-cultural and civic-territorial nationalism was further elaborated by Kohn (1955). The national identity of states established in already existing territories has been developed after revolutionary struggles on universal equality and civil liberties and eventually encompasses elements of a civic nation and the virtues of republicanism. The development of such a rational

conception of citizenship rooted in political and social reality was mostly the case of stable democracies in Western Europe. States that emerged after the liberation of a foreign enemy and have strived for the unification of the population under the same borders, like Italy, Greece as well as countries of Central and Eastern Europe, developed more ethnocentric and particularistic identities linked to traditional ties of kinship and status (Kohn 1944; Smith 1998, ch.1). Therefore, the content and salience of the idea of the nation varies in time and context. The establishment and reproduction of national consciousness is strongly and variously related with the political system in which it was formed and the strategies of ethnic boundary making pursued by state elites (Bauböck 1998, p.326; Wimmer & Min 2006).[16] With regard to citizenship studies, scholars following the cultural approach dismiss the modernization argument according to which peoples' preferences change in response to changes in external circumstances. It is prevailing elite understandings of nationhood that shape the considerations of state interests which, in turn, determine nationality law, the institution of formal citizenship (Schnapper 1992, p.51; Brubaker 1992, p.15).

Brubaker, in particular, views the state as an association of membership and citizenship, an instrument of closure occupying a central place in the administrative structure and political culture of the state. The legal bond of the citizenry with the state is expressed in the concept of nation, something "more cohesive than the aggregate of persons that belong to a state" (Brubaker 1992, p.21). While in the French tradition the nation was conceived as a political fact associated with universal values and the institutional and territorial frame of the state, the German national identity is pre-political, developed in relation to an organic cultural, linguistic or racial community. These distinctive understandings of nationhood, rooted in the political and cultural geography, are embodied and expressed in opposing definitions of citizenship:

> The expansive assimilationist citizenship law of France, which automatically transforms second-generation immigrants into citizens …[A]nd the German definition of the citizenry as a community of descent, restrictive towards non-

[16]As Wimmer (2013) underlines, the diffusion of nation-states has been the result of the dissolution of great empires and the process of decolonisation. The dissolution of the Ottoman and Habsburg empires and the Soviet Union in early '90s as well as the breakup of the colonies of Spain, Britain, France and Portugal are indicative examples of ethnic boundary making in Europe. During the process of nation-building new ethnic identities in search of a nation may emerge such as the Orthodox Christians resulting from the administrative organisation of the Ottoman Empire or different ethnic groups may join the same nation as a result of changes in borders. In the latter case, the dominant ethnic group may be defined as the nation which incorporates the other groups, as the case of France, or a new national identity that mixes (as in US) or supersedes ethnic differentiation may be constructed, as in Belgium and Switzerland (pp.49-56)

> German immigrants yet remarkably expansive towards ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (Brubaker 1992, p.14).

The republican inclusive and the ethnocultural differentialist conceptions of nationhood were crystalized in the decades before the First World War (WWI) and reinforced in distinct historical and institutional settings so as to mediate the economic, demographic or military interests of each country. Thus, state interests are culturally constituted and understandings of nationhood frame and shape judgments regarding the political imperatives (Ibid., p.1-17).

Despite similar migration processes and converging immigration policies, citizenship legislation is resistant to change. Bounded with historically rooted cultural idioms and definitions of belonging, nationality law involves considerable moral and symbolic stakes. According to Brubaker:

> Proposals to redefine the legal criteria of citizenship raise large and ideologically charged questions of nationhood and national belonging. Debates about citizenship in France and Germany are debates about what it means to belong to the nation-state. The politics of citizenship today is first and foremost a politics of nationhood. As such, it is a politics of identity, not a politics of interest … The "interests" informing the politics of citizenship are "ideal" rather than material (Brubaker 1992, p.182).

Furthermore, in spite of the similar forms of politics in France and Germany the content of debates is essentially different since different aspects of nationality law are endorsed or denounced. The affinity between definitions of citizenship and conceptions of nationhood constrains the debate permitting only marginal changes while making fundamental transformations on basic principles of nationality law highly improbable. The appeal to political and cultural tradition becomes central to collective mobilisation and the investment of legal tradition with normative dignity and symbolic meaning raises the political cost of challenging it (Ibid., pp.184-187).

3.3. Alternative explanations and their limitations

Brubaker's argument on the path-dependent nature of citizenship policy turned out overly deterministic. Its static formulation could not explain the empirical observation of fundamental changes in elite preferences and legislation over time, as the introduction of elements of ius soli in states with ethnic conception of nationhood such as in Greece or Germany, neither why states with similar ethno-cultural national identities adopt different provisions of civic inclusion. What needs to be answered therefore is how new understandings and worldviews emerge and in which ways ideas of civic inclusion interact with cultural and legal traditions, access the political agenda

and affect policy-making. The first kind of critique argues that recent convergence in policies and public debates cannot be accounted from a model perspective. The latter kind of critique argues that models are too static and simplistic to be analytically useful.

3.3.1. The liberal convergence thesis

The argument on the stability of citizenship policies induced by institutionally entrenched conceptions of nationhood has been challenged by the liberal convergence thesis (Soysal 1994; Jacobson 1996). Pursuant to this point of view, notably supported by Joppke (2007b; Joppke 2007c; Joppke 2008; Joppke 2010; Joppke & Morawska 2003), nationhood ceased to be the main factor informing immigrant integration policy and citizenship legislation. Joppke has argued that both the ethnoculturalist and the multiculturalist models of integration have been discredited in public debates since they have failed to provide for effective integration of immigrants and social cohesion. As previous policies have failed to effectively integrate non-European immigrants, particularly Muslims, previously divergent citizenship regimes across Europe have been replaced by a single model of civic integration comprised of shared liberal values. The tendency of the model approach to emphasise path-dependency cannot explain the civic turn of European states which now promote a liberal identity rather than national distinctiveness (Joppke 2007c, p.243; Joppke 2008, p.543; Joppke 2010, pp.131-140).

While Joppke points to globalisation pressures, codification of human rights and European law to explain convergence of the ideational aspect of civic integration he invokes party politics to explain differences in national policies. One the one hand, left-wing political parties are inclined to support immigrants' rights and facilitate access to citizenship. On the other hand, right-wing parties are more interested in retaining links with expatriates and promote ethnically selective policies (Joppke 2003, p.431). Other authors also suggested that correlations of power and party politics may account for differences among national citizenship regimes. However, the convergence thesis has been contested.

Goodman (2012) concedes with Joppke that immigration pressures and demographic changes have rendered obsolete questions of cultural homogeneity and national identity. Civic integration policies produce a new type of membership, a collective state identity that entails new expectations of belonging on the basis of standardised requirements and objective assessment. However, besides the fact that most countries emphasise common values and institutions instead of culturally specific

attributes Goodman sees no liberal convergence. The employment of similar policy instruments does not necessarily produce similar outcomes neither serves the same policy goals (Goodman 2012; Goodman 2014; Goodman 2010b). Beyond descriptive accounts, a systematic comparative analysis shows that the multiculturalist backlash and the civic integration turn are evident in public discourse but not in institutionalised policies. In contrast, civic integration requirements vary significantly in terms design, scope and level of restrictiveness (Goodman 2014, pp.37-64; Huddleston 2013). Further studies uphold the argument that civic elements of national identity and voluntary engagement to shared liberal values are widely used in political discourse; even radical right parties frame ethnic values in civic terms in order to become electorally successful. However, the retreat from multiculturalism and the civic turn in political discourse have not radically changed the basis of policies (Halikiopoulou, et al. 2013). As Vertovec and Wessendorf argue:

> The backlash against multiculturalism in Europe demonstrates how public discourse, policies and public opinion do not form a piece: while certainly touching and even influencing one another from time to time, in effect they move disjointly (Vertovec & Wessendorf 2009, p.34).

Comparative law analyses have pointed to the relevance of constitutional traditions and existing institutional structures as a key factor explaining the origin and historical continuity of citizenship policies. Convergence of citizenship policies was therefore related with the prevalence of certain structural conditions (Weil 2001; Howard 2009). Ius soli originates from the feudal system of land ownership where it represented the allegiance of all persons born in the territory to the monarch. After the French Revolution, European countries replaced ius soli with birth from a national establishing a right to maintain one's nationality irrespective of territorial movement as well as a natural right of citizens to pass the status to their children. Ius soli was re-introduced as a form of social attachment in the late 19th century French law aiming to the incorporation of increasing number of children of immigrants born in the state. In the British tradition of colonial rule ius soli was transplanted in the colonies enabling the integration of ethnically diverse population (Weil 2001, pp.19-21; Weil 2005).

Constitutional regimes and democratic institutions established during the mid- to late 19th century in combination with the experience of a country as a colonial power were considered as factors with strong impact to the formation of a civic conception of inclusion translated into liberal nationality laws. One the one hand, interaction with diverse groups of people endowed more openness in both national identity and

institutions of former colonial powers. On the other hand, the timing of democratization is considered crucial since intellectual, political and economic conditions of the 19th century were quite different from these of the first half of the 20th, during which a relative stable political environment was missing and policies tended to be more exclusionary, protective and restrictive (Howard 2009, pp.37-46; Janoski 2010).

Howard's (2009) study accounted both for historical variation in the 1980s and recent changes taking place after the 2000s by examining both the legacy of pre-existing institutions and contemporary party politics. Against Brubaker, Howard dismisses ascriptive or voluntary conceptions of membership and takes into account the presence of ius soli provisions, the toleration of dual citizenship and naturalisation requirements to assess the liberal character and inclusiveness of citizenship policies. Against Joppke, he argues that citizenship in certain EU countries, Austria, Denmark, Italy, Spain and Greece remained restrictive while he characterises the liberalisation of Germany's nationality law as partial, marked by a restrictive backlash. To explain the lack of liberalisation Howard recognises that citizenship liberalization is more likely if a leftish government is in power. Nevertheless, he considers the mobilization of anti-immigrant public opinion, whether by a successful far right party, a public movement or a kind of referendum, as the decisive factor for the outcome of the reform. The politicisation of the issue when far right parties enjoy high electoral support can therefore block or compromise the effects of liberalisation (Howard 2009, pp.52-62; Howard 2008; Howard 2010).

Although the hypothesis on the ideological orientation of government and public mobilisation by far-right parties offers a convincing explanation about the conditions of liberal policy change, it ignores variation regarding the particular content and purpose of policy proposals. Goodman (2012) refines Howard's arguments on party politics by accounting for the role of the existing institutional context, the current setting within which decisions are made and which leads state actors to different understandings about the interpretation and solution of membership problems. As instruments of different policy strategies, similar civic requirements produce different effects in different institutional settings; in specific contexts naturalisation requirements may facilitate integration rather than signalling a restrictive turn (Ibid.; Goodman 2014).

Hence, the ideological orientation of the party in power defines whether the government seeks to change or fortify existing approaches but it is the inherited

citizenship policy that defines the parameters of the debate as well as the purpose and justification of the reform initiative. This institutional perspective explains diversity of membership strategies as the result of interaction of existing citizenship policy and politics. Instead of treating citizenship as a dependent variable, the role of citizenship as an independent causal variable and the effects of policy feedback are emphasised. Policy change is seen as an incremental negotiated procedure with contained or moderated outcome (Goodman 2014; Goodman 2012). According to Goodman (2012), "[T]racing these stories of adoption, design, and implementation confirm that new requirements do not signal departures from national approaches to citizenship, but rather fortify them" (p.692).

A second point of criticism to Howard's argument concerns the weakness to fully examine the configurations of citizenship policies within and across the categories of applicants. Goodman refers to material and procedural requirements of naturalisation to account for the divergent purposes of civic integration, namely functional integration or effective closure (Goodman 2010a, p.4; Goodman 2012, p.678). In a similar vein, Honohan (2010) disaggregates the requirements of ius soli citizenship to address a broader range of degrees of inclusiveness. Despite the fact that reform proposals do not constitute a unidirectional process, they are strongly correlated with the return to power of a left-wing government as the cases of Germany, Portugal and Greece suggest. However, she argues that compromised outcomes or failed reforms are not only related with opposition by conservative parties but also with a preference to facilitate expatriates and an anachronistic self-image as a country of emigration (Honohan 2010). Another group of scholars addressed the multi-dimensional character of citizenship policies by accounting not only for the degree of inclusion of immigrants and their offspring but also of emigrants. Two-dimensional typologies take into account not only resident population but former nationals and their descendants as well as ethnically kin populations. Furthermore, they examine both the acquisition and loss of nationality (Vink & de Groot 2010a; Vink & Bauböck 2013; Vink, 2017).

By disaggregating the requirements of nationality acquisition and widening the range of categories of applicants more nuanced correlations of citizenship policy reform and political contestation emerge. Liberalising changes of ius soli usually become the subject of considerable public debate and public contention; yet weaker forms of ius soli, such as double ius soli or conditional acquisition of nationality after birth tend to be more easily accepted by centre and right-wing parties. To the contrary, expansions

of emigrant rights are not met with serious opposition and are supported by both right and left-wing parties while obstacles relevant to the naturalisation procedure hardly ever become an issue of great public concern (Faist & Triadafilopoulos 2006).

Moreover, variation is observed in the way that the issue of immigrant integration is defined in national public debates. Extensions of ius soli and facilitation of naturalisation takes place in countries where the exclusion of long-established immigrant residents has come to be seen as a policy anomaly; this is not always the case though. In certain cases, reforms may be connected not with immigration but with issues of national security or bilateral state relations, as in the case of Ireland. In other cases, nationality issues may be confused with issues of irregular immigration or may be even completely absent from the political agenda, as until recently in Greece. Hence, despite the liberalisation and convergence of policy instruments, states continue to select and shape their citizenry and determine their citizenship policy according to multiple purposes and diverse goals (Honohan 2010; De Hart & van Oers 2006; Bauböck 2006; Jeffers, et al. 2017, p.2).

The argument that existing institutional configurations contextualise politics, mediate immigrant related pressures and states' strategies for promoting new definitions of civic integration draws on the historical institutionalist approach. Influenced by the macro-sociological tradition historical institutionalist analyses saw the representation of interests and the political process shaped by institutional factors that vary from place to place and bear the traces of their own history. As Steinmo (1989) argued, neither self-interest nor values have substantive meaning if abstracted from the institutional framework that provides the context for humans to interpret them and define their policy preferences (p.502). The focus lies on broad societal and state structures, and institutions are defined as rules, formal or informal procedures, norms and conventions entrenched in the organisational structure of the polity that structure conduct and relations of power (Thelen & Steinmo 1992; p.2). The central assumption is that political conflicts and outcomes of new policies are structured by pre-existing rules and legacies which reflect historical experience and remain stable for discrete periods of time. The relevant aspects of the setting within which social and economic events as well as political contestation take place, shape the preferences and constrain the behaviour of individuals affecting the decision-making process. These context effects mediate not only the political outcome of interest but are able to condition

political outcomes in later periods of time by restructuring the institutional and ideological setting (Immergut 1998, pp.16-17; Immergut 2006; Hall 2016).

Historical institutionalists depart from synchronic analyses where current conditions affect current outcomes or static comparisons of different stages of political development which restrict analysis to 'snapshots' of political processes and outcomes or specific historical periods. Instead, they examine policy-making in long periods. A diachronic analysis investigates empirically the process of change over time to uncover how power is built in policy structures. History matters because unfolding group contestation on institutional arrangements and struggles on institutional change over time could go into the black box of politics and explore the evolution of policy options and the suppression of alternatives, the groups that favoured particular outcomes, and the inaction associated with the adaptation of preferences or anticipated reactions (Pierson 2016, pp.132-136). Small and contingent events or decisions can have enduring consequences and the sequencing of events may be critical for explaining divergent outcomes (Pierson 2004; Pierson 1993; Falleti & Lynch 2009; Campbell 2010).

Causal explanations delineate the relevant conditions that have to be present, namely the structural factors that allow a mechanism to produce the outcome of interest. Causal mechanisms are seen as relational concepts rather than a chain of observable intervening variables. Thus, as Falleti and Lynch (2009) remark, "causation resides in the interaction between the mechanism and the context within which it operates" (p.1145). Despite the emphasis on the determinant role of formal political and administrative structures the concept of rationality is not rejected. An eclectic approach is followed that integrates features of rational choice and sociological institutionalism by emphasising both micro-foundations and macro-structures. Actors are considered embedded in social, economic and political structures, connected to each other by network relations and shared cognitive frameworks that affect political action and generate interaction effects. Although they rationally pursue their interest, institutions shape their preferences and goals and mediate relations of cooperation and conflict (Hall & Taylor 1996; Hall 2016).

The main feature of this approach is the emphasis on asymmetries of power and the institutionalisation of advantage, the incorporation of ideational elements and the focus on the temporal dimension of the political process (Hall 2016, pp.34-38; Hall & Taylor 1996). According to Hall:

> The organization of policy-making affects the degree of power that one set of actors has over policy outcomes. … On the other hand, organizational position also influences an actor's definition of his own interests, by establishing his institutional responsibilities and relationships to other actors. In this way, organizational factors affect both the degree of pressure an actor can bring to bear on policy and the likely direction of this pressure (Hall 1986, p.19).

The focus is therefore on how intermediate-level political institutions structure relations among the legislature, the judiciary, the executive and interest groups and the interest lies in explaining variation of national outcomes by studying interaction effects in particular contexts (Thelen & Steinmo 1992, p.6).

3.3.2. The national distinctiveness thesis

In contrast to the liberal convergence thesis which interpreted civic integration requirements as a breach with the nation, another camp of scholars saw the promotion of language and knowledge of society requirements as an implicit return to nationally distinctive conceptions of integration (Goodman 2014, pp.11-12; Kostakopoulou 2010; Mouritsen, 2011). According to this view national variation in civic integration policies demarcate distinctive cultural interpretations and reactions to broadly similar challenges. Besides the shifting balances of the right and left, nationally specific discourses of civicness continue to define the parameters of political controversy and national citizenship policies still reflect path-dependent reactions of culturally bounded nation states (Mouritsen 2012, pp.86-90).

Following Brubaker's assumption on the path dependent nature of policy development, a number of studies attempted to show that social reality is structured by pre-existing ideas about national belonging and that such ideas inform contemporary preferences and policy by framing social interactions and institutional arrangements (Bleich 2002; Bleich 2003; Favell 2001). However, Brubaker's initial assumption on the internal consistency of understandings of civic and ethnic nationhood has been considered analytically misleading and therefore largely discarded. Instead of conceptualising national models as dense, coherent, homogeneous and static structures they were predominantly treated as ideal types without neglecting historical contingency and the fact that in political reality conceptions of nationhood may be internally complex and experience varying degrees of contestation over time (Bertossi & Duyvendak 2012; Vink 2017, pp.224-230; Schain 2012, p.483).

Comprehensive typologies of integration, comprising of both the dimension of citizenship and cultural diversity, were employed in comparative migration studies with

the aim to cover a broader range of conceptions of inclusiveness across policy sectors and domains of integration. As a result, various integration typologies, such as the French civic assimilationist, the Dutch and British multiculturalist and the ethno-cultural differetialist or assimilationist models of Germany, Switzerland and South-Eastern Europe, have been developed and used as an independent variable to explain sharp contrasts between countries (Castles & Miller 2009; (Koopmans, et al. 2005; Freeman 2004; Freeman 2006). In the comparative study of Koopmans, et al., citizenship is conceived as

> a conceptual (and political) space in which different actors (which include nation-states, but also subnational actors such as political parties or civil society actors) and policies can be situated and developments can be traced over time (Koopmans, et al. 2005, p.9).

The contours of this conceptual space are defined by the equality of individual access to citizenship as well as the amount of cultural difference and group rights that citizenship allows. Cross-national differences in contention over immigration and cultural diversity are explained primarily by different collective conceptions of national identity and their crystallisation in nationally-specific policies that function as discursive and institutional opportunity structures for making legitimate and realistic claims. Hence, although decisive in influencing the political agenda, opportunities for xenophobic claims and effective mobilisation of extreme-right demands are mediated by the structure of political institutions, established ideological positions of mainstream parties as well as alliance structures and patterns of conflict (Koopmans, et al., 2005; (Koopmans & Statham 2000; Schain 2006).

Drawing important cues from sociological institutionalism these studies argued that political decisions result from cognitive and organizational procedures rather than interests; conceptual models structure and constrain policy alternatives and define what kind of rules are considered legitimate as well as which kind of actors are considered as appropriate authorities for dealing with the issue. Institutions are defined broadly to include not merely formal rules, norms and procedures but also conventions and customs, myths and symbols, cognitive scripts and templates for behaviour. Institutional arrangements are considered intersubjective, culturally specific practices, dependent upon macro-level processes, which shape preferences and identities and guide the actions of rational individuals by generating meaning and providing frames of interpretation as well as justifications for action. Individuals are considered embedded in multiple relationships and the organisational environment is characterised

by limited information, uncertainty and ambiguity with respect to the goals of action. Human action is therefore reliant on shortcuts of bounded rationality, such as standard operating procedures, taken for granted cognitive paradigms and normative frameworks which stabilise expectations and define the appropriateness of actions in terms of relations between roles and situations. Institutional arrangements and procedures are adopted and reproduced because they provide legitimacy and social acceptability to rules of conduct pursuant to 'a logic of social appropriateness' (March & Olsen 1989, pp.21-38; DiMaggio & Powell 1991).

Nevertheless, inferring the dominant conception of nationhood by the configuration of policies and jumping to the conclusion that formalised normative value systems account for cross-national differences has been considered problematic. The assumption that models, conceived as all-encompassing independent variables, are able to account at once for the status of immigrants, policy orientations and the structure of public discourse has led to analytical ambiguity and normative misunderstandings (Bertossi & Duyvendak 2012; Bertossi 2011). Scholars of nationalism, Brubaker among them, questioned the characterisation of entire states as ethnic or civic as well as the understanding of distinctions between Western and Eastern, voluntary and organic, liberal and illiberal forms of nationalism as mutually exclusive. It has been widely accepted that opposed analytical elements co-exist in concrete cases and are politically used alternatively and in different manners and proportions, to legitimate or discredit particular state policies or national movements. From a normative point of view both civic and ethnic forms of nationalism have been considered as potentially exclusive or inclusive depending on the criteria used to regulate access to the political community (Yack 1996; Brubaker 1998; Brubaker 1999; Schnapper 1998). From a discursive perspective, national identity is understood as a public project processed by social actors both in voluntaristic terms, as a product of human action, as well as in deterministic terms, as manifestations of the communal organic characteristics of the nation (Zimmer 2003; Mouritsen, 2011).

As regards access to citizenship, the principles of ius soli and ius sanguinis are not mutually exclusive but are used in a complementary manner by states to address different target groups and fulfil different purposes (Vink 2017, pp.224-225; Vink & de Groot, 2010b; Vink & Bauböck 2013). Treated as a consistent and preconceived notion, national models have been considered an inappropriate tool for the explanation of social reality and the assessment of the success or failure of a national approach of

integration. As Bertossi and Duyvendak argue, the assumption that social actors interiorise ideational frames and that normative and idealistic structures are the primary driving forces of policies and practices ignores the dynamics of agency and collective interests. Missing a theory for agency and action, the national distinctiveness thesis cannot explain the origin of models, how normative value systems are translated into a complex institutional and social reality and how the causal relation between national models and policy developments works (Bertossi & Duyvendak 2012, pp.237-240; Bertossi 2011).

Approaches drawing on new-institutionalism acknowledged and integrated the reciprocal influence of socio-cognitive and structural factors on political outcomes (Hall & Taylor 1996). The comparative study of Favell (2001) pays close attention to the origins, evolution and content of liberal practices as well as to the contingent political circumstances that impose empirical constraints on policy-making, such as the rules of democratic deliberation, the existing institutional conditions and the inherent limitations of resources and information. Besides the analysis of the organisational rationality of existing political institutions, the continuing interaction of agency and structure is emphasised by focusing to the "dynamics of political conflict and consensus-building in the emergence of new institutions" (Favell 2001, p.19). Agency refers to the ability of groups and individuals to act consciously as strategic actors and attempt to enhance their positions as contextual conditions change (Thelen & Steinmo 1992, pp.16-18; Hay 2002, pp.94-95). In this view, social learning is seen as "a deliberate attempt to adjust the goals or techniques of policy in response to past experience and new information" (Hall 1993, p.278).

For Favell (2001) nationally bounded solutions to immigrants' integration problems are the result of distinctive public philosophies, of public political theories "founded on a set of consensual ideas and linguistic terms held across party political lines" (p.2). Instead of ideal political or philosophical theories the interest lies in public ideas and justifications used by political actors, influential intellectuals and academics to create coherent political solutions and sustain policies. Expressed through argument and rhetoric, they structure the social and cultural context of policies, shape and constrain their development over time. This complex of normative values is cognitively held and understood by a political consensus which outweighs interest-based disagreements, upholds and works within the dominant policy framework (Ibid, pp.1-38). From this perspective, continuity of nationally distinctive citizenship policies is

not understood as “an example of some timeless political ‘tradition’ imposing itself” (Ibid. p.21), but as the product of a political process that establishes the dominant picture of political reality, sets the agenda, defines the policy goals and maintains particular policy lines. It is the outcome of constructive dynamic of forward-looking policy-making that determines the future course of political and institutional responses to integration dilemmas (Ibid. pp.1-38).

However, political outcomes are not regarded as entirely dependent on material entities; instead, underlying normative structures constrain the set of policy ideas that are considered acceptable, legitimate or administratively viable by political elites. For policies to be adopted they must fit the prevailing values of a society (Hall 1989b, pp.373-374). Formal institutions mediate the degree to which different ideas are transported into policy-making arenas to provide solutions for policy dilemmas. Objective conditions, such as historical events, the size of the state and the cultural composition of the population create perceptions about the character of the political community which lay the foundations for the institutionalisation of particular national identities by elites. Therefore, historically constructed ideas and worldviews, culture and shared belief systems are also considered to affect institution building. If interests are contextually defined, the process of the social construction of perceptions of interests is the key causal mechanism linking context effects to the formation of ideologies of social partnership and the establishment of institutions which yield divergent, nationally specific responses to common policy problems (Campbell & Hall 2009; Campbell 2010; Campbell, 2002).

To explain the long-lasting effects of past decisions and the way preceding policy arrangements shape the incentives and resources of political actors the concept of path dependency is employed. Once a country has established certain institutional arrangements the costs of reversal are very high. Consequently, the probability of further movement along the same path increases (Pierson 2004; Pierson 2000; Mahoney 2001). The temporal dimension is a particularly prominent feature in efforts to account for the construction of interests and for bias towards policy continuity. Models of path-dependency situate historical causes of fundamental transformation at intense and rapid formative moments, often produced by an exogenous shock, followed by periods of relative stability. According to Collier and Collier (1991) a critical juncture is “a period of significant change, which typically occurs in distinct ways in different countries (or other units of analysis) and which is hypothesized to produce distinct legacies” (p.29).

Such critical junctures represent the starting point of a mechanism of continuous reproduction of particular patterns of action even though the original factors no longer occur. The dynamics of increasing returns, also described as self-reinforcing or positive feedback processes, carry and amplify these lock-in effects which constrain the political process along a particular path by restricting the range of policy choices available to decision-makers (Pierson 2000; Campbell 2010).

Favell (2001) points to variation in "the timing of immigration becoming a hot and salient political issue or the coming together of a political solution" (p.23) as a plausible explanation of the differences in the rhetorical terms and underlying justification of these policy frameworks across national cases. The re-emergence of immigrants' integration as a salient political issue may entail normative pressures and conflict across institutional arenas triggering a full-scale debate on the dominant understanding of citizenship. Seen as a process of collective social learning, political competition and argument may lead to the questioning of the core elements of the dominant framework and the destabilisation or the dissolution of the existing agreement. In case that a new consensus on the core elements of citizenship policy is reached a new policy paradigm may be established (Ibid. pp.14-22).

However, the questioning of the original settlement and a concomitant radical reform is deemed highly unlikely. Notwithstanding the different positioning of actors with respect to the policy instruments the fundamental underlying terms for identifying the objects and issues of public policy have remained remarkably stable. Political actors have deep stakes in maintaining the overall policy framework over time, depoliticising the issue and eliminating the risk of destabilisation of the status quo or fundamental change. The possibility of evolutionary development of the dominant policy framework is not precluded though. As past experience is infused with new information, terms and concepts are stretched incrementally, official justifications are adapted to different present and future conditions and existing institutions are associated with new problems, allowing progressive changes on the peripheral elements of the policy framework (Favell 2001, pp.22-33).

Favell's explanation on political outcomes appertains to Hall's (1993) paradigmatic approach. Hall defines a policy-paradigm as

> a framework of ideas and standards that specifies not only the goals of policy and the kind of instruments that can be used to attain them, but also the very nature of the problems they are meant to be addressing (Hall 1993, p.279).

Embedded in the terminology through which policy-makers communicate, this interpretive framework it taken for granted and consequently is unamenable to scrutiny as a whole. To explain fundamental policy change Hall distinguishes normal policy-making from paradigmatic shift by identifying different kinds of learning and policy change. Normal policy-making entails incremental changes in instrument levels or settings as well as changes in the instruments of policy themselves, in response to past experience and new knowledge, while the overall goals of policy remain the same. Paradigmatic change represents an overarching change in the terms of policy discourse and entails simultaneous change in instruments, instrument settings and the hierarchy of goals behind the policy (Hall 1993, pp.278-280).

Three elements are considered important regarding the conditions for paradigmatic change. First, a political crisis prompted by cumulative policy failures and ad hoc attempts to cover them by stretching the terms of the paradigm which gradually undermine the intellectual coherence of the existing paradigm and its authority in dealing with anomalous developments. Second, a shift in the locus of authority over policy engendered by conflicting scientific opinions and wider contest between competing paradigms. Third, along persuasion and argument, the power of supporters of a new paradigm to secure positions of authority over policy-making that would enable them to rearrange the organisation and standard operating procedures (Hall 1993, pp.280-281). The main implication of Hall's argument is that policy-making can be structured not solely by a set of institutions but also by a particular set of ideas. While the two often reinforce each other, the ideas embodied in a policy paradigm constitute a form of power with independent causal effects that can trigger a complete shift in the policy direction (Hall 1993, p.290).

Strategically used 'rhetorical frames' (Schön & Rein 1994, p.32) adapted to appeal to certain aspects of political identity, and not others, can substantially influence the level of conflict and coalitional dynamics as well as the likely direction and extent of institutional change (Capoccia 2016). Nevertheless, while Hall assumes that a single, coherent paradigm dominates a policy domain, other scholars suggest that competing frameworks are likely to coexist and compete each other while the dominance of a paradigm is temporary (for a detailed analysis see Cairney & Weible 2015; Skogstad & Schmidt 2011). Thus, as Baumgartner contents,

> when ideas are widely shared by an entire community, they can be called a paradigm. Some policy communities may well be dominated by a single paradigm,

> others may see competition and others may see the replacement of one dominant paradigm by another (Baumgartner 2013, p.251).

One the one hand, ideas, principled beliefs and public sentiments comprise of normative and cognitive discourse structures that affect the way actors perceive, interpret and articulate interests and policy programs. The structure of discourse within a policy paradigm shapes how policy ideas are communicated and operationalised, constrains the range of ideas which policy-makers perceive as publicly acceptable and consequently the policy alternatives they are likely to adopt. On the other hand, interests and identities are multidimensional. Fragmentation, conflict and overlap among institutions may induce competition of ideas resulting in institutional change (Campbell 2002, p.32; Campbell 2004, pp.90-123).

3.3.3. The liberal constraint thesis

A number of studies criticised the emphasis on incrementalism and argued that policies go through long periods of stability but also short periods of rapid change. In this view, institutional change follows the pattern of punctuated equilibrium, a discontinuous model of institutional development characterised, according to Capoccia and Kelemen,

> by relatively long-periods of path dependent institutional stability and reproduction that are punctuated occasionally by brief phases of institutional flux-referred to as critical junctures-during which more dramatic change is possible" (Capoccia & Kelemen 2007, p.341).

During these situations, key decisions and actions of powerful political actors, such as political leaders, policymakers, bureaucrats or judges, become especially consequential on political outcomes as the structural influences on political action are significantly relaxed and the range of plausible and feasible choices expands substantially (Ibid., pp.341-344; Campbell 2004, p.5; Hay 2002; pp.160-161).

To understand the mechanisms that account for the extension of immigrants' rights and the evolution of nationality law, in spite of the high politicisation of the issues of immigration and citizenship and public pressure, citizenship and migration scholars focused on the configuration of interests, ideas and institutions. To achieve a greater balance between structure and agency they draw on public policy and agenda setting literature (Guiraudon, 2000a; Hansen & Koehler 2005). Agenda setting, the process by which a collection of problems, understandings of causes and alternative solutions gain or lose the attention of the public and governmental officials (Birkland 2007, p.63), is considered a fundamental political process, entailing controversy and competition on how to define the problem and concomitant solutions (Ibid.).

Agenda setting perspectives see political actors as capable of strategic action trying to control to both the definition of policy issues as well as the participants involved in the policy process. Powerful actors in pluralist governments can insulate themselves by the influence of large-scale democratic forces and create relatively independent depoliticised policy sub-governments of limited participation by manipulating the policy image and venue. The prevailing policy image is associated with the beliefs and values concerning a particular issue, the dominant understanding of a policy problem and the rhetorical frames used to define it. The institutional venue of policy action is related to the rules guiding decision-making and the participants at different levels of governance. Non-interfering sub-governments are supported by powerful images which are interwoven with the policy venue and are strategically used by political elites and dominant interest groups to reinforce their privileged positions. According to this set of theories, the interaction between the policy image and venue constitutes the mechanism that explains both prolonged stability of policy arrangements but also dramatic reversals (Baumgartner & Jones 1991).

According to Baumgartner and Jones (2009), "[T]he tight connection between institution and idea provides powerful support for the prevailing distribution of political advantage" (p.16). They embrace Schattschneider's (1960) idea of organisation as "the mobilization bias" which assumes that some issues are organised into politics while others are organised out (Ibid. p.71) and contend that those who benefit from the mobilization of bias are in a better position to promote and defend their interests by manipulating the agenda of public debate. By establishing a prevalent understanding of policy questions and solutions policy monopolies limit controversy over policy development to one dimension of the issue, as conflicting definitions and interests are excluded from the process. Accordingly, each policy image finds favourable reception in different venues, as each venue involves different participants and decision-making routines; issues defined as technical are handled by experts whereas discussions on social impacts of policies involve a much broader range of participants (Baumgartner & Jones 2009, pp.3-24; Baumgartner & Jones 1991). As Schattschneider (1960) argues, "a conclusive way of checking the rise of conflict is simply to provide no arena for it or to create no public agency in power to do anything about it" (p.69). Potential political issues are prevented from being actual by means of non decision-making. A non decision is "a decision that results in suppression or thwarting of a latent or manifest

challenge to the values or interests of the decision-maker" (Bachrach & Baratz 1970, p.44 as in Lukes 2005, pp.20-25).

However, these arrangements are considered fragile in the long-term as changes to the institutional environment and public opinion may lead to failure to control the policy image. The demise of policy monopolies is associated with shifts in public attention caused by new understandings of the nature of policy and changes in the intensities of interests. Central to the process of change is Schattschneider's concept of conflict expansion. The disadvantaged side of a policy debate could redefine the basic dimension of conflict and change their position by going public with a problem, increasing the attention to the undesirable effects of the prevailing policy settlement and mobilising people that were disinterested or not involved in the debate. Nevertheless, mobilisation of opponents is expected to lead to marginal incremental improvements due to the limited resources of the disadvantaged. Even when mass publics are involved, public debate follows elite debate and conflict; the process of issue expansion aims primarily to substantiate policy decisions that are already taken by elites and solidify these changes (Baumgartner & Jones 2009, pp.3-38; Baumgartner & Jones 1991).

A second way to broaden the scope of conflict is through reinterpretation of the issue definition and search for alternative institutional venues in different levels of government that are favourable for the new image and reinforce the resources of the challenging group. The interaction of policy image with competing venues of political action may lead to the demise of systems of limited participation and entail rapid and dramatic change. Baumgartner and Jones examine the relationship between issue assignment and political rhetoric and argue that a slight change in rhetoric renders venue change more likely and in turn a change in venue may facilitate further rhetorical changes. In case of positive feedback, the new policy image will diffuse rapidly replacing the old one. As the underpinning understanding change, the policy process and outcomes change as well (Baumgartner & Jones 2009, pp.3-38; (Baumgartner & Jones 1991). Consequently, manipulation of image and venue may account for both stability and change. Stability is related with the close connection of problems to political images resulting from the monopolistic control over a policy by a single arena of policymaking experts; change is associated with failure to control policy images and loss of control over the policy itself (Ibid.).

Immigration and citizenship studies have also emphasised the role of multiple and competing venues of policymaking and authoritative decision-making in mobilising different constituencies. Boswell (2007) remarks that state interests are not always reducible to societal interests. Therefore, the system of party politics which define value orientations and party programs should be distinguished from the state's bureaucratic apparatus which determines the detailed content and implementation of collectively binding decisions aiming to secure legitimacy over time. Furthermore, it is acknowledged that the administration is comprised of various agencies with divergent interests and goals and varying degrees of autonomy and capacity (Boswell 2007, pp.79-80). From this perspective, "foreigners' rights are best discussed behind closed doors than in a media-covered electoral arena where xenophobic voices can be heard" (Guiraudon 2000a, pp.84-85). Administrative and judicial institutions have been considered as venues insulated from social interests and public opinion, less controversial than political arenas where arguments become dramatic and thus capable to mitigate against restrictive immigration policies (Ibid.; Hansen & Koehler 2005).

Certain scholars have stressed the role of courts in creating moral obligations for states that are hostile towards the extension of rights to long-settled immigrants (Joppke 1998; Joppke 2001). Guiraudon (2000a), characterised courts as "venues biased in favour of equality before the law" (p.72), capable of circumscribing the administrative discretion enjoyed by states with respect to the entry and stay of aliens as well as affirming the principle of non-discrimination on the basis of nationality in cases concerning social and civil rights. Nevertheless, as regards reforms on political rights and access to citizenship, spill over from the executive arena is more likely. The abolishment of restrictions regarding political participation, eligibly for election or the right to work in sensitive posts in public sector or civil service, is subject to political decisions involving extended parliamentary debates on the definition of the nation between competing coalitions and consequently dependent on power relations. Since, with the exception of the US, requirements of access to citizenship are generally absent from constitutions, governments are only symbolically bound by courts. And courts have respected the discretion of states to determine access to the political community under the limitations of social cohesion and public order (Guiraudon 2000a; Joppke 2001).

Bureaucracies and venues of specialised experts have been deemed more receptive to nationality law reforms, capable of narrowing the debate to technical

issues. Despite the fact that the German government accepted the recommendation of the Constitutional Court for the facilitation of naturalisation, the reform process was successfully blocked when opponents altered the terms of the debate and transferred it from the parliament to the streets broadening the range of participants. On the contrary, in the French case, the government managed to cope with contestation of the reform by shifting the debate to an objective committee of experts which was able to alter the definitional basis of the nationality issue in favour of voluntarism. On these grounds, variation of policy frames is related with different venues responsible for policy decisions, such as administrative agencies and bodies of scientific advice or assemblies of political party representatives (Hansen & Koehler 2005; Guiraudon 2000a). Policy entrepreneurs take advantage of triggering events and manage to change the tone of the political debate by shifting issues between these institutional levels. However, although studies of agenda setting and punctuated equilibria in politics emphasise the role of venues of specialised experts in policy change, the different roles of scientific knowledge in shaping and redefining policy images has not been examined extensively (Timmermans & Scholten 2006, p.1104).

A closer examination on the relation between experts and policy-makers spells out that scientific venues, within which rival views for immigrant issues are expressed and policy shifts are formally decided, may generate both negative and positive feedback. Scholten and Timmermans (2010) argue that the role of venues of expertise and policy advice in the production of frame shifts is associated with the structural setting of problem framing. Part of this setting is the relation -the nexus- between immigrant integration research and policy which determines the distribution of positions among actors involved in the definition of the problem and the rules of the game. This nexus is not static; different structures form different types of interaction between researchers and policymakers which can sustain or dissolve policy monopolies by keeping issues off the political agenda reinforcing the mobilisation of bias or by getting issues on the agenda respectively. Mutually reinforcing policy frames and policy-making structures generate long periods of stability which are interrupted when the frames and structures are contested and redefined. The interest therefore lies in boundary organisations, such as expert committees, advisory bodies, research councils or think tanks, which hold positions of authority both in politics and science and work on the structure of the boundaries that allow for the interaction of the fields and the

diffusion of knowledge to policy (Scholten & Timmermans 2010; Timmermans & Scholten 2006; Entzinger & Scholten 2015; Scholten 2011a; Scholten 2011b).

A typology of four different modes of interaction between experts and policy-makers is developed, on the basis of the structural conditions that afford primacy either on research or policy. In the enlightenment model the roles of scientific research and policy are distinguished and there are no pronounced institutional relationships. The primacy of autonomous science over politics is attributed to instrumental use, its role to pursue scientific truth, rationalise and steer policy development. In the technocratic model, science is also given primacy but scientists are directly involved in problem framing, policy design and political decision-making. An institutionalised research-policy nexus permits the translation of knowledge into policy practice. To the contrary, in the bureaucratic model, politics decide the values and goals pursued in government policies. The role of research is constrained in the production of facts and data that serve as input for the political decision-making process without neglecting considerations of power nor reducing value choices to technical-scientific resolutions. Yet, a firm institutional nexus is established where advisory bodies and planning offices are closely associated with the government administrative apparatus. Political primacy is also retained in the engineering model. Although scientific research is involved in the rational design of policies and the resolution of policy problems, the nexus between research and policy is less institutionalised. It is political priorities and the prevailing political values and goals that determine which resources of expertise are selected and mobilised (Scholten & Timmermans 2010, pp.530-532; Scholten 2011a, pp.42-51; Knorr 1977).

Pursuant to this view, the structural setting and social practices that demarcate the roles and coordinate the relation between research and policy, giving primacy on the one side or the other, are factors that account for the culture of policy-making and the variation of policy frames over time even within the same context. The emergence and endorsement of a multiculturalist frame in the Netherlands is associated with the technocratic model where knowledge organisations or individual experts are central to limiting the scope of conflict and depoliticizing issues. After immigrant issues became the subject of social and political controversy, support for the multiculturalist model weakened and governments endorsed assimilationist policies. Expansion of political debate and mobilisation of support is considered part of the strategy employed by policy entrepreneurs searching to produce a frame shift. The assimilationist frame is therefore

related with the engineering mode of policymaking where scientific expertise is used selectively to set new frames on the policy agenda and legitimate policy discourse (Scholten & Timmermans 2010, pp.539-541; Scholten 2011a; Scholten 2011b).

With this argument Scholten and Timmermans illustrate the different uses of scientific venues in the dynamics of agenda setting:

> Expert organizations can be venues in agenda setting by inspiring politicians, by providing ammunition in political debates, or they can function as vehicles for depoliticization. They are more or less visible in the definition of problems and are a part of agenda setting via the route of low politics by narrowing the scope of debate, or a high politics route involving drama, mass mobilization and conflict expansion (Scholten & Timmermans 2010, p.541).

In the process of negative feedback, science is accorded primacy over politics and scientific venues provide evidence as well as cause and effect arguments that sustain a policy monopoly by keeping issues off the political agenda. The primacy of science over politics, in situations of negative feedback, will depend by the technical complexity of the issue and the political risk entailed in the policy field. Political primacy is most likely in the process of positive feedback where disadvantaged policy entrepreneurs manage to get issues on the political agenda by seeking access to alternative scientific venues that offer supporting evidence that challenges the existing policy image and strengthens the persuasive power of alternative policy advocacy. New research institutions may also be established to promote a particular policy image supported by the new alliance of intimacy between politics and science. As the new policy monopoly gets established, science may regain primacy in order to sustain the new policy frame. Hence, agenda setting dynamics involve a degree of strategic venue shopping between scientific councils, think tanks, and expert committees but also shifts in the primacy of politics or science (Timmermans & Scholten 2006; Scholten 2011a, pp.54-56; Guiraudon, 2000b).

3.4. The interplay between scientific knowledge production and policymaking

Hall (1993) acknowledged the role of scientific expertise and issues of authority in the process of policy change. Strategic action and policy innovation, taking place within relative closed policy networks, as well as shifts in the locus of authority over policy-making, engaging new kind of expertise, have been considered as forms of learning leading to first and second order changes, namely technical adjustments or changes in the legal instruments employed as solutions to meet the policy goals. Third order change, the change in the policy purposes and movement from one policy paradigm to

another entails a different process involving political judgment, electoral competition and broader societal debate. The choice between competing paradigms is ultimately based on a set of political judgements rather on sole scientific grounds, as for Hall,

> paradigms are by definition never fully commensurable in scientific or technical terms. Because each paradigm contains its own account of how the world facing policymakers operates and each account is different, it is often impossible for the advocates of different paradigms to agree on a common body of data against which a technical judgment in favor of one paradigm over another might be made" (Hall 1993, p.280).

Incommensurability refers to the core elements of the image of the paradigm, the fundamental principles according to which problems and solutions are framed, rather than secondary attributes such as organisational modes or decision-making principles. The core assumptions that define a paradigm are often taken for granted and escape examination (Carson, et al. 2009, pp.153-155, 389-391; Kuhn, 1970). Timmermans and Scholten (2006) showed that the structural setting of policy design and decision-making as well as the nexus between researchers and policy-makers can take different forms. Scientific knowledge is not always employed to adjust policy output but also to draw attention of political actors to problems that are largely ignored, influence the perception of interests and temper the views of opponents (Ibid.; Boswell, et al. 2011). Further studies have shown that a high degree of institutionalisation of research-policy relations is more likely to emerge in a depoliticised context (Favell 2003; Scholten 2011a). Nevertheless, under certain circumstances changes in secondary practices and the characteristics of the research-policy nexus may trigger a profound reconceptualization of the definition of problems and associated patterns of causality, calling for fundamentally different remedies, strategies and policy goals (Carson, et al. 2009, pp.397-398, 400-404 Moyson, et al. 2017, 165-166; Scholten & Verbeek 2015; Scholten, et al. 2015a).

Across Europe, relations between researchers and policymakers have developed in different ways. In some countries, such as in the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom, research-policy structures were strongly institutionalised and debates took place in formal arrangements through research or advisory committees. In other cases, relations were less institutionalised and took the form of informal networks. In cases where the permanent nature of immigration was not recognised by politicians and policymakers and immigrant integration was absent from the political agenda, such as in Germany, Austria and Denmark, co-operation was blocked and research remained autonomous and mainly an academic affair (Entzinger & Scholten 2015, pp.60-61;

Bommes & Thränhardt 2010; Scholten, et al. 2015b). Yet, in the past two decades immigration has become the subject of intense public and political debate across Europe. Migrant integration policies have become an area of risk and uncertainty characterised by a growing need for scientific knowledge to underpin decisions of the policy community. As a result, debates are not constrained in rival interests and values but increasingly invoke rival factual claims about the causes, dynamics and impacts of migration. Correspondingly, the role of expert councils, research committees and prominent public intellectuals in crafting specific policy narratives becomes essential (Boswell, et al. 2011; Boswell 2009; Scholten & Verbeek 2015; Florence & Martiniello 2005).

In politicised settings, the migrant integration crisis is often attributed to past policies and the role that social research has played in the development of these policies is increasingly criticised. The authority of government sponsored commissions, characterised by limited participation of researchers and selective use of knowledge, is gradually undermined in public controversies. Politicisation of migration is thus expected to contribute to the contestation of established research-policy relations or enhance their mutual respect. In cases of strong and stable institutionalisation, relations become less direct, more ad-hoc and more open to diverse participants. In cases were an institutional relationship between research and policy was absent, the sense of urgency created by the politicisation triggers the active involvement of researchers to public debate and policy-making resulting to the establishment and institutionalisation of research policy relations (Scholten & Verbeek 2015; Scholten, et al. 2015a; Entzinger & Scholten 2015; Scholten 2011b).

At the same time, though, the interests of policy-makers influence the way knowledge is produced and deployed. From the perspective of policymakers, the politicisation of migrant integration policy entails serious consequences for the cultures and practices of scientific knowledge utilisation. Instead of being used instrumentally, as a direct input for policymaking applied to adjust policy outputs, scientific knowledge is often used selectively and in symbolic ways; to substantiate policy choices that have already been made and provide ammunition in policy controversies; to legitimate policy actors and institutions claiming authority over a particular policy domain; or to draw attention of political actors to problems that are largely ignored, influence the perception of interests and temper the views of opponents (Boswell, 2008; Weingart 1999; Timmermans & Scholten 2006). The different uses of knowledge are not

mutually exclusive although the instrumental use of knowledge beyond secondary policy aspects, such as the development of concrete policy proposals, is difficult to discern; neither the possibility that knowledge is not used at all should be precluded (Scholten, et al. 2015b, pp.6-7; Scholten, et al. 2015c; Scholten & Verbeek 2015).

The interaction between researchers and policy-makers is considered to affect not only the policymaking process but also the production of knowledge in the field of migration. The production of knowledge is relevant to the policy setting within which these claims are validated; the degree of institutionalisation of research-policy nexus may influence the structural characteristics of migration research as well as the extent of consensus or fragmentation in the research field as regards the social construction of problems (Scholten, et al. 2015b; Entzinger & Scholten 2015). A close relation between researchers and policy-makers during the development of national policies is associated with strongly policy-oriented research and a consensus over the national model of integration and the character of migration research. However, the strong association of researchers and research institutes with national governments has been condemned for contributing to nationally specific problem definitions in scientific research, as well as for excluding alternative definitions and solutions, by privileging specific knowledge producers or by directing government funds to specific research centres (Wimmer & Glick Schiller 2002; Florence & Martiniello 2005; Bommes & Thränhardt 2010; Scholten, et al. 2015c; Scholten, 2011a, pp.19-23; Favell 2001).

Shared frames of immigrant integration, co-produced by researchers and policy-makers, are more likely to come into existence and be sustained in depoliticised settings. Nevertheless, as Entzinger and Scholten (2015) argue, the politicisation of migration alters the interplay between the production of knowledge and policy-making. Uncertainty regarding the effectiveness of integration policies is associated with diversification of knowledge and contestation of substantive knowledge claims as well as with intense knowledge conflicts and changes in the relations between research production and policy-making that may enable researchers to critically reflect how to define immigrant integration (Ibid.; Scholten, et al. 2015c).

While in depoliticised settings the chances for the monopolisation of a single knowledge paradigm that is privileged in the research-policy nexus are greater, in politicised policy settings a fragmentation of knowledge claims and the rise of knowledge conflicts is more likely to occur, as the Dutch engineering model spells out. Correspondingly, the forms of knowledge mobilised in politicised settings are more

conceptual and theoretical than policy-oriented forms that dominate in depoliticised settings where the generated data are used instrumentally as tools for policy coordination. In cases where research has been developed autonomously from policymaking, as in Germany, multiple schools of thought may emerge. After the conceptual shortcomings of migrant integration policy became visible and politicised issues, academics took advantage of the situation assuming a more active role in the public debate. The protection of research autonomy helped researchers to maintain their authority. They created alliances with civil society organisations and brought forward suggestions and recommendations for the adoption of concrete and comprehensive migration policies as well as for the institutional anchoring of boundary organisations. When the non-migration paradigm was abandoned, policymakers began to approximate external expertise and establish boundary organisations to legitimise political positions or even encourage a paradigm shift (Entzinger & Scholten 2015; Scholten & Verbeek 2015; Scholten, et al. 2015c).

Therefore, knowledge produced by academics and employed by politicians is not necessarily taken for granted but needs to be coherent with different sources of knowledge, consistent with available information and conform to criteria of scientific validity. Established knowledge claims are contested and challenged for failing to meet criteria of credibility, undermining the paradigm's validity and its legitimacy for guiding policy-making. Knowledge claims are therefore distinguished from conceptions of nationhood or public philosophies of integration that represent a more general set of ideas. Besides being morally compelling or in accordance with perceived interests, knowledge claims have to be cognitive plausible (Boswell, et al. 2011, p.2).

Schön and Rein (1994) employ the term policy frames to define the structures of belief, perception and appreciation that underlie policy positions, provide ways to make sense of a complex reality, and guide analysis and action in practical situations (p.23; Rein & Schön 1996, p.89). Boswell, et al. (2011) elaborate the concept of policy frames to emphasise the cognitive component of narratives. Policy frames or narratives refer to actors' attempts to develop plausible interpretations and compelling accounts of complex phenomena and events in order to engender support and motivate action. They comprise of a relative contained and coherent set of knowledge claims about the policy problem and the target population that a policy intervention should address, a set of causal relations between actions and events as well as a set of assumptions about the effects of the intervention (Ibid., pp.4-5; Scholten, 2011a, pp.35-38). To be persuasive

and compelling, they also need to "'fit' with the available facts about the case" (Boswell, et al. 2011, p.6).

The cognitive component is considered to create its own dynamic. The expansion and diversification of knowledge may produce greater uncertainty for policy development and destabilise existing institutional arrangements as the new challenges need to be addressed through science (Boswell, et al. 2011). The emergence of new data and the development of new theoretical models for interpreting reality may question the paradigm's validity and legitimacy for guiding policymaking and induce frame conflicts within the policy community that blocks policy design (Rein & Schön 1996, p.94; Carson, et al. 2009, pp.400-404). As Rein and Schön (1977) argue, when consensus over the nature of the problem itself has eroded, the exploration of the definition of the problem becomes more urgent (p.237). In situations of consistent controversies over unsolvable problems a change in political leadership is not considered a sufficient factor for a major institutional change. Instead, organisational changes related to the designation of new authorities, responsibilities, and expertise for articulating and implementing policy may have an enormous impact in the reconceptualization of the core elements of the paradigm and the resolution of the conflict (Carson, et al. 2009, pp.400-404).

Schön and Rein (1994) distinguish disputes characterised by a general agreement about a shared definition of a problematic policy situation from persistent controversies characterised by a multiplicity of frames. Policy controversies are seen as:

> Disputes in which the contending parties hold conflicting frames. Such disputes are resistant to resolution by appeal to facts or reasoned argumentation because the parties' conflicting frames determine what counts as a fact and what arguments are taken to be relevant and compelling (Schön & Rein 1994, p.23).

Yet, while for Hall translation across different conceptual schemes is impossible due to the concept of incommensurability, for Schön and Rein the possibility of translation and reframing is possible through critical frame reflection (Scholten 2011a, pp.52-54). Frame reflection is an endogenous, bottom-up process which permits actors to engage reciprocally with the analysis concrete issues, bring into question their own problem definitions, assumptions and values that underlie policy design activities and explore the possibility of new ways of interpreting and acting (Rein & Schön 1996). The dialectic between alternative perspectives may contribute to a more direct confrontation

of complex reality by reducing normatively charged attitudes (Rein & Schön 1977, p.250).

Frame reflection is situated and context-dependent:

> The analysts need to have the capacity to distance themselves from emotionally charged controversy to accept the principle of plausible pluralism, to suspend disbelief in frames to which they may be normatively opposed, and to engage in a process of deliberation that requires a high degree of self-reflection" (Rein & Schön 1996, p.100).

Pragmatic resolution of intractable frame conflicts is therefore most likely to be achieved in situational settings that enable reflective policy conversation without excluding specific actors. Participants must become aware of their own frames, searching for internal inconsistencies and incompatibilities with new information, but also, they must reflect on alternative frames held by antagonists and have the willingness to adapt and combine elements of conflicting frames in order to reach a mutually acceptable policy solution (Schön & Rein 1994, pp.166-187). Social science can, therefore, be used instrumentally and play a significant role even in politicised settings. Boundary organisations can contribute to the resolution of intractable frame conflicts by creating the conditions conducive to critical frame reflection. As Knorr remarks, it is the cognitive and methodological inadequacy of the social sciences that preclude them for providing solid bases for decisions (Knorr 1977, p.197). Thus, a certain distance in the research-policy relation is required for maintaining both academic authority and political primacy (Entzinger & Scholten 2015; Scholten 2011a, pp.56-58).

The fragmentation and diversification of knowledge is partly attributed to politicisation and changes to the research-policy nexus in national settings. The internationalisation of academia, the proliferation of comparative research and knowledge dissemination have also been considered determinant factors for the contestation of national models of integration. Furthermore, the growing involvement of EU and local authorities in the production of new data and the emergence of research policy venues on local and European levels have also been acknowledged as factors relevant to the theoretical development of migration research (Scholten, et al. 2015c, pp.326-328; Scholten & Verbeek 2015). Recent studies argue that European research networks can play an important role in the construction and diffusion of policy narratives that render immigrant integration a problem of Europe instead of a nationally distinctive problem (Geddes 2005; Geddes & Achtnich 2015).

During the diffusion process, though, the meaning and content of policy can be discursively processed, developed or reinvented in order to deal with concrete situations, match perceived interests, be appealing and persuasive, resulting to context specific migration narratives (Boswell, et al. 2011, pp.5-8). Consequently, social science results are not directly translated into practical measures and action strategies. Instead, scientific research utilisation is an indirect and diffuse process subject to further rational processing by policymakers in various design, implementation and decision levels (Knorr 1977, pp.179-180). In the face of multiple and contending knowledge claims at the national level, the emergent policy frame would incorporate and reflect the outcome of the contest (Rein & Schön 1996, pp.93-95).

3.5. Beyond national models: European research networks and policy diffusion

The interdependence between knowledge production and the political priorities of national governmental actors has been blamed for hampering the critical theoretical development of the migration research field beyond the frame of the nation state. The incorporation of historical rooted definitions, interpretations and frames of integration developed during the nation building process to nationally specific models of integration and the erroneous confirmation of nationally bounded perspectives in academic literatures has been assumed to contribute to the unproblematised reproduction of national models of integration and hinder the process of rational learning. Conceptual and normative models of integration guiding policymaking have been used as analytical models by researchers reifying nation-building legacies in academic research. Research strongly embedded in national contexts has been criticised for a biased selection of topics, conceptual and theoretical approaches and a lack of a more scientific perspective beyond the confines of the nation-state. Furthermore, nationally specific frames have been considered to further influence the collection of scientific data and impede cross-national comparison. In this regard, besides domestic political biases to knowledge production, the national character of administrative categories and definitions as well as the lack of comparative cross-national knowledge is another factor hindering the process of rational learning and critical reflection (Favell 2003; Bommes & Thränhardt 2010; Scholten 2009; Lavenex, 2005). These shortcomings in conceptualising and theorising migrant integration reflected in academic discourses were characterised as methodological nationalism (Wimmer & Glick Schiller 2002).

The reification of the ideological and symbolic dimensions of the incorporation of ethnic minorities and immigrant groups used in political and public debates into models has been considered another weakness of the approach that treat national integration models as an independent variable. According to Bertossi and Duyvendak (2012), the constant focus of social scientists in official versions of discourse, strategically framed by policy-makers, opinion leaders but also scholars who participate in the public arena, permits the invasion of normative, political and moral interests in academic discussions and affects the definition of the research agenda. The substitution of in-depth research and analysis of empirical reality by the use of nuanced, yet preconceived, models, affects the selection of indicators and the analytical importance placed on them limiting the predictive potential of national models. Furthermore, it disregards other possible independent variables. Besides dominant, elite-shaped frames, public narratives and policy discourses are socially embedded and constantly transformed, assessed, contested and negotiated by a wide variety of actors in different contexts, concrete interactions and institutional settings (Ibid., pp.241-242; Bertossi 2011; Bertossi, et al. 2015).

Nevertheless, the concept of national models should be not entirely discarded. What Bertossi (2011) suggests is that the definition of national models as institutionalized coherent normative systems, the assessment of their power to make sense of empirical reality as well as the existence of a causal relation between national models, policy developments and collective mobilisations, is an empirical question. A genuine national framework must be induced from empirical reality and take into account strategic ambiguity. Cognition and social actors' agency should be placed at the centre of analysis and inconsistencies with social, political or institutional practices should be explained rather than taken for granted. In this perspective, conceptions of citizenship are not seen as objective entities but as polysemic and contradictory structures of reference, strategically used in various contexts, by a variety of actors, to frame the questions of identity (Ibid.; Bertossi, et al. 2015, pp.73-74). On this background, critical reflection means "taking the models of integration as objects of analysis rather than as a starting point for research" (Scholten 2011a, p.23).

Scholten, Entzinger and Penninx observe that the fragmentation of knowledge into more heterogeneous schools of thought and the contestation national models of integration at the national level are closely associated with a growing alignment of knowledge paradigms among European countries towards more international and post-

national perspectives (Scholten, et al. 2015c, p.327). Two factors have been considered to account for developments on national and local research and its relation to policy. First, the growing involvement of local authorities to integration policy design due to territorial decentralisation raised demands for research directed to local concerns and the solution of concrete problems rather than symbolic issues of national importance. Second, the involvement of the EU in the research area of migration and the development of various international networks conducting comparative research has contributed to explicit criticism of national models of integration. EU funded projects, assessed the comparability of national data systems and designed new indicators to complement or replace them (Ibid.; Penninx 2015; Geddes & Achtnich 2015; Scholten 2011a, pp.219-221).

The initiative for selective mobilisation of research and its assignment to external expertise is considered as a soft means for policy coordination and stimulation of policy convergence; a legitimising form of knowledge utilisation that enables further EU intervention, evolved into more substantiating forms, with research focusing on specific EU policy priorities, as reflected in the 2004 Common Basic Principles of Integration and the 2009 Stockholm Common Integration Agenda. At the same time, though, the funding provided by the European Commission permitted the organisation of research across national borders as well as the involvement of a wide range of new actors besides bureaucratic policymakers, such as politicians, NGOs and expert practitioners, interest groups and migrants themselves, in local or European dialogues on integration creating opportunities for frame reflection, the emergence of new understandings and the creation of new coalitions (Scholten, et al. 2015b, pp.8-10; Scholten, et al, 2015c).

Despite the fact that the EU has no competence on the area of immigrant integration and citizenship and does not promote a particular paradigm of immigrant integration, a certain degree of policy coordination at the national and local level is achieved though non-binding measures that promote exchange of knowledge on immigrant integration and stimulate applied scientific research. In 2003 National Contacts Points of Information were established, comprising of experts, and the Common Basic Principles on Immigrant Integration were formally adopted by the Justice and Home Affairs Council in 2004 aiming to design a shared framework for a coherent European approach to immigrant integration. In the 2005 Communication on a Common Agenda for Integration (European Commission 2005, COM/2005/389 final)

a wide range of areas for the development of EU action were defined, including monitoring the impact of national reform programmes and the application of the anti-discrimination and long-term residents directives; the stimulation and support of innovative training programmes and technical seminars as well as joint programmes and dissemination of results; the promotion of research and dialogues on identity and citizenship; and the enhancement of networking as well as exchange of information on good practices regarding the civic integration of TCN between member-states, regional and local authorities and other stakeholders. Three Handbooks on Integration for policy-makers and practitioners, containing both methodological and substantive topics were published in 2004, 2008 and 2010 respectively. The financial resources for the promotion of activities at the local level were promoted through the Preparatory Actions and the European Fund for the integration of TCN (Geddes & Achtnich 2015).

The establishment of the European Migration Network, under the auspices of the Commission's directorate General of Justice and Home affairs, aimed at the exchange of knowledge and sharing of ideas between state actors and the collection of national information on migration and integration issues. National reports are prepared by the National Contact Points, based in interior ministries, often in cooperation with relevant stakeholders, academic researchers and think-tanks as well as NGO's and international organisations. Although the European Migration Network is not considered to produce ground-breaking evidence that radically affects national policies and tends to be used as a venue for the substantiation of existing policy choices, the frequent interaction between officials from member states is considered a form of social learning (Geddes & Achtnich 2015).

Additionally, to improve the quality of policies and avoid technocratic decisions, the EMD, a partnership of civic society organisations, searched to establish a well informed and constructive debate on immigrant integration linking the European and national agendas. Aiming at increasing the level of participation of non-governmental actors and supporting communication and co-operation between stakeholders at the national level, the partners are organisations, think-tanks, academic institutes and foundations engaged in human rights and advocacy work, with a high status on public debates and an active role in policy development. The partners coordinate a national network meeting twice a year and discuss the positions taken by national governments and non-governmental actors in annual meetings in Brussels

(Niessen, et al. 2005). Further, the partners delivered reports with special reference to evidence-based policy-making and consultation:

> Rapporteurs give their assessment of whether immigration and integration policies are based on a thorough analysis, including for example, mapping exercises, research, evaluations and learning from other countries. They also comment on whether the views of stakeholders are taken into account in the conception, implementation, evaluation phases of the policy making process (Niessen, et al. 2005, p.2).

Moreover, the 2005 Communication recognised the lack of shared definitions and of comparable data and called for the development of statistical tools, common indicators and evaluation mechanisms (European Commission 2005, COM/2005/389 final, pp. 11-12). The European Commission has funded two programmes, aiming at measuring integration policies and monitoring compliance with EU policy frameworks but also depicting complex social phenomena into comprehensible indicators, so as to promote and facilitate horizontal policy learning between countries. MIPEX is an evaluation exercise led by the NGO Migration Policy Group and the British Council.[17] It involved numerous partners of EU and non-EU countries, mainly members of civil society organisations and academic researchers as well as politicians and bureaucrats. The normative framework, against which policies were measured and ranked, is derived from the standards of EU legislation and the CoE. The comprehensive assessments in eight broad domains of immigrant integration, including access to nationality, were extensively disseminated (Geddes & Achtnich 2015; Scholten, et al. 2015c).

A typology focusing specifically on nationality has been developed in projects undertaken by the EUDO citizenship observatory. Established within the European Union Observatory on Democracy in 2006, an independent and interdisciplinary academic organisation, the EUDO citizenship research platform is hosted at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies of the European University Institute in Florence.[18] The NATAC project,[19] developed a glossary of important terms associated with definitions of different citizenship statuses as well as types and modes of acquisition and loss of nationality. On the basis of country reports, conducted by national experts and comprising of the history of nationality law and policy as well as

[17] Co-financed by the European Commission in 2007 and the European Fund for Integration of Third-Country Nationals 2011 and 2015.

[18] In 2017 the EUDO citizenship observatory became the Global Citizenship Observatory (GLOBALCIT), affiliated with the Global Governance Programme at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies.

[19] Funded by the European Community's Sixth Framework Programme and co-financed by the Austrian Ministry for Education, Science and Culture from 2002 to 2006.

the basic features of current nationality law and administrative practice on 15 member-states, a typology of 27 modes of acquisition and 15 modes of loss was designed to permit structured (quantitative) comparison between the most common provisions of nationality laws (Bauböck, et al. 2006d). The project Access to Citizenship and its Impact on Immigrant Integration (ACIT)[20] further elaborated four sets of indicators concerning citizenship laws (CITLAW), their implementation (CITIMP), and their impact on acquisition rates (CITACQ) and integration policies (CITINT) in all 27 EU Member States and accession candidate and EEA countries (Bauböck, et al. 2013; Jeffers, et al. 2017).

CITLAW indicators differ from those MIPEX indicators relative to the nationality strand as they are "more comprehensive with regard to the modes of acquisition and loss covered" (Jeffers, et al. 2017, p.3) including indicators for ius sanguinis and voluntary renunciation of nationality. Furthermore, CITLAW indicators are "more detailed with regard the conditions attached to such modes" (Ibid. p.3). According to the explanatory report, nationality laws "may aim at inclusion or exclusion, or they may aim at strengthening individual autonomy and choice or the power of authorities in the determination of citizenship status" (Ibid., p.12). To capture the multiple and often conflicting public policy purposes of nationality laws, besides the inclusion of immigrants and their offspring, an inductive and finely calibrated coding procedure is suggested taking into account substantive and procedural conditions for each indicator. A country's citizenship regime therefore results from the position that the country occupies within the multidimensional space of 45 basic indicators (Ibid. p.6).

The ACIT Standard for evaluating and improving national legislation was developed after the major legal and procedural opportunities and obstacles for the acquisition and loss of nationality across Europe were assessed:

> Academic researchers, government and civil society now have access to comprehensive data, comparative analyses and practical guidelines on how to evaluate the outcomes of citizenship policies, set targets and good governance standards, and assess the prospective impact of policy changes. ACIT contributes thereby to evidence-based policies and more effective practices for integration and acquisition of citizenship by creating authoritative, comprehensive and easy-to-use databases, which foster European information exchange and cooperation (Bauböck, et al. 2013, p.2).

[20] Funded by the European Fund for the Integration of Non-EU immigrants from 2011-2013.

Besides the expansion of availability and accessibility of data, both policy-oriented and theory-oriented systematic cross-national research has flourished in international research networks which initially emerged with the support of EU funds (Scholten, et al. 2015c). Prominent examples are the collection of Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies under the auspices of EUDO citizenship as well as the IMISCOE international network, established in 2004. Can alignment of knowledge paradigms among European countries affect domestic developments of citizenship policy and nationality law? This study attempts to answer this question by exploring the dynamics of the activities of the EUDO citizenship research network in the contestation of the established Greek citizenship policy and the reform of the GNC.

3.6. Research Design

This study adopts a structuralist-constructivist perspective which considers both policy-making and social-scientific research as structured social relations, defined by the distribution of and the struggles over material or symbolic power (Bourdieu 1989; Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992, pp.7-11). Attention is, therefore, paid to the distribution of material resources and the objective structures which are able to guide and constrain externally agents' practices and interpretations but also to schemes of perception and systems of classification that function as symbolic templates that structure internally agents' actions, judgements and subjective interpretations (Ibid.).

The theoretical framework draws eclectically upon two major streams in the literature of public policy and policymaking processes: new institutional theory, and theories of knowledge utilisation and social learning. This integrated framework provides the opportunity to put emphasis simultaneously on cognitive factors, such as ideas, norms, ideology and culture; on structural characteristics and policymaking institutions; as well as on the types and configurations of collective actors. It also permits to illustrate how these categories are interrelated as well as how they affect the public policy process. Furthermore, by combining the analysis of the effects of pre-existing policies, strategic considerations and ideational factors, the prevailing logics of action during the policy and decision-making process, as well as the nature of consensus achieved, can be valued and therefore the possibility of institutionalisation of the new paradigm (Carson, et al. 2009).

3.6.1. Operationalisation of public policy paradigms

This thesis adopts the concept of public policy paradigm to define a shared conceptual framework through which adherents conceive problems, solutions, interests and goals regarding policymaking. According to Carson, Burns and Calvo (Carson, et al. 2009), the formulation of a paradigm entails three types of processes: cognition and meaning, expression and action and its institutionalisation (p.17). As a problem-solving model, a policy paradigm defines the types of problems to be publicly addressed, by giving priority among competing principles and goals, and delineates the suitable strategies and resources to achieve these goals. It further identifies the authorities responsible for decision-making and policy implementation as well the type of expertise and methods that should be considered relevant and legitimate. An institutionalised policy paradigm constitutes an operative rule regime which shapes social relations and the distribution of resources, structures power relations and defines the appropriate logic of action (Ibid. pp.24-25, 141-155; Skogstad & Schmidt 2011). In short, paradigms are defined as:

> Complexes of ideas of how to conceptualize, analyze, and deal with public issues – including conceptualizing and analyzing why an issue should be dealt with publicly, what kinds of knowledge, forms of causality, ways of distributing responsibility and authority, and ways to organize and arrange participation (and exclusions) (Carson, et al. 2009, p.376).

The structure of public policy paradigms is conceptualised in distinct complexes that emphasise both cultural and organisational components. The problem-solving complex specifies the components of the cognitive-normative framework used by policymaking agents for problem definition and solution. These are the values defining goals and priorities, a model for framing issues and problems as well as causes and mechanisms, and the appropriate means for the solution of the problem. The social-structural or organisational complex specifies the key roles of social agents and their relationships. The main components are the public authorities, experts and stakeholders deemed appropriate to participate, the decision-making procedures to be followed and norms relating to the venue and time of decision-making (Carson, et al. 2009, pp.141-155). Idealised rule regimes that serve as a blueprint for institutional design are distinguished from institutionalised policy paradigms. Despite the fact that both are comprised by the same set of components, the blueprint paradigm represents a socially constructed ideal model and therefore will differ significantly from the institutionalised paradigm. Operative institutional paradigms, implemented in real-world situations, contextualise abstract and ideal rules in concrete action situations and entail adaptation

as well as negotiation, compromise or failure. Hence, public policy paradigms have to be investigated both as ideas and as concrete practices (Ibid.). Figure 1 depicts Carson's Burns' and Calvo's conceptualisation of the structure of public policy paradigms.

The structure of public policy paradigms further indicates the dimensions of potential change. A highly institutionalised paradigm requires agreement between the problem-solving complex and the social-structural complex. Although the two complexes are interwoven, each sub-complex exerts different kinds of influence and is affected in different ways in the processes of social change; actors may invest in protecting concrete organisational arrangements and already materialised ideas and principles or, in contrast, may invest in effective problem-solving and long-term functionality of the institutional arrangements. A shift in the paradigm therefore may be initiated or entail changes only in a particular sub-complex. As a consequence, rules may change in a piecemeal fashion, entailing changes only in one sub-complex, or may be developed and implemented under the influence of competing interpretations that impede the process of institutionalisation over time (Carson, et al. 2009, pp.141-155, 375-406).

As the process of institutionalisation unfolds over time, the blueprint paradigm is adapted due to adjustments to path dependencies linked to external conditions, existing institutional structure and power relations among influential actors or lack of conceptual elaboration of a model for action by intellectual expertise. Internal consistency, the entrenchment of core principles and normative practices into concrete institutions and identity-giving practices tend to render paradigms durable and resilient to change. (Carson, et al., 2009, 141-155, 375-406). However, as Carson, Burns and Calvo maintain, the 'asynchronicity' between change in the conceptual framework that guides the policy paradigm and institutional change "argues for an analytical distinction between paradigm shift and the institutionalization of that change" (Ibid.p.376). The new paradigm may be weakly institutionalised or its operationalisation may fail (Ibid.). Paradigm transformation entails profound changes resulting in the fundamental reconfiguration of the core elements of the problem-solving and organisational complexes. The core elements of a public policy paradigm, comprising of the fundamental assumptions, priorities, principles and values, are distinguished from secondary, peripheral elements associated with practices, procedures and forms of measurement. While the former distinguish one paradigm from another the latter "distinguish variations of a given paradigm" (Ibid. p.400). Given the fact that secondary

characteristics may be shared with competing paradigms, changes at the peripheral level are less prone to controversy or conflict and therefore easier to be adopted (Ibid. pp.400-406).



Figure 1. Public Policy Paradigm. Source Carson, et al. (2009, p.150)

3.6.2. The Greek case

This thesis examines empirically the process of construction and transformation of a policy paradigm and the effects of European integration in domestic citizenship policy in a single case-study, the case of Greece. In depth within case analysis aims to test the theories concerning the operation of soft framing mechanisms. The interest in the Greek case lies in the observation that citizenship policy is characterised by a long period of

stability and a short period of abrupt and radical change aiming to bring nationality law in line with European standards. The liberalising reform met strong reactions and was compromised, resulting in a nationally distinctive policy outcome which, however, remains highly compatible with liberalising trends in European countries.

Greece does not represent a country likely for Europeanisation effects to be explicitly present in policy outcomes and the lack of fit between evolving European norms on citizenship and domestic understandings is not expected to trigger pressures for proactive policy change. Greek migration and citizenship policy has been driven predominantly by domestic concerns and correlations of power while the country's institutional capacity to produce substantive liberalising change is low. The ineffective implementation on the EU Directives concerning long-term immigrant residents, reluctance to ratify the European Convention on Nationality or set nationality law on the political agenda are the main features of policy-making since the 1990s. The dominant political culture and contextual historical geopolitical factors are considered the main factors permitting only a thin process of Europeanisation during which European norms are absorbed but political elites are not learning (Anagnostou 2005; Triandafyllidou 2014b; Triandafyllidou 2014a).

However, the fundamental changes in public discourse and citizenship policy that took place in 2010 and 2015 spell out the increasing influence of Europe. The active involvement of non-governmental actors, particularly academics and specialised researchers in the reform process raises the expectation on the decisive role of scientific knowledge as well as on the crucial role played by policy brokers who transmit new evidence and information to political elites. As Spanou (2004) explains, the weak policy capacity of public administration, the lack of active involvement of the Greek parliament in the Europeanisation process and the general neglect of staff responsibilities has created "a gap between the needs and availability of the required expertise. This gap is often addressed in an *ad hoc* manner" (p.14). The qualitative inadequacy in human resources is frequently covered by political advisors or highly specialised professionals from the labour market. Academics, serving as special advisors or General Secretaries, also play a crucial role in substituting civil service expertise, diffusing and managing European level priorities. The absence of an institutionalised policy framework leaves space for individual initiatives and strategies and successful Europeanisation of domestic policy is often attributed to "informal dynamics and personal commitment" (Ibid., p.15).

Addressing the micro-foundations of policy learning (Radaelli 2009; Boswell 2008; Boswell 2009), this study focuses on the use of knowledge and the actions undertaken by the experts of the independent authority of the Greek Ombudsman and the advocacy network of HLHR, both involved in European research projects and in domestic policy design. At the same time, the backlash that took place during the implementation stage permits the examination of the effects a wide range of intervening variables.

3.6.3. Data Sources

To escape the erroneous and unproblematised reproduction of national immigrant integration models, the Greek citizenship policy paradigm is empirically induced. Policy paradigms are communicated and articulated through discourses, comprised of oral and written accounts that are embedded in a particular institutional context, as well as through social action and interaction. Institutionalised discourses appertain to written rules and laws, underlying principles regarding rule-making authority as well as institutional strategies and practices for dealing with specific types of problems and issues. Along with changes on key dimensions in institutional arrangements, patterns of change are detected when discourses adopted by actors differ in principle and content from previous assumptions, preferences and arguments. Gaps between actors' statements and their reflection at the institutional level, in organisational procedures and practices are indicative for internal inconsistences and should be further explored (Carson, et al. 2009, pp.146-162).

The conceptual elements of the policy paradigm are identified in the following sources. Primary sources comprise of legal texts, official policy documents and explanatory reports; committee reports and meeting proceedings; written records of parliamentary debates; and court decisions. Due to the sensitivity of the issue of nationality in the Greek context though, availability of this kind of evidence is rather limited. Secondary sources, such as publications and reports of public interest organisations, independent authorities and NGOs in response to perceived problems and specific proposals were also used to address inadequacy of evidence. Moreover, secondary literature and academic research as well as commentary published in media were particularly useful to the reconstruction of the Greek immigrant integration model permitting both the identification of the research-policy nexus and the detection of changes in the terminology, causal theories and normative perspectives.

Emphasis is placed to the diverse actors involved in important developments in policy or research, namely research institutes, advisory bodies or policy departments as well as the positions they expressed. Evidence on the underlying assumptions, values and motivations of political actors regarding policy change was informed by three interviews with the key agents involved in the design of the draft laws from 2010 to 2015, the period when the inclusive reform took place: the Secretary General of Immigration Policy from 2009 to 2011, the Secretary General of Population and Social Cohesion from 2012 to 2015, and the counsellor of the Deputy Minister for Immigration Policy in 2015. These semi-structured interviews were useful in identifying not only how various actors viewed the issue of citizenship and their role in policy-making but also how their positions changed over time.

The discussion guide covered the main content of the research topic permitting, at the same time, the interviewees to speak freely about their experience with policy-making. The guiding questions searched whether knowledge produced by transnational or national expert organisations such as the EUDO citizenship network or the Greek Ombudsman was used in policy design and how, whether legislation of other countries with similar problems was considered, whether there were any inner party reactions or consultation with other political parties and what was the role of the far-right. Further questions concerned personal estimations about the effectiveness of public consultation and the possibility of changes in the practice of public administrative authorities.

The multiplicity of data sources aims to enhance research reliability. Consistency and stability between public statements, policy frames and documents on the one hand, and institutional and organisational arrangements on the other, are considered to provide sound evidence for establishment of the dominant policy paradigm.

3.6.4. Method of analysis

The analysis is understood primarily as a theory-testing case study. A theory is deduced from existing literature and empirical within-case analysis aims to confirm whether the hypothesised causal mechanism is present in reality. The inductive path is followed as regards the collection of evidence for the empirical test (Beach & Pedersen 2012). With respect to Europeanisation, the intervening causal processes influencing policy development as well as the logic of action and extent of change, the approach deductively builds on insights from different streams of literature and applies existing

theories in the field of citizenship policy. Regarding the explanation of policy continuity and change in the Greek case, the analysis proceeds inductively as it explicitly looks into the role of strategically used policy frames and moments of frame reflection and sheds light in the relation between research and policy development. To establish the presence of the causal mechanism linking changes in the production and use of knowledge and policy change the analysis covers the policy and decision-making process from 1990 to 2015. The analytical strategy to detect the most important policy frames and frame shifts pays attention to the political conflicts that led to new institutional arrangements, the controversies in the academic literature, the arenas in which competition over policy-making takes place as well as to the participants with key roles in the policy area expressing fundamentally different positions (Carson, et al. 2009, pp.158-165).

According to Carson, Burns and Calvo:

> Discourses may serve to either legitimize or challenge the existing order and may be institutionalized-formalized and codified into rules, policies and laws. These formulations, like rule systems, intersect and conflict-or reinforce each other-to shape the environment within which policymaking takes place. These also tend to reinforce or undermine the various underlying assumptions and values that form the foundations of a paradigm (Carson, et al. 2009, pp.163-164).

The method of process tracing (George & Bennet 2005, pp.205-232) is employed to delineate the historical context of policy domain as well as to elucidate the causal relationship between the research-policy nexus and political outcomes. By tracing the process of construction, institutionalisation and dissolution of the paradigm of the Greek citizenship policy and the development of competing policy frames over time this research examines the role of non-state actors, involved in research networks at the European and national level, in policy diffusion and policy learning as well as their role as policy brokers in the process of policy change.

The first hypothesis theorises the relation between research and policy-making and considers the interaction between the policy image and the policy venue as the main mechanism that explains stability and change of citizenship policy (Scholten & Timmermans 2010). In highly politicised contexts the structure of relations between research and policy alter, entailing changes in the utilisation of expertise in policy-making as well as in the patterns of knowledge production. Strongly institutionalised relations become more ad hoc and open to diverse participants. In cases where relations are absent, politicisation may trigger the establishment of research-policy structures and

create opportunities for researchers to become actively involved in political debate and policy design (Scholten & Verbeek 2015).

Knowledge utilisation takes more symbolic forms, either to substantiate already decided policy choices or to legitimise the involvement of specific policy actors (Boswell 2009). While symbolic knowledge utilisation is essential for the social construction of the migrant integration policy problem, instrumental use of expert knowledge is expected in secondary aspects of policy design. Yet, in cases where research has developed autonomously and the development of more concrete plans and implementation measures is at stake, expertise can play a key role in engaging political actors to a process of critical reflection and learning (Scholten & Verbeek 2015; Scholten, et al. 2015c). Politicisation of migrant integration and changing research-policy relations are further expected to encourage the theoretical development and diversification of knowledge claims as well as the rise of knowledge conflicts undermining the relevance of national models of integration for researchers and its validity for guiding policy-making (Entzinger & Scholten 2015).

The internationalisation of the research community and the involvement of EU and local authorities in the production of new data is also considered to affect knowledge production at the national level and contribute to the alignment of knowledge paradigms across European countries. The second hypothesis therefore examines the mobilisation of research and expertise by the EU as a means of agenda setting (Geddes 2005; Geddes & Achtnich 2015; Scholten & Verbeek 2015; Scholten, et al. 2015c). The conditions relevant to the function of mechanisms of social interaction and learning are uncertainty, the degree of tractability of the problem and the level of politicisation of the issue of interest as well as the context conditions attributing primacy to science or policy in the decision-making process (Ibid., Scholten, 2011a).

To address the shortages of a single case-study analysis with regard to external generalisation of research findings and establish a valid causal chain between the indirect effects of policy coordination at European level and domestic policy outcomes alternative explanations theorising domestic change in the absence of the process of European integration are also examined (Haverland 2008; Bennet 2010). As George and Bennet argue:

> Process-tracing in single cases … has the capacity for disrpoving claims that a single variable is necessary or sufficient for the outcome. Process-tracing in a

> single case can even exclude all explanations but one, if that explanation makes a process-tracing prediction that all other theories predict would be unlikely or even imposible (George & Bennet 2005, p.220).

The counterfactual argument is associated with domestic factors as incentives for policy change and considers the interaction between the inherited citizenship policy and party politics as the most prominent explanation of policy stability and change (Howard 2009; Goodman 2012). Domestic concerns might regard geopolitical interests, demographic developments and issues of social cohesion or societal pressure (Checkel 2001a; Checkel 2001b; Vink 2005; Vink 2010; Maatsch 2011). The direction and extent of change is relevant to changes of government and the ideological orientation of the party in power. Left-wing parties are inclined to support the extension of citizenship rights to TCN. The introduction of ius soli for the 2nd and 3rd generation of immigrants, tolerance for dual nationality and the facilitation of naturalisation is more likely with a leftish government in power. Right-wing parties are more interested in the inclusion of expatriates and co-ethnics and more likely to support ethnically selective policies (Joppke 2003; Howard 2009; Goodman, 2014). Mobilisation of the public and political competition are conditioned by the nature of the policy issue and the saliency of the reform as well as by assymetries of power, opportunity structures and the degree of agenda-control (Honohan 2010; Faist & Triadafilopoulos 2006; Favell 2001).

The two explanations are not mutually exclusive since each mechanism may affect different aspects of citizenship policy that shape the policy outcome. The aim is therefore to analyse the process of policy development and learning during the periods that important debates or important policy changes took place. Frameshifts are understood as indicators of the tractability of the problem (Scholten 2011a). Yet, as Capoccia and Kelemen (2007) remark, not all junctures are critical. Policy-makers might use expert knowledge to advance their interests while the ultimate goal of policy remains the same. To distinguish between objective and strategically calculated policy frames I search for discontinuities and inconsistencies between the policy frame and operative, institutionalised paradigm. The relations between research and policy-making is delineated pursuant to Boswell's (2008) typology on the political uses of expert knowledge. Hall's (1993) approach is employed to assess the extent of policy change; paradigmatic change concerns change in policy goals and underlying beliefs and should be discerned from changes in policy instruments or changes in the levels of

instruments. To capture the differentiated effects of learning and craft a sufficient explanation of the nuanced political outcome of the Greek nationality law reform, the analysis is supplemented with Schön and Rein's (1994) framework on critical frame reflection.

Concrete controversies in liberal democracies that encourage reasonable pluralism entail a variety of frames competing for resources and meaning. The two are considered related as the symbolic contest over the meaning provides legitimacy for the claim of social resources. The process of reframing is related to the changes of a frame over time, how it achieves a dominant position in the policy discourse or how it becomes repudiated. While windows of opportunity for reframing are provided by exogenous events, the process of reframing is triggered endogenously and requires cooperation and reflection. As assumptions, worldviews and values that remained in the background of a frame become issues of frame reflective dialogue and inquiry among frame sponsors the likelihood of reframing increases. Frame reflective dialogue requires trust among participants and productive deliberation. It is characterised by openness towards alternative frames, a critical stance towards one's own frames and readiness to adapt. Frame reflective inquiry occurs when actors engage reciprocally with concrete issues and develop new understandings and prescriptions for action through frame extension and frame blending. A pragmatic resolution of the conflict is achieved when the outcomes of design inquiry incorporates elements of conflicting frames at work in the policy discourse (Rein & Schön 1996; Schön & Rein 1994). As Schön and Rein argue:

> When he policy pendulum swings from one unworkable extreme to another, what may be needed in the new situation is a mixture of an old frame that has been rejected and a new frame that does not altogether fit a new situation in which the previous unthinkable has become a reality. In order to make such a reframing work, the policy makers must reflect on the old and new frames-accepting in this process, elements of the old frame delegitimized by their recent reforms. They must import elements of the old frame that stand in direct conflict with the new one, producing emerging frames through dialectical policy discourse (Ibid. p.40).

3.7. Conclusion

This chapter has reviewed in detail the literature on citizenship and migration to elucidate the process of construction, development and demise of policy models. In particular, insights were drawn from historical institutionalist approaches emphasising that political outcomes are conditioned by the setting within which political contestation takes place, pre-existing rules as well as taken-for-granted norms and

beliefs entrenched in institutionalised national models of immigrant integration. Political competition and conflict permit only incremental, marginal adjustments to policy development (Brubaker 1992; Howard 2009; Goodman 2012; Goodman 2014).

The initial assumption on the internal consistency of understandings of nationhood and models of integration (Brubaker 1992; Koopmans, et al. 2005) has been challenged by studies assuming that not only ethnic and civic elements co-exist in a concrete integration models but are instrumentally used by political actors to enhance their positions (Yack 1996; Brubaker 1999; Schnapper 1998; Bertossi & Duyvendak 2012). Scholars integrated contingency, agency and socio-cognitive factors into the analysis of the organisational rationality of pre-existing institutions to explain national models of integration as the result of a political process structured on a set of consensual ideas that limit available choices (Favell 2001; Bleich 2003). Public ideas and justifications are interwoven with specific institutional venues of policy and decision-making providing support for the prevailing distribution of political advantage by limiting the range of participants. Changes in the definition of problems and alternative venues of debate might challenge dominant policy monopolies (Baumgartner & Jones 1991; Baumgartner & Jones 2009). State bureaucracies and venues of specialised experts have been considered more receptive than parliaments to nationality law reforms (Hansen & Koehler 2005; Guiraudon 2000a).

However, public policy analyses argued that scientific venues may not always trigger policy change. Scientific knowledge may have different functions depending on the structural setting of policy design and decision-making and the type of interaction between experts and policy-makers. The research-policy nexus might be strongly institutionalised or marked by strong boundaries. The institutional setting might afford primacy to political considerations or to science (Timmermans & Scholten 2006; Scholten & Timmermans 2010). The politicisation of migrant integration alters the type of interaction between researchers and policy-makers, involving changes in knowledge utilisation and production (Boswell 2008; Boswell 2009; Scholten & Verbeek 2015). Such changes are likely to trigger shifts in policy frames or more profound reconceptualization of the definition of problems and solutions calling for fundamentally different strategies and policy goals. The latter is contingent to contestation of established research policy relations and the production of new knowledge that challenges the validity of the existing policy paradigm (Entzinger & Scholten 2015; (Scholten & Verbeek 2015;Scholten, et al. 2015a; Scholten 2011a).

Along with politicisation of migrant integration and changes to the research-policy nexus in national settings, the diversification of knowledge and the emergence of knowledge conflicts is influenced by the internationalisation of academia and the emergence of new research venues, the production of new data and the development of common definitions for policy analysis. European research networks can play an important role in the construction and diffusion of new narratives encouraging the critical theoretical development of migration research (Geddes 2005; Geddes & Achtnich 2015; Scholten & Verbeek 2015; Scholten, et al. 2015c). On the basis of these propositions the last part of the chapter proceeded to the operationalisation of public policy paradigms and discussed the selection of the case and data sources as well as the method of analysis and the hypotheses tested concerning the process paradigms' reproduction and change.

4. The evolution of law and politics of citizenship in Greece

4.1. Introduction

As stated in the theoretical framework, historical institutionalist approaches assume that pre-existing policy arrangements, rules and legacies reflecting historical experience shape the preferences of political actors, structure political conflicts and policy outcomes in later periods of time. In the Greek case, the historical developments that contributed to the formulation of the ethno-cultural understanding of the Greek nationhood and structured political choices with respect to nationality during the state building process have indeed influenced policy-making in later periods of time. During the 1990s, political elites are confronted with the question of nationality acquisition by TCN as well as co-ethnics who are settled in the country. Besides immigrants and political refugees that had already been in the country since the 1970s, a large number of economic immigrants, many of which are descendants of Greeks, arrive in the country in the late 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s.

In this chapter the presence of path dependencies is examined by analysing the political discourse and coalitions of power developed during critical changes in citizenship policy. These changes concern the adoption of the special naturalisation procedure for homogenis from countries of the former Soviet Union and the naturalisation for homogenis with residence abroad, the abolition of the provision on the deprivation of citizenship from non-ethnic Greek nationals as well as the regularisation of access to citizenship for homogenis foreign nationals with Greek passports, of Greeks of Albania and TCN. Besides the way the problems confronted were defined by political elites, emphasis is given to the venues of discussion as well as the actors considered appropriate to get involved in policy-design. The aim is to illustrate the dominant views, identify and map points of consensus or conflict and draw conclusions on the dominant political culture, the logic of decision-making as well as the scope of policy learning during the 1990s and to the adoption of the 2004 GNC.

4.2. The evolution of the Greek nationality code

The Greek national state emerged in the second decade of the 19th century after a separatist war with the Ottoman Empire (Liakos 2007). The revolution of independence started at the beginning of the century. Under the Ottoman Turks ruling the varieties of ethnic populations were grouped on the basis of religious affiliation and administratively organised into millets. The Orthodox millet was comprised of Greeks

in majority and of Bulgarians, Romanian, Serbs, Vlachs, Albanians and Arabs in the second place. The ecumenical patriarch of Constantinople, the head of the Orthodox church and millet was also administered by Greeks who enjoyed civil power too (Vogli 2007, part I; Clogg 1992, chap.1). Therefore, to discern Greeks from other residents of the Ottoman Empire, and particularly Muslims, the autochthonous population of the orthodox millet constituted the Greek genos with which the Greek nation was initially identified (Christopoulos 2012, p.46). Since the declaration of the establishment of the Greek State in the constitutional assembly of 1822 the concept of the Greek genos evolved to expand the boundaries of the Greek nation (Christopoulos 2006a, pp. 253-258). The main objective was to include three groups of population: the indigenous population permanently residing in the independent territories, named autochthonous; orthodox Christians of Ottoman nationality residing in irredentist territories and persons of Greek descent or origin settled abroad that joined the revolution, named heterochthonous (Vogli 2007).

4.2.1. The 1835 Law on the Greek nationality

The political independence of Greece takes place in 1830 with the first London Protocol.[21] The establishment of the regime of hereditary monarchy in 1833 signified the administrative unification of the Greek state. The development of civic and political bonds between citizens and the state based on the consent of individuals to subjection to power was for the first time enacted in the Greek society. The formulation of the institutions of the state and the fostering of a common national identity constituted the priority of political authorities in this period. A civic approach to the nation was supported by certain decisive personalities of this period, such as Adamantios Korais, who conceived the Greek 'genos' in terms of political bonds. Nevertheless, such an approach was never included in official positions and legislation unless it was projected in terms of the ethnic ideology combined with religion or participation in the war (Vogli 2007, part II; Clogg 1992, chap.3; Kitromilides 1989).

The administrative municipalities constituted the starting point of the reform that would restrain the power of the local leading groups who come under the authority of civil servants and would inspire patriotism, foster trust and loyalty to state institutions. A royal decree stipulated the oath to the king and registration to civil

[21] Signed on the 3rd February 1830 by Great Britain, France and Russia.

registers as the requirements for the attribution of political rights.[22] Orthodoxy became the prevailing religion and that was included in the King's oath (Vogli 2007, part II; Christopoulos 2012, pp.51-59). The interconnection of the local with the political identity by membership to the 'demos' raised awareness regarding the status of the citizen and paved the way for the first nationality law in 1835 (Vogli 2007, chap.5; Christopoulos, 2012, pp.51-56).[23] The regency's direction to the committee responsible for the drafting of the 1835 Nationality Law was to copy and adapt the French civil law to the demographic needs of the Greek Kingdom (Vogli 2007, chap.5). According to article 1, "Greeks are: a. all persons born in the Kingdom of Greece by parents that were entitled to nationality at the time of birth, b. all persons who acquired the nationality with the previous laws, c. persons involved in the revolution for at least two years, d. persons included to the 1830 Protocol and e. naturalised persons."

The reference to previous laws concerns the revolutionary constitutions, drafted during the years of the revolution of independence.[24] They prescribed that Greeks are autochnonous Christians residents of the revolted areas and heterochthonous Christians of the Ottoman territories who settle in Greece or join the revolution.[25] With respect to persons settled in third countries, the laws prescribed that Greeks are descendants of a Greek father, descendants of persons of Greek ethnic origin who settle in Greece and foreigners who naturalise. The naturalisation requirements were three years residence in the country,[26] no perpetration of criminal offences and the acquisition of land property. Great achievements and special services, in terms of public morality, the establishment of profitable business or recruitment to the army for two years constituted entitlements sufficient for naturalisation (Georgiades 1941, pp.155-156; Stathopoulos & Vardakis 1953, pp.1-2; Christopoulos 2012, pp.45-51; Vogli 2007, part I). As regards the 1830 Protocol, Greece and the Ottoman Empire were engaged to authorise the reciprocal migration of populations: Greeks with Ottoman nationality who wish to

[22] Royal Decree of 27 December 1833/8 January 1834 not published in the Government Gazette. See also Royal Decree on the responsibilities of Prefectures and the Prefectures' services 26 April/8 May 1833, Government Gazette no.17, 4/16 May 1833.
[23] Law on the Greek Nationality of 15/27 May 1835, Government Gazette no.20, 16/28 May p.142, Chapter A' On Nationality.
[24] 1822 Law of Epidaurus on the Provisional Regime of Greece, Title A', Part B'; Law of Epidaurus on the Provisional Regime of Greece as amended in 1823, Part B', chapter B' on the political rights of Greeks; 1827 The Political Constitution of Greece, Chapter C' on the public law of Greeks and Chapter D on naturalisation.
[25] The Greek language was set as a requirement for heterochthonous persons from 1823 to 1827.
[26] In 1823 the residence period was set to five years while in 1827 it was reduced to three.

abandon the ottoman territories should sell their property and leave within the period of one year without any other restrictions. The Greek government should equally permit the respective resettlement (article 6). The right to immigration was attributed to Greeks from the territories that revolted but remained under the Ottoman rule and Greek families that were persecuted from Istanbul and the shores of Asia Minor (Stathopoulos & Vardakis 1953, pp. 2-5; Vogli 2007, part II).[27]

According to article 2 of the 1835 Law, persons born in Greece by foreign parents acquire the nationality in adulthood after their declaration of permanent settlement in Greece and registration in a municipality. The combination of the principles of descent and place of birth eliminated the disparities between the status of heterochthons, and their descendants, and the status of autochthons. However, given that the concept of the Orthodox autochthonous genos can no longer serve as a distinctive criterion, another broader conception of the ethnic community is cultivated. It is enshrined in the term homogenis, the foreigner who belongs to the Greek ethnic community opposed to allogenis, the foreigner who naturalised (Christopoulos, 2013).

The criterion of descent for persons born abroad by a Greek father is maintained specifying that "persons born abroad by a Greek father that lost the entitlement to Greek nationality come under article 2" (article 3). Similar to the French law, the only requirement for these autochthonous aliens and heterochthonous co-ethnics was the declaration of will, settlement and registration to the municipality. Nonetheless, in practice settlement in Greece for Greeks born abroad was not mandatory as their intention to settle in the near future was taken for granted. The procedure could be conducted in the newly established network of consulates abroad which, under international law, constituted part of the sovereign state (Vogli 2007, part II). Equally maintained are the provisions for naturalisation and honorary naturalisation (articles 5 and 6). Applications for naturalisation are submitted in the municipality of prospective residence, associating naturalisation with registration to the civil registry, and the oath to the king is taken in front of the Prefect (articles 7 and 9)(Stathopoulos & Vardakis

[27] Protocol no 32 signed in London between Great Britain, France and Russia on 16 June 1830. The deadline was extended for eighteen months under article 7(a) of the Treaty of Istanbul signed in 27 June/9July 1832. The deadline was prolonged with the Protocol of 1836, which specified that in the exchange were included all Greeks born in the ottoman territory who immigrated before the 1830 Protocol and set the deadline of three-year period before the exchangeable population could return to Turkey, Protocol of London, singed on 30 January 1836 between France, Great Britain and Russia, articles C', D'. The Treaty between Greece and Turkey, published in Government Gazette no.1, 2 January 1837, extended the deadline to 1/13 July 1837.

1953, pp.5-7). The Greek nationality is lost in the cases of naturalisation or settlement in another state without the intention to return, appointment to public office or service in a foreign government without permission of the king and bearing arms against the country (article 10). Marriage with a foreign male national is also a reason for loss (article 12). The law further provided for the reacquisition of the Greek nationality, conditional to residence in the country (articles 11,12).

Notwithstanding the rivalry developed between the autochthonous and heterochthonous population with respect to the distribution of power in the government and state apparatus (Clogg 1992, chap.3; Vogli 2007), the antagonisms of the two groups fades away in the background of the expected territorial expansion. As Papastylianos (2013) remarks, as long as the issue of national integration is at stake the relationship of the Greek state with the different categories of national community - Greek citizens, unredeemed ethnic Greeks and diaspora- remains an open question (p.56). The prominence of the criterion of descent from a Greek father irrespective of the place of residence was mutually accepted by participants in the assembly that drafted the Constitution of 1844 in favour of the nations' unity. In the next citizenship law, the equal membership of descendants of Greeks to the citizenry through the application of the ius sanguinis principle would ensure the continuation of the nation without complementary requirements (Christopoulos 2012, p.57; Vogli, 2017, pp.83-95).

4.2.2. The 1856 Civil Law

The Civil Law on nationality was introduced in 1856.[28] Greeks are persons born by a Greek father or, in case of unknown father, by a Greek mother (article 14(a), (b)). Persons born in Greece are considered Greeks only in the cases of by unknown parents or unknown nationality (article 14(c)),[29] of stateless minors (article 14(c2), (st))[30] and of minors recognised by a Greek father (article 14(d)). As regards the naturalisation procedure, the initial provision prescribed the declaration and settlement to the municipality. The required period of residence after the declaration is three years for

[28] Civil Law TϗA'/1856, Government Gazette no.75, 15 November 1856.
[29] As amended by article 1 of Legislative Decree of 13/15 September 1926, ratified by the Presidential Decree of 12/13 August 1927.
[30] Added with article 1 of Legislative Decree of 13/15 September 1926, ratified by the Presidential Decree of 12/13 August 1927.

aliens and two for homogenis (article 15).[31] The period of residence is six months for persons enlisted in the army who were naturalised by Royal Decree (article 15).[32] The application and oath take place in the municipalities and consulates after the authorisation of the Minister of Interior. The Minister of Interior is responsible to decide freely on naturalisation; nevertheless, according to the Council of State, the reasons of rejection must be justified (article 15).

Despite the fact that women of foreign nationality married to Greek nationals acquire the nationality of their spouse,[33] spouses and children of naturalised persons remain aliens. Children may naturalise within one year from adulthood by declaration and oath to the municipality (article 17). The Greek nationality is lost in case of appointment to public office or service of a foreign government without permission of the king or acquisition of a foreign nationality (article 23). In the first case reacquisition of the Greek nationality is conditional to residence in Greece, subject to the naturalisation procedure (article 28). In the second case reacquisition takes place immediately or after six months (articles 26,27) Additionally, the requirement of government permission for the loss of nationality after naturalisation in another state is added to article 23 (Stathopoulos & Vardakis 1953, pp.8-20).

Confined by the imperative of territorial integration of Greece, the qualifications of the citizen were not defined in this Law. The Great idea, which meant to be dominant ideology henceforth, supplemented the national myth of ancient Greece with the Byzantine past shaping a concept of unbroken continuity and a romantic destiny of the nation which included the centres of Hellenism in Macedonia and Asia Minor and set the aspired capital in Constantinople (Liakos 2007, pp.208-209; Clogg 1992, chap.3). The frontiers of the imagined Greek community were meant to contribute to the formulation of patriotic awareness and the construction of the Greek national identity (Papastylianos 2013).

Central to the construction and diffusion of the idea of the homogeneous pre-politic Greek nation was the establishment of the University of Athens and the action taken by intellectuals to transmit the Western culture to the East through the Greek

[31] See also Royal Decree of 21 August 1911 supplementing article 15 of Civil Law ΤΚΑ'/1856, Government Gazette no.238, 24 August 1911 and Royal Decree of 23 October 1911 on the implementation of Law ΓΩΜΒ (3842)/1911 on the abolition of Law ΒΤΚ'/1895 supplementing article 15 of Civil Law ΤΚΑ'/1856, Government Gazette no.298, 27 October 1911.
[32] Amended by article 1 of Law ΒΩΔΖ'/1901, Government Gazette no.41, 20 February 1901 and article 1 Law ΓΩΜΒ (3842)/1911, Government Gazette no.197, 7 July 1911.
[33] 1835 Civil Law, article 4.

language and education. Although symptomatic to a certain degree with the doctrine of national unity elaborated since the middle of the 19th century in political discourse, the nationalist ideology, prescribing an extensive national community defined by shared cultural characteristics, has been fairly successful. After the territorial integration, Greece emerged as one of most ethnically homogeneous states in Europe despite the ethnically divergent groups settled in its territory (Kitromilides 1989, pp.166-177). However, as Kitromilides remarks,

> at the level of political and social actuality this community remained elusive and ill-defined beyond the world of intellectuals … As before the War of Independence and as within the independent kingdom, therefore, so in the irredenta as well the national community had to be constructed out of the confusion and the embarrassments of actual demographic facts (Kitromilides 1989, pp.168-169).

The fact that there were no ancestors holding the status of the Greek citizen by that time rendered the identification of homogenis outside the state rather ambiguous (Vogli 2009; Christopoulos 2012, pp.59-69).

The provisions of the 1856 Civil Law remained in power until the adoption of the GNC in 1955,[34] segmented though by numerous amendments that took place after consecutive wars and annexations as well as deviations from democracy that leaded to great discontinuity and lack of homogeneity (Christopoulos 2012, pp. 59-94). The territorial integration of Greece took place from1864 to 1947. The annexation of new territories doubled the size of Greece and added to the population around 2.000.000 persons (Clogg 1992, p.83).[35] The determination of the borders was accompanied by

[34] Legislative decree 3370/1955 on the ratification of the Greek Nationality Code, Government Gazette no.258/A', 23 September1955.

[35] The Ionian islands were annexed to Greece with the Treaty between Greece, France, Great Britain and Russia on the unification of the Ionian Islands with the Kingdom of Greece signed at London on 17/29.3.1864, ratified by Law N'/1864 Government Gazette no.25, 17 June 1986. Thessaly and part of Epirus were annexed in Greece with the Congress of Berlin, 13 June-13 July 1878 and the respective Treaty of Berlin between the United Kingdom, Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Italy, Russia and the Ottoman Empire. At the end of the second Balkan war Greece acquired the region of Epirus without the northern part of that was incorporated in Albania which was recognised as independent state. Moreover, Greece acquired the region of southern Macedonia and Thessaloniki, Crete and the islands of eastern Aegean. The relevant treaties are the Treaty between Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia Montenegro and the Ottoman Empire singed at London on 30 May 1913, and the Treaty between Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia, Montenegro and the Ottoman Empire signed at Bucharest on 10 August 1913 as well as the Protocol of Florence signed in 17.12.1913. Western Thrace came under Bulgarian sovereignty pursuant to the Treaty between The Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria signed at Istanbul on 30 September 1913. After the end of World War I and the defeat of Bulgaria a part of Western Thrace was ceded to Greece with the Peace Treaty between the Allied and associated Powers and Bulgaria signed at Neuilly on 14/27 November 1919, ratified by Law 2433/1920, Government Gazette no.162, 23 July 1920. See also Peace Treaty between the Allied and associated powers and Germany signed at Versailles in 28 June 1919. In 1920, after an expansionist strategy, Eastern and Western Thrace and the islands of Imbros and Tenedos were added to the Kingdom of Greece with the Treaty of Sevres which was never ratified by Turkey, see Treaty of Sevres between the Allied and Associated Powers and Greece on Thrace of 10 August 1920

the relevant international treaties which regulated the acquisition of nationality and the protection of minorities.[36] The attribution of nationality was based in the system of residence, irrespective of religion and ethnic origin. An option right to maintain the previous citizenship conditional to the obligation to transfer the residence out of the borders of the annexed territory ensured, pursuant to international law, not only the self-determination of the individual but also the interests of the annexing state (Georgiades 1941, pp.89-98; Grammenos 2003, pp.376-380). As a result, besides Ottomans, the new population in Epirus and Macedonia comprised of Albanian speaking Muslims and Orthodox, Vlachs of Greek or Romanian conviction, Slavs of Greek or Bulgarian consciousness and Spanish-speaking Sephardic Jews that had the ottoman citizenship (Grammenos 2003, 381-385; Christopoulos, 2012, pp.59-69; Clogg, 1992, pp.83-85).

After the First Word War (WWI), the mutual and voluntary exchange of ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities was arranged by a bilateral Convention between Greece and Bulgaria signed in 1919.[37] Almost 46.000 Greeks arrived from Bulgaria and 92.000 Bulgarians departed from Thrace (Divani 1999, pp.58, note 20, 290-370; Dragostinova 2009). In 1923, the exchange of population between Greece and Turkey was regulated by the Treaty of Lausanne which provided for the Convention between Greece and Turkey and the Ankara Convention.[38] In contrast to the voluntary character

ratified by Legislative Decree of 29 September 1923, Government Gazette no.330, 15 November 1923. In 1922 Greece relinquished the region of Smyrna and ceded Eastern Thrace to Turkey with the Protocol of Moudania, 28 September/11 October 1922. In 1923, only the Western part of Thrace was attributed to Greece by the Peace Treaty between the Allied and Associated Powers and Turkey 27 July 1923 ratified by Legislative Decree of 25 August 1923 Government Gazette no.238, 25 August 1923. Lastly, the Dodecanese were annexed in Greece as late as 1947 with the Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Italy signed at Paris in 10 February 1947, ratified by Legislative Decree 423 of 21 October 1947, Government Gazette 226/47 A' (Georgiades 1941; Grammenos 2003).

[36] Treaty between Greece, France, Great Britain and Russia on the unification of the Ionian Islands with the Kingdom of Greece signed at London on 17/29.3.1864, ratified by Law N'/1864 Government Gazette no.25, 17 June 1986; 1881 Treaty between Greece and Turkey signed at Istanbul on 20.6/2.7.1881, ratified by Law ΛΖ/March 1882, Government Gazette no.14, 11 March 1882; Peace Treaty between Greece and the Ottoman empire signed at Istanbul in 22.11.1897 ratified by Law ΒΦΙΕ'/1897, Government Gazette no.181, 6 December 1897; Peace Treaty between Greece and Turkey signed at Athens on 1/14 November 1913, ratified by Law 79/1913, Government Gazette no. 229,14 November 1913.

[37] Convention between Greece and Bulgaria for the Voluntary and Reciprocal Emigration of ethnic minorities of 14/27 November 1919, ratified by Law 2434/1920, Government Gazette no.163, 24 July 1920.

[38] Treaty of Lausanne, article 142 on the Convention concerning the exchange of Greek and Turkish populations signed in Lausanne on 30 January 1923 and Protocol XVI to the Lausanne Peace Treaty of 24 July 1923, ratified by Legislative Decree of 25 August 1923, Government Gazette no. 238, 25 August 1923 and Convention between Greece and Turkey on the implementation of the Treaty of Lausanne on the exchange of Greek-Turkish populations and of Declaration no IX, signed in Ankara in 10.6.1930 and ratified by Law 4793/1930, Government Gazette no.226, 3 July 1930. See also Legislative Decree of 21 August 1923 on the massive inclusion of homogenis freed by Turkey and Greece, Government Gazette

of previous agreements this exchange was mandatory as there was no option right provided and people had to resign from their property. The criteria were based on residence and religious faith (Georgiades 1941, pp.118-134; Grammenos 2003, pp.392-402). Persons who immigrated to third countries are included to the exchange as regards their nationality.[39] Furthermore, equal to the exchangeable population of the Lausanne Treaty were considered refugees coming from Russia, as an expression of ethnic solidarity for their suffering during the war,[40] as well as refugees from the provinces of Kars and Ardachan in Caucasus (Grammenos 2003, 400-401; Stathopoulos & Vardakis 1953, p.142).[41] About 1.500.000 Greeks came from the Ottoman Empire and 100.000 from revolutionary Russia towards 380-400.000 Turks that were deported from Crete and Greek Macedonia (Clogg 1992, p.101; Divani 1999).

Excluded from the exchange were the residents of Imvros and Tenedos,[42] Turkish nationals of Greek Orthodox faith settled in the municipality of Istanbul, and Greek nationals of Muslim faith settled in Western Thrace that were present in the territories in the 1st August of 1929, the date of treaty signature, irrespective of the date of arrival or place of birth.[43] Excluded from the exchange were also Greek Orthodox Turkish nationals and Muslim Greek nationals with Albanian origin, Muslims and Greek orthodox that converted their official religion before 1922, TCN and Armenian refugees in Greece (Grammenos 2003, pp.404-407; Georgiades 1941, pp.131-134).[44] Moreover, a group of Greek nationals of Muslim faith and Albanian origin, named Chams, who were settled in Epirus in the region of Thesprotia were excluded from the exchange (Stathopoulos & Vardakis 1953, p.126; Grammenos 2003, p.397). Albania

no.238, 25 August 1923, article 2 and Law 3051/1924 on the registration of exchangeable homogenis in the civil and male registers, Government Gazette no.37, 20 February 1924.

[39] Law 3098/1924 on the acquisition of Greek nationality by Greek genos refugees from Asia Minor and Thrace, Government Gazette no.169, 24 July 1924, Law 2280/1940 articles 11,12, and Law 2130/1993article 23(1).

[40] Resolution of the Constitutional Assembly D', Assembly POZ' of 10 April 1925, Government Gazette A' 99, 23.4.25, p. 565. See also article 12 of Civil Law 2280/1940 stating that homogenis from Russia are considered persons that arrived until the end of 1937.

[41] Resolution of the Constitutional Assembly of 14.6.26, Government Gazette A' 203/18.6.26 modified by Law 3477/28, Government Gazette 235/30.10.28, p.633.

[42] Article 14 of the Treaty of Lausanne and articles 4, 5 of Protocol XV on Karagats and the islands of Imvros and Tenedos, signed between the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan, Greece and Turkey in 24.7.1923.

[43] Ankara Convention, articles 10, 14 and article 28(a), (b) and Decision of the Mixed Commission 60/23.2.31 and 63/21.3.31. As "settled" are defined those Greeks of Istanbul and Muslims of Western Thrace that are registered in the municipalities' civil registers or have their permanent domicile and the intention of permanent settlement in these municipalities, Decision of the Mixed Commission no 27, 10 March 1927 (Georgiades 1941, pp.264-266).

[44] Ankara Convention, article 12.

had recognised the presence of a Greek-speaking Orthodox minority in the region of Northern Epirus since 1921.[45] In 1926, after the Convention between Greece and Albania,[46] the Greek nationality was recognised to persons born in Albania that were either Turkish nationals residents in Greece or in a third state and acquired the Greek nationality before the independence of Albania in 29 June 1913 (article 1(1), (3)), either residents in 6 August 1924 in Western Thrace[47] (article 1(2)) (Grammenos 2003, pp.402-403).[48]

The integration of the refugees who arrived massively in the newly acquired regions, especially since the outbreak of the WWI (Divani 1999, pp.55, 298-370), constituted the primary concern for the Greek state. In 1920 the naturalisation of adult homogenis refugees who enter the Greek territory was facilitated.[49] Following amendments in 1927 and 1940 the required residence period for the naturalisation of homogenis was eliminated.[50] The application is submitted to the local prefect or deputy administrator. Children and spouses are automatically entitled to the Greek nationality. A residence and work permit is provided and the Greek nationality is attributed automatically with appointment in public office or attendance of military school.[51] The qualification of the Greek genos had been added earlier to the requirements for the entry to military schools.[52] Children of naturalised persons become Greeks with the

[45] Albania became a member of the League of Nations after the Unilateral Declaration on the protection of minorities of 2 October 1921 ratified in 17 February 1922. The final document of border demarcation was signed at Paris on 30 July 1926.

[46] Convention on Citizenship between Greece and Albania signed in Athens in 13.10.1926, ratified by Law 3655/1928, Government Gazette no.212, 13 October 1928.

[47] The date the Treaty of Sevres on the protection of minorities in Greece was put in force.

[48] An option right for the Greek citizenship was also provided to Turkish nationals born in the provinces annexed to Greece after the 1.1.13 but resided in Albania in 1.11.13, the time that the Peace Treaty with Turkey came in force, with three years deadline for resettlement (article 4).

[49] Law N2060/1920, on the naturalization of refugees, Government Gazette no.53/A', 5 March 1920, and Legislative Decree of 19/23.10.1922 on the naturalization of refugees, Government Gazette no.211/A', 23 October 1922 which was abolished by the Legislative Decree of 5/28 May 1926.

[50] Civil Law ΤΚΑ'/1856, article 15, as amended by article 2 Legislative Decree of 10/11 September 1925, amended by the Legislative Decree of 5/28 May 1926 ratified by the Legislative Decree of 15 October 1927, ratified by Laws 3441 and 3442 of 1927 and merged with article 2 of Mandatory Law 2280/1940 amending and complementing the provisions on nationality, Government Gazette no.117, 6 April 1940. The automatic naturalisation of homogenis refugees for the first time implemented in 1906, before the territorial integration of the country, with respect to refugees from Eastern Romulia, Bulgaria, Romania and Epirus, see Law ΓΡΙΙΕ' (3185)/1906 on the attribution of the Greek nationality to homogenis refugees coming from Easter Romulia, Bulgaria and Romania, Government Gazette no 1, 4 January 1907, articles 1 and 2 and Royal Decree of 23 January 1907, Government Gazette no 19, 29 January 1907.

[51] Mandatory Law 2280/1940, articles 8 and 9.

[52] Mandatory Law 2126/1939 on the school of offices of military services, Government Gazette no.470, 7 December 1939, article 8 and Mandatory Law 2127/1939 on the Evelpidon Military School, Government Gazette no.528, 7 December 1939, article 6.

possibility to renounce the nationality within one year from adulthood.[53] In 1927, the scope of ius soli is amplified to include aliens who are born and live in the country by the coming of age unless they renounce the Greek nationality by declaration to the local authorities within one year from adulthood. It is complemented by the requirement of father's or mother's birth in the country or the alternative of five-year residence of the parents before birth.[54] Since 1940, however, the ius soli procedure entails the submission of naturalisation application within one year from adulthood and is approved by the Minister of Interior. While the requirements on parents' birth or residence remain the same, persons born in the country are considered persons born in the territories annexed after the 1st November 1913 (Stathopoulos & Vardakis 1953; Vrelli-Vrontaki, 2005).[55]

Moreover, in 1940, the privileges for the naturalisation of homogenis abroad were constricted. Emigration from the Greek territories was not reduced with the establishment of the Greek state but continued intensively since 1890 towards the U.S.A., Australia, Canada and South Africa (Venturas 2009). To maintain links with emigrants the provision regarding naturalisation in a foreign state was amended in 1914.[56] The implicit acceptance of dual nationality was justified as ensuring the fulfilment of political and military obligations of the individual towards the state, without infringing his or her personal will to the selected nationality (Georgiades 1941, pp.72-78; Stathopoulos & Vardakis 1953, pp.15-16; Christopoulos 2006a, p.261).[57] Furthermore, from 1916 to 1940 homogenis living abroad are entitled to protection by the Greek state and are invited to acquire the Greek nationality after registration in the civil registers that takes place in the consulates within certain deadlines (Ibid., pp.69-70).[58] Yet, The restrictions imposed to immigration by the USA and the abandonment

[53] Article 17 as amended by article 2(1) of Presidential Decree 12/13 August 1927 and article 4 of the Mandatory Law 2280/1940.
[54] Civil Law TκA'/1856, article 14(e), added by article 1 of Legislative Decree of 13/15 September 1926, ratified by the Decree of 12/13 August 1927. Excluded are children of aliens who live in Greece as a result of appointment to civil service.
[55] Civil Law TκA'/1856, article 14(e) as amended by article 1 of Mandatory Law 2280/1940.
[56] Law 120/1914 amending article 23 of Civil Law TκA'/1856, Government Gazette 1914 no.1, 2 January 1914.
[57] Civil Law TκA'/1856, Chapter B on the loss and acquisition of civil rights, article 23 and Law 468/1943 amendments on provisions on nationality, Government Gazette no.259 of 13 August 1943, article 2.
[58] Law 734/1916 on the registration on the records or civil registers of the State of homogenis settled abroad, Government Gazette no.112, 14 June 1916 and Law 1524/1918 on the recognition as Greek citizens of persons registered in the consular rolls in Turkey and Egypt and were recognised as such by the authorities, Government Gazette no.207/A, 25 September 1918.

of the Great Idea weakened the relations of the Greek state with the overseas diaspora and the Greek communities in the USSR and Egypt (Venturas 2009, pp.105-116; Venturas 2013; Papadopoulos 2013; Vogli, 2013). Since 1940 the laws attributing nationality by registration to the civil records and oath in consulates abroad are abolished.[59] Only a special provision refers to the naturalisation of stateless homogenis settled abroad.[60]

After the stabilisation of the borders the Greek citizenry encompassed the majority of the Greek orthodox population. Homogenis refugees were settled in the evacuated Muslim and Bulgarian villages reinforcing the ethnic element in the sensitive new borders (Vrelli-Vrontaki 2005, p.185).[61] The ethnic homogeneity of the nation is undermined though by persons that were not included to the exchanges or opted to stay under the minority protection treaty. The Greek authorities are therefore engaged to a process of Hellenization of the allogenis nationals, non-orthodox or persons with different ethnic origin. The exemption from the polity of unwanted population takes place by means of loss of the Greek nationality. Various authoritarian and military regimes established during the turbulent political decades of the 20th century (Clogg 1992, pp.100-168) serve this aim with unprecedented success.

Since 1927 settlement abroad is re-introduced as a cause for deprivation of nationality concerning only non-ethnic Greek nationals and their minor children. A Presidential Decree[62] provided that 'Greek allogenis nationals that abandon Greek territories without the intention to return loose the Greek nationality' (article 4) (Georgiades 1941, pp.73-85; Stathopoulos & Vardakis 1953; Christopoulos 2012, pp.71-84). The ministerial decision has retroactive effect as is considered an act confirming a situation existing since the day of departure.[63] Resettlement of former Greek nationals in the country is prohibited (Kostopoulos 2003).[64] Since the

[59] Mandatory Law 2280/1940, article 16

[60] The applications are submitted in the consulates and the Minister of Interior decides based on the documentation and the assessment of the ambassador, Civil Law ΤΚΑ'/1856, article 15a added by article 3 of Mandatory Law 2280/1940.

[61] Law 350/1914 on the establishment of homogenis newcomers in Macedonia and elsewhere, Government Gazette no.318, 7 November 1914, article 22. Those that possess the necessary requirements may be appointed as civil servants before acquiring the Greek nationality. The nationality is acquired automatically by appointment.

[62] Presidential Decree of 12 August 1927 on the ratification and amendment of the 13/15 September 1926 Legislative Decree on the amendment of provisions of Legislative Decree amending the provisions of the Civil Law, Government Gazette no.171/A, 13 August 1927.

[63] Nationality Council, Proceedings of session 261 of 23.6.1939, p.54-55.

[64] Law 4310/1929 on the settlement and mobility of aliens in Greece, police control, passports and deportation and displacement, Government Gazette no.287/A, 16 August 1929, article 22.

authoritarian deviation in 1935 and in the background of the communist threat, the criterion of national consciousness is invoked to complement the ideological concept of allogenis and becomes the decisive element for the evaluation of allegiance. The process of Hellenization entails the exemption of internal enemies, of persons who repudiate the official national ideology and constitute a threat to public security (Christopoulos 2012, pp.71-90).

In 1940 the Mandatory law 2280 proceeded to further amendments on the status of allogenis nationals residing in the country.[65] Article 5 of the 1927 Decree which automatically attributed the Greek nationality to children of allogenis refugees not included to the exchanges is abolished. Only persons who have completed the military service can maintain the status (article 7). The Greek nationality of persons of non-Greek origin who use foreign passports or foreign nationality certificates may be revoked after the decision of the Minister of Internal Affairs and the consultation of the Nationality Council, an advisory body established in 1938.[66] Persons who acquired the Greek nationality by naturalisation, birth in the country or marriage with Greek may lose the Greek nationality after the decision of the Minister of Internal Affairs, following the consultation of the Nationality Council and a High Officer of the Public Security Service.[67] The reasons for revocation were the commitment of 'acts against the public order, the internal and external security and the social regime', 'action to the benefit of a foreign state incompatible with the status of the Greek citizen and the interests of Greece' and desertion.[68] The scope of the concept of naturalised persons comprised of ex-Ottoman nationals that came as refugees as well as authochthons from the territories annexed in 1913 and 1919 (Kostopoulos 2003, p.56; Stathopoulos & Vardakis 1953).[69]

The scope for nationality revocation was amplified when unworthiness was established as a reason for nationality deprivation.[70] The revocation could be based on 'courts' decisions, official documents or information by individuals that were

[65] Mandatory Law 2280/1940 amending and complementing the provisions on nationality, Government Gazette no.117, 6 April 1940, Chapter B', Special Provisions.
[66] Civil Law TκA'/1856, article 23a, as amended by Mandatory Law 2280/1940, article 5.
[67] Civil Law TκA'/1856, article 28a(1)(2), as amended by Mandatory Law 2280/1940, article 6.
[68] Civil Law TκA'/1856, article 28a(3) as amended by Mandatory Law 2280/1940, article 6.
[69] Council of State 466/1945.
[70] Law 580/1943 amending and supplementing the provisions on nationality, Government Gazette no.302/A, 10 September 1943.

considered valid.'[71] The Nationality Council concluded in 1944 that the legal provisions in the detriment of allogenis can be implemented against a person of Greek origin who lacks the Greek consciousness as such a person cannot be considered a homogenis.[72] The provisions were maintained in power by a decision of the Council of Ministers in 1946 in spite of the fact that the law should have been automatically cancelled after liberation as it was enacted by a government appointed by the occupation powers (Kostopoulos 2003; Stathopoulos & Vardakis 1953).[73] During the years of the civil war the administrative practice of deprivation did not distinguish between homogenis and allogenis. As Kostopoulos (2003) remarks, the concept of national consciousness was determined by political criteria (p.56). The extension of scope directed to persons who threaten the security of the nation, namely the communists.

A circular followed by a Resolution of the Parliament specified that the 1927 Decree could be used against homogenis living permanently or temporarily in a foreign country that lack the national consciousness as manifested by their commitment to actions against national interests or support to the insurgence.[74] Despite the fact that the measure was designed to have a limited and exceptional character it was implemented widely and without the necessary documentation even after the end of the civil war. The measures of nationality withdrawal affected Vlachs that moved to Romania Albanian Muslims, Greek Jews and Armenians that left for Palestine and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) respectively, Slavic-speaking Christian communists settled in Northern Greece, Greek communists who fled to Eastern Europe as well as a considerable number of Slavic speaking Macedonians (Kostopoulos 2003; Baltsiotis, 2004b; Christopoulos 2012, pp.84-90; Divani 1999).[75]

4.2.3. The 1955 Greek nationality code

In 1955 the first codification of nationality law took place without significant changes to provisions on acquisition and loss of nationality.[76] According to the explanatory

[71] Regulatory Decree of 28 January 1942 on the implementation of Law 2280/1940, Government Gazette no.200, 7 August 1942, article 2.
[72] Nationality Council, Proceedings of Session 444 of 19.5.1944, p.2-4.
[73] Council of Ministers, Decision 253 of 7 May 1946, Government Gazette no.167/A, 11 May 1946.
[74] Circular of the Ministry of Interior Affairs to the Prefectures, no.949, 14 March 1947, and Greek Parliament, Resolution LZ', 4 December 1947, on the deprivation of the Greek nationality to persons acting against national interests from a foreign country, Government Gazette no.267/A, 7 December 1947, article 1.
[75] Disclosed Circular of the Hellenic Army General Staff, Directorate of Conscription, No. 50862, F. 38254, 16 December 1947 (as in Christopoulos 2012, pp.87-88).
[76] Legislative decree 3370/1955, on the ratification of the Greek Nationality Code, Government Gazette no.258/A', 23 September 1955.

report the fact that a great number of Greeks are emigrants necessitates the preservation of the ius sanguinis principle as the main mode of nationality acquisition (Grammenos 2003, pp.257-268). Foreign children born in the country acquire the Greek nationality in case of statelessness or unknown parents, adoption or recognition by a Greek father (articles 1,2,3).[77] The distinction between homogenis and allogenis is perpetuated through the preservation of the provisions addressing naturalisation and loss of nationality, despite the fact that none of the terms is legally specified. With respect to naturalisation, stateless homogenis residents in a foreign state, as well as spouses of non-Greek origin, are recognised as Greeks. This special procedure of naturalisation takes place in the consulates and the nationality is acquired after the approval of the application, the consulate's report by the Ministry of the Interior and the oath of the applicant (article 5).[78] Children of stateless homogenis abroad acquire the Greek nationality without the possibility to renounce it by declaration in adulthood in contrast to children of naturalised aliens (articles 10, 11)[79] (Grammenos 2003; Vrelli-Vrontaki 2005, pp.145-165). Pursuant to the explanatory report this distinction is made, on the one hand, to facilitate children to maintain their original nationality and, on the other hand, because the Greek state is more interested to include co-ethnics rather than TCN (Grammenos 2003, p.259).

Furthermore, foreigners of non-Greek origin who wish to naturalise in Greece must fulfil the following requirements: declaration of will to the local authorities of the place of intended residence with the presence of two Greek citizens as witnesses, naturalisation application to the Ministry of the Interior, eight years of continuous residence within a period of ten years before the application or alternatively three years of residence after the application and a moral character, no conviction for certain offenses and no decision for deportation. Previous residence is not required for persons who are born and live in the country as well as spouses of Greeks (articles 6 and 7).[80] Women may apply for the Greek nationality by declaration and oath within one year from the naturalisation of the spouse (article 11).[81] In the explanatory report it is stated

[77] In 1978 and 1979 Roma residents in Greece acquire the Greek nationality under the status of stateless, Ministry of the Interior, Circular 69468/212, 20 October 1978 and 16701/81, 12 March 1979.
[78] Replaced by article 2 of Mandatory Law 481/1968 setting the minimum age to 21 years, annulled with Law 2910/2001, article 72.
[79] Merged to article 10 with Law 1438/1984. According to article 10 of 1955 GNC spouses of naturalised Greeks acquire the Greek nationality by declaration within one year from naturalisation.
[80] Merged to article 6 with Law 1438/1984. The requirement of morality is annulled with Law 1438/1984, article 3.
[81] Abolished with Law 1438/1984, article 5.

that, notwithstanding the fact that the will of the individual is the determinant element for naturalisation, the decision on the acquisition of nationality depends on the independent judgment of the state to acknowledge this will (Grammenos 2003, pp.258-259; Vrelli-Vrontaki 2005, pp.145-165) .

The 1955 GNC nullified the laws of 1927, 1940 and 1943 and maintained the 1947 Resolution in power (article 33). According to article 19, allogenis nationals who leave the Greek territory without the intention to return may lose the Greek nationality. Article 20 stipulates that the nationality of Greeks settled abroad is deprived after the approval of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the consent of the Nationality Council, in the case of involvement in actions in the detriment of the nation and against the interests of the Greek state. In 1962, however, support from abroad to the political parties or organisations that have been dissolved was added to the actions against the nation justifying deprivation of nationality.[82] The Colonels' Junta that ceased power in 1967 added a retroactive effect to the implementation of this last provision.[83] Furthermore, article 19 is amended to include persons who are born and have their permanent residence abroad as well as their children aiming members of minorities who undermine ethnic homogeneity such as Slav-Macedonians and the Turkish-speaking Muslim minority in the ethnically sensitive region of Thrace (Grammenos 2003, pp.190-204; Papassiopi-Passia 2011, pp.192-195; Vrelli-Vrontaki 2005, pp.156-158).

4.3. The Greek political culture

In Greece political parties are the main actors in the process of policy reform. According to the Constitution of Greece, the study and examination of bills and law proposals falling within the jurisdiction of the parliament is conducted by committees composed by Members of Parliament in proportion to the strength of the parties (article 68). The adoption of laws requires an absolute majority of the members present, which cannot be less than one-fourth of the total number of the Members of the Parliament (article 67).

The post-war period (1949–67) was dominated by the political right which monopolised power, while the Left, identified with communism, was persecuted and suppressed. The political change that took place after the fall of dictatorship in 1974

[82] Legislative decree 4234/1962, Government Gazette no.116/A, 30 July 1962, article 4 and Constituent Act H/67 on the deprivation of nationality of persons acting against national interests and the confiscation of their property, Government Gazette no.121/A, 11 July 1967, article 1(1).
[83] Mandatory law 481/1968, Government Gazette no.164/A, 24 July 1968, article 7.

constituted a turning point in the Greek political history marking the consolidation of parliamentary democracy in the country and respect for fundamental rights (Alivizatos 2012, chap.11). The Constitution of 1975 is adopted and the CoE's Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed in 1950, is ratified.[84] Anti-communism ceased to be the dominant ideological characteristic and the political party system acquired a relatively stable three block structure, organised according to the Left, Centre and Right divide (Lyrintzis 2005). The main political aim of the parties in government was the modernisation of the country and accession to the EU, as a means of fortifying the newly established democratic institutions (Ioakimidis 2000). However, as Sitaropoulos remarks,

> The prevalent post-dictatorship political forces that forged the new Constitution had no intention of challenging the dominant Greek politico-legal tradition of supressing principles of human rights protection and nurturing state phobias vis-à-vis ethnic/religious minorities (Sitaropoulos 2006, p.115).

The restoration of democracy in 1974 signalled the restoration of past wrongs and the modernisation of the GNC in conformity to civil rights and the principle of equality. The abolishment of the Junta's constitutional acts[85] and the restoration of citizenship status to persons affected by article 20 of the GNC during the Junta's years constituted a priority in the political agenda.[86] Pursuant to the Greek Constitution (article 4(3)) the Greek nationality is lost only in case of voluntary acquisition of another nationality or the undertaking of service contrary to the national interests. Nevertheless, under the pressure of nationalistic reactions, the repatriation of political refugees and the restoration of nationality were limited to homogenis Greeks excluding former citizens of non-Greek descent with inadequate national consciousness.[87] The respective public debate was monopolised by the persecution of homogenis during the years of the Colonels' Junta and was conceived as evidence of patriotism that cuts across the political spectrum. In contrast, the issue of Slavic speaking minority in Macedonia and Chams persecuted the previous years was absent (Kostopoulos 2003; Baltsiotis 2004b;

[84] Legislative Decree 53/1974, On the of the Convention "For the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms" signed in Rome on the 4th of November 1950, and its Additional Protocol of Paris of the 20th March 1952, Government Gazette no.256/A, 20 September 1974.
[85] Constituent Act of 5 August 1974, Government Gazette no.217/A, 7 August 1974, article 10.
[86] Legislative Decree 30/1974, Government Gazette no.248/A, 16 September 1974.
[87] Joint Ministerial Decision of the Ministers of the Interior and Public Order on the repatriation of political refugees and the reacquisition of nationality, no.106841, 29 December 1982, Government Gazette no.1/B, 5 January 1983. Despite the proclamation of the establishment of special committees comprised by law officers (article 111(5) of the Greek Constitution), the Nationality Council remained the determinant institution for the restoration of nationality (Kostopoulos 2003).

Christopoulos 2012, pp.84-90). Furthermore, the Resolution that extended the scope of nationality deprivation to homogenis committed to actions against the national interest abroad is abolished as late as 1985 (Grammenos 2003, p.297).[88]

Article 19 of the 1955 GNC on the involuntary loss of nationality of former nationals characterised as allogenis is maintained in force by a transitional provision stipulating that a law will provide its abrogation (article 111(6) of the Greek Constitution). Furthermore, the Ministry of the Interior prohibited the services of civil registers in sensitive regions of the country to issue documents to persons residing in Countries of Eastern Europe, the U.S.A, Canada and Australia without the consent of the central services.[89] The political expedience behind the maintenance of the provision is further evident by the fact that while Greece proceeded to the ratification of 1954 UN Convention for the Status of Stateless Persons,[90] the ratification of the 1961 UN Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness is still pending (Sitaropoulos 2006, p.122).[91] Article 19 is abolished in 1998.[92] The prohibition to provide birth certifications, though, is repealed in 2001.[93] The consent of the Ministry of the Interior, however, is still required for residents of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. (Kostopoulos 2003; Baltsiotis 2004b).

From the middle of the 1970s until 2012 the two major parties competing for power are the Pan Hellenic Socialist Movement (Πανελλήνιο Σοσιαλιστικό Κίνημα, PASOK), which represents the centre and centre-left and New Democracy (Νέα Δημοκρατία, ND) representing the Right. The left block is comprised of the Communist Party (Κομμουνιστικό Κόμμα Ελλάδος, KKE) and the reformist party, Coalition of the Left (Συνασπισμός, SYN) later part of the Coalition of the Radical Left (Συνασπισμός Ριζοσπαστικής Αριστεράς, SYRIZA). The content of political identities associated with the left and right cleavage have been ideologically vague, adapted to the necessities of the political conjuncture creating a polarised system of limited pluralism. Populism,

[88] Law 1540/1985 on the regulation of properties of political refugees, Government Gazette no.217/A, 23 December 1985, article 9.
[89] Ministry of the Interior, Disclosed Circular E.P. 4089, 27 June 1975 (as in Kostopoulos 2003, pp.69-70, note 219).
[90] Law 139/1975, On the ratification of the International Convention on the status of stateless, Government Gazette no.176/A, 26 August 1975.
[91] Pursuant to article 9 of the 1961 Convention: A Contracting State may not deprive any person or group of persons of their nationality on racial, ethnic, religious or political grounds.
[92] Law 2623/1998 on the reorganisation of the electoral records, the organisation and exercise of the right to vote, modernisation of the electoral processes and other provisions, Government Gazette no.139/A, 25 June 1998, article 14.
[93] Ministry of the Interior, A' Division on Nationality, Circular E.P. 51, 16 February 2001.

clientelism, radical rhetoric as well as contradictory and contested reforms were the main characteristics of the 1980s as both parties searched to secure their electoral bases (Nicolacopoulos 1990; Lyrintzis 1990; Spourdalakis & Papavlassopoulos 2008; Lyrintzis 2005; Nicolacopoulos 2005).

As a result of the weak civil society and lack of associational culture, the structure and function of expert communities, as developed during the 1980s and 1990s, presents the following characteristics: overlap of experts in different institutions, clear and long-standing affiliation of institutions with political parties, importance and durability of a common belief system shared by members of the advocacy coalition comprised by experts and political parties. The development of independent research institutes and think-tanks outside universities is limited. While research stemming from government funded institutes operating under the supervision of ministries is primarily academic, policy-oriented research institutes are set up by or strongly affiliated to political actors (Spourdalakis & Papavlassopoulos 2008; Ladi 2005). As Ladi (Ibid.) remarks "[M]ost intellectual activity takes place close to the political parties or in relation to the party competition more generally" (p.285). The dominance of a relatively small elite of experts is accompanied by scarcity of scientific research with respect to minority and migrant rights. If not indifferent, research is presented as conciliatory and remorseful towards state policy, prone to partial and selective use of information as well as questionable research methods (Tsitselikis & Christopoulos 2000, pp.11-14). Few non-profit organisations aiming to develop policy-oriented research and dialogue as well as the incorporation of international human rights law in the Greek legal order are established and their members are mostly academics (Ladi 2005). More prominent are the HLHR, the Maragopoulos Foundation for Human Rights, the Greek Helsinki Monitor and the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP).

The project of modernisation corresponded to the Europeanisation of the Greek society and economy and was accompanied by a rationalistic and technocratic approach that brought limited but important and consensual reforms (Lyrintzis 2005; Spourdalakis & Papavlassopoulos 2008). Modernisation was further related with the adoption of a new political culture which rejects ideological conflict and promotes deliberation, dialogue and consensus (Psimitis & Sevastakis 2002). Political parties' control of the state system is reduced and interest groups are detached from political parties as they become institutionalised as independent actors. Furthermore, the role of the civil society is strengthened and the participation of experts in public discourse and

policy reform is increased (Spourdalakis & Papavlassopoulos 2008; Ioakimidis 2000; Featherstone & Papadimitriou 2008, pp.39-45; Ladi 2005; Ladi 2011). In 1997 the institution of the Ombudsman is introduced to the Greek political system and in 1998 the National Commission for Human Rights (NCHR) is established as an independent advisory body to the Greek State. The annual reports of the Greek Ombudsman, consisting of cases of maladministration and advisory opinions with regard to citizenship policy, have been a constant contribution and source of criticism to administrative practices.

Nevertheless, the interplay between state, party structures and economic interests did not permit major changes in public administration and public policies (Lyrintzis 2005). Notwithstanding the dissatisfaction with current structures policy learning has been limited. The involvement of experts to the process of policy change is mainly defined by their proximity to the governing party and the influence of the political agenda by independent experts or think tanks remains limited. Despite the fact that by the end of the 1990s the ideological distance between the dominant parties has narrowed, the process of modernisation has not been a consensual one and cross-party cooperation or support of reform initiatives is rare (Ladi 2005; Featherstone & Papadimitriou 2008, pp.39-45).

Inner party frictions emerged as political parties search to provide solutions to problems caused by the changing social environment. The process of modernisation and secularisation, the renewal of conflict in former Yugoslavia and the massive influx of immigrants revealed inner party frictions between those supporting new ideas and policy innovation and those who hesitated to proceed to a break with the past. The rise of nationalist parties was a reaction to the re-orientation of ND, which had absorbed political actors affiliated to far or extreme right, towards the political space of the centre (Nicolacopoulos 2005; Georgiadou 2008). Although their electoral success is mainly attributed to the discontent of the electorate towards the political elite and corruption, their impact to public discourse and political agenda should not be underestimated. Irredentism and references to orthodoxy, devaluation of parliamentarianism, opposition to Europeanisation and cultural pluralism, are some of the main positions that politicise contemporary issues with reference to the national identity (Georgiadou 2008). However, apart from the formation of nationalist parties with low popularity, political discourse has been in various instances dominated by nationalistic assertions which transcended party cleavages (Nicolacopoulos 2005; Lyrintzis 2005). As Lyrintzis

(Ibid.) observes the exact meaning and content of the modernisation project employed in the 1980s and 1990s was never theoretically developed or explicitly explained. As a result, it was not translated into concrete policies and failed to create a solid social block that could promote resolute dialogue with civil society and a coherent strategy for change (pp.250-255).

At the beginning of the 1990s nationalistic and xenophobic discourse dominated the Greek political arena. The dissolution of Yugoslavia revived Balkan nationalisms triggering conflicts within and between states (Kemp 2001, pp.8-9). Political developments in Macedonia spread uncertainty in Greece and a diplomatic crisis between the two states (Skoulariki 2007; Valden 1995). Public contention and nationalistic discourse receded when negotiations were taken to the UN level. However, the crisis had a decisive effect on the political culture and nationalistic discourse (Skoulariki 2007; Alivizatos 2001, pp.233-236, 251-259). According to Skoulariki (2007), the demand of national unanimity regarding national interests, with the exception of KKE and SYN, manifested the priority of the national identity over the political or social one (pp. 78-83). Moreover, suspicion towards the western aliens was amplified in the dominant parties of PASOK and ND and an inter-party alliance for the defence of the interests of the nation emerged (Ibid., pp.94-95). Valden (1995) further argues that the institutionalisation of nationalistic discourse in domestic politics and media limited the range of options in foreign policy, as options in favour of the national interest were often rejected for the sake of party interests (pp.277-283). The following sections demonstrate that citizenship policy has not only been closely associated with political priorities of foreign policy but has also been influenced by ethnic myths on the Greek identity that promote the idea of national homogeneity (Christopoulos 2004c).

4.4. Persons of Greek descent and the status of co-ethnics

In the middle of the 1990s the Greek foreign policy focused on the promotion of political and economic stability in the region of Balkans and South-Eastern Europe. As a member of the European Economic Community since 1981, the main objective was the development of economic relations in South-Eastern Europe and the Balkans that would enhance the chances of accession to the monetary union. Towards these objectives the Council for Greeks Abroad was established in 1995 (Constitution of Greece, article 108). Moreover, new embassies were established and missions of humanitarian aid were organised with the contribution of the diaspora in the US. The

new strategy for homogenis abroad entailed the recognition of the different identities of homogenis that were attributed to "different historical processes and social relations" (Venturas 2009, p.128) and promoted their integration in the country of residence. In this background Greece was actively involved in the peace-making process in Abkhazia (Ibid.).

At the same time, the reinforcement of the universality of Hellenism, the shaping of homogeneity and the strengthening of the national consciousness constituted the main objective of political elites. The funding of courses of Greek language, not only in Western Europe but also in Albania and the countries of the former USSR constituted the means for the fostering of a common ethnic identity and the inclusion of extra-territorial populations to the imagined community of the Greek nation (Venturas 2009, pp.116-135; Sideri 2013). The Greek education abroad was connected with the European policy on multiculturalism and linguistic plurality and the privileged treatment of homogenis foreigners was legitimised as a morally acceptable policy aiming at the protection of fundamental rights of socially vulnerable groups (Ibid.; Greek Parliament Proceedings 1993a).

Nationality law is also amended to satisfy requests of homogenis who have their permanent residence abroad, to adjust to domestic social circumstances and adapt domestic legislation on the management of immigration with European standards.[94] A committee responsible for the drafting of a new nationality code is established in the beginning of the 1990s and in 1993 submits the codified text without further amendments (Grammenos 2003, pp.39-40). Yet, the new nationality code is voted in the parliament in 2004. The policies employed remain obscure and ambiguous generating various categories of potential citizens with different opportunities regarding residence and access to nationality.

4.4.1. Homogenis settled abroad

The inclusion of homogenis foreigners takes place with two different processes: the definition of nationality and the naturalisation process for homogenis settled abroad. The definition of nationality is a process related with the registration of an ancestor, male or female, in the civil registers or a birth certificate of a child born within a valid marriage (Christopoulos 2012, p.119). After the establishment of the Greek state,

[94] Explanatory Report to Law 2130/1993, 26 October 1992 and Circular of the Ministry of the Interior F.32089/10641/24, 26 May 1993.

registration of every national to the municipality of residence was mandatory for the undertaking of rights and duties of the citizen. Voting rights are attributed to Greeks after registration that occurred on the grounds of birth in the territory, enlistment to the army, marriage or permanent settlement.[95] The main objective was to ensure the inclusion in equal terms of both autocthonous and heterochthonous population, as well as immigrants about to come, and foster a community of social bonds and common interests. Additionally, the civil registry would enable the measurement and control of the resettled population and the listing of personal information for the identification of individuals (Vogli 2007, chap.5; Christopoulos, 2012, pp.51-56).

After the introduction of equality of sexes[96] the principle of the independence of nationality between spouses was adopted. Until then a woman married to a foreigner would lose the Greek nationality and acquire the nationality of her spouse unless she submitted a declaration.[97] Women transmitted the Greek nationality to their children only in case of a stateless father or a child out of wedlock, not recognized by the father (article 1(b), (c)) (Vrelli-Vrontaki 2005, pp.146, 155). In 1984 article 1 of the 1955 GNC is amended and the Greek nationality is equally transmitted by a Greek female at birth irrespective of the nationality of the father or the place of birth.[98] The critical time for the acquisition of the Greek nationality is the nationality of the parents at the time of birth. Women retain the Greek nationality after marriage with a foreigner[99] and both nationalities are transferred to the child (Grammenos 2003, pp.72-92; Papassiopi-Passia 2011, pp.89-90; Christopoulos 2012, pp.103-110). Additionally, in 1982 civil marriage was recognised in the Greek legal order.[100]

Law 1438/1984 provided the opportunity to children born before 1984 by a mother of Greek nationality at the time of birth or marriage and children born by a Greek mother or father in a civil marriage before 1982 to become Greeks by declaring his/her will to the Minister of Interior, the local prefect or the Greek consulate in his place of residence by the 31st December 1986. A number of Albanian citizens, homogenis children of mixed marriages, and Vlachs that found themselves restricted

[95] Law on the establishment of Municipalities of 27.12.1833/8.1.1834, Government Gazette no.3, 10/22 January 1834.
[96] Constitution of 1974, article 4(2).
[97] 1835 Law article 12, 1955 GNC article 16.
[98] Law 1438/1984 amending the provisions of the Code of the Greek Nationality and of the law on birth certificates, Government Gazette no.60/A, 8 May 1984, article 1(1).
[99] Law 1438/1984, article 6.
[100] Law 1250/1982 on the introduction of civil marriage, Government Gazette no.46/A, 7 April 1982.

within the Albanian borders during the WWII, profited from the definition of nationality (Baltsiotis 2009, p.18). However, the strict two-year deadline for the submission of the declaration excluded many persons entitled to the Greek nationality. Furthermore, the unequal treatment of applicants regarding the time of acquisition of the Greek nationality generated further problems and complaints (Papassiopi-Passia 1999; Papassiopi-Passia 2011, pp.146-150). [101]

In 2001, when precaution for homogenis with residence abroad became the object the Greek policy, the provisions of 1984 law regarding children born by a Greek mother before 1984 and children born by a Greek father before 1982 were restored without deadlines, giving the opportunity to 2nd and 3rd generation descendants of Greeks from the USA, Canada and Australia to acquire the Greek nationality and the European passport.[102] Minor children of successful applicants acquire also the Greek nationality.[103] The declaration is submitted to the Secretary General of the administrative region or the consular authorities in the country of residence who, provided the requirements are met, is obliged to affirm or define the Greek nationality, a qualification that already exist and needs to be ascertained (Papassiopi-Passia 2011, pp.143-150; Christopoulos 2012, pp.110-124).[104]

In contrast to naturalisation, the definition of nationality has a declaratory rather than constitutive effect. Evidence that one of the interested person's ancestors is or was Greek at some stage of their lives is provided by a certificate of the registration of the marriage or the birth of the ancestor concerned in the municipal rolls or registers of males in the municipality or commune of the Greek state. The aim of the procedure is to ascertain the fulfilment of the legal requirements and facts, 'an uninterrupted line of descent' from an ancestor bearing the Greek nationality, not necessarily a first degree

[101] Pursuant to Law 1438/1984, article 8(1) children born before 1984 by a mother of Greek nationality at the time of birth or marriage acquire the Greek nationality at the time of declaration. With respect to children born in civil marriages before 1982, which were retroactively recognised as valid, the law provided that children born by a Greek mother in a civil marriage before 1982, acquire the Greek nationality since the time of birth as children born out of wedlock (article 9(3)). In contrast, children born before 1982 by a Greek father acquire the Greek nationality since their declaration. article 9(1)) (Grammenos 2003; Papassiopi-Passia 2011, pp.143-150).

[102] Law 2910/2001 on the entry and sojourn of aliens in the Greek territory. Acquisition of the Greek nationality by naturalisation and other provisions, Government Gazette no.91/A, 2 May 2001, articles 69 (6) and 69(7).

[103] Law 2910/2001, article 69(4) as amended by Law 3013/2002 on the upgrade of civil protection and other provisions, government gazette no.102/A, 1 May 2002. In 2004 the provisions were integrated to article 14 of the GNC with Law 3284/2004 on the ratification of the Greek Nationality Code, Government Gazette no.217/A, 10 November 2004.

[104] Law 2910/2001, article 69 and 2004 GNC article 25.

relative, and define the nationality on the basis of ius sanguinis. (Christopoulos 2009a, p.112; Christopoulos 2012, pp.110-124). Nevertheless, the exact procedure and requirements of the act of definition of the Greek nationality were never explicitly stipulated (Ibid.).

Persons who cannot ascertain that one of their ancestors was registered in the civil registers follow the naturalisation for homogenis. The Law 2130/1993[105] provided for the first time the possibility to homogenis with foreign nationality that live abroad to apply for the Greek nationality. The declaration and application are submitted to the Greek consular authorities at the place of residence and is forwarded to the Ministry of the Interior accompanied by the report of the consul (article 4(a), codified in article 10 of the CNC). The consular report constitutes substantive evidence regarding the status of homogenis as well as the morality of the applicant (Grammenos 2003, pp.140-146).[106] In 2001 the presence of two witnesses of Greek nationality at the time of declaration as well as absence of deportation decision and conviction for certain offences was added as a requirement.[107] Homogenis from Cyprus, Albania, Istanbul, Imbros and Tenedos as well as Greeks of diaspora, who fall outside the scope of international treaties on massive naturalisation and whose Greek descent cannot be ascertained by the process of definition of nationality follow the process of naturalisation (Ibid., pp.111-112).[108] The provision is still valid with no amendments regarding requirements of residence although the knowledge of Greek language and attachment to the country were added as a criteria to be taken into account by the consular authorities.[109] In combination with the application of the law of descent and the acceptance of dual citizenship the Greek nationality can be acquired by limitless

[105] Law 2130/1993 Amending and complementing provisions on Regional Government, the Greek Nationality Code, the Code of Communities and Municipalities, the provisions on the revenues of the Organisations of Local Government and other provisions, Government Gazette no.62/A, 23 April 1993.
[106] Ministry of the Interior, Circular F.32090/10643/25, 26 May 1993. The law stipulates that persons who can provide the legal documents for the definition of the Greek nationality, spouses of homogenis who are not homogenis themselves and persons who have lost the Greek nationality under special provisions fall outside the scope of this provision. However, homogenis who lost the Greek nationality after the acquisition of a foreign nationality or marriage with a foreigner can follow the process of naturalisation. Naturalisation of stateless homogenis abroad remains a distinctive procedure.
[107] Law 2910/2001 on the entry and sojourn of aliens in the Greek territory. Acquisition of the Greek nationality by naturalisation and other provisions, Government Gazette no.91/A, 2 May 2001, articles 58(b)(c) and 63.
[108] Ministry of the Interior, Public Administration and Decentralisation, Circular F.94345/14612/8, 3 May 2001; Ministry of the Interior, Circular no. F. 141886/14339/34, Guidelines on the naturalisation process of homogenis settled abroad- article 10 of Law 3284/2004, 4 June 2014.
[109] Ministry of the Interior, Public Administration and Decentralisation, Circular F.102744/2709/6, 28 January 2005.

generations of persons with residence in other states (Papassiopi-Passia 2011, pp.118-120; Christopoulos 2012, pp.157-193).

4.4.2. Homogenis of the former USSR

The process of definition of nationality was employed again in 1990 to descendants of Pontians established in countries formerly belonging to the Soviet Union and had been attributed the status of homogenis. The legal foundation of the process of definition of nationality of Pontians, adopted in 1993 (Law 2130/1993), was article 1 of the 1955 GNC in combination with the Treaties of Lausanne and Ankara on the population exchanges between Greece and Turkey (Tsioukas 2005, p.35). Before the ratification of the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, a great number of Pontic-speaking Orthodox Christians left the Turkish territory to escape the persecution and moved from the regions of the Ottoman Empire in the Black Sea towards Marioupol in Ukraine, Abkhazia and Western Georgia and Stavropol in Caucasus and Kazakhstan. Although, in the background of Soviet nationalities they were recognised as 'Greki', in the process of time, these dispersed groups adopted different dialects, Pontic, Turkish or Russian, and had no knowledge of Modern Greek. The rediscovery of their common Greek ethnic past was the result of a process of diaspora formation that started before the mass scale immigration in Greece (Voutira 2006; Sideri 2013; Christopoulos 2009a).

On the one hand, the interest of the Greek state for these populations emerges at the end of the 1970s when their relocation to Western Thrace was planned confidentially by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, within the framework of transformation of the composition of the population settled in this nationally sensitive area. Although this strategy was not implemented, a number of cultural associations and corporate groups are established by the first generation refugees and revive the Pontian culture. Pontian Soviet citizens arrive in Greece since 1985 and the number augments as the links between associations become stronger. In this context, Pontian-speaking Orthodox Christians constitute the third and fourth generation of homogenis refugees from the Asia Minor who were not included in the population exchanges and their past suffering has not yet been officially recognised. On the other hand, after the breakup of the socialist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe and the changes in borders, the integration of Pontian Greeks in the post-Soviet nationalising states was uncertain. The fear of cultural extinction and economic insecurity constituted the main

motivation to re-settle in Greece, a state already engaged in the West-European capitalist order (Voutira 2006; Deltsou 2009; Christopoulos 2004b).

In 1990 according to a ministerial decision Greeks of Pontian origins that settle permanently in Greece are registered in the registers of males, municipal rolls and birth registers. Considering the urgent and imperative need to settle down homogenis coming from the Soviet Union and the fact that the lack of the required documents occurs unintentionally, the registration takes effect "in deviation of any general or special provision."[110] With the exception of the date of birth, evidence and facts that are not derived by the passport are established by the personal affirmation of the applicant. Only persons that hold a Greek consular passport are entitled to the definition of nationality while persons holding Soviet passports apply for naturalisation. The process of definition takes place at the Prefectures. Pontiacs are divided in two categories. Persons whose ancestors departed from Turkey before the Balkan wars (18.10.1912) fall under the provisions of the Treaty of Ankara acquire the Greek nationality since the ratification of that Treaty in 1930. Persons whose ancestors departed between 1912 and 1934 acquire the Greek nationality according to the provisions of the Treaty of Lausanne ratified in 1923. The required documents include the consular passport with a repatriation visa that ascertains the registration to the consular rolls, a birth certificate and the certificate of marriage of the persons concerned or their ancestors. The registration in the consular registers or the possession of the Greek passport of one person of the family is considered a sufficient evidence for the definition of the nationality of the whole family (Grammenos 2003, pp 311-316, 326-338).[111] Three years later the respective law is adopted (Law 2130/1993, articles 6 and 7, codified in article 15 of the GNC).

Moreover, article 23 of Law 2130/1993 abolished articles 11 and 12 of the Mandatory Law 2280/1940 which were incompatible with the 1990 Ministerial decision. In contrast to the abolition of article 19 of the GNC, which had proactive effect, as explained in the next section, the abolition of the 1940 provisions had retroactive effect. As a result, the nationality of persons who fell under the provisions of article 7 of the Treaty of Lausanne and article 28 of the Treaty of Ankara and are not

[110] Joint Ministerial Decision by the Government Presidency Ministers of Interior and National Defence, no. 24.755, 6 April 1990 (as in Grammenos 2003, p.311)

[111] Circular of the Ministry of the Interior 34205, 24 May 1990, Ministry of the Interior, Circular 28700/11333/23, 26 May 1993 and Circular of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 69381/4396/8, 16 February 1999.

registered to the consular rolls are considered repatriates and could have their nationality defined. The aim of provisions of Law 2130/1993 was to include a limited number homogenis who were not registered or could not prove their registration to the consular rolls or were unable to submit a soviet document with their nationality (Papassiopi-Passia 2011, pp.83-86, Grammenos 2003, pp.170-171). According to informal data of the Ministry of the Interior 180.000 persons arrived in Greece and Cyprus up to 2000 (Ministry of Macedonia-Thrace. General Secretary of Repatriated Greeks, 2000, p.51).[112] The Greek nationality was ascertained to 105.000 persons until 2000. The majority is registered in the regions Central Macedonia and Eastern Macedonia and Thrace where the Turkish minority is settled (Baltsiotis 2004a; Tsioukas 2005, pp.34-36; Christopoulos 2009a; Christopoulos 2012, 125-144).

4.4.3. Restriction of facilitated naturalisation

At the beginning of the 2000s, a different personalised naturalisation procedure was adopted.[113] The changes brought in the procedure of naturalisation of homogenis Pontians aimed to combat the phenomenon of definition of nationality to non-homogenis political refugees to the former USSR as well as descendants of Pontians established in third countries and to eliminate the submission of counterfeit documents by taking into account not only typical criteria but also substantial elements.[114] A secondary goal was to restrain their repatriation, strengthen the ties and economic relations of the national centre and diaspora in the regions of Caucasus, the Black Sea and Central Asia (Standing Committee on National Defence and Foreign Affairs 1999, pp. 9-12). An exceptional procedure of naturalisation was introduced that addresses particularly homogenis of the former Soviet Union, settled in states of the former USSR or in Greece until the publication of the law,[115] who lack the necessary documents and fall outside the scope of the provisions of the Treaties of Lausanne and Ankara for the definition of nationality.[116] Homogenis who have come in Greece until the publication

[112] The Source countries are Georgia (52%), Kazakstan (20%), Russia (15%), Ukraine (2%), Uzbekistan (2%).
[113] Law 2790/2000, Rehabilitation of repatriated homogenis from the former Soviet Union and other provisions, Government Gazette no.24/A, 16 February 2000 and Law 2910/2001 on the entry and sojourn of aliens in the Greek territory. Acquisition of the Greek nationality by naturalisation and other provisions, Government Gazette no.91/A, 2 May 2001, article 76(1-8, 10, 14).'
[114] Circular of the Ministry of the Interior, Public Administration and Decentralisation F.79174/10913/18, 17 March 2000.
[115] The date of entry in Greece, resulting from passport, travel document, contracts and bills, is considered as a proof of residence. Ministry of the Interior, Circular no F.79174/16211/10, 15 May 2001. The deadline was prolonged with Law 2910/2001, article 76 and Law 3491/2006 article 18.
[116] Law 2790/2000, article 1 amended by Law 2910/2001, article 76.

of the law with a Greek passport or a tourist visa and lack the repatriation visa fall also under the scope of this provision. The absence of criminal record with respect to certain offences was added as a requirement.[117] To overcome problems related with difficulties to reach original documents, such as birth certificates, the procedure entails the ascertainment of the status of homogenis, rather than the Greek descent, with an interview conducted in the consular of the place of residence. Any elements, and not only official documents, submitted by the applicant can be taken into account for the committee's conclusion (Papassiopi-Passia 2011, pp.150-157; Grammenos 2003, pp. 164-179).[118]

The status of homogenis is examined in the consulates by a committee comprised by the consul as president and two Greek citizens as members.[119] The documents and the opinion of the consular committee are forwarded to the regional authority of the municipality in which the applicant is interested to be registered, where secondary committees give an advisory opinion on the origin of the applicant. One of the members of the committees established in the Regions should be the delegate of the most representative association of homogenis; a requirement indicative of the decisive role of local associations, as Christopoulos (2012, p.138) remarks. The decision is taken by the Secretary General of the Region. The Greek nationality is acquired after the oath of the applicant in front of the consular authorities. The application and oath of homogenis settled in Greece, including persons who lack a valid repatriation or tourist visa, takes place in the regional authority of residence.[120] Under the same procedure homogenis who lose the nationality of the source state with their naturalisation can be provided with the Special Identity Card for Homogenis (Ειδικό Δελτίο Ταυτότητας Ομογενούς, EDTO), which ascertains the status of homogenis and is accompanied by residence and work permit. The provision addresses homogenis with residence in former USSR countries, Cyprus or Greece. In the latter case the consular report is

[117] The applicant must not be convicted for the crimes enumerated in Law 2910/2001, article 58 for the naturalisation of aliens of non-Greek origin.
[118] Circular no F.79174/16211/10, 15 May 2001. See also Joint Ministerial Decision no F.7914/6330, Composition of the special committees of paragraph 4 of article 4 of Law 2790/2000 (Gov.Gaz.24/A/16.2.2000) for the assessment of the Greek descent of homogenis from the countries of the former Soviet Union, Government Gazette no.169/B, 8 March 2000.
[119] The members of the consular committee are appointed with the decision of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Law 2910/2001, article 76, as amended by Legislative Decree no.92 on the limitation of the shared competence of Ministers provided in paragraph 2 of article 15 of Law 3284/2004, Government Gazette no.95/A, 8 May 2006.
[120] Law 2790/2000, article 1 as amended by Law 2910/2001, article 76.

omitted. The competent authority for the issuing decision, though, is the Ministry of Public Order (Papassiopi-Passia 2011, pp.150-157; Grammenos 2003, pp.164-179).[121] The process of the definition of nationality of homogenis of the former Soviet Union was marked by inaccuracy and great delay in its implementation (The Greek Ombudsman, 2001a, pp.12-14; Christopoulos 2012, pp.125-144; Christopoulos 2006a, pp.272-273; Tsioukas 2005; Baltsiotis 2004a; Christopoulos 2004a). It is nullified in 2006 after the advisory opinion of the Legal Council of State and replaced by an examination procedure.[122]

4.5. Parliamentary debates and institutional arrangements

During the preparation of the draft law, the term refugee was considered inappropriate as homogenis from the former USSR do not fall under the scope of the provisions of the UN Conventions on the definition of refugee (Greek Parliament Proceedings 1993a; Greek Parliament Proceedings 1993b, p.5399). The replacement of the term refugees by the term repatriates homogenis served the construction of historical continuity with the Treaty of Lausanne that legitimised the inclusion of Pontians to the Greek genos. At the same time, it ensured that the law would be implemented exclusively to Pontic Greeks without deviating from the national strategy towards other groups (Christopoulos 2012, pp.126-134; Venturas 2009, pp.116-120; Vogli 2017, pp.67-71). Voutira holds that that:

> For many non-native Soviet groups that had been displaced, forcibly uprooted, deported dispossessed, and underprivileged in the old Soviet regime (e.g. Bulgarians, Germans, Greeks, Jews, Poles), the redefinition of identity along ethno-national lines has led to an improved access to emigration to the West under the redefinition of "repatriation" as the "right to return" to one's historical homeland (Voutira 2006, p.380).

Indeed, the 'repatriation' of Pontians, who massively enter Greece after 1989, was not based on the ascertainment or definition of the Greek descent but on the confirmation of belonging to the Greek genos. Neither the ancestors of Pontic Greeks were present in Turkey at the time of the exchange nor did any of the descendants possess the Turkish nationality (Christopoulos 2012, pp.126-134).

[121] Law 2790/2000, article 1 (11) amended by Law 2910/2001 76(6), Common Decision of the Ministers of the Interior, Public Administration and Decentralisation-Foreign Affairs, Economy, Labour and Social Insurances, Public Order, 4864/8/8-γ, 17 July 2000.

[122] Law 3491/2006 Regulation of issues regarding the National Centre of Public Administration and Regional government and other issues that fall in the competence of the Ministry of Interior, Public Administration and Decentralisation, Government Gazette no.207/A, 2 October 2006, article 18, Advisory Opinion of the Council of State 89/2006, Third Department of the Council of State (as in Christopoulos 2012, p.143).

The institutionalisation of special naturalisation for homogenis of the former Soviet Union has been a consensual political choice; both the conservative and the socialist party introduced draft laws while in power, in 1993 and 2000 respectively. Despite accusations of electioneer, all parties conceded to grant privileges to this group of co-ethnics and political antagonism was limited to the measures of integration (Triandafyllidou & Gropas 2010, pp150-154; Christopoulos 2012, p.130). The reach of unanimity was considered an indication of prevalence of national over electoral interests (Greek Parliament Proceedings 1993c, p.4969-4971). The exclusion of homogenis of Northern Epirus from the process of definition of nationality was another point of consensus during the first round of debates in 1993. Under the imperative to preserve the size of the minority in Albania, representatives of PASOK, SYN and KKE persistently asked the government to delimit the scope of the provision so as to except this group of homogenis. The Minister of the Interior of ND, Ioannis Kefalogiannis, assured that the government follows the strategy "that promotes national interests and the respect of Greeks settled in the Greek area of Northern Epirus" (Greek Parliament Proceedings 1993d, p.4916). The Greek nationality is not attributed and will not be attributed to homogenis of Albania (Ibid.).[123]

A few years later, the Greek Ombudsman pointed out the 'unsound legal foundation' of the process of nationality definition and underlined the fact that the requirement of repatriation visa concerns exclusively the repatriation of political refugees of the period of the civil war from 1946 to 1947. According to the report:

> The tacit extension of the repatriation requirement to other categories of persons had the paradoxical effect to necessitate the issuing of consular repatriation visa in cases of persons that are not interested in their repatriation but pursue to be formally informed on whether they possess the Greek nationality or not (The Greek Ombudsman 1998, p.34).

The report also calls attention to the mistrust and prohibitive practice followed by the administration towards homogenis from Albania and other Balkan countries that are entitled to the definition of their nationality. In particular, the Greek authorities are reluctant to deal with such applications and demand a consular visa of repatriation; they

[123] In 1990 the National Institute for the Reception and Rehabilitation of Repatriated Homogenis is established (Law 1893/1990, Government Gazette no.106/A, 16 August 1990, article 8). Its operations were divided in the Program of Repatriates, the Program of Albania and the Program of support of homogenis in the former republics of USSR. Its operation was terminated in 2003. According to the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs among the objectives was the reception and settlement of Pontians and the constraining of the influx of Albanians and homogenis from Northern Epirus (Greek Parliament Proceedings 1993d, p.4874).

refrain to issue a decision and when they do it is mostly oral and negative (The Greek Ombudsman 1998, pp.33-34, 46).

As Christopoulos (2012) argues, the fact that the definition of the Greek nationality constitutes an affirmative act and commands the administration to ascertain the Greek nationality of descendants of allogenis Greeks, descendants of members of ethnic minorities in Greece whose nationality had not been revoked, contradicts to the political imperative of their exclusion from the Greek nation (p.120). Nevertheless, the inadequate regulatory framework has afforded to the administration adequate discretionary powers to decide on the basis of a number of questionable rules, circulars, case law, verbal and confidential guidelines or personal opinions (Ibid., pp.119-124). The mistrust of the authorities towards certain categories of persons entitled to the definition of their Greek nationality resulted in a practice that disregards the objective criterion of ethnic descend and renders the subjective criterion of national consciousness the main qualification for the status of homogenis (Ibid. pp.125-134; Tsioukas 2005). According to The Greek Ombudsman (1998), the maladministration in the process of nationality acquisition is attributed to the prominent role of ethnic origin in the Greek law which had two main consequences: "the segmentation of the legal framework in provisions that treat different categories of homogenis on a case-by-case basis" as well as the cultivation of the conviction of the responsible authorities that "the relevant issues are from the outset related with 'nationally sensitive' affairs" and are therefore conducted confidentially (p.33).

The decentralisation of authorities competent for the definition took place during the 1990s due to the overload of applications.[124] While the procedure, both the process of definition and the respective research, is conducted by the regional government, in certain cases the Ministry of the Interior, which is responsible for the procedure of naturalisation, informally reserves the competence over the research. Therefore, for reasons of national interest, cases that concern research on former nationals of non-Greek origin are referred to the Ministry's Directorate of Definitions. These cases concern in particular persons from the Muslim minority in Thrace who lost the Greek nationality, Slav-Macedonians political refugees who had not re-acquired the

[124] Law 2307/1995 on the adaptation of legislation concerning the competence of the Ministry of Interior to the provisions on the Local Authorities and other provisions, government gazette no.113/A, 15 July 1995, article 9 (the process of definition is conducted by the Prefect and the relevant research is conducted by the central services of the Ministry) and Law 2647/1998, on the transfer of competence to the regions and the Local Authorities and other provisions, no.237/A', 22 October 1998, article 1A(1).

Greek nationality, people of Bulgarian origin that fled to Bulgaria after the Balkan wars until the burst of the civil war, Albanian Muslims (Chams) that were persecuted after WWII, Vlachs that immigrated to Romania, Armenian Greeks who fled to Armenia after their persecution from Turkey during 1920s and Greek Jews that immigrated to Israel (Christopoulos 2012, pp.114-115; Christopoulos 2006a, pp.271-272). The Minister of Public Order had already competence to give his opinion on the decisions of the Minister of Internal Affairs with regard to the possession of the status of homogenis.[125]

Nevertheless, suspicion was also developed with regard to the identity of repatriates as the entrenched perception on their Greek ethnic origin was undermined. The procedure attesting the Greek origin and the status of homogenis was highly vulnerable resulting to the definition of the Greek nationality to persons with contested national consciousness (Standing Committee on National Defence and Foreign Affairs 1999, p.8; Tsioukas 2005; Christopoulos 2012, pp.134-144). Furthermore, the national authorities soon became aware of the fact that almost half of the newcomers were economic immigrants who had crossed the borders without official documents or had arrived with a tourist visa and were settled in urban areas in search of better employment opportunities. Their illegal status and economic situation rendered the national plan of settlement and economic revitalisation of Thrace unattainable and the integration efforts ineffective. At the same time, the use of the Russian language and the preservation of the identity of origin in the associations that were established, generated suspicion in the society and the media concerning the identity of the repatriated homogenis, the consistency and legitimacy of the process of repatriation and nationality definition as well as the social and economic benefits that were provided (Ibid., Venturas 2009; Voutira 2006; Vogli & Mylonas 2009, pp.377-383).

Accusations over unlawful naturalisations and insufficient integration measures were the main point of controversy in the parliamentary debates of 2000 and 2001. The draft law on the restitution of homogenis from the former Soviet Union was prepared by the Standing Committee of National Defence and Foreign Affairs with the contribution of the Special Standing Committee of Expatriate Greeks and was adopted with inter-party consensus. The goal of the new policy was to deal with the problems

[125] Law 1975/1991, Entry-departure, sojourn, employment, deportation of aliens, process of recognition of foreign refugees and other provisions, Government Gazette no.184/A, 4 December 1991, article 17(2).

accumulated during the last decade and to provide for the integration of homogenis Pontians (Standing Committee on National Defence and Foreign Affairs 1999). To eliminate the submission of counterfeit documents, a personal interview affirms the Greek consciousness of the applicant. The process of nationality acquisition is simplified though, as the status of citizen is obtained after oath instead of definition and is accompanied by a number of privileges such as housing, cultivable land, employment in the public sector, vocational training and Greek language courses (Law 2790/2000). At the same time the EDTO would provide the possibility of seasonal stay and work in Greece for persons who do not want to leave their home country or risk of losing the nationality of the origin state (Ibid., pp.9-10; Greek Parliament Proceedings 2000, p.3030).

Providence for Hellenism and the institutionalisation of naturalisation of homogenis with residence abroad raised demands for the extension of groups entitled to the EDTO (Greek Parliament Proceedings 2000, p.3040, 3045; Greek Parliament Proceedings 2001a, p.5642). The empowerment of the Greek communities in vital areas was considered an objective of primary importance for the process of nation-building and was marked by an alteration in the terms of parliamentary discourse; instead of references to repatriated homogenis, Pontians were considered part of the Hellenic community beyond the confines of the Greek state, an indigenous group that left their home country in the Black Sea; as such they fall under the scope of article 108 of the Constitution regarding the preservation of ties of diaspora with the motherland (Greek Parliament Proceedings 1999; Greek Parliament Proceedings 2000; Venturas 2009, pp.120-122). The scientific committee of the parliament that elaborated the draft law observed that the positive regulations concern exclusively homogenis from the former USSR rather than from countries of the Eastern bloc or homogenis in general and expressed concerns for the insufficient justification of this discrimination. As regards the attribution of nationality or the EDTO, it is stated that there is no infringement of the principle of equality as the Greek Constitution provides for equality in the treatment of Greek citizens (article 4(1)). However, the differentiated treatment between naturalised homogenis from the former USSR and naturalised homogenis from other countries is not adequately justified in the explanatory report to the draft law (Department for the Legislative Elaboration of Draft Laws and Law Proposals 1999).

Under the rhetoric of the common ethnic origin, the Greek diaspora was integrated in the national myth and upgraded the status of the country in the domestic

and the international arena. In the official discourse the term diaspora is used alternatively with the term homogenis, which is amplified to include Greek minorities abroad, emigrants and descendants of expatriates, concealing the heterogeneity of the identities comprising the Greek diaspora (Venturas 2009; Vogli 2017). Nevertheless, the Greek authorities neglected the actual living conditions and the needs of the Greek diaspora. The institutions established failed to function as intermediary actors in this reciprocal relation (Divani 2013). Venturas (2009) argues that the reason of this failure could be attributed to the paternalistic attitude of the Greek authorities and the belief that the definition of the criteria of belonging and the limits of the nation appertain to the exclusive jurisdiction of the national centre (p.131).

Yet, the adoption of new modes of access to citizenship and the de-territorialisation of the nation raised the question of the goal of integration; would it be the establishment of a process of assimilation to Hellenism or a multicultural society accessible on the basis of residence and education? (Greek Parliament Proceedings 2000, p.3049; Standing Committee of Public Administration, Public Order and Justice 2001, pp.9-10; Greek Parliament Proceedings, 2001b, p.5600). During the parliamentary debate that took place in 2001, references of the representatives of the socialist government and the conservative opposition to the naturalisation of homogenis living abroad involved specifically the 2nd and 3rd generation of diaspora, notwithstanding the fact that there is no generational limit in the provision. MPs of ND expressed their disagreement with the elimination of requirement of residence that took place in 1993; they stated that the social circumstances have changed and further safeguarding measures should be taken (Greek Parliament Proceedings 2001c, pp.6349-6350). The MP George Karasmanis, stated:

> The naturalisation of first and second generation of homogenis constitutes an imperative. Nevertheless, it should not become an industry. Safeguards must be provided … The two Greek citizens should be able to stand as witness a single time (Greek Parliament Proceedings 2001c, p.6358).

Moreover, despite the constitutional provision on remote participation to national elections (Constitution of Greece, article 51(4)) and the consent of political elites, no legislative initiative was taken towards the attribution of remote voting rights to Greeks with residence abroad (Venturas 2009, p.132; Christopoulos 2013b). While these questions remain unanswered, the debate on the naturalisation of TCN, examined later in this chapter, provided the answer on the goal of integration.

4.6. Former nationals and the status of co-ethnics denied access to citizenship

In the GNC, the status of homogenis constituted the primary requirement and criterion for the privileged treatment of co-ethnics. The recognition of the status constituted the first stage of access to citizenship (Tsioukas 2005, p.32) and the non-naturalisation of allogenis aliens is a core assumption of citizenship policy throughout the 20th century (Baltsiotis 2004b, p.93). Nevertheless, for a significant number of persons settled in the country and characterised as homogenis, inclusion to the nation does not entail access to citizenship. Their status is regulated by a number of joint ministerial decisions and administrative orders, escaping accountability and bypassing public debate. Besides, decision-making takes place long after their settlement and integration in the Greek society (Tsioukas 2009a, p.63). At the same time, the politicisation of nationality and acess to citizenship at the beginning of the 1990s involves the restriction of naturalisation of aliens of non-Greek descent who are conceived as a threat to national homogeneity (Christopoulos 2006a, p.267).

4.6.1. Involuntary loss of nationality for Greeks of Turkish origin

The provision of article 19 (Legislative Decree 3370/1955), on the involuntary loss of the Greek nationality of persons of non-Greek descent, remained in power until 1998 depriving the Greek nationality from 60.004 persons.[126] Since the late 1950s and beginning of 1960s the provision affected severely the Muslim minority in Western Thrace. Comprising mainly of persons of Turkish origin but also Slavic-speaking Pomaks and Roma, the rights of the minority, the only officially recognised minority by the Greek state, has been protected by the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne (articles 37-45). Its application to ethnic Turks aimed to restrict the size of the minority and was closely related to developments on the relations between Greece and Turkey, such as the forced dislocation of the Orthodox minority in Istanbul, the Turkish invasion in Cyprus in 1974 and the crisis in the Aegean in 1987 (Sitaropoulos 2006, pp.108-119).

The involuntary loss of nationality by Greeks of Turkish origin is culminated severely during the years of dictatorship, from 1967 to 1974 when the suspension of civil and social rights enhrined in the Constitution of Greece[127] as well as the country's

[126] According to the document of the Ministry of the Interior, Public Administration and Decentralisation, Directorate of Nationality, without file number send to the Hellenic League of Human Rights on 18 June 2003 (as cited in Christopoulos 2012, p.91, note.50).

[127] Royal Decree 280/1967, Declaring the country in a state of siege and suspending articles of the Constitution, Government Gazette no.58/A, 21 April 1967.

derogration from obligations deriving from the European Convention on Human Rights took place, in view of internal dangers threatening public order and security (Sitaropoulos 2006; Kostopoulos 2003; Baltsiotis 2004b; Anagnostou 2005).[128] Although some decisions have been repealed, due to inadequate justification and documentation, the number of stateless Muslims residents in Greece has not been clarified (Ibid., pp. 116-117; Kostopoulos 2003, p.64). Lack of scientific research on minorities deepened the concealment of the issue of nationality deprivation (Baltsiotis 2004b, pp.95-96).

Since the beginning of the 1990s, non-governmental organisations and pressure groups raise complaints to international organisations regarding the discriminative treatment of the minority and members of the minority demand equal rights and their recognition as a Turkish minority. A stream of appeals to the High Commissioner on National Minorities of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) concerns among others forced assimilation and restrictions in cultural expression, difficulties with visas and travel as well as the question of citizenship (Kemp 2001, p.180). Greek political authorities began to realise the detrimental results of the restrictive administrative policy. The escalation of conflict between nationalistic groups of Greek Orthodox residents and Muslims in Thrace in 1990 led to the decision for a policy change on the basis of non-discrimination and equality of rights. The decision was taken by the leaders of three political parties, ND, PASOK and SYN in a private meeting (Giannopoulos & Psarras 1990). The same year Greece and Turkey, as participating states to the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE, renamed to OSCE in 1995) signed the Copenhagen Document which encompasses provisions on positive minority rights (articles 30-40).[129] Despite the consensus on the policy change, no initiative was taken for the abolishment of the provision on the loss of nationality and the rectification of injustices (Anagnostou 2005, pp.335-346).

However, since the end of the 1980s, experts of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are involved in the CSCE's activities on Human Dimension and the working groups of

[128] See Reservations and Declarations for Treaty No.005 - Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, available at https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/005/declarations?p_auth=QxfYvI7t&_coeconventions_WAR_coeconventionsportlet_enVigueur=false&_coeconventions_WAR_coeconventionsportlet_searchBy=state&_coeconventions_WAR_coeconventionsportlet_codePays=GRE&_coeconventions_WAR_coeconventionsportlet_codeNature=10, last accessed 7.8.2018.

[129] Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE, Copenhagen, 29 June 1990

the CoE setting the international standards for minority protection. They become aware of the fact that the approach followed by the Greek authorities with respect to minorities is highly incompatible with emerging norms and search to put pressure on political leaders to reassess the strategic interests of the country. As Anagnostou (2005) explains in a study informed by an interview with Alexis Heraclides, appointed as consultant on human rights and minorities in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,[130] experts underlined the excessive costs of the defensive approach at the international level and urged for the adoption of measures for the protection of cultural identity, the recognition of a Slavic-speaking linguistic minority and the abolition of article 19 of the GNC (pp.341-346). The recommendation for a policy change with respect to loss of citizenship was strongly opposed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Antonis Samaras, who had already been engaged in the nationalistic mobilisation of the public regarding the Macedonian issue, as well as diplomats and high officials of the ministry closely related to the Minister. Yet, the Prime Minister Constantinos Mitsotakis, influenced by notable diplomats, kept a more positive stance. Although he avoided attention, he accepted the presence of ethnic Turks, Slavic-speaking Pomaks and Gypsies, groups with different identities within the minority in Thrace, and proceeded to the abolition of measures which were incompatible with the principles of equality and non-discrimination and restricted cultural and linguistic diversity. The precarious parliamentary majority of ND at that time, though, constituted an impediment to further changes with respect to article 19 of the GNC (Ibid.).[131]

The issue of deprivation of the Greek nationality was further elaborated away from publicity after the elections of 1993, during the governmental period of the socialist party. Since the middle of the 1990s, Prime Minister Costas Simitis set the goal of full integration to the EU. To enhance the country's democratic credibility and prevent criticism and diplomatic isolation of Greece at the international level the priorities of foreign policy in the Balkans are reassessed to fit EU policy goals.[132] Changes in the leadership of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs signified a shift to growing respect to minority and citizenship issues. Christos Rozakis, a former member of the CoE's European Commission of Human Rights and later judge and Vice-President to

[130] In this capacity he participated in the CSCE and the relevant UN Commission.
[131] See Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Memorandum of Alexis Heraclides, 26 February 1991, and Evangelos Kofos, 'Questions and Answers for our Minority Policy', 29 April 1991 (as cited in Anagnostou 2005, p. 334, note 3)
[132] The EU was expected, in turn, to support the Greek claims against Turkey in Cyprus and the Aegean.

the ECtHR, has been appointed as the State Secretary of Foreign Affairs in 1996. Although his service lasted only few months, the following Deputy Minister Giannos Kranidiotis as well as the Alternate Minister George Papandreou followed suit (Anagnostou 2005, pp.346-350). In 1997, Greece accedes to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by the UN in 1966.[133] The same year Greece signed the CoE's ECN and the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. Neither of the conventions has been ratified though. Furthermore, no action has been taken for accession to the UN Convention on Statelessness.

Nonetheless, the ongoing stream of complaints and reports concerning the rights of Muslims in Thrace brought up the probability of a monitoring procedure on the effects of article 19 on equal treatment under the auspices of the CoE as well as the attention of OSCE's High Commissioner on National Minorities (Anagnostou 2005, p.348; Anagnostou 2011, pp.6-12; Kemp 2001, pp.180-183). A visit of the Commissioner to the country in 1998 accompanied by firm recommendations to political actors to abolish the provision on the withdrawal of the Greek nationality by persons of non-Greek descent permanently residing abroad presented a window of opportunity for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to enter into negotiations with officials of the Ministry of the Interior. Officials of the latter Ministry raised strong opposition on the grounds of the sensitive demographic balance in Thrace and the public reactions that a possible return of Albanian-speaking Chams in Epirus and Thrace would trigger. Consensus, however, was reached on the condition that the abrogation of article 19 would not have a retroactive effect. (Anagnostou 2005, pp.346-354). Stateless persons are provided with identity documents and persons who had lost their nationality on the grounds of the specific provision may appeal against the revocation or follow the ordinary naturalisation procedure (Sitaropoulos 2006). [134]

All political parties (ND, PASOK, SYN, KKE), except the Democratic Social Movement (Δημοκρατικό Κοινωνικό Κίνημα DIKKI),[135] supported the initiative during the vote of the respective law in parliament. Nevertheless, the parliamentary

[133] Law 2462/1997 on the ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights aiming at the abolition of the death penalty, Government Gazette, no.25/A, 26 February 1997.
[134] Law 2623/1998, on the re-composition of electoral lists, the organisation and exercise of the right to vote in a different municipality, modernisation of the electoral process and other provisions, Government Gazette, no.139/A, 25 June 1998, article 9(14).
[135] A party shaped by former members of PASOK that later cooperated with left parties.

proceedings and the political outcome spell out the limited degree of social learning. Policy change was predominantly attributed to domestic considerations and acknowledgement of past violations of human rights norms was confined to left-wing parties. On the one hand, the Minister of the Interior of PASOK, Alexandros Papadopoulos, referred to "various reasons" and highlighted the provision of article 111 of the Greek Constitution prescribing for the preservation of article 19 of the GNC and its repeal by law after the necessary period (Greek Parliament Proceedings 1998a, pp.280-281). On the other hand, the representative of the conservative opposition party Prokopis Pavlopoulos declared:

> We must mention … -and the Ministry should also clarify- one thing. The provision of article 19, as in force today, does not violate any international norm, nor was our country ever accountable or condemned to international for a due to article 19. Article 19 is currently amended -and the government rightly does so- because we want to pursue this policy. We are not accountable, I repeat, anywhere and there are no reasons of international commitment … The policy followed was not incompatible with international law … Consequently, there is no issue of retroactivity or reservation for future consideration of the matter (Greek Parliament Proceedings 1998a, p.286).

To the contrary, SYN and KKE brought attention to the problems faced by persons affected by the provision. SYN submitted a proposal for a transitory provision focusing on the re-examination of certain cases concerning persons who were born in Greece and are still settled in the country as stateless persons and those who lost the Greek nationality while studying abroad (Greek Parliament Proceedings 1998b). The MP of the communist party Achilleas Kadartzis, answering allegations of prospective violations of the Treaty of Lausanne by the side of Turkey, raised by a couple of representatives of PASOK and ND, stated that:

> The protection of national independence and territorial integrity of the country is associated with the state's policy. It is not related to article 19, which is a source of hazard of basic human rights (Ibid., p.387).

An indirect result of the lack of retroactivity and special transitional provisions for persons who deprived the Greek nationality on the basis of article 19, according to The Greek Ombudsman (1998), is the impediment of their naturalisation; their previous illegal residence in Greece prohibits them to meet the requirements relevant to criminal record (pp.34-35; Kostopoulos 2003, pp.67-70; Christopoulos 2012, pp.90-94). An

exception adopted in 2011 is addressed only to Jews born in Greece until 1945 who lost their nationality after their departure from the country (Ibid., pp.93-94).[136]

One year after the adoption of the law the public debate with regard to the rights of the members of the Muslim minority in Thrace is still marked with inconsistencies and confusion. Positive measures have been implemented in the context of an ethnocentric understanding that dictates the preservation of their distinction from the orthodox community and encourages scepticism towards diversity (Skoulariki 2009; Christopoulos 2004a, pp.136-139). In 1999, the OSCE's High Commissioner on National Minorities, in one of his rare public statements,[137] entered the public debate to clarify to sections of the political elite and the media that commitments under the 1990 Copenhagen Document should not be interpreted as incompatible with respect to the principle of the territorial integrity of states (article 37). Moreover, he stated that commitments refer not only to minorities officially recognised by the state; to the contrary the provisions of the Copenhagen Document refer to groups within the Muslim minority with different ethnic or linguistic identities (Kemp 2001, pp.181-182).[138]

The NCHR has also stated its dissatisfaction, as well as the dissatisfaction of international human rights organisations, and urged the government to sign and ratify the relevant Conventions CoE and the UN (NCHR 2003). No action has been taken in this direction though. As Sitaropoulos (2006) remarks, article 19 of the GNC was "an overtly racially/ethnically discriminatory provision" (p.108) that had long-lasting negative effects both on the members of the minorities and the local societies; "[A]t the same time it contributed to the persistence of a central state mentality aiming, in effect, at the exclusion of the 'ethnically other' from modern society" (Ibid., p.108).

4.6.2. Passports for homogenis fleeing from Turkey and Albania

After the population exchanges, both Albania and Turkey searched to downgrade the size of the Greek minorities. The majority of the Greek population living in Istanbul had departed before the exchange. Out of 400.000 persons established in Istanbul around 195.000 were exchanged until 1925 (Divani 1999, p.194). 40.000 persons that left before the 1923 agreement without holding Turkish passport lost the Turkish

[136] Law 4018/2001, Reorganisation of the system for the residence permits of aliens in the country, regulation of issues of Local Authorities and other provisions concerning the Ministry of the Interior, Government Gazette no.215/A, 30. September 2011, article 13.
[137] The statement was given to the Greek section of BBC World Service.
[138] Statement of 23 August 1999, OSCE doc. HCNM.GAL/6/99 (as cited in Kemp 2001, p.181).

nationality and where deprived of the right to return to Turkey (Ibid., p.197). The Turkish objective was to minimize the Greek minority which was considered a threat for the internal security. The rights of settled persons were infringed as there were restrictions on travelling and the use of the Greek language, lack of provisions on minority schools, political representation and appointment to civil services (Ibid., pp.192-204).

The persecution of the Greek minority continues during the 1950s and 1960s and is linked with the developments over the union of Cyprus with Greece and its eventual independence. In 1964, 12.500 members of the Greek minority in Istanbul, considered enemies of the Turkish nation, are deported. (Clogg 1992, pp.149-168). Furthermore, the Mandatory Law 2280/1940 provided that homogenis refugees from Asia Minor and Thrace that acquired a foreign nationality before the signature of Treaties of Lausanne and Ankara without permission of the Turkish Government lose the right to the Greek nationality (article 11). The status of refugee and the entitlement to the Greek nationality as regards homogenis coming from Russia is limited to persons that came until 1937 (article 12). The intention of attributing the status of alien to these groups of homogenis was to facilitate their settlement in Greece (Georgiades 1941, pp.126-127, 131-134; Grammenos 2003, pp.399, 404-406).

In Albania the repression and persecution of Greeks escalated during the interwar period and a great number of minority members fled to Greece (Divani 1999, pp.258-297). From 1940 to 1987 Albania and Greece were considered to be in a state of war as Greece contested the Albanian rule of Northern Epirus. The closure of borders by the belligerent states disrupted interstate movements that were common not only for members of the Greek minority but also for Albanian elites, with studies being the most prominent reason. Not only those persons and their descendants remained entrapped in the Greek territory but more Greeks, as well as Albanians and Vlachs, immigrated permanently during the 1930s and the 1960s. Since the end of WWII, Albania typically respected the rights of minorities; nevertheless, the establishment of the Albanian communist regime isolated the country from the international system, undermined the political rights of the whole population as well as the minority educational system. The prohibition of religious activities and the relocation of specialised workers diminished the size of the minority and the role of the Orthodox Church as a cohesive link as well as the size of the minority (Tsitselikis & Christopoulos 2003; Baltsiotis 2003; Christopoulos 2004b; Christopoulos 2009b, p.74).

Considering the hardship of homogenis traveling or working abroad and given that their naturalisation is not feasible, the Council of Ministers decided in 1952 to provide Greek passports to homogenis from Northern Epirus, to stateless homogenis from Cyprus, to 'settled' homogenis from Istanbul and homogenis from Imbros and Tenedos. The acquisition of the passport for homogenis from Turkey and Albania (O.T.A. passport) does not entail the recognition of the Greek citizenship; it enables though, the departure of these groups from Greece.[139] By the time this decision is abolished, in 1976, the Greek authorities attempt to maintain the size of the Greek minorities in Turkey and in Albania by refusing an entitlement to the Greek nationality (Christopoulos 2004c; Christopoulos 2012, pp.94-101).

The Council of Ministers decides to provide O.T.A. passports to homogenis from Turkey who lost the Turkish nationality, to homogenis from Turkey without valid Turkish passports who live in Greece more than five years and to homogenis from Northern Epirus. In the case of homogenis from Northern Epirus there was no requirement of statelessness or lack of Albanian passport since no Albanian passports were provided anyway and Albania had never deprived the Albanian nationality. According to this confidential decision the Greek passport constitutes a refutable presumption of the Greek nationality rather than a conclusive evidence of it.[140] The passports were issued by the Prefecture following the approval of the Ministry of Public Order. Initially they were valid for specific journeys. Their expiry date was extended to five years irrespective of the number of journeys until 1998, when, after an informal meeting of the Ministers of the Interior, Public Order and Foreign Affairs, the application for naturalisation was added as requirement and the issue and validity of passports was linked to the naturalisation process. O.T.A passports were annually renewed as long as the naturalisation procedure was in process (The Greek Ombudsman 2006a, p.17).

The result of this political choice concerning homogenis from Turkey and Albania was the creation of a group of denizens, comprised of 2nd and 3rd generation of stateless, former Ottoman subjects or Albanian nationals who had no substantial links or biotic ties with their place of origin. The denial of the Greek nationality is

[139] Act of the Council of Ministers no.765, on the issuing of Greek Passports to homogenis from Cyprus, Istanbul, N. Epirus, Imbros and Tenedos, 10 July 1952.
[140] Council of Ministers, Disclosed Decision no.22, Issuing of special passports to non-Greek citizens from Turkey and North Epirus, 1 March 1976 (as in Christopoulos 2012, p.96, and Tsioukas 2009a, p.54).

accompanied by a number of privileges such as appointment to public office without the requirement of Greek nationality. This condition is replaced by the proof of Greek descent and consciousness (Papastylianos 2013, p.49). Since 1977, homogenis were entitled to special residence permits.[141] The issuing of passports without nationality continued despite the fact that this practice constituted an infringement to the legal order as stateless persons were not recognised as such but rather were attributed the status of quasi-citizen. In 2001 administrative authorities recommend the naturalisation of stateless persons as the reasons for this practice no longer exist.[142] However O.T.A passports are officially abolished as late as 2006, when the competence over passports was transferred from Prefectures to the Police (Christopoulos 2012, pp.94-101).[143]

4.6.3. Special identity cards for homogenis of Albania

Mass immigration of Greeks from Albania started at the beginning of the 1990s (Pavlou 2004, pp.265-267). Until then, members of the minority had been effectively integrated in the Albanian society. Since the fall of the communist regime, tensions between the Albanian government and the Greek minority were related to the minority's opportunities for Greek language education, suspicion towards the activities of Greek-Albanian cultural organisations and status of the Orthodox Autocephalous Church of Albania. In 1994, members of the Greek minority were removed from positions they occupied in the public sector, the army and the police on ethnic grounds. These problems not only deteriorated relations between Greece and Albania but also sparked nationalist discourse associated with the question of Northern Epirus, stemming from relevant cultural associations and organisations. Against this background, crucial for the prevention of politicisation of the controversy and the containment of further conflict between the two states was the mediating role of the OSCE's High Commissioner on National Minorities who facilitated dialogue by suggesting the main points out of contention and by urging the Albanian government to establish a

[141] Joint Ministerial Decision, O.T.A permits and passports, 26 February 1977 (as in Tsioukas 2009a, p.54).
[142] Department of Passports and Identity Cards, Ministry of the Interior, Briefing note to the Secretary General of the Ministry, 2 October 2000 (as in Christopoulos, 2012, p.98).
[143] Law 3130/2003, Issuing of passports by the Greek Police and other provisions, Government Gazette no.23/A, 29 January 2003.

framework for the protection of minority rights in compliance to the principles enshrined in the 1990 Copenhagen Document (Kemp 2001, pp. 162-167, 178-180).[144]

At the end of the decade though, on the occasion of the collapse of the regime and in conjunction with the relaxation of border-crossing restrictions, the minority turns for protection to the motherland which according to article 108 of the Greek Constitution is responsible to provide protection for Greeks living abroad. While a number of people especially from the minority's territorial zone arrive with consular visa others, Albanian citizens among them, are invited by relatives who already live in Greece and possess the Greek nationality. (Christopoulos 2009b; Pavlou 2004). Under article 17 of Law 1974/1991, foreigners invoking the status of homogenis must declare it and submit proofing documents to the respective police authorities during their entry to the country. The requirements, duration and process of acquisition of residence and work permit are to be defined with joint ministerial decisions. The provision, however, remains inactive until 1998 when homogenis coming from Albania are provided with EDTO, the special identity card that recognises the status of co-ethnic and guarantees lawful residence and access to employment for homogenis (Tsioukas 2009a).

The policy developed in practice until 1998 was transient and based on political imperatives. It was insecure for the newcomers and susceptible to corruption. Police authorities provided to persons that came in 1991 with six-month, non-renewable, residence permits escorted by a homogenis card based on the statement of the applicant. Yet, many Albanians living in the minority zone as well as Greeks living outside of it could easily obtain a card from cultural organisations or the Greek consular respectively. Although there is no provision on the lawful residence of persons whose application is rejected, the state shows tolerance on their illegal residence (Tsioukas 2009a; Pavlou 2004, pp.272-274; Triandafyllidou & Veikou 2002, pp.197-200). Since 1998, decisions are adopted at ministerial level and details on implementation are assigned to circulars. EDTO are issued by police authorities and are valid for three years. Family members are also entitled to EDTO, irrespective of their ethnic origin. A consular visa is required for the applicant to be eligible. Expired travel documents or visas are also accepted. [145] A renewable six-month certification corresponding to

[144] A bilateral Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, Good Neighbourliness and Security between Greece and Albania was signed by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs in Tirana on the 21st of May 1996.
[145] Joint Ministerial Decision of the Ministers of the Interior, Public Administration and Decentralisation, National Defence, Foreign Affairs, Economics, Employment and Social Insurance and Public Order,

residence and work permit is issued until the decision on the EDTO is reached. Negative decisions shall be justified, and applicants have the right to appeal. EDTO can be revoked after the decision of police authorities for reasons of public order and security.[146] Approximately 185.000 Albanian citizens were attributed the status along with privileges in labour market and social security (Baltsiotis 2009, pp.7-8; Christopoulos 2009b, p.73; Triandafyllidou & Maroufof 2010, p.44).

The prohibition of attribution of nationality to Greeks from Albania encapsulates the political choices of all governments until 2008. Naturalisation applications are not examined and homogenis applicants receive neither negative nor positive reply (The Greek Ombudsman 2005, pp.60-61). The official position of political authorities was that the attribution of nationality is hindered by the risk of losing the Albanian nationality and the possibility to return. The issue was discussed in the short parliamentary debate for the codification of the GNC that took place in 2004 under the government of ND. While there was an agreement between the conservative and the socialist party on the 'duty' of political authorities to ascribe the Greek nationality to Greeks of Albania settled in Greece, the main point of disagreement was the timing of the fulfilment of this obligation. The position of the conservative government was that the Greek nationality must not be attributed before ensuring, by means of an inter-state agreement, that the rights of these persons in the country of origin as well as their property would be secured (Greek Parliament Proceedings 2004, pp.2161-2162, 2165, 2370).

As the Minister of the Interior Prokopis Pavlopoulos stated: "[…] First the Albanian government should be convinced to provide the necessary assurance and afterwards we could proceed to the necessary adjustments" (Greek Parliament Proceedings 2004, p.2165). He continues that, corresponding to the rightful political choices of the former government of PASOK which were endorsed by the conservative party, ND is going to ensure the best interests of homogenis. "In any case we consider them, and they are, an integral part of the Greek population, an integral part of our historic continuity" (Ibid., p.2165). Despite the fact that representatives of the socialist

no.4000/3/10-e', Requirements, duration and procedure for the granting of residence and employment rights to Albanian citizens of Greek origin, Government Gazette no.395/B, 29 April 1998.

[146] Joint Ministerial Decision of the Ministers of the Interior, Public Administration and Decentralisation, National Defence, Foreign Affairs, Economics, Employment and Social Insurance and Public Order, no.4000/3/10-le, Requirements, duration and procedure for the granting of residence and employment rights to Albanian citizens of Greek origin, Government Gazette no.707/B, 6 June 2001.

party considered the argument on the endangerment of the minority's rights excessive, they did not questioned the assertion regarding the withdrawal of the Albanian national in case of acquisition of the Greek. As the MP of PASOK, and ex-Minister of the Interior during the period of 1996-1999, Alekos Papadopoulos stated:

> The tug of war and sound discussions between the Greek and the Albanian government for the fortification of dual nationality were locked in a stalemate and no agreement has been reached on account of the Albanian government (Greek Parliament Proceedings 2004, p.2161).

The party's position, however, was in favour of the immediate attribution of the Greek nationality and the resolution of potential problems at the diplomatic level. The diplomatic capacity of Greece as a member of international organisations was considered an asset strong enough to dispel fears regarding actions of dispute and withdrawal on the side of Albania (Ibid. pp. 2160-2161, 2170-2171).

Yet, as Christopoulos (2009b) remarks, the assertion concerning the loss of Albanian nationality is 'politically misleading and legally unfounded' (p.75). Pursuant to the Albanian Constitution, the Albanian nationality can be deprived only when a national applies for its loss and dual nationality is tolerated. In practice, next to the expediency of maintaining the size of the Greek minority and its ideological substantiation in the context of irredentist discourse, the actual reason for denying their naturalisation was the mistrust developed towards the Greek descent and minority status of persons who acquired homogenis cards by illicit means (Ibid., pp.73-75; Christopoulos 2004c; Christopoulos 2012, pp.146-149; Tsioukas 2005, pp.36-37; Baltsiotis 2009). A great number of Albanians with Christian names or fake Greek passports and excellent use of the Greek language came in Greece in search of better living conditions. Moreover, members of the minority do not deny their Greek-Albanian identity, although there is no intention to return in Albania. In the background of xenophobic and racist discourse, the asset of national descent, exclusively related with members of the Greek minority is undermined as they are culturally associated with Albanians rather than Greeks (Pavlou 2004; Veikou 2001).

In 2005 a change in policy and the criteria for the attribution of EDTO takes place with another ministerial decision.[147] On the one hand, in response to claims for

[147] Joint Ministerial Decision of the Ministers of the Interior, Public Administration and Decentralisation, National Defence, Foreign Affairs, Economics, Employment and Social Insurance and Public Order, no.4000/3/10-d', Residence and Employment of homogenis of Albania, Government Gazette no.646/B, 13 May 2005, amended by Joint Ministerial Decision no.4000/3/10-nb', Government Gazette no.583/B, 9 May 2006.

naturalisation, the validity of EDTO is prolonged from three years to ten years with a residence and work permit. On the other hand, national consciousness replaces national descent as the requirement for the status of homogenis; neither the consular visa, which is not accepted henceforth if expired, nor the place of origin or language are sufficient for the renewal of EDTO. Special Committees for Homogenis are established in the Divisions of Aliens responsible to determine the status of homogenis in case of doubt. Next year, the permission to start the naturalisation of homogenis from Albania is announced in a press release of the Ministry of the Interior, reassuring that, after the constitutional reform in Albania and the affirmation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the rights of this group are secured.[148] The ordinary rather than the special naturalisation procedure is followed.[149]

In the Annual Report of 2007, the problems that homogenis of Albania faced with respect to the acquisition or renewal of the EDTO, the naturalisation process and their lawful residence in Greece are highlighted by The Greek Ombudsman and further action is recommended (The Greek Ombudsman 2007, pp.66-67, 70-71). Since 2008, after the adoption of Law 3731/2008,[150] persons whose EDTO applications are rejected are provided with one-year residence permit and their status is regulated by the law on the entry and sojourn of TCN (article 45(1z)).[151] Due to excessive retards in the process, homogenis are excluded from the required personalised interview (article 41(2)). As a result, the number of naturalisations is significantly raised; until 2010, 50.000 Greeks from Albania acquired the Greek nationality (Tsioukas 2009a; Christopoulos 2012, pp.144-156; Christopoulos 2006a, pp.273-274).

4.7. Immigrant's access to citizenship

During the 1990s, Greece becomes a destination country for economic immigrants and within a decade TCN comprise almost the 10% of the permanent population.[152] Besides

[148] Press Office, Ministry of the Interior, Public Administration and Decentralisation "Briefing by the Minister to the Standing Committee of Public Administration, Public Order and Justice on the issue of nationality attribution to homogenis from Northern Epirus, 7 November 2006 (as in Christopoulos 2012, pp.144-145).
[149] Article 5 of the 2004 GNC
[150] Law 3731/2008, Reorganisation of the municipal police and regulation of other issues falling under the competence of the Ministry of the Interior, Government Gazette no.263/A, 23 December 2008,
[151] Law 3386/2005 on the entry and sojourn of TCN in the Greek territory, Government Gazette no.212/A, 23 August 2005.
[152] According to data of the Hellenic Statistical Authority the number of aliens with permanent residence in 1991 was 166.031. In 2001 the permanent alien population reached 761.813 persons while the general census of 2011 recorded 912.000 persons (http://www.statistics.gr/el/immigration-data, last accessed 8.8.18).

Russian and Ukrainian citizens, the majority of immigrant population is consisted mainly of Albanian as well as Bulgarian and Romanian citizens who lacked the necessary documents and residence permits but also, in a lesser degree, immigrants from Asian and African countries (Tsioukas 2009b; Triandafyllidou & Maroufof 2010). Given the geopolitical context and the restrictive legal framework of the EU, the first laws follow a defensive, instrumental and reactive approach to immigration rather than a comprehensive long-term policy design (Law 1975/1991). The regularisation of immigrants takes place with two Presidential Decrees in 1997[153] and with Law 2910/2001 offering short-term renewable residence permits on the basis of the labour market needs (Triandafyllidou 2009, pp.159-165; Triandafyllidou 2010, pp.97-111; Tsioukas 2010, pp.129-134).[154] The restrictive immigration policy is also reflected to provisions concerning the naturalisation of TCN.

In 1993 the required residence period for naturalisation is raised to ten years, within the last twelve years or five years after the declaration of will, with Law 2130/1993, and the presence of two Greek citizens as witnesses is added to the procedure of application submitted to the Ministry of the Interior (article 4(1a,b,c). Naturalisation requirements do not apply to persons who are born and have their permanent residence in Greece (article 4(1b)) as well as persons who offer special services and their naturalisation could advance national interest (article 8). Marriage with a Greek citizen does not entail an entitlement to the Greek nationality, however constitutes a fact that is taken into account (article 32). In 1997, spouses of Greeks with children born within marriage are excluded from the requirement of residence.[155] In 2001, pending deportation decisions and criminal behaviour regarding specific offences are added as impediments prohibiting naturalisation (Law 2910/2001, article 58(1b,c)). The optional requirement of five-year residence after the naturalisation declaration is

[153] Presidential Decree no.358/1997, Requirements and procedure for the lawful residence and employment of aliens in Greece who are not nationals of EU member states, Government Gazette no.240/A, 28 November 1997, and Presidential Decree 359/1997, Issuing of residence card of limited duration to aliens, Government Gazette no.240/A, 28 November 1997.

[154] Law 2910/2001 on the entry and sojourn of aliens in the Greek territory. Acquisition of the Greek nationality by naturalization and other provisions, government gazette no 91/A', 2 May 2001 which amended Law 1975/1991. Further amendments were introduced by law 3013/2002, art. 25, law 3064/2002 art. 32, law 3068/2002 art.15, law 3074/2002 art. 11, N. 3103/2003 art. 23, law 3146/2003 art. 8, law 3153/2003 art.37, law 3169/2003 art. 10, law 3202/2003 art. 31-32, law 3242/2004 art. 25, law 3274/2004 and Decree 15514/11.10.04 of the Under-secretary of the Ministry of the Interior (as in Pavlou, et al. 2005, p.4, note 11).

[155] Law 2503/1997, Administration, organisation and personnel of the Prefecture, regulation of issues of local government and other provisions, Government Gazette no.107/A, 30 May 1997, article 14(12).

repealed and knowledge of the language are added to the requirements for naturalisation (article 58(2a,b)). A fee of 500.000 drachmas (approximately 1.500 euros) is added to the necessary documents (article 59(b)), however homogenis applicants are excluded from the requirement to submit the naturalisation fee one year later.[156] The naturalisation process is decentralised as the declaration and application can be submitted to Municipalities and local communities and regional authorities are responsible for its examination (articles 60,61,62) (Grammenos 2003, pp.103-139; Vrelli-Vrontaki 2005).

A personal interview conducted by the Naturalisation Committee, established under the auspices of the Ministry of the Interior, Public Administration and Decentralisation, is also added to the naturalisation process (articles 60, 64). Applicants must have a sufficient knowledge of the Greek language, history and culture. The opinion of the Committee is not binding for the Minister of the Interior who is responsible for the decision on the application, yet, it is mandatory to be taken into account. It is at the discretion of the Ministry of the Interior to decide, in relevance with the interest of the country as defined by national policies, the acceptance or the rejection of each individual case.[157] According to the 1955 GNC (Law 3370/1955, article 6(3)) decisions rejecting naturalisation applications are not subject to justification, restricting the applicants' right to petition pursuant to article 10(1) of the Greek Constitution. Since 1993, the deadlines for reply to citizens' application engaging all services of public administration[158] do not apply in the process of naturalisation (Law 2130/1993, article 5). The reason raised for this exception is the time needed for the process of scrutiny for decisions on acquisition or definition, loss and re-acquisition of the Greek nationality (Grammenos 2003, pp.103-139; Vrelli-Vrontaki 2005).[159]

The naturalisation procedure for TCN of Law 2130/1993 was introduced by the conservative government of ND. The restrictive measures on the naturalisation of aliens were consensually adopted in order to harmonise domestic legislation with European policy but also for reasons of national interest (Greek Parliament Proceedings 1993d,

[156] Law 3013/2002, Upgrading civil protection, Government Gazette no.102, 1 May 2002, article 21(3).
[157] Ministry of the Interior, Public Administration and Decentralisation, Circular F.94345/14612/8, 3 May 2001.
[158] Law 1943/1991, Modernisation of organisation and function of public administration, upgrading of personnel and other relevant provisions, Government Gazette A'/50, 11.4.1991, article 5, Law 2690/1999, Ratification of the Code of Administrative Procedure, Government Gazette no.45/A, 9 March 1999, article 4.
[159] Ministry of the Interior, Circular F.32089/10641/23, 26 May 1993.

p.4924; Greek Parliament Proceedings 1993c, p.4970-4971; Greek Parliament Proceedings 1993e, p.5208; Greek Parliament Proceedings 1993b, pp.5399-5400). Pursuant to the Explanatory Report to the law, Greece has been accepting a great number of immigrants from neighbouring states, as well as Africa and Asia, who apply for the Greek nationality in order to ensure their legitimate residence in the country as well as their legitimate movement, among other privileges, within the area of the EEC. "Greece, as a member of the EEC, is bound to attend and harmonise with the legislation of other states of the EEC, until a common response to the problem is established" (Explanatory Report to Law 2130/1993, as cited in Grammenos 2003, p.317).

Only a small number of PMs of ND raised concerns regarding the protection of Hellenism and the special characteristics of the nation while MPs of the communist party argued that states should combat the root causes of immigration. The exception of the naturalisation procedure from the deadlines and obligation to justify administrative decisions was also determined for reasons of national security; administrative authorities must have the time needed for a thorough and effective examination of applications (Greek Parliament Proceedings 1993d, p.4907; Greek Parliament Proceedings 1993b, pp.5399-5400). Certain MPS of PASOK, KKE and SYN expressed their opposition to the exception from deadlines and opted for prolonged but precise deadlines for naturalisation decisions (Greek Parliament Proceedings 1993d, pp.4918-4919; Greek Parliament Proceedings 1993e, pp.5197; Greek Parliament Proceedings 1993b, pp. 5400-5401, 5407).

A few years later, the Greek Ombudsman underlines the problems emerging from the lack of coordination between the Ministry of Public Order and the Ministry of Interior during the examination of the personality of the applicant, which may take even ten years, and states that the assertion that public authorities are not subject to reasonable deadlines when they manage naturalisation applications is irrational and contrary to the principle of sound administration (The Greek Ombudsman 1998, pp.31-32). The Greek Ombudsman further highlights the fact that omission of written justification of negative decisions prohibits judicial intervention on their legitimacy, undermines the rights of individuals with long-term residence and reinforces the tendency towards abuse of power (The Greek Ombudsman 1999, pp.66-67; The Greek Ombudsman 2000, pp.72-73; The Greek Ombudsman 2001b, pp.114-115; The Greek Ombudsman 2004, p.89). Nevertheless, no particular concerns were raised in the parliament on this issue, as access to citizenship has never been conceived as an

entitlement but rather a privilege of the state (Greek Parliament Proceedings 1993b, p.5404).

The adoption of Law 2910/2001 was marked by declarations of PASOK regarding the comprehensive management of immigration in the framework of European policy. The socialist government of Costas Simitis recognised the permanent character of immigration in Europe as well as its effective contribution in national economies and inaugurated measures relating to the long-term residence of TCN in Greece (Greek Parliament Proceedings 2001b, pp.5593-5595). According to the explanatory report to the law, the new immigration policy aims not only to the definion of the requirements of legal entry, sojourn and employment but also to the creation of the conditions that are essential for their social integration (Explanatory Report to Law 2910/2001, p.1). Besides another regularisation programme the law provides for family reunification. New and more flexible types of residence permits are introduced and the required lawful residence for the attribution of permanent residence permits is reduced from fifteen years to ten years. Moreover, the responsibility is transferred from police authorities to regional authorities under the auspices of the Ministry of Interior (Tsioukas 2010, pp.132-134; Triandafyllidou 2010, pp.106-111; Triandafyllidou 2009, pp.165-168). However, European immigration policy is not substantially integrated in the law and immigrants are still seen "as a needed albeit temporary and dispensable labour force" (Ibid. p.166; Mavrodi 2005). The residence permits have short duration and require frequent renewals depending not only by the fulfilment of typical requirements but also by a personal assessment of the applicant and his/her capacity to adapt to the Greek society. Furthermore, the administrative procedure is too complex and time consuming to consolidate a secure legal framework on residence regularisation (The Greek Ombudsman 2003, pp.103-110; Tsioukas 2010, pp.129-134; Triandafyllidou 2009, pp.165-168).

The parliamentary debate hardly substantiates a firm political will for the institutionalisation of the long-term integration of TCN. Despite statements of representatives of PASOK on a civic approach to integration and rupture with past practices on selective admission to citizenship, the government reassured that the Minister is free to reject naturalisation applications even in opposition to the opinion of the Naturalisation Committee (Greek Parliament Proceedings 2001b, pp. 5605-5606, 6510-5612; Greek Parliament Proceedings 2001d, p.5931). The opposition party focused less on the endangered homogeneity of the Greek society but more on the

responsibility of the state to preserve social cohesion and public security. As the rapporteur of ND stated, "the Greek society is not ready to accept radical solutions … the well-intended homogeneity of the Greek society continues to constitute a non-negotiable value for the Greek society" Athanasios Davakis, (Greek Parliament Proceedings 2001b, p.5600)

Still, evidence from the UN reports on ethnic minorities, presented by the Maragopoulos Foundation for Human Rights during the drafting of the law, was invoked by MPs of ND to support arguments associating the size and ethnic composition of the immigrant population with insecurity for territorial integrity and advocate for preference to co-ethnics (Greek Parliament Proceedings 2001b, pp. 5600, 5608, 5614-5615; Greek Parliament Proceedings 2001a, pp.5645, 5649, 5653-5654). MPs of SYN and KKE expressed their opposition with regard to the requirement of residence, knowledge of language and the expensive naturalisation fee. They, also, encouraged the introduction of justification of naturalisation decisions in accordance to the rule of law and respect for human rights (Greek Parliament Proceedings 2001c, pp.6345-6348). The provision was characterised "anti-democratic" and incompatible with the rule law (Aggelos Tzekis, KKE, Ibid., p.6346). Nevertheless, the low electoral power of both parties did not permit further discussion on this proposal.

In effect, xenophobic discourse transcends the political spectrum and also extends to other institutions such as the church (Christopoulos 2001, pp.60-62; Triandafyllidou 2009, pp.166-167; Gropas & Triandafyllidou 2009). The appeal to common origin as a means to demarcate the limits of the nation and the political community is conducive to the exclusion of aliens of non-Greek descent who live and work in Greece and whose number has been augmented significantly during the 1990s (Venturas 2009, p.135; Christopoulos 2004a). Immigration was not seen as a permanent condition but rather as a temporary economic phenomenon. In the context of political instability in the Balkans and given the fact that the majority of immigrants came from neighbouring countries, immigration was also seen as a threat for the territorial integrity and political stability as well as for the cultural unity and homogeneity of the nation Despite efforts of some NGO's, affiliated to the left, to set immigration to the political agenda there was no political will for a comprehensive policy design; negative public opinion and the absence of voting rights on behalf of the immigrants encouraged political elites to adopt a utilitarian approach to immigration. Until 2004, both of the main political parties shared exclusionary views towards TCN (Triandafyllidou 2009,

pp.162-168; Triandafyllidou 2010, pp.98-111; Tsioukas 2010, pp.129-131). According to Triandafyllidou:

> The Greek migration policy has to date been shaped less by left and right wing ideologies or policy choices but rather by a weird combination of nationalist ideology, lack of political will and free market laissez faire principles (Triandafyllidou 2009, p.160).

The code of 2004 replaced the 1955 code and integrated the laws adopted in the course of the two previous decades.[160] The provisions on the naturalisation were codified in articles 5-9 and preserved the differentiation between homogenis and allogenis applicants as the requirements of residence and knowledge of the language and history were addressed only to the latter group. Excluded from the requirement of residence are also persons born and settled in the country while the requirement of three-year residence is added for spouses with children within marriage. Stateless persons and persons recognised as refugees may apply after five years of residence within the last twelve years (article 5(2)). A special provision provides for the facilitated naturalisation of Athletes of Olympic sports who are members of a national team, with the requirement of five-year lawful residence in the country within the last twelve years (article 5(3)). Homogenis settled abroad acquire the Greek nationality by declaration submitted in the consular authorities of place of residence (article 10). TCN who offered special services to the country or his/her naturalisation could serve exceptional interests acquire the Greek nationality with honorary naturalisation (article 13). The provisions on the definition of nationality (article 14) and the naturalisation of homogenis settled to countries of the former USSR (article 15) are circumscribed in the subsection titled specific cases of nationality acquisition.

The initiative for the codification of provisions on nationality was taken by the government of PASOK. A special Committee for the codification of the GNC was established[161] and the draft law was elaborated in the Standing Committee of Public Administration, Public Order and Justice. The nationality code was adopted under the conservative government of Constantinos Karamanlis, elected in 2004. It was endorsed as the outcome of common political determination to establish a long-term integration policy consistent with liberal principles of equality and non-discrimination. The

[160] Law 3284/2004 on the ratification of the Greek Nationality Code, Government Gazette no.217/A, 10 November 2004.

[161] The Committee for the drafting of the GNC comprised of three officials serving as legal consultants to the Council of State, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Legal Council of State as well as high officials of the Ministry of the Interior (Explanatory Report to Law 3284/2004, p.1)

rapporteur of ND, Antonios Foussas, remarked that this code "will bring full transparency principally to the issue of hellenisations" (Greek Parliament Proceedings, 2004, p.2149). The contribution of immigrants to the economy and prosperity of the state is recognised and the fact that citizenship policy is inextricably linked with immigration policy is acknowledged (Ioannis Vladis, rapporteur of PASOK, Ibid., pp.2150-2151). The communist party and the coalition of the left expressed their opposition to the restrictive naturalisation requirements and the degree of discretion granted to the administration. (Ibid., pp.2151-2154).

The adoption of Law 3284/2004 by the government of ND under the procedure for Codes and not the regular legislative procedure entailed its discussion in a single parliamentary session and the restriction of submission of amending proposals. The Minister of the Interior, Public Administration and Decentralisation, however, illustrated the dominant policy frame:

> The GNC pivots around two axes. The first rule: The Greek nationality, evidently and indisputably, is acquired by Greeks through descent, creating the necessary requirements for the Greek body politic to include without doubt those who have the origin permitting the continuation of our culture and history … The second axis on which the code pivots is … the more general inclusive turn to all persons that wish and can live as Greeks, in essence. We set the conditions so as whoever comes in Greece, wants truly to live in this place, can contribute, loves Greece, to be given the opportunity to become also typically Greek (Prokopis Pavlopoulos,Greek Parliament Proceedings 2004, p.2163)

The codification that took place in 2004 could have been an appropriate occasion for the specification of the qualifications of the Greek citizen. The new code, however, rested largely within the existing policy frame and access to the polity for aliens of non-Greek descent remained restricted. This missed opportunity could be attributed to lack of political rather than limited research on integration problems and on proposals for new solutions to old problems. The Greek Ombudsman has, since 1998, constantly expressed concerns for the problems that foreigners of non-Greek origin confront due to the strong adherence of the Greek legislation to the principle of descent. More specifically, it has been argued that the provision regarding the assessment of the personality and morality of the applicant during the naturalisation procedure (2004 GNC, article 7(2)) is particularly vague. As a result, police authorities often relate their research with the existence of national consciousness and interpret morality as 'commitment to national ideals', stripping their judgment from objectivity. Thus, The Greek Ombudsman advised the institutionalisation of explicit criteria that would specify the concept of morality on the basis of participation and integration to

social and economic activities and in consonance with international law. (The Greek Ombudsman 1998, pp.31-32, 46).

Other deficiencies with regard to the organisation of the administrative authorities are related with the abuse of the discretionary power of regional authorities and the inefficient monitoring of central services, the inappropriate and formalistic implementation of legal provisions with respect to the definition of nationality as well as the insufficient infrastructure and personnel of the respective services (The Greek Ombudsman 2001b, pp.112-116; The Greek Ombudsman 2004, pp.89-90). As mentioned in the report, these comments and recommendations were mostly ignored by the Ministry of the Interior (The Greek Ombudsman 2001b, pp.114-115). No substantial change in the legislative framework or administrative practice has taken place after the introduction of the Code (The Greek Ombudsman 2007, p.68). Notwithstanding the fact that nationality laws are repeatedly amended, policy-making is not oriented to the design of a forward-looking durable management of immigration and integration but rather is confined to consequential but short-term solutions of problems that emerged in the past ignoring current social developments (Papassiopi-Passia 2006, p.121; Christopoulos 2004a, p.105; Christopoulos 2001, pp. 75-76; Vogli 2017, pp.110-111).

4.8. Conclusion

This chapter reviewed the evolution of the GNC and examined the politics of immigration and citizenship from the beginning of the 1990s to the adoption of the law on the GNC in 2004. In the background of the influx of immigrants and co-ethnics from the Balkans and Eastern Europe, the definition of the criteria of belonging to the nation and the requirement of access to citizenship were based on the concepts of homogenis and allogenis. The institution of citizenship in Greece was established on a cultural and ideological basis in the detriment of the political and civic character of the bond between the individual and the state that citizenship entails. The concealment of past practices of revocation of nationality by non-ethnic Greeks members of minorities and the advent of co-ethnics from Albania and the former USSR reinforces the paradigm of a homogeneous nation.

Political discourse focused principally on the repatriated Pontic Greeks who were shortly involved in clientelist networks and nationalist politics. Immigration of TCN was considered a temporary phenomenon and no mainstream party gets motivated

to campaign for a holistic integration policy. Parties of the left supported the integration of immigrants from the perspective of class-struggle and equality respectively. However, no initiative to open the debate for immigrants' access to the political community is taken, even by the most modernising parts of the political elite. Advisory opinions are mostly neglected by governments and when experts participate to the decision-making process, knowledge has a symbolic function offering legitimacy to already taken decisions. The goals and design of citizenship policy constitutes a consensual process; nevertheless, no prescriptive measures are introduced and policy learning in the context of European immigration policy is limited.

A special identity card, the EDTO, provided by the Ministry of Public Order, is institutionalised to provide for the privileged treatment of descendants of Greeks and their facilitated access to citizenship. The treatment of various groups of homogenis, though, is not consistent and eventually the requirements and access to citizenship are fragmented to address different categories of applicants. The first is aliens who follow the ordinary naturalisation procedure under the requirements of absence of criminal offences, lawful residence, knowledge of language, history and culture, and a discretionary assessment of his/her personality and morals. Applications are submitted to the Community or Municipality of residence and the respective authority for naturalisation decisions is the Minister of the Interior, Public Administration and Decentralisation. The second is homogenis aliens who apply for ordinary naturalisation and are excluded from naturalisation requirements, besides the provision on criminal offences, and from the procedure of oral interview. The third category concerns homogenis settled abroad whose naturalisation application is submitted to the Greek Consulates and assessed by the authorities of the Ministry of the Interior, Public Administration and Decentralisation in cooperation with the Ministry of Public Order. The fourth category concerns particularly homogenis settled in countries of the former USSR and cannot have their nationality defined on the basis of the Treaties of Lausanne and Ankara. Applications are submitted to the consular authorities who, in the absence of the respective documents such as birth certificate, assess the identity of homogenis, instead of their Greek descent, with an interview. Decision are taken by the Secretary General of the Prefecture. Exceptional provisions address children born and settled in the country, spouses of Greeks with children within marriages and TCN who are members of national teams of Olympic sports, TCN who have offered special services to the country and TCN whose naturalisation serves exceptional national interests.

The differentiated treatment of applicants spells out that, despite the predominance of the principle of descent, nationality laws have been flexible enough to serve national policy and strategic interests. The institutionalisation of the vague terms of homogenis and allogenis in the GNC to discern foreigners who wish to become Greeks in official discourse and administrative practice has been intertwined with wide discretionary powers of administrative authorities that is terminated in 2010. It has also developed to a major impediment for the introduction of an entitlement to nationality on the basis of residence and socialisation that is repudiated only when the number of children born and raised in the country and the problems they faced with respect to their legitimate residence could not be ignored.

5. The research-policy nexus in Greek citizenship policy-making

5.1. Introduction

Until the middle of the 2000s there are no institutionalised relations between universities, academic institutes or research centres with policy-makers or the public administration limiting opportunities to affect policy beyond theoretical critiques. Research on ethnic and religious minorities, immigrant integration and access to citizenship in Greece takes place independently from the state; it is usually self-funded and largely supported by EU or private funding (Pavlou, et al. 2005, pp.13-19). EU funding enabled the conduct of research in large samples and multiple complementary techniques of data collection. The study of citizenship was contained to studies of private (family) law, nationality law and civil rights (Christopoulos 2015). Besides law academics specialising in constitution, historians neglected minorities and examined only the persecution of communists during the period of the cold war (Baltsiotis 2004b, pp.95-96).

Social research focuses initially to homogenis from the former USSR while TCN, mainly Albanians, are included to the sample after the regularisation of their status. The subject matter covers a wide range of issues and problems in the relations between immigrants and the Greek population or the state. A great number of studies though remains unpublished. What is more, knowledge production lacks theoretical and methodological consistency, systematic analysis and follow-up and therefore falls short in providing an accurate account on the status of immigrants. Investment of state institutions on research production and utilisation is occasional and inadequate to support long-term projects. The research object is therefore determined in a large extent by governments' concerns or EU priorities instead of scientific criteria and domestic social needs (Stratoudaki 2009).

The shortcomings of immigration management and the ineffective transportation and integration of the EU Directives in the national legal framework triggered changes in the production of knowledge. Besides new policy-oriented research opportunities, new venues for dialogue emerge that facilitate the approximation of migration experts and state actors. This chapter analyses developments in knowledge production, changes in research orientation as well as changes in the relations between academic research and policy-making. The aim is to identify the actors and ideas that contributed to the contestation of the existing policy

paradigm and shed light on the sources of new ideas that structured discourse on policy change.

5.2. Developments in the research community

During the 1990s the development of a critical theoretical approach on minorities and immigrants has been hindered by the conception that there is no evidence for the presence of relevant groups in the country. Furthermore, social research concerning nationally sensitive issues has been considered to function in the detriment of national interest and should be avoided. As a result, knowledge production is conciliatory, characterised by biased or selective use of data that do not conflict national interests. Its scientific and methodological validity is also contested as research is often motivated by emotionally charged historical and nationalistic arguments ignoring or concealing problems emanating from actual reality. Arguments emerging after 1989 challenging the official narrative of political elites and public administration are also emotionally charged and lack methodological soundness undermining the effectiveness of political intervention (Tsitselikis & Christopoulos 2000).

In 1996, the year that the Minority Groups Research Centre (KEMO) was established, its founding members organised a kick off conference aiming to bring together academics and international organisation officials dealing with minorities and immigrants in order to formulate and initiate a substantial public debate on the accommodation of ethnic, religious and linguistic diversity. During the meeting the shortages of evidence-based knowledge production were identified and the need for inter-disciplinary dialogue as well as the development of a constructivist approach of research on minorities was stressed. The goal is to achieve convergence of methodological tools for theoretical and empirical research, and the development of a multidimensional perspective by creating a venue for communication, openness and mutual understanding, where ideas between the disciplines of law, international relations, social sciences and history are exchanged (Tsitselikis & Christopoulos 2000).

Furthermore, participants of the meeting acknowledged that research confined within the academic community is fruitless and a greater effort for social learning is necessary through dissemination of results in the wider society. The formulation of a critical, realistic perspective accurately articulated and founded on strictly scientific criteria was commonly agreed. The codification of this common scientific approach to diversity and human rights protection aims to redefine the concept of national interest

by providing an alternative both to the dominant attitude of the state, that involves the concession of minority rights exclusively to the officially recognised Muslim minority in Thrace, and the perspective of various NGOs and activists (Vasilaki 2007), erroneously advocating the minority status to every group with cultural particularity. Concurrence with the dominant policy paradigm should be inconsequential for the formulation of arguments. Yet, the framing of theories and arguments should correspond to the degree of political controversy and strive for raising awareness among decision-makers and the public without directly arousing public sentiment (Tsitselikis & Christopoulos 2000).

Besides domestic knowledge production reference is made to international research as well as international norms. Legal and political developments taking place in the context of the Europeanisation process are considered to give rise to an ideological framework that supports claims for protection of minority groups and provide mechanisms for their promotion. The failure of the Greek state to track these developments is confirmed by official reports of the CoE, OSCE and the UN which rank Greece among conservative states and is further ascertained by the infringement proceedings before the ECtHR. Against this background, the encouragement of critical reflection through cooperation with international organisations or other relevant institutions is considered indispensable (Tsitselikis & Christopoulos 2000).

Since its foundation, KEMO shed light to issues of ethnic, religious and ethnic diversity that had not only been absent from the public debate and the political agenda but also had been marginally covered by scholarly work. In close cooperation with experts from the HLHR and the Greek Ombudsman's Division for Human Rights and Equal Treatment, and the support of Panteion University, which provided legitimation in these first initiatives, a number of meetings and conferences are organised, and a series of publications is produced (Tsitselikis & Christopoulos 2000). The interest of academics and human rights experts in the area of citizenship studies is triggered by the problems faced by immigrants with permanent residence in the country and strong biotic ties due to the restrictive immigration policy and the mismatch of the multicultural social and demographic reality with the dominant national ideology on the homogeneity of the nation (Takis 2010; Triandafyllidou & Maroukis 2010; Papassiopi-Passia, 2006; Contiades & Papatheodorou 2007; Varouxi 2008). The liberalisation of citizenship law in Germany, a state with a similarly exclusive ethnocultural national identity, prompted assertions for the necessity to redefine the

criteria of belonging and admission to the political community on the basis of typical requirements and the introduction of ius soli (Christopoulos 2001, pp.75-76; Baltsiotis 2004a, pp.334-337).

As noted in the conclusions of the KEMO's and HLHR follow-up conferences, the experience of immigration should be used positively for a reflective analysis of the national identity. The allocation of citizenship rights to immigrants commands the redefinition of the status of the Greek citizen, both in terms of the rigid ideas of ethnic and religious homogeneity entrenched in the ideological core of citizenship and in terms of actual access to social and public goods (Pavlou & Christopoulos 2003). Academic knowledge can play an important role in promoting critical thinking. A necessary condition though is that knowledge production refrains from reproducing official state discourse on issues of non-decision but also from employing positivist models and determinist concepts as analytical tools (Christopoulos 2006b).

5.3. The academic debate

By the end of the 1990s academics and human rights experts engage actively in research on ethnic minorities, immigration and citizenship policy.[162] Existing justifications for the strategies chosen by the Greek political elites are challenged and alternative explanations for the ambivalent process of formation of the national identity are put forward. A common inference of the knowledge produced concerns the authoritarianism inspiring the country's political culture. This section looks into the literature focusing on the Greek nationality law and policy and illustrates the arguments developed with respect to the definition of the status of homogenis and allogenis as well as the goals and legitimacy of political choices. The last part sheds light on the policy frame that dominated the Greek policy until 2010.

5.3.1. On the definition of the status of homogenis and allogenis

Throughout the 20th century, the statuses of homogenis and allogenis produced the interpretive framework of political discourse on the national identity. However, pursuant to the jurisprudence of the Nationality Council and handbooks of nationality law there is no legal provision defining the term homogenis (Grammenos 2003, pp.99; Tsioukas 2005, p..33; Christopoulos 2012, pp.74-79). Yet, the content of the concepts

[162] Besides the introduction of relevant courses in the study programs of universities, an integral master's program on social discrimination, migration and citizenship is established in the University of Peloponnese, Department of social and education policy, in 2007.

has been the object of continuous negotiation and consultation within the Ministry of the Interior. The two terms constitute ideological rather than discrete legal concepts and as such their definition can change according to the occasion and be adapted to geo-political conjunctures (Baltsiotis 2004b, p.88; Christopoulos 2012, pp.116-117; Kostopoulos 2003, p.53). The criteria for the attribution of the status were, therefore, formulated from time to time by administrative authorities and courts.

During the period of the cold war, national consciousness rather than ethnic origin constitutes the main factor for determining the status of allogenis. In 1960 the Ministry of the Interior deems necessary to clarify that, notwithstanding the historical origin of the meaning of the terms, the translation followed by the Ministry has not been based solely on the criterion of descent. On the contrary, it is accepted that consciousness constitutes the determinant factor for the distinction between homogenis and allogenis. For that reason, there have been cases of persons with Greek descent that were considered as allogenis and lost their Greek nationality as they were missing national consciousness as well as cases of non-Greek descent that were considered as homogenis with Greek national consciousness. National descent, ethnicity, religion and language, constitutes a subsidiary criterion. Yet, the directions for the recognition of the prerequisite of national consciousness were only indicative: lack of registration to the consular rolls and contact with the Greek consular authorities, absence of interest for issues or events concerning Greece, the intentional acquisition of foreign nationality and the use of foreign passport, conscription in foreign army (Grammenos 2003, pp. 268-276).[163]

According to legal experts the prevalence of national consciousness and disregard of the requirement of descent in the circular of 1960 is an aftermath of the civil war (Grammenos 2003, p.100; Alivizatos 1983). From the interwar period to the establishment of democracy, the terms of the people -the electoral body- and the nation were representing two different concepts rather than coinciding in a single concept representing the source of state power. Authoritarian regimes searched to conceptually detach the electorate from the nation and establish the latter as the source of state power.

[163] Ministry of the Interior, Circular no.121559/412, 19 December 1960, on the concepts of the terms homogenis and allogenis in the Greek Nationality Code. See also Ministry of the Interior, Circular no.81559, 9 September 1963, on the definition of nationality of homogenis settled abroad; and Ministry of the Interior Circular no.51401/104, 4 June 1965, Announcement on the publication of the Royal Decree 339/21.4/10.5.1965 on implementation of provisions of article 35 of Legislative Decree 3370/1955 "on the ratification of the Greek Nationality Code."

The substance of national will may not be derived from the majority of the peoples' will but from the quality of people's will that endorse national interests. Pursuant to this view, the state represents the expression of the organised will of the nation. The deprivation of nationality on the basis of political convictions reflected this idea (Ibid. pp.83-86). Since the establishment of democracy, in 1974, the world nation next to the world people in the Constitution has been considered to refer to providence for the Greek diaspora. The two terms are complementary rather than mutually exclusive (Manitakis 2004, pp.191-202). Nevertheless, as Alivizatos remarks:

> There are explicit signs, arising not only from the persistent endurance of some arbitrary state practices of the past, but also from the discourse of certain political parties, which indicate that the definitive coincidence of the people and the nation, from a legal aspect, is still far from being established as the dominant legal framework (Alivizatos 1983, p.90).

In accordance with the case law of the Council of State, allogenis is considered the person of another ethnic descent who acquired the Greek nationality by any means and has expressed feelings that indicate the absence of Greek national consciousness, prohibiting his/her assimilation to the Greek ethnic community, which consists of persons connected to each other by common historical traditions, aspirations and ideals (Decision 57/1981. Similar formulation in Decision 59/1981). Homogenis is considered the person belonging to the Greek genos or nation; the possession of Greek national consciousness is deduced principally by features of his/her personality that link this person to the Greek nation such as descent, language, traditions and generally the common understanding of the historical destiny of the nation (Decision 2756/1983). The Nationality Council has also supported the view that consciousness rather than descent is the primary factor for the determination of the status (Papassiopi-Passia 2011, pp.36-39; Grammenos 2003, pp.99-100).

Undoubtedly, the criterion of national consciousness is prominent in the subsequent circulars of the Ministry of the Interior regarding the acquisition of nationality by homogenis with residence abroad and homogenis from the former Soviet Union. The only differentiation is that absence of relatives in Greece or contact with them and the country, absence of knowledge of the Greek language, history and culture, membership in organisations or events that undermine issues of national interest were

added to the evidence on failure to satisfy the requirement of national consciousness.[164] The criteria characterising national consciousness become more explicit since 2001;

> homogenis foreigner is the person who does not possess the Greek nationality but the Greek ethnicity. It is the alien who is related to the Greek nation via common history, language and religion, common traditions and customs. All these constitute elements that define the common national consciousness, which is the criterion for the status of homogenis (Ministry of the Interior, Public administration and Decentralization, Circular F94345/14612/8, 3 May 2001, Naturalisation-Definition).

In the context of the reassessment of citizenship policy, the status of homogenis is a personalised status assessed in each individual case; consular authorities are responsible to examine not only the Greek descent but also whether the interested person is entitled to the status of homogenis, as conceptually defined by the legal theory and case-law. During the interview it is scrutinised whether the applicant has a feeling of belonging, has contact with the Greek customs, traditions and way of life of Greeks in the former Soviet Union, has knowledge of the Greek language or the Pontic dialect, etc.[165] The circular on the 2004 GNC remains within the same framework (Grammenos 2003, pp.321-325, 364-375; Baltsiotis 2004a, pp.320-326; Tsioukas 2005, pp.33-34; Christopoulos 2012 pp.140-141).[166]

The most precise description of homogenis is related to the objective criterion of descent and concerns Greeks of Northern Epirus (Triandafyllidou & Veikou 2002, p.198). According the Council of State "co-ethnics from Albania are the people that descent from Greek parents and their place of birth (theirs and their parents) is N. Epirus" (Decision no.2207/1992). The Greek Ombudsman, however, expressed concerns for preferential treatment on the basis of place of origin. Notwithstanding the fact that the state has a clear intention to provide for preferential treatment towards homogenis, two distinctive policies are followed by Greek authorities with respect to homogenis for the former USSR and homogenis from Albania. Commenting on Law 2910/2001, it is observed that for homogenis of Albania the issuing of EDTO is qualified by their permanent residence in Greece, the recognition of the status of homogenis does not entail the definition of their nationality and the authority responsible for their applications is the Police rather than the Prefecture (The Greek

[164] Ministry of the Interior, Circular F.32090/10643/25, 26 May 1993, Detailed directions on the naturalisation of homogenis aliens with residence abroad.
[165] Ministry of the Interior, Circular no F.79174/16211/10, 15 May 2001, Amendments in Law 2790/2000 on the acquisition of the Greek nationality by homogenis of the former Soviet Union.
[166] Ministry of the Interior, Public administration and Decentralization, Circular F.102744/2709/6, 28 January 2005, New Nationality Code.

Ombudsman 2001a, pp.12-14; Vogli & Mylonas 2009, pp.372-382; Christopoulos 2012, pp.196-199). Furthermore, while the lawful residence of EDTO holders from USSR whose permit is not renewed is regulated by the law on immigration, the respective group from Albania is not entitled an immigrant status until 2008. However, spouses and descendants of homogenis from Albania are also entitled to EDTO in contrast to spouses of homogenis from the USSR or other countries that are entitled to residence permits (The Greek Ombudsman 2007, pp.66-67; Tsioukas 2005, pp.35-37; Christopoulos 2012, pp.153-154).

The discriminative policy is abandoned in 2005. The change in policy regarding homogenis from Northern Epirus was affirmed during the adoption of the 2004GNC (Greek Parliament Proceedings 2004). However, the parliamentary debate was rather limited. Neither the formulation of explicit content of the term homogenis nor the issues of inconsistencies and discriminative treatment constituted subjects of debate, reinforcing the suggestion that the limits and criteria of inclusion and exclusion to the Greek political community are not issues of public concern.

5.3.2. On the legitimacy of selective access to citizenship and rights

The ambiguity characterising the policy towards homogenis and allogenis has raised diverging opinions with respect to the goal of citizenship policy as well as its legitimacy. In the 2004 GNC the importance of ethnic bonds, common descent and common national identity is evident in the prevalence of ius sanguinis and absence of ius soli, the provisions on the naturalisation of homogenis with residence in Greece or abroad and the exemption from the naturalisation fee, as well as the acquisition of nationality after conscription in the Greek forces (2004 GNC articles 1, 4, 5, 6(3)(ζ), 10, 15) (Voulgaris 1999).

One strand of legal experts does not consider preferential treatment of co-ethnics as contrary to the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of ethnic origin (ECN, article 5), as the prohibition is referred to TCN (Voulgaris 1999; Kasimatis 1980, pp.90-93). Moreover, the distinction between allogenis and homogenis does not result from ethnic origin and national descent but from the right to self-determination. According to this opinion, descent does not represent a sufficient, cohesive bond of an ethnic group; the criterion for an effective bond is the feeling of common goals and aspirations and the will to participate in common action. Voulgaris (1999) argues that objective criteria such as descent are not appropriate to determine the members of the

community as they restrict the right to self-determination. To the contrary, subjective criteria such as ethnic consciousness and the common feeling of belonging to the Greek nation are considered evidence of integration to the Greek society and an ascertainment for the inclusion to the political community (pp.1359-1361).

In opposition to this view, it is argued that the Greek legislation has always upheld descent as the principal criterion. The possession of national consciousness has a subsidiary character; it is a matter of fact and should be deduced by evidence that is stated with accuracy in the report of the respective authority (Papassiopi-Passia 2011, p.36). In practice while national descent constitutes the essential requirement in order to apply for the examination of the status of homogenis, national consciousness is a qualification related to the final decision on the status that facilitates the acquisition of nationality. Tsioukas (2005) stresses that, although descent is not sufficient for the attribution of the Greek nationality, the presence of national consciousness is inconsequential unless it is complemented by the requirement of descent (p.34). Papassiopi-Passia (2011) asserts that the requirement of national consciousness is particularly important for the attribution of the status of homogenis with respect to the naturalisation procedure. Yet, it is the requirement of descent that prevails when it comes to preferential treatment of the law towards homogenis aliens on the basis of their residence and work permit as in the case of appointment of homogenis from Northern Epirus, Istanbul, Cyprus, Imbros and Tenedos in public office, the acquisition of property in certain areas by homogenis aliens or their enrolment to sports associations (pp. 36-45). According to this view, had Greece ratified the ECN the discriminative treatment between homogenis with foreign nationality and TCN with permanent residence permits would have constituted an infringement of article 5 (Ibid., pp.44-45; Grammenos 2003).

Despite the fact that the term allogenis is not adopted in the 2004 GNC, a number of legal provisions encumbers the exercise of certain rights from naturalised citizens of non-Greek ethnic origin. This distinction concerns the President of the Republic who must be Greek by descent (Constitution of Greece, article 31). Moreover, certain public offices are considered particularly important for the organisation and function of the Greek state and for that reason appointment is reserved for Greeks; naturalised citizens may apply after five years from their naturalisation. These concern

appointment in public office,[167] in the judiciary or as lawyer,[168] and in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[169] Appointment as legal officer or notary was prohibited for non-ethnic Greeks until 1995 and 2000 respectively.[170] Vigilance towards citizens of non-Greek origin has been reduced as the time limit is one year after naturalisation for civil servants,[171] and three years for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and for legal officers, concerning both naturalised homogenis and allogenis.[172] Yet, favourable treatment for homogenis is still sustained (Papassiopi-Passia 2011, pp.36-45; Christopoulos 2012, pp.77-78).[173]

The limitations of rights of naturalised citizens was firstly introduced to the newly established Greek state in the 19th century. At that time, it was related with antagonism between the autochthonous and heterohthonous populations regarding the distribution of power in the government and state apparatus. In the first Constitutional Assembly that took place in 1844, the adoption of article 3 of the Constitution which stablished the equality of Greek citizens before the law of the state raised the question of the attributes of the Greek citizen. The aim of the article was to ensure the equality of all persons possessing the status against non-citizens on the occasion of the centralisation of power and the expansion of bureaucracy and the relation between the citizenry. Nevertheless, autochthonous Greek citizens who held positions of power saw the proliferation of political civil and social rights in combination with the rationalisation of state institutions as a threat to the established status quo and raised complaints. The debate focused on the relation between the citizenry and the cultural community of the Greek genos and on claims for the restrictions of the rights of

[167] Presidential Decree 611/1977, on the Code of Civil servants, Government Gazette no.198/A, 16 July 1977, article 18.
[168] Law 3086/2002, Organisation of the Legal Council of State and requirements of officers and employees, Government Gazette no.324/A, 23 December 2002, article 30(3) and Legislative Decree 3026/1954, on the Code of Lawyers, Government Gazette no.235, 8 October 1954, article 3(1).
[169] Law 2594/1998, on the Code of organisation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government Gazette no 62/A, 24 March 1998, article 53(1).
[170] Law 2318/1995, on the Code of Legal Officers, Government Gazette no.126/A, 19 June 1995, which abolished Legislative Decree 1210/1972 and Law 2830/2000 on the Code of Notaries, Government Gazette no.96/A, 16 March 2000, which abolished law 670/1977.
[171] Law 2683/1999 on the Code of Civil Servants Government Gazette no.19/A, 9 February 1999, article 4, amended by Law 3528/2007, Government Gazette no.26/A, 9 February 2007.
[172] Law 3566/2007, on the Code of the organisation of the ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government Gazette no.117/A, 5 June 2007, article 66(1a), amended by Law 3712/2008, on the organisation of the system of official translation, establishment of the translations service in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, chartered translators and other provisions, Government Gazette no.225/A, 5 November 2008, and Law 2812/2000 on the ratification of the Code of Legal Officers, Government Gazette no.67/A, 10 March 2000 , article 2(2).
[173] Law 2830/2000, article 19(2) and Law 3712/2008, article 10(a).

naturalised citizens. Discontent was expressed towards the European intelligentsia, Bavarian and Greek, who, due to their better education, acquired high offices in the detriment of autochthons who conducted the war. They were accused of limited patriotic action, lack of adherence to traditional values and failure to promote national interests inside the country and abroad (Dimakis 1991;Vogli 2007, chap.7; Papastylianos 2013).

Eventually, however, the provisions adopted were far more moderate than the extent of the controversy, affecting temporarily a limited number of citizens with a resolution attached to the constitution (Dimakis 1991). A period of adaptation before appointment, varying from two to four years, was imposed to heterochnonous Greeks who settled in the country after 1827, the year that descent from a Greek father was added to the requirements of nationality acquisition, distinguishing civil from political rights (Resolution B').[174] With respect to article 3, the Constitution of 1844 provided that "only Greek citizens are accepted to all public offices. Citizens are those who acquired or will acquire the characteristics defined by the laws of the state". Despite the fact that the content of article 3 was adopted as a moderate solution to the controversy, the provision has henceforth been established in the Greek constitutional order (Vogli 2007, chap.7; Christopoulos 2012, pp. 56-57).[175]

Pursuant to the case law of the Council of State the limitations of the 20th and 21st century concern the qualifications for appointment in certain posts which according to the Constitution of Greece, article 103(1), are defined by the law. However, the prominent view among legal experts is that they are contrary to article 4(1) of the Constitution providing for the equality of all Greek citizens before the law and call for the elimination of the discriminatory practice. Papassiopi-Passia (2011) argues that, although this is a practice followed by other states too, there is no justification for the reservation to place confidence in naturalised persons of non-Greek descent as the state has already accepted that these individuals fulfil the requirements for the attribution of nationality (p.42). Voulgaris (1999) holds that the provision regarding the appointment of homogenis with foreign nationality in public office requires not only Greek descent but also an ethnic consciousness and is founded on article 108 of the Constitution

[174] Appointed as civil servants were therefore autochthonous population and persons who moved to Greece and joined the revolution. Greeks who came from territories of the Ottoman Empire, as refugees or under the Protocols, were discerned from heterochthonous persons.
[175] 1975 Constitution of Greece, article 4.

providing for the Greek diaspora. To the contrary, the meaning of allogenis in the cases that restrict certain rights from naturalised citizens is established on ethnic descent rather than ethnic consciousness. Given that there is no constitutional provision providing for the preferential treatment, with the exception of the constitutional provision regarding the President of the Republic, the provisions are considered to undermine the principle of equality of all citizens and to be in opposition with article 5 of the ECN (pp.1361-1363).

5.3.3. On the dominant policy paradigm

The law of descent and the principle of ius sanguinis has been a constant feature of the GNC, an expression of cultural continuity and homogeneity of the Greek nation. Vogli and Mylonas (2009) contend that the formation of special relationship between homogenis and the Greek state has been associated, since the era of political independence, with the process of state-building; as a result, the consolidation of preferential treatment in the GNC is conceived as a fundamental and perpetual component of state sovereignty (p.356). Nonetheless, they argue that affirmation of prevalence of ius sanguinis is not sufficient to explain the differential treatment of immigrant groups that lies beyond the homogenis-allogenis distinction (Ibid.).

The dominant explanation provided by political parties and mainstream media attributes preferential access to citizenship to the ethnic character of the Greek state and the tension entrenched in the Greek national identity between the universalistic understanding of Hellenism and the particularistic claims of Orthodoxy and Greek nationalism. Differentiated policies towards homogenis are associated to political patronage and search for votes (Vogli & Mylonas 2009; Christopoulos 2001). Triandafyllidou and Veikou (2002) more accurately argue that national ideology is determined by an implicit or explicit ‘hierarchy of Greekness’ (p.189) organised in ‘concentric circles around the ethnonational core’ creating ‘multiple levels of inclusion and exclusion’ (p.201). Although the Greek national identity includes both ethnic and civic features, interaction with the changing international context and domestic social and political conditions reinforced ethnic ties and common cultural past at the expense of civic features. In the background of immigration pressures, the Greek state has opted for a selective policy defined by a combination of ethnic and religious features. Differentiated treatment between homogenis form the USSR and Northern Epirus is

justified on the basis of national interests, meaning the interests of citizens of the Greek state that prevail over the interests of the Greek diaspora (Ibid., pp.202-203).

Vogli and Mylonas (2009) argue that priorities of foreign policy explain the timing of inclusion of each group to the political community, but they do not sufficiently explain the privileges afforded to homogenis from the former USSR. In this view, it is the utility of each group with respect to national interests in conjunction to their potential electoral impact, determined by the geographical concentration and organisational cohesion of each group, that determines variation in the degree of inclusion. In contrast to homogenis from the USSR, homogenis from Albania are involved in a situation of irredentism and associated not only with claims on recognition of past injustices with respect to the persecution of Chams but also with the great number of Albanian immigrants in Greece. Furthermore, besides the concentration of homogenis from Northern Epirus in urban centres, the limited organisational power of unions and associations as well as their familiarity with the Greek political system constitute factors that discourage their political manipulation (Ibid., pp.383-389). The argument on the utility associated with national interests and political expediency provides a satisfactory interpretation of political choices regarding different groups that have been considered as homogenis. Yet, it disregards the (unintended) consequences of the national ideology to the integration of TCN.

Baltsiotis (2004a) holds that the ideological construction of the Greek orthodox genos rather than ethnicity or descent is at the core of the citizenship policy; a construction flexible enough to enable the occasional inclusion of co-ethnics but too rigid to accept the inclusion of immigrants who meet the requirements of residence, language and social integration (pp.332-337; Baltsiotis 2004b, p.85). Christopoulos (2004c) further comments that the history of Greek citizenship has been inextricably linked to dominant discourse on national ideology but also to discretionary administrative practice. From this point of view the Greek genos represents the conception of belonging to the ideal ethnic community; a conception entrenched in public administration that perpetuates a xenophobic and exclusionary practice substantiated by –realistic or imaginary- concerns of undermining ethnic homogeneity. As a result, while assimilation to the national community is the only way of inclusion to the political community, the possibility of TCN immigrants or ethnic minorities to assimilate is precluded for mere historical and ideological reasons (Baltsiotis 2004a; Christopoulos 2004a; Christopoulos 2004d).

These authors suggest that the fact that the Greek society is characterised by cultural homogeneity does not stem from the uniqueness of Hellenism, Orthodoxy or national consciousness. To the contrary, it is the outcome of the state's denial to naturalise allogenis foreigners, a practice followed by political elites since the period of the Cold War, and of the successful assimilation, whether forcible or not, of non-Greek speaking and non-Orthodox groups of population that remained in the country (Baltsiotis 2004b, p.93; Baltsiotis 2004a, p.335; Christopoulos 2012, pp.204-207; Christopoulos 2001, pp. 63-64). Therefore, next to the explicit constitutive effects of 'imagined communities', national ideologies also implicitly reflect the optimal model for the consolidation of state power (Ibid., pp.58-59;). According to Christopoulos (2012), the content of the term homogenis can be defined by pointing out the authority responsible to decide in case of ambiguity or doubt (p.117). The determination of the concept of the Greek genos and the decision over access to the political community is not an issue of human rights and democratic consolidation but an issue lying in the exclusive jurisdiction of the government, a right of the sovereign state (Ibid., pp.199-204). Given that discrimination on the basis of genos, ethnicity, language or religion is contrary to the Constitution, the criterion of ethnic origin is concealed by justifications related to public order, national interest or security (Dimoulis 2008, pp.157-158).

On the one hand, from 1991 the Minister of Public Order contributes to the decision of the Minister of Interior with an opinion on the status of homogenis while from the beginning of the 2000s the former is exclusively responsible for the judgement (Law 1975/1991, article 7(2) and Law 2790/2000, article 1(11) amended by Law 2910/2001, article 76(6)). On the other hand, since the Civil Law of 1856 (article 15) the judgement on the degree of integration of TCN in order to naturalise rests on the discretion of public administration. As late as 2005, the Ministry has called employees not to abuse their discretionary powers;[176] yet, the administration escapes the obligation to justify negative decisions depriving the right of applicants to appeal to courts on the legitimacy of decision (2004 GNC article 8(2)). Furthermore, the deadline for administrative acts is set to 60 days and the applicant must be informed before this deadline in case of extension (Law 2690/1999, article 4). Cases of attribution, definition, loss and reacquisition of nationality, however, fall outside the scope of this

[176] Ministry of the Interior, Public administration and Decentralization, Circular F.102744/2709/6, 28 January 2005, New Nationality Code.

provision. Therefore prolonged delay or negligence to proceed application do not constitute omissions of due action (2004 GNC, article 31).

Contradictory decisions raise concerns on political expediency and undermine the principles of legal certainty and the protection of legitimate interests of the individual. Based on the ambiguous criterion of national consciousness and strategically implemented through a number of circulars, disclosed directives and oral orders, citizenship policy eventually constitutes an issue not regulated by rules but rather by occasional regulatory administrative acts. The decision on access to the political community appertains exclusively to the discretion of administration, as an entitlement to the Greek nationality on civic grounds would undermine not only the credibility of the national ideology on ethnic homogeneity but also the legitimacy of state intervention in the admission process (Christopoulos 2012, 196-199, 204-208; Christopoulos 2007).

5.4. The 2004 Greek nationality code: cultural dualism or policy monopoly?

At the beginning of the 21st century, scholars characterised the European integration process in Greece as a partially successful project (Demertzis 1997). The reasons for the incomplete transition to modernisation after 1974 are attributed predominantly to the Greek political culture and the particularities of the Greek identity. The latter is considered Janus-faced, comprising of two contradictory cultures; a parochial one, inherited by the Ottoman tradition and the Byzantine past and a modernising one influenced by the Enlightenment and Western liberal values (Triandafyllidou, et al. 2013; Triandafyllidou & Veikou 2002, pp.192-195). The interpretive framework of cultural dualism introduced by Diamandouros (2000) is employed by this approach to explain the political and ideological conflicts. According to Diamandouros' schema, the process of modernisation has been characterised by tensions between two cleavages that divide society; one represents a western modernising culture, advocating the introduction of western institutions, rationalisation of state structures and secularisation, while the other represents the parochial culture, championing tradition and the preservation of established pre-capitalist, pre-democratic political structures, implicitly nourishing a weak civil society, clientelist networks of power but also nationalism and xenophobia. Elements of the two cultures can be found in both the left and right-wing spectrum of the political system. The parochial culture attributes a dominant role at state intervention and undermines the role of institutions as intervening

structures between the state and society. Opposition to reforms signifying the redefinition of power relations and competition between the two cleavages has impeded the emergence of alternative ideas and consensual structures of political representation (Ibid.).

According to Tsoukalas (1983), the polarising relation between modernisation and tradition takes different forms. In European industrialised societies modernisation takes the form of endogenous change rooted in a compatible tradition which is transformed by the process. To the contrary, in Greece, as in other peripheral belated states, the concept of tradition is related not to the actual but an ideologically defined past not familiar with the process of evolution and reform. As a result, transition to modernity and the implementation of reforms require a radical rupture with tradition generating an antagonistic relationship between the two poles (Ibid.; Tsoukalas 1995). Lack of structural reforms, the strong relation of the Orthodox Church with the state and the dominant nationalistic discourse, therefore, has been attributed to the domination of the parochial culture over a liberal one (Triandafyllidou, et al. 2013). However, the approach focusing on the inadequacy characterising policy emulation from western European states has been criticised not only for neglecting the positive measures of liberalisation adopted during the last decades but also for its limited contribution to effective knowledge about society (Alivizatos 2001, pp.19-46; Gavriilidis 2002, pp.570-571). More specifically, the dichotomous approach of cultural dualism has been criticised for the rigid and simplified representation of modernity and the arbitrary adoption of the Western modernisation pattern as the optimal model of the process of reform. Furthermore, such an approach runs the risk of ideological closure since it precludes the emergence of new agents of change as well as the appearance of different forms of social and political conflict (Triandafyllidou, et al. 2013, p.14; Kouki & Liakos 2015, pp.54-58; Tziovas 1995).

Kouki and Liakos (2015) argue that the approach that understands modernity through the frame of transition to democratisation and European integration is loaded with normative expectations and prescriptive policies fostering particular identities, hierarchies and power dynamics:

> The passage from authoritarianism to democratisation was read ahistorically and in relation with party and top-down politics, while local contexts and cultural traditions, social mobilisations and protest movements were ignored if they were not compatible with a prescribed pattern of later development (Ibid, p.57).

Alivizatos (2001) further states that it is not only the acceptance of the expanded role of the state by the entire political spectrum that should raise concerns but also the absence of resistance on behalf of society. Despite the fact that political pluralism has been inaugurated in the Constitution of 1974, freedom of collective or individual self-determination is undermined by the limited access to political, economic or social participation beyond the channels provided by the existing political party formations (Ibid., pp.29-32). Lipovats (2000) attributes the weakness of civil society to the dominance of the hegemonic discourse of Orthodoxy and the representation of social problems as national issues, nourishing nationalism and racism. Therefore, considering the extent of introduction of new ideas and breach with existing structures and conceptions, the degree of reconstruction of the relation between the state and civil society, and the participation of new actors, the interpretation of the two cultures into concrete political goals and practices as well as social attitudes and performance can hardly be established (Psimitis & Sevastakis 2002, pp.71-77).

Psimitis and Sevastakis (2002) attribute the political choice of 'thin' modernisation to the combination of two factors: a technocratic approach adopted by political elites and organised interests aiming at the preservation of the established power relations and the emergence of an apolitical rationalistic and centre oriented, mediating political culture which serves the balance of inner-party interests; it dictates a rupture with past while at the same time lacks an ideologically coherent and binding strategy for the future. Conservatism and failure to implement political decisions is not considered an unintended consequence of ineffective implementation of political goals but an intentional outcome of strategic filtering of social demands. Therefore, in the paradigm of 'thin' modernisation, limited rationalisation and institutional inadequacy constitutes a dynamic process that restricts the range of problems and alternative solutions and institutionalises political intervention (Ibid. pp.62-70). The process of decision-making is confined through the mechanism of non-decisions; contention is prevented from the outset "whether by impeding the coherent political articulation of emerging issues and their access to the venue of decision-making, whether by eliminating eventual claims at the phase of administrative implementation" (Ibid., p.68). The bias in mobilisation and access to decision-making diminishes the chances for formation of an arena where alternative ideas and proposal could be expressed (Ibid., p.70).

With respect to the interpretive framework of cultural dualism, this thesis suggests that the politics of citizenship in Greece until 2004 escape the dualism outlined in the cleavages of traditionalist and modernisers. One the one hand, the liberalisation of nationality law has been hesitant and reluctant. Modernising legislative initiatives are barely escorted by a corresponding discourse on civic principles of integration. Criticism to governmental choices remains outside the public sphere principally for ideological reasons but still under the pretext of the national sensitivity and national importance of the issue. One the other hand, there is no evidence of concrete demands of political actors for a new civic approach neither proposals on alternative policy goals by expert communities or the civil society until the end of the 1990s. The modernisation of citizenship policy is largely related with the adoption of a new political culture that repudiates political contention as obsolete and praises consensus but still remains too conservative to be characterised as liberal.

The view that sees a policy monopoly acting in administrative venues of limited participation and manipulating policy through non-decisions seems to fit the pattern of policy and decision-making on citizenship policy. Not only societal actors are excluded from the debate but also scientific research and recommendations from non-governmental actors are ignored. Policy-making takes place within state bureaucracy by committees closely associated with the government and political parties and the goals while values of policy are determined by political considerations. As a result, there is no room for deliberation, scientific input to problem resolution and critical reflection perpetuating the indeterminacy of concepts. The adoption of the ambivalent legal concepts of homogenis and allogenis in political discourse and administrative practice has afforded extended discretion of the administration to decide access to citizenship and the difficulty to introduce an entitlement to the Greek nationality even after the articulation of legitimate demands. However, there is little evidence that this indeterminacy is an unintended consequence of a tradition of weak administration or a failure to modernise citizenship policy; to the contrary it is a strategic choice of political elites to preserve the dominant role of the state in the attribution (and loss) of the status of the Greek citizenship.

In 1993 the State Secretary of the Interior of the ND government, Aggelos Bratakos, explains in the parliament that:

> Besides the time needed for civil services to confirm the dossier of persons who want to naturalise … a national policy is implemented through the naturalisation

> procedure; And there exist national reasons that often dictate that the Ministry provides no answer, nor positive neither negative, to an application (Greek Parliament Proceedings 1993b, p.5402).

He continues that during the debate in principle of the draft law an honest discussion with representatives of SYN and KKE took place. After examining certain cases that cannot be stated in public the Ministry of the Interior explained that it is not appropriate to answer applications concerning nationals of states that are under negotiations with Greece (Ibid.). Representatives of PASOK refused to attain the inter-party meeting. In 2001, however, the Minister of the Interior of PASOK government Vasso Papandreou asserted that:

> The question of the discretion of the Minister of the Interior not to justify his decision to deny naturalisation has been discussed repeatedly in the Committee. It pertains to a sovereign right, to the exercise of public authority and I think that nowadays there is no legal complication. There is the case law of the Council of State but also of the ICJ. There are reasons why a Minister must have the discretion -the Consul as well, the Consul not to issue a visa, the Minister not to justify not to justify why he denies the naturalisation of certain individuals. These reasons might be more general and irrelevant to the specific individual; therefore, justification is not necessary (Greek Parliament Proceedings 2001c, p.6348).

In 2004, representatives of the two mainstream parties repeated the necessity to refrain from providing justification for negative naturalisation decisions and claimed that this policy is implemented in other European states. Exception from deadlines and judicial review was presented as a choice facilitating both the administration and the applicants (Greek Parliament Proceedings 2004). Representatives of KKE and SYN objected vigorously this choice. They argued that naturalisation requirements constitute sufficient evidence for the degree of integration of the applicant and should not be overturned by the administration's subjective judgement on morality. The naturalisation procedure was criticised as prone to selectivity, power abuse and political expediency. In particular, Fotis Kouvelis, MP of the coalition of the left, argued that suspicion and scepticism characterising the regulation of nationality acquisition during the Cold War should be abandoned. Given the changes taking place at international level with respect to immigration, the concepts of national interest and security must be reinterpreted rather than been invoked vaguely. The institutionalisation of deadlines and the mandatory justification of naturalisation decisions should be the first step towards the reconsideration of the goals of citizenship policy (Ibid., pp.2151-2154).

Moreover, Fotis Kouvelis questioned the allegation of policy emulation by European states. Undeniably, most of the EU-15 member-states provided for justification of naturalisation decisions in their nationality laws by that time.

Administrative courts in some of these countries have also upheld the engagement of the administration to render a reasoned judgment (Greek Parliament Proceedings 2004, p.2153; Christopoulos 2012, pp.208-210). The ECtHR has also supported the obligation of states to respect and safeguard the free development of personality as well as the privacy of social life when determining on the acquisition and loss of nationality (Papastylianos 2001). Nevertheless, in Greece the recognition of nationality attribution as an exclusive jurisdiction of state resulted in limited case law. Actions brought before the Council of State concerned mainly the deprivation of nationality under article 19 as well as the revocation of nationality due to counterfeit documents setting the limitation of five to eight years from acquisition (Vrontakis 1999; Tsolakou 2011; Christopoulos 2012, pp.141-142, 201-204). The court has been reluctant to circumscribe state discretion; besides the declaration of will of the applicant, the consent of the state has been considered necessary for the acquisition and loss of the Greek nationality (UNHCR Greece 2008, pp.89-306; Tsolakou 2011; Tsapogas 2008). Despite the progress of international law, the circular on the 2004 GNC[177] merely prompts civil servants to refrain from abusing this discretion.

At the same time there is no provision for channels of communication with society, evidence-based research and policymaking or access of non-governmental actors to venues of policy design and consultation. In 2002 the Migration Policy Institute (Ινστιτούτο Μεταναστευτικής Πολιτικής, IMEPO) is established, a think-tank supervised by the Ministry of the Interior aiming to conduct research with respect to immigration policy design and implementation.[178] Since 2004 the appointed president has been a member of the Central Committee of ND, the party in government, and the board is comprised by bureaucrats rather than migration specialists. Besides the organisation of few conferences on managing migration and a series of seminars, the first research projects were commissioned mainly in the first half of 2005, before the integration of EU Directives. However, despite absorbing state funding almost exclusively for research on migration, the production and dissemination of knowledge by IMEPO was limited to elementary information and documentation producing a deficit of policy-oriented knowledge within public administration. (Pavlou, et al. 2005,

[177] Ministry of the Interior, Public administration and Decentralization, Circular F.102744/2709/6, 28 January 2005, New Nationality Code.
[178] Law 3013.2002, Upgrading civil protection, Government Gazette no.102/A, 1 May 2002, article 23(1).

p.13; Pavlou 2007a, p.311). It function is terminated in 2010 by the government of PASOK when the General Secretariat for Immigration policy is established in the Ministry of the Interior.

5.5. Towards a policy of civic integration

The first decade of the 21st century was marked by the rise of two competing trends towards immigration policy. On the one hand, since the elections of 2004, PASOK the main opposition party, SYN and KKE, included in their party programs a set of pro-active measures regarding the integration of immigrants as well as the naturalisation of the second generation. After the initiative of George Papandreou, the leader of PASOK, immigrants are accepted as party members. The initiative is partly supported by the party's regional and local committees (Triandafyllidou 2009, p.169).[179] Agents of the civil society, such as trade unions, also supported the regularisation of immigrants and respect for working rights. On the other hand, nationalist and xenophobic views are asserted by Laos, the extreme right party that entered the parliament in 2007. These marginalised views are legitimised in the media but are also shared by candidates of all major parties of the political spectrum. Against this background, the government of ND, in power from 2004-2009, follows a realistic ad hoc approach to immigration rather than a progressive policy for the long-term management of immigration. Besides statements on the contribution of immigrants to the Greek economy and the need to respect the rights of legal immigrants, no official positions on immigration policy are included in the party programme and governmental discourse focuses more on the fight against illegal immigration (Triandafyllidou 2009, pp.168-172; Gropas & Triandafyllidou 2009, pp.15-19; Pavlou, et al. 2005, pp.1-5).

Besides the fact that Greece had been a host immigration country for more that fifteen years, it was the obligation to incorporate the EU Directives that opened the political debate for the integration of long-term immigrants in 2005 (Triandafyllidou 2009, p.174). Parliamentary debates indicate a shift in official public discourse towards a consensus over the acceptance of the permanent nature of immigration, its positive impact on economic development and the need to regulate the residence status of immigrants and ensure that immigrant workers' rights are respected. Nevertheless, in contrast to developments with respect to political rhetoric, no mainstream immigration policy has been developed and inefficiencies in the implementation of the legislative

[179] Statutory text of the Pan Hellenic Socialist Movement, article 18(2).

framework persist. No effective solutions to the problems of undocumented immigrants and informal economy, social inequality and discrimination or civic integration are put forward. Immigration is still predominantly seen as a problem related to public order and national security. Public opinion remains negative since there has been no endeavour to adapt society to the accommodation of cultural diversity. Furthermore, despite the fact that NGO's and immigrant associations played a significant role in promoting and facilitating discussion on integration there was no public consultation or opportunities for non-governmental actors to contest or influence integration policy beyond secondary changes and corrective measures (Pavlou, et al. 2005; Pavlou 2007a).

5.5.1. The Europeanization of immigration and anti-discrimination policy

The obligation to incorporate the EU Directives 2003/86/EC on the right to family reunification and 2003/109/EC on the status of long-term residents dictated the confrontation and management of the issue of social integration of long-term residents by the conservative government (Takis 2010; Pavlou, et al. 2005, pp.1-5; Triandafyllidou 2010, pp.111-128; Triandafyllidou 2009 pp.168-177). Law 3386/2005 introduced additional, but limited in scope, regularisation programmes for long term residents and provided for the unification of the residence and work permit. It further introduced residence permits for economic activities, family reunification, special or exceptional reasons as well as permits of indefinite duration of residence and, in the framework of EU legislation, of long-term duration of residence (Ibid.; Tsioukas 2010, pp.134-159).[180] A Department for Social Integration was established, functioning as the National Contact Point of the EU Migration Network, and the drafting of a national Action Plan for the social integration of immigrants was further announced but never implemented. The incorporation of the European Directives did not substantially alter the existing restrictive approach to Greek immigration policy neither provided a secure legal framework for long-term residents. No pro-active integration programmes, such as adequate language courses, were adopted and immigrants' transactions with public authorities are still marked by discrimination and racism (Varouxi 2008, pp.17-20; Pavlou 2009; Pavlou, et al. 2005, pp.1-12; Triandafyllidou 2009, pp.168-177). As Triandafyllidou (Ibid.) argues, the EU has been the main source of information, policies and practices for developing a more open and integration oriented national immigration

[180] Law 3386/2005, on the entry, sojourn and social integration of TCN in the Greek territory, Government Gazette 212/A', 23 August 2005. Modified by laws 3536/2007 and 3613/2007.

policy; however, no direct policy learning or transfer has taken place mainly due to lack of political will and fear of losing votes to the right.

Besides the limited policy emulation by European countries with similar immigration problems or more profound experience on integration, Tsioukas (2010) underlines that there has been no willingness to recognise the obligation of the state to provide for the social integration of long-term residents (pp.159-162). Such an obligation emanates from the Constitution and particularly article 2(1) on the fundamental responsibility of the state to respect and protect human dignity, article 5(1) protecting the right to the free development of personality as well as article 25(1) establishing the welfare state and provision for the consolidation social cohesion. Moreover, despite the general acceptance of the need to extend local voting rights, debates lacked a comprehensive forward-looking perspective as well as the essential normative background for the endorsement of the concepts of democratic participation and civic citizenship (Gropas & Triandafyllidou, 2009, pp.21-22). Overall, the liberalisation of immigration policy has been the result of pressure to harmonise domestic legislation with EU law and the "fortunate coincidence of skilled and open-minded bureaucrats holding key positions in the Ministry" (Triandafyllidou 2009, p.174). Both the public discussion and the unsound transposition of EU Directives spell out the lack of expertise in public administration and the inadequate use of research and consultation provided by IMEPO (Pavlou 2009, pp.26-29; Pavlou, 2007a, pp.309-313; Pavlou, et al. 2005, pp.13-14; Varouxi 2008, pp.46-47; Georgarakis 2009).

EU regulations are not only invoked as a source of policy liberalisation but also to justify restrictive immigration measures (Pavlou 2009, pp.30-31; Pavlou 2007b). Before the transposition of the EU Directives in 2005, an increase in administrative expulsions concerning mainly Albanians took place. Although administrative discretion with regard to the issuing of permanent residence permits is terminated in 2005, biotic links with the country of residence are not taken into account to expulsion decisions until 2006.[181] The insecurity emanating from the legal framework is therefore detected on the difficulty to retain the status of lawful resident due to strict requirements for renewal, a situation affecting severely young immigrants who were born, raised and

[181] Presidential Decree 150/2006, Adaptation of the Greek Legislation to the Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003, concerning the status of TCN who are long term residents, Government Gazette no.160/A, 31 July 2006. The regularisation programme was extended to underage children of immigrants and adult immigrant students or graduates of Greek schools and education institutions (Tsioukas 2010, p.146).

have studied in Greece. Children of immigrants that reach adulthood are entitled to a renewable residence permit until the age of 21. After that age the residence permit is renewed only for reasons of work, studies, family reunification or marriage (Law 3386/2005, article 60(4)). A different path exists for TCN athletes who join sport teams or Greek athletics confederations providing exceptional procedures regarding residence permits and facilitated naturalisation (2004 GNC, article 13). Pursuant to law 3536/2007 the requirement for the attribution of residence permit of indefinite duration is ten years of residence irrespective of the type of permit. The entitlement is extended to adult children of TCN over 21 years old without the requirement of adequate economic resources. Second generation immigrants however, whose status has been regularised in 2001, are excluded from the scope of this provision. At the same time, requirements for the long-term residence permit, which is automatically renewed every five years providing a more secure status and a greater range of rights, are far more restrictive and applications for the acquisition of the status remain particularly low (Law 3386/2005 articles 67-69) (Tsioukas 2010, pp.141-149; Papatheodorou 2007; Pavlou 2007a; The Greek Ombudsman 2007, pp.61-62).

Additionally, the EU anti-discrimination Directives 2000/78/EC, establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation, and 2000/43/EC, implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, were transported in the domestic legislative framework in 2005.[182] Despite the fact that the Directives were accurately incorporated in technical terms, the shortcomings in the organisational structure for monitoring policy implementation indicates the deficiency of policy design. The institution responsible for the promotion of the social dialogue, the drafting of reports and making recommendations for the effective implementation of the law is the Economic and Social Council (Law 3304/2005, article 18). The authorities responsible for monitoring infringements of equal treatment are the Greek Ombudsman, in cases of violations committed by public services; the Equal Treatment Committee, stablished by article 21 and annexed to the Ministry of Justice, in cases concerning private persons and legal entities; and the Labour Inspectorate in cases involving employers (Law 3304/2005, articles 19, 20). Besides overlap of accountability, Triandafyllidou (2014a) highlights

[182] Law 3304/2005, Implementation of the principle of equal treatment irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, religious or other conviction, disabilities, age or sexual orientation, Government Gazette no.16/A', 27 January 2005.

the inadequacy of the both the Equal Treatment Committee and Labour Inspectorate, in comparison to the Greek Ombudsman, to meet their responsibilities due to lack of resources and appropriate guidance (pp.126-128). Additionally, the institutional affiliation of the Equal Treatment Committee with the Ministry of Justice raises questions for its integrity and independence (Ibid.; Pavlou, et al. 2005).

A number of corrective measures are adopted in 2008.[183] First, it is recognised that the inefficiency of the legal framework regarding the regulation of immigration constitutes an impediment to the social integration of immigrants and the naturalisation procedure. Convictions for infringement of legal provisions concerning lawful residence and movement in the Greek territory should not constitute an obstacle to the naturalisation procedure and is therefore omitted from naturalisation requirements.[184] Moreover, in order to strengthen social cohesion and secure the lawful residence and full integration of children of TCN who are born in the country, second generation immigrants become eligible for the acquisition of the status of long-term resident after the decision of the General Secretary of the Region without passing the integration test. The entitlement is offered at the age of eighteen and is conditional to the lawful residence of parents and the successful attendance of primary education and the first three years of secondary education (Law 3731/2008 article 40(7), Explanatory Report to Law 3731/2008, p.18).[185] Despite the fact that this provision is adopted by the Ministry of the Interior as a measure promoting equality of socio-economic rights and encouraging naturalisation application, the provision remains rigid and exclusionary as no option to acquire the Greek nationality by a simple declaration of will is provided (Gropas & Triandafyllidou 2009, p.15).

Immigrant children's access to education, irrespective of their parents' legal status, has been regulated since 2001. However, given the pressure to enter the labour market, school drop outs are common in the secondary educational level. Participation is higher in primary education and in schools of technical vocational training. Moreover, the national educational system remains ethnocentric and assimilative, an

[183] Law 3731/2008, Reorganisation of the municipal police and regulation of other issues falling under the competence of the Ministry of the Interior, Government Gazette no.263/A, 23 December 2008, articles 38-46. According to article 39 the residence permit of indefinite duration becomes a 10-year renewable residence permit. Article 42 refers to research programs assigned by the Ministry of the Interior to institutions such as IMEPO in the context of the European Migration Network, pursuant to Council Decision 2008/381/EC.

[184] Law 3731/2008 article 41(1) amending Law 3284/2004 article 5(1b) and Explanatory Report to Law 3731/2008, 20 November 2008 pp.18-19.

[185] In total 9 years of compulsory schooling.

environment inappropriate for the consolidation of equal treatment. No regular or widely available language learning programmes exist for adults either (Law 2910/2001, article 40) (Pavlou 2007a, p.318; Pavlou 2009, p.51-52).[186] The educational deficit concerns also civil servants. Next to organisational and functional deficiencies, training and guidance of public administration is also inadequate resulting in failure to comply with the legal framework, whose implementation relies to individual attitudes of civil servants. Largely, however, public administration conduct is ideologically charged and there is widespread reluctance to accept immigrants as equals (Georgarakis 2009; Varouxi 2008).

Notwithstanding restrictive state policies, ineffective implementation of anti-discrimination legislation and ethnocentric political discourse advocating ethnic and cultural homogeneity, a 'de facto' integration of immigrants has been consolidated in social relations (Pavlou 2009, pp.49-55; Baldwin-Edwards 2005). Family networks and personalised relationships, as well as immigrant organisations and NGOs rallying for human rights, fulfil the role of missing institutional structures by providing social and legal support, conducting evidence-based research and disseminating results on human rights violations, challenging existing policy and mobilising support for policy change (Pavlou & Christopoulou 2008; Varouxi 2008, pp.43-46). On the one hand, although immigrant associations lack collective goals, they are predominantly concentrated in providing information and advice regarding the regularisation process and improving their living conditions. On the other hand, NGOs have significantly contributed to public awareness in favour of immigrants' social inclusion and political representation (Varouxi, et al. 2009; Gropas & Triandafyllidou 2005; Pavlou 2007a). [187]

5.5.2. Civil society and public consultation

Despite the conversion of political discourse from xenophobic to tolerant views, the policy approach did not change substantially. The fact that integration is contingent upon state programmes to be designed rather than existing functional structures of social and immigration policy postpones the debate over the success of failure of immigration policy for the future. Immigration is understood by political elites as

[186] Regarding reactions to immigrants' participation to school activities see the interview of Odysseas Tsenai in http://dimitrisangelidis.blogspot.com/2011/06/blog-post_5145.html, last accessed 12.9.2017.
[187] Examples are the Greek Forum of Immigrants, a confederation of immigrant associations, and the Network for the Social Support of Immigrants and Refugees. Since 2000, the NGO Generation 2.0 deals specifically with problems in studies and employment confronted by the 1 ,5 and 2n generation of immigrants raising claims for their access to citizenship at an early age.

problem rather than an endogenous social phenomenon composing the Greek society that should be interwoven with social policy design. Social integration of immigrants is understood as a process during which immigrants are disciplined and adapted to the social standards of the Greek society without recognising the heterogeneity of the latter. Such an approach conceals the question of the permanent residence of immigrants in the country and the necessity of a holistic approach to social and civic integration (Papatheodorou 2007, pp.66-70; Pavlou, et al. 2005; Eleftheriou 2009).

The depreciation of the of long-term resident status and ignorance for instituting a special status for the second generation of immigrants appears to be in sharp contrast not only with declarations for the encouragement of equal treatment and immigrants' integration but also with the visibility of an augmenting number of children who are raised in the country and already integrated in society (Tsioukas 2010, p.159; Pavlou 2007a). As Pavlou (2009) argues, anti-racist discourse in politics and media takes the form of a utilitarian approach to immigration stripped by extreme views. The issue of the 1,5 and 2nd generation of immigrants becomes appealing to the press and media and a pro-immigrant approach is adopted by proponents of multiculturalism but is also tolerated by xenophobic segments of society. Nevertheless, in spite of claims of immigrants' organisations as well as recommendations of research communities and NGOs, the political debate on the facilitation of access to citizenship or measures for political participation remains absent. The government's choice (ND) with respect to the adoption of immigration laws in 2005 and 2007 was to refrain from public consultation. Immigrants' lack voting rights and organised representation of interests hindered the promotion of integration policy to the political agenda. The participation of local and regional actors as well as civil society in policy design has been marginal (Ibid.; HLHR-KEMO 2005a).

An Inter-Ministerial Committee for the monitoring and coordination of immigration policy is established in 2005.[188] A special committee comprised by technocrats, experts and ministry officials supports the function of the Inter-ministerial Committee by preparing the issues examined at the political level and making

[188] Comprised by the Ministers of the Interior, Public Administration and Decentralisation, Economy and Finance, Foreign Affairs, National Defence, Employment and Social Protection, Public Order, and Merchant Shipping, Law 3386/2005 article 3, the ministries of Development, National Education and Religion, Healthcare and Social Solidarity, Rural Development and Food, and Culture were added with Law 3536/2007, Special Provisions for Issues of Immigration Policy and other affairs falling under the competence of the Ministry of the Interior, Government Gazette no.42/A, 23 February 2007, article 2.

recommendations on appropriate measures (Explanatory Report to Law 3386/2005; Papatheodorou 2007, pp.58-59). The special committee is established in 2007 under the title National Committee for the Social Integration of Immigrants and is supported by the Aliens and Immigration Directorate of the Ministry of Interior and IMEPO, which is the liaison between the National Committee and civil society (Law 3536/2007, article 1). According to the Explanatory Report to Law 3386/2005, the implementation of a policy for the social integration of immigrants "requires the mobilisation of society and the engagement of all political and social stakeholders involved with immigration issues" (p.1). However, while the members of the Committee include representatives of the executive, parliamentary groups, regional authorities, unions of civil servants, lawyers, workers, tradesmen and even the Church of Greece, expertise is constrained to one representative of the International Organisation of Migration (IOM) and one academic. The participation of immigrant associations, NGOs and human rights organisations as well as social stakeholders dealing with immigration issues in debates and policy design is left at the discretion of IMEPO.

The first meeting between the Minister of the Interior and representatives of immigrant communities takes place in 2005 in the context of the National Migration Dialogue after the mediation of the National Confederation of Trade Unions. Representatives of the Network for the Social Support of Immigrant and Refugees, KEMO and the HLHR also attended the meeting, whose outcome was limited to the acceptance of an open communication with the president of IMEPO. Nevertheless, both immigrants and key stakeholders were excluded from the first formal consultation between IMEPO and MPs on migration policy held a few months later (Pavlou, et al. 2005, pp.18-19). Selected representatives of migrant and human rights organisations are invited for the first time to the parliament and the respective Committee in 2007; yet there was no particular effect in policy output (Pavlou 2009, p.38; Triandafyllidou 2009, pp.168-177). According to Pavlou (2009; 2007a), lack of expertise has been substituted by obscure personal and clientelist relations that are developed beyond the public sphere and surmount political contention and divisions. Conservative segments of the mainstream parties, a constitutive part of the political system closely connected with the media elite, are mobilised when the ideological foundations of established correlations of power are at stake in order to achieve inaction or counteraction to the accommodation of social change. Employers and the Church are also considered powerful lobbying groups against policy change maintaining the low economic and

social status of immigrants. Therefore, respect for immigrants' rights is encouraged without challenging power relations neither the ideological foundations of the idea of a homogeneous and coherent society, the ethnocentric conception of national identity or its relation to policy choices (Ibid.; Christopoulos 2004d, p.357; Varouxi 2008, pp.20-22).

The sharp division between the civil society and the government as well as the autonomy of research from policy-making is evident in the divergent views expressed by key administrative officials and social stakeholders as well as human rights experts with respect to the goals and content of integration policy and the adequacy and competence of public administration to effectively implement this policy in a research conducted by the National Centre for Social Research. According to Georgarakis:

> A dividing line has been formed in all issues concerning the content of immigration policy and the treatment of immigrants by the administration. A line reflecting the gap between the perception dominant among social stakeholders and immigrant associations regarding the inadequacy of immigration policy and its ineffective implementation, and the appraisal of administrative officials as regards the substantial and optimal solutions provided to immigration issues. It seems that under these circumstances a polarising relation is structured that hinders rupture with prejudices and negative attitudes as well as the development of trust between the administration and this part of the population (Georgarakis 2009, p.47).

Social actors have further expressed the view that the consultation process takes place occasionally and aims more at the legitimation of predetermined policy choices than the exchange of views and the cooperation in policy design. The design of immigration policy is based on a utilitarian approach reflecting the configuration of political interests. They stress the need for the design a long-term comprehensive policy approach, the institutionalisation of permanent structures for deliberation and consultation between the society and the state as well as the development of a common language of communication. Political elites however, bounded by legacies of the past that impede the definition of immigrants' integration as a national issue, are unwilling to invest in personnel, expertise and information and proceed to the definite settlement of the issue. The central administration is defensive and suspicious of towards civil society organisations and their formal relation is mostly characterised by tensions and conflict. Yet, some form of cooperation exists. An informal network of coordination seems to have been developed during the last years between individual public officers and NGOs facilitating the exchange of information regarding necessary interventions (Varouxi 2008; Georgarakis 2009; Tsikiridi 2009).

5.5.3. Research networks and policy-oriented learning

Following the fragmented and insufficient reform of citizenship and immigration policy, academics and human rights experts search to draw attention to the connection between nationalism and immigrant integration. Strategically invoked arguments challenge not only the core assumptions of racist and xenophobic discourse but also the mainstream public discourse of political elites that accepts diversity without contesting the dominant policy paradigm and existing configurations of power. The focus lies to the comprehensive redefinition of the content of Greek nationality on the basis of common political and civic principles instead of ethnic homogeneity and the institutionalisation of a more inclusive and participatory citizenship policy (Pavlou 2007b; Christopoulos 2006b).

Policy-oriented learning is promoted through the proliferation of publications and academic consultation meetings, especially after 2003, focusing on recommendations for policy change. The 2004 GNC is evaluated as particularly restrictive and exclusionary while the inclusion of long-term immigrant residents, and the 2nd and 3rd generations, without the duty to deny their cultural and ethnic identities is considered an imperative of vital importance for social cohesion. It is further advanced through the participation of members of key organisations and institutions in European research programmes that facilitated structured comparison and the dissemination of best practices (Pavlou 2009; Pavlou 2007a; Pavlou & Christopoulou 2008). The Greek Ombudsman, the HLHR and later ELIAMEP had all been partners to the MIPEX project whose results ranked Greece amongst the lowest scores of immigrant integration policies including citizenship and political participation. The president, by that time, of HLHR Dimitris Christopoulos as well as Dia Anagnostou, member of KEMO, were involved in the projects of EUDO citizenship observatory producing a number of reports critically evaluating the Greek nationality law and the attribution of citizenship rights (Christopoulos 2006a; Christopoulos 2013a; Anagnostou 2011). Further publications in Greek examining comprehensively Greek citizenship policy from a comparative perspective for the first time contributed significantly in challenging both historical myths and arguments of modernisation and Europeanisation (Christopoulos 2012; Kouzelis & Christopoulos 2012).

In the absence of a regular and institutionalised process of public consultation, ideas and views were exchanged in context of the National Migration Dialogue

organised by the HLHR and KEMO within the framework of EMD.[189] The aim of the round tables that took place in 2005 was to bring together state officials and non-governmental actors such as migration experts, NGOs and migrant associations, raise accountability of state officials in the decision-making process regarding immigration and citizenship policy and explore points of agreement for the effective implementation of integration policy (HLHR-KEMO 2005b; HLHR-KEMO 2005a).[190] The National Migration Dialogue constituted the venue were the Common Basic Principles on Integration were formally communicated to non-governmental stakeholders, given that the Greek authorities disregarded consultation during the debate at EU level. The members of HLHR and KEMO undertook the role of policy brokers mediating the relation between society and the state. The government of ND was represented solely by the president of IMEPO; representatives of PASOK and SYN though were more receptive to legislative initiatives. The influence of this new emerging coalition advocating the ascription of political rights and citizenship as a means of immigrants' integration in the political debate of the 2005 immigration law was meagre (Pavlou, et al. 2005; Pavlou 2009). By 2009 though, a concrete legislative initiative for the amendment of the GNC had been produced by the HLHR and presented to government authorities and representatives of political parties.

5.6. Problem definition and ideas for policy change

The Greek Ombudsman has paid close attention to the implementation and outcome of citizenship policy and has constantly reported the problems emerging from the ambiguity but also the inflexibility of national law. In 2007, the annual report included an extensive analysis of the problems related to the existing legal framework on nationality and detailed recommendations for policy change. With respect to the naturalisation of TCN it is observed that the number of successful applications is particularly low. Rejected applications concern individuals who fulfil the typical requirements, preserve stable and solid links with the country and are effectively integrated in society. Not only these personal and social characteristics are dismissed but also the attribution of nationality is closely attached to national security concerns.

[189] Responsible of the program and the coordinator for the national dialogue was Miltos Pavlou, special investigator on the Greek Ombudsman. The EMD partners have also participated at the RAXEN Network monitoring Racism and Xenophobia generation a number of reports.

[190] Besides the National migration dialogue criticism to immigration policy and recommendations for inclusionary policy change have been systematically produced by ELIAMEP, see for example Triandafyllidou (2005).

As a result, nationals of neighbouring countries are rarely naturalised. The compatibility of the current policy with the principles of equality and non-discrimination is questioned as it disregards aliens of non-Greek descent who are born and plan their future in the country while privileges homogenis aliens. Furthermore, the lack of reasoned decisions, subject to judicial review is contrary to the rule of law and raises concerns on questionable and arbitrary practices based on implicit political appraisals on national belonging that generate the mistrust of applicants towards institutions. Under these circumstances social cohesion is severely undermined (The Greek Ombudsman 2007, pp.68-70).

The recommendations of the Greek Ombudsman encompass the acknowledgment of an entitlement to the Greek nationality to long-term residents with stable biotic ties with the country, their spouses and parents, and particularly minors born or raised in the country conditional to the parents' long-term residence status. In particular the state must take action for the following issues: the renouncement of practices that entail the rejection of naturalisation applications on the basis of the country of origin or other blur criteria; the clarification and standardisation of the procedure and the introduction of explicit requirements in light of the degree of the applicant's integration and the ties developed with the Greek society; the enforcement of justification and review of decisions rejecting applications as well as the reduction of naturalisation fee; the facilitation of the process concerning the submission documents and the issuing of residence permits to stateless persons and homogenis from Turkey and Albania that came in Greece before 1990 so as to enable their naturalisation. Moreover, Greek authorities are urged to arrange a number of pending issues regarding the naturalisation of homogenis such as the codification of the requirements and process for the definition of the Greek nationality (art 25 GNC) (The Greek Ombudsman 2007, pp.68-75).

The legislative proposal of the HLHR appeared in 2009, as a reaction to the failure of the 2004 reform of the GNC to contribute to the design of an insightful and long-term policy disengaged by the logic pertaining the past policy frame and adapted to the challenges of the current conjuncture. It was prepared after taking into consideration international norms, the practices of European states, particularly the German Citizenship Code, and the recommendations of the Greek Ombudsman as well as of civil servants of the Nationality Directorate. The proposed changes for the rationalisation and modernisation of citizenship policy were considered politically

viable as they do not disregard the political tradition on which the GNC has been historically structured. The explanatory report starts from the definition of the problem to be addressed (HLHR 2009, pp.2-3). As repeatedly noted in the Greek Ombudsman's reports the roots cause of problems encountered in the GNC is detected in the persistent adherence to the principle of descent which is applied without exceptions or consideration of biotic ties (The Greek Ombudsman 1998, p.31; The Greek Ombudsman 2007, p.68).

The first adjustment therefore appertains to the regulation of citizenship acquisition at birth. The Greek nationality is automatically ascribed to children of Greek nationals born in Greece; children of Greek nationals born abroad provided that one of the parents was born in Greece, or has his permanent residence in Greece at the time of the child's birth, or is registered at the civil registers and submits a registration application within three years since the birth of the child (2nd generation of emigrants); children of Greek nationals born abroad as well as children of foreign nationals born in Greece who would otherwise become stateless; and children of foreign nationals born in the country, provided that one of his/her parents was also born in the country and has been a permanent resident ever since (3rd generation of immigrants) (article 1). The application of ius sanguinis therefore maintains its primacy but gradually becomes conditional to generational limits and residence qualifications in cases of birth abroad in order to ensure the existence of a genuine link between expatriates and Greece as well as respect for individual will and eliminate incidents of abuse. The generational limit is relevant to the proposal for the introduction of the ius soli principle as complementary to ius sanguinis (HLHR, 2009).

The introduction of ius soli citizenship takes the form of citizenship acquisition by declaration of will on the basis of birth or residence in the country. Eligible are children of foreign nationals born in the country conditional to a 5-year residence period of one of the parents starting before or after the birth, the common declaration of the parents and the registration of the child to the civil registers; and children of foreign nationals who live permanently in the country for five years and attend or have attended the Greek school. This option is based on the ascertainment of genuine links with the country and the aspiration to consolidate those links. In case of an omission by the parents to submit the relevant declaration, eligible persons acquire the nationality by their declaration within three years from adulthood (article 4). Within one year from

adulthood the Greek nationality can be voluntarily renounced (article 16) (HLHR 2009).

Additionally, the process of naturalisation is amended. The distinction between co-ethnics and alien applicants of non-Greek origin, concerning the residence requirement for the acquisition on nationality as well as further distinctions after naturalisation, are abolished as incompatible with the European Convention on Nationality. The proposed residence period for naturalisation is five years within the last ten years. The period corresponds to the period required for the acquisition of the long-term residence permit. It is accompanied by the requirements of knowledge of the Greek language as well as the confirmation of the applicants' integration in the Greek society and his/her will and capacity participate actively to the Greek political community in accordance with the fundamental principles through an interview. All decisions, admitting or rejecting naturalisation applications are justified pursuant to the Code of Administrative Procedure and subject to deadlines. Citizenship acquisition by naturalisation therefore ceases to be a sovereign prerogative of state but an entitlement of individuals fulfilling objective legal criteria (articles 5-13). The process of loss of nationality is also rationalised; involuntary loss of nationality is prohibited, and the acceptance of relative applications falls under the circumscribed powers of public administration (articles 14-21) (HLHR 2009).

The favourable provision for athletes of Olympic sports is abolished as well as the naturalisation procedure for homogenis living abroad. The procedures for special naturalisation (articles 12,13) are distinguished form the process of definition of nationality (articles 22-24) which codified in one provision reducing administrative discretion and selectivity as well as the arbitrary interpretation of vague provisions on national consciousness. As noted in the legislative proposal:

> Without ignoring the importance of the homogenis-allogenis distinction during the historical path that formulated the GNC, the proposed amendment concerns the rationalisation and restriction of the acceptance of the status of homogenis for the acquisition of the Greek nationality without a substantive requirement associated with the existence of strong and active bonds of the person concerned with the Greece or/and the Greek society. The distinction between homogenis and allogenis therefore ceases to function as a decisive element, more or less a pretext, for the treatment of naturalisation applications (HLHR 2009, p.5).

Another deficiency treated with the law proposal is the lack of statistical data on the status of naturalisation applicants. The only record kept so far regarded the status of homogenis or allogenis. Administrative authorities have been particularly hesitant to

share data on withdrawal of nationality and the number of definitions of nationality difficult to detect (The Greek Ombudsman 2005, p.61; Christopoulos 2012, pp.218-224). Information such as gender, age, place of residence and previous nationality are about to complement the record and contribute to policy design (article 29) (HLHR 2009).

5.7. Conclusion

The chapter analysed the character of scientific knowledge produced in Greece and traced the developments in the domestic research community after the Europeanisation of immigration policy. The relation of experts with policy-makers and the ways scientific knowledge was utilised in policy development has been at the centre of attention. Academic research on migration and citizenship developed independently from the state, which did not search to establish close relations with universities or academics institutes. Until the middle of the 1990s scientific research is mainly engaged in the study of co-ethnics and lacks theoretical and methodological consistency, systematic analysis and follow up. Nevertheless, the shortcomings in migration management along with the ineffective transportation of the EU Directives as well as the mismatch of multicultural social and demographic conditions with the dominant national ideology on the homogeneity of the Greek nation induced a more critical and policy-oriented approach of academic research. Funding from the EU has also proliferated the object and methods of research. Since the end of the 1990s, existing justifications of political elites on the formation of national identity and the choices made in citizenship policy are challenged and alternative explanations are developed.

Academic debate is concerned with the ambiguities in the definition of the status of homogenis and allogenis as well as the legitimacy of selective access to citizenship and the inconsistencies in the treatment of homogenis from the former USSR and homogenis of Albania. Opinions with respect to the discriminative character of citizenship policy and the privileged access to citizenship for homogenis diverge as views are divided between justifications based on national consciousness, linked with the right to self-determination, and national descent. Scholars, however, concede that the limitations of the rights of non-ethnic Greeks after naturalisation are contrary to the prohibition of discrimination on the basic origin, enshrined in the Greek Constitution, article 4(1) and in article 5 of the ECN. Scholars also questioned the official justification of ethnic homogeneity framing the selectivity of the Greek paradigm and alternative

explanations were put forward, concerning structural factors of the international environment and domestic context shaping national interests; political expediency and the utility of each groups of co-ethnics; the national ideology of the Greek genos entrenched in the practice of public administration that precludes an entitlement to the Greek citizenship to aliens of non-Greek origin. The determination of the Greek genos lies at the exclusive jurisdiction of the state and citizenship constitutes an issue of non-decision aiming at the preservation of the established status quo.

Along with the ineffective implementation of immigration policy and the problems that emerged with respect to the legal settlement of long-term residence, participation in European research networks and debate within the framework of the National Migration Dialogue proves decisive for raising awareness for the state of art of immigrant integration in the country; the development of new theoretical accounts and the production of policy-oriented knowledge; the definition of problems and alternative solutions; as well as the approximation of experts with state officials and policy-makers. Eventually, the issue of the 2nd generation of immigrant becomes prominent and a comprehensive law-proposal is prepared and communicated to the political parties redefining the concept of citizenship in conformity to the rule of law and principles of civic integration.

6. The agenda-setting of citizenship policy reform in Greece

6.1. Introduction

Since 2009 political debate has been dominated by the issue of the European financial crisis, an issue that would play a decisive role in domestic politics the next years. Inequality, unemployment and discontent, stemming from the sense that governments had failed to fulfil their commitments towards both EU partners and the Greek voters, give rise to social upheavals and rearrangement of the configuration of powers. The imperative to concede to an agreement with the EU partners on the implementation of a set of rigid economic measures forced political actors to form unusual coalitions between right and left-wing parties such as those of PASOK, ND and Popular Orthodox Rally (Λαϊκός Ορθόδοξος Συναγερμός, Laos) in 2011, ND, PASOK and the Coalition of the Democratic Left (Συνασπισμός Δημοκρατικής Αριστεράς, DIMAR),[191] in 2012, and SYRIZA with Independent Greeks (Ανεξάρτητοι Έλληνες, ANELL)[192] from 2015 to the time of writing this essay. Meanwhile the extreme right party of Golden Down (Χρυσή Αυγή, GD) gains power. Racist violence augments precariously along with hate speech and impunity. The targets are Pakistanis and Africans whose population in the country, along with the number of refugees, has increased significantly during the last decade (The Greek Ombudsman 2013a). While the mainstream political parties are initially hesitant to condemn the anti-immigrant positions of extreme-right, a large anti-racist movement of solidarity emerges.

Against this background, the management of immigration becomes one of the few differentiating factors in the political programmes of the mainstream parties. Interestingly the adoption of the two nationality laws in 2010 and 2015 coincided with the political debate on the first and the third Memorandum of Understanding, the economic agreement between the Greek government and EU partners, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund, that monopolised the political interest at the domestic and European level. Following the elections that took place between these two points of time, in 2012 and the beginning of 2015, LAOS lost parliamentary representation while ANELL and GD entered the parliament in 2012. PASOK and ND lost their electoral power and SYRIZA won the 2015 elections forming

[191] A left-wing party with European orientation, formed under the leadership of the former MP of SYN Fotis Kouvelis.
[192] A patriotic party formed under the leadership of the former MP of ND, Panayiotis Kammenos.

a coalition government with ANELL. Moreover, the leader and MPs of GD were arrested in 2013 with the accusation of the organisation of criminal acts but maintained their representation in the parliament until the completion of the court proceedings. This chapter explores the process of citizenship policy change, from the agenda setting procedure to the backlash of the decision of the Council of State, and the adoption of the final provisions of ius soli for the second generation of immigrants.

6.2. Challenging the dominant policy paradigm

The law-proposal of HLHR on the new GNC was presented to representatives of the political parties right before the elections of 2009. The ND's Minister of Interior Prokopis Pavlopoulos, who designed the 2004 GNC, acknowledged the need for amendments and modernisation. Yet, the President of PASOK, Papandreou was far more receptive and even advocated more inclusive ius soli provisions (Christopoulos 2015). While in opposition, the Migration Working Group of PASOK engaged in a dynamic expansion of the public debate on the political participation of TCN, including the institutionalisation of local voting rights and the attribution of nationality to second generation immigrants and minors enrolled in Greek schools for three years. However, these views are attributed to a segment of the party, comprising by the president of the party George Papandreou and certain academics, and are translated principally into informal participation to the political sphere through consultative committees rather than rights attribution and substantial change in power relations (Gropas & Triandafyllidou 2009, pp.18-22; Triandafyllidou 2014b).

Since PASOK came in power in 2009, there is an explicit interest of the Prime Minister in the facilitation of the integration of TCN as well as the amelioration of the asylum system and the management of irregular immigration (Triandafyllidou 2014a, pp.124-126; Anagnostou 2011). The new government heralded a rupture with corruption as well as abusive political practices of the past and endorsed a more inclusive, republican understanding of democratic deliberation. Part of this strategy was the establishment of Councils for the Integration of Immigrants in the municipalities of the country.[193] The aim of the Councils, whose formation and organisation rests at the

[193] Law 3852-2010, New architecture of Local Government and decentralised administration-Kallikratis programme, Government Gazette no. 87/A' 7 June 2010, article 78 and Law 4018/2011, on the re-organisation of the system of permits for the residence of aliens in the country under conditions of high security, arrangements of issues of Organisations of Local Government and other provisions falling under the competence of the Ministry of the Interior, Government Gazette no.215/A', 30 September 2011.

discretion of municipal authorities, is to promote consultation with immigrant residents at the local level, to detect problems and facilitate their unimpeded integration and participation in public activities. The reform of nationality law was largely embedded in this theoretical political project. However, prior elaboration and design by the executive were missing (Takis 2016). The drafting of the nationality law is described as a ´pleasant coincidence´ of political circumstances and of personal concerns of specific strategically-minded actors (Ibid.), in combination with proper time management (Christopoulos 2015). The General Secretariat for Immigration Policy is established in the Ministry of Interior and the former Deputy Ombudsman for Human Rights and Professor of Philosophy of Law, Andreas Takis becomes the Secretary General. The aim is to proceed to the reform before the anticipated negotiation of the Memorandum of Understanding (Ibid.).

The goal of policy change was to disengage political participation from conceptions of national identity and conform the GNC with the principles of sound administration and the rule of law. The implementation of this idea was incorporated in the approach developed by the experts of the Greek Ombudsman for the management of migration and immigrant´s integration and carried out by a scientific group formed for the specific purpose under the Secretary General. The nationality law reform was the first of a series of laws to be adopted comprising the design of comprehensive integration policy: security of residence, social integration through political participation and access to citizenship. Starting with the reform of nationality law, policy designers had the chance to take political opponents by surprise. At the same time, they managed to send a powerful political message to the immigrant communities that their contribution during the years they have spent living and working in Greece is now formally recognised irrespective of ties of blood and religion. Shortly, "a strategy for a civic conception of the nation" (Takis 2016).

The policy proposal was framed as an issue of immigration policy, highlighting the two-way process of civic integration, and as a solution to the problems of social cohesion and democratic accountability. In the explanatory report it is stated that the policies of massive regularisations have not succeeded to safeguard neither the security of border nor the security of residence of immigrants who are permanently settled, work under legitimate conditions and fulfil their duties towards the state. The insecurity of the status of the 2nd generation of immigrants is stressed as alarming both for domestic economy and social cohesion. Distinct reference is made to the European Pact on

Immigration and Asylum, adopted by the Council of European Union in 2008, and the responsibility of EU states to actively promote the lawful settlement and integration of TCN as well as the practices of EU states with similar experience in migration.[194]

Nevertheless, the decision to disentangle the Greek citizenship from an ethnic conception of the nation is grounded to the democratic and liberal character of the Greek Constitution, notably article 5(1) that guarantees the participation of every person to the economic, social and political activities:

> Instead of belonging to a community of blood, the proposed draft law sets at the core of the Greek citizenship the animus of the possessor [:] the common political consciousness of belonging to the Greek polity and of the personal responsibility for its historical development. This means that the Greek citizen, along with descent by a Greek parent, is identified by the fact that he adopts a specific political identity, defined by the political regime and the history of the country. For this reason, the proposed draft law is founded on an understanding of the Greek citizen and the Greek nation based on the democratic and liberal character of our political regime (Explanatory Report to Law 3838/2010, p.2).

The political conception of the Greek citizenship, based on a common social and political culture, is also derived from the country's constitutional tradition:

> Without underestimating the importance of the Greek descent for the formulation of the Greek nation, this new understanding associates the Greek citizenship and the accompanying rights of full political participation with the embracement of the political identity of Greeks or, in other words, the formulation of a Greek political consciousness. Identity or consciousness that in this case are not based on blood, descent or assimilation to religious-ethnic characteristics but on the full and active participation to social and economic developments in the country, on the one hand, and the competence of corresponding full and active participation to developments of the Greek Republic, with respect to its principles. This political understanding of the Greek citizenship, meaning the Greek nationality in (legal terms), continues a long-term constitutional tradition of our country that dates back to the revolutionary constitutions adopted during the formation of the Greek State (Explanatory Report to Law 3838/2010, p.3).

The three revolutionary constitutions were drafted during the revolution of independence in 1822, 1823 and 1827.[195] They are indicative of the dominant will to establish the rule of law and the division of powers as well as the principle of equality. Since the end of the 18th century and the beginning of the 19th the ideas of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution are disseminated in the Balkans and the Greek territory and contribute decisively to the formulation of the ideas and institutions that would inspire the struggle for independence. Influence is detected in the

[194] Explanatory Report to Law 3838/2010 Contemporary provisions for the Greek nationality and the political participation of homogenis and TCN and other provisions, 26 February 2010.
[195] 1822 Law of Epidaurus on the Provisional Regime of Greece; Law of Epidaurus on the Provisional Regime of Greece as amended in 1823; 1827 The Political Constitution of Greece.

liberalisation movement of Rigas Ferraios, who composed a draft constitution in 1797[196] championing popular sovereignty, civil rights and equality irrespective of language, religion and ethnic origin; in the Greek diaspora communities; and as well as the constitutive acts of the Ionian islands, a semi-sovereign polity subject to the Ottoman rule (Alivizatos 2012, pp.33-40). Persons educated in Europe and the mercantile class who participated to the revolution were strongly influenced by the ideas of Enlightenment and aspired to establish a national awareness based on the political and civic ties of individuals and the state according to the European standards (Clogg 1992, chap.1; Kitromilides 1989).

The implementation of the revolutionary constitutions was hindered by the conflict developed between local agents who cooperated with the Ottoman authorities and held positions of power within the Greek communities during the Ottoman rule and intellectuals who advocated the limitation of such powers through the establishment of institutions and constitutional guarantees. The necessities of the struggle for independence was another factor hindering the operation of the adopted constitutional regimes. They are therefore also indicative of the ideological adaptation and the restrictions posed to the formulation of the national identity by the necessities of liberation, the achievement of military objectives and political sovereignty. Although they were never implemented, they exerted strong influence regarding the establishment of institutions of representative democracy and government. (Alivizatos 2012, pp.40-65).

6.3. The 2010 reform of the Greek nationality code: mapping opposing policy frames

The draft law is largely divided in two sections. The first concerns the facilitation and rationalisation of the naturalisation procedure and the introduction of ius soli citizenship for the 2nd and 3rd generations of immigrants. The second section introduces political participation rights to local elections to homogenis holding EDTOs and TCN with long-term residence permits. Entitled are persons who possess the long-term EU residence status, persons who possess a national ten-year residence permit or a permit of indefinite duration, parents of a Greek citizen, spouses of a Greek or an EU citizen,

[196] Rigas the Patriot. New Political Government of the inhabitants of Rumeli, Asia Minor, the Islands of the Mediterranean and Wallachia and Bogdania. For the Laws-liberty, equality, fraternity-and the nation (as cited in Alivizatos 2012, p.37).

persons possessing the status of refugee or stateless, and homogenis holding EDTO or homogenis residence permit (http://www.opengov.gr/ypes/?p=325, last accessed 4.2.18).

Opposition from the inner-party was more than evident (Takis 2016). Compared with the HLHR's law proposal, which was handed over to the Minister from the outset of the policy-making process, the provisions regarding citizenship acquisition and naturalisation take a different form. The additional requirements for acquisition of ius sanguinis citizenship at birth, such as place of birth for children born to Greek parents in Greece and place of birth or registration to civil registers for children born abroad are omitted. The abolishment of the distinction between homogenis and allogenis is also partial, given that homogenis are excluded from the requirement of residence in the country before naturalisation. Ius soli citizenship after birth is closely associated with education and is acquired after the declaration of the parents, with the requirement of six years of education, or in adulthood, conditional to permanent residence and three years of mandatory primary education. These were also the provisions to draw attention during the public debate.

6.3.1. Public consultation

The public consultation of the draft law on citizenship and naturalisation entitled "Contemporary provisions for Greek citizenship and the political participation of homogenis and immigrants who are lawful residents" was launched in the end of 2009, triggering a heated public debate.[197] The majority of the comments focused on the provisions on ius soli citizenship and electoral rights. The negative views expressed ranged from racist and xenophobic, focusing to territorial integrity which is threatened by the presence of immigrants from neighbouring Balkan countries, to more moderate that still project the exceptionalism of the Greek case, the superiority of the Greek culture and the ethnic homogeneity which is distorted by the integration of persons who cannot accept and adapt to the fundamental principles endorsed by the Greek society. Positive views focused on the necessity to preserve social cohesion and the fact that Greece as a European country should respect the rights of all residents (www.opengov.gr/ypes/?p=325, last accessed 4.2.18).

[197] Since 2010 and Law 3861/2010, Government Gazette no.112/A', 13 July 2010, all decisions and acts of the government and public administration are posted online for public consultation.

The draft law was submitted in the parliament the first months of 2010. Earlier, the government proceeded to certain modifications with respect to the requirements of ius soli citizenship and naturalisation to achieve the widest parliamentary consensus. Therefore, the legal residence of both parents instead of one is necessary for ius soli citizenship at birth and after birth, and the level of education is set to six years. Furthermore, the residence period for naturalisation of TCN is raised from five to seven years (Ministry of the Interior, Decentralisation and E-Governance 2010). The draft law was further elaborated by the Standing Committee of Public Administration, Public Order and Justice. Among the participants was the Greek Ombudsman, representatives of the National Committee for Human Rights, the HLHR, the UNHCHR, the Greek Forum for Immigrants, the Pontian Confederation and the Chimara Union. Despite the wide participation of social stakeholders, the legacies of the past insisted as the Committee added the following clause in the provision concerning the naturalisation procedure, and in particular the access of the applicant to the advisory opinion of the Naturalisation Committee: "Analytical judgments regarding issues of public or national security which are likely to be included in the advisory opinion are not communicated to the applicant" (Standing Committee of Public Administration, Public Order and Justice 2010, p.5). The provision was withdrawn before the parliamentary debate as it undermined the main goal of the draft law that is to disengage the acquisition of nationality from political decisions concerning the national policy on foreign affairs and engage the process with the rule of law and respect for individual rights (Christopoulos 2012, pp.232-237; Anagnostou 2011).

The final provisions of Law 3838/2010 concerning the 3rd and the 2nd generation of immigrants are as follows: the Greek nationality is acquired automatically at birth by minors born in the country provided that one of the parents is born in Greece and permanently settled in the country since his/her birth; the Greek nationality is acquired by declaration at birth by minors born in Greece to immigrant parents who are both settled permanently and regularly in the country for five years, after the common declaration of the parents and the application for registration to the civil registers of their place of residence within three years from the child's birth; the Greek nationality is acquired by declaration after birth by children who have attended successfully six grades of a Greek school and are settled permanently and legally in the country, after the common declaration and application of the parents who should also be settled legally in the country. Persons who fulfil the requirements but lost the chance to apply

while underaged can acquire the nationality by declaration within three years from adulthood. The registration to the civil registers by the Municipality and acquisition of nationality after birth is completed after the publication of the respective decision to the Government Gazette by the Region (articles 1 and 1A, amending GNC, article 1). The Greek nationality can be renounced by declaration and application within one year from adulthood (article 9 replacing GNC, article 19). A transitional provision provides for the acquisition of ius soli citizenship by 2nd generation adult immigrants who fulfil the requirements regarding the Greek education (article 24).

As concerns naturalisation, the required residence period is seven uninterrupted years for TCN and three for citizens of the EU, spouses of Greek citizens with a child, persons who have the parental responsibility for a minor Greek citizen, political refugees and stateless persons. The residence permits that fulfil the qualifications are explicitly mentioned in the same article (article 2 replacing GNC article 5 and transitional provision in article 25). The respective circular accompanying the law specifies the definition of continuous residence. The term is associated the fact that a foreigner has continuously intended to place the centre of his/her biotic ties in a particular geographical region; temporary physical absence of the person concerned from his/her place of residence is compatible with continuous residence.[198]

The substantial requirements are also defined: sufficient knowledge of the Greek language; typical integration to the social and economic life substantiated among others by familiarity with Greek history and culture, public and social activities and fulfilment of social insurance and tax liabilities; active participation to the political life substantiated by familiarity with state institutions and the political history of the country. References to ethics and personality are abolished (article 3 amending GNC, article 5 by adding articles 5A and 5b).[199] "Decisions on naturalisation applications are reasoned according to the Code of Administrative Procedure" (article 6 replacing GNC, article 8) and specific deadlines are set for every stage of the procedure (article 12 replacing GNC, article 31). The opinion of the Naturalisation Committee, with the exception of information concerning issues of national security, is communicated to the applicant who can raise his complaints to the Nationality Council (article 5 replacing

[198] Ministry of the Interior, Decentralisation and E-Government, Circular no.F.130181/29365/8, Amendment to the Greek Nationality Code, 28 May 2010, p.14.
[199] The provisions on the substantial requirements, the naturalisation procedure and decision apply also to pending naturalisation applications pursuant to Law 3938/2011, Establishment of Office for the Combat Incidents of Arbitrariness, Government Gazette no.61/A, 31 March 2011, article 26(3.b)

GNC, article 7). The naturalisation procedure is decentralised, and the Regions are responsible for the collection of statistical data regarding the acquisition and loss of nationality (article 10). Special reference is made to the acceleration of pending naturalisation applications and the naturalisation of persons with E.D.T.O (articles 22,23) (Christopoulos 2012, pp.225-262; Christopoulos, 2013a).

The provisions engaging public administration to justified decisions and deadlines enabling the judicial review of naturalisation decisions were consensually accepted and did not draw the attention of MPs during the parliamentary debate. The automatic acquisition of ius soli citizenship by the 3rd generation of immigrants was also largely accepted and absent from the debate. Nonetheless a heated controversy burst out on the requirements for ius soli citizenship for the 2nd generation of immigrants. The requirements for the attribution of voting rights to TCN on the election of local government (articles 14-17) were also questioned despite being an issue endorsed by all political parties (Anagnostou 2011, pp.18-28). The political consensus that characterised the development of the GNC had been dissolved. The opposing camps were organised around the antagonistic policy frames that see citizenship as the crown of the integration process or as the means for an effective integration. The controversy continued after the adoption and implementation of the law when the Ministerial Decision specifying the requirements for ius soli citizenship on the basis of birth or education in the country[200] and the circular concerning voting rights[201] were brought before the court as incompatible with the Constitution. The following sections illustrate the arguments employed in the parliament and the Council of state.

6.3.2. The parliamentary debate

After being compromised to a certain extent, Law 3838/2010[202] was introduced to the parliamentary floor by the government of the socialist party. The rapporteur of PASOK, referring to immigrants as potential Greek citizens mentioned:

> These people work, pay their insurance and tax burdens, make progress, acquire property, have families, children that attend the Greek school. Greece has become

[200] Decision of the Minister of the Interior, Decentralisation and E-Government, no. F130181/23198/10, 20 April 2010, Enumeration of documents accompanying the declaration and application of registration to the civil registers, on the basis of birth or education in Greece, pursuant to the provisions of article 1A of the GNC, Government Gazette no.562, 30 April 2010.

[201] Ministry of the Interior, Decentralisation and E-Government, Circular no.24592/6, on the exercise of the right to vote and be elected by homogenis and lawfully residing TCN for the appointment of the elected authorities of first grade local government, 7 May 2010.

[202] Law 3838/2010, Contemporary provisions on the Greek nationality and the political participation of homogenis and immigrants who are lawful residents, Government Gazette no.49/A', 24 March 2010.

> their home, the country that became their second homeland for many of them and the first and only homeland for their children. And that constitutes a reality beyond the obligation to respect fundamental rules of international law and human rights (Ioannis Diantidis, Greek Parliament Proceedings 2010a, p.4721).

The Minister of the Interior, Decentralisation and E-Government, Ioannis Ragkousis, stated that the draft law addresses three issues: minors of second generation, a modern naturalisation code compatible with the rule of law and the political participation of economic immigrants and homogenis (Greek Parliament Proceedings 2010b, pp.4773-4776). He added that a major, central element in the rationale of this draft law is that Greek citizens are not only persons of Greek descent but also persons who acquire the status and, referring to the naturalisation process, he explained that:

> Today, because we should also mention this, the vague criterion of morality and personality is applied. For the first time the present draft law establishes as requirement the knowledge of the Greek language, knowledge examined with written exams to ensure full transparency. The examination of knowledge of the system of government and of course of Greek political history is also written (Ioannis Ragkousis, Ibid., p.4775).

The law was voted in the parliament by PASOK and SYN. The communist party abstained for voting while ND and LAOS voted against. The final provisions of the 2010 nationality law were adopted after a three-day debate in the parliament.

The nationalist party opposed strongly the draft law, which undermined the national integrity of the country, and demanded a referendum (Greek Parliament Proceedings 2010a). The position of the party was in favour of the entitlement to the Greek nationality exclusively on the basis of descent. Among the requirements that aliens should fulfil for the acquisition of the status is the endorsement of the Greek positions in national issues. Furthermore,

> Nationality must be attributed to allogenis aliens in a modest manner and exceptionally [,]it should not lead to the distortion of the character of the nation-state, neither nurture the rise of minority issues, especially from neighbouring or Islamic countries (Georgios Karatzaferis, Greek Parliament Proceedings 2010b, p.4777).

MP's of LAOS raised abjections concerning the constitutionality of the provisions attributing electoral rights to TCN on the reasoning that political participation and appointment to public services is reserved for Greek citizens. All parties however rejected this assertion. The representatives of PASOK and SYN invoked the differentiation made in the Constitution about the organisation and conduct of local and national elections. The former additionally referred to the guidelines of the CoE with regard to the enfranchisement of EU citizens and the EU Stockholm programme (Petros Efthimiou, Greek Parliament Proceedings 2010a, p.4723). Representatives of KKE

stressed the need for the conduction of a genuinely ideological debate. Representatives of ND contended that the government's choice raises political instead of constitutional issues (Ibid., pp.4720-4725). According to the spokesman of the conservative party, the government will be judged and criticised in emerging political issues, "matters that have to do with the protection of the nation" (Konstantinos Tsavaras, Ibid.,p.4724).

The reaction of the far-right failed to mobilise negatively public opinion. As Anagnostou (2011) remarks, one of the reasons might be the lack of support to the cause by the Orthodox Church who was under the leadership of a more moderate archbishop (p.27). The mobilisation of LAOS, though, was effective enough to compel ND, the main opposition party, to adopt a restrictive stance. Under the leadership of Antonis Samaras,[203] a politician well-known for his conservative and nationalist views since the controversy over Macedonia, the conservative party prioritised the political inclusion of co-ethnics and the protection of Greek minorities in neighbouring countries as a means for the implementation of foreign policy and the protection of strategic interests. Samaras linked the issue of nationality with problems on border control. Pursuant to his opinion,

> The draft law … makes use of the automatic attribution of nationality to children of immigrants with a lawful status, as a means to speed up the naturalisation of lawful ones and the regularisation of illegal ones (Antonis Samaras, Greek Parliament Proceedings 2010b, p.4772).

The proposed reform would render Greece susceptible to irregular immigration, as previous governments have failed to effectively protect the borders of the country and would breed racism and xenophobia. He further engaged that "ND will abolish this law" (Ibid.)

The main objection of the opposition party as regards the 2nd generation of immigrants, is that "someone must first become Greek substantially and be attributed the Greek nationality afterwards" (Athanasios Nakos, Greek Parliament Proceedings 2010a). The acquisition of nationality is seen as the crown of social integration instead of the first step of the process. The existing requirements of the 2004 GNC in combination with the possibility for TCN to acquire the long-term residence permit were considered adequate for the achievement of the goal of integration. ND supported that no change is required since their legal status is currently secured throughout their childhood and they have the option to acquire the Greek nationality the moment they

[203] He was nominated the leadership of the party in 2009.

reach adulthood. According to the rapporteur of the party "… if they do not wish for this -for we respect the option right- they choose the status of long-term resident" (Ibid., pp.4725-4726).

The party's position was that the attribution of nationality to minor immigrants must be detached from the parents' legal status since as parents of nationals they will be entitled to 5year residence permit without fulfilling any obligations. Nationality must be acquired after a responsible choice of the interested person and the nurturing of national conscience through the attention of the nine-year mandatory Greek education.

> The decision on the attribution of nationality is not an individual right of the foreigner that the state must uphold … It is a prerogative of the state. It is about the determination of values, recognition of culture and a promise to continue a historic path (Athanasios Nakos, Greek Parliament Proceedings 2010a, p.4726).

The government is therefore considered to encourage the inclusion to the polity of persons who lack an effective bond with the country, for mere electoral reasons, without providing for the means of their effective integration and without defending the substance of Greekness or the status of homogenis (Ibid.; Greek Parliament Proceedings 2010b; Greek Parliament Proceedings 2010c).

Political parties of the left supported the view that the draft law is not liberal enough and more inclusive provisions should be adopted. Both SYN and KKE disagreed with the limitations to the electoral rights of TCN. (Greek Parliament Proceedings 2010a; Greek Parliament Proceedings 2010b; Greek Parliament Proceedings 2010c). With respect to the ius soli citizenship, the communist party expressed the view that all immigrant minors should register to the civil registers and have equal rights with Greek minors irrespective of the status of the parents; citizenship however must be acquired optionally in adulthood to ensure that the genuine will of the person concerned is expressed. KKE abstained the vote for the reason that a large number of economic immigrants are excluded from the provisions of the draft law (Greek Parliament Proceedings 2010a, pp.4766-4768). The coalition of the left supported the view that the acquisition of nationality is a critical element of the process of integration and highlighted the divergence of the existing policy from European standards on immigrants' political rights and naturalisation. According to the rapporteur of SYN:

> […] As Coalition of the Radical Left, we have been constantly demanding and with persistent questions the integration of jus loci in jus sanguinis and basically the gradual entrenchment of the law of society. Biotic ties independently of the

> law of blood or soli are those that should lead to the attribution of citizenship rights (Nicolaos Tsoukalis, Ibid., p.4732).

The party advocated the detachment of the parents' residence status from the acquisition of nationality of the child who has attended school in Greece and the abolishment of the requirement of legal residence for persons who have attended the Greek school and apply for the Greek nationality in adulthood (Ibid., pp.4731-4733).

Lastly, during the debate on the articles of the draft law one MP of PASOK, commended and raised her objection to the term ´successful´ that accompanies the requirement of attainment of six grades of education. "I do not believe that we are looking for excellent students in any case" (Sofia Sakorafa, Greek Parliament Proceedings 2010c, p.4893). Moreover, commenting on the naturalisation process and the requirement of 'sufficient' knowledge of the language, Sakorafa called attention to the fact that "the state has not been able to guarantee Greek language courses in adult educational centres, while it (knowledge of the language) constitutes a requirement for the issuing of the long-term resident permit" (Ibid.).

6.4. The decision of the Council of State

The parliamentary debate revealed that the conflict on the qualifications that define a genuine and effective bond between individuals and the Greek state remained intractable even after the adoption of Law 3838/2010. As Christopoulos (2012) remarks "the main cause of reactions is the ideological magnitude of the reform, not its actual political content" (p.226). While the number of immigrants registered to electoral registers as well as naturalisations remains particularly low one year after the implementation of the law and the turmoil of the financial crisis dominates the political agenda, citizenship policy turns into the bone of contention (Ibid., pp.225-227; Triandafyllidou 2015; Anagnostou 2016).

During the negotiations for the formation of the provisional grand coalition government that took place in 2011, the presidents of ND and later of LAOS declared that the abolition of the nationality law constitutes one of the basic conditions of their participation. An unexpected intervention though was going to move the debate in a different venue. In 2011, Law 3838/2010 was contested for violating the sovereignty of Greek people. The requirements for the acquisition of citizenship by the second

generation of immigrants[204] and the attribution of electoral rights[205] were challenged as incompatible with the Greek Constitution. The case was brought before the Council of State, the supreme administrative court, by a Greek citizen related with the party of GD, while four cultural-patriotic organisations jointed the second phase. Against the complain and in favour of the law intervened an Albanian citizen enrolled in the electoral registry under the provisions of the respective law and the HLHR ((Anagnostou 2016; Papapadoleon 2014, pp.211-215; Anagnostou 2011, p.28). The Council of State engages in constitutional review in the context of specific cases and, given the fact the judiciary is the only institution capable of counterbalancing the executive that enjoys parliamentary majority, recourse to judicial review of government legislation constitutes a strategic means of political opposition (Anagnostou 2016, pp.602-604).

6.4.1. The decision of the 4th chamber of the Council of State

In the preliminary judgement, the 4th Chamber of the Council of State held that pursuant to the Greek Constitution the state policy is based on the will of the people but should serve the interest of the nation, which comprises from the past and future generations (Council of State, Section D, Decision No. 350/2011, paragraph 9). In concord to the Greek constitution, the Greek legislation on nationality has been based to the stable criterion of descent from 1827 to 2004 in order to safeguard the ethnic homogeneity of state. "Precisely because of the importance of the institution of nationality" the access of homogenis aliens to the Greek nationality has always been favourably regulated (paragraph 10). The articles concerning the 1,5 and 2nd generation of immigrants are incompatible with the Greek Constitution, as they do not provide a process for the confirmation of the existence of genuine bond by the administrative authorities. Furthermore, because of the consecutive regularisations of immigrants without the necessary papers, the requirement of legal residence is elusive. The current requirements undermine the 'ethnic character of the Greek state' and do not ensure substantial integration in the Greek society. In addition, in case that the Greek

[204] Decision of the Minister of the Interior, Decentralisation and E-Government, no. F130181/23198/10, 20 April 2010, Enumeration of documents accompanying the declaration and application of registration to the civil registers, on the basis of birth or education in Greece, pursuant to the provisions of article 1A of the GNC, Government Gazette no.562, 30 April 2010.

[205]Ministry of the Interior, Decentralisation and E-Government, Circular no.24592/6, on the exercise of the right to vote and be elected by homogenis and lawfully residing TCN for the appointment of the elected authorities of first grade local government, 7 May 2010.

nationality is attributed without a personalised assessment "it should constitute the final stage of the integration process and not a means for the integration of foreigners that have not, thus far, acquired the Greek conscience in the Greek society" (paragraph 14). As regards the electoral rights of TCN the 4th Chamber held that the right to vote and be elected for public authority is reserved to the Greek citizens and cannot be extended unless the Constitution is amended (paragraph 25). The case was eventually referred to the Court's Plenary.

The preliminary decision was heavily criticised by experts of constitutional law and political theorists. It was characterised as a political and ideological interference that violates the division of powers and undermines the legislative authority (Anagnostou 2016). The main argument is that the Council of State is not responsible to decide for an issue that falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the sovereign people represented by the parliament (HLHR 2013a; Manitakis 2011; Tsakirakis 2011; Christopoulos 2011; Papaioannou 2013). The reasoning of the Council of State is in strike contrast with previous case-law, which exempts acts of state authorities from checks on constitutionality on the grounds that nationality law falls within the sphere of the country's general policy. At the same time, it diverges significantly not only from the reasoning of extensive minorities or exceptional cases of the Council of State, that uphold more inclusive interpretations of citizenship on the grounds of biotic ties, but also from international case law (Tsolakou 2011; Christopoulos 2012; Tsapogas 2008; Takis 2012, pp.130-132).

With respect to the right to vote in the local elections, it is argued that regional government does not interfere with the design of the general national policy. Moreover, the right to vote is not only a public service reserved for Greek citizens but also a fundamental political right associated with the democratic principle and universal suffrage (Papastylianos 2010). The consideration of the nation and national sovereignty as normative concepts separate and superior of the concepts of the people and popular sovereignty further degrades the principle of democratic accountability (Tsakirakis 2011; Tsolakou 2011). The use of the vague and subjective term of the nation in the Greek Constitution is associated with the obligation of the state to protect expatriates and cannot be linked with checks on the constitutionality of every law and administrative act (HLHR 2013a). As regards the interpretation that places the ius sanguinis principle at the core of national sovereignty, it was argued that the court proceeded to a selective and unilaterally fragmented review of the Greek legislation.

Besides the inclusive and evolutionary ideas that transpire the Greek Constitution and legislation, the theoretical debate on the vagueness of the criterion of national consciousness that opened on the occasion of the abolition of article 19 of GNC was also ignored (Tsolakou 2011; Papastergiou 2011).

6.4.2. The decision of the Plenary Session

The Court's Plenary also ruled that the provisions of Law 3838/2010 were not in compliance with the Constitution. Nonetheless, the Plenary did not follow the reasoning of the preliminary decision on the exclusiveness of ius sanguinis principle dismissing the constraint of an individualized judgment in adulthood for the 2nd generation of immigrants. The judgment on the electoral rights focused on competing interpretations regarding the scope of amendment of article 102(2) concerning the election of local authorities that took place during the constitutional reform in 2001. The Plenary also held that political participation should signify the end of a dynamic process of social and economic integration; political rights should be attributed with the acquisition of nationality not as an intermediate point in the process of integration (Council of State, Plenary, Decision 460/2013, paragraphs 11-14). As to the acquisition of ius soli citizenship the Plenary deemed that the relevant provisions should combine typical requirements with substantive requirements to ensure the presence of genuine link with the Greek society (Ibid. paragraphs 5-10).

To support this argument article 1(3) of the Greek Constitution was invoked: "All powers derive from the People and exist for the People and the Nation; they shall be exercised as specified by the Constitution." The Court ruled that the determination of the composition of the people, meaning the electorate, falls exclusively within the jurisdiction of the legislative body. The parliament regulates the qualifications of the Greek citizen in relation to specific political, economic and social conditions, however, domestic constitutional restrictions and principles must be taken into account. According to the Decision:

> The legislator cannot ignore the fact that the Greek state was established and remains an ethnic state with specific history and that this character is guaranteed by the definition of article 1(3) of the current Constitution... As a consequence, the minimum condition and limitation for the relevant regulations for the attribution of the Greek nationality is the presence of a genuine bond of the alien with the Greek state and society, which are not spineless organisms and short term creations but represent an enduring entity with specific cultural background, a community with relatively stable morals and traditions, a common language with a long tradition, elements that are transported from generation to generation with

> the assistance of smaller social units (family) and organised state units (education) (Council of State, Plenary, Decision 460/2013, paragraph 6).

Article 4(3) of the Greek Constitution was invoked as a counter argument in the opinion of the minority: "Greek citizens are persons who possess the qualifications specified by law." Therefore, as concerns the regulation of citizenship acquisition, in contrast to loss, the legislative body is not subject to constraints.

> The attribution of nationality is predominantly a political decision associated with the objectives of public interest as well as the instruments appropriate for the advancement of these objectives, which can alter "corresponding to domestic and international conditions that form the general policy of the country as well as the prevailing political preferences of the parliament (Council of State, Plenary, Decision 460/2013, paragraph 6).

According to this perspective, the recognition and attribution of citizenship is interpreted as the legal bond between an individual and the state and not the nation. The parliament is free to determine which objective criteria are evaluated as sufficient to ascertain a substantive bond with society and fulfil the goal the proper integration of the 2nd generation of immigrants to the economic and societal life and hence to social cohesion and peace. The role of this Court is limited to examine whether the substantive choices of the legislative body with respect to objectives of the public interest and the instruments employed to achieve these objectives are objective and rational (Ibid.).

The second argument of the Court was related to the issue of immigration management. The massive regularisations of immigrants, that took place exceptionally under past immigration laws, aimed at the registration of TCN that are settled in the country and the regularisation of their status. This goal however has not been achieved. A great number of immigrants have regularised their status without fulfilling the ordinary requirements of lawful residence and employment. Therefore, the precise period as well as the legitimacy of their residence cannot be confirmed by the administration (Council of State, Plenary, Decision 460/2013, paragraphs 7-8). Consequently, as regards citizenship attribution at birth, the typical requirement of lawful residence of parents for a period of 5 years cannot establish their substantive integration to the society and their intention of permanent stay in the country since it is not combined with substantive requirements indicative of their successful integration. Furthermore, it is precarious since it addresses to aliens that entered the country contrary to the law and their status was regularised afterwards. As for citizenship attribution after birth, the requirement of 6 years of education does not guarantee the desired integration as it is not combined with a substantive relation of parents with the

country. Moreover, the required length of schooling is less than the period of 9 years of education which is the obligatory period of education under the constitution. The transition provision of article 24 of the respective Law is also based to the requirement of six-year education without providing for the settlement of the interested person in the country from his/her graduation to the submission of the application (paragraphs 9-10).

The opposing opinion, 13 out of 32 members, stressed that the provisions are addressed to minors and not their parents. The relevant requirement concerns only the period of lawful residence of the parents, under the respective immigration laws, which has never been contested by the Council of State. Moreover, pursuant to article 16(2) of the Constitution, the development of the national conscience and the formation of responsible citizens is part of the mission of public education. According to the explanatory report of Law 3838/2010 the acquisition of nationality before adulthood contributes to the formation of responsible future citizens and serves more effectively the goal of social and national cohesion. The view that sees the choice of the legislator as inappropriate cannot be objectively maintained since comparable provisions are implemented various EU member-states with similar constitutional traditions. As regards the years of necessary education, it is noted that the obligation of nine years of education concerns both nationals and aliens (Council of State, Plenary, Decision 460/2013, paragraph 10).

6.5. The 2015 reform of the Greek nationality code: engineering consensus

In July of 2012, the conservative party of ND won the election and formed a coalition government with PASOK and DIMAR. The extreme right-wing party of LAOS lost completely its electoral power after participating to the provisional grand coalition government of 2011. The neo-Nazi organisation of Golden Down, in contrast, did enter the parliament bringing racist discourse to the centre of the political stage. The Prime-Minister, Antonis Samaras, also engaged in an anti-immigrant discourse proclaiming the fight of irregular immigration and the amendment of the recently introduced nationality Law (Christopoulos 2017; Triandafyllidou 2015; Triandafyllidou 2014b). The actual policy followed, though, was considerable compromised compared to the pre-elections political rhetoric.

The views of the left-wing coalition parties constituted a significant constraint. Interestingly though, the main reactions came from DIMAR and not from PASOK; the

party that introduced the reform was inclined to accept a compromised solution on citizenship policy (Syrigos 2016; Papaioannou 2012). One year later, the Deputy Minister of the Interior, Charabos Athanasiou, responding to the question of an MP of DIMAR, stated that "Law 3838 is not useless, as presented mainly by journalists. The law has flaws, [and] these flaws were communicated to the Council of State and assessed" (Greek Parliament Proceedings 2013, p.12650). He continued that:

> In accordance to the Constitution therefore, since the provision was deemed unconstitutional, it would be easy for the Ministry to introduce a provision saying "the provision was deemed unconstitutional. Article 1A', because that is what the issue is about, of Law 3838 is abolished" and this ends here … However, is this right? This is the easy solution. There is a social problem. Children are born. We need to confront this. We are a welfare state and we must consider these issues too (Ibid.p.12651).

Underlying the intention of the Ministry to introduce the criteria of adulthood and Greek education, he added:

> In a few words, we change the philosophy of the law. We do not provide the Greek nationality to someone in the hope of integrating in the Greek society, but we provide it to someone who has been integrated … as a reward for this effort (Ibid. p.12652)

In 2014, the Code of Immigration and Social Integration[206] is adopted, codifying the provisions of entry and stay and integrating the EU directives 2011/98/EU and 2014/36/EU on residence permits. The law ameliorates in a great extent the previous regime of short residence permits and provides for a renewable residence permit of five years' duration for the 2nd generation of immigrants residing legally in Greece. The provision is addressed to adults, provided that are born in Greece or have concluded six grades of education in a Greek school before the age of 21 and are lawfully settled in the country (Law 4251/2014, article 108).[207] In the explanatory report the 2nd generation of immigrants is described as a group with solid ties with the country that needs special and favourable treatment. The protective framework established aims to safeguard their lawful state and facilitate their social integration (Explanatory Report to Law 4251/2014, p.2).[208] During the parliamentary debate on the immigration law the issue of ius soli citizenship was raised by MPs of DIMAR and SIRIZA. MPs of Golden Dawn and ANELL also submitted their versions of amendments in the parliament (Greek

[206] Law 4251/2014, Code of Immigration and Social Integration and other provisions, Government Gazette no.80/A, 1 April 2014.
[207] See also Decision of the State Secretary of the Interior no.130181/25843, Inclusion of the residence permit for the second generation to the titles of permanent residence accepted for the naturalisation of aliens, Government Gazette no.3142/2014, 21 November 2014.
[208] Secondary amendments to issues of nationality were provided in article 142.

Parliament Proceedings 2014). The government, however, elaborated the issue on a separate draft law which never reached the floor of the parliament due to the political conjuncture of incapability to elect the new President of the Republic that lead to the dissolution of the parliament and elections (Syrigos 2016).

The Greek Ombudsman expressed concern on the suspension of the amendment of the GNC as well as reservation for the possible substitution of ius soli citizenship by the residence permit for the 2nd generation of immigrants and recommended the introduction of additional requirements for the acquisition of nationality on the basis of birth or studies in the country (The Greek Ombudsman 2014, p.99). In the annual report it is stated that nationality law should not be understood as a part of immigration policy but as an issue concerning primarily the political community (The Greek Ombudsman 2013b, pp.66-67, 131). The HLHR also highlighted the fact that the provision on the residence permit does not contribute to a substantial policy for integration unless it is supplemented by the option of citizenship acquisition (HLHR 2014, p.3). Furthermore, after the intervention of the Council of State, the HLHR elaborated a number of alternative amendments of article 1A with the constructive input of the coordinators of the EUDO citizenship network and initiated a new round of consultation with left-wing political parties, DIMAR, SYRIZA and PASOK to a certain extent, aiming to keep the issue on the agenda. Part of this strategy was the launching of an awareness campaign and the organisation of public debates. As Christopoulos notes:

> In anticipation of the elections, we had to think of smart techniques to inject social aspiration and political interest on the issue of citizenship to the political party that would take charge of the administration of the country (Christopoulos 2015).

6.5.1. Diversification of knowledge and scope of reflection

The preparation of the reform started right after the appointment of the coalition government headed by ND. A few months later though, in November of 2012, the decision of the Council of State leaks to the public press. On this occasion, the Prime Minister orders the design of a new draft law and the Deputy Minister of the Interior proceeds to the suspension of the administrative procedures concerning the acquisition of the Greek nationality under articles 1A and 24 of Law 3838/2010. The processes concerned are the submission of applications, the examination of documents, the publication of decisions, oath taking and registration to the civil registers.[209] This

[209] Deputy Minister of the Interior, Charalabos Athanasiou, Circular no. 965, Suspension of the procedure granting nationality under articles 1A and 24, 15 November 2012.

initiative was based on the thought that it would prevent the submission of more appeals and would protect the status of persons who had already acquired the Greek nationality (Syrigos 2016). Yet, it was heavily criticised by the left-wing coalition partners and the main opposition party, SYRIZA, for violating the rule of law. The local administration further reacted to the decision.

The Mayor of Athens, in his letter to the Secretary General of Regional Administration, states that judicial decisions cannot have legal effects before their official publication. Furthermore, the decision of the Deputy Minister was not published online in accordance with the respective regulations on decisions and acts of the government. Therefore, the Municipality of Athens will continue to follow the existing procedure (TO VIMA 2012; Aftodioikisi 2012a). This initiative was supported by five more mayors who submitted a common statement in the conference of the Central Union of Municipalities of Greece which underlined the fact that the abstention from the established procedures would be justified only in case of deficit in the applications, failure to fulfil the requirements provided by the law or doubts on the validity of the submitted documents. As a result, denial to receive an application or to register a person who possesses the Greek nationality to the civil registers would infringe the Code of Administrative Procedure and the regulations concerning civil registers (Aftodioikisi 2012b). The HLHR and the Greek Ombudsman also expressed their disagreement (HLHR 2013b; The Greek Ombudsman 2013c). The latter stated that:

> The municipalities and local governments ought to implement the existing nationality law until its amendment or replacement by another provision. Any divergence would be unlawful and even would amount to offense while no circular would offer immunity (Ibid.).

Eventually, the decision of the Council of State if officially published in February 2013.

The decision of the Council of State guided the policy-making process. According to Angelos Syrigos, the Secretary General responsible for the design of the draft law and expert in international relations and foreign policy, the major concern of the executive was the controversy regarding the principles of ius sanguinis and ius soli. There was no actual interest neither in the immigration code nor in the rest of the provisions of the citizenship code due to fear of the political cost. Exceptions were the former Minister of the Interior, Prokopis Pavlopoulos, who had drafted the 2004 GNC and was motivated by scientific concern as well as Takis Mpaltakos, the Cabinet Secretary well known for his extreme-right views, who was interested in the results of

naturalisation decisions. Despite scepticism on the attribution of nationality, the proposed provisions were endorsed by ND members as they were presented from a pragmatic perspective, detached from the ideological and political dimension of the issue (Syrigos 2016). As stated in the explanatory report of the draft law, the amendment aims at regulating the issues that emerged after the judgment of the Council of State as well as practical issues concerning the mode of operation of public services.[210]

The draft law[211] comprises of provisions concerning the acquisition of nationality by the 2nd generation of immigrants, amendments to the naturalisation requirements and procedure as well as the acquisition of nationality by homogenis settled abroad (unpublished document, article 5). The objective of the Ministry was to complement the typical requirement of residence with the substantive requirement of education as well as to disengage the acquisition of nationality from the status of the parents and link it with the prerequisite of the legal capacity of the applicant, enacted at the age of eighteen. Adult aliens lawfully settled in Greece acquire the Greek nationality by declaration and application in the respective local government provided that one of the following requirements are fulfilled: the successful attendance of nine years of education in a Greek school; the attendance of six years of secondary education in a Geek school; the possession of a baccalaureate of a Greek school and the successful accomplishment of studies in a Department of a Greek University or Technical Institution (article 5(1),(2)). The years of education were determined in relation to difficulty and demands of each educational level and constitute the confirmation of the actual integration of the interested person to the Greek society (Explanatory Report to the Draft Law).

To eliminate the delay in the naturalisation procedure the option of a written test is added as an alternative to the oral interview. For the same reason the possibility of

[210] Explanatory Report to the Draft Law "Transposition in the Greek legal order of the Directives 2011/98/EU on the joint process of submission of application by TCN for the acquisition of a common permit for residence and work in the territory of a member-state and on the common set of rights for working persons from third countries who are lawful residents in a member-state, and 2014/36/EU on the requirements of entry and sojourn of TCN for temporary employment, arrangement of issues of nationality and other provisions."

[211] Draft Law "Transposition of the Directives 2011/98/EU on the joint process of submission of application by TCN for the acquisition of a common permit for residence and work in the territory of a member-state and on the common set of rights for working persons from third countries who are lawful residents in a member-state, and 2014/36/EU on the requirements of entry and sojourn of TCN for temporary employment, arrangement of issues of nationality and other provisions", unpublished document.

applicants to submit complaints to the nationality Council, in cases of negative opinions of the Naturalisation Committee, is abolished and the submission of a new naturalisation application becomes possible after two years from the previous application instead of one. Homogenis aliens are excluded from the interview during the naturalisation procedure (Draft Law, article 5(3-7)). Additionally, the procedure for the naturalisation of homogenis settled abroad is outlined anew and the list of necessary documents is harmonised with the documents required for the naturalisation of TCN. Homogenis from the former Soviet Union are equated with homogenis settled abroad and acquire the Greek nationality with the same procedure (article 5(8)). The process of nationality acquisition by homogenis from the former Soviet Union settled in Greece after the implementation of law 2910/2010 as well as by family members of persons who acquired the Greek nationality under the provisions of Law 2130/1993 is also regulated to solve the problems created by their residence status (article 5(11) and Explanatory Report to the Draft Law).

The Greek Ombudsman had already highlighted the problems in the procedure of naturalisation and definition of nationality of homogenis as well as the acquisition of nationality by declaration in a special report submitted to the Ministry (The Greek Ombudsman 2012a, pp.7-10). However, only the recommendations concerning the naturalisation of homogenis from the former USSR are reflected in the draft law. The Secretary General considered that the Reports of the Greek Ombudsman are no objective enough to be taken into account during the drafting of the law:

> There is a group of people who ideologically situate themselves in the principle of ius soli. This group is also in the Greek Ombudsman, it is a quite specific group, Christopoulos, Tsapogas and Takis coming from the Ombudsman. It is a very specific group that dominates the debate …. and transports in Greece political issues which are raised abroad … We need to overcome ideological disagreements; the problem is not solved by granting citizenship to children born in Greece because only few of them were actually born here (Syrigos 2016).

The Ministry, however, consulted experts of nationality law and private international law. The experience on practical problems and the feedback provided by high officials of the Nationality Division was also deemed particularly instructive for the Secretary General (Syrigos 2016). The Ministry further consulted the National Committee for Human Rights which stated that the restriction of the capacity of minors to contract legal transactions is not correlated with the acquisition of nationality which denotes a bond between the individual and the state. References to specific age limits should therefore be omitted from the draft law. The Committee concluded that the

respective provisions hinder the achievement of the main goal of the law, that is the facilitation and shielding of social integration of children born or raised in the country as their status is not differentiated from immigrants who arrived as adolescents or adults. As regards the abolition of the possibility to submit complaints on the opinion of the Naturalisation Committee, it is held that the delay on the examination of complaints by the Nationality Council constitutes a reason for the reform of the organisational structure of the respective administrative body instead of a reason for the restriction of the rights of applicants (NCHR 2014).

Despite the lack of consultation, the contribution of human rights advisory bodies in rationalising and softening extreme views is recognised. The law proposal provides for the establishment of a Committee for the elaboration of the GNC that will unify and simplify existing provisions balancing national interest with constitutional principles. The Committee is chaired by the Secretary General of Population and Social Cohesion and, besides administrative actors, its members comprise of one expert of the Legal Counsel of State, two professors of public international law, one scientific expert of the Greek Ombudsman and one representative of the National Committee of Human Rights (Draft Law, article 6). According to Syrigos (2016), while contradictory views can always be expressed in the parliament, such a committee can submit its scientific opinion and provide for a final solution to this enduring political controversy.

6.5.2. The process of reframing and the emergent dominant frame

The advent of SYRIZA in power was marked by new declarations on the reform of the GNC. The coalition with the right-wing party of ANELL hindered but did not prevented this process. The polarisation induced by developments in the financial crisis had significantly reduced the interest of political actors and the media to engage in additional controversies (Christopoulos 2017). The Ministry of the Interior is reorganised, and Dimitris Christopoulos, the Greek national expert of the EUDO citizenship research network and former president of the HLHR, becomes the counsellor of the Deputy Minister for Immigration Policy. The goal of policy-making was the design of an enduring law based on the short experience of the implementation of Law 3838/2010 and the widest possible political consensus (Christopoulos 2015; Greek Parliament Proceedings, 2015a, pp.3689-3691). The draft law is discussed in public consultation (http://www.opengov.gr/ypes/?p=2634, last accessed 27.2.18) and the respective committees. The list of participants in the parliamentary committee is the

longest of all the previous committees engaged in the design of nationality legislation. Besides the active involvement of public administration and representatives the local government, the list comprised of the deputy Ombudsman for Human rights and the Deputy Ombudsman for Children's Rights, one representative from the HLHR, representatives from the Forum of Immigrants, the Forum of Refugees as well as various NGOs and Albanian, African and Afghan immigrants' associations (Standing Committee of Public Administration, Public Order and Justice-Standing Committee of Production and Commerce 2015).

In the first place, article 1A of the GNC is harmonised with the decision of the Council of State. The Greek nationality is not attributed at birth; it is acquired with declaration and application on the grounds of birth and education in Greece. The requirements for children born in Greece are the enrolment and attendance of the first class of a Greek primary school, continuous and lawful five-year residence of one parent before birth and lawful residence of both parents at the time of declaration. The residence permits that fulfil the requirements are explicitly mentioned in the article. In case that the child is born before the completion of the five-year residence period, the requirement for the parent's residence before the declaration becomes ten years.[212] In the second place, the views expressed by the independent authorities, the civil society and the political parties were considered. Recognising the progress in the conservatives' understanding of social integration (Christopoulos 2015), the provision concerning children raised in the country is maintained, without restrictions on the age of the applicant though. Underaged aliens settled permanently and lawfully in Greece are entitled to acquire the Greek nationality on the grounds of the successful attendance of a Greek school. The required level of education is defined in nine years or six years of secondary education (GNC, article 1B(1)). The provision concerning persons who possess a baccalaureate of a Greek school and have accomplished their studies in a Department of a Greek University or technical institution is also maintained (GNC, article 1B(2).

[212] Law 4332/2015, "Amendments of the provisions of the GNC- Transposition in the Greek legal order of the Directives 2011/98/EU on the joint process of submission of application by TCN for the acquisition of a common permit for residence and work in the territory of a member-state and on the common set of rights for working persons from third countries who are lawful residents in a member-state, and 2014/36/EU on the requirements of entry and sojourn of TCN for temporary employment and other provisions", Government Gazette no.76, 9 June 2015, article 1, amending GNC article 1A and adding article 1B.

Moreover, after persistent consultations with left-wing and centre-left parties, the fundamental policy frame of Law 3838/2010 was preserved. According to the explanatory report, the provision of article 1A aims at

> ensuring the prosperous development and integration of persons born or raised in Greece. The normative and political foundation is the effective enlargement of democracy which presupposes the self-determination of the boundaries of the 'people', the political community; eventually, the determination of 'who we are' … The Greek nation is a community of descent, under article 1, paragraph 1 of the GNC which establishes the law of descent as the technique for the acquisition of the Greek nationality. However, it is also a nation of selection and conscience. It constructs bonds of solidarity among its members on the basis of the common sense of belonging, irrespective of peoples' origin (Explanatory Report to Law 4332/2015, p.1).

The goal of article 1A is twofold: first, the affirmation that the Greek nationality is acquired by a person whose biotic needs, interests and plans for the future are linked with the country. This is confirmed by the parents' permanent residence in the country and the registration of the child in the Greek school. Second, the acquisition of nationality by 2nd generation of immigrants at an early age and particularly the first years of a person's life, as the moment he/she joins for the first time an administrative unit of the state, namely the school, are considered decisive for the formulation of his/her social and therefore national identity (Ibid., p.2).

A transitional provision offers the opportunity to adults who fulfil the requirements of article 1B, concerning the acquisition of nationality on the grounds of participation to the educational system, to submit an application within three years from the publication of the law. Their applications as well as pending application submitted under the law 3838/2010 are examined in priority (Law 4332/2015, article 2). As Christopoulos remarks:

> Despite the fact that Law 4332/2015 seems more restrictive that the Law 3838/2010, its scope practically addresses a wider category of persons … by virtue of the transitional provision which was added during the debate in the Parliament that gives priority to the examination of applications of persons which are settled in Greece for years and are now adults … This debate is not irrelevant to current historical circumstances … Reality has exceeded political disagreements on the proper age for nationality acquisition. After 25 years of being a destination country, the backlog of persons concerned restricts severely the actual effect of policy change (Christopoulos 2015).

During the parliamentary debate, all political parties, with the exception of GD, admitted the urgent social need for a durable solution in the regulation of nationality acquisition and acknowledged the positive direction of the law. The MP of the extreme-right party characterised the draft law detrimental for the country:

> The Greek state, the Greek nation is for us probably the only one within Europe and the Balkans comprising by an ethnically homogeneous population … [T]here are no secessionist movements in Greece and, additionally, the overwhelming majority of us are Orthodox Christians (Ioannis Lagos, Greek Parliament Proceedings 2015a, pp.3714-3715).

Law 4332/2015 was voted by SYRIZA, PASOK, POTAMI[213] and KKE. ND and ANNEL insisted in the acquisition of nationality in adulthood (Ibid.; Greek Parliament Proceedings 2015b; Greek Parliament Proceedings 2015c Greek Parliament Proceedings 2015d; Greek Parliament Proceedings 2015e).

The Deputy Minister for Immigration Policy, Anastasia Christodoulopoulou, stated that the provisions of the draft law do not represent the ideological position of the party but reflect a realistic and durable approach (Greek Parliament Proceedings 2015a, p.3689). The debate that took place in 2010 was deemed fruitless since it ignored the social need for the regulation of the status of children of immigrants and

> actually, created two camps on the basis of ideological issues, who is with the law of descent and who with the law of place of birth, what do we mean by the word 'nation' and what do we mean with the word 'body politic' (Anastasia Christodoulopoulou, Ibid., p.3690).

The spokesman of the socialist party declared:

> It is a great achievement that today we do not discuss whether minors and young persons of the second generation should acquire the Greek nationality. We basically discuss when they will acquire it. Society is not alarmed. Extreme voices of 2010 are not heard. More and more (people) accept the reality of the second generation (Georgios Arvanitidis, PASOK, Ibid., p.3707).

Arguments against the acquisition of nationality at the age of six, on the basis of birth and education, were shared among the conservative and the patriotic party. They concerned mainly school dropouts and the possibility that the family leaves the country. A more humanitarian approach was followed though. According to the spokesman of ANNEL, the party participating in the coalition government, the attribution of nationality to immigrant's children constitutes a necessity but equal treatment is not achieved through processes without content (Nicolaos Mavragiannis, Greek Parliament Proceedings 2015a, p.3704). "Nationality is not a lever of pressure or 'oppression' for the formulation of national consciousness. National consiousness … must be developed voluntarily" (Ibid., p.3705).

The rapporteur of ND, condemned the association of the attribution of nationality with requirements to be fulfilled by the parents instead of the minors. From this point of view, neither the child's will nor his or her potential for integration can be

[213] A newly formed party of the centre that entered the parliament in 2015.

deduced by requirement of birth and registration. Reffering to Muslims, he stated that they intentionally drop out of school and added: "by precluding the possibility and the obligation of fulfillment of the nine-year mandatory education, we actually support their ghettoisation which is a deliberate choice of their parents" (Georgios Georgadas, Greek Parliament Proceedings 2015a, p.3697).

Yet, Chalalabos Athanasiou, MP of ND and former Deputy Minister of the Interior, brought to discussion the provision on homogenis of the former USSR included in the draft law prepared by the preceding government and asked:

> Why we cannot attribute nationality to those who have Greek blood and a process in the consular authorities or elsewhere is required? I cannot understand. In fact, we ascribe nationality to a child of aliens who will be born in Greece and not to our homogenis. I do not want to mention that these children … are potential voters. However, our homogenis, since most of them are settled here, would also be potential voters. I cannot understand why you have an interest to the one case and not the other (Greek Parliament Proceedings 2015a, p.3735).

6.6. A restrictive backlash or the dissolution of the dominant paradigm?

The analysis of the Greek case confirms the hypothesis on the domestic sources of policy change and the dominance of centre-left and left-wing political forces in reforms concerning the integration of TCN. Both liberalising reforms in 2010 and 2015 were initiated by left-wing parties, PASOK and SYRIZA. Right-wing parties recognised the need for policy change but opposed to the idea of nationality as a means of integration. Furthermore, Howard's hypothesis on the restrictive effects of the presence of the far-right is partly established. The mobilisation of anti-immigrant views by the extreme-right did not actually hindered the adoption of the law 3838/2010; yet, it instigated the intervention of the Council of State (Anagnostou 2011; Anagnostou 2016; Triandafyllidou 2014b; Triandafyllidou 2015). The decision of the Court also deviates, to a certain extent, from the theory that sees domestic courts and private venues as factors facilitating liberalising change (Ibid.). The provisions regarding voting rights and the 2nd generation of immigrants were compromised; however, the law was not irrevocably reversed. Human rights experts involved with the design of reform proposals argue that the backlash on the 2nd generation citizenship and voting rights is of secondary importance; the most significant change that took place with the 2010 reform was the rationalisation of the administrative process for the acquisition and loss of citizenship and its harmonisation with the rule of law (Takis 2016; Christopoulos 2015).

From this perspective, the main problem of the Greek citizenship regime was not the restrictive content of provisions but the arbitrariness characterising the administrative procedure under which these provisions are implemented. The restrictiveness of citizenship policy concerned predominantly TCN; the policy regulating the inclusion of homogenis has been continuously renegotiated formulating a regime characterised by heterogeneous procedures and conflicting decisions. Entrenched in this policy paradigm are not only historically defined political expediencies linked with issues of national security but also an excessive ideological attachment to an ideal citizenship model of the past, reinforced through the selective reproduction of knowledge claims depicting Greece as an ethnically homogeneous emigration country, ignoring social reality. According to this narrative, citizenship policy is associated with inclusion to the Greek nation, understood as an ethnic community, instead of participation to the political community. Framed as a nationally sensitive issue, the question of citizenship policy design takes place with regulatory acts away from the public view and the goal of policies is not reflected in the GNC. At the same time, as a decision falling exclusively within the jurisdiction of the sovereign state, the administration enjoys an exceptional discretion to legitimately reject or ignore naturalisation applications without revealing the reasons to the persons concerned (Christopoulos 2012, pp.196-199, 224; Anagnostou 2011).

Undoubtedly, the decision on the acquisition of nationality encompasses the element of a political decision that expresses the "dominant volition of the state" (Takis 2012, p.116). In the policy paradigm that has historically defined the GNC, the unlimited expression of state sovereignty and the element of volition is understood as the absolute discretion of the executive power to render individual judgments on individual cases regarding the fulfilment of the general and vague requirements of the law. According to an opposing interpretation the expression of state sovereignty is understood as popular sovereignty, the unlimited expression of the general will of the people on a specific historical moment. The scope of state discretion concerns the definition of the concrete legal requirements for nationality acquisition by the legislative power. This political decision reflects both the understanding of the nation and public interest. The latter frame is increasingly invoked by the research community. The former is invoked by far-right and nationalistic segments of society but is mainly is reproduced by anti-democratic structures of power that have been developed within the state (Ibid., pp.114-120).

In the Greek political history, authoritarian ideas have been endorsed and continuously reproduced not only by extreme-right parties but also by a large part of the mainstream political discourse (Christopoulos 2014a, p.29; Kousouris 2014). The notion of the 'deep state' is used to denote:

> The existence of power mechanisms which are politically oriented towards excessive conservatism … [The deep state] acts- usually, but not always- in secret, in relative autonomy from the official state authority. It is reproduced by making use of the stagnation and concession of the official mechanism. Despite the fact that the deep state is not, by definition, illegitimate it often resorts to practices dismantling the rule of law (Christopoulos 2014b, Preamble, p.10).[214]

Driven by the ideological beliefs of its representatives, the deep state prefers to escape accountability and deliberation (Ibid., Preable, p.10).

Even though the rationalisation of the naturalisation procedure and the reduction of the residence period was overshadowed in the public debate by reactions on the introduction of ius soli, the enactment of deadlines and mandatory justification of naturalisation decisions remains crucial for two reasons: first, by subjecting naturalisation decisions to judicial review the scope of the right to fair trial is extended for first time in the area of nationality law;[215] second, citizenship policy is eventually transformed from an issue of non-decision-making to a public policy issue (Christopoulos 2012, pp.230-237). According to Christopoulos:

> The main question, therefore, is not simply about the transfer of an argument from the backstage to the public sphere … [It is about] the construction of an argument which, while being public, can withstand exposure to public criticism and judicial accountability (Ibid., p.235).

The breakthrough of the reform, therefore, was the introduction of the question of nationality itself in the political agenda and the overt definition of the qualifications of the Greek citizens by the sovereign people, the body politic (Ibid., pp.228-230).

Since the 1990s, the Greek citizenship policy has been formulated on the basis of a firm cross-party consensus. Reforms on nationality law, whether in the direction of re-ethnicization, such as the facilitation of naturalisation of co-ethnics, or in the direction of de-ethnicization, such as the abolition of article 19 on the loss of citizenship, as well as lost chances for frame reflection, such as the codification of 2004, were based predominantly on similar political interests, common cultural

[214] Such mechanisms are detected in the Greek police, the judiciary system, the Greek army and the Church of Greece.

[215] The provision for a personalised interview as an alternative to a written test is maintained for mere pragmatism concerning the characteristics of both the immigrant population and the administration (Christopoulos 2012, p.259).

understandings and common perceptions of foreign policy strategies (Anagnostou 2011). The Greek courts also tended, from time to time, to reinforce the policy monopoly by reproducing dominant nationalistic and racist perceptions (Christopoulos 2014a, p.20; Papapadoleon 2014). The public consultation and discussion that opened in 2010 is seen as a critical juncture as "it moved the debate beyond the differentiated and discriminatory treatment of homogenis and allogenis to the issue of immigrants' long-term integration in the country" (Anagnostou 2011, p.26). This change in the definition of the issue turned citizenship policy from an issue of non-decision-making into an intractable conflict illuminating not only the divergence of the position of political elites (Ibid., Triandafyllidou 2014a; Triandafyllidou 2014b) but also the implicit conflict of knowledge that has taken place during the last decade.

During the political controversy that emerged, the exclusive jurisdiction of the sovereign people, the body politic, to determine the qualifications of the Greek citizen and correspondingly the content of national identity was contested by two opposing policy frames. The first is the view that sees the idea of the nation as superior to constitutional order and understands social cohesion as the outcome of the formation of a homogeneous cultural community on the basis of common descent, religion and ethnic characteristics. Proponents of this perspective, found among the conservative right-wing political spectrum but also the 4th chamber of the Council of State, support the exclusive application of the principle of descent, since nationality law constitutes the institutional mechanism that guarantees the reproduction of the national distinctiveness through time. The inclusion to the community of persons that distort these ethnic characteristics takes place only exceptionally and is determined by the executive and the affiliated state mechanisms of national security. The second view emanates from a radical view of democratic equality and rejects distinctions between nationals and aliens. Endorsed predominantly by the communist party but also by left-wing MPs, this view claims equal social and political rights for all persons who are permanently settled and whose interests are affected from political decisions. Such an entitlement is not subject to a political judgement but is derived from the Greek Constitution and international human rights law (Takis 2012, pp.118-122).

However, the controversy that emerged was disproportionately more intense than the actual impact of the change in policy. The designers of 2010 law gave more emphasis to the ideological rupture with the previous policy paradigm instead of the capacity and willingness of the public administration to materialise the policy goal

(Christopoulos 2012, p.226; Christopoulos 2015). Notwithstanding the political will to recognise the institutional role of the state in social integration, Andreas Takis states that administrative authorities raised severe objections to the law, and particularly to the opportunity to make complaints against the Naturalisation Committee, in every step of the policy-making process. Officials in the Ministries of the Interior, of Foreign Affairs, of Public Order and National Defence, irrespective of political orientation, constitute an inextricable part of the policy monopoly that frames issues of national policy and identity as the core of the Greek polity (Takis 2016). Parts of the public administration and especially the police are considered to be part of what has been described as the deep state (Christopoulos 2014b).

The ineffective implementation of the law, that spells out the strong resistance of public administration, has been documented in the reports of the Greek Ombudsman. The implementation of Law 3838/2010 generated a rise in the cases concerning nationality acquisition. According to the report of 2012:

> Integration in the Greek society constitutes, both for foreigners and persons who just acquired the Greek nationality, a troublesome procedure, as the administration is not familiar with the recognition of equal rights, [not] even with those [rights] that are long-established in the law (The Greek Ombudsman 2012b, p.82).

The acquisition of nationality by declaration on the basis of birth or studies in the country is marked by undue delay that exceeds the period of one year. Besides the inadequacy of personnel, the cause of the problem is detected in administrative practice. Following the guidelines of circular 8/2010,[216] administrative authorities demand the resubmission of the required residence permit before issuing the decision on the acquisition of nationality. However, according to articles 1A(6) and 24(1) of Law 3838/2010, the decision of the administration is an act ascertaining that the interested person fulfilled the requirements at the time the application was submitted (Ibid., pp.83-84; The Greek Ombudsman 2012a, pp.7-8).

A second source of delay is the lack of organisation and overlap of responsibilities among the authorities involved. Police authorities are involved in the process of nationality acquisition by providing an assessment concerning reservations and convictions related to public order (GNC article 7). The practice followed by police authorities, though, is the re-examination of all the typical requirements, such as the legality of residence or risks for national security, causing an unjustified extension of

[216] Ministry of the Interior, Decentralisation and E-Government, Circular no.F.130181/29365/8, Amendment of the GNC, 28 May 2010.

the process. According to the law, an omission to submit the assessment on time should not hamper the issuing of the decision. In practice however, decentralised authorities tend to suspend the procedure (The Greek Ombudsman 2011, pp.90-91). The practice to confirm the fulfilment of requirements that have already been assessed by different services takes place also during the procedure for the issuing of passports (The Greek Ombudsman 2012b, pp.95-96; The Greek Ombudsman 2008, pp.47-48).

The perception established among police authorities regarding discretion and demarcation of their competence as well as the mistrust towards the rest of the administrative services constitutes a legacy of past migration management. Since the end of the Cold war, the Greek police has been responsible for the management of immigration flows from the Balkan states to Greece. In the absence of a framework for immigration policy and given that Law 1975/1991 did not provide for a legitimate path of entry in the country nor for the appropriate training of police units involved, police authorities employed violence, repression and deportation to restrain the incoming flows and preserve the myth of a homogeneous cultural community. As a result, a mentality of authoritarianism, impunity and lack of accountability among police services has been nurtured and well-preserved until nowadays along with the entrenchment of racist ideology (Christopoulos 2014c, pp.116-122).

The naturalisation procedure is not free of delay either. Besides problems concerning the prioritisation of applications and shortage of personnel, attention is drawn to the inappropriate training of the Naturalisation Committees, resulting in deviating levels of difficulty of the interview assessment (The Greek Ombudsman 2012b, pp.84-85; The Greek Ombudsman 2014, pp.92-93). According to the experts involved in the drafting of 2010 and 2015 laws, the differences in the practices of different regions are still enormous. The main problem is detected in the regions of eastern Attica and central Macedonia or eastern Aegean (Takis 2016; Christopoulos 2015). The public administration needs additional personnel and training that will contribute to the change of mindset and the adoption of common practices. The establishment of the Committee for the Codification of the Greek Nationality Law, founded by Law 4332/2015 (article 4), is a first step towards this direction. The scrutiny of justifications rejecting naturalisation applications by the central administration may further contribute to the process of learning. Yet, this is something to be seen in the coming years (Christopoulos 2015; Christopoulos 2017).

A typical example of inadequate reasoning of decisions rejecting naturalisation applications is mentioned in the Greek Ombudsman's Report of 2015. The case concerned a decision of the Naturalisation Committee rejecting the application of a citizen of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia on basis of her ideological stance against the historical narrative on the Greek nation, instead of the objective assessment of her knowledge on fundamental moments of the Greek history and culture. Furthermore, the interest of the applicant to public issues and the intention of involvement in public action was assessed as a negative element of the application. The Division of Civil Status of Central Macedonia considered that the decision did not infringe the provisions of Law 4342/2015 and that no possibility for corrective action by the Division was provided by the law; the case therefore was taken to the Nationality Council. While the judgement of the Nationality Council of the Ministry of the Interior was pending, the Greek Ombudsman called the Ministry to issue exhaustive guidelines to the Committees in order to render the examination of the applicant's integration more objective (The Greek Ombudsman 2015, pp.80-81). Pointing to the circular of the Ministry of the Interior,[217] the Greek Ombudsman asserted that to ascertain the legal requirements of integration, the Naturalisation Committee is authorised "to take into account only knowledge and familiarity with fundamental historical and cultural standards of the Greek Republic and not necessarily agreement with those" (Ibid., p.80)

On these grounds, the effects of extreme-right parties in the GNC reform should not be overestimated. Economic hardship, the growing mistrust towards state institutions and political parties, the democratic deficit that emerged during the years of the financial crisis and the mismanagement of immigration were factors that favoured the diffusion of the extreme-right ideology of LAOS and GD. Both parties set immigration on the political agenda, spread xenophobic discourse and triggered the backlash in a radical policy form. Nonetheless, the party of LAOS is not represented in the parliament since 2012 while GD, facing a trial on the accusation of forming a criminal organisation since 2013, can hardly affect political outcomes. The main compromise of the effects of the law took place after the decision of the Council of State to accept the complaint and deliver an opinion on the issue as well as during the actual implementation of the law by the administration. The effects of the political

[217] Ministry of the Interior, Decentralisation and E-Government, Circular no. F130181/39910/10/13, Fulfilment of substantial requirements in the naturalisation process, 2 August 2010.

outcome of the reform were further undermined by mechanisms of power aiming to circumvent political accountability in the virtue of national security.

Nevertheless, democratic values and liberal constraints are equally entrenched in the Greek political culture. The intervention of the Council of State induced a process of frame reflection on both sides of the political conflict (Anagnostou 2016). Five years after the debate was launched, the controversy has taken the form of a political disagreement on the level of policy instruments, demarcated by a general agreement that persons of non-Greek origin with biotic links with the country will become Greeks at some point of their lives (Christopoulos 2015). The content of the idea of the nation is defined pragmatically by the provisions of nationality code. Despite the persistence of nationalistic arguments, the monopoly reproducing the idea of an ethnically homogeneous nation has been irreversibly eroded. The institutionalised administrative practice that permitted unlimited discretion to state authorities has been deemed illegitimate (Takis 2016). For a critical redefinition of the Greek nation as a national political community, though, the redefinition of content of the term homogenis is necessary. As Takis remarks:

> Any entitlement based on the status of homogenis should be associated with a historically established political entity of the Greek nation. Tracing our origin back to specific entities to justify the current institutional state practice regarding homogenis would be revealing for the political self-consciousness as the people of the Greek republic (Takis 2012, p.121).

Past clientelist practices of fast-track naturalisations of homogenis have been consensually rejected by political actors. As regards the naturalisation of homogenis settled abroad, the consular report should provide information for knowledge of the Greek language, the political system and social developments, the applicant's attachment to the country and national consciousness.[218] Moreover, the Ministry of the Interior has provided detailed guidelines on the process of naturalisation of homogenis of Albania holding EDTO. The status of homogenis is derived from the possession of EDTO.[219] The status of residence and employment of homogenis with Albanian nationality is further regulated by a number of Ministerial Decisions. After application to the regional Divisions of Aliens of police authorities they are provided with residence

[218] Ministry of the Interior, Circular no. F. 141886/14339/34, Guidelines on the naturalisation process of homogenis settled abroad- article 10 of Law 3284/2004, 4 June 2014.
[219] Ministry of the Interior, Circular no. F.130181/34405/52, Clarifications on the naturalisation process of homogenis aliens holding EDTO-article 23 of Law 3838/2010, 13 December 2012.

and work permit of uniform format according to EU standards[220] and EDTO. In case of doubt a special committee for homogenis provides a reasoned opinion.[221] In 2015, an exhaustive list of the regions where the Greek minority has been traditionally established is provided, excluding persons coming from the respective areas from the requirement of consular visa.[222]

In 2012, Special Committees are established in the regions of Attica, Epirus, Western Macedonia and Macedonia-Trace, responsible for the assessment of the of the status of homogenis coming from countries of the former USSR and apply for the Greek nationality or EDTO.[223] In the respective circular it is stated that "Greek descent and Greek national consciousness are the elements that constitute the determinant factors and comprise the concept of the status of homogenis."[224] The interview examines elements concerning both the ties of the applicant with the Greek communities in the country of origin and the degree of integration in the Greek society. The circular clarifies that knowledge of "the Greek or the Pontian or Roman or Turkish language (Turkish speaking of Tsalka)" is an indication for the former, while at the same time highlights that knowledge of the Greek language is of the utmost importance for the ascertainment of the latter. The process of issuing of EDTO has also being regulated with a Ministerial Decision. Spouses and children are also entitled to EDTO as well as residence and work permits of uniform format.[225]

However, distinctive issues for reconsideration are found in the reports of the Greek Ombudsman. The need to clarify the requirements and the procedure for the

[220] In accordance to the EU Council Regulation (EC) No 1030/2002 of 13 June laying down a uniform format for residence permits of third-country nationals.

[221] Joint Ministerial Decision of the Ministers of the Interior, Decentralisation and E-Government, Finance, Foreign Affairs, Employment and Social Insurance, Civil Protection, no.4000/3/10-ξz, Residence and employment of homogenis of Albania, Government Gazette no.665/B, 17 May 2010; Joint Ministerial Decision of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Finance, National Defence, Interior, Employment, Social Insurance and Providence and Public order and Civil Protection, no.4000/3/10-pb', Residence and employment of homogenis of Albania, Government Gazette no.3043/B, 15 November 2012.

[222] Joint Ministerial Decision of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Finance, National Defence, Interior, Employment, Social Insurance and Providence, Public Order and Civil Protection, no.4000/3/10-Pγ', amendment of provisions of joint ministerial decision no.4000/3/10-pb', 14.11.2012 "Residence and employment of homogenis of Albania" (B'3044), article 2(1)

[223] The members of the committees were appointed by the Decision no.F.79174/25219 of Ministry of the Interior, Government Gazette no.457/Y.O.DD, 28 September 2012.

[224] Ministry of the Interior, Circular no.F.79174/9029/7, Establishment and role of the Committees of article 15 of Law 3284/2004. Fulfilment of the substantial requirements in the naturalisation procedure on the basis of Law 2790/2000, as amended and in force, 17 April 2013.

[225] Joint Ministerial Decision of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Finance, National Defence, Interior, Employment, Social Insurance and Providence, Public Order and Civil Protection, no. 4000/3/84, Government Gazette no.53/B, 16 January 2014.

definition of nationality, the acquisition of nationality on the basis of descend, and the codification of cases has been repeatedly highlighted. The legal framework regulating the naturalisation of homogenis from the former USSR should also be redefined to narrow the discretion of administrative authorities in the assessment of the status. The examination of the respective applications by the regular Naturalisation Committees is highly recommended. Furthermore, the independent authority urges the Ministry to resolve enduring problems by withdrawing circulars and orders of contested legitimacy, concerning persons with specific linguistic and cultural characteristics who were attributed the status of allogenis. The attribution of the Greek nationality to stateless Muslims settled in Greece as well as the attribution of ius soli citizenship to stateless Armenians settled in Greece since 1922 and persons who come from Albania and Turkey before 1990 (with OTA passports) is also recommended (The Greek Ombudsman 2012a, pp.7-8; The Greek Ombudsman 2012b, p.85; The Greek Ombudsman 2015, p.81). Particular reference is also made to issues of equal treatment between naturalised citizens and citizens of Greek origin such as access to public services, such as the judiciary system and the army (Ibid., pp.102-103).[226] Furthermore, the question of ratification of the European Convention on Nationality and the UN Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, a recommendation repeatedly made by the NCHR is pending (NCHR 2003, p.3; NCHR 2010, p.5; NCHR 2014, p.7).

6.7. The effects of Europeanisation

The hypothesis attributing causal effects to changes in knowledge production and the relations between research and policy-making is also confirmed. This thesis argues that changes in the views of left-wing political actors and political will to proceed to rupture with practices of the past and institutional path dependencies is the main factor for policy change in the Greek case. Yet, it is not considered sufficient for paradigmatic change unless complemented with the political will to institutionalise relations with the research community.

Under conditions of politicisation of migrant integration, the rise of knowledge conflicts undermined the legitimacy of the existing policy paradigm. Developments in

[226] The additional requirements after naturalisation concerning non-ethnic Greek citizens pursuant to the Code of Lawyers is abolished with Law 4194/2013, Code of Lawyers, Government Gazette no,208/A, 27 September 2013. Moreover, pursuant to the Decision no. 3317/2014 of the Council of State, discrimination on the basis of the Greek genos with respect to access to military schools are contrary to the Constitutional provision on equal treatment.

domestic research production since the middle of the 1990s facilitated the introduction of citizenship policy change in the political agenda. The involvement of experts of the Greek Ombudsman and the HLHR in the policy-making process in 2010 constituted a critical juncture in citizenship policy development signifying a shift in core ideas and instruments of citizenship policy. The effects of scientific knowledge in policy development are further evident after the intervention of the Council of State in keeping the issue on the political agenda, searching for alternative but equally inclusive policy choices and in engineering consensus among political parties on the goal of policy change. Moreover, scientific knowledge was essential for raising awareness on the practices of public administration (and the police) that undermine the effective implementation of law. However, the examination of the degree of learning in administrative authorities as well as the dynamics of the Committee for the Codification of the Greek Nationality Law, established in 2015, exceeds the scope of this study and might constitute the object of further research.

In this context, the liberalising effects of European soft framing mechanisms are evident not only in changes in the discourse of political actors and state agents but also in developments regarding domestic knowledge production and changes in the research-policy nexus. The involvement of academics and human rights experts in European research networks contributed significantly to domestic theoretical and methodological developments of research and the identification of inconsistencies in the existing policy paradigm. The National Migration Dialogue, conducted in the context of the EMD, provided a venue for the diffusion of a critically reflective approach to citizenship policy. In 2010, scientific knowledge produced at European level was predominantly utilised instrumentally in policy design but also symbolically to provide legitimation to predetermined policy choices. After the intervention of the court, scientific knowledge and especially exchange of ideas within the framework of the EUDO citizenship network, provided substantiation to the choices of policy design. Furthermore, soft framing mechanisms provided the means employed by experts to distance themselves from the ideological controversy and engage political actors in a process of critical frame reflection and learning, restricting political controversy to disagreement on the level of policy instruments and permitting, eventually, the achievement of a new political consensus on the goal of citizenship policy. These inferences are further elaborated in the next chapter.

6.8. Conclusion

This chapter examined the legislatives reforms that took place in 2010 and 2015. The approximation of migrant integration experts and political actors takes place in the pre-election period of 2009 and close cooperation is inaugurated with the government of PASOK and the appointment of the former Deputy Ombudsman for Human Rights as the Secretary General for Immigration Policy. Law 3838/2010 aims to establish a civic approach on immigrant integration and extend access to citizenship to TCN with biotic bonds with the country. Based on the Greek Ombudsman's policy recommendations and drawing from the principles enshrined in the Greek Constitution, ideas expressed in the Revolutionary Constitutions but also the 2008 European Pact on Immigration and Asylum and policies implemented in European states, ius soli citizenship and voting rights for TCN are introduced. Moreover, the naturalisation procedure is facilitated and rationalised in conformity to the rule of law. Existing provisions concerning homogenis are maintained after opposition of political actors.

The publication and adoption of the law triggered an intense controversy over two competing understandings of the national community; one seeing the nation as a community of descent and access to citizenship as the result of integration and one seeing the nation as a civic political community and access to citizenship as a means of integration. The conflict between left and right-wing parties on the second generation of immigrants and the qualifications of the Greek citizen becomes intractable. The intervention of the Council of State and its ruling on voting rights and the requirements of ius soli citizenship for the 2nd generation is considered part of the strategic action of actors opposed to the new policy. Despite the compromising effects of the courts' decision, the presence of an extensive dissenting minority and criticism of the judgement coming from the academic community kept the issue of an inclusive reform on the political agenda. Although the government of ND did not introduce new provisions in the parliament, policy change was discussed by the executive and a draft-law attributing an entitlement to citizenship in adulthood irrespective of the parents' residence was designed.

The final provisions were introduced by the government of SYRIZA and comprise of amendments elaborated by the HLHR. A notable member of the HLHR and national expert in the EUDO citizenship network is appointed as consultant to the Minister of Immigration and searches to design a law that maintains the fundamental

frame of the recent reform, conform to the restrictions posed by the Council of State and achieve the widest possible consensus among political parties. Consultation with experts of the EUDO citizenship network provided ascertainment and substantiation to the policy choices. Law 4334/2015 incorporated certain provisions proposed by the conservative party attributing citizenship on the basis of socialisation and schooling but also provided for the acquisition of citizenship at a minor age conditional to the parents' residence status and schooling. It was voted with by all parties except the extreme right party of GD.

Concluding, the analysis spells out that in the Greek case correlations of power and interest-driven dynamics are the primary factor that accounts for policy continuity and change. The liberalisation of citizenship policy was an initiative of left-wing parties and the compromised outcome of the reform reflects path dependent asymmetries of power. Political will, however, was a factor sufficient for institutional but not paradigmatic change. Sufficiency of conditions for paradigmatic change seems to be accomplished after the changes in knowledge production, the structural changes in the relation between research and policy and the input of scientific knowledge in venues of policy-making.

7. Conclusion

7.1. Transnational research networks and domestic developments on citizenship policy

As stated in the introduction, the main research question of this thesis is whether soft framing processes of European integration can influence domestic developments in citizenship policy and how. The focus is on the influence of EU non-binding measures, such as the diffusion of guidelines for action included in the Common Basic Principles on Immigrant Integration and the Stockholm Programme, as well as the emergence of new venues of social interaction comprised of transnational state and non-state actors, such as the EMD. This study pays special attention to the domestic effects of new data, knowledge and ideas for action produced within the framework of the MIPEX and particularly the EUDO citizenship research network. Mobilisation of research by the EU, in the form of European research networks, can play an important role in the construction and diffusion of new narratives and encourage the critical theoretical development of migration research through explicit criticism to the analytical validity and intellectual coherence of national models of integration (Geddes 2005; Geddes & Achtnich 2015; Scholten & Verbeek 2015). This thesis asked whether such developments can have a similar effect in the area of citizenship policy and explored the results of evidence-based policy-making and consultation with non-state actors bearing scientific expertise in policy outcomes.

To elucidate the processes of interaction between transnational and domestic ideas and actors, and the dynamics in policy development and change, the recent reform in the Greek citizenship code has been analysed. The analysis of the Greek case shows that, although Europe was not the primary cause of policy change, soft framing mechanisms of European integration played a crucial role in the process of institutional change. New data and new theoretical models communicated in European research networks empowered policy entrepreneurs to set citizenship on the political agenda; mediate political conflict by influencing perceptions of problems and solutions; engage policy-makers in the process of learning; and eventually reach political consensus on a civic turn on immigrant integration.

7.2. Explaining the role of ideas in institutional change

Changes in the Greek immigration policy are predominantly attributed to domestic concerns and primacy of national politics. The impact of Europeanisation of

immigration policy has been limited; the transposition and implementation of EU Directives has been considered inadequate and ineffective, characterised by the need of continuous amelioration of the legislation. The deficit in "hard" Europeanisation is attributed to the Greek political culture, notably to the "national elites' resistance to ideas, policies or norms initially formulated and consolidated at the level of EU policy and politics" (Triandafyllidou 2014b, p.422). Lack of expertise in public administration and inadequate use of research is also considered one of the factors hindering the sound implementation of the EU Directives (Tsioukas 2010; Papatheodorou 2007; Pavlou 2007a; Pavlou, et al. 2005; Triandafyllidou 2009; Triandafyllidou 2014a; Gropas & Triandafyllidou 2009; Varouxi 2008; Georgarakis 2009).

Nevertheless, the "soft" influences of Europeanisation in framing citizenship policy are acknowledged in the Greek scholarship. Anagnostou (2005) illustrates the indirect effect of European norms and institutions that prepared the ground and created catalytic pressure for the abolition of article 19. She further describes the 2010 reform as the result of a gradual and incremental process stemming from the determination of PASOK to achieve convergence with European trends in immigration and nationality law (Anagnostou 2011). With respect to the 2010 reform, Triandafyllidou (2014b; 2014a) traces the effects of Europeanisation in changes in official political discourse from nationalist orientation towards views tolerant to diversity as well as in the references of spokespersons of PASOK and SYRIZA to European standards, employed during the parliamentary debate along with references to national history employed to legitimise their positions.

These studies stress the legitimatory use of European norms and standards in official discourse and the role of both social and political actors in promoting policy change. Yet, the effects of knowledge utilisation by non-state actors and particularly the role of expert organisations in mediating controversies and facilitating policy diffusion have not been scrutinised. The main argument of this thesis is that a close examination of the role of boundary organisations in encouraging frame reflection and rationalise policy design sheds light in different mechanisms of policy diffusion and offers a better explanation of the ultimate outcome of the reform. To establish the argument on the effects of transnational research networks to domestic policy developments two alternative but not mutually exclusive explanations of institutional change were examined: one attributing causal effects to changes in knowledge production and the relation between research and policy-making and the other

attributing causal effects to changes in government and the ideological orientation of the party in power.

The two hypotheses theorise different mechanisms and conditions of change. While the first considers the interaction between the policy image and policy venue as the main mechanism that explains stability and change of citizenship policy (Scholten & Timmermans 2010), the second considers the interaction between the inherited citizenship policy and party politics as the most prominent explanation (Howard 2009; Goodman 2012). In the first case, the mobilisation of research and expertise by the EU is expected to have an instrumental function through social interaction and learning (Geddes 2005; Geddes & Achtnich 2015; Scholten & Verbeek 2015; Scholten, et al. 2015c). The conditions relevant to social learning are uncertainty, the degree of tractability of the problem and the level of politicisation of the issue of interest (Ibid., Scholten, 2011a). In the second case, European soft framing mechanisms are expected to have a symbolic or legitimatory function. The incentives for policy change are associated with changes in domestic conditions and concerns (Checkel 2001a; Checkel 2001b; Vink 2005; Vink 2010; Maatsch 2011) Political competition is conditioned by assymetries of power, political opportunity structures and the degree of agenda-control (Honohan 2010; Faist & Triadafilopoulos 2006; Favell 2001).

7.3. The Greek policy paradigm

The empirical analysis involved the inductive formulation of the dominant Greek policy paradigm and the tracing of the process of its consolidation and demise. In this critical analysis of the Greek citizenship paradigm the focus is on power relations as well as on the relation between research and policy-making, the relevant venues of action and the actors participating in policy design and the decision-making procedure. To examine the presence or absence of the causal explanations linked with the effects of European integration four research sub-questions were answered with respect to the Greek case. The first two concerned the role of ideas in citizenship policy, the reasons for their entrenchment in collective identities and institutions and their effects in the development of policy and research. The latter two concerned the circumstances for the development of new ideas that can transform policy paradigms and the role of expert communities in the process of policy change.

7.3.1. Tracing the process of construction and reproduction …

Approaches drawing from historical institutionalism argue that historically rooted ideas endorsing definitions of belonging and taken-for-granted conceptions of nationhood, along with pre-existing institutions, limit legitimate and feasible options and the likelihood of fundamental transformations of nationality laws. Continuity of citizenship policies is accompanied by incremental, secondary changes which are contingent to party politics (Brubaker 1992; Howard 2009; Goodman 2012; Goodman 2014; Mouritsen 2012). Undeniably, the development of the Greek citizenship policy was framed on the basis of the idea of a homogeneous nation. Persons belonging to the Greek genos, identified with the term homogenis are distinguished from allogenis, aliens of non-Greek descent who naturalised as Greek citizens. The ideological construction of the legal statuses of homogenis and allogenis served as the interpretive framework of the concept of the Greek national identity. The narrative of the homogeneous Greek nation and the myth of an extensive national community defined by shared cultural characteristics has been shared among state institutions and reinforced by the long period of stability of the GNC. However, the conception of the Greek national community remained ill-defined as none of the laws defined the qualifications of the Greek citizen (Vogli 2007; Vogli 2017; Christopoulos 2012; Kitromilides 1989; Papastylianos 2013). This led to the paradoxical representation of citizens who are Greeks by descent but not considered to belong to the Greek nation and of individuals of non-Greek descent and foreign nationality who are considered ethnic Greeks (Papassiopi-Passia 2011, pp.36-45; Christopoulos 2004a, pp.99-103).

In practice, instead of limiting available options, the idea of ethnic homogeneity, constructed on the critical importance of national consciousness, has been flexible enough to include or exclude citizens according to the needs of the state. The limits of the concept of the Orthodox genos were constantly under negotiation with new interpretations, dependent on political circumstances at domestic or international level (Kostopoulos 2003; Baltsiotis, 2004b; Christopoulos 2012; Christopoulos 2006a; Tsioukas 2005). The period of democratisation did not constitute a juncture for reflection on the inconsistencies of the established citizenship policy. Derspite the fact that a new mode of nationality acquisition for descendants of Greeks is adopted, the nationality definition, the exact requirements and procedure are not stipulated by the law and remain ambiguous in practice (Grammenos 2003; Papassiopi-Passia 2011). In

this policy paradigm, the legal statuses of homogenis and allogenis, although vaguely defined, are powerful enough to provide for the privileged treatment of persons characterised as homogenis, as regards naturalisation, and the discriminative treatment of allogenis, with respect to the rights attributed after the acquisition of nationality but also the loss of the status of the Greek citizen. More importantly, the dynamics of these ideas into laws and practices are encountered in the absolute discretion of administrative authorities to decide who is going to be included to the citizenry and when.

The policy paradigm was reproduced during the 1990s when political elites are confronted with the problem of integration of a large number of co-ethnics and TCN that are settled in the country. The development of policy concerning homogenis is marked by discriminatory treatment and severe inconsistencies between the narrative on co-ethnics and institutional practice (Tsioukas 2005; Vogli & Mylonas 2009). At the same time, immigrants who are long-term residents remain excluded from the polity without official justification. According to the findings of this study, the politics of citizenship in Greece until 2004 and the adoption of the GNC escape political antagonism. The adoption of Law 3284/2004 on the codification of the GNC has also been a consensual procedure among political elites characterised by limited public debate and lack of profound reflection on the internal inconsistencies of the dominant policy paradigm. Only a small number of MPs, belonging to KKE and SYN, expressed their opposition to the exception of naturalisation decisions from justification and deadlines. However, left-wing parties opting for respect of the rule of law and human rights lack the necessary electoral power to induce policy change or set the inclusion of TCN to the polity in the political agenda. Citizenship is still conceived as a privilege of the state and not an entitlement of the individual (Christopoulos 2004a; Christopoulos 2012; Baltsiotis 2004a; Triandafyllidou 2010; Triandafyllidou & Gropas 2010).

Against this background, instrumentalist approaches that attribute policy continuity to power asymmetries and the mobilisation bias (Bleich 2003; Favell 2001) provide a better explanation for certain aspects of the dominant policy paradigm concerning Greek citizenship. On the one hand, the embeddedness of the idea of a homogeneous nation in the institution of citizenship contributed to the concealment of the presence of ethnically diverse population. One the other hand, the issue of nationality acquisition has been strongly related with issues considered nationally

sensitive affairs creating the conviction to the responsible authorities that it constitutes an issue that should be dealt with confidentially (Baltsiotis 2004a; Christopoulos 2012; Venturas 2009). As a result, throughout the 1990s and until the middle of the 2000s, policy design concerning the regulation of the status homogenis takes place in the Ministry of the Interior with the involvement of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and National Defence and decisions are predominantly implemented through joint ministerial decisions avoiding large-scale public debate or the participation of non-state actors in venues of policy design and decision-making. The parliamentary committees responsible for the elaboration of laws are the Standing Committee of Public Administration, Public Order and Justice and the Standing Committee of Expatriate Greeks but also the Standing Committee of National Defence and Foreign Affairs. Immigration from neighbouring countries is treated as threat to political stability and selective admission to citizenship, based on commitment to national ideals, is preserved for the sake of social cohesion and national security. No substantial initiative was taken for the institutionalisation of the long-term civic integration of TCN (Papassiopi-Passia 2006; Tsioukas 2010; Triandafyllidou 2010; Triandafyllidou 2009).

The liberalisation of nationality law was not accompanied by concrete demands for a new civic approach and change in the goals of policy but instead was hesitant and reluctant lacking tensions between proponents of the established status quo and modernisers. To the contrary, for alleged reasons of national sensitivity and national security, criticism to governmental choices by civil society or migration experts is kept outside the public debate and no channels of communication and consultation with non-governmental actors are provided (Pavlou 2007a; Pavlou, et al. 2005). Policy-making takes place in bureaucratic venues of limited participation and policy goals are formed in conformity to occasional political considerations constraining the chances for scientific input to problem solution and frame refection. While dictating a rupture with the past, social demands are strategically filtered by means of non-decisions and mobilisation bias restricting the range of problems and alternative solutions addressed, hindering the formulation of an ideologically coherent strategy for the future (Psimitis & Sevastakis 2002). As the parliamentary proceedings spell out, the preferences of political actors remain fixed. The dominant role of the state in the acquisition and loss of the Greek nationality constitutes a strategic choice of political elites rather than an unintended consequence of structural factors and political culture. This argument is

confirmed by further developments concerning the Europeanisation of immigration policy since 2005.

Accordingly, recommendations of human rights organisations or the Greek Ombudsman, are hardly taken in account. The lack of institutionalised relations with state institutions restricted opportunities to affect policy-making beyond theoretical critiques. A remarkable case was the abrogation of article 19 of the GNC on the deprivation of nationality by citizens of non-Greek ethnic origin. The input of experts of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that participated in venues of the CoE and OSCE dealing with the protection of minority rights was decisive for policy change. Nevertheless, as regards political actors, social learning on equality and non-discrimination was limited as the inclusive turn was justified on domestic concerns and changing geopolitical circumstances rather than respect for human rights principles (Anagnostou 2005). Governments refrained from ratifying the CoE Conventions on Nationality and on the Reduction of Statelessness.

7.3.2. …contestation and transformation

The sharp division of research and policy-making is reflected in the divergent views between administrative officials on the one hand and human rights experts and social stakeholders on the other regarding the goals and content as well as the implementation of integration policy. (Georgarakis 2009; Varouxi 2008; Tsikiridi 2009). Since the middle of the 1990s developments in academic research concerning migration and citizenship bring into focus the incosistencies of citizenship policy. The interest lies in the lack of a precise definition of the statuses of homogenis and allogenis as well as the goals and legitimacy of selective access to citizenship. Contestation of the established policy paradigm is based on the incompatibilities of provisions on discriminative treatment and discretionary naturalisation with the Greek Constitution and the ECN. The ineffective management of immigrant integration is another source of criticism. The consistency of the policy frame defining the dominant paradigm in official discourse with the institutionalised policy paradigm has also been the object of academic debate. The dominant elite narrative on ethnic homogeneity is challenged and the redefinition of the content of Greek nationality on the basis of common political and civil principles is advocated (Pavlou 2007b; Christopoulos 2006b). Besides theoretical critiques, an emerging advocacy network comprised by experts of the Greek Ombudsman, HLHR and KEMO organised meetings within the framework of EMD

where policy-oriented ideas were exchanged with non-governmental stakeholders and a limited number of political actors (HLHR-KEMO 2005b; HLHR-KEMO 2005a; Pavlou, et al. 2005; Pavlou 2009).

Notwithstanding the fact that the influence of this network was scarce in the debate for the adoption of 2005 immigration law, the law-proposal of the HLHR presented in 2009 managed to set citizenship policy reform on the political agenda and open the debate on the qualifications of the Greek citizen. Two opposing views were developed during and after the adoption of Law 3838/2010 revealing the dissolution of the existing policy monopoly and the intractability of the problem concerning the definition of the qualifications of the Greek citizen. One the one hand, the view that opposes attribution of citizenship on the basis of typical requirements and sees the Greek nation as a community of ethnic descend and the status of citizenship as the crowning of the integration process attributed in adulthood is supported by right-wing parties and the 4th Chamber of the Council of State. On the other hand, the view that sees the Greek nation as a civic community and the attribution of the status of citizenship as a means for integration attributed in minor age is supported by left-wing parties, human rights organisations and a considerable part of judges. The standards of the EU and the CoE on the integration of TCN were invoked in support of the later view (Takis 2012; Anagnostou 2011; Triandafyllidou 2014b; Triandafyllidou 2014b; Christopoulos 2017).

Law 3838/2010 signified a fundamental change in the goals of citizenship policy. Moreover, despite the compromises due to the limitation of the judgement of the Council of State and the goal of achieving an enduring political consensus, Law 4332/2015 constitutes a major inclusive turn of citizenship policy. In combination with the rationalisation of the naturalisation process adopted in 2010, a change in the Greek policy paradigm on citizenship has been concluded in 2015 since not only the instruments but also the goals of citizenship policy have been redesigned in conformity with the rule of law and domestic social reality. A new political consensus has been achieved regarding the content of the idea of the nation permitting the inclusion of TCN of non-Greek origin to the political national community. The principle of descent remains the dominant technique for the acquisition of nationality. The preservation of ethnic homogeneity, though, ceased to constitute a policy objective (Explanatory Report to law 4332/2015; Takis 2016; Christopoulos 2015).

Two developments were critical for the transformation of the Greek policy paradigm. First, a change in issue definition; citizenship policy was redefined from a nationally sensitive matter and an issue of non-decision to a problem of immigrant integration and consolidation of democracy whose solutions and policy goals are manifestly reflected in the GNC. The decision on nationality acquisition and loss does not represent the unlimited expression of state sovereignty but an expression of the general will of the people. Second, the dissolution of the existing policy monopoly, comprised by political actors and administrative authorities embracing and reproducing nationalistic ideas of ethnic homogeneity, that permitted the participation of a wider range of actors to policy-making venues and the consideration of alternative policy choices. The draft-laws of 2010 and 2015 were elaborated in the Standing Committee of Public Administration, Public Order and Justice with the participation of representatives of numerous immigration associations and human rights organisations. Against this background, besides the initiative for policy reform undertaken by left-wing political parties, the role of experts is considered decisive for the diversification of knowledge claims, the contestation of the existing policy paradigm with arguments supported by scientific knowledge and the eventual political outcome. Still, the lack of amendments regarding the privileged treatment of homogenis spells out the endurance of institutional path dependencies and the primacy of political considerations linked with preference in maintaining bonds with co-ethnics.

7.4. The Europeanisation of citizenship policy? Evidence from Greece

The results of the Greek case study confirm the hypothesis attributing the sources of liberalising citizenship policy change to domestic instead of European forces. The mismatches and inconsistencies between the existing policy paradigm and socio-demographic reality as well as the profound integration of long-term resident immigrant in the Greek society were the main factors dictating the reform of nationality law. The presence of centre-left or left-wing parties as a necessary condition for the facilitation of access to citizenship for TCN and their descendants is also confirmed, as reform initiatives in 2010 and 2015, were undertaken by PASOK and SYRIZA respectively. Nevertheless, it is not considered sufficient for the institutionalisation of policy change. The restrictive effects of opposition by the far-right are partly established in the Greek case; although mobilisation of anti-immigrant views was irrelevant for the adoption of the law, agents with nationalistic views strategically triggered the intervention of the

Council of State to block the implementation of the law. Even though fundamental changes regarding the naturalisation process remained unaffected, the courts' intervention severely restricted available policy choices for the inclusion of TCN to the political community. The sufficiency of conditions for a paradigmatic policy change is satisfied with the approximation of researchers and policy-makers and the institutionalisation of relations. The analysis of the Greek case confirms the hypothesis regarding the effects of changes in the interaction between specialised researchers and policy-makers in policy developments. Both political primacy and academic authority were therefore necessary for the inclusionary policy change and the liberalisation of the Greek nationality law.

One the one hand, the mandatory transposition of EU Directives on immigration policy created a need for experts to ensure their effective implementation and reluctantly opened channels of communication between researchers and policy-makers. On the other hand, domestic political dynamics associated with the reconfiguration of powers due to the financial crisis upgraded migration to the new source of political polarisation. The diversification of knowledge claims created a window of opportunity for the research community to challenge the main assumptions framing the dominant paradigm of citizenship policy. Changes in the structure of the research-policy nexus and the institutionalisation of relations between the two contributed to the diffusion of both theory and policy-oriented knowledge in the domestic political arena.

According to the findings of this study two non-governmental actors, the HLHR and the Greek Ombudsman played a crucial role as broker organisations enabling the process of social learning. The participation of members of these institutions in European research programmes and comparative projects, the EUDO citizenship and MIPEX respectively, further advanced domestic research and enforced strategic argumentation on the definition of problems and solutions. To challenge entrenched knowledge claims, set change of citizenship policy on the political agenda and achieve institutional change, three streams of knowledge where employed. The EU policy framework on immigrant integration and scientific knowledge produced at the European research network of EUDO citizenship; knowledge acquired through domestic experience with administrative practise and recommendations by the Greek Ombudsman; and elements of the Greek political history that have been deliberately disregarded in the official narrative on the Greek nation. The Greek case therefore confirms the assumption associating social interaction in venues of expertise at the

European level with changes in the production and the use of knowledge at the domestic level as well as with the processes of frame reflection and social learning.

Despite the lack of explicit references to European norms, such as the ECN, policy emulation from European countries has been an integral part of the design of both the 2010 law proposal and the draft law of ND. The cases employed in this process as well as the reasons for their employment, however, differ significantly; while the recent liberalising reforms in Germany and Portugal were used as guidelines in legal technicalities concerning the introduction of ius soli at birth (Takis 2016), the cases of Austria and Belgium were used to substantiate the centrality of education and knowledge of the language (Syrigos 2016). The mechanism of policy emulation therefore accounts for both inclusive and restrictive aspects of nationality law weakening the argument of liberal convergence.

To the contrary, participation of non-state actors in European research networks, such as MIPEX and particularly the EUDO citizenship network, and diffusion of ideas in domestic venues of policy-making had a decisive effect in inclusive policy development but also in the tractability of the political controversy and the reconciliation of conflicting policy frames. As the Greek national expert of the EUDO citizenship network remarks:

> In the first place, participation in EUDO, information on other countries' practices and exchange of ideas on best practices helped me realise the restrictiveness and arbitrariness of provisions of the 2004 GNC. In the second place, involvement in the network contributed in the definition of the goals of citizenship policy and in setting the political agenda. Political determination, evidence-based policy design and strict adherence to arguments formulated after profound research and reflection were the main elements responsible for the resolution of the conflict and the achievement of political consensus (Christopoulos 2015).

Nonetheless, the effects of European integration as regards the Greek case should not be overpraised. The contribution of expert knowledge, which had been developed independently from policy-making during the 1990s, has been decisive for the contestation of the established policy paradigm, the accentuation of the failures in policy implementation and the criticism in the backlash induced by the 4th Chamber of the Council of State. Yet, left-wing political parties were more receptive to social learning. Moreover, they were more inclined than the conservative to approximate experts and use scientific knowledge produced at the European level as an input in policy design. Firstly, the introduction of voting rights and ius soli citizenship in the reform of 2010 was a decision characterised by political primacy, attributed to

incremental changes in the ideological position of the socialist party of PASOK. Knowledge produced at the European level was used instrumentally in policy design but also symbolically to legitimate policy choices. Secondly, the 2015 reform that took place after the acquisition of power by the coalition of the left was also triggered by political considerations. After the controversy that emerged and the technical complexity of the issue of ius soli citizenship, the mobilisation of resources of expertise functioned as a means for the depoliticization of the issue and the achievement of consensus. Social interaction in the context of European networks provided substantiation to policy choices.

Still, the proposal for the creation of a scientific committee for the elaboration of the GNC by the conservative party of ND and the establishment of such a committee by SYRIZA in the last phase of the reform spells out the mutual recognition of the primacy of science over politics. The approximation of researchers and policy makers contributed to the dissolution of the established policy monopoly and the amplification of participants in venues of policy-making. Against this background, the process of European integration triggered changes in the structural setting defining the relationship between research and policy-making. These changes were implemented predominantly by the centre-left and left-wing political parties.

The involvement of domestic norm entrepreneurs in European research networks contributed in setting citizenship policy in the political agenda; the change of the definition of the problem of integration of TCN; and the reconceptualization of the dominant understating of nationhood through the process of frame reflection. Therefore, along with incremental changes in the ideological positions of political actors induced by the permanent nature of immigration and the socio-economic integration of long-term immigrant residents, policy change in the Greek citizenship policy was punctuated by a change in the research–policy nexus. Soft framing mechanisms of European integration facilitated domestic non-state actors with expertise in issues of citizenship to take advantage of this critical juncture and engage political actors in critical reflection and social learning resulting in paradigmatic citizenship policy change.

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